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ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME,

CHAPTER I. PAOK.

Os THE REDRESS OF PRIVATE WRONGS BY THE MERE ACT OF THE PARTIES 1-17

wrongs arc divisible into private wrongs and public wrongs, 2

private wrongs or civil injuries are an infringment or privation of the private

or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals 2

for their redress courts of justice are instituted, 2

the redress is effected, 1, by the mere act of the parties ; 2, by mere opera-

tion of law; 3, by suit or action in courts, 3

redress by the mere act of the parties is, 1, that from the act of the in-

jured party only; 2, that from the joint act of all the parties, 3

of the first sort are:

1. defence of one's self, and those who stand in the relation of hus-

band and wife, parent and child, master and servant, 3

2. recaption of goods wrongfully taken, or wife, child or servant

wrongfully detained, 4

3. entry on lands and tenements occupied by another without right, 5

4. abatement or removal of nuisance, 5

5. distress for rent or other duties, or of cattle damage feasant,.... 0

which is a taking of a personal chattel of the wrongdoer into

the custody of the party injured to procure satisfaction, 6

the things which may be distrained, 7

distress should be made by day except in case of damage feasant, 10
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and generally upon the premises, 11

and for the whole duty at once, 11

and must be reasonable in amount, 1'2

the property must be impounded, 12

replevin of the property 18

6. seizing of heriots, &c., 15

of the second sort are :

1. accord, which is a satisfaction agreed upon between the party in-

jured and the party injuring, 15

2. arbitration, which is where the parties submit the matters in dis-

pute to the judgment of arbitrators, sometimes adding an um-

pire ... 16

right to real property cannot be submitted 10

the submission may be made a rule of court 16

CHAPTER II.

Or REDRESS BT THE MERE OPERATION OP LAW, 18-21

redress by mere operation of law is by retainer and remitter, 18

retainer is where a creditor becomes execulor or administrator to his debtor,

in which case he may retain the amount of his own debt before paying

other debts of equal degree, 18

remitter is where one who has a good title to lands, &c., comes into possession

by a bad one, and is thereupon remitted to his ancient good title, which

protects his possession 19

but the new title must be cast upon him, not gained by his own act or folly, . 20

CHAPTER III.

OF COURTS IN GENERAL 22-29

redress of injuries in courts is effected by the co-operation of the act of the par-

ties and the act of the law, 22

Vii

viii ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

OF COURTS IN GENERAL —(continued.') PAO»-

where a party has a remedy by his own act, he has a remedy in court at his

option 22

a court is a place where justice is judicially administered, 23

the power to hold which is derived from the king, who, in contemplation of

law, is always present, 23

some courts are of record, whose acts and proceedings are enrolled for a per-

petual memorial and testimony 24

against the truth of which records nothing can be averred, 24

other courts are not of record, and have limited power, 25

in every court there are three constituent parts, the actor, the reus, and the

judex, 25

also in superior courts, attorneys and advocates, or counsel, 25

the advocates are either barristers or sergeants, 20

some of whom are king's counsel 27

they cannot maintain action for fees, 28

their privileges and responsibilities, 29

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE PUBLIC COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY, 30-60

courts of justice are either, 1, of a public or genetal jurisdiction throughout the

realm ; or, 2, of a private or special jurisdiction, 30

historical view of courts, 30-32
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of the courts for the redress of civil injuries there are:

1. the court of piepottdre, incident to fairs and markets, 32

2. the court-bsron, incident to every manor, and holden by the steward, 33

3. the hundred court, a larger species of court-baron, 34

4. the county court, incident to the jurisdiction of the sheriff, 35

the new county courts, 35ra

5. the court of common pleas, or common bench, 37

held by judges appointed by the king, with jurisdiction in all civil

cases. 41

6. the court of king's bench, 41

which has general control of inferior jurisdictions and corporations,

and cognizance of civil and criminal causes, 42

7. the court of exchequer, 44

which is a court both of equity and common law, 45

8. the court of chancery, 47

which has certain common law jurisdiction, 48

but its equity powers are of chief consequence 50

historical view thereof, 50-56

9. the court of exchequer chamber, which is a court of appeal, 56

10. the house of peers, 57

11. the courts of assize and nisi prius, 53

courts of the United States, 60n

CHAPTER V.

OF COURTS ECCLESIASTICAL, MILITARY AND MA RITIME, 61-70

history of the ecclesiastical courts 61-64

1. the archdeacon's court, the most inferior, 64

2. the consistory court, of every diocesan bishop, 64

3. the court of arches, a court of appeal belonging to the archbishop of Can-

terbury, 65

4. the court of peculiars, a branch of the court of arches, 65 -

5. the prerogative court for testamentary causes where there are bona notalrilia

in two dioceses 65

6. the court of delegates, the great court of appeal in ecclesiastical causes,.. 66

7. a commission of review, sometimes granted to revise the sentence of the

court of delegates, 67

transfer of jurisdiction to matrimonial and probate courts, 67n

of military courts, the only permanent one is the court of chivalry, 68

maritime courts have authority to determine all maritime injuries arising upon the

high seas or in parts out of the reach of the common law, 69

they are only the court of admiralty and its courts of appeal 69

of which the highest is now the judicial committee of the privy council 69n

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME. ix

CHAPTER VI. PAas.

OF COUKTS OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION, 71-85

courts of a special or private jurisdiction are:

1. the forests courts, 71

2. the courts of commissioners of sewers, 73

3. the court of policies of insurance 74

4. the court of the rnarshalsea and palace court, 76

5. the courts of the principality of Wales 77

6. the court of the duchy chamber of Lancaster, 78

7. the courts of counties palatine, 79

8. the stannary courts, 80

9. the courts of London and other corporations, 81

10. the university courts, 83

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE COGNIZANCE OF PRIVATE WRONGS, 86-114

the common law determines the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical, military and mari-

time courts, and keeps them within bounds, 86-87

injuries cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts are:

1. pecuniary, including,

subtraction of tithes, 88

non-payment of ecclesiastical fees and dues, 89

spoliation, by a clerk or incumbent taking the fruits of his benefice
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without right 90

remedy by decree for account, 91

dilapidations, which are a sort of waste 91

remedy, by action for damages, 91

neglect of repair of church, &c,., 92

2. matrimonial, which are :

jactitation of marriage, for which the remedy is to enjoin perpetual silence

on that head, 93

subtraction of conjugal rights; the court being empowered to award

restitution, 94

cruelty, adultery, &c., for which a divorce a mensa et thoro may be

decreed 94

marriage in fraudem legis, in which case it will be adjudged void,...... 94

refusal of proper maintenance to the wife, in which case alimony will be

awarded, 94

3. testamentary causes, which are the probate of wills, the granting of admin-

istrations and suing for legacies 95-98

these courts proceed according to the civil and canon laws, and enforce their de-

crees by excommunication, 98-103

civil injuries cognizable in the court military or court of chivalry are injuries in

matters of honor, and encroachments upon distinctions of degrees and quality,. 103

civil injuries cognizable by the courts maritime are such as are committed on the

nigh sea, or out of the reach of common-law remedies, 106

their proceedings resemble those of the civil law, 108

all other injuries fall within the cognizance of the courts of common law, 109

of which the refusal or neglect of justice is remedied by writ of procedendo or

mandamus, 109

and encroachment of jurisdiction is remedied by writ of prohibition, Ill

CHAPTER VIII.

OF WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS, 115-143

all wrong may be considered merely a privation of right, and the natural remedy

is the being put in possession of that right, 116

this may be effected either by a delivery of the thing detained to the owner, or

by satisfaction in damages, 116

the inslruments by which remedy is obtained are suits and actions 116

which are divided into personal, real, and mixed, 117

civil injuries are to the rights of persons or to the rights of property, 118

injuries to the rights of persons are, 1, to the absolute, 2, to the relative rights, 119

the absolute rights of individuals are, 1, personal security, 2, personal liberty,

3, private property, 119

X ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

Or WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.—(continued.') ™*-

injuries against a man's personal security are,

1. affecting his life, to be hereafter considered, 119

2, 3. affecting his limbs or body, which maybe by threats of bodily harm,

by assault, by battery, by wounding, or by mayhem, 120

4. affecting his health by unwholesome practices, 121

5. affecting his reputation 123

which may be by slander, 123

or by libel, 125

or by malicious prosecution 126

injuries against a man's personal liberty are by false imprisonment, 127

to remove which the remedies are, 1, by writ of mainprize; 2, by writ de odio

et atia; 3, by writ de homine replegiando ; 4, by writ of habeas corpus, 128

of which the fast is the principal, 129

the habeas corpus act 135

damages may also be recovered in an action of trespass, 138

injuries to private property are considered hereafter, 138

injuries to relative rights affect:

I. husbands, aud may be,

1. abduction, or taking away his wife, for which he may recover

damages, 139

2. adultery, for which trespass or action on the case will lie 139
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3. beating or ill-treating the wife, for which husband and wife join

in suing, or the husband may sue separately for loss of services, 140

II. parents, by the abduction of children 140

III. guardians when their wards are stolen or ravished away from them, 141

IV. masters, and these are:

1. retaining a man's hired servant before his time has expired. .... 142

2. beating him, per quod servitium amisit, 142

3. to which may be added the seduction of his female servant, .... 143n

the remedy for each is an action for damages, 142

CHAPTER IX.

OF INJURIES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY, 144-166

personal property is either in possession or in action 144

the injuries to rights thereto are either by deprivation of possession, or by abuse

or damage to the chattels while the owner continues in possession.. 145

1. in case of an unlawful taking, remedy to restore the property may be

had by replevin, 145

which was formerly applicable only to distress, 145

damages may be recovered instead, 151

2. for an unlawful detainer of goods, remedy to recover possession may

be by replevin or detinue, 151

or damages may be recovered in trover 152

for injuries to property in the owner's possession, the remedies are :

1. by action of trespass, where the act was immediately injurious to the

property, 153

2. by action on the case, where the injury was only consequential, 154

injuries to rights in action are by breach of contract, 154

contracts are express or implied 154

express, include debts, covenants and promises, 154

a debt is a sum due l>y certain and express agreement, 154

for which action of debt or on the case may be brought, 155

a covenant is an undertaking by deed, 156

remedy for breach, an action of covenant to recover damages, 157

or, in case of covenant real, to compel performance 157

who may take advantage of covenants, 158

a promise is in the nature of a verbal covenant, 158

remedy for breach, an action of assumpsit, 158

certain promises required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, 159

implied contracts are such as reason and justice dictate and which

therefore the law presumes the man has contracted to perform,.. 160

of which are, 1, those arising from the nature and constitution of

government, 160

as to pay judgments, penalties, &c., 100

2. those which arise from natural reason and the just construction of law, 1G2

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME. xi

OF INJURIES TO PERSONAL PROPEKTT.—(continued.) "Glt

as 1. to pay quantum meruit for labor, 162

2. to pay quantum valebat for goods, 163

3. to account for money had and received to the use of another, 163

4. to repay money laid out and expended for one's own use,.... 163

5. to pay the balance on an account stated, 164

6. to perform one's duty in any undertaking, 165

in some cases, also, there is an implied warranty on sales, 166

in all these cases an action lies on the implied assumpit, 166

and sometimes an action of deceit, 166

CHAPTER X.

OP INJURIES TO REAL PROPERTY ; AND FIRST OP DISPOSSESSION OR OUSTER OP THE

FHKRHOLD,.. 167-197

injuries affecting real property are, 1. ouster; 2. trespass; 3. nuisance ; 4. waste;

5. subtraction ; 6. disturbance 167

ouster or dispossession may be

1. by abatement, where, on death of the person seized, a stranger enters

before the heir, 168

2. by intrusion, where after a particular estate is determined, a stranger

enters before the remainder man or reversioner 169

3. by disseisin, which is a wrongful putting one out of possession 169

4. by discontinuance, which is where tenant in tail or husband of tenant
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in fee makes a larger estate of the land than he is entitled to, 171

5. by deforcement, which is where the entry was originally lawful, but

'the detainer is become unlawful, 172

the remedies for these wrongs are,

I. peaceable entry, which is applicable only to the first three cases, .... 175

and the right of which may be tolled 176

and which must be made within twenty years, 178

II. actions at law, which are,

1. writ of entry, \ 180

2. writ of assize, 184

III. where the wrong doer hath gained the actual right of possession, the

remedy is by writ of right or other writ in the nature thereof,.. 190

the present remedy for these wrongs is by action of ejectment. 197»

CHAPTER XI.

OP DISPOSSESSION, OR OUSTER, OF CHATTELS REAL, 198-207

ouster from chattels real is,

1. from estates by statute or elegit, for which the remedy is by assize of novel

disseisin, 198

2. from estates for years, for which the remedies are :

1. a writ of ejections firnus, 199

2. a writ quart ejecit infra terminem, 199

the first, or action of ejectment, is now the usual mode of trying title, 200

in it the party recovers possession, and also damages, 200

proceedings in ejectment, 200-205

after recovery of possession an action may be brought for mesne profits, 205

ejectment does not lie for incorporeal hereditaments except tithes, 206

3. a writ quart ejecit infra terminem lies against one who has come in under

the wrong doer, 207

CHAPTER XII.

OF TRESPASS, 208-215

is an injury directly and immediately injurious to the person or property

of another, and therefore necessarily accompanied with some force 208

trespass to lands, signifies an entry on another man's ground without lawful

authority, doing some damage, however inconsiderable, 209

remedy, by action of trespass qiiare claugum frtgit, 210

to maintain which one must have both property in the soil and pos-

session, 210

where the trespass is by cattle, they may be distrained damage feasant, 211

in some coses an entry on another's lands is justifiable, 212

but if the person entering abuses his privilege, he becomes trespasser

ab i nil in, 213

Vol. ii-n

xii ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

CHAPTER XIII. »*•«.

OP NUISANCE, 216-222

nuisances are : 1, public or common ; 2, private, 216

a private nuisance is anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, ten-

ements or hereditaments of another, 216

this may be,

1. to corporeal hereditaments, 216

2. to incorporeal hereditaments, as by obstructing a way, &c., 218

the remedies for private nuisances, besides that by abatement are:

1. by action on the case for damages, 220

2. by assize of nuisance, in which damages may be recovered and the

nuisance abated, 221

3. by writ quod permittat prosternere 221

but an action on the case is now the sole remedy, 222

CHAPTER XIV.

OP WASTE, 223-229

waste is a spoil or destruction in lands or tenements, being either voluntary or

permissive 223

to be injured by waste, one must have an interest in the estate, 223

which may be either a present interest (as by right of common), 224

or an interest in remainder or reversion, 224

the remedies are,
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1. preventive by writ of estrepement, 225

or by injunction in equity, 227

2. corrective, by writ of waste, to recover the place wasted and damages, 228

for which an action on the case is now substituted, 229n

CHAPTER XV.

OF SUBTRACTION, .... 230-235

subtraction is when one who owes services to another withdraws or neglects to

perform them '. 230

this may be, 1. of rents or other services due by tenure ; 2. of those due by

custom 230

of those due by tenure, the general remedy is by distress, 231

other remedies are, 1. action of debt; 2. assize; 3. writ de consiietudin-

ibw et servitiis ; 4. writ of cessavit; 5. writ of right sur disclaimer, 231

to remedy the oppression of the lord, the tenant has, 1. writ ne injuste

vexes ; 2. writ of mesne, 234

of those due by custom, the remedies are, 1. writ of secta ad molendinum, &c.,

2. action on the case 235

CHAPTER XVI.

OP DISTURBANCE:, 236-253

disturbance is a hindering or disquieting the owner of an incorporeal hereditament

in his regular and lawful enjoyment of it, 236

I. disturbance of franchises is remedied by action on the case 236

II. disturbance of common, which may be, 1. by intercommoning without

right; 2. by surcharging the common; 3. by enclosure,or obstruc-

tion, for each of which is appropriate remedy, 237-241

III. disturbance of ways is redressed by action on the case, 241

IV. disturbance of tenure has the like remedy, 242

V. disturbance of patronage, is the hindrance of a patron to present his clerk

to a benefice, 242

for which there were various remedies, of which quare impedit is the

present, 246-253

CHAPTER XVII.

OF INJURIES PROCKEDING FROM OR AFFECTING THE CROWN, 254-269

These are 1. Where the crown is aggressor; 2. where tho crown is the sufferer,.. 254

the maxim that the king can do no wrong, 254

injuries to rights of property by the crown are remedied,

1. by petition of right, grounded on facts set forth in the petition, 256

2. by monstrans de droit, when the right already appears, and is estab-

lished, 256
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OF INJURIES PROCEEDING FROM OR AFFECTING THE CROWN— (continued.') PA8m-

injuries to the rights of the crown are redressed:

1. by the usual common law actions, 257

2. by inquest of office, to recover possession, 258

3. by scire facias, to repeal the king's letters patent or grant, 201

4. by information in the exchequer to recover monies or chattels, or to

obtain damages for wrongs to the possessions of the crown 261

5. by writ of quo warranto, or information in the nature thereof, when

offices, franchises or liberties are usurped, 262

6. by mandamus, to admit or restore a person entitled to a place or office, 204

or to compel elections, Ac, 265

recapitulation: completeness of the remedies given for wrongs, 265-209

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE PURSUIT OF REMEDIES BY ACTION ; AND, FIRST, OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT, 270-278

the common pleas, the original court for civil actions 271

the king's bench and exchequer have now concurrent jurisdiction generally,.. 271

of the orderly parts of a suit the first is the original writ from the court of

chancery 272

which is either optional or peremptory, 272

return thereof, 275-278

the four terms of court, 275

CHAPTER XIX.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

OF PROCESS 279-293

after the original writ comes process, or the means of compelling the defendant to

appear, 279

this includes, 1. summons; 2. writ of attachment or pone, sometimes the first

process; 3. writ of distringas; 4. capias adrespondendum, and testatum

capias, or, instead of these, in the king's bench, the bill of Middlesex

and writ of Intitat, and in the exchequer, the writ of quo minus ; 5.

the nliiiK and pluries writs; 6. the exigeat, or writ of ejcigi facias, pro-

clamations and outlawry ; 7. appearance and common bail; 8. arrest

9. special bail, first, to the sheriff and then to the action, 279-292

for all which a writ of summons is now substituted in ordinary cases.

CHAPTER XX.

OF PLEADINGS 293-313

pleadings are the mutual altercations between the plaintiff and defendant, formerly

oral, but now in writing, 293

I. the declaration, narratio or count, which is an amplification of the original

writ, with the addition of time and place of the injury, 293

the venue in which is in some cases local, 204

it may contain several counts, 295

of nan-pros, retraxit and discontinuance, 205, 296

II. the defence, claim of cognizance, imparlance, view, oyer, aid-prayer, voucher,

or parol demurrer, 297-301

III. the plea, which is either dilatory or to the action, 301

dilatory pleas, merely to delay or put off the suit, are:

1. to the jurisdiction of the court, 301

2. to the disability of the plaintiff, 301

3. in abatement of the writ or counts, 302

these must be verified and-pray judgment, &c., 302, 303

pleas to the action either confess the complaint in whole or in part, as in

tender and set-off, 303

or totally deny the cause of complaint; as the general issue or special

plea in bar, 305, 306

instances of special pleas, 306, 308

the qualities of a plea are, 1. that it be single ; 2. direct and positive and

not argumentative; 3. with convenient certainty of time, place and

persons; 4. answering the plaintiff's allegations in every material

point, and, 5. so pleaded as to be capable of trial - 308

special pleas must advance some new fact not mentioned in the declara-

tion, and are bad if only amounting to general issue, 309

they may give color to the plaintiff, 309

xiv ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

OF PLEADING — (conft'nued.) "«••

IV. the replication of the plaintiff, which may be followed by rejoinder, sur-

rejoinder, rebutter and sur-rebutter, 310

concerning departure, new assignment, duplicity, &c., 310-313

CHAPTER XXI.

OF ISSUE AND DEMURRER, 314-324

issue is either upon matter of fact or matter of law, 314

issue of law is called a demurrer, and it admits the facts to be true, as stated,

but denies their legal sufficiency 314

this issue is tried by the court 315, 323

issues of fact are to be tried by jury 315

new matter after issue joined may be pleaded puts Harriett contimmnce, .... 316

pleadings were formerly in Norman or law-frcnch, and then in Latin, but now in

English, 317-323

CHAPTER XXII.

OF THE SEVERAL SPECIES OF TRIAL, 325-348

the uncertainty in legal proceedings discussed, 325-330

trial is the examination of the matter of fact in issue, 330

the several species are :

1. by the record, where matter of record is in issue 331

2. by inspection, or examination, which is by the court, where the mat-

ter in issue is the evident object of the senses 331
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3. by certificate, where the evidence of the person certifying is the only

proper criterion of the point in dispute, 333

4. by witnesses, which is only used on writ of dower, where the death

of the husband is denied, 336

5. by wager of battel, now abolished, 337

6. by wager of law, also now abolished 341

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE TRIAL BY JURY, 349-385

trial by jury, called also trial per pats, or by the country, 349

is of two kinds, extraordinary or ordinary 351

the first is by the grand assize in writs of right, and by the grand jury in

writs of attaint 351

in the ordinary jury trial the process is :

1. the venire facias to the sheriff to summon jurors 352

with the subsequent compulsive habere corpora, or distringas 354

if the sheriff be not indifferent, the process issues to coroners or

elisors, 354

2. the carrying down the record to nisi prius, 356

3. the sheriff's return of common or special jurors, 357

4. the challenges, which are to the whole array or to the polls 358

jury de medietate linguce, 300

challenges to the polls are either propter honoris respectum, propttr

dcfcctum, propter affectum, or propter delictum 3G1-3G4

5. the tales de circumstantibits to fill the jury, 364

6. the swearing of the jury, 365

7. the presentation of the case on the evidence 3G6

which must relate to the fact or point in issue, 307

evidence is of two kinds, by proofs, or by the private knowledge of

the jurors, 367

proofs are cither written or by parol 307

the best evidence the case will admit of is always required, if to be

obtained 368

witnesses are brought in by subpoena ad tettificandum, 309

infamous and interested parties are excluded, 309

one credible witness generally sufficient, 370

proof may be positive or circumstantial, 371

swearing of the witness; exceptions, 372

demurrer to evidence, 373
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OF TDK TRIAL Br JURY—(continued.) TJi0m-

judge's summing up 374

verdict, general or special 375-379

general considerations regarding j ury trials 379-385

CHAPTER XXIY.

OF JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS, 386-401

return of the postea, 386

judgment may be suspended or arrested, 386

1. new trial may bo granted for matter extrinsic the record, 387

as for misbehavior of party or jury, excessive damages, &c., 387

for which cause must be shown by affidavit, if the matter was not ap-

parent to the judge, 391

and terms may be imposed, 392

2. judgment may be arrested for cause apparent on the record, 393

as where declaration does not pursue the writ, or is insufficient, 393

but certain defects in the declaration are cured by verdict 394

and if the issue be immaterial, repleader may be awarded 395

judgments are the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter

contained in the record, 395

they are either, 1. upon demurrer ; 2. on verdict; 3. by confession or default:

4. upon nonsuit or retraxit, 395

they are also, 1. interlocutory; 2. final 396
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warrants of attorney to confess judgment, 397

writ of inquiry to assess damages, 398

costs or expenses of suit are now the necessary consequence of judgment,... 399

but the king generally neither pays nor receives them 400

case of executors, &c., and paupers, 400

CHAPTER XXV.

Or PROCEEDINGS IN THE NATURE OP APPEALS, 402-411

proceedings in the nature of appeals from judgments are:

1. a writ of attaint (now superceded) to impeach the verdict, 402

2. a writ of deceit in the common pleas to reverse a judgment there had by

fraud or collusion, 405

3. a writ of audita querela, to discharge a judgment by matter that has since

happened 406

4. a writ of error to some superior court of appeal 407

which is only upon matter of law appearing on the face of the pro-

ceedings, 407

and slight mistakes and errors are cured under the statutes of amend-

ments and jeofaih 407

history of these statutes i 407—410

writs of eiTor are to the king's bench from all inferior courts of record,.. 410

formerly also from the common pleas and the court of king's bench

in Ireland, 410

they are now from the three superior courts at Westminster to the

exchequer chamber, 410n

and from the exchequer chamber and the superior courts of Ireland

to the house of lords, 411n

CHAPTER XXVI.J

OF EXECUTION, 412-425

execution is the putting the sentence of the law in force, 412

I. when possession of any hereditament is recovered the execution is an

habere facias seisinam possessionem, &c., 412

II. in other actions where something special is to be done, a special writ is

awarded According to the nature of the case, 413

as in nuisance, replevin, &c., 413

III. when money is recovered the writ is either,

1. a capias ad satisfaciendum against the debtor's body, 414

or in default thereof, a scire facias against his bail, 416

2. a.//Vn>\//«-/«s npiinst hi* goods and chattels, , 417

3. a tcntri facias, against goods aiid profits of lands, 417
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Op EXECUTION—(continued.) **•«•

4. an i'lii/il, against goods and the possession of lands, 418

5. an exttndifacia*, and other process, on statutes, recognizances, lit;.,

against the body, lands and goods, 420-425

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF PROCBBDINGS IN THE COURTS OF EQUITY 426-455

matters of equity which belong to the peculiar jurisdiction of the court of

chancery are:

1. the guardianship of infants, 427

2. the custody of idiots and lunatics, 427

3. the superintendence of charities, 428

4. jurisdiction in bankruptcy, now taken away, 428

some peculiar equity causes are heard in the exchequer and duchy court of

Lancaster, 429

equity in its true and genuine meaning is the soul and spirit of all law, 429

to set law and equity in opposition to each other will be found either wholly or to

a certain degree erroneous, 430

that equity follows the law; that both interpret the law according to its spirit;

that both have the same object; that both follow rules and precedents, and

observe the same rules of property, evidence, &c., 430-436

the essential differences between the courts of equity and of law are:

1. the mode of proof, by a discovery on the oath of the party, which gives
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jurisdiction in matters of account and fraud, 437

2. the mode of trial, by depositions taken in any part of the world 438

3. the mode of relief, by giving a more specific and extensive remedy

than can be had in courts of law 438

examples, specific performance, getting aside deeds, enjoining waste, &c., 438

4. the true construction of securities for money by considering them

merely as a pledge 439

5. the execution of trusts under nearly the same rules as would govern

the estate at law, 439

the proceedings in a suit in equity are :

1. the bill of complaint, in the nature of a declaration, 442

which must bring all interested parties before the court, 442

2. the subpoena, followed, if nec-ssary, by attachment, &c., to compel

appearance, 443

or against corporations, a distringas 444

3. appearance, 445

4. demurrer, which corresponds to that at law, 446

5. pleas, either to the jurisdiction, to the person, or in bar,., 446

6. answer, which is given upon oath, 446

but defendant may plead, answer and demur to different parts of

the same bill, 446

7. exceptions to answer for insufficiency, 448

8. amendments of bill, bill of supplement, of revivor, of interpleader, <Sbc.,.. 448

9. hearing upon bill and answer, 448

10. replication and issue, 448

11. examination of witnesses upon interrogatories, 449

publication of examinations, 449

bill to perpetrate testimony, 450

12. hearing of the cause upon evidence, 450

cross-causes to be heard together, 451

13. decree interlocutory, 452

feigned issue and trial; question of law for opinion of common law

court; reference to master, &c., 452

14. final decree, 453

15. petition for rehearing, or bill of review, 453

16. appeal to the house of lords, 454

APPENDIX.

No. 1. proceedings on a writ of right patent.

2. proceedings in an action of trespass in ejectment by original in the king's bench.

3. proceedings in an action of debt in the court of common pleas removed into the

king's bench on writ of error.
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BOOK IV. OF PUBLIC WRONGS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATUKB pp CHIMES AND THKIH PUNISHMENT, ............................ 1-19

general division of the subject, ........................ . .......... . ......... 1

the king the proper prosecutor for public offences, ..... . ...................... 2

a crime or misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law

either forbidding or commanding it, ........ . ......................... 5

the two terms properly synonymous, though " crimes " is used to denote the

more serious offences, .............................................. 5

crimes are distinguished from civil injuries in that they are a breach and vio-

lation of the public rights due to the whole community in its social aggre-

gate capacity ....................................................... 5

every public offence a private wrong and something more .................. 5

punishments and their purpose ......................................... 7

the right to inflict them I'or offences mala in se is by nature in every indi-

vidual, ....................... ................................. 7

in a state of society the right is transferred to the sovereign power ...... 8

this power may also punish acts mala prohibita ....................... 8

the rightfulness of capital punishment considered, .................... 9

the purpose of punishment is to prevent future offences, ................ 11

this may be either, 1. by the amendment of the offender himself; 2.

by deterring others by his example ; 3. by depriving him of the
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power to do future mischief, .................................. 11

the measure of punishment must be determined by the wisdom of

the legislative power, ....................................... 12

punishments unreasonably severe are to be avoided ............... 16

the certainty rather than the severity of punishments deters, ...... 17

they should be graduated to the offence, ......... . ............... 17

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CHIMES ............................... 20-33

want or defect of will alone excuses from punishment for forbidden acts, ........ 20

to constitute crime there must be both a vicious act and a vicious will, ..... ..... 21

the will does not join with the act:

1. where there is a defect of understanding .............................. 21

2. where there is understanding and will, but not called forth at the time, as

in case of offences by chance or ignorance ........................... 21

3. where the act is constrained by outward force or violence, ......... ..... 21

a vicious will may be wanting in cases of:

1. infancy ; in certain cases of omission of duty, &c., one under 21 not being

punishable, .................................................... 22

but for breaches of the peace, &c., he is responsible at 14 ............... 22

under 7 one cannot be guilty of felony ................ . .............. 23

between 7 and 14 he is presumed incapable, but evidence of malice may

be given, ......... ..................... .» ...................... 23

2. idiocy or lunacy .............. . ..................................... 24

3. drunkenness ; which does not generally excuse, ........................ 25

but may in cases where intent is the gist of the offence, .............. 25n

4. misfortune or chance, without design ................................. 26

5. ignorance or mistake of fact .......................................... 27

but ignorance of law is no excuse, .................................. 27

6. compulsion, or inevitable necessity, .................................. 27

as in case of wife coerced by husband, ............................... 28

who, however, is not excused in murder, manslaughter or treason, . . 29

nor in case of keeping a brothel, ............................... 29

nor where she offends alone ...................... . ............. 29

threats or menances, which induce a fear of death or other bodily harm

may also excuse,... ............................................. 30

also the necessity of choosing between two evils, as in case of homicide

by an officer in some cases where his authority is resisted, ........... 30

want of food, &c., not a legal excuse ................................. 31

7. incase of the king, who is legally incapable of committing a crime, ....... 32
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CHAPTER III.

OB PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES, 34-4O

persons are guilty of crimes either as principals or accessories, 34

• principal is either,

in the first degree, when he is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime, 34

in the second degree, when he is present aiding and a betting the fact to be

done, 34

presence may be either actual or const motive, 34

an accessory is one who neither commits the offence, nor is present, but is some

way concerned therein, 35

1. accessories can only be in petit treason and felony; in high treasons and

misdemeanors all aro principals 35

2. an accessory before the fact is one who, being absent at the time of the

crime committed, doth yet procure, counsel or command it to be done,.. 36

3. «o accessory after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been com-

mitted, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon, 37

but the felony must be complete at the time of assistance given, 38

the wife is excused for concealing her husband, 39

4. accessories formerly liable to the same punishment as principals, 39

and could not be tried till principal convicted.. 40

but changes in these particulars are made by statutes, 39-40

CHAPTER IV.
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OF OFFENCES ACAINST GOD AND RELIGION, 41-65

private vices not the object of municipal law, except as, by their evil example or

effects, they prejudice the community,... 41

offences punishable by the laws of England are those against, 1. Qod and his holy

religion; 2. the law of nations; 3. the king and his government; 4. the public,

or commonwealth ; 5. the rights of individuals, 42

offences against God and religion are :

1. apostacy, punishable by certain incapacities and imprisonment, 44

2. heresy, cognizable generally in spiritual courts, 45

3. reviling the ordinances of the cliurcli, 50

or non-conformity to its worship,.. 51

which is excused in case of dissenters,... 53

or professing tho popish religion, Ac., 55

the laws against papists considered,. > 57-59

4. blasphemy, or denial of the being or providence of the Almighty, or con-

tumelious reproaches of the Saviour 59

5. profane swearing and cursing, 60

6. pretending to use witchcraft or conjuration,. 60-62

7. religious impostures,..^n 62

8. simony, or the corrupt presentation of any one to an ecclesiastical benefice

for gift or reward, 62

9. profanation of the Lord's day 63

10. drunkenness, 64

11. open and notorious lewdness or indecency, 64

including the having of bastard children, 65

CHAPTER V.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAWS OF NATIONS, 66-73

the law of nations is a system of rules deducible by natural reason and estab-

lished by universal consent, to regulate the intercourse between independ-

ent states 66

which in England is adopted by the common law as part of the law of the

land 67

offences against it are principally by whole states or nations, in which case

resort can only bo had to war 68

but when individuals violate it, the government under which they live should

take notice of the offence 4 68

the principal offences against the law of nations are :

1. violation of safe conducts or passports, 68

2. infringement of the rights of ambassadors, 70

3. piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, 71
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OF OKFEXCER AG.U.VST THE LAWS OF NATIOKS—(<MH/tV!«W.)

which every nation may punish 71

certain other acts, including dealing in slaves, are statutory felonies,. ..72, 73

4

CHAPTER VI.

OF HIGH T&KASON, 74-93

offences more immediately affecting the royal person, crown and dignity, are,

1. treason; 2. felonies injurious to the prerogative; 3. praemunire; 4. other mis-

prisions and contempts, 74

treason, under statute 25 Edw. Ill, may be either,

1. compassing or imagining the death of the king or queen consort, or their

eldest son and heir........ 76

Tiy king is meant the king in possession......... 77

the compassing, &c., must be evidenced by an overt act,.. 79

mere words not treasonable, 79-81

2. violating the king's companion, or eldest daughter unmarried, or wife of

king's eldest son and heir 81

3. levying war against the king in his realm -. 81

4. adhering to the king's enemies .... 82

5. counterfeiting the king's great or privy seal, 83

6. formerly, counterfeiting the king's money, or importing counterfeit money,

was treason, 84

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

7. slaying the chancellor, treasurer, or a judge, in their places, during their

offices 84

subsequent statutory treasons relating to papists, coining, and the pro test an t

succession, 85-92

punishment of treason in case of males formerly, to be drawn, hanged, em-

bowelled alive, beheaded, quartered; the head and quarters to be at

the king's disposal, 92

now modified so that the hanging be until death,.. ..., 92n

of females, formerly to be burned, noVr to be hanged, 93»

CHAPTER Vlt.

OF FELONWS IwJuHtotrs TO TH* Ktiro's PREROGATIVE k 94-102

felonies are such offences as at. common law occasioned forfeiture of lands or goods 94

usually punished by death, unless clergy allowed, 97

those injurious to the king's prerogative are, 1. relating to the coin ; 2. against

the king's council; 3. serving a foreign prince; 4. embezzling the king's

armor or stores; 5. desertion from the king's forces,................98-102

CHAPTER Vm.

Or Pn^-MrxiKK, ...103-118

prsemunire, in its original sense, IB the offence of adhering to the temporal power

of the pope, in derogation of regal authority,.................... ,iv .103-116

origin and progress of the papal usurpation,...* . ...^... 105

statutes of prsemunire 110

other cases of statutory praemunire trere,

iholestlrt» possessors of abbey lands,-. 116

acting as broker in usurious contract, .... 116

obtaining stay of proceedings in suit for monopoly, ..*...» 116

monopoly of making or importing gunpowder, ....*. 116

exerting power of purveyance or pre-emption,».», i «•..-. 116

asserting legislative power in parliament without the king,... 116

sending a subject out of the realm a prisoner, 116

refusing to take oaths of allegiifnce, supremacy, 4c., i. 117

defending the right of the pretender, or denying the right of parliament to

limit the descent of the crown,.. 117

treating of Other matters by the peers of Scotland, when convened to elect

representatives, i.".. 117

undertaking unlawful subscriptions, 117

assisting at unlawful marriage in royal family 117

punishment of prtemunire, to be out of king's protection.lands and goods for-

feited, and imprisoned at the king's pleasure, 118
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CHAPTER IX. "«•

OF MISPRISIOXS AND CONTEMPTS AFFECTING THE KINO AND GOVERNMENT 119-126

misprisions are such high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly-

bordering thereon, 119

these are: I. negative, in concealing what ought to be revealed; 2. positive, in

doing something which ought not to be done, 119

negative are:

1. misprision of treason, consisting in the bare knowledge and conceal-

ment of treason, without assent thereto, 120

2. misprision of felony, in the concealment of a felony which a man knows,

but never assented to 121

3. concealment of treasure-trove, 121

positive are: 1, maladministration 01 public trusts, punished usually by im-

peachment 121

including embezzlement of public moneys, 122

2. contempts against the king's prerogative, as, by refusing him assistance,

neglecting to join the posse connlatus when required, receiving pen-

sion from foreign power, &c., , 122

3. Contempts against the king's person and government, as, by speaking

or writing against them, &c., 123

4. contempts against the king's title, as, by heedlessly denying his right,

or refusing to take the oaths for securing the government, 123
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5. contempts against his palaces or courts of justice, as, by assaults therein,

threats to a judge, obstructing the administration of justice, &c., 124-126

CHAPTER X.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE, 127-141

crimes specially affecting the commonwealth are: 1. against public justice ; 2. against

public peace; 3. against public trade; 4. against public health; 5. against public

peace and economy, 128

offences against public justice are,

1. embezzling, vacating or falsifying records or personating others in courts of

justice, 128

2. compelling prisoneis to become approvers 128

3. obstructing the execution of lawful process, 129

4. escapes by prisoners, and allowing the same by officers, 129

5. prison breach, 130

6. rescues of others from arrest or imprisonment, 131

7. returning from transportation before term expired, 132

8. taking reward under pretence of helping the owner to stolen goods, 132

9. receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, 132

10. compounding felony, 133

11. common barratry, or the frequent exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels,, 134

or suing for fictitious plaintiff, or without authority 134

12. maintenance, or an officious intermeddling with a suit which no way concerns

one, by maintaining or assisting a party to prosecute or defend it, 135

13. champerty, or a bargain to carry on the suit of another at the bargainer's

expense, and share the subject-matter if it is successful, 135

14. compounding information on penal statutes, 136

15. conspiracy to indict an innocent man of felony, 136

and sending letters threatening to accuse of crime, 137

16. perjury, which is the wilfully swearing false in a judicial proceeding in a

matter material to the issue or point in question, by a person to whom

a lawful oath is administered, 137

and subornation of perjury 137

17. bribery, which is the taking of an undue reward by one concerned in the

administration of justice to influence his official conduct, 139

or the offering such bribe, 140

18. embracery, which is an attempt to influence a jury corruptly, 140

19.' false verdict of juKors, formerly punished, 140

20. negligence of public officers in the administration of justice 140

21. oppression and partiality in public officers, 141

22. extortion by public officers, 141
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CHAPTER XI. PAGK.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE 142-153

offences against the public peace, are,

1. riotous assembling of twelve or more persons and not dispersing on procla-

mation, 142

2. unlawful hunting by night or in disguise, 143

3. sending letters demanding money, or threatening violence, Ac 144

4. destroying locks, flood-gates, £c., 144

5. affrays, or the fighting of tiro or more persons in a public place to the terror

of others, 145

6. riots, routs and unlawful assemblies, the last of which is where three or

more assemble to do an unlawful act 146

the second is where three or more meet to do an unlawful act upon a

common quarrel, and make some advances towards it, 146

a riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of violence,... 146

7. tumultuous petitioning, 147

8. forcible entry or detainer, which is the violently taking or keeping posses-

sion of lands and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without

authority of law, 148

9. riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons, 149

10. spreading false news in some cases, 149

11. false and pretended prophecies with intent to disturb the peace, 149
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12. challenges to fight duels, or bearing such challenges, 150

13. libels, which are malicious defamations of any person, made public by print-

ing, writing, signs or pictures, in order to anger him, or expose him to

public hatred, contempt and ridicule, 150

punishing which does not abridge the liberty of the press 151

which consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and

not in freedom from censure for criminal publications, 152

CHAPTER XII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRADE, 154-160

offences against public trade are;

1. owling, or transporting sheep or wool out of the kingdom, to the detri-

ment of its staple manufacture, 154

2. Smuggling, or the offence of importing goods without paying the duties

imposed thereon 155

3. fraudulent bankruptcy, 155

4. usury, or the unlawful contract on a loan of money to receive the same

again with exorbitant increase, 156

5. cheating, breaking the assize of bread, selling by false weights and meas-

ures, &c., 157

or defrauding another of any thing of value by color of any false token,

letter or pretence 158

6. forestalling the market 158

7. regrating, or buying and selling again in the same market or near the same, 158

8. engrossing, or getting into one's possession, or buying up large quantities

of corn, &c., to sell again 158

9. monopolies, which are a license or privilege allowed by the king for the sole

buying and selling, making, working, or using of any thing, 159

now void, and the monopolist punishable, except in case of patents for

inventions, &c 159

combinations to raise the price of provisions, &c., are also punishable,.. 159

10. exercising a trade without having previously served as an apprentice, 10.

11. enticing or seducing artisans to go abroad, 160

CHAPTER XIII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE PUBLIC POLICE OK ECONOMT, 161-174

Offences against the public health are :

1. disregarding lawful orders in time of plague, or quarantine regulations, ... 161

2. selling unwholsome provisions, or adulterating wine, 162

offences against the public police and economy are:

1. clandestine or irregular marriages, 162

2. bigamy, or (more properly) polygamy, or the having a plurality of wives

at once, 10*

xxii ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

OP OrFEWCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC HEALTH, Ao.—{continued.') ****•

in which case the marriages, except the first, are mere nullities, 16?

in three cases, namely : I. where the party had been continually abroad '

for seven years, or, 2. was not known to be livingduring that time ; 3.

was divorced a mrnsa ft thorn: though the second marriage is void, it

is not a felony, 164

in other cases, namely, 1. where there is a divorce a rinculn, and 2. where

the first marriage was voidable for want of age, and was afterwards

not agreed to, the second marriage is valid, 164

3. idle soldiers and mariners wandering about the realm, 165

4. gypsiesremaining in the kingdom, ic., 165

5. common nuisances, which are either the doing of a thing to the annoyance

of all the king's subjects, or neglecting to do a thing the common good

requires, 166

as obstructions to the highways, bridges, or public rivers, 167

offensive trades and manufactures, 167

disorderly inns, bawdy-houses, gaming-houses, fee., 167

lotteries, fire works, &<:., - 168

eavesdroppers and common scolds, 168

6. being idle and disorderly, rogues and vagabonds, 169

7. luxury, the laws against which are generally repealed, ... 170

8. gaming, which is made punishable by penalties, and the securities obtained
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thereby are void, 171

9. offences against the game laws, 174

CHAPTER XIV.

Or HoinciDK,. ...... 176-204

crimes against persons are principally, 1. against their persons; 2 agaiust their

habitations ; 3. against their property 177

of crimes injurious to the persons of subjects, the first is homicide, or the killing

of a human creature 177

which is either justifiable, excusable or felonious,. 177

justifiable homicide is,

1. such as is owing to unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or

desire, inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, 178

as when done by command of the law, 178

or to prevent some atrocious crime, 179

2. such as are committed for the advancement of public justice,

as where an officer kills one that assaults or resists him, 179

or one charged with felony is killed in the endeavor to arrest him, 179

or where persons are killed in dispersing a mob, 180

or where jailor or officer kills the prisoners who assault him, 180

or where the trespassers in parks, Ac., will not surrender to the keepers, 180

but in all these cases the killing must be an apparent necessity,.... 180

formerly, where one was killed in trial by battle, 180

3. such as are committed for the prevention of any forcible and atrocious

ciime, 180

as where one is slain who attempts robbery, murder or burglary 180

or in the defence of chastity, 180

in all these cases the slayer is faultless and not punishable 182

excusable homicide is,

1. per infortuniam, or by misadventure, 182

but if this occur in consequence of an idle, dangerous and unlawful sport

or other act it is manslaughter, 183

2. se, defendendo, or in self-defence 183

but here it must appear that the slayer had no other possible (or prob-

able) means of escaping from his assailant, 184

this head includes defence of one's family, 186

also the case where both parties are innocent, as shipwrecked persons

contending for the same plank, 186

in these cases there was formerly forfeiture of goods, 188

felonious homicide is the killing of a human creature without justification or ex-

cuse 188

this may be self-murder, punished by ignominous burial and forfeiture of

goods, 189

ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME. xxiii

OF HOMICIDE — (continued.) "«•

or killing another, which is either manslaughter or murder 190

manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice express or im-

plied, 191

•which is either voluntary or involuntary, 191

instances of tlie first, where in a sudden tight one kills another, or the hug-

band slays one taken in adultery with his wife, 191

instances of the second, where one kills another induing a lawful act negli-

gently or in an unlawful manner, 192

'these homicides felony, but not capital, generally , 193

murder is the unlawful killing by one of sound mind and memory of any reason-

ble creature in being, and under the king's peace, with malice aforethought,

express or implied 195

express malice is where one with deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill

another 199

and this exists whea one kills another in a duel 199

and where one upon a sudden provocation beats another in a cruel and

unusual manner, 199

the malice need not be towards the person killed in particular, 199

malice is implied without proof in case of deliberate killing, or killing with-

out provocation 200

and where one kifts an officer in the performance of his duty, 200
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and where one is killed in the attempt to commit a felony, 200

pan icide Is the murder of one's parents or children, 202

petit treason is the murder of the master by the servant, the husband by the

wife, or his superior by an ecclesiastical person, 203

the distinction between which and murder is now abolished, 204 »

CHAPTER XV.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS, 205-219

offences against the persons of individuals are :

1. mayhem, or the violently depriving another of the use of such of his mem-

bers as may render him the less able in fighting to defend himself or

:in noy his adversary, 205

which includes loss or disabling of a hand, finder, eye or foretooth, .... 205

to which offence may be added malicious shooting at any one, 207

2. forcible abduction and marriage or defilement of females, 208

and taking away female child under sixteen years of age from parent or

guard ian, 209

3. rape, or the carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will,. 210

which a male infant under fourteen is presumed incapable of committing, 212

forcible violation of a harlot is rape,.. 213

evidence of the party ravished, 213

4. the crime against nature . 215

all which offences are felonies, 216

5. 6, 7. assaults, batteries and wounding, which are punishable as misdemean-

ors, .. 216

of which beating a clerk in orders or clergymen is more severely punished, 217

8. false imprisonment also a misdemeanor, 218

9. kidnapping, or the forcible abducting or stealing away of a person from his

own country and sending him into another, 219

CHAPTER XVI.

Or OFFENCES AGAINST THE HABITATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS 220-228

offences more immediately affecting the habitations of individuals, are arson and

burglary, 220

arson is the malicious and wilful burning of the dwelling-house of another, .... 220

1. out-houses which are parcel of the dwelling, though not contiguous, are

subjects of arson, 221

also, a barn filled with hay or corn, or a stack of corn by the old corn-

law, 221

the house must be the house of another, 221

2. the attempt to bum a dwelling is not arson, but the consuming of any part

is sufficient, 222

but malice is essential, 222
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OP OFFENCES AGAINST rnr, HABITATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS — (continued.')

the offence is felony, '>&>,

burglary is the breaking and entering by night into a dwelling-house with intent

to commit a felony, 224

1. it is night when there is not daylight enough begun or left to discern a

man's face withal 224

2. the offence may be committed in a church, 224

and in any house where a man resides, though he may be temporarily ab-

sent 225

and in any building inclosed with the house by t he same common fenf e,.. 225

a chamber in college or inn of court, Ac., is (he occupant's mansion 225

tents and booths not dwelling houses, though the owner lodge there,.... 226

3. there must be both a breaking and an entry, 226

the removal of any obstruction to entering is a sufficient breaking 226

the entering a chimney, or getting in by fraudulent artifice, 226

the entry with any part of the body, or with an instrument held in the

hand, is sufficient, 227

4. the intent must be to commit either a common-law or statutory felony,.. 228

CHAPTER XVII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY .• 229-250

offences more immediately affecting the property of individuals are:

1. larceny, which is either simple or compound, 229
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simple larceny is the felonious Uking and carrying away of the personal

goods of another, 229

the taking must be against the owner's consent, 230

and breach of trust is not larceny, 230

but embezzlement by sen-ante is made felony, 231, 234

the taking of one's own goods to defend another is felony in some cases, 231

any removal of the goods, though the thief does not make off with them,

is a sufficient carrying away 231

the intent must be felonious, 232

the property must be the personal goods of another, 232

annimals/er# naturte, unreclaimed, not subjects of larceny generally,.. 235

but domestic animals (except dogs and the like) are, 236

so may be the property of unknown persons 236

the offence is a felony at common law, 237

compound larceny has all the properties of the other, with the aggrava-

tion of a taking from one's house or person, 240

larceny from the person is:

1. by privately stealing 242

2. by open and violent taking, which is robbery, 243

the taking must be complete, 243

and from the person, or from one's presence, and be accomplished

by menaces or violence 243

the value is immaterial 243

the taking must be by force or a previous putting in fear, .... 243

2. malicious mischief to property from wanton cruelty or revenge, 244-247

3. forgery, or the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the preju-

dice of another man's right, 247

the statutes for the punishment thereof, 248-250

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING OFFENCES 251-257

preventive justice consists in obliging persons suspected of future misbehavior to

give pledge or securities for keeping the peace or for good behavior 251

the security consists in being bound in a recognizance in a certain sum, to be

void if the condition is observed, 252

the condition may be to keep the peace generally, or particularly, also with

regard to the person craving the security, A 253

if the condition is broken, the recognizance is estreated and sent up to the

exchequer for suit, 253

any justice of the peace may demand such security, 253

or the superior courts may take it, 253

femes covert and infants give security by their friends and not in person,.... 254
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OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING OFFENCES — (continued.) »«»•

the security is discharged 1. by demise of the king; 2. by death

of the principal before forfeiture; 3. by order of the court on

cause ; 4. if granted on private account, by release, &c., 254

any justice may ex qfficio bind parties to keep the peace who make af-

fray in his presence, &c., 254

and private parties may swear the peace against others, where

there is Just cause to fear injury 255

what will constitute a breach of the recognizance, 255

any justice may bind over to the good behavior any that be not of good

fame 256

how the recognizance may be forfeited, 257

CHAPTER XIX.

OF COURTS OF A CRIMINAL JURISDICTION,... 258-279

courts of criminal jurisdiction are either of a public and general jurisdiction, or

only of a private and special jurisdiction, 258

criminal courts of public and general jurisdiction are,

1. the high court of parliament, which may by bill attaint persons or inflict

pains and penalties • 259

and the commons may impeach before the lords a commoner for high mis-

demeanors, or a peer for any crime, 259

' proceedings on impeachment 260
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2. the court of the lord high steward, for the trial of peers for treason, felony

or misprisison of either, 261

the trial being by peers upon indictment previously found 262

all the peers being summoned except the bishops, 263

3. the court of king's bench, which takes cognizance of crimes of all grades,. 265

4. the court of chivalry, now disused, 268

5. the high court of admiralty, having cognizance of offences on the sea, or on

the coasts out of the body of any county, &<•., -. 268

the powers now transferred to the central criminal court 269n

6. 7. the courts of oyer and terminer and general goal delivery 269

8. the court of general quarter sessions of the peace, 271

9. the sheriff's tourn or great court-leet of the county 273

10. the court-leet, or view of frankpledge, 273

11. the court of the coroner, to enquire concerning deaths in prison or sudden

or violent deaths, 274

12. the court of the clerk of the market, 275

criminal courts of a private and special jurisdiction are,

1. the court of the lord steward, treasurer or controller of the king's house-

hold 276

2. the court of the lord steward of the king's household, or in his absence, of

the treasurer, controller and steward of the marshalsea, 276

3. the courts of the two universities, 277

CHAPTER XX.

OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS, 280-288

summary convictions, except in case of contempts are unknown to the common

law, 280

in these there is no intervention of a jury 280

these are allowed,

1. in cases of offences against the revenue laws, 281

2. in cases of vagrancy and other disorderly offences, 281

a summons in these cases is requisite, 282

to this head may also be referred,

3. the punishment of contempts of court by attachment, 283

the power to do which is an inseparable incident to every superior

court, 286

if the offence be in the presence of the court it may be punished with-

out further proof or examination, 286

in other cases a party is generally ruled to show cause, and examined

on interrogatories 287

and if convicted may be fined and imprisoned 287

but if he clears himself by his answer he is discharged, 288

VOL. IL-iv
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CHAPTER XXI.

Or AHRESTS, 289-295

an arrest is the apprehending or restraining one's person, in order to be forthcom-

ing to answer an alleged or suspected crime, 289

it is made, in general,

1. by warrant, which, in extraordinary cases, may be granted by the

privy council or secretaries of state, 289

but ordinarily by justices of the peace, .. - 290

and upon cause shown on oath, 290

form of the warrant; which must be under seal, 291

a general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected or guilty of a

crime, naming none, is void 291

if the warrant is fuir on its face the officer is justified in executing it, 291

2. by officers without warrant, which may be by a justice in case of fel-

ony or breach of peace in his presence, 292

or by sheriff or coroner, of any felon in his county, 299

or by constable, in case of breach of peace in his view, or of felony

actually coinmitteil, or dangerous wounding, 292

or by watchmen, of all offenders, 292

3. private persons and officers present at the commission of a felony must

arrest the felon, 293

and may justify breaking doors for the purpose, 293
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and upon probable suspicion in case of felony actually committed

may arrest the supposed felon 293

4. hue and cry is the old common-law processof pursuing, with hont and

voice, felons and such as have dangerously wounded another,.... 294

which may be raised by precept of a justice, or by a peace officer,

any person knowing of a felony, 294

and those prosecuting it have the same powers as under a warrant,. 204

rewards sometimes offered for arrests, 295

CHAPTER XXII.

Or COMMITMENT ON BAIL 296-300

when a person is arrested, he is taken before a justice and examined, 296

if the charges prove unfounded, he is discharged, ........ 296

otherwise, he is committed for safe custody, or held to bail,..... ......... 297

bail must not be refused in bailable cases, nor excessive bail required, ...... 297

anciently all felonies werr bailable, but .statutes make some exceptions, 298

a prisoner committed to await trial is to be treated with the-utmost humanity, 300

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THB SEVK»AL MODES OP PROSECUTION, 301-316

prosecution of offenders is either with or without the previous finding of the fact

by inquest or grand jury, 301

the first is either by presentment or indictment 301

a presentment, properly speaking, is the notice taken by a grand jury of an

offence from their own knowledge or observation, 301

an inquisition of office is the act of a jury summoned by the proper officer to

inquire of matters relating to the crown, 301

as in case of felo de se, deodands, Ac., 301

an indictment is a written accusation of crime, preferred to and presented upon

oath by a grand jury, 302

which is a tribunal of not less than twelve nor more than twenty-three,. 302

who are charged by the judge, and proceed upon evidence, 303

and inquire only for the body of the county, 303

they return a bill not a true bill, or a true bill, 305

twelve must concur in finding a bill, 306

indictments must be certain as to person, place, time, and offence, 306

though time and place are generally immaterial 306

informations arc either at suit of the king and a subject jointly, or at suit of

the khig alone 308

the first are a sort of qui tarn action, 308

the second are either filed, ex ojficio, by the attorney-general, or are on

the relation of some private person or common informer, 308
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OF THE SEVERAL MODES OF PROSECTTION—(continutd.) «"»•

the trial must be by jury of the county of the offence, 309

these informations are confined to misdemeanors, 310

informations in the nature of quo warranto are employed, instead of the writ

of that name, 312

formerly there might be an appeal, or a criminal accusation by a private sub-

ject against another, demanding punishment on account of the partic-

ular injury suffered by a crime, 312

which could be had in case of larceny, rape, arson, and murder, 314

trial on which was a bar to indictment, but an appeal might be had after

acquittal on indictment,. 315

the king could not pardon in case of appeal, but the appellee might re-

lease, 316

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF PROCESS UPON AN INDICTMENT, 318-321

process to bring in an offender, when indicted in his absence, is by venire facias,

distress infinite, capias, and, if he absconds, outlawry, 318

the punishment of outlawry is forfeiture, and, in treason and felony, conviction

of the offence charged, 319

by certiorari the indictment and proceedings may be removed into the king's bench

before trial, 320

which is done, 1. to determine the validity of proceedings; 2. to obtain an
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impartial trial; 3. to plead a pardon; or, 4. to obtain process of outlawry, 320

in case of a peer the indictment is transmitted on certiorari into parliament, 321

CHAPTER XXV.

Or ARRAIGNMENT AND ITS [NTIDBNTS,.... 322-331

arraignment is calling the prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the indictment, 322

when arraigned the indictment is read to him, and it is demanded whether he

is guilty or not guilty, ... 323

if he makes no answer, or answers foreign to the purpose, or, after pleading

not guilty, refuses to put himself upon the country, he is said to stand

mute, 324

which in treason, petit larceny and misdemeanors was equivalent to con-

viction, 325

in other cases the prisoner was subjected to the peine forte et dure, 325

torture illegal in England 326

now if the prisoner stands mute a plea of not guilty is entered, 324n

if he pleads guilty, judgment is awarded...... 329

if he confesses and accuses another to obtain pardon, he is called an approver, 329

CHAPTER XXVI.

Or PLEA ANB Issus 332r341

the defence of the accused is made either by, 1. plea to the jurisdiction; 2. de-

murrer; 3. plea in abatement; 4. special plea in bar; 5. general issue,.... 332

formerly plea of sanctuary and benefit of clergy, 332

plea to the jurisdiction is when an indictment is taken before a court that hath no

cognizance of the offence 333

demurrer admits the fact, but denies that in law a crime is charged, 333

which, if adjudged ngainst the prisoner in case of felony, he shall pi pad over, 334

plea in abatement is principally for misnomer, and must show how the defect may

be remedied, 334

special plea in bar is either autrefois acquit, autrtfois convict, autrefois attaint, or a

pardon, 335-338

which if found against the prisoner he may plead not guilty,. 338

the general issue is the plea of not guilty, 338

CHAPTER XXVII.

Or TRIAL AND CONVICTION, 342-304

formerly there were methods of trial not now allowed, 342

1. tried by ordeal, , 342-345

2. trial by the corsned or morsel of execration, 345

3. trial by battle, 346

xxviii ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

OF TRIAL AND CoNTiCTiriN— (continued.)

the methods now in use are:

4. in the court of the lord high steward when a peer is capitally indicted 348

5. trial by jury secured by niagna charm 349

the advantages of which considered 349

the process to obtain jury, 350

the pi isoner entitled to a copy of the indictment, 351

and list of witnesses against him, 351

and compulsory process for his witnesses, 351

the jury consists of twelve, who must be sworn, 352

challenges may be had either by the crown or the prisoner; 1. to the

array; 2. to the polls 352

an alien may have a jury de medietate except in treason, 352

at common law the prisoner may have 35 peremptory challenges,..353, 354

if by reason of challenges the jury be not full a tales is issued, 354

the prisoner is now, though not formerly, allowed a full defence by

counsel in all cases 355n

the doctrine of evidence generally the same as in civil cases, 356

but in treason and misprision of treason two witnesses are required, 356

presumptive evidence of felony to be admitted cautiously, 358

the witnesses for the prisoner now examined on oath 360

the verdict of the jury is either, 1. general, guilty or not guilty, or 2.
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special, setting forth the facts and praying the judgment of the

court whether they establish the crime 360

if not guilty, the prisoner is forever discharged, 361

if guilty, there may be allowance to the prosecutor for expenses,

and restitution of stolen goods, 362

and in some cases the prisoner is allowed to speak (or settle)

with the prosecutor, 368

CHAPTER XXVIII.

OP THE BENEFIT OF CLKROY 365-374

benefit of clergy had its origin in the usurped jurisdiction of the popish ecclesiastics, 365

originally none but the clergy admitted; afterwards all who could read, 367

on plea of clergy the prisoner was burned in the hand and discharged;

by the statute 18 Eliz. might be imprisoned a year, 308, 369

subsequent statutory changes, until benefit of clergy means exemption

from capital punishment, 369-373

now it is wholly abolished, 3C5n

it was allowable only in petit treason and capital felonies, 374
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COMMENTARIES

ON

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK THE THIRD.

OF PRIVATE WRONGS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE REDRESS OF PRIVATE WRONGS BY THE MERE ACT

OF THE PARTIES.

AT the opening of these Commentaries (ft) municipal law was in general de-

fined to be, "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a state,

commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong." (b) From hence,

therefore, it followed, that the primary objects of the law are the establishment of

rights, and the prohibition of wrongs. And this occasioned (c) the distribution

of these collections into two general heads; under the former of which we have

already considered the rights that were defined and established, and under the

latter are now to consider the wrongs that are forbidden, and redressed by the

laws of England.

*In the prosecution of the first of these enquiries, we distinguished r *« i

rights into two sorts: first, such as concern, or are annexed to, the per- L J

eons of men, and are then called jura personarum, or the rights of persons;

which, together with the means of acquiring and losii% them, composed the first

book of these Commentaries: and secondly, such as a man may acquire over ex-

ternal objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are called jura
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rerum, or the rights of things: and these, with the means of transferring them

from man to man, were the subject of the second book. I am now, therefore,

to proceed to the consideration of wrongs; which for the most part convey to us

an idea merely negative, as being nothing else but a privation of right For

which reason it was necessary, that before we entered at all into the discussion

of wrongs, we should entertain a clear and distinct notion of rights: the con-

templation of what \sjus being necessarily prior to what may be termed inju-

ria, and the definition of fas precedent to that of nefas.

Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs, and public

wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil

rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon

frequently termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and violation of pub-

<«l Intrmlue. 11.

(ft) Sanctlojusta,jubeiu honetta, etprohlbetu eontraHa. Cle. 11. PhUlpp. 12. Bract. I. 1, c. 8.

(at Book I, ch. 1.

2 REDRESS BY ACT OP THE PARTY. [Book III

lie rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a com-

munity; and are distinguished by the harsher appellations of crimes and mis-

demeanors. To investigate the first of these species of wrongs, with their legal

remedies, will be our employment in the present book; and the other specie?

will be reserved till the -e-t or concluding volume.

The more effectually to accomplish the redress of private injuries, courts ol

justice are instituted in every civilized society, in order to protect the weak from

the insults of the stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws by which

rights are defined, and wrongs prohibited. This remedy is therefore princi-

r *31 pally to be sought by application to these "courts of justice; that is, by

L •" civil suit or action. For which reason our chief employment in this boot

will be to consider the redress of private wrongs, by suit or action in courts

But as there are certain injuries of such a nature, that some of them furnish

and others require a more speedy remedy than can be had in the ordinary forms

of justice, there is allowed in those cases an extrajudicial or eccentrical kind of

remedy; of which I shall first of all treat, before I consider the several remedies

by suit: and, to that end, shall distribute the redress of private wrongs into

three several species: first, that which is obtained by the mere act of the parties

themselves; secondly, that which is effected by the mere act and operation oi

law; and, thirdly, that which arises from suit or action in courts, which con-

sists in a conjunction of the other two, the act of the parties co-operating with

the act of law.
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A.\\&, first, of that redress oi private injuries, which is obtained by the mere

act of me parties. This is of two sorts: first* that which arises from the act of

the injured party only; and, secondly, that which arises from the joint act of

all the parties together: both which "I shall consider in their order.

Of the first sort, or that which arises from the sole act of the injured party, is,

I. The defence of one's self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as

stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, master and ser-

vant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these his relations, (1) be

forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by

force; and the breach of the peace which happens, is chargeable upon him only

who began the affray, (d) For the law, in this case, respects the passions of the

human mind; and (when external violence is offered to a man himself, or those

to whom he bears a near connexion) makes it lawful in him to do himself that

r *, -i immediate justice, to which he *is prompted by nature, and which no pru-

L J dential motives are strong enough to restrain. It considers that the future

process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with

force; since it is impossible to say to what wanton lengths of rapine or cruel ty out-

rages of this sort might be carried, unless it were permitted a man immediately

(d} a Boll. Abr. 540. 1 Hawk. P. C. 13)

(1) In the defence of one's self, or any member of his family, a man has a right to employ

all necessary violence, even to the tokiug of life. Shorter v. People, 2 N. Y. 193; Yatea v.

People, Si N. Y. 509; Logne v. Commonwealth, 38 Penn. St. 265; Pond «. People, 8 Mich.

150; Maher v. People, 24 111. 241. But except where a forcible felony is attempted against

person or property, ho is always to avoid such lamentable consequences if possible, and he can-

not justify standing up and resisting to the death when the assailant might have been avoided

by retreat. Peoples. Sullivan, 7 N. Y. 3tW. But when a man is assaulted in his dwelling, ho

is under no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which ho may defend to any extrem-

ity. And this means not simply the dwelling-houso proper; whatever at the common law is

Within the curtilage is entitled "to the same protection. Pond v. People, 6 ,M idi. 150. And in

deciding what force it is necessary to employ in resisting the assault, a man must act upon the

circumstances as they appear to him at the time, and ho is not to be held criminal because on.

a calm survey of the facts afterwards it appears that the force employed was excessive. See

the cases cited above; also Henton t>. State, 24 Texas, 454 ; Schiner v. People, 23 111. 17 : Pat-

ten v. People, 18 Mich. 314. In the last case it was held that where a man s dwelling, in which

was his mother in feeble health, was assailed by rioters, and he had reason to believe that the

noise and threats of the assailants endangered his mother's life, ho had the same right to em-

ploy force to quell the riot that he would have had to defend his mother agaiust an actual

attack upon hur person.

2
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to oppose one violence with another. Self defence, therefore, as it is justly

called the primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken

away by the law of society. In the English law, particularly, it is held an excuse

for breaches of the peace, nay even for homicide itself: but care must be taken,

that the resistance does not exceed the bounds of mere defence and prevention;

for then the defender would himself become an aggressor.

II. Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of the

party injured. This happens, when any one hath deprived another of his

property in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child,

or servant: in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or

master, may lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find them;

so it be not in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the peace, (e) The

reason for this is obvious; since it may frequently happen that the owner may

have this only opportunity of doing himself justice: his goods may be after-

wards conveyed away or destroyed; and his wife, children, or servants, con-

cealed or carried out of his reach; if he had no speedier remedy than the

ordinary process of law. If, therefore, he can so contrive it as to gain possession

of his property again, without force or terror, the law favours and will justify

his proceeding. But, as the public peace is a superior consideration to any one

man's private property; and, as, if individuals were once allowed to use private

force as a remedy for private injuries, all social justice must cease, the strong

would give la\v to the weak, and every man would revert to a state of nature;

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

for these reasons it is provided, that this natural right of recaption *shall r *= -i

never be exerted, where such exertion must occasion strife and bodily "- -"

contention, or endanger the peace of society. If, for instance, my horse is taken

away, and I find him in a common, a fair, or a public inn, I may lawfully seize

him to my own use; but I cannot justify breaking open a private stable, or

entering on the grounds of a third person, to take him, except he be feloniously

stolen; (f) but must have recourse to an action at law. (2)

III. As recaption is a remedy given to the party himself, for an injury to his

personal property, so, thirdly, a remedy of the same kind for injuries to real

property, is by entry on lands and tenements, when another person without any

right has taken possession thereof. (3) This depends in some measure on like

r«JSInstl31. Hal. Anal. » 48. (f) 2 Roll. Bep. 45, 66, 208. 2 ttoll. Abr. 565, 5«6.

(2) [In the ease of personal property improperly detained or taken away, it may be retaken

from the house and custody of the wrongdoer, even without a previous request; but unless

it was seized or attempted to be seized forcibly, the owner canuot justify doing any thing

more than gently laving his hands on the wrongdoer in order to recover it; 8 T. R. 78; 2

Roll. Abr. 56, 208 ; id". 565, pi. 50 ; 2 Leonard, 202; Selw. X. P. tit. Assault and Battery ; nor

can he without leave enter the door of a third person, uot privy to the wrongful detainer,

to take his goods therefrom. 2 Roll. Abr. 05, 56, 208; id. 5fi5, I, pi. 2; Bac. Ab. Tres-

pass, F.I

Nor can he lawfully enter upon the lands of a third party who is not a wrongdoer for

the purpose of retaking his own property: Heermauco «. Vernoy, 6 Johns. 5; Blake v.

Jerome, 14 id. 406; and his attempt to do so may be resisted by force. Newkirk v. Sabler, 9

Barb. 652.

(3) [With respect to land, and houses also, resumption of possession by the mere act of the

party is frequently allowed. Thus, if a tenant omit at the expiration of his tenancy, to

deliver up possession, the landlord may legally, in his absence, break open the outer door and

resume possession, though some articles of furniture remain therein; and if the landlord put

his cattle on the land, and the tenant distrain them as a damage-feasant, he may lie sued.

1 Bing. K. 158; 7 T. R. 481, 432; 1 Price R. 53; Andr. 109 ; 6 Taunt 202. If the landlord, in

resuming possession, be guilty of a forcible entry with strong hand, or other illegal breach of the

peace, he will be liable to an indictment. 7 T. R. 432; 3 id. 295; 6 Taunt. 202; 8 T. R. 364,

4O3. But the circumstance of the owner of property using too much force in regaining pos-

session, but taking care to avoid personal injury to the party resisting, will not enable the

latter to sue him. But if any unnecessary violence to the person bo used in rescuing or

defending possession of real or personal property, the party guilty of it is liable to be sued.

8 T. R. 299; id. 78; 1 Sannd. 296, n. 1. So, as the law allows retaking of the possession of

land, it also sanctions the due defence of the possession thereof; and therefore, though if one

enter into iny ground, I must request him to depart before I can lay hands on him to turn

3
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reasons with the former; and like that, too, most be peaceable and without

force. There is some nicety required to define and distinguish the cases, in

which such entry is lawful or otherwise; it will therefore be more fully con-

sidered in a subsequent chapter; being only mentioned in this place for the sake

of regularity and order.

IV. A fourth species of remedy by the mere act of the party injured, is the

abatement or removal of nuisances. (4) What nuisances are, and their several

species, we shall find a more proper place to inquire under some of the sub-

sequent divisions. At present I shall only observe, that whatsoever unlaw-

fully annoys or doth damage to another is a nuisance; and such nuisance

may be abated, that is, taken away or removed, by the party aggrieved thereby,

so as he commits no riot in the doing of it. (g) If a house or wall is erected

so near to mine that it stops my ancient lights, which is a private nuisance,

I may enter my neighbor's land, and peaceably pull it down. (h) Or if a new

gate be erected across the public highway, which is a common nuisance, any

of the king's subjects passing that wav, may cut it down and destroy it. (*)

r *g -i *And the reason why the law allows this private and summary method

L -"of doing one's self justice, is because injuries of this kind, which ob-

struct or annoy snch things as are of daily convenience and use, require an im-

mediate remedy, and cannot wait for the slow progress of the ordinary forms of

justice.

(it) 9 Hep. 101. 9 Rep. SS. (h) Salk. K». (i) Cro. Car. 181.
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him out, yet if he refused I may then push him out, and if he enter with actual force I need not

first request him to be gone, hut may lay hands on him immediately. 8 T. K. 78; 1 Salk. 641;

gee 1 King. 158.]

(4) [Thus, in case of apvblic nuisance, if a liouse be built across a highway any perepn may

pull it down : but it is a general rule, that the abatement mint, be limited by its necessity, and

no wanton or unnecessary injury must bo committed. 2 Salk. 458. As to private nuisances,

they also may be abated; and therefore it was recently held, that if a man in his own soil

erect a thing which is a nuisance to another, as by stopping a rivnlot, and so diminishing the

water used by the latter for his cattle, the party injured may enter on the soil of the other and

abate the nuisance, and justify the trespass; and this right of abatement is not confined merely

to a house, mill, or land. 2 Smith's Kep. 9; 2 Rul. Ab. 565; 2 Leon. 202; Com. Dig. Pleader, 3

M. 42; 3 Lev. 92.

As to cutting trees, "if the boughs of your trees grow ont into my land, I may cut

them." Per Croke, J., Rol. Rep. 394; 3 Bnla. 198; Tin. Ab. Trees, B. and tit. Nuisance, W,

2, pi. 3.

The abater of a private nuisance cannot remove the materials further than necessary; or con-

vert them to his own use. flalt. c. 50. And so much only of the thing as causes the nuisance

should be removed ; as if a house be built ton high, only so much of it as is too high should be

pulled down. 9 Kep. 53; God. 221; 2 Stra. 668.]

Any obstruction to a navigable river is a nuisance, whioh any citizen having occasion to use

the river for the passage of his vessel may lawfully remove. Inhab. of Arnndol T. McCnlloch, 10

Mass. 70. And the permission of the town to create the obstruction will not preclude the abate-

ment. Id. But that which the legislature of the state permits cannot be a public nuisance :

"Williams r. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 18 Barb. 222; unless the permission is exceeded: Ronwick

r. Morris, 7 Hill, 575; Hinchman r. Railroad Co., 2 Green, N. J. 75; it may nevertheless be a

private nuisance, as where a dam erected by legislative act floods the lands of an individual, in

which case he may abate it. State v. Moffett, 1 Greeno, Iowa, 247. Generally a legislative act

permitting the construction of a bridgu or dam across a navigable stream is a eumplete protection

to the structure. Commonwealth r. Breed, 4 Pick. 460; Depow r. Trustees of W. and E. Canal,

5 Ind. 8; Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N. H. 200. Except where the river constitutes a high-

way for foreign or inter-state commerce, in which case the regulations which congress might pre-

scribe would be supreme: See Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 72; United

States v. New Bedford Bridge, 1 Wood, and M. 401; Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How 5l«. A

statutory penalty or other remedy for abating a private nuisance does not exclude the private

remedy. Wotmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend. 250; State f. Moffett, 1 Greene, Iowa, 247. But in exer-

cising the right to abate, as little iiyury is to be done as possible. Moffett v. Brewer, id. 348.

And if the nuisance consists in occupving a building for an unlawful purpose, it seems that this

does not justify tearing down the building: Welch r. Stowell, 2 Dong. Mich. 332; though if the

occupation is such as to breed disease, it has been held that it might be destroyed if necessary.

Meeker v. Van Rcusselaer, 15 Wend. 397.

As to the right to abate private nuisances in general, see, further, Dimes ». Petley, 15 Q. B.

276; Jones r. Williams, 11 M. and W. 17(5; Davies v. Williams, 16 Q. B. 546; Hyde v. Grahuuv

1 H. and C. 598. Indianapolis r. Miller, 27 Ind. 3S)4.

4
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V. A fifth case, in which the law allows a man to be his own avenger, or to

minister redress to himself, is that of distraining cattle or goods for non-pay-

ment of rent, or other duties; (5) or, distraining another's cattle, damage-

foasauf, that is, doing damage, or trespassing, upon his land. The former

intended for the benefit of landlords, to prevent tenants from secreting or with-

drawing their effects to his prejudice; the latter arising from the necessity of

the thing itself, as it might otherwise be impossible at a future time to ascertain

whose cattle they were that committed the trespass or damage.

As the law of distresses is a point of great use and consequence, I shall con-

sider it with some minuteness: by inquiring, first, for what injuries a distress

may be taken; secondly, what things may be distrained; and thirdly, the man-

lier of taking, disposing of, and avoiding distresses.

1. And, first, it is necessary to premise, that a distress, (j) districtio, is the

taking a personal chattel out of the possession of the wrongdoer into the cus-

tody of the party injured, to procure a satisfaction for the wrong committed.

1. The most usual injury, for which a distress may be taken, is that of non-

payment of rent It was observed in a former book, (k) that .distresses were

incident by the common law to every rent-service, and by particular reservation

to rent-charges also; but not to rent-seek, till the statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28,

extended the same remedy to all rents alike, and thereby in effect abolished all

material distinction between them. So that now we may lay it down as an

court, (1) or other certain personal service, (m) Hhe lord may distrain of com-
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mon right 3. For amercements in acourt-leet a distress maybe had of common

right; but not for amercements in a court-baron, without a special prescription

to warrant it. (n) 4. Another injury, for which distresses may be taken, is

•where a man finds beasts of a stranger wandering in his grounds, damage-

feasant; that is, doing him hurt or damage, by treading down his grass, or the

like; in which case the owner of the soil may detain them, till satisfaction be

made him for the injury he has thereby sustained. 5. Lastly, for several duties

and penalties inflicted by special acts of parliament (as for assessments made by

commissioners of sewers, (o) or for relief of the poor,) (p) remedy by distress

and sale is given ; for the particulars of which we must nave recourse to the

statutes themselves: remarking only, that such distresses (a) are partly analogous

to the ancient distress at common law, as being repleviable and the like; but

(j! The thing Itself taken by this process, as well as tho process itself, is In our lair-books very fre-

quently called a distress.

(k) book II. ch. 3. (I) Bro. Abr. tit. JXttrett, IB. (m) Co. Lift «. (n) Brownl. 86.

(o) Stat. 7 Ann. c. 10. (p) Stat. « Eliz. e. 2. (q) 1 Burr. MS).

(5) [As to distresses in general, see Gilbert on Distresses, by Hunt; Bradby on Dist.; Com.

Dig. Distress; Bac. Ab. Distress; Vin. Ab. Distress: 2 Saunders, index, Distress; "Wilkinson on

Replevin.

Accepting a note of hand, and giving a receipt for the rent, does not, till payment, preclude,

the landlord from distraining ; and so if the landlord accept a bond; but a judgment,

obtained on either of such instruments, would preclude the right of distress. See Bull. N. P.

182. An agreement to take interest on rent in arrear, does not take away the right of distress.

2 Chit. R. 245. Where there are rents for which the party cannot distrain, although he may

have an assize, yet remedy may be had in equity. Per Comeyns, B. Exch. Trin. 5 and (i Geo. -

II; 1 Selw. N. P. (5th ed. 673. But where an estate has been- let without in any way fixing the

amount of rent, the only remedy is by action.]

(C) [But to entitle a party to distrain there must be a rent due in the legal sense of that word.

One man may be in possession of another's house or land, with his consent, and may be bound to

render him sueh a sum for the use and occupation of it as ajury shall deem a proper equiva-

lent for the rent; but if there bo no actual demise, nor any contract for a demise amounting to

as much, and no fixed rent has been agreed on or paid, the owner cannot distrain; for in his

avowry to an action of replevin for such distress he would be bound to state an actual tenancy

and the definite terms of it, which it would be impossible to do under such a relation as above

supposed. Kegan v. Johnson, 2 Taunt. 143; Dunk ». Hunter, 5 B. and A. 322.]

7 REDRESS BY ACT OF THE PARTT. [Book III.

more resembling the common law process of execution, by seizing and selling

the goods of the debtor under a writ of fieri facias, of which hereafter.

2. Secondly; as to the things which may be distrained, or taken in distress,

(7) we may lay it down as a general rule that all chattels personal are liable to

be distrained, unless particularly protected or exempted. Instead, therefore of

mentioning what things are distrainable, it will be easier to recount those which

are not so, with the reason of their particular exemptions, (r) And, 1. As every-

thing which is distrained is presumed to be the property of the wrongdoer, it

will follow that such things wherein no man can have an absolute and valuable

property (as dogs, cats, rabbits, and *all animals ferce naturce) cannot be

L J distrained. Yet if deer (which are ferce naturce) are kept in a private

inclosure for the purpose of sale or profit, this so far changes their nature, by

reducing them to a kind of stock or merchandise, that they may be distrained

for rent, (s) Whatever is in the personal use or occupation of any man, is for

the time privileged and protected from any distress; as an axe with which a

man is cutting wood, or a horse while a man is riding him. But horses draw-

ing a cart, may (cart and all) be distrained for rent-arrere; and also, if a horse,

though a man be riding him, be taken damage-feasant, or trespassing in

another's grounds, the horse (notwithstanding his rider) may be distrained and

led away to the pound, (t) (8) Valuable things in the way of trade shall not be

liable to distress. As a horse standing in a smith shop to be shoed, or in a common

inn ; or cloth at a tailor's house; or corn sent to a mill or market. For all these
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are protected and privileged for the benefit of trade; and are supposed in com-

mon presumption not to belong to the owner of the house, but to his cus-

tomers. (9) But, generally speaking, whatever goods and chattels the landlord

(r) Co. Litt. 47. (>) Davis ». Powell, C. S. Hil. 11 Ota. II. (t) \ Sid. 440.

(7) [Besides the rales in the text, it is a maxim, of law, that goods in tlie custody of the late

cannot be distrained; thus goods distrained, damage-feasant, cannot be distrained: Co. Litt.

47 a • so goods taken in execution: "Willes, 131: but the goods so taken must be removed

from the premises within a reasonable time, or they will not be protected, 1 Price, 277; I'M.

and S. 711; however, growing com, sold under a writ of fl. fa., cannot be distrained, unless

the purchaser allow it to remain uncut an unreasonable time after it is ripe: 2 B. and B.

362-5 Moore, 97, S. C.: but goods, taken under a void outlawry, are liable to distress. 7 T.

R 259. For the protection of landlords, by the 8 Ann. c. 14. s. 1, no goods taken in execu-

tion upon any premises demised can be removed until rent, not exceeding one year's arrear,

be pam. Only rent due at the time of the levy can be obtained under the act: 1 M. and S.

245- 1 Price, 274; but forehand rent, or rent stipulated to be paid in advance, may be

obtained. 7 Price, 690. If tho sheriff remove the (foods without payment of the rent, and

after notice and a formal demand of the rent, an action on tho case lies against him. 3 Stra.

97 • 3 B. and A. 440. But no specific and formal notice is necessary. 3 B. and A. 645; 4

Moore 473; 2 B. and B. 67, S. C. The action liea, though part only of the goods be

removed; 4 Moore, 473; 2 B. and B. 67, S. C. ; but the landlord's consenting to the removal

waives his remedy. 3 Camp. 24. Instead of an action, tho landlord may move the court out

of which the execution issued, that he may be paid what is due to him out of the money

levied and in the sheriff's hands.: Cas. Tern. Hardw. 255; 2 Wils. 140; and the court will

grant the motion, though the sheriff had no notice of the rent due till after the removal. 3 B.

and A. 440.

The county court act, 19 and 20 Vic. e. 108, contains a provision analogous to that of the

statute of Anne. It enacts that where goods in a tenement for which rent is due are taken in

i-xecution under the warrant of a county court, the landlord may claim the rent due him by-

iielivering a notice to the bailiff making the levy, and snch bailiff shall then, in making the

levy distrain also for the rent so claimed. See Beard v. Knight, 8 E. and B. 865.]

(B) The court of king's bench, in Storey v. Robinson, 6 T. R. 138, decided, contrary to this dic-

tum that such a distress could not be made, as it would lead to a breach of the peace. And see

Field v. Adames, 12 Ad. and Ell. 649; Bunch v. Kennington, 1 Q. B. 679.

As to what may and what may not be taken by distress, see Simpson v. Hartopp, "Willes, 512,

•ind the notes thereto, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 187.

(9) Goods of a principal in the hands of a factor are privileged frota distress for rent due

Vom such factor to his landlord, on the ground that the rule of public convenience, put of

.vhith the privilege arises, is within the exception of a landlord's general right to distrain,

uid therefore that such goods are protected for the benefit of trade. 6 Moore Rep. 243; 3B.

uulB. 75, S. C. So goods landed at a wharf and consigned to a broker, as agent of the con-

..iguor for sale, and placed by tho broker in the wharfinger's warehouse for sate custody until
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finds upon the premises, whether they in fact belong to the tenant or a stranger,

are distrainable by him for rent: for otherwise a door would be open to infinite

frauds upon the landlord; and the stranger has his remedy over by action on

the case against the tenant, if by the tenant's default the chattels are distrained,

so that lie cannot render them when called upon. With regard to a stranger's

beasts which are found upon the tenant's land, the following distinctions are how-

ever taken. If they are put in by consent of the owner of the beasts, they are

.distrainable immediately afterwards for rent-arrere by the landlord, (u) (10) So

also of the stranger's cattle break the fences, and commit a trespass by coming

on the land, they are distrainable immediately by the lessor for his tenant's

rent, as a punishment to the owner of the beasts for the wrong committed

through his negligence, (v) But if the lands were not *sumciently fenced r *q -i

so as to keep out cattle, the landlord cannot distrain them, till they have L ->

been levant and couchant (levantes et cubantes) on the land; that is, have been

long enough there to have lain down and rose up to feed; which in general is

held to be one night at least:(11) and then the law presumes, that the owner

may have notice whether his cattle have strayed, and it is his own negligence

not to have taken them away. Yet, if the lessor or his tenant were bound to

repair the fences and did not, and thereby the cattle escaped into their grounds,

without the negligence or default of the owner ; in this case, though the cattle

may have been levant and couchant, yet they are not distrainable for rent, till

actual notice is given to the owner that they are there, and he neglects to
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remove them: (w) for the law will not suffer the landlord to take advantage of

his own or his tenant's wrong. (12) 4. There are also other things privileged

by the ancient common law; as a man's tools and utensils of his trade, the axe

of a carpenter, the books of a scholar, and the like: which are said to be privi-

leged for the sake of the public, because the taking them away would disable the

owner from serving the commonwealth in his station. (13) So, beasts of the

(u) Cro. Eliz. 549. (v) Co. Lilt 47. (w) Lutw. 1580.

an opportunity for polling them should occur, are not distrainable for rent due in respect of

the wharf and •warehouse, as they were brought to the wharf in the course of trade. 1 Bing.

2S3. So goods carried to be weighed, eveii at a private beam, if in the way of trade, are

exempt; so is a horse that has carried corn to a mill to be ground, and during the grinding of

the corn is tied to the mill door. Cro. Eliz. 549, 596. Goods in a public fair are exempt from

distress, unless for toll due from the owner. 2 Lutw. 1380. Goods in possession of a carrier

are also exempt, and this though the earner be not a public one. 1 Salk. 249.]

Upon the subject of exemptions from distress the following American cases are referred to:

Himely r. Wyatt, 1 Bay, 102; Phaelon v. McBride, id. 170; Youngblood v. Lowrey, 2 McCord,

39; Walker r. Johnson, 4 id. 552 ; Hoskins ». Paul, 4 Halst. 110 ; 'Brown v. Sims, 17 S. and R.

138; Stone v. Mathews, 7 Hill, 428; Counah r. Hale, 23 Wend. 462. These cases hold, gen-

erally, that wherever the tenant, in the regular course of his business, comes into possession

of the goods of his customers, they are not subject to distress for his rent. See Kiddle v. Welden,

5 Whart. 9.

Many of the United States have, by statute, abolished the landlord's remedy by distress.

(10) [Except where they are on the way to a distant market, and are put in to rest for the night,

in which case they are privileged for the public benefit. Tate v. Gleed, 2 Wms. Suund. 290, n. 7.]

(11) [Levant and couchaut in this sense means, that the cattle must be lying down and rising

up on the premises for a night and a day, without pursuit made by the owner of them. Gilb.

Dis. by Hunt, 3d ed. 47.]

(12) [In the case of Poole r. Longuevill, 2 Saund. 289, the contrary was determined, but

that case was overruled in 2 Lutw. 1580, and the result of the cases seems to be, that if a

stranger's beasts escape into another's land, by default of the owner of the beasts, as by

breaking the fences, otherwise sufficient, they may be distrained for rent immediately, with-

out being levant and eottchant; but that if they escape there by default of the tenant of the

land, or for want of his keeping a sufficient fence, then they cannot be distrained for rent or

service of any kiud till they nave been levant and concbont, nor afterwards by a landlord for

rent on a lease, unless the owner of the beasts neglect or refuse, after actual notice, to remove

them within a reasonable time; but it is said, that such notice is not necessary where the dis-

tress is by the lord of the fee, or by the grantee of a rent-charge. 2 Lntw. 1573; Co. Litt.

47, b. n. 3; Gilb. Dis. by Hunt. 3d ed. 45; 2 Saund. 290, n. 7, 285," n. 4. See also Singleton v.

Williamson, 7 H. and N. 410.]

(13) [A stocking frame, (Wills, 512), or a loom, (4 T. R. 565), being implements of trade,

cannot be distrained; but it must be observed, that utensils and implements of trade may be
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plough avaria cornea, and sheep, are privileged from distresses at common

law; (x) while dead goods or other sorts of beasts, which Bracton calls caialla

otioga, may be distrained. But as beasts of the plough may be taken in execu-

tion for debt, so they may be for distresses by statute, which partake of the nature

of executions, (y) And perhaps the true reason why these and the tools of a

man's trade were privileged at the common law, was because the distress was

then merely intended to compel the payment of the rent, and not as a satisfac-

tion for its non-payment: and therefore, to deprive the party of the instruments

and means of paying it, would counteract the very end of the distress, (z)

5. Nothing shall be distrained for rent, which may not be rendered again in as

good plight as when it was distrained: for which reason milk, fruit and the

rfciQn like, cannot be distrained, a distress at *common law being only in the

L J nature of a pledge or security, to be restored in the same plight when the

debt is paid. So, anciently, sheaves or shocks of corn could not be distrained,

because some damage must needs accrue in their removal, but a cart loaded

with corn might; as that could be safely restored. But now by statute 2 W.

and M. c. 5, corn in sheaves or cocks, or loose in the straw, or hay in barns or

ricks, or otherwise, may be distrained, as well as other chattels. 6. Lastly,

things fixed to the freehold may not be distrained; as caldrons, windows,

doors and chimney-pieces : for they savour of the realty. (14) For this reason

also corn growing could not be distrained; till the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19,

empowered landlords to distrain corn, grass or other products of the earth, and
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to cut and gather them when ripe. (15)

Let us next consider, thirdly, how distresses may be taken, disposed of or

avoided. And, first, I must premise, that the law of distresses is greatly altered

within a few years last past. Formerly, they were looked upon in no other light

than as a mere pledge or security, for payment of rent or other duties, or satisfac-

tion for damage done. And so the law still continues with regard to distresses of

beasts taken damage-feasant, and for other causes, not altered by act of parlia-

ment ; over which the distrainor has no other power than to retain them till satis-

faction is made. But distresses for rent-arrere being found by the legislature to

be the shortest and most effectual method of compelling the payment of such rent,

many beneficial laws for this purpose have been made in the present century;

which have much altered the common law, as laid down in our ancient writers.

In pointing out, therefore, the methods of distraining, I shall in general sup-

pose the distress to be made for rent; and remark, where necessary, the differ-

ences between such distress, and one taken for other causes,

[•••i-j-i *In tne nrst place then all distresses must be made by day (16) unless

L J in the case of damage-feasant; an exception being there allowed, lest

(x) Slat. 51 Hen. Ill, el. 4, dedMrictianes tcacearn. (f\ 1 Burr. 689. (z) Ibid. 688.

distrained where they are not in actual use, and no other sufficient distress can be fonnd on

the premises. Co. liitt 47, a; 4 T. K. 565. This rale of exemption does not extend to cases

where a distress is given in the nature of an execution by any particular statute, as for poor

rates and the like: 3 Salk. 136; 1 Burr. 579; Lord Raym. 384; 1 Sulk. 249; S. C.; nor where

the distress is for damage-feagaut. Com. Dig. Distress, B. 4.]

(14) [Co. Litt. 47, b. This rule extends to such things us are essentially parts of the free-

hold, although for a time removed therefrom, as a millstone, removed to be picked. 4 T.

R. 567.1

(15) [The act applies only to corn and other produce of the land which may become ripe

and are capable of being cut and laid up; therefore trees, shrubs and plants, growing on laud

which the defendant* nad demised to the plaintiffs for a term, and which they had converted

into a nursery ground, and planted subsequently to the demise, were held not distrainable by

the former for rent. 2 Moore, 491; 8 Taunt. 431, S. C. ; 3 Moore, 114, S. P.

To these heads of things not distrainable may be added, all goods in the custody of the

lav, whether as being already distrained damage-feasant, or taken in execution. In this last

cose, however, so long as they remain on the premises, the statute B Ann. c. 14, gives the land-

lord a beneficial lien on them, for which see post, p. 417.]

As to the exemption from distress of goods in the custody of the law, see Taylor's Land,

and Ten. $ 594, et scq.

(16) [The distress cannot be mode till the day after the rent falls due, unless, indeed, there

be an agreement or local custom to the contrary. Gilb. Dist. 56, etc.; Hargrove's Co. Litt.
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the beasts should escape before they are taken, (a) And, when a person intends

to make a distress, he mnst, by himself or his bailiff, enter on the demised prem-

ises : formerly during the continuance of the lease, but now, (b) if the tenant

holds over, the landlord may distrain within six months after the determination

of the lease; provided his own title or interest, as well as the tenant's possession,

continue at the time of the distress. If the lessor does not find sufficient distress

on the premises, formerly he could resort nowhere else ; and, therefore, tenants

who were knavish made a practice to convey away their goods and stock fraudu-

lently from the house or lands demised, in order to cheat their landlords. But

now (c) the landlord may distrain any goods of his tenant, earned off the prem-

ises clandestinely, wherever he finds them within thirty days after, unless they

have been bona fde sold for a valuable consideration : and all persons privy to,

or assisting in, such fraudulent conveyance, forfeit double the value to the land-

lord. The landlord may also distrain the beasts of his tenant, feeding upon any

commons or wastes, appendant or appurtenant to the demised premises. The

landlord might not formerly break open a house, to make a distress, for that is

a breach of the peace. But when he was in the house, it was held that he might

break open an inner door; (d) and now (e) he may, by the assistance of the peace-

officer of the parish, break open in the daytime any place whither the goods

have been fraudulently removed and locked up to prevent a distress; oath being

first made, in case it be a dwelling-house, of a reasonable ground to susoect that

such goods are concealed therein. (17)
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Where a man is entitled to distrain for an entire duty, he ought to distrain

for the whole at once; and not for part at one time, and part at another. (/) (18)

But if he distrains for the whole, and there is not sufficient on the premises, or

he happens *to mistake in the value of the thing distrained, and so takes r*.. „-]

an insufficient distress, he may take a second distress to complete his L J

remedy, (g)

Distresses must be proportioned to the thing distrained for. By the statute

of Marlbridge, 62 Hen. Ill, c. 4, if any man takes a great or unreasonable dis-

tress, for rent-arrere, he shall be heavily amerced for the same. As if (h) the

landlord distrains two oxen for twelve-pence rent; the taking of both is an

unreasonable distress; but if there were no other distress nearer the value to

be found, he might reasonably have distrained one of them; but for homage,

fealty, or suit and service, as also for parliamentary wages, it is said that no dis-

tress can be excessive, (t) For as these distresses cannot be sold, the owner,

upon making satisfaction, may have his chattels again. The remedy for exces-

sive distresses is by a special action on the statute of Marlbridge, for an action

of trespass is not maintainable upon this account, it being no injury at the

common law. (j) (19)

(a) Co. Lilt. 142. IM Stat 8 Ann. c. 14. (el Stat 8 Ann. c. 14. 11 Geo. II, c. 19.

(d) Co. Lin nil. Comberb. 17. (e) suit. 11 Geo. II, c. 19. (/) 2 l.iitw. 1532.

(g) Cm. Eli*. IS. Stat. 17 Carr. II, c. 7. 1 Burr. SHO. (A) Z Inst. 107.

(?) Hi'". Air. t. aitue, 291, prerogative, W. (j) 1 Ventr. nil. Fitzgibb. 85. 1 Burr. 690.

47, b. n. 6. The distress mnst not be mode after tender of payment of the entire rent due. Ac-

cording to 8 Co. 147, a.; Gilb. Dist. by Hunt, 76 etc.; 3 Stark. 171; 1 Taunt. 261, tender upon

the laud before the distress makes the distress tortious; tender after the distress, and before the

impounding, makes the detainer, and not the taking, wrongful ; tender after impounding

makes neither the one nor the other wrongful; but in the case of a distress for rent, upon the

eqnitv of the 2 W. and M. c. 5, a sale of the distress after tender of the rent and costs, would be

illegal I

(17) [A landlord who enters on his tenant's premises to distrain, is justified in breaking an outer

door in the ordinary way in which other persons can do it when it is left so as to be accessible to

all who have occasion to go into the premises: Ryan v. Shilcock, 7 Exch. 72; but he cannot

break open an outer door of a stable, although not within the curtilage, to levy a distress. Brown

c. Glenn, l(i Q. B. 254. See further as to tic mode of entry to distrain, Hancock v. Austin, 14

C. B. N. S. 634 ; Nash v. Lucas., L. K. 2 Q. B. 590.]

(18) [If the cattle distrained dio in the pound, the loss will fall on the party distrained on, and

not upon the distrainor. Burr. 1738; 1 Sulk. 248; 11 East, 54.]

(19) [And see 2 Stra. 851; 3 Leon. 48. See exceptions, IBu

298. It is no bar to this action, that between the distress and sale of the goods distrained, the

(19) [And see 2 Stra. 851; 3 Leon. 48. See exceptions, 1 Burr. 582; 1 H. Bla. 13; 9 East

ir to this action,
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When the distress is thus taken, the next consideration is the disposal of it.

For which purpose the things distrained must in the first place be carried to

some pound, and there impounded by the taker. But, in their way thither,

they may be rescued by the owner, in case the distress was taken without cause,

or contrary to law : as if no rent be due; if they were taken upon the highway,

or the like; in these cases the tenant may lawfully make rescue, (k) But if

they be once impounded, even though taken without any cause, the owner may

not break the pound and take them out; for they are then in the custody of the

law. (I)

A pound (parcus, which signifies any inclosure) is cither pound-over/, that is,

open overhead; or pound-eot'ertf, that is, close. By the statute 1 and 2 P. and

M. c. 12, no distress of cattle can be driven out of the hundred where it is

F*131 ^ken, *unless to a pound-overt within the same shire; and within three

I- -I miles of the place where it was taken. This is for the benefit of the ten-

ants, that they may know where to find and replevy the distress. And by stat-

ute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, which was made for the benefit of landlords, any person

distraining for rent may turn any part of the premises, upon which a distress is

taken, into a pound, pro hoc vice, for securing of such distress. If a live dis-

tress, of animals, be impounded in a common pound-overt, the owner must take

notice of it at his peril; but if in any special pound-overt, so constituted for this

particular purpose, the distrainor must give notice to the owner: and in both

these cases, the owner, and not the distrainor, is bound to provide the beasts
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with food and necessaries. But if they are put in a pound-covert, in a stable or

the like, the landlord or distrainor must feed and sustain them, (m) (20) A dis-

tress of household goods, or other dead chattels, which are liable to be stolen or

damaged by weather, ought to be impounded in a pound-covert, else the distrainor

must answer for the consequences.

When impounded, the goods were formerly, as was before observed, only in

the nature of a pledge or security to compel the performance of satisfaction ; and

upon this account it hath been held, («) that the distrainor is not at liberty to

work or use a distrained beast And thus the law still continues with regard to

beasts taken damage-feasant, and distresses for suit or services; which must re-

main impounded, till the owner makes satisfaction; or contests the right of dis-

training, by replevying the chattels. To replevy (replegiare, that is to take back

the pledge) is, when a person distrained upon applies to the sheriff or his officers,

and has the distress returned into his own possession, upon giving good security

to try the right of taking it in a suit at law; and, if that be determined against

him, to return the cattle or goods once more into the hands of the distrainor.

This is called a replevin, of which more will be said hereafter. At present I

p^.. .-• shall only observe, that, as a distress is at common *law only in nature of a

*• J security for the. rent or damages done, a replevin answers the same end to

the distrainor as the distress itself; since the party replevying gives security to

return the distress, if the right be determined against him.

This kind of distress, though it puts the owner to inconvenience, and is there-

fore a punishment to him, yet if he continues obstinate and will make no satisfac-

tion or payment, it is no remedy at all to the distrainor. But for a debt due to the

crown, unless paid within forty days, the distress was always salable at common

<*) Co. Litt. 100, 181. (I) Co. LIU. 47. (») IWd. (n) Cro. Jac. 148.

parties came to an agreement respecting the sale; 1 Bing. 401; 4 D. and R. 539; 2 B. and

C. 821, S. C.; and the notion is sustainable though there was a tender of the rent before the

distress was made. 2 D. and R. 250. Where more rent is distrained for than is due, the remedy

is at common law, aud is not founded on the 52 Hen. Ill, c. 4 ; nor on the 2 W. and M. c. 5, $ 5;

Stra. 851. Where uo rent is due, the owner of the goods distrained may, in an action of

trespass on the ease, recover double the value of the goods and full costs. 2 W. and M. sess. 1,

c. 5, $5.1

(20) This subject is covered by the statute 12 «nd 13 Vic. c. 92, amended by 17 and 18 Tic.

c. 60.
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law. (o) And for an amercement imposed at a court-leet, the lord may also sell

the distress: (p) partly because, being the king's court of record, its process par-

takes of the royal prerogative; (q) but principally because it is in the nature of

an execution to levy a legal debt. And so, in the several statute-distresses be-

fore mentioned, which are also in the nature of executions, the power of sale is

likewise usually given, to effectuate and complete the remedy. And, in like

manner, by several acts of parliament, (r) in all cases of distress for rent, if the

tenant or owner do not, within five days after the distress is taken, (21) and no-

tice of the cause thereof given him, replevy the same witli sufficient security;

the distrainor, with the sheriff or constable, shall cause the same to be appraised

by two sworn appraisers, and sell the same towards satisfaction of the rent and

charges; rendering the overplus, if any, to the owner himself. And, by this

means, a full and entire satisfaction may now be had for rent in arrere, by the

mere act of the party himself, viz.: by distress, the remedy given at common

law; and sale consequent thereon, which is added by act of parliament.

Before I quit this article, I must observe, that the many particulars which

attend the taking of a distress, used formerly to make it a hazardous kind of

proceeding: for if any *one irregularity was committed, it vitiated the r*i--i

whole, and made the distrainors trespassers db initio. (s) (22) But now L J

by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, it is provided, that, for any unlawful act done,

the whole shall not be unlawful, or the parties trespassers ab initio: but that

the party grieved shall only have an action for the real damage sustained, and
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not even that, if tender of amends is made before any action is brought.

VI. The seizing of heriots, when due on the death of a tenant, is also another

species of self-remedy; not much unlike that of taking cattle or goods in dis-

tress. As for that division of heriots, which is called heriot-service, and is only

a species of rent, the lord may distrain for this, as well as seize, but for heriot-

custom (which Sir Edward Coke says (t) lies only in premier, and not in render)

the lord may seize the identical thing itself, but cannot distrain any other chat-

tel for it. («) The like speedy and effectual remedy, of seizing, is given with

regard to many things that are said to lie in franchise ; as waifs, wrecks, estrays,

deodauds, and the like; all which the person entitled thereto may seize, with-

out the formal process of a suit or action. Not that they are debarred of this

remedy by action ; but have also the other and more speedy one, for the better

asserting their property; the thing to be claimed being frequently of such

a nature, as might be out of the reach of the law before any action could be

brought.

These are the several species of remedies which may be had by the mere act of

the party injured. I shall next briefly mention such as arise from the joint act

of all the parties together. And these are only two, accord and arbitration.

WBTn.Abr.t.dittrai.n. (p) 8 Rep. 41. (?) Bro. 76«. 12 Mod. £».

(r) S W. & M. o. 5. 8 Ann. c. 14. 4 UPO II, c. 23. 11 Geo. II, c. 19. (») I Ventr. 37.

(<) Cop. i 25. («) Cro. Kliz. 580. Cro. Car. 260.

(21) [The five days are reckoned inclusive of the day of sale; as if the goods are distrained on

the 1st, they must not be sold before the 6th. 1 H. Bla. 13. An action lies on the equity of

this act for selling within the five days. Semb. id. If the distrainor continue in possession

more than a reasonable time beyond the five days, an action of case or trespass lies on the equity

of the statute. 11 Bast, 395; Stra. 717 : 4 B. and A. -MS; 1 B. and C. 145. Though the act

authorizes a sale after the five days, it does not take away the right to replevy alter tha five

days, in ease the distress is not sold, but it would be otherwise after a safe. 5 Taunt. 451; 1

March, 135. By the consent of the tenant, the landlord may continue in possession longer than

the five days without incurring any liability; and his so continuing in possession will not of

itself create any presumption of collusion between him and the tenant to defeat an execution. 7

Price. 690.]

his

freeholder could not justify the taking up of an estray for him by a third person without his pre-

vious authorization, notwithstanding he had assumed to ratify the act. See Heam >-. Ewin, 3

Cold. 399.

15 REDRESS BY ACT OF THE PARTT. [Book III.

I. Accord is a satisfaction agreed upon between the party injuring and the

party injured; which, when performed, is a bar of all actions upon this account.

F*16l "^s ^a man con';rac'; *ko build a house or deliver a horse, and fail in it;

*• J this is an injury for which the sufferer may have his remedy by action,

but if the party injured accepts a sum of money, or other thing, as a satisfaction,

this is a redress of that injury, and entirely takes away the action, (w) (23) By

fu>) 9 Hep. 79.

Ig ^ ----- - - .._... - .._ _ _ _-

(23) [The mere consent of a party to accept a satisfaction, without an actual satisfaction, is

not sufficient to discharge the other; the accord and satisfaction must be perfect, complete, and

executed, for were it otherwise, it would be only substituting one cause of action for another,

which might go on to auv extent. 9 Hep. 79, b ; 5 T. H. 141. Satisfaction must be made to

the whole of the original demand, and a party will not be discharged upon performance of a sat-

isfaction to part of such demand, the residue remaining unperformed. 1 Taunt. 526; 5 East,

230. The performance of one of two things stipulated for by an accord is nugatory. Lord

Raym. 203; 3 Lev. 189. The accord and satisfaction must be certain; and accord to pay a loss

sum on the same, or at a subsequent day, is not sufficient. 5 East, 230. So an accord, that

the defendant shall employ workmen in two or three days, is bad : 4 Mod. 88; and performance

of an uncertain accord will not aid the detect. 3 Lev. 189; Yelv. 124.

We have already saen, ante book 2, how far a contract may bo varied, released, or discharged

by another contract. A deed before breach cannot be discharged by accord and satisfaction

without a deed: 1 Taunt. 428; Com. Dig. Pleader, 2 V. 8; but after breach accord and satis-
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faction without deed, is a good plea, for there the satisfaction is of the broach, and not of th«

deed. Com. Dig. Accord, A. 1 and C.; 7 East, 150; 1 J. B.Moore, 358, 460; Cro. Eliz. 46; 2

Wils. 86; 6 Rep. 43, b.

The satisfactiou must be a reasonable one. Generally speaking, the mere acceptance of a less

sum is not in law a satisfaction of a greater sum (5 East, 230), and this though an additional

security be given. 1 Stra. 426. An agreement between a debtor and creditor, that part of a

larger sum due should be paid by the debtor, and accepted by the creditor as a satisfaction for

the whole, might, under special circumstances, operate as a discharge of the whole; but then

the legal effect of such an agreement might be considered to bo the same as if the whole debt

had been paid, and part had been returned as a gift to the party paying. Per Holroyd, J., 2 B.

and C. 481. A debtor's assignment of all his effects to a trustee, to raise a fund for the pay-

ment of a composition to his creditors, is a sufficient satisfaction : 2 T. R. 24; so if a third per-

son guarantees a payment of the loss sum. 11 East, 3'JO. So if a creditor, by his undertaking

to accept a composition, induce the debtor to part with his property to his creditors, or induce

other creditors to discharge the debtor to outer into a composition-deed, or deliver up securities

to him, such creditor would be bound by such undertaking. 2 Stark. Rep. 407; 2 M. and S.

120; 1 Esp. 236. And where several creditors, with the knowledge of each other, agree on the

faith of each other's undertaking to give time to, or accept a composition from, a debtor, the

agreement will be binding on every creditor who is party to it. 3 Camp. 175; 2 M. and S.

122 ; 16 Vos. 374. Payment and acceptance of a part of a debt before the day it falls due, or at

a place where the whole debt was not payable, in satisfaction of the whole, is a good satisfac-

tion : Co. Litt. 212, b; and so if the debtor gives a chose in possession for a chose in action (2

T. R. 24,) as the gift of a horse or other property in specie. Co. Litt. 212, b. The mere fulfil-

ment of an act which a party is bound in law to do, is no satisfaction. Per Grose, J., 5 East,

302. A release of an equity of redemption is no satisfaction. 2 Wils. 86. Conferring a benefit

to a third person at the debtor's request is sufficient. See Skin. Hep. 391.

The satisfaction should proceed from the party who wishes to avail himself of it; for when

it proceeds entirely from a stranger, it will bo a nullity. See 5 East, 294 ; 1 Smith, 515; Cro.

Eliz. 541.

Accord and satisfaction by copartner, is a bar to any action against the other partners; 9

Rep. 79, b.; so the acceptance of satisfaction from a joint tort-feasor discharges the other

wrongdoers (Sembl. 3 Taunt. 117), and accord and satisfaction to one of the several co-plaintiffs,

will operate as a discharge from all. See 13 Edw. IV, 6; 5 Co. 117, b.]

To be good, an accord and satisfaction must be advantageous to the creditor; and it is upon

this ground that a receipt by a creditor of a part of his demand then due has been held no an-

swer to an action for the remainder, notwithstanding his agreement to receive it in satisfac-

tion: Watkinson v. Iiiglesby, 5 Johns. 386; Blanchard v. Noyes, 3 N. H. 518; Wheeler c.

Wheeler, 11 Vt. 60; Hinckley v. Arey, 27 Me. 3152; Daniels v. Hatch, 1 N. J. 91; Eve v. Mose-

ley, 2 Strobh. 203; Warren v. Skinner, 20 Conn. 559. But it is otherwise if the claim is not

liquidated, or is in dispute. Stockton ». Prey, 4 Gill, 406; Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Met. 551. Or if

the debtor give a negotiable note for part of the debt. Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. and W. 23. Or

any chattel though of much less value than the amount of the debt. Jones ». Bullitt, 2 Lit. 49;

Reed v, Bartlett, 19 Pick. 273. Or the note of a third person. Booth «. Smith, 3 Wend. 66. Or

pay part before it is due. Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283. And in any other case it is a good ac-

cord and satisfaction if the creditor receive some distinct benefit which he would not otherwise

have been entitled to. See Douglass v. White, 3 Barb. Ch. 621. And it has been held that,

12

Chap. 1."] ARBITRATION. 16

several late statutes (particularly 11 Geo. II, c. 19, m case of irregularity in the

method of distraining, and 24 Geo. II, c. 24, in case of mistakes committed by

justices of the peace), even tender of sufficient amends to the party injured is a

bar of all actions, whether he thinks proper to accept such amends or no. (24)

II. Arbitration is where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters

in dispute, concerning any personsil chattels or personal wrong, to the judgment

of two or more arbitrators; who are to decide the controversy: and if they do

not agree, it is usual to add, that another person be called in as umpire, (impe-

rator, or impar,) (x) to whose sole judgment it is then referred: or frequently

there is only one arbitrator originally appointed. This decision, in any of these

cases, is called an award. And thereby the question is as fully determined, and

the right transferred or settled, as it could have been by the agreement of the

parties, or the judgment of a court of justice, (y) But the right of real prop-

erty cannot thus pass by a mere award: («) which subtilty in point of form

(for it is now reduced to nothing else) had its rise from feudal principles; for,

if this had been permitted, the land might have been aliened collusively with-

out the consent of the superior. Yet, doubtless, an arbitrator may now award a

conveyance or a release of land; and it will.be a breach of the arbitration bond

to refuse compliance. For, though originally thte submission to arbitration used

to be by word, or by deed, yet both of these being revocable in their nature, it

is now become the practice to enter into mutual bonds, with condition to stand

to the award or arbitration of the arbitrators *or umpire therein r*i«-i
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named, (a) (25) And experience having shown the great use of these <• -I

(*) Whart. Angl. tncr. I, 772. Nicola. Scot. Hist. libr. nh. l.proptflnem.

(y) Brownl. H. I Freem. 410. Iz) 1 Uoll. 'Abr. 21*. 1 Lord Kaym. 115.

(a) Append. No. HI, 5 6.

whore a vendee who has ordered goods from a manufacturer consents to receive them and waive

strict complicance with the contract, he is bound by this waiver, notwithstanding there was no

distinct consideration for it. Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich. 266; and see Mon-

roe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. 305; Lattimore r. Harsen, 14 Johns. 330; Conyer v. Lynde, 10 Ind. 282.

And of late a disposition has been manifested to uphold agreements to accept part of a demand

in satisfaction of the whole. See Popper v. Aiken, % Bush, 251.

(24) [By several statutes (particularly 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case of irregularity in the method

of distraining, and 11 and 12 Vic. c. 44, in case of mistakes committed by justices of the peace),

a tender of amends to the party injured is a bar to the action, if the party thinks proper to

accept such tender. If the party injured does not accept the amends tendered, and the

jnry, on the trial of the action, think the sum oflbred sufficient, their verdict must be for the

defendant By the common law procedure act, 1852, section 70, the defendant in all actions

(except actions for assault and battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest or

prosecution, criminal conversation or debauchery of the plaintiff's daughter or servant), may

pay into court a sum of money by way of compensation or amends. And by statute 6 and 7

Tic. c. 96, s. 2, in an action for a libel contained in any newspaper or periodical publication,

the defendant may plead that it was inserted without malice or gross negligence, and that an

apology had been offered to be published. The defendant may with the plea pay money into

court as amends. By section 4, the offer ot apology is admissible in evidence in mitigation

of damages.]

In some of the United States statutes will be found adding to the number of cases in which

tender of amends may be made, and in some a disposition has been manifested of late to per-

mit the defendant in any suit brought for the recovery of debt or damages, to make an offer

of such a sum as he is willing to allow judgment to pass fur, and if the plaintiff declines to

accept, to give costs against him unless the verdict in his favor is larger than the offer.

(25) [A time should, in all cases, be mentioned within which the award is to be made; but

if no time be mentioned, the award should be made in a reasonable time. 2 Keb. 10, 20; 3 M.

and S. 145.

A court of chancery will not decree a specific performance: 19 Tes. 431; 6 Ves. 815; and

no action lies for not appointing an arbitrator: 2 B. and P. 13; but if a party has agreed not

to revoke, or has covenanted to perform an award, and the award be made, he will be liable

to an action for a breach of the agreement or covenant, if he revoke or refuse to perform the

award: see 5 B. and A. 507; 1 D. and R. 106; 2 Chit. R. 316; 5 East, 266; and see 4 B. and

C. 103; and an attachment for 11 contempt of court sometimes lies, where the submission is a

rule of court. Crompt. Prac. 252; 1 Stra. 593; 7 East, 607.

"With respect to the revocation of the arbitrator's authority, it is a rale of law, that every

tpccies of authority, being a delegated power, although, by express words, made irrevocable, is

17 REDRESS BY ACT OF THE PARTY. [Book III.

peaceable and domestic tribunals, especially in settling matters of account, and

other mercantile transactions, which are difficult and almost impossible to be

adjusted on a trial at law; the legislature has now established the use of them,

as well in controversies where causes are depending, as in those where no action

is brought: enacting by statute 9 and 10 Win. Ill, c. 15, that all merchants

and others, who desire to end any controversy, suit, or quarrel, (for which there

is no other remedy but by personal action or suit in equity), may agree, that

their submission of the suit to arbitration or umpirage shall be made a rule

of any of the king's courts of record, and may insert such agreement in

their submission, or promise, or condition of the arbitration-bond: which

agreement being proved upon oath by one of the witnesses thereto, the court

shall make a rule that such submission and award shall be conclusive: and,

after such rule made, the parties disobeying the award shall be liable to be pun-

ished, as for a contempt of the court; unless such award shall be set aside, for

corruption or other misbehaviour in the arbitrators or umpire, proved on oath

to the court, within one term after the award is made. And, in consequence

of this statute, it is now become a considerable part of the business of the

superior courts, to set aside such awards when partially or illegally made; or

to enforce their execution, when legal, by the same process of contempt, as is

awarded for disobedience to those rules and orders, which are issued by the

courts themselves. (26)

nevertheless in general revocable. See 8 Co. 82. A submission to arbitration may be revoked
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by the act of God, by operation of law, or by the net of the parties.

The death of either or any of the parties before the award is delivered, in general vacates

the submission, unless it contain a stipulation to the contrary: see 1 Marsh. 366; 7 Taunt.

571; 1 Moore, 287, S. C.; 2 B. and A. 394; but where all matters in difference in a cause are

referred by order of nisi prius to arbitration, the death of one of the parties, at any time ,

before award made, is a revocation of the arbitrator's authority, and the court will set

aside an award made after his death; or, in other words, it should seem, if the cause of action

is referred, the death abates the action, but not so if other matters besides the cause of action

are referred. 3' D. and K. 608; 2 B. and A. 394.

If a feme-sole submit to arbitration, and marry before the award is delivered, such marriage

is in effect a revocation, without notice to the arbitrators : 2 Keb. 865; Jones, 388 ; Roll. Abr.

331; but the husband and wife may be sued on their bond for such revoking. 5 East, 266.

Bankruptcy of one of the parties is no revocation. 2 Chit. Rep. 43; 4 B. and A. 250.

The death of the arbitrators, or one of them, will defeat the reference, unless there be a

clause in the submission to the contrary: see 4 Moore, 3; so if the arbitrators do not make

the award within the limited time, or thev disagree, or refuse to act or intermeddle any fur-

ther. 1 Roll. Ab. 261: 2 Saund. 129; Tidd, Hth eel. 877.

The parties themselves, as we have just seen, may revoke the arbitrator's authority before

the award is made: the revocation must follow the nature of the submission; if the latter be

by parol, so may the revocation. 2 Kub. 64. If the submission be by deed, so must the revo-

cation. 8 Co. 72; and Bee T. Jones, 134. Notice of the revocation by the act of the parties

must be given to the arbitrators, in order to render it effectual. Roll. Abr. 331; Vin. Ab.

Authority, 13; and see 5 B. and A. 507.]

It has" been very common of late to introduce into certain species of contract a clause

requiring the parties to submit to arbitration, any disputes that may arise under them; but it

has been generally supposed these stipulations could not be enforced, because they ousted the

courts of jurisdiction. But recently an agreement not to bring suit until the damages were

adjusted by a committee, or by arbitration, has been sustained. Avery v. Scott, 8 Exch. 487;

S. C. in House of Lords, 5 H. L. Cas. 811; and see Kussell v. Pellegrini, 6 El. and Bl. 1020.

The statement above that the marriage of a feme-sole revokes a submission to arbitration is

probably not applicable in those states where the disabilities of coverture are removed and

the woman is allowed to act on her own behalf the same after marriage as before.

Although it is perhaps true that the bankruptcy of ono of the parties will not revoke a

submission, yet the assignee would have the same power to revoke which the bankrupt pos-

sessed before the assignment. See Marsh v. "Wood, 9 B. and C. 659.

(26) The common law procedure act, 1854, contains various provisions designed to give

full effect to an agreement to arbitrate, where the parties fail to select a sole arbitrator or

nmpire, or where two are to be chosen and one party neglects or refuses to make choice. In

the first case an arbitrator or umpire may be chosen bv a judge of one of the superior courts,

and in the other, the arbitrator who has" been selected by one party may proceed as solo arbi-

trator. And if a reference is to two arbitrators, they may without special authority in the

submission, appoint au umpire, unless the terms of the submission forbid; and if they fail to
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CHAPTER II.

OF REDRESS BY THE MERE OPERATION OF LAW.

THE remedies for private wrongs, which are effected by the mere operation

of law, will fall within a very narrow compass; there being only two instances

of this sort that at present occur to my recollection: the one th'at of retainer,

where a creditor is made executor or administrator to his debtor; the other in

the case of what the law calls a remitter.

I. If a person indebted to another makes his creditor or debtee his executor,

or if such a creditor obtains letters of administration to his debtor; in these

cases the law gives him a remedy for his debt, by allowing him to retain so

much as will pay himself, before any other creditors whose debts are of equal

degree, (a) (1) This is a remedy by the mere act of law, and grounded upon this

reason; that the executor cannot, without an apparent absurdity, commence a

suit against himself as a representative of the deceased, to recover that which

is due to him in his own private capacity: but having the whole personal estate

in his hands, so much as is sufficient to answer his own demand is, by operation

of law, applied to that particular purpose. Else, by being made executor,

*he would be put in a worse condition than all the rest of the world r*ig-i

besides. For, though a ratable payment of all the debts of the deceased, '- -*

in equal degree, is clearly the most equitable method, yet as every scheme for a

proportionable distribution of the assets among all the creditors hath been

hitherto found to be impracticable, and productive of more mischiefs than it
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would remedy; so that the creditor who first commences his suit is entitled to

a preference in payment; it follows that as the executor can commence no

suit, he must be paid the last of any, and, of course, must lose his debt in case

the estate of his testator should prove insolvent, unless he be allowed to retain

it. The doctrine of retainer is therefore the necessary consequence of that

other doctrine of the law, the priority of such creditor who first commences his

action. But the executor shall not retain his own debt, in prejudice to those

of a higher degree; for the law only puts him in the same situation, as if he

had sued himself as executor, and recovered his debt; which he never could be

supposed to have done, while debts of a higher nature subsisted. Neither shall

one executor be allowed to retain his own debt, in prejudice to that of his co-

executor in equal degree; but both shall be discharged in proportion, (b) Nor

shall an executor of his own wrong be in any case permitted to retain, (c)

II. Remitter is where he who hath the true property or jus proprietatis in

?ands, but is out of possession thereof, and hath no right to enter without recov-

ering possession in an action, hath afterwards the freehold cast upon him by

Borne subsequent, and of course defective, title; in this case he is remitted, or

sent back by operation of law, to his ancient and more certain title, (d) The

right of entry, which he hath gained by a bad title, shall be ipso facto annexed

to his own inherent good one: and his defeasible estate shall be utterly defeated

and annulled by the instantaneous act of law, without his participation or con-

sent (e) As if A disseizes B, that *is, turns him out of possession, and r „,„,,-.

dies, leaving a son C; hereby the estate descends to C the son of A, and L -"

B is barred from entering thereon till he proves his right in an action; (2) now

(a) 1 Boll. Abr. 922. Plowil. 543. See book II. page MI. (6) Vlner. Altr. t. executor!, D. 3.

(c) .'. Itcp. 30. (d) Litt. ! 659. (e) Co. Litt. 358. Cro. Jac. IN).

award, and fail to appoint an umpire, one may be appointed by a judge. The act also also contains

provisions for expediting the award, and it empowers the court to set it aside in proper cases. It

also empowers the court, where the award directs possession of land to be delivered, to enforce

the award by summary process, as it might a judgment in ejectment.

(1) This in not the law in the United States. Debts of equal degree are paid ratably, and the

executor in his accounting is allowed for no payment to himself beyond his just proportion.

(2) [B would not now be barred from entering by the descent of the estate to 0: 3 and 4 Win.

IV, c. 2V, $ 39; but the above passage may still serve as an illustration. The student
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if afterwards C, the heir of the disseizor, makes a lease for life to D, with

remainder to B, the disseizee for life, and D dies; hereby the remainder accrues

to B, the disseizee: who thus gaining a new freehold by virtue of the remainder,

which is a bad title, is by act of law remitted, or in of his former and surer

estate. (/) For he hath hereby gained a new right of possession, to which the

law immediately annexes his ancient right of property.

If the subsequent estate, or right of possession, be gained by a man's own act

or consent, as by immediate purchase, being of full age, he shall not be remitted.

For the taking such subsequent estate was his own folly, and shall be looked

upon as a waiver of his prior right. (g) Therefore is to be observed, that to

every remitter there are regularly these incidents; an ancient right, and a new

defeasible estate of freehold, uniting in one and the same person; which

defeasible estate must be cast iipon the tenant, not gained by his own act or

folly. The reason given by Littleton (h) why this remedy, which operates

silently, and by the mere act of law, was allowed, is somewhat similar to that

given in the preceding article; because otherwise he who hath right would be

deprived of all remedy. For as he himself is the person in possession of the-

freehold, there is no other person against whom he can bring an action to

establish his prior right. And for this cause the law doth adjudge him in by

remitter; that is, in such plight aaif he had lawfully recovered the same laud

by suit. For, as Lord Bacon observes, (i) the benignity of the law is such, as

when, to preserve the principles and grounds of law, it depriveth a man of his
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remedy without his own fault, it will rather put him in a better degree and con-

dition than in a worse. Nam quod rcmedio destituitur, ip#a re valet, si culjxt

F*211 a^s^- But there shall be no *remitter to a right, for which the party

t J has no remedy by action: (k) as if the issue in tail be barred by the tine

or warrant (3) of his ancestor, and the freehold is afterwards cast upon him;

he shall not be remitted to his estate tail: (/) for the operation of the remitter

is exactly the same, after the union of the two rights, as that of a real action

would have been before it. As, therefore, the issue in tail could not by any

action have recovered his ancient estate, he shall not recover it by remitter.

And thus much for these extrajudicial remedies, as well for real as personal

injuries, which are furnished or permitted by the law, where the parties are so

peculiarly circumstanced, as not to make it eligible, or in some cases even pos-

sible, to apply for redress in the usual and ordinary methods to the courts of

public justice.

CHAPTER IIL

OF COURTS IN GENERAL.

THE next, and principal, object of our inquiries is the redress of injuries by

suit in courts: wherein the act of the parties and the act of law co-operate;

the act of the parties being necessary to set the law in motion, and the process

of the law being in general the only instrument by which the parties are ena-

bled to procure a certain and adequate redress.

And here it will not be improper to observe, that although in the several cases

of redress by the act of the parties mentioned in a former chapter, (a) the law

(/) Finch, L. 191. Lltt.»68S. (y) Co. Lltt. 348, 880. (») } 881. (*) Elem. r. 9.

(I-} Co. Lltt. 3». (J) Moor. 115. 1 Andr. 288. (a) Cb. I.

•will find the law concerning remitter ably investigated in the argument and judgment of I he

eonrt in the case of Doed. Daniell u. Woodroffe, 10 if. and AV\ 608.]

(3) Estates tail are no longer barrable by these means. See statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c .74,$ 14

There ii no remitter where the right is barred by the statute of limitations. See Doe «.

Voodroffe, 10 M. and W. 608; 15 id. 768; 2 H. L. Ca. 811.
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allows an extrajudicial remedy, yet that does not exclude the ordinary course of

justice; but it is only an additional weapon put into the hands of certain per-

sons in particular instances, where natural equity or the peculiar circumstances

of their situation require a more expeditious remedy, than the formal process

of any court of judicature can furnish. Therefore, though I may defend myself,

or relations, from external violence, I yet am afterwards entitled to an action

of assault and battery: though I may retake my goods, if I have a fair and

peaceable opportunity, this power of recaption does not debar me from my action

of trover or detinue: I may either enter on the lands, on which I have a right

of entry, or may demand possession by a real action : I may either abate a nui-

sance by my own authority, or call upon the law to do it for me: I may distrain

for rent, or have an action of debt, at my own *option; if I do not I-^OQI

distrain my neighbor's cattle damage-feasant, I may compel him by •- -"

action of trespass to make me a fair satisfaction: if a heriot, or a deodand, be

withheld from me by fraud or force, I may recover it though I never seised it.

And with regard to accords and arbitrations, these, in their nature, being

merely an agreement or compromise, most indisputably suppose a previous right

of obtaining redress some other way: which is given up by such agreement.

But as to remedies by the mere operation of law, those are indeed given, because

no remedy can be ministered by suit or action, without running into the pal-

pable absurditv of a man's bringing an action against himself: the two cases

wherein they "happen being such wherein the only possible legal remedy would
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be directed against the very person himself who seeks relief.

In all other cases it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is. a

legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever that

right is invaded. And in treating of these remedies by suit in courts, I shall

pursue the following method: first, I shall consider the nature and several

species of the courts of justice; and, secondly, I shall point out in which of these

courts, and in what manner, the proper remedy may be had for any private in-

jury, or, in other words, what injuries are cognizable, and how redressed, in each

respective species of courts.

First, then, of courts of justice. And herein we will consider, first, their na-

ture and incidents in general j and then, the several species of them, erected and

acknowledged by the laws of England.

A court is denned to be a place wherein justice is judicially administered. (V)

And, as by our excellent constitution the sole executive power of the laws is

vested in the person of the king, it will follow that all courts of justice which

are *the medium by which he administers th« laws, are derived from the poj.!

power of the crown, (c) For, whether created by act of parliament, or I- -"

letters patent, or subsisting by prescription (the only methods by which any

courts of judicature (d) can exist), the king's consent in the two former is ex-

pressly, and in the latter impliedly, given. In all these courts the king is sup-

posed in contemplation of law to be always present; but as that is in fact im-

possible, he is there represented by his judges, whose power is only an emanation

of the royal prerogative.

For the more speedy, universal, and impartial administration of justice between

subject and subject, the law hath appointed a prodigious variety of courts, some

with a more limited, others with a more extensive, jurisdiction; some constituted

to inquire only, others to hear and determine; some to determine in the first

instance, others upon appeal and by way of review. All these in their turn will

be taken notice of in their respective places: and I shall therefore here only men-

tion one distinction, that runs throughout them all, viz.: that some or them

are courts of record, others not of recoi d. A court of record is that, where the

acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parchment for a perpetual memo-

rial and testimony: which rolls are called the records of the court, and are

of such high and supereminent authority, that their truth is not to be called

in question. For it is a settled rule and maxim that nothing shall be averred

fbj Co. Litt. 88. (c) See Book I, Ob. 27. (d) Co. Litl. MO.
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against a record, nor shall any plea, or even proof, be admitted to the con-

trary, (e) (1) And if the existence of a record be denied, it shall be tried by-

nothing but itself; that is, upon bare inspection whether there be any such

record or no; else there would be no end of disputes. But, if there appear

any mistake of the clerk in making up such record, the court will direct him

to amend it. All courts of record are the king's courts, in right of his crown

and royal dignity, (/) and therefore no other court hath authority to fine or

r*25l ^prison; so that the very erection *of a new jurisdiction with the power

L -"of tine or imprisonment makes it instantly a court of record. (g) A court

not of record is the court of a private man ; whom the law will not intrust with

any discretionary power over the fortune or liberty of his fellow subjects. Such

are the courts-baron incident to every manor, and other inferior jurisdictions :

where the proceedings are not enrolled or recorded ; but as well their existence

as the truth of the matters therein contained shall, if disputed, be tried and

determined by a jury. These courts can hold no plea of matters cognizable by

the common law, unless under the value of 40s. nor of any forcible injury

whatsoever, not having any process to arrest the person of the defend-

ant. (A) (2)

In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus,

&n&.judex; the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus,

or defendant who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or

judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the law
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arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to ascertain

and, by its officers, to apply the remedy. It is also usual in the superior courts

to have attorneys and advocates, or counsel, as assistants.

An attorney at law answers to the procurator, or proctor, of the civilians and

canonists, (i) And he is one who is put in the place, stead, or turn of another,

to manage his matters of law. Formerly every suitor was obliged to appear

in person to proseciite or defend his suit (according to the old Gothic con-

stitution), (k) unless by special license under the king's letters patent. (I) This

is still the law in criminal casts. (3) And an idiot cannot to this day appear

(«) Co. Litt. 260. (/) Finch, L.231. (g) Sulk. 200. 12 Mod. S88. iJi) SInst. 311.

(<) Pope Boniface VIM, In U Decretal, 1. 3, I. 16, >, 3, speaks of "procuratorOnu, qui in aliquitnu partibtu

attomati nuitcupaniur."

It) Stiernhook tie jure Oath. 1.1, e. 8. (It F. K. B. 25.

(1) [This rale is subject to some exceptions; for in the case of a judgment signed on a warrant

of attorney given upon an unlawful consideration, or obtained by fraud, upon an affidavit thereof,

the court will afford relief upon a summary application. Dougl. 196 ; Cowp. 727; 1 Hen. Bla.

75. And equity will relieve against a judgment obtained by fraud or collusion. 1 Anst. 8; 3

Ves. and B. 42. And third persons who have been defrauded by a collusive judgment may show

f.uch fraud, so as to prevent themselves from being prejudiced by it. 2 Marsh. 392; 7 Taunt. 97 ;

13 Eliz. c. 5.]

A judgment is void if the court which assumed to render it had no jurisdiction. But gener-

ally it is not competent to show a want of jurisdiction in opposition to the recitals in the re-

cord. Whether, where a judgment rendered in one state is brought into controversy in another,

it is competent to show a want of jurisdiction in contradiction of the record, is in dispute npou

the authorities. See Storbuck v. Murrav,5 "Wend. 148; Hall v. "Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Brodshaw

v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Gleason v. Do'dd, 4 Met. 333; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas. 551, which

ullow such evidence, and Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Tt. 302; Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Biinelar

i:. Oawson, 4 Scain. 536; Roberts ». Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512, and Lincoln v. Tower, 4 McLean,

473, which exclude it.

(2) The courts not of record in the United States, like the superior courts, are the creatures of

statute, and are held by officers elected or appointed for the purpose. But they are not in any

proper sense the courts of private men, and some of them are vested with large powers, and try

cases in the common law mode, with jury. Courts of justices of the peace in the several states

are generally held not to be courts of record.

(3) [This is not universally so, for in prosecutions and informations for misdemeanors, espe-

cially in the court of king's bench, a defendant may, and usually does, appear and plead by his at-

torney or clerk in court. ]

And now in England a full defence is allowed to be made by counsel in all oases of felony.

See statute 6 and 7 "Wm. IV, c. 114. It is allowed also in the United States in a,H cases, civil

and criminal.
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by attorney, but in person, (m) for he hath not discretion to enable him to ap-

point *a proper substitute: and upon his being brought before the court r *9fi •,

in so defenceless a condition, the judges are bound to take care of his in- >• -I

terests, and they shall admit the best plea in his behalf that any one present

can suggest. (») But as in the Koman law, " cum olim in usu fuisset, alterius

nomine agi non posse, sed, quia hoc non minimam incommoditatem habebat,

cesperunt homines per procuratores liligare," (o) so with us upon the same prin-

ciple of convenience, it is now permitted in general, by divers ancient statutes,

whereof the first is statute Westm. 2 c. 10, that attorneys may be made to pros-

ecute or defend any action in the absence of the parties to the suit. These at-

torneys are now formed into a regular corps; they are admitted to the execu-

tion of their office by the superior courts of Westminster-hall; and are in all

points officers of the respective courts of which they are admitted; and, as they

nave nuiny privileges on account of their attendance there, so they are pecu-

liarly subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges. (4) No man

can practice as an attorney in any of those courts, but such as is admitted, and

sworn an attorney of that particular court: an attorney of the court of king's

bench cannot practice in the court of common pleas; nor vice versa. To prac-

tice in the court of chancery it is also necessary to be admitted a solicitor

therein: and by the statute 22 Geo. II, c. 46, no person shall act as an attorney

at the court of quarter sessions, but such as has been regularly admitted in some

superior court of record. So early as the statute 4 Henry IV, c. 18, it was en-
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acted, that attorneys should be examined by the judges, and none admitted but

such as were virtuous, learned, and sworn to do their duty. And many subse-

quent statutes (p) have laid them under farther regulations. (5)

fmj F. K. B. Z7. (n) Bro. Abr. t. idiot, 1. (o) Intt. 4 tit. 10.

(p) 3 Jac. I, c. 7. 12 Geo. I. c. 28. 2 Goo. II, c. 28. 22 Geo. II, e. 46. 23 Geo. n, e. 26.

(4) [An attorney is bound to use care, skill, and integrity, and if he be not deficient in any of

these essential requisites, he is not responsible for any error or mistake arising in the exercise of

his profession. 4 Burr. 2061, and see 4 B. and A. 202. If he bo deficient, and a loss thereby

arises to his client, he is liable to an action in damages. 2 WIN. 325; 1 Bing. 347; and in somo

cases, as we have above seen, the court of which he is an attorney will afford a summary rem-

edy. The judges will exercise their summary jurisdiction over the attorneys of the several

courts, not merely in the cases where they have been employed in the conduct of suits, or any

matter purely professional, but " whenever the employment is so connected with professional

character as to afford a presumption that their character formed the ground of their employ-

ment." Hughes v. Marye, 3 T. K. 275; In re Aitkin, 4 B. and A. 47; Luxmore v. Lethbndge,

5B. and A. 898.

Upon the general power of the court to deal summarily with attorneys, see In re Austin et al.

5 Rawle, 203; Matter of Mills, 1 Mich. 393; In re Percy 36 N. Y. 651; matter of Blake, 3 El.

and El. 33. A person appearing as,attomey is presumed to have due authority, Lagow c. Patter-

son, 1 Blackf. 32; Osbome v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat 830; Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N. Y. 502.

Having been connected on one side he will not be permitted to engage on the other. Chol-

monddey v. Clinton, 19 Tesey. 261; Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392; Goulden e. State, 11 Ga. 47.

He will be liable to his client for any damages sustained by the latter in consequence of his neg-

ligence, misconduct or disobedience of instructions: Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. 174 ; Holmes v.

Peck, 1 R. I. 245; Reiley v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435. A purchase made by him of his client of

the subject matter of an existing litigation will not be upheld,: Wood e. Downer, 18 Tesey, 119;

Jackson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 479; West v. Raymond, 21 Ind. 305.

(5) [The above statutes, with several others passed subsequently, have been repealed by 6

and 7 Vic. c. 73, and the laws relating to attorneys consolidated. In order to be admitted an

attorney, a person must have been bound by contract in writing to serve as clerk during five

years to a practicing attorney or solicitor, and have duly served accordingly, but one year may

be served with a barrister or certified special pleader, and one with the attorney's London

agent. Or if within four years previously, and within six years after his matriculation, he has

taken the degree of bachelor of arts, or within eight years of bachelor of laws, in one of the

universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin, Durham or London, the binding may be for three

years, and one of them may be served with the agent. Before admitting an attorney the

judges are required to examine and inquire touching his fitness and capacity to act as such,

and if satisfied thereof, they are to administer to him an oath that he will truly and honestly

demean himself in practice. For the purpose of facilitating this inquiry, eight or more of them,

including the three chiefs, may from time to time appoint examiners, and make rules for con-

ducting the examintion. By the same statute, an attorney of any one of the superior courts of

law at Westminster is entitled to be admitted in any other of these courts, or in any inferior court

of England or Wales, upon signing the roll of sucl} other court.] See amendatory statutes 14

and 15 Vic. c. 88; 23' and 24 Yio, o. 127,

IP
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Of advocates, or (as we generally call them) counsel, there are two species or

degrees; barristers, and Serjeants. The former are admitted after a considerable

period of study, or at least standing, in the inns of court; (^) and are in our old

F *271 books *8tyled apprentices, apprenticii ad legem, being looked upon as

L J merely learners, and not qualified to execute the full office of an advo-

cate till they were sixteen years standing; at which time, according to Fortes-

cue, (r) they might be called to the state and degree of Serjeants, or servientes

ad legem. How ancient and honorable this state and degree is, with the form,

splendour, and profits attending it, hath been so fully displayed by many learned

writers, (,v) that it need not be here enlarged on. I shall only observe, that ser-

jeants at law are bound by a solemn oath (t) to do their duty to their clients •

and that by custom (u) the judges of the courts of Westminster are always ad-

mitted into this venerable order, before they are advanced to the bench; the orig-

inal of which was probably to qualify the puisne barons of the exchequer to

become justices of assize, according to the exigence of the statute of 14 Edw. Ill,

c. 16. From both these degrees some are usually selected to be his majesty's

counsel learned in the law; the two principal of whom are called his attorney,

and solicitor general. The first king's counsel, under the degree of serjeant,

was Sir Francis Bacon, who was made so honoris causa, without either patent or

fee; (w) so that the first of the modern order (who are now the sworn servants

of the crown, with a standing salary) seems to have been Sir Francis North,

afterwards lord keeper of the great seal to King Charles II. (a;) These king's
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counsel answer, in some measure, to the advocates of the revenue, advocati fisci,

among the Romans. For they must not be employed in any cause against the

crown without special license; (6) in which restriction they agree with the ad-

vocates of the fisc: (y) but in the imperial law the prohibition was carried still

further, and perhaps was more for the dignity of the sovereign: for, excepting

some peculiar causes, the fiscal advocates were not permitted to be at all con-

T *2S 1 cerne^ *m private suits between subject and subject (z) A custom has

L J of late years prevailed of granting letters patent of precedence to such

barristers as the crown thinks proper to honour with that mark of distinction:

whereby they are entitled to such rank and pre-audience (a) as are assigned in

their respective patents; sometimes next after the king's attorney-general, but

usually next after his majesty's counsel then being. These (as well as the queen's

attorney and solicitor-general), (b) rank promiscuously with the king's counsel,

and together with them sit within the bar of the respective courts ; but receive no

salaries, and are not sworn; and therefore are at liberty to be retained in causes

against the crown. And all other Serjeants and barristers indiscriminately (except

(?1 See Book I, Introduc. f 1. (r) De LL. c. 50.

(«) Fortesc. ibid. 10 Hop. prof. Dndg. Orig. Jurid. To which may be added a tract bv the late Ser-

goant Wynne, printed in 1765, entitled • • Observations touching the antiquity and dignity of the degree of

sorgeant'at law." •

(d 3 Inst. 214. (tt) Fortesc. c. 50. (w) See hisletters. 258.

(z) Sec his life by Rogers North, 37. (y) Cod. 2, 9, 1. (z) Ibid. 2, 7, 13.

(a) Pro-andlenoo in the courts is reckoned of so much consequence, that it may not be amiss to sub-

join a short table of the precedence which usually obtains among the practUen:

1. The king's premier serjeant (so constituted by special patent.) (7)

2. The king's ancient serjeant. or the eldest among the king's serjeant*. (7)

3. The king's advocate general.

4. The king's attorney-general. (7)

5. The king's solicitor-general. (7)

6. The king's Serjeants.

7. The king's counsel, with the queen's attorney and solicitor,

S. Scvji'.-inis at law.

9. The recorder of London.

10. Advocates of the civil law.

11. Barristers.

In the courts of exchequer two of the most experienced barristers, called the port-man and the fctj-

man (from the places in which they sit) have also a precedence in motions

l&) Seld. tit. Aon. 1, 6, 7.

(6) The license to defend a prisoner is never refused, but some expense must be incurred in

obtaining it.

(7) [By the king's mandate, 14th Dec. 1811, the king's attorney and solicitor-general are now

to have place and andienco before the king's premier Serjeant.]
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in the court of common pleas, where only Serjeants are admitted) (8) may take

upon them the protection and defence of any suitors, whether plaintiff or defend-

ant ; who tire therefore called their clients, like the dependents upon the ancient

Roman orators. Those indeed practiced gratis, for honour merely, or at most

for the sake of gaining influence: and so likewise it is established with us, (c)

that a counsel can maintain no action for his fees; which are given, not as loca-

tio vel conductio, but as quiddam honorarium ; not as a salary or hire, but as a

mere gratuity, which a counsellor cannot demand without doing wrong to his

reputation: (d) (9) as is also laid down with regard to advocates in the civil

law, (e) whose honorarium was directed by a decree of the senate not to exceed

in any case ten thousand sesterces, *or about 801. of English money. (/) r*og-|

(10) And, in order to encourage due freedom of speech in the lawful de- <- •"

fence of their clients, and at the same time to give a check to the unseemly licen-

tiousness of prostitute and illiberal men (a few of whom may sometimes insinu-

ate themselves even into the most honourable professions), it hath been holden

that a counsel is not answerable for any matter by him spoken, relative to the

cause in hand, and suggested in his client's instructions; although it should

reflect upon the reputation of another, and even prove absolutely groundless;

but if he mentions an untruth of his own invention, or even upon instructions

if it be impertinent to the cause in hand, he is then liable to an action from the

party injured, (a) (11) And counsel guilty of deceit or collusion are punishable

by the statute Westm. 1,3 Edw. I, c. 28, with imprisonment for a year and a day,
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and perpetual silence in the courts; a punishment still sometimes inflicted for

gross misdemeanors in practice, (h)

(c) T>:.vis pref. 22. 1 Ch. Rep. 38. (d) Davis, 23. (») Ff. 11, «. 1.

(/J nnn. 1. 1. 11,7. (ffj Cro. Jao. 90. (hi Sir T. Kayin. 876.

(H) [That is, in bank; for at trials at nisi prius in C. P. a barrister, who is not a Serjeant, may

even lead a cause.]

And now by statute 0 and 10 Vic. c. 54, all barristers have the same privileges in the court of

common pleas ae the Serjeants.

(9) [Upon the same principle a physician cannot maintain an action for his fees. 4 Term Rep.

317.]

In the United States a counsellor is not only entitled to stipulate for a reasonable fee, but he may

recover upon the client's implied promise to pay a reasonable compensation. In the state of New

Jersey, however, the rule appears to be otherwise. Seeley r. Crane, 3 Green, 35; Van Alter e.

McKinney'B Ex'rs, 1 Harrison, 236.

It has been held that if an attorney renders a bill on the understanding that it is to be imme-

diately paid, and the client disputes it, and compels its collection by legal proceedings, the attor-

ney is not bound by the bill rendered, but may recover what the evidence shows the services to

be reasonably worth. Romeyn v. Campau, 17 Mich. 327.

Physicians also in the United States may recover upon an implied promise to pay reasonable

fees. See Ordronaux Juris, of Med. 40.

(10) [The circumstances which led to this decree, as recorded by Tacitus, deserve to be men-

tioned. Samius, a Roman knight of distinction, having given Suilins a fee of three thousand

guineas to undertake his defence, and finding that he was betrayed by his advocate, ferio in demo

IJHX incubuit; in consequence of this the senate insisted upon enforcing the Cincian law, qua

cavetur antiqiiitus, negttis ob causam orandam pecuniam donumve nccipitit."]

(11) [See the important case establishing the correctness of this position. Holt, C. ST. P. 621;

1 B. and A. 232; 1 Saund. Rep. 130.]

See also McMillin v. Birch, 1 Binn. 178; Hoar ». "Wood, 3 Met. 194; Ring v. Wheeler, 7 Cow.

725; Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410; Garrr. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91; Jennings «. Paine, 4 Wis.

358: Cooley Const. Li in. 443.

21
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CHAPTER IV.

OF THE PUBLIC COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY.

WE are next to consider the several species and distinctions of courts of jus-

tice, which are acknowledged and used in this kingdom. And these are, either

such as are of public and general jurisdiction throughout the whole realm ; or

such as are only of a private and special jurisdiction in some particular parts

of it. Of the former there are four sorts ; the universally established courts of

common law and equity ; the ecclesiastical courts ; the courts military ; and

courts maritime. And, first, of such public courts as are courts of common law

and equity.

The policy of our ancient constitution, as regulated and established by the

great Alfred, was to bring justice home to every man's door, by constituting as

many courts of judicature as there are manors and townships in the kingdom;

wherein injuries were redressed in an easy and expeditious manner, by the

suffrage of neighbours and friends. These little courts, however, communi-

cated with others of a larger jurisdiction, and those with others of a still

greater power; ascending gradually from the lowest to the supreme courts,

which were respectively constituted to correct the errors of the inferior ones,

and to determine such causes as, by reason of their weight and difficulty,

F*311 a a more solemn discussion. *The course of justice flowing in

L -I large streams from the king, as the fountain, to his superior courts of

record ; and being then subdivided into smaller channels, till the whole and
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every part of the kingdom were plentifully watered and refreshed. An insti-

tution that seems highly agreeable to the dictates of natural reason, as well as

of more enlightened policy ; being equally similar to that which prevailed in

Mexico and Peru before they were discovered by the Spaniards, and to that

which was established in the Jewish republic by Moses. In Mexico each town

and province had its proper judges, who heard and decided causes, except when

the point in litigation was too intricate for their determination ; and then it was

remitted to the supreme court of the empire, established in the capital, and con-

sisting of twelve judges, (a) Peru, according to Garcilasso de Vega (an histor-

ian descended from the ancient Incas of that country), was divided into small

districts containing ten families each, all registered and under one magistrate ;

who had authority to decide little differences and punish petty crimes. Five of

these composed a higher class of fifty families ; and two of these last composed

another, called a hundred. Ten hundreds constituted the largest division, con-

sisting of a thousand families ; and each division had its separate judge or mag-

istrate, with a proper degree of subordination, (b) In like manner we read of

Moses, that, finding the sole administration of justice too heavy for him, he

" chose able men out of all Israel, such as feared God, men of truth, hating cov-

etousness ; and made them heads over the people, rulers of thousands, rulers of

hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens ; and they judged the people at

all seasons ; the hard causes they brought unto Moses ; but every small matter

they judged themselves." (c) These inferior courts, at least the name and form

of them, still continue in our legal constitution : but as the superior courts of

record have in practice obtained a concurrent original jurisdiction with these;

and as there is, besides, a power of removing plaints or actions thither from all

the inferior jurisdictions ; upon these accounts (amongst others) it has happened

F*321 *na^ **nese P^ty tribunals have fallen into decay, and almost into obliv-

L J ion ; whether for the better or the worse, may be matter of some specu-

lation, when we consider on the one hand the increase of expense and delay,

and on the other the more able and impartial decision, that follow from this

change of jurisdiction.

fa) Mod. Un. Htat. xxxvill, 468. (bj Mod. Un. Hiat. xxxix. It. (c) Exod. o. 18.
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The order I shall observe in discoursing on these several courts, constituted

for the redress of civil injuries (for with those of a jurisdiction merely criminal

I shall not at present concern myself), will be by beginning with the lowest,

and those whose jurisdiction, though public and generally dispersed throughout

the kingdom, is yet, (with regard to each particular court) confined to very

narrow limits; and so ascending gradually to those of the most extensive and

transcendent power.

I. The lowest, and at the same time the most expeditious, court of justice

known to the law of England, is the court of piepoudre, curia pedis pulverizati;

BO called from the dusty feet of the suitors: or, according to Sir Edward Coke,

(d) because justice is there done as speedily as dust can fall from the foot;—upon

the same principle that justice among the Jews was administered in the gate of

the city, (e)that the proceedings might be the more speedy, as well as public.

But the etymology given us by a learned modern writer (/) is much more

ingenious and satisfactory; it being derived, according to him, from pied

puldreaux, (a pedlar, in old French), and therefore signifying the court of such

petty chapmen as report to fairs or markets. It is a court of record, incident

to every fair and market; of which the steward of him who owns or has the

toll of the market, is the judge; and its jurisdiction extends to administer jus-

tice for all commercial injuries done in that very fair or market, and not in any

preceding one. So that the injury must be done, complained of, heard, and

determined, within the compass of one and the same day, unless the fair con-
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tinues longer. The court hath cognizance of *all matters of contract r*ooi

that can possibly arise within the precinct of that fair or market; and "- -I

the plaintiff must make oath that the cause of action arose there, (g) From

this court a writ of error lies, in the nature of an appeal, to the courts at West-

minster; (A) which are now also bound by the statute 19 Geo. Ill, c. 70, to issue

writs of execution, in aid of its process, after judgment, where the person or

effects of the defendant are not within the limits of this inferior jurisdiction;

which may possibly occasion the revival of the practice and proceed ings in these

courts, which are now in a manner forgotten. The reason of their original

institution seems to have been, to do justice expeditiously among the variety of

persons that resort from distant places to a fair or market; since it is probable

that no other inferior coiirt might be able to serve its process, or execute its

judgments, on both or perhaps either of the parties; and therefore unless this

court had been erected, the complainant must necessarily have resorted, even in

the first instance, to some superior judicature.

II. The court-baron is a court incident to every manor in the kingdom, to be

holden by the steward within the said manor. This court-baron is of two

natures: (i) the one is a customary court, of which we formerly spoke, (/fc) apper-

taining entirely to the copyholders, in which their estates are transferred by

surrender and admittance, and other matters transacted relative to their ten-

ures only. The other, of which we now speak, is a court of common law, and

it is the court of the barons, by which name the freeholders were sometimes

anciently called: for that it is held before the freeholders who owe suit and

service to the manor, the steward being rather the register than the judge.

These courts, though in their nature distinct, are frequently confounded together.

The court we are now considering, viz.: the freeholders' court, was composed

of the lord's tenants, who were the pares of each other, and were bound by their

feudal tenure to assist their lord in the dispensation of domestic justice. This

was formerly held every three weeks; and its most important business is to

determine, by writ of right, all controversies relating to the right of lands within

the manor. It may also hold plea of any personal actions, of debt, trespass on

the case, or the like, where the debt or damages do not *amount to forty r*q^-i

shillings: (1) which is the same sum, or three marks, that bounded the L -I

jurisdiction of the ancient Gothic courts in their lowest instance, or fierding-

(d) 4 Inst. 272. (t) Ruth, c. 4. (f) Barrington'9 observat. on the stat. 337.

fa) Stat. 17 Eilw. IV. c. 2. fh) Cro. Ellz. 773. (I) Co. Litt. 5S.

(k) Book 2, cb. 4, c.h. e and ch. ft. (I) Finch, 248.
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courts, so called, because four were instituted within every superior district or

hundred, (m) But the proceedings on a writ of right may be removed into

the county court by a precept from the sheriff called a tolt, (n)" quia toUit atque

eximit causam e curia baronum." (o) (1) And the proceedings in all other

actions may be removed into the superior courts by the king's writs of pone, (p)

or accedas ad curiam, according to the nature of the suit, (q) After judgment

given, a writ also of false judgment (r) lies to the courts at Westminster to

rehear and review the cause, and not a writ of error; for this is not a court of

record: and therefore in some of these writs of removal, the first direction

given is to cause the plaint to be recorded, recordari facias loquelam.

III. A hundred-court is only a larger court-baron, being held for all the

inhabitants of a particular hundred instead of a manor. (2) The free suitors

are here also the judges, and the steward the registrar, as in the case of a court-

baron. It is likewise no court of record: resembling the former in all points,

except that in point of territory it is of greater jurisdiction, (s) This is said by

Sir Edward Coke to have been derived out of the county court for the ease of

the people, that they might have justice done to them at their own doors, with-

out any charge or loss of time; (?) but its institution was probably coeval with

that of hundreds themselves, which were formerly observed (u) to have been

introduced, though not invented, by Alfred, being derived from the polity of

the ancient Germans. The centeni, we may remember, were the principal

inhabitants of a district composed of different villages, originally in number a
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r*35] hundred, but afterwards only *called by that name; (v) and who prob-

"- •" ably gave the same denomination to the district out of which they were

chosen. Caesar speaks positively of the judicial power exercised in their

hundred-courts and courts-baron. " Principes regionum atque pagorum"

(which we may fairly construe, the lords of hundreds and manors), "inter suos

jus dicunt, controversiasgue minuunt." (w) And Tacitus, who had examined

their constitution still more attentively, informs us not only of the authority

of the lords, but that of the centeni, the hundredors, or jury; who were taken

out of the common freeholders, and had themselves a share in the determina-

tion. " Eliguntur in conciliis et principes, qui jura per pagos vicosque red-

dunt: centeni singulis, ex plebe comites, consuium simul et auctoritas, adsunt."

(x) This hundred-court was denominated hcereda in the Gothic constitution, (y)

But this court, as causes are equally liable to removal from hence as from the

common court-baron, and by the same writs, and may also be reviewed by writ

of false judgment, is therefore fallen into equal disuse with regard to the trial

of actions.

IV. The county court (3) is a court incident to the jurisdiction of the sheriff.

It ia not a court of record, but may hold pleas of debt or damages under

(m) Stiernhook, dejure Goth. 1.1, c. 2. (n) F. N. B. S, 4. See Appen. No. I, ( 2. (o) 3 Rep. pref.

(p) See Append. No. I, f 3. (?) F. N. B. 4, 70. Finch, L. 444. 445. (r) F. N. B. 18.

(s) Finch, L. 243. 4 Iriat. 267. (0 2 Inst. 71. '«) Book I, p. 116.

(e) Centeni ex singulis pagis snnt, id gue ipsum inter »uoi vacant ur; et, quod primo numerta fuU, jam

nomen et honor ett. Tac. de mor. Germ. c. 6.

(w) Dt JSM. Hull. 1. 6, c. 22. (z) De Morib, Oerman. c. 13. (y) Stiernhook, 1. 1, c. 2.

(1) 'Write of right are now abolished. Statutes 3 and 4 Wm. IT, c. 37.

(2) The courts-baron and hundred-court have lonjj been obsolete as courts of civil jurisdiction.

(3) [The new county courts, so called in contradistinction to the county courts before men-

tioned, were established by the statute 9 and 10 Vie. c. 95. They at first possessed jurisdiction

only for the recovery of debts, damages and demands, legacies and balances of partnership

accounts, where the sum sued for did not exceed 201. They were also charged with the power

of giving a landlord possession of premises where the tenant's term had determined, or he

had received proper notice to quit, in cases in which the rent did not exceed 50i. annually, and

no fine had to be paid. By the statute 13 and 14 Vic. c. 61, their jurisdiction was extended to

actions where the amount did not exceed 502., and, if tin- litigants consented in writing, to

actions for any amount whatever. By this statute an appeal was also given against the decis-

ion of the judge on matter of law, but only in actions for sums above 20Z. No appeal lies

from his decision in matters of fact. The other statutes relating to this branch of the juris-

diction of these courts arc the 12 and 13 Vic. c. 101, and 15 and 16 Vic. c. 54. They have no

Chap. 4.] COUNTY COURT. 35

the value of forty shillings. («) Over some of which causes these inferior courts

ihave, by the express words of the statute of Gloucester, (a) a jurisdiction

totally exclusive of the king's superior courts. For in order to be entitled to

sue an action of trespass for goods before the king's justiciars, the plaintiff is

directed to make affidavit that the cause of action does really and bona fide

amount to 40s.; which affidavit is now unaccountably disused, (b) except in the

court of exchequer. The statute, also, 43 Eliz. c. 6, which gives the judges in

many personal actions, where the jury assess less damages than 40s., a power to

certify the same and *abridge the plaintiff of his full costs, was also meant r „„„-,

to prevent vexation by litigious plaintiffs; who, for purposes of mere •• J

oppression, might be inclinable to institute suits in the superior courts for

injuries of a trifling value. The county court may also hold plea of many real

actions, and of all personal actions to any amount, by virtue of a special writ

called a justicies ; which is a writ empowering the sheriff for the sake of dis-

patch to do the same justice in his county court, as might otherwise be had at

Westminster, (c) The freeholders of the county are the real judges in this

court, and the sheriff is the ministerial officer. The great conflux of freeholders,

which are supposed always to attend at the county court (which Spelman calls

forum plebeicB justicia et theatrum comitivce potestatis), (a) is the reason why

all acts of parliament at the end of every session were wont to be there pub-

lished by the sheriff; why all outlawries of absconding offenders are there pro-

claimed ; and why all popular elections which the freeholders are to make, as
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formerly of sheriffs and conservators of the peace, and still of coroners, verde-

rors, and knights of the shire, must ever be made in plena comitatu, or in full

county court. By the statute 2 Edw. VI, c. 25, no county court shall be ad-

journed longer than for one month, consisting of twenty-eight days. And this

was also the ancient usage, as appears from the laws of King Edward the

elder; (e) "prospositus (that is, the sheriff) ad quartam drciter septimanam

frequentem populi concionem celebrato: cuique jus dicito; litesque singulas

dirimito." In those times the county court was a court of great dignity and

splendour, the bishop and the earldorman (or earl), with the principal men of

the shire sitting therein to administer justice both in lay and ecclesiastical

causes. (/) But its dignity was much impaired, when the bishop was prohibited

and the earl neglected to attend it. And!, in modern times, as proceedings are

removable from hence into the king's superior courts, by writ of pone or recor-

dari, (g) in the same manner as from *hundred-courts, and courts-baron;

and as the same writ of false judgment may be had, in nature of a writ

of error; this has occasioned the same disuse of bringing actions therein.

fz) 4 Inst. 26«. fa) 9 Edw. I, c. 8. fbj 2 Inst. 311.

(c.) Finch, 818. F. N. B. 162. (d) Olou v. comitatu*. (e) C. 11.

(/) LL. Eadgari. c. 5. (g) F. N. B. 70. Finch, 445.

jurisdiction, it may be observed, unless the parties expressly consent in writing to that effect,

in actions in which the title to corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments, or to any toll or fran-

chise, or in which the validity of any devise or bequest nnder a will or settlement, may come

in question. Actions brought for a malicious prosecution, for libel or slander, criminal con-

versation or seduction, or breach of promise of marriage, are expressly excluded.

The judges must be barristers of seven yearn standing. The judge decides all questions as

well of fact as of law. unless one or other of the parties to the action has demanded a jury, for

the trial of matters of fact, which in actions for sums above W. may be obtained as ol right,»

and consists of five jurors summoned from the district where the court is holden. The court

is a court of record. It is held once a month. And to encourage parties to resort to this tri-

bunal, the plaintiff in the superior courts (in suits in which they have concurrent jurisdiction)

does not recover his costs in actions of contract where he recovers no more than 20Z., and in

actions of tort where he recovers no more than 52. unless the judge of the superior court who

tries the cause certifies for costs, or it appears to the court that there was sufficient reason for

bringing the action in the superior court.

Subsequent statutes, (19 and 20 Vic. c. 108; 28 and 29 Vic. c. 99; and 31 and 32 Vic. o. 71).

bnve stifl further enlarged the jurisdiction of these courts, and they now have equitable ana

maritime jurisdiction, and also probate jurisdiction in certain cases.

VOL. IL-4 S5
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These are the several species of common law courts, which, though dispersed

universally throughout the realm, are nevertheless of a partial jurisdiction, and

confined to particular districts: yet communicating with, and as it were mem-

bers of, the superior courts of a more extended and general nature; which are

calculated for the administration of redress, not in any one lordship, hundred,

or county only, but throughout the whole kingdom at large. Of which sort is,

V. The court of common pleas, or, as it is frequently termed in law, the court of

common bench.

By the ancient Saxon constitution, there was only one superior court of

justice in the kingdom; and that court had cognizance both of civil and spirit-

ual causes, viz.: the wittena-gemote, or general council, which assembled annu-

ally or oftener, wherever the king kept nis Christmas, Easter, or Whitsuntide,

as well to do private justice as to consult upon public business. At the conquest

the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was diverted into another channel; and the con-

queror, fearing danger from these annual parliaments, contrived also to separate

their ministerial power, as judges, from their deliberative, as counsellors to the

crown. He therefore established a constant court in his own hall, thence called

by Bracton, (h) and other ancient authors aula regia, or aula regis. This court

was composed of the king's great officers of state resident in his palace, and usu-

ally attendant on his person: such as the lord high constable and lord mares-

chal, who chiefly presided in matters of honour and of arms; determining

according to the law military and the law of nations. Besides these there were
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the lord high steward, and lord great chamberlain; the steward of the house-

F *381 hold.; the lord chancellor, whose peculiar *business it was to keep the

L "HJ king'g geaij and examine all such writs, grants, and letters, as were to pass

under that authority; and the lord high treasurer, who was the principal

adviser in all matters relating to the revenue. These high officers were assisted

by certain persons learned in the laws, who were called the king's justiciars or

justices; and by the greater barons of parliament, all of whom had a seat in the

aula regia, and formed a kind of court of appeal, or rather of advice, in matters

of great moment and difficulty. All these in their several departments trans-

acted all secular business both criminal and civil, and likewise the matters of

the revenue: and over all presided one special magistrate, called the chief jus-

ticiar, or capitalis juxticiarius totius AnglicB ; who was also the principal minis-

ter of state, the second man in the kingdom, and by virtue of his office guardian

of the realm in the king's absence. And this officer it was, who principally

determined all the vast variety of causes that arose in this extensive jurisdic-

tion ; and from the plenitude of his power grew at length both obnoxious to the

people, and dangerous to the government which employed him. (i)

This great universal court oeing bound to follow the king's household in all

his progresses and expeditions, the trial of common causes therein was found

very burthensome to the subject. Wherefore King John, who dreaded also the

power of the justiciar, very readily consented to that article which now forms

the eleventh chapter of magna carta, and enacts, "that communia placita

non sequantur curiam reqis, sed teneantur in aliquo loco certo." This certain

place was established in Westminster-hall, the place where the aula regis origin-

ally sat, when the king resided in that city; and there it hath ever since con-

tinued. And the court being thus rendered fixed and stationary, the judges

became so too, and a chief with other justices of the common pleas was there-

upon appointed; with jurisdiction to hear and determine all pleas of land, and

injuries merely civil, between subject and subject. Which critical establishment

r *OQI of this principal court of *common law, at that particular juncture

L J and that particular place, gave rise to the inns of court in its neigh-

bourhood ; and thereby collecting together the whole body of the common law-

yers, enabled the law "itself to withstand the attacks of the canonists and

civilians, who laboured to extirpate and destroy it. (_/) This precedent was soon

after copied by King Philip the Fair in France, who about the year 1302 fixed

fk)ia,tr.l,e.1. (i) Spelm. Ol. 331, 2,3. (jilb. Hist C. P. Introduc.17. ()) See Book I, Introduc. U.

26
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the parliament of Paris to abide constantly in that metropolis; which before

used to follow the person of the king wherever he went, and in which he him-

self used frequently to decide the causes that were there pending; but all were

then referred to the sole cognizance of the parliament and its learned judges. (£)

And thus,'also, in 1495 the emperor Maximilian I. fixed the imperial chamber

(which before always travelled with the court and household) to be constantly

held at Worms, from whence it was afterwards translated to Spire. (I)

The aula regia being thus stripped of so considerable a branch of its jurisdic-

tion, and the power of the chief justiciar being also considerably curbed by

many articles in the great charter, the authority of both began to decline apace

under the long and troublesome reign of King Henry III. And, in further pur-

suance of this example, the other several officers of the chief justiciar were

under Edward the First (who new-modelled the whole frame of our judicial

polity) subdivided and broken into distinct courts of judicature. A court of

chivalry was erected, over which the constable and mareschal presided; as did

the steward of the household over another, constituted to regulate the king's

domestic servants. The high steward, with the barons of parliament, formed

an august tribunal for the trial of delinquent peers; and the barons reserved to

themselves in parliament the right of reviewing the sentences of other courts in

the last resort The distribution of common justice between man and man

was thrown into so provident an order, that the great judicial officers were

*made to form a check upon each other: the court of chancery issuing all r+tn -\
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original writs under the great seal to the other courts; the common pleas L u J

being allowed to determine all causes between private subjects; the exchequer

managing the king's revenue; and the court of king's bench retaining all the

jurisdiction which was not cantoned out to other courts, and particularly the

superintendence of all the rest by way of appeal; and the sole cognizance of

pleas of the crown or criminal causes. For pleas or suits are regularly divided

into two sorts: pleas of the crown, which comprehend all crimes and misde-

meanors, wherein the king (on behalf of the public) is the plaintiff; and common

pleas, which include all civil actions, depending between subject and subject.

The former of these were the proper object of the jurisdiction of the court of

king's bench; the latter of the court 01 common pleas: which is a court of

record, and is styled by Sir Edward Coke (m) the lock and key of the common

law; for herein only can real actions, that is, actions which concern the right

of freehold or the realty, be originally brought: and all other, or personal pleas

between man and man, are likewise here determined; thomgh in most of them

the king's bench has also a concurrent authority. (4)

The judges of this court are at present (n) four in number, (5) one chief and

three puisne justices, created by the king's letters patent, who sit every day in

the four terms to hear and determine all matters of law arising* in civil causes,

whether real, personal, or mixed and compounded of both. These it takes cog-

nizance of, as well originally, as upon removal from the inferior courts before-

mentioned. But a writ of error, in the nature of an appeal, lies from this court

into the court of king's bench. (6)

(k) Mod. Un. Hist, xxiil, 396. (I) IMd. xxlx, «7. (m) 4 Inst. 90.

(n) King James I, during the greater part of his reign, appointed five judges in the courts of king's bench

and common pleas, for the benefit of a casting voice in case of a difference m opinion, and that the circuit*

might at all times be fully supplied with judges of the superior courts. And, in subsequent reigns, upon

the permanent indisposition of a judge, a fifth h'ath been sometimes appointed. Sir T. Raym. 475.

(4) [The jurisdiction of each court is so well established, that at this day the court of king's

bench cannot be authorized to determine a mere real action; so neither can the court of com-

mon pleas, to inquire of felony or treason. Hawk. b. 2. oh. I. *. 4 ; Bac. Ab. Courts, A. The

king's bench, however, tries titles to land by the action of ejectment.]

(5) The number of the judges was afterwards changed to five, and by statute 3t and 32 Vio.

c. 125, it is increased to six. And the writ of error, instead of being to the king's bench, is to

the judges of that court and the barons of the exchequer in the exchequer chamber, and from

their judgment to the house of lords.

(6) [This court is called the queen's bench in the reign of a queen, and during the filrotectorate

of Cromwell it was styled the upper bench.]

27

41 PUBLIC COURTS OF COMMON LAW AND EQUITY. [Book III.

r,. - , *VI. The court of king's bench (so called because the king used for-

L ** J merly to sit there in person, (o) the style of the court still being coram ipgo

rege) is the supreme court of common law in the kingdom; consisting of a chief

justice and three puisne justices, who are by their office the sovereign conserva-

tors of the peace, and supreme coroners of the land. Yet, though the king

himself used to sit in this court, and still is supposed so to do; he did not,

neither by law is he empowered (p) to, determine any cause or motion, but by

the mouth of his judges, to whom he hath committed his whole judicial

authority, (q) (7)

This court, which (as we have said) is the remnant of the aula regia, is not,

nor can be, from the very nature and constitution of it, fixed to any certain

place, but may follow the king's person wherever he goes: for which reason all

process issuing out of this court in the king's name is returnable " ubicunqtte

fuerimus in Anglia." It hath indeed, for some centuries past, usually sat at

Westminster, being an ancient palace of the crown; but might remove with the

king to York or Exeter, if he thought proper to command it. And we find that,

after Edward I had conquered Scotland, it actually sat at Roxburgh, (r) And

this movable quality, as well as its dignity and power, are fully expressed by

Bracton, when he says that the justices of this court are " capitales, generales,

perpetui, et majores; a latere regis residentes, qui omnium aliorum corrigere

tenentur injuring et errores." (s) And it is moreover especially provided in the

artvyuli super carias, (t) that the king's chancellor, and the justices of his bench,
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shall follow him, so that he may have at all times near unto him some that be

learned in the laws.

F*421 *The jurisdiction of this court is very high and transcendent. It keeps

L ** J all infenor jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and may

either remove their proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit their progress

below. It superintends all civil corporations in the kingdom. It commands

magistrates and others to do what their duty requires, in every case where there

is no other specific remedy. It protects the liberty of the subject, by speedy

and summary interposition. It takes cognizance both of criminal and civil

causes; the former in what is called the crown-side or crown-office; the latter

in the plea-side of the court. The jurisdiction of the crown-side it is not our

present business to consider; that will be more properly discussed in the ensuing

book. But on the plea-side, or civil branch, it hath an original jurisdiction

and cognizance of all actions of trespass, or other injury alleged to be commit-

ted vi et armis; of actions of forgery of deeds, maintenance, conspiracy, deceit,

and actions on the case which allege any falsify or fraud: all of which savour

(o) 4 Inst. 7.1.

(p) See book 1. ch. 7. The king used to decide causes in person in the aula regia. "In curia domini rtait

ipte in propria persona jura decemU." (Dial, de Scatxh. 1.1, { 4.) After its dissolution King Edward I Ire-

?uently sat In the court of king's bench. (See the records cited. 2 Burr. 161.) And, In later times, James

is snid to have sat there in person, but was informed by his judges that he could not deliver an opinion.

(q) 4 Inst. 71. (r}U.«, 21 Edw. I. Halo Hist. C. L. 200. (•) 1. 3, c. 10. (t) 28 Edw. I, c. 5.

(7) [Lord Mansfield, in 2 Burr. 851, does not mean to gar, nor do the records there cited

warrant the conclusion, that Edw. I actually sat in the king's bench. Dr. Henry, in his very

accurate history of Great Britain, informs us, that he has found no instance of any of our

kings sitting in a court of justice before Edw. IV. " And Edw. IV (he says), in the second

year of his reign, sat three days together, during Michaelmas term, in the court of king's

bench; but it is not said that he interfered in the business of the court; and as he was then a

very young man, it is probable that it was his intention to learn in what manner justice wax

administered, rather than to act the part of a judge." 5 vol. 382. 4to. edit. Lord Coke says,

that the words in magna carte, c. 29, nee super earn ibimus nee super enm mittemus nisi, <!-.-.,

signify that we shall not pit in judgment ourselves, nor send pur commissioners or judges to

try him. 2 Inst. 46. But that this is an erroneous construction of these words, appears from

a charter granted by King John in the 16th year of his reign, which is thus expressed: nee roper

eos per vim velper arma ibimus nisi per legem regni nostri velper judiciumparium sunrum,

See Int. to Bl. Mftji. Ch. p. siii. Statutes and charters in pan materia must be construed by

a reference to each other, and in the more ancient charter the meaning is clear, that the king will

not proceed with violence against his subjects, unless justified by the law of his kingdom, or by

a judgment of their peers. ]
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of a criminal nature, although the action is brought fbr a civil remedy; and

make the defendant liable in strictness to pay a fine to the king, as well as

damages to the injured party, (u) The same doctrine is also now extended to all

actions on the case whatsoever; (w) but no action of debt or detinue, or other

mere civil action, can by the common law be prosecuted by any subject in this

court, by original writ out of chancery; (x) (8) though an action of debt, given

by statute, may be brought in the king's bench as well as in the common pleas, (y)

And yet this court .might always have held plea of any civil action (other than

actions real) provided the defendant was an officer of the court; or in the cus-

tody of the marshal, or prison-keeper, of this court; for a breach of the peace

or any other offence, (z) And, in process of time, it began by a fiction to hold

plea of all personal actions whatsoever, and has continued to do so for ages:

(a) it being surmised that the defendant is arrested for *a supposed r*<o-|

trespass, which he never has in reality committed; and, being thus in the •• -"

custody, of the marshal of this court, the plaintiff is at liberty to proceed against

him for any other personal injury: which surmise, of being in the marshal's

custody, the defendant is not at liberty to dispute, (fy And these fictions of

law, though at first they may startle the student, he will find upon further con-

sideration to be highly beneficial and useful; especially as this maxim is ever

invariably observed, tfiat no fiction shall extend to work an injury; its proper

operation being to prevent a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might

result from the general rule of law. (c) So true it is, that infictixme juris semper sub-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:01 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

sistit cequitas.(d) In the present case, it gives the suitor his choice of more

than one tribunal, before which he may institute his action ; and prevents the

circuity and delay of justice, by allowing that suit to be originally, and in tho

first instance, commenced in this court, which, after a determination in another,

might ultimately be brought before it on a writ of error. (9)

For this court is likewise a court of appeal, into which may be removed by a

writ of error all determinations of the court of common pleas, and of all inferior

courts of record in England; and to which a writ of error lies also from the

court of king's bench in Ireland. (10) Yet even this so high and honourable

court is not the dernier resort of the subject; for, if he be not satisfied with any

determination here, he may remove it by writ of error into the house of lords, or

the court of exchequer chamber, as the case may happen, according to the nature

of the suit, and the manner in which it has been prosecuted. (11)

VII. The court of exchequer is inferior in rank not only to the court of king's

bench, but to the common pleas also: but I have chosen to consider it in this

order, on account of its douole capacity, as a court of law and a court of equity

*also. It is a very ancient court of record, set up by William the Con-

queror, (e) as a part of the aula regia, (/) though regulated and reduced

to its present order by King Edward I; (g) and intended principally to order

the revenues of the crown, and to recover the king's debts and duties. (A) It is

called the exchequer, scaccharium, from the checked cloth, resembling a chess-

(H.1 Finch, I.. 198. 1 last. 23. Dyversiie de courte» c. bank If roy.

(ic) V. N. B. 86, 92 1 Lilly Pract. Reg. 603. (x) 4 Inst. 78. Trye'8 Jns Fllizar. 101.

(y) Carth. -ill. (*l * !"»'- "'• I") ""'''- 72.

(5) Thus, too. In tho civil law; contra Jictionem non admittitur probatio : quid mim tfficertt probaUo verita-

tif, ubiflctio advernu verilatem flngit aamjtctio nihil aliud est, yuam liyis mln raits verltatem in repossiWi

exjusta causa dispositio. (Gothofred. in Ff. I. Si, *. 3.)

(c) 3 Rep. 30. 2 ttoll. Rep. 502. (</) 11 Rep. 91. Co. l.itl, 130. (e) Lamb. Archeion. 24.

(/) Marlon, hist. exch. 109. (g) Spelm. Hull. I, in cod. leg. vtt. apud WUkins. (A) 4 Inst. 103-116.

(8) This is not the present practice. See Tidd's Prac. 8th ed. 97.

(9) [But as .there is no reason for doing that indirectly which may be done directly, it was

considered expedient to abolish this among other legal fictions (2 Win. IT, o. 39), and the mods

of commencing an action has for some time been, and is now, uniform in all the superior

courts.]

(1C) This is now otherwise. Writs of error and appeals from this court are to the house of

lords of the United Kingdom.

(11) But now the appeal in all cases is to the judges of the common pleas and barons of the

exchequer in the exchequer chamber, and from their judgment to the house of lords.
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board, which covers the table there: and on which, when certain of the king's

accounts are made up, the sums are marked and scored with counters. It con-

sists of two divisions: the receipt of the exchequer, which manages the royal

revenue, and with which these Commentaries have no concern: and the court

or judicial part of it, which is again subdivided into a court of equity, and a

court of common law. (12)

The court of equity is held in the exchequer chamber before the lord treasurer,

the chancellor of the exchequer, the chief baron, and three puisne ones. (13)

These Mr. Selden conjectures (i) to have been anciently made out of such as

were barons of the kingdom, or parliamentary barons; and thence to have de-

rived their name; which conjecture receives great strength from Bracton's

explanation of magna carta, c. 14, which directs that the earls and barons be

amerced by their peers; that is, says he, by the barons of the exchequer, (k) The

primary and original business of this court is to call the king's debtors to account,

by bill filed by the attorney-general; and to recover any lands, tenements, or

hereditaments, any goods, chattels, or other profits or benefits, belonging to the

crown. So that by their original constitution the jurisdiction of the court of

common pleas, king's bench, and exchequer, was entirely separate and distinct:

the common pleas being intended to decide all controversies between subject

and subject; the king's bench to correct all crimes and misdemeanors that

amount to a breach of the peace, the king being then plaintiflf, as such offences

are in open derogation of the jura regalia of his crown; and the exchequer to
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r*iK-i adjust *and recover his revenue, wherein the king also is plaintiff, as the

L -" withholding and non-payment thereof is an injury to his jurafiscalia.

But, as by a fiction almost all sorts of civil actions are now allowed to be brought

in the king's bench, in like manner by another fiction all kinds of personal suits

may be prosecuted in the court of exchequer. For as all the officers and minis-

ters of this court have, like those of other superior courts, the privilege of suing

and being sued only in their own court; so also the king^s debtors and farmers,

and all accomptants of the exchequer, are privileged to sue and implead all man-

ner of persons in the same court of equity that they themselves are called into.

They have likewise privilege to sue and implead one another, or any stranger, in

the same kind of common law actions (where the personalty only is concerned)

as are prosecuted in the court of common pleas.

This gives original to the common law part of their jurisdiction, which was

established merely for the benefit of the king's accomptants, and is exercised by

the barons only of the exchequer, and not the treasurer or chancellor. The

writ upon which all proceedings here are grounded is called a quo minus: in

which the plaintiff suggests that he is the king's farmer or debtor, and that the

defendant hath done him the injury or damage complained of; quo minus suffi-

ciens existit, by which he is less able to pay the king his debt or rent. And

these suits are expressly directed, by what is called the statute of Eutland, (I)

(i) Tit hon. Z, 5,16. (k) 1. 8, tr. 8, «. 1, J 3. flj 10 Edw. I, o. 11.

(12) [Though this conrt is inferior in rank as well to the court of common pleas as the king's

bench, and though in general a subject has a right to resort to either of the superior courts for

the redress of a civil injury, yet this court, having an original, and in many cases an exclusive

jurisdiction in fiscal matters, will not permit questions, in the decision of which the king's

revenue or his officers are interested, to be discussed before any other tribunal; and therefore,

if an action of trespass against a revenue officer, for his conduct in the execution of his office,

be brought in the court of C. P. or K. B., it may be removed into the office of pleas of this

court of exchequer. 1 Anstr. 205; Hardr. 176; Parker, 143; 1 Price, 206; 8 id. 584; Man-

ring's Exchequer Prac. 161, 164, n. On such occasions the court interposes on motion, by order-

ing the proceeding to be removed into the office of pleas, which order operates by way of in-

junction.]

(13) The equity jurisdiction of the exchequer, by statute 5 Vic. c. 5, was transferred to the

court of chancery, and it is now only a conrt of law and revenue. The fiction mentioned in the

text a few lines further on, by which it obtained jurisdiction, is now abolished, and nearly every

civil case may be brought in this court without resort to any such suggestion. The number

of the judges was increased to six by statute 31 and 32 Vic. c. 125,
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to be confined to such matters only as specially concern the king or his minis-

ters of the exchequer. And by the articuli super cartas, (m) it is enacted, that

no common pleas be thenceforth holden in the exchequer contrary to the form

of the great charter. But now, by the suggestion of privilege, any person may

be admitted to sue in the exchequer as well as the king's accomptant. The sur-

mise of being debtor to the king, is therefore become matter of form and mere

words of course, and the court is open to all the nation equally. The same holds

with regard to the equity side of the court: for there any person may file

*a bill against another upon a bare suggestion that he is the king's ac- p^g-i

comptant; but whether he is so or not is never controverted. In this •- J

court on the equity side, the clergy have long used to exhibit their bills for the

non-payment of tithes: in which case the surmise of being the king's debtor is

no fiction, they being bound to pay him their first fruits, and annual tenths.

But the chancery of late years obtained a large share in this business.

An appeal from the equity side of this court lies immediately to the house of

peers; but from the common law side, in pursuance of the statute 31 Edw. Ill,

c. 12, a writ of error must be first brought into the court of exchequer chamber.

And from the determination there had, there lies, in the dernier resort, a writ of

error to the house of lords. (14)

VIII. The high court of chancery is the only remaining, and in matters of

civil property by much the most important of any, of the king's superior and

original courts of justice. It has its name of chancery, cancellaria, from the
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judge who presides here, the lord chancellor or cancellarius ; who, Sir Edward

Coke tells us, is so termed a cancellando, from cancelling the king's letters patent

when granted contrary to law, which is the highest point of his jurisdiction.(»)(15)

But the office and name of chancellor (however derived) was certainly known

to the courts of the Roman emperors: where it originally seems to have sig-

nified a chief scribe or secretary, who was afterwards invested with several

judicial powers, and a general superintendency over the rest of the officers of

the prince. From the Roman empire it passed to the Roman church, ever emu-

lous of imperial state; and hence every bishop has to this day his chancellor,

the principal judge of his consistory. And when the modern kingdoms of

Europe were established upon the ruins of the empire, almost every state pre-

served its chancellor, with different jurisdictions and dignities, according to their

different constitutions. But in all of them he seems to have had the supervi-

sion of all charters, letters, and such other public instruments of the crown, as

were authenticated in the most solemn manner; and, therefore, *when

seals came in use, he had always the custody of the king's great seal. So

that the office of chancellor, or lord keeper, (16) (whose authority by statute

5 Eliz. c. 18, is declared to be exactly the same), is with us at this day created

by the mere delivery of the king's great seal into his custody: (o) whereby he

becomes, without writ or patent, an officer of the greatest weight and power of

any now subsisting in the kingdom; and superior in point of precedency to

every temporal lord, (p) He is a privy counsellor by his office, (g) and, accord-

ing to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, (r) prolocutor or the house of lords by pre-

(in) 28Edw. I, e. 4. fnj 4Inst. 88. (o) Lamb. An-htian. 56. 1 Roll. Abr. 385.

(p) Slat. 31 Hen. VIII, c. 10.

(q) s fli if n, office of lord, rhanc. $ 3. (r) Of the office of lord chancellor, edit. 1661.

(14) The appeal is now to the judges of the king's bench and common pleas in the exchequer

chamber, and from their judgment to the house of lords.

(15) [See also Gibb. Decl. and Pall, 2, 99, and 1 Camp. Lives of the Chancellors, 2, as to tho

various derivations ascribed to the name.]

(16) [King Henry V had two great seals, one of gold, which he delivered to the bishop of

Durham, and made him lord chancellor; another of silver, which he delivered to the bishop

of London to keep; and historians often confound chancellors and keepers; 1 Hair. Ch. 68,

note ; 4 Inst. 88; but, at this day there being but one great seal, there cannot be both a chan-

cellor and a lord keeper of the great seal at one time, because both are but one office, as is

declared by the statute 5 Elia. (4 Inst. 88), and the taking away the seal determines the office.

1 Sid. 338.]
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scription. To him belongs the appointment of all justices of the peace through-

out the kingdom. Being formerly usually an ecclesiastic (for none else wore

then capable of an office so conversant in writings), and presiding over the royal

chapel, («) he became keeper of the king's conscience ; visitor, in right of

the king, of all hospitals and colleges of the king's foundation ; and patron of

all the king's livings under the value of twenty marks (t) per annum in the

king's books. He is the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics ;

and has the general superintendence of all charitable uses in the kingdom. And

all this, over and above the vast and extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in

his judicial capacity in the court of chancery ; wherein, as in the exchequer,

there are two distinct tribunals: the one ordinary, being a court of common

law ; the other extraordinary, being a court of equity.

The ordinary legal court is much more ancient than the court of equity. Its

jurisdiction is to hold plea upon a scire facias to repeal and cancel the king's

letters patent, when made against law, or upon untrue suggestions ; and to hold

plea of petitions, monstrans de droit, traverses of offices, and the like ; when the

king hath been advised to do any act, or is put in possession of any lauds or

goods, in prejudice of a subject's right, (u) On proof of which, as the king can

F*481 never *'3e supposed intentionally to do any wrong, the law questions not,

*• * but he will immediately redress the injury ; and refers that conscientious

task to the chancellor, the keeper of his conscience. It also appertains to this

court to hold plea of all personal actions, where any officer or minister of the
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court is a party, (v) It might likewise hold plea (by scire facias) of partitions

of land in coparcenery, (w) and of dower, (x) where any ward of the crown was

concerned in interest, so long as the military tenures subsisted : as it now may

also do of the tithes of forest land, where granted by the king, and claimed by a

stranger against the grantee of the crown; (y) and of executions on statutes, or

recognizances in nature thereof, by the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6. (?) But if

any cause comes to issue in this court, that is, if any fact be disputed between

the parties, the chancellor cannot try it, having no power to summon a jury :

but must deliver the record propria manu into the court of king's bench, where

it shall be tried by the country, and judgment shall be there given thereon. (a)(17)

And when judgment is given in chancery upon demurrer or the like, a writ of

error in nature of an appeal lies out of this ordinary court into the court of

king's bench : (/>) though so little is usually done on the common law side of the

court, that I have met with no traces of any writ of error (c) being actually

brought, since the fourteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1572.

In this ordinary, or legal, court is also kept the officina justitia : out of which

all original writs that pass under the great seal, all commissions of charitable

(i) Madox. hist, ofexch. 4*.

(t) 38 Edw. III. 8 F. N. B. 35, though Hobart (214) extend* this value to twenty pound*.

(u) 4 Ecp. 54. (v) 4 Inst. 80. (v) Co. Litt. 171. F. N. B. 62.

(.i-) Bro. Abr. Of. dower, At. Moor. 885. (y) llro. Ht. dumet. 10. (z) 2 Roll. Abr. 469.

(u J Cro. Jao. 12. Latch. 112.

(b) Yearbook, 18 Edward HI, 25. 17 AM. 24. 29 ^»». 47. Dyer, 315. 1 Eoll. Rep. 887. 4 Inat 80.

,,.....,...

(c} The opinion of Lonl Keeper North, in 1682 (1 Vern. 131 ; 1 Equ. Cas. abr. liiii. that no such writ of

error lay, and that an Injunction might issue ngamst it, seems not to hare been well considered.

-r- -- _«— -- -

(17) [It is important to confine this observation (which is not always done) to the common

law side of the court of chancery. Sitting as a judge of common law and trying causes accord-

ing to the rules of the common law, the lord chancellor cannot decide by himself a disputed fact,

and has no power of issuing process to the sheriff or other officer for summoning a jury. But on

the equity side of the court, where the jurisdiction of the lord chancellor is placed entirely on

other grounds than those of the common law. he is equally competent to decide on disputed facts

as on disputed law ; and it is matter of discretion only when he either orders or permits the par-

ties to submit the trial of such fact to the cognizance of a jury. For the manner in which this

is done, sec post, 452. According to the later precedents when a record comes into the king's

bench from chancery, the chancellor does not deliver it propria manu, but sends it by the clerk

of the petty bag. 1 Bq. Ca. Abr. 128.]

Under the recent statute 25 and 26 Vic. o. 42, courts of equity are required to determine ques-

tions of law in oases where formerly it was the practice to refer them to the courts of law, and

they may now summon juries lor the determination of questions of fact in certain cases. Statute

21 and 27 Vio. 0.27.
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uses, sewers, bankruptcy, idiotcy, lunacy, and the like, do issue; and for which

it is always open to the subject, who may there at any time demand and have

ex debito justitite, any writ that his occasions *may call for. These writs r*jgi

(relating to the business of the subject) and the returns to them were, *- '

according to the simplicity of ancient times, originally kept in a hamper in

hanaperio; and the others (relating to such matters wherein the crown is

immediately or mediately concerned) were preserved in a little sack or

bag, in parva baga; and thence hath arisen the distinction of the hanaper

office, aiid petty bag office, which both belong to the common law court in

chancery.

But the extraordinary court, or court of equity, is now become the coiirt of

the greatest judicial consequence. This distinction between law and equity, as

administered in different courts, is not at present known, nor seems to have ever

been known, in any other country at any time: (d) and yet the difference of one

from the other, when administered by the same tribunal, was perfectly familiar

to the Konians; (e) the jus prcetorium, or discretion of the praetor, being distinct

from the leges, or standing laws, (/) but the power of both centred in one and

the same magistrate, who was equally intrusted to pronounce the rule of law,

and to apply it to particular cases, by the principles of equity. With us, too,

the aula rcgia, which was the supreme court of judicature, undoubtedly admin-

istered equal justice, according to the rules of both or either, as the case might

chance to require; and, when that was broken to pieces, the idea of a court of
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equity, as distinguished from a court of law, did not subsist in the original plan

of partition. For, though equity is mentioned by Bracton (g) as a thing con-

trasted to strict law, yet neither in that writer, nor in Glauvil or Fleta, nor yet

in Britton (composed under the auspices and in the name of Edward I, and

*treating particularly of courts and their several jurisdictions), is there r ^-n i

a syllable to be found relating to the equitable jurisdiction of the court •• ° '

of chancery. It seems, therefore, probable that, when the courts of law, pro-

ceeding merely upon the ground of the king's original writs, and confining

themselves strictly to that bottom, gave a harsh or imperfect judgment, the

application for redress used to be to the king in person, assisted by his privy

council (from whence, also, arose the jurisdiction of the court of requests, (h)

which was virtually abolished by the statute 16 Car. I, c. 10); and they were

wont to refer the matter either to the chancellor and a select committee, or by

degrees to the chancellor only, who mitigated the severity or supplied the defects

of the judgments pronounced in the courts of law, upon weighing the circum-

stances of the case. This was the custom, not only among our Saxon ancestors,

before the institution of the aula regia, (i) but also after its dissolution, in the

reign of King Edward I; (4) and, perhaps, during its continuance, in that of

Henry II. (I)

In these early times, the chief judicial employment of the chancellor must

have been in devising new writs, directed to the courts of common law, to give

remedy in cases where none was before administered. And to quicken the dili-

gence of the clerks in the chancery, who were too much attached to ancient precu-

(rfi The council of conscience, Instituted by John m, king of Portugal, to review the sentence of all inferior

courts, and moderate them liy equity (Mod. Un. Hist, xxii, 237), seems rather to have been a court ofappeul.

(e) Thus, too, the parliament of Paris, the court of session in Scotland, and every other jurisdiction in

Europe, of which we have any tolerable account, found all their decisions as well upon principles of equity

as those of positive law. (Lord Kainta, histnr. law tracts, I, SIS, Sto, princ. of equity, 44.)

(/I Thua Cicero: " Jnm itllt proml»*i», non e»se staiulum, quit non vtdet. qna coactui quh metu qua

drcKptxt tlolaprnminerUJ qua yutdempleraqucjurepratorioliberantur, nonnulla legibus." Utte. I. i.

loi /. 4, c. l.fol. 23.

(A| Tim matters cognizable in this court. Immediately before its dissolution, were " almost all suits, that

by colour of equity, or supplication made to the prince, might be brought before him; but originally anil

properly nil poor men's Milt*, which were made to hin majesty by supplication; and upon which they were

entitled to have rlifht, without payment of nny monev for the game." (Smith's Commonwealth, b :!. c. 7.)

(fi \erno ad rtgem apptllet pro nliqua lite. ni*t jut ilomi contequi non posM. Si jut nimii leverum ait,

oUerlntio tlfintle qwrratur <ipltd regem. LL. Etlg. c. j.

(i'l Lambard. Archeinn. 59.

(i) Joannes Sarisburiensis (who died A. D, 11S2, 21! Hen. II), speaking of the chancellor's office In the

renci prefixed to tiiapolycraticon. has these lines :

IHe e»t, otii lrgf» ream cnnreUat Mijuat

l-t manduta pUprinripit aquafaxU.
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dents, it is provided by statute, Westm. 2, 13 Ed\v. I, c. 24, that, "whensoever

from thenceforth in one case a writ shall lie found in the chancery, and iu a like

r ,„. j -, ease, falling under the same right and requiring like remedy, *no precc-

1 -1 dent of a writ can be produced, the clerks in chancery shall agree in

forming a new one; and, if they cannot agree, it shall be adjourned to the next

parliament, where a writ shall be framed by consent of the learned in the law, (?«)

lest it happen for the future that the court of our lord the king be deficient in

doing justice to the suitors." And this accounts for the very great variety of

writs of trespass on the case to be met with in the register; whereby the suitor

had ready relief, according to the exigency of his business, and adapted to the

specialty, reason and equity of his very case. («) Which provision (with a little

accuracy in the clerks of the chancery, and a little liberality in the judges, by

extending, rather than nan-owing, the remedial effects of the writ), might have

effectually answered all the purposes of a court of equity; (o) except that of

obtaining a discovery by the oath of the defendant.

But when, about the end of the reign of King Edward III, uses of lands were

introduced, (p) and, though totally discountenanced by the courts of common

law, were considered as fiduciary deposits and binding in conscience by the

clergy, the separate jurisdiction of the chancery as a court of equity began to

be established; (q) and John Waltham, who was bishop of Salisbury and chan-

cellor to King Richard II, by a strained interpretation of the above-mentioned

statute of Westm. 2, devised the writ of sabpaena, returnable in the court of chan-
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cery only, to make the feoffee to uses accountable to his cestuy que use: which

process was afterwards, extended to other matters wholly determinable at the

common law, upon false and fictitious suggestions; for which, therefore, the

chancellor himself is, by statutes 17 Kic. II, c. 6, directed to give damages to the

f*52l Par';y unJustly aggrieved. But as the "clergy, so early as the reign of

"• -• King Stephen, had attempted to turn their ecclesiastical courts into

courts of equity, by entertaining suits pro liesione fidei, as a spiritual offence

against conscience, in case of non-payment of debts or any breach of civil

contracts; (r) till checked by the constitutions of Clarendon, (s) which declared

that, "placita de debit-is, qiue fide interposita debentur, vel absque interpositione

fidei, sint in justitia rcyis: therefore probably the ecclesiastical chancellors,

who then held the seal, were remiss in abridging their own new acquired juris-

diction; especially as the spiritual courts continued (t) to grasp at the same

authority as before in suits pro Icesione fidei, so late as the fifteenth centnrv. («)

till finally prohibited by the unanimous concurrence of all the judges. How-

ever, it appears from the parliament rolls, (w) that, in the reigns of Henry IV

and V, the commons were repeatedly urgent to have the writ of subptena entirely

suppressed, as being a novelty devised by the subtlety of Chancellor Waltham,

against the form of the common law; whereby no plea could be determined,

unless by examination and oath of the parties, according to the form of the law

civil, and the law of holy church, in subversion of the common law. But

though Henry IV, being then hardly warm in his throne, gave a palliating

answer to their petitions, and actually passed the statute 4 Henry IV, c. So,

whereby judgments at law are declared irrevocable unless by attaint or writ of

error, yet his son put a negative at once upon their whole application: and in

(mi \ prri'nt variety of new precedents of writs, in cases before unprovided for, are jriven by this very

SUituUM)!' \Vcstm. 2. (n) Lamb. Archeion. (il.

(o) This was the opinion of Fairfax, a very learned Jntljfo in the time of Edward the Fourth. " if tub

pcenn (wivs lie) ne tterroit jnj/ cy surtfitcment nfte come il est ore, si nolis {ittetiftomn* tiels nctiotts sur ten cu&£,

ct mainfeinomus lejurisdiction, de ceo court, ct (Tauter courts.'* (Yearbook, 21 Edw. JV, 23.t

(pi Sue hook II. ch. 20. (</) spelin. Gluts, 106. 1 Lev. 242.

(r| Lonl I.yttelt. Hen. II. b. 3, p. :*>!, note. («) 10 Hen. II, c. 15. Speed. 458.

((} In 4 Hen. Ill, Miits in court Christian pro la-tivne Jtdei upon temporal contracts were adjudged to l>e

contrary to l;i\v. (Fitzh. Abr. t. Prohibition. 15.) Hut in the Btatute or writ of circumspectc affiitf*. Mip-

pnscd b'y some to have issued l:i Ediv. I, but more probably (:] Pryn. Kcc. :i3(()!) Edw. II, suits JH-U taiwiic

fitlei were allowed to the ecclesiastical conrts; according to some ancient copies (lierthelet ttat. nittiq.

London 1531, DO. b : 3 Pryn. llec. SiH), and the common English translation of that statute, though iu Lymle-

wodc's copv (I'rov. 1. 2, t. 2). and in the Cotton MS. (Claud. I). 2), Unit (-lausc is omitted.

(«) Year-book, 2 Hen IV. 10. 11 lieu. IV, SS. :H Hen VI, 29. 20 Edw. IV. 10. /

(w) Hot. I'arl. ^ Hen. IV, Nos. 78 and 110. 3 Jim. V, No. 46. cited iu I'n unu's abr. of Cotton's rccor ils,

41U, 422, 424, 548. 4 lust. »a 1 Itoll. Abr. 370, 371, 372.
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Edward IVs time, the process by bill and subpcena was become the daily prac-

tice of the court, (x)

*But this did not extend very far: for in the ancient treatise, entitled r*-o-i

diversile des courtes, (y) supposed to be written very early in the sixteenth L J

century, we have a catalogue of the matters of conscience then cognizable by

subpama in chancery, which fall within a very narrow compass. No regular

judicial system at that time prevailed in the court ; but the suitor when he

thought himself aggrieved, found a desultory and uncertain remedy, according

to the private opinion of the chancellor, who was generally an ecclesiastic, or

sometimes (though rarely) a statesman : no lawyer having sat in the court of

chancery from the times of the chief justices Thorpe and Knyvet, successively

chancellors to King Edward III, in 1372 and 1373, (z) to the promotion of Sir

Thomas Moore by King Henry VIII, in 1530. After which the great seal was

indiscriminately committed to the custody of lawyers, or courtiers, (a) or church-

men, (b) according as the convenience of the times and the disposition of the

prince required, till Sergeant Puckering was made lord keeper in 1592 ; from

which time to the present the court of chancery has always been filled by a law-

S;r, excepting the interval from 1621 to 1625, when the seal was intrusted to

r. Williams, then dean of Westminster, but afterwards bishop of Lincoln ; who

had been chaplain to Lord Ellesmere, when chancellor, (c)

In the time of Lord Ellesmere (A. D. 1616) arose that notable dispute between

the courts of law and equity, set on foot by Sir Edward Coke, then chief justice
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of the court of king's bench; whether a court of equity could give relief after

or .against a judgment at the common law ? This contest was so warmly

carried, on, that indictments were preferred against the suitors, the solicitors,

the council, and even a master in chancery, for having incurred a prminunire,

by questioning in a court of equity a judgment in the court of king's bench,

obtained by gross fraud and imposition, (d) This matter being brought before

the king, was by him referred *to his learned counsel for their advice r*-< i

and opinion; who reported so strongly in favour of the courts of L ° I

equity, (e) that his majesty gave judgment in their behalf; but not contented

with the irrefragable reasons and precedents produced by his counsel (for the

chief justice was clearly in the wrong), he chose rather to decide the question

by referring it to the plenitude of his royal prerogative. (/) Sir Edward Coke

submitted to the decision, (g) and thereby made atonement for his error : but

this struggle, together with the business of commendams (in which he acted a

very noble part) (h) and his controlling the commissioners of sewers, (i) were

the open and avowed causes, (k) first of his suspension and soon after of his

removal, from his office.

Lord Bacon, who succeeded Lord Ellesmere, reduced the practice of the

court into a more regular system ; but did not sit long enough to effect any

considerable revolution in the science itself : and few of his decrees which

have reached us are of any great consequence to posterity. His successors, in

the reign of Charles I, did little to improve upon his plan ; and even after the

(x) not. Parl. 14 Kdw. IV. No. :«(not 14 Kdw. III. as cited 1 Roll. Abr. 370, cf-c).

(y) Tit Chnncery, /ul. •£>!;. Ilaslell's edit. A. D. liWl. (z) Spclin. Gloss 111. Dudg. chron. Ser. 60.

fa} Wriothesly, .St. John, and ii.H i..n. (I) tioodrick, Oardiuer, and lleuth.

(c) ninfl. llril. 42,'S. (d) Huron's Works, IV, (ill, 612, 682.

(c) Whitelocke ofparl. ii. SHO. 1 Chmi. lion. Append. H.

(f) '"Fur that it appertained to our princely office only to judge over all judges, and to discern and detc-

miue Mich dlflterODGQfl as at any time may nnd shall arise between otir several courts, touching their juris-

diction. and the same to nettle and determine, as we in our princely wisdom shall find to stand mo -i with

our honour,7' Ac. (i Cnanc. Itep. append -'•'> i

fr/J See the entry in the council bonk, 3C. July. ISIIi. (Biogr. B:-lt. 1300.)

(h) In n cause of the bishop of Winchester, touching a cummendam. Kincr James. conceiving that the mat-

ter affected his prerogative, gent letters 10 the judges not to proceed in it till himscllhad been first consulted.

ft) See thai nnicle in chap. 6.

(tj^ee Lord Kllesmere's speech to Sir Henry Montague, the new chief justice, IS Xov. 1(110. (Moore's

reports. S2S.1 Though Sir Edward might probably have retained his scat, if, during Ids suspension, he

»ould have complimented Lord Villiers (the uew "fiivourite) wltli the disposal of tho most lucrative office

in lii.- cunrt. (Riogr. Brit. 1391.)
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restoration the seal was committed to the earl of Clarendon, who had with-

drawn from practice as a lawyer near twenty years ; and afterwards to the earl

of Shaftsbury, who (though a lawyer by education) had never practised at all.

r*---i Sir Heneage Finch, who succeeded in 1073, *and became afterwards earl

L -I of Nottingham, was a person of the greatest abilities and most uncor-

rupted integrity; a thorough master and zealous defender of the laws and con-

stitution of his country ; and endued with a prevailing genius, that enabled him

to discover and to pursue the true spirit of justice, notwithstanding the embar-

rassments raised by the narrow and technical notions which then prevailed ir.

the courts of law, and the imperfect ideas of redress which had possessed the

courts of equity. The reason and necessities of mankind, arising from the

great change in property by the extension of trade and the abolition of military

tenures, co-operated in establishing his plan, and enabled him in the course of

nine years to build a system of jurisprudence and jurisdiction upon wide aud

rational foundations; which have also been extended and improved by many

great men, who have since presided in chancery. And from that time to this

the power aud business of the court have increased to an amazing degree. (18)

From this court of equity in chancery, as from the other superior courts, an

appeal lies to the house of peers. But there are these differences bet ween appeals

from a court of equity, and writs of error from a court of law: 1. That the

former may be brought upon any interlocutory matter, the latter upon nothing

but a definitive judgment: 2. That on writs of error the house of lords pro-
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nounces the judgment, on appeals it gives direction to the court below to rectify

its own decree.

IX. The next court that I shall mention is one that hath no original juris-

diction, but is only a court of appeal, to correct the errors of other jurisdic-

tions. This is the court of exchequer chamber; which was first erected by

statute 31 Edw. Ill, o. 12, to determine causes by writs of error from the com-

mon law side of the court of exchequer. And to that end it consists of the

lord chancellor and lord treasurer, taking unto them the justices of the king's

bench and common pleas. In imitation of which a second court of exchequer

chamber was erected by statute 27 Eliz. c. 8, consisting of the justices of the

common pleas, and the barons of the exchequer, before whom writs of error

r*-Q-| may be brought to reverse judgments *iu certain suits (I) originally begun

I- ° -I in the court of king's bench. (19) Into the court also of exchequer

(0 Sec ohap. 25, p. 411.

(18) Besides the chancellor there are three vieo-chanopllors; one being provided for by

statute 53 Geo. Ill, c. 24, and two were added by statute 5 Vic. c. 5. Those judges are to

hear and determine all matters depending in the court of chancery—either as a court of law

or equity—subject to an appeal to the lord chancellor, or to the court of appeal in chancery men-

tioned below.

The master of the rolls has long held a separate court of equity, and his jurisdiction,

which was for a loug time in dispute, is now regulated by statute. Originally he wa-s the

chief merely of the masters iu chancery, whose functions wero mainly ministerial, but now

decrees and orders made by him arc final, except as they may be altered or sot aside on appeal

to the lord chancellor, or to the court of appeal in chancery. By statute 15 and 16 Vic. c. 80,

the gradual abolition of masters in chancery is provided for, aud their functions are transferred

to the judges aud their chief clerks. By statute 1 and si Vie. c. SM, the muster of tho rolls is

custodian of the public records.

By statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 83, the court of appeal in chancery was created. It con-

sists" of two lords justices, with whom the lord chancellor may be associated, or tho court

may be held by him and either one of the lords justices, aud by the two lords justices alone.

An appeal from either of tho vice-chancellors or from the master of the rolls may be either to

this court or to the lord chancellor. The two lords justices, without the lord chancellor,

also constitute a court of appeal in bankruptcy, in which cases their judgment is final. From tho

court of appeal in chancery an appeal lie-< to the house of lords. If when sitting alone tho lunU

justices differ in opinion, the decision appealed from stands affirmed.

By a recent act (30 and 31 Vic. o. i>4), each of the lords justices may sit separately as a court

of appeal, for the purpose of hearing appeals from interlocutory orders.

(19) But now these courts are abolished, and the court of exchequer chamber, as it now

exists, is composed, lor the purpose of hearing appeals from any one of the superior courts of

Chap* 4.] HOUSE OF PEERS : COURTS OP ASSIZE, &c. 56

chamber (which then consists of all the judges of the three superior courts.

and now and then the lord chancellor also), are sometimes adjourned from the

other courts such causes, as the judges upon argument find to be of great weight

and difficulty, before any judgment is given upon them in the court below, (in)

From all the branches of this court of exchequer chamber, a writ of error

lies to

X. The house of peers, which is the supreme court of judicature in the

kingdom, having at present no original jurisdiction over causes, but only upon

appeals and writs of error, to rectify any injustice or mistake of the law, com-

mitted by the courts below. To this authority this august tribunal succeeded

of course upon the dissolution of the anla regia. For, as the barons of parlia-

ment were constituent members of that court; and the rest of its jurisdiction

•was dealt out to other tribunals, over which the great officers who accompanied

those barons were respectively delegated to preside; it followed, that the right

of receiving appeals, and superintending all other jurisdictions, still remained

in the residue of that noble assembly, from which every other great court was

derived. They are therefore in all causes the last resort, from whose judgment

no farther appeal is permitted; but every subordinate tribunal must conform to

their determinations ; the law reposing an entire confidence in the honour and

conscience of the noble persons who compose this important assembly, that (if

possible) they will make themselves masters of those questions upon which they

undertake to decide, and in all dubious cases refer themselves to the opinion's
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of the judges, who are summoned by writ to advise them; since upon their

decision all property must finally depend. (20)

Hitherto may also be referred the tribunal established by statute 14 Edw. Ill,

c. 5, consisting (though now out of use) of one prelate, two earls, and two

barons who are to be chosen at every new parliament to hear complaints of

grievances and delays of justice in the king's courts, and (with the advice of

the chancellor, treasurer and justices of both benches) to give directions for

remedying these *inconveniences in the courts below. This committee r*-~-i

seems to have been established, lest there should be a defect of justice for L °'J

want of a supreme court of appeal, during any long intermission or recess of

parliament; for the statute farther directs, that if the difficulty be so great, that

it may not well be determined without assent of parliament, it shall be brought

by the said prelate, earls and barons, unto the next parliament, who shall finally

determine the same.

XL Before I conclude this chapter, I must also mention an eleventh species

of courts, of general jurisdiction and use, which are derived out of, and act as

collatteral auxiliaries to, the foregoing; I mean the courts of assize and nisi

prius.

These are composed of two or more commmissioners, who are twice in every

year sent by the king's special commission all round the kingdom except London

and Middlesex, where courts of nisi prius are holden in and after every term,

before the chief or other judge of the several superior courts; and except the

four northern counties, where the assizes are holden only once a year), (21) to try

(m) 4 Inst. 119. 2 Bulst 140.

law—the queen's bench, common pleas and exchequer—of the judges, or judges and barons, as

the case may be, of the other two courts.

(20) In practice the house of lords, when sitting to hear appeals, is composed only of the

" law lords," as they are called; that is, the peers who at the time hold judicial positions or

who have heretofore held such positions. Every peer indeed has the right to be present and

participate, but it is a right which is not, and could not often -with propriety be, asserted,

eince few except the law lords have any such training as would fit them for the duties to be

performed. A quorum of peers must be present, but three is a quorum of the house of peers,

and two besides the chancellor would be sufficient to constitute this court. If those two

should chance to be lay members, and the decree under review be one made by the chancellor

himself, his own vote would affirm it, as the lay members would take no part. But usually four

or five law lords are present.

(21) But now the assizes are held here twice a year.
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by a jury of the respective counties the truth of such matters of fact as are

then under dispute in the courts of Westminster-hall. These judges of assize

came into use in the room of the ancient justices in eyre, justiciarii in itinere;

who were regularly established, if not first appointed, by the parliament of

Northampton, A. D. 1176, 22 Hen. II, («) with a delegated power from the king's

great court, or anla regia, being looked upon as members thereof; and they

afterwards made their circuit round the kingdom once in seven years for the

purpose of trying causes, (o) They were afterwards directed by magna carta, c.

12, to be sent into every county once a year, to take (or receive the verdict of

the jurors or recognitors in certain actions, then called) recognitions or assizes;

the most difficult of-which they are directed to adjourn into the court of com-

mon pleas to be there determined. The itinerant justices were sometimes mere

r*rg] justices of assize or of dower, or of gaol-delivery, and the like; and *they

L -" had sometimes a more general commission to determine all manner of

causes, being constituted justiciarii ad omnia placita: (p) but the present

justices of assize and nisiprius are more immediately derived from the statute

\Vestm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, which directs them to be assigned out of the king's

SAVorn justices, associating to themselves one or two discreet knights of each

county. By statute 27 Edw. I, c. 4, (explained by 12 Edw. II, c. 3,) assizes and

inquests were allowed to be taken before any one justice of the court in which

the plea was brought; associating to him one knight or other approved man of

the county. And, lastly, by statute 14 Edw. Ill, c. 16, inquests of nisi prius
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may be taken before any justice of either bench (though the plea be not

depending in his own court), or before the chief baron of the exchequer, if he

be a man of the law; or otherwise before the justices of assize, so that one of

such justices be a judge of the king's bench or common pleas, or the king's

Serjeant sworn. They usually make their circuits in the respective vacations

after Hilary and Trinity terms; assizes being allowed to be taken in the holy

time of lent by consent of the bishops at the king's request, as expressed in

statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 51. And it was also usual during the times of

popery, for the prelates to grant annual licenses to the justices of assize to

administer oaths in holy times: for oaths being of a sacred nature, the logic of

those (deluded) ages concluded that they must lie of ecclesiastical cognizance, (q)

The prudent jealo'usy of our ancestors ordained, (r) that no man of law should

be judge of assize in his own county, wherein he was born or doth inhabit; (22)

and a similar prohibition is found in the civil law, (s) which has earned this

principle so far that it is equivalent to the crime of sacrilege, for a man to be

governor of the province in which he was born, or has any civil connexion, (t)

The judges upon their circuits now sit by virtue of five several authorities.

1. The commission of the peace. 2. A commission of oyer and terminer. 3. A

commission of general gaol-delivery. The consideration of all which belongs

r*-cn properly *to the subsequent book of these Commentaries. But the

L J fourth commission is, 4. A commission of assize, directed to the justices

and Serjeants therein named, to take (together with their associates) assizes in

the several counties; that is to take the verdict of a peculiar species of jury,

called an assize, and summoned for the trial of landed disputes, of which here-

(n) Sold. Jan. 1.2, f 5. Spelm. Cod. 89».

(nj Co. Lilt. 203.—Anno, 1461, miticiarii Ulntrantai ventrunt ajnid Wifforniamln octarii S. Johannis bap-

thfi'i—ft totus comiititus cos arfmtttere rrcituni'it. qvnil septcm mini nontlum erant elupsi, postgvtimjimticarU

ilitlem uUimo-talemiit (Annul. Eccl. IFigorn. in Whart. Angl. tacr. /, 4H6.|

(uj llract. I. 3. tr. 1. c. 11.

(<l) Iii6t:inc.c3 hereof may be met With in Hie appendix to Spclman's original of the terms, and in Mr.

I'ai-kcr's Antiquities, 209.

(r) Stat. 4 Edw. Ill, c. 2. 8 me. II, c. a. 33 Hen. VIII, n. 24. (t) Ff. 1, 22, 3. (t) C. 9, S3, 4.

(•22) [This restriction was construed to extend to every commission of the judges: lint it

being found very inconvenient, the 12 Geo. II, c. 27, was enacted for the express purpose of

authorizing the commissioners of oyer and terminer, and of gaol-delivery, to execute their

commissions in the criminal courts within the counties in which they were born, or in which

thiT reside. See book 4, 271. This restriction, as to commissioners of assize and nisi prius.

was taken off by the 49 Geo. Ill, c. 91.] .
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after. The other authority is, 5. That of nisi prtus, which is a consequence

of the commission of assize, (it) being annexed to the office of those justices by

the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, and it empowers them to try all ques-

tions of fact issuing out of the courts of Westminster, that are then ripe for

trial by jury. These by the course of the courts (w) are usually appointed to

be tried at Westminster in some Easter or Michaelmas term, by a jury returned

from the county wl'*rein the cause of action arises ; but with this proviso, nisi

prius, unless befar< the day prefixed the judges of assize come into the county

ia question. This they are sure to do in the vacations preceding each Easter

and Michaelmas term, which saves much expense and trouble. These comniir-

sions are constantly accompanied by writs of association, in pursuance of the

statutes of Edward I and II, before mentioned; whereby certain persons (usually

the clerk of assize and his subordinate officers) are directed to associate them-

selves with the justices and Serjeants, and they are required to admit the said per-

sons into their society, in order to take the assizes, &c.; that a sufficient supply of

commissioners may never be wanting. But, to prevent the delay of justice by

the absence of any of them, there is also issued of course a writ of si non omnes;

directing that if all cannot be present, any two of them (a justice or a Serjeant

being one) may proceed to execute the commission.

These are the several courts of common law and equity, which are of public

and general jurisdiction throughout the kingdom. And, upon the whole, we

cannot but admire the wise economy and admirable provision of our ancestors,
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in settling the distribution of justice in a method so well calculated for cheap-

ness, expedition, and ease. By the constitution which they established, all

trivial debts, and injuries of small consequence, were to be recovered or re-

dressed in every *man's own county, hundred, or perhaps parish. Pleas of r*cn -i

freehold, and more important disputes of property, were adjourned to the "- •'

king's court of common pleas, which was fixed in one place for the benefit of

the whole kingdom. Crimes and misdemeanors were to be examined in a court

hy themselves: and matters of the revenue in another distinct jurisdiction.

jJow indeed, for the ease of the subject and greater dispatch of causes, methods

have been found to open all the three superior courts for the redress of private

wrongs; which have remedied many inconveniences, and yet preserved the forms

and boundaries handed down to us from high antiquity. If facts are disputed,

they are sent down to be tried in the country by the neighbours; but the law,

aris'ing upon those facts, is determined by the judges above: and, if they are

mistaken in point of law. there remain in both cases two successive courts of

appeal, to rectify such their mistakes. If the rigour of general rules does in

any case bear hard upon individuals, courts of equitv are open to supply the

defects, but not sap the fundamentals, of the law. tastly, there presides over

all one great court of appeal, which is the last resort in matters both of law

and equity; ami which will therefore take care to preserve an uniformity and

equilibrium among all the inferior jurisdictions: a court composed of prelates

selected for their piety, and of nobles advanced to that honour for their personal

merit, or deriving both honour and merit from an illustrious train of ancestors:

•who are formed by their education, interested by their property, and bound

upon their conscience and honour, to be skilled in the laws of their country.

This is a faithful sketch of the English juridical constitution, as designed by the

masterly hands of our forefathers, of which the great original lines are still

strong and visible ; and, if any of its minuter strokes are by the length of time

at all obscured or decayed, they may still be with ease restored to their pristine

vigoui: and that not so much by fanciful alterations and wild experiments (so

frequent in this fertile age), as by closely adhering to the wisdom of the ancient

plan, concerted by Alfred, and perfected by Edward I, and by attending to the spirit,

-without neglecting the forms, of their excellent and venerable institutions. (23)

(u) Sulk. 4M. fw) See ch. 23, p. 353.

(23) The courts of the United Statos consist of the following:

1. The senate as a court of impeachment.
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CHAPTER V.

OF COURTS ECCLESIASTICAL, MILITABY AND MARITIME.

BESIDES the several courts which were treated of in the preceding chapter and

in which all injuries are redressed, that fall under the cognizance of the common

law of England, or that spirit of equity which onght to be its constant attend-

ant, there still remain some other courts of a jurisdiction equally pnblic and

general; which take cognizance of other species of injuries, of an ecclesiastical,

military and maritime nature; and therefore are properly distinguished by the

title of ecclesiastical courts, courts military, and courts maritime.

I. Before I descend to consider particular ecclesiastical courts, I must first of

all in general premise, that, in the time of our Saxon ancestors, there was no

2. The supreme conrt.

3. The circuit conrts.

4. The district courts.

5. The court of claims.

6. The supreme court of the District of Columbia.

7. The territorial courts.

The court of impeachment derives its authority from article 1, section 3 of the constitution, and

is sufficiently spoken of elsewhere. The judicial power generally is conferred by article 3,

section ij.

The supreme conrt has original jurisdiction of nil cases affecting ambassadors, other pnblic

ministers and consuls, and of those to which a state shall be a party. It also has appellate
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jurisdiction from the circuit court in civil cases, where the matter in dispute exceeds &MKXI.

and from tho highest state court of each state, in any cose where has been drawn in question

the validity of a treaty, or of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States,

and the decision of the state court has been against its validity; also where has been drawn

in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any state, on the

ground of its being repugnant to the constitution, laws" or treaties of the United States, and

the decision of the state court has been in favor of such state law or authority ; also where the

decision of the state court has been against a right claimed under any clause of the constitution

of the United States, or under any treaty or statute of or commission held under the United

States; it has also appellate jurisdiction fro'm the territorial conrts where the amount in dispute

exceeds $1000, except from Washington territory, where it must exceed $2000; and from the

supreme court of the District of Columbia and from the court of claims, where the amount in

controversy exceeds $3000 ; and in any other case where; the judgment or decree may affect a con-

stitutional question or furnish a precedent for a class of cases, the United States may appeal with-

out regard to the amount in controversy.

The United States circuit court* have original jurisdiction, concurrently with the state courts,

of all civil suite, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds $500, and tho

United States is a plaintiff, or on alien is a party, or where the suit is between a citizen of the

Btate in which it is brought and a citizen of another state. They hnve exclusive jurisdiction of all

crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where specially

otherwise provided; and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the crimes aud

offences cognizable therein. Under the patent laws they have jurisdiction in equity to restrain

infringements. They have also appellate jurisdiction from the district courts where the matter in

dispute; exceeds $50.

The district courts have jurisdiction exclusively of the state courts, and concurrently with

the circuit conrts, of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United

States, committed within their several districts or upon the high seas, where the punishment

is not capital. They have also exclusive cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty aud

maritime jurisdiction, including seizures under the laws of impost, navigation or trade of the

United States; and of all seizures on land or water under the laws of the United States, and

of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under those laws. They have also jurisdic-

tion concurrently with the state courts and the circuit courts, of all coses where on alien sues

for a tort, done, in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States; also

of all suits at common law where the United States or any offiee.r thereof, under the authority

of an act of congress, may sue; also exclusive of the state courts of all suits against consuls

or vice-consuls except for capital offences. These courts also have jurisdiction in bankruptcy

cases.

The territorial courts possess such powers as are specially conferred upon them by the acts pro-

viding for their creation.

The supreme court of the District of Columbia is a court of general jurisdiction in law

and equity : any one of its judges may hold a district court with the powers of the other
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sort of distinction between the lay and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction: the county

court was as much a spiritual as a temporal tribunal: the rights of the church

were ascertained and asserted at the same time, and by the same judges, as the

rights of the laity. For this purpose the bishop of the diocese, and the alder-

man, or, in his absence, the sheriff of the cbuntv, used to sit together in the

county court, and had there the cognizance of all causes, as well ecclesiastical

as civil: a superior deference being paid to the bishop's opinion in spiritual

matters, and to that of the lay judges in temporal, (a) This union of power

was very advantageous to them both ; the presence of the *bishop added r ^gg-i

•weight and reverence to the sheriff's proceedings; and the authority of ^ J

the sheriff was equally useful to the bishop, by enforcing obedience to his

decrees on such refractory offenders, as would otherwise have despised the thun-

der of me • ecclesiastical censures. ^

But so moderate and rational a plan was wholly inconsistent with those views

of ambition that were then forming by the court of Rome. It soon became an

established maxim in the papal system of policy, that all ecclesiastical persons,

and all ecclesiastical causes, should be solely and entirely subject to ecclesiasti-

cal jurisdiction only: which jurisdiction was supposed to be lodged, in the first

place and immediately, in the pope, by divine indefeasible right and investiture

from Christ himself; and derived from the pope to all inferior tribunals. Hence

the canon law lays it down as a rule, that" sacer dotes a regibus konorandi

sunt, non iudicandi ;" (b) and places an emphatic reliance on a fabulous tale
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which it tells of the emperor Constantine: that, when some petitions were brought

to him, imploring the aid of his authority against certain of his bishops,

accused of oppression and injustice, he caused (says the holy canon) the peti-

tions to be burnt in their presence, dismissing them with this valediction : "He

et inter vos causas vestras discutite, quia dignum non est ut nos judicemus

Deos."(c)

It was not, however, till after the Norman conquest that this doctrine wag

received in England; when William I (whose title was warmly espoused by

the monasteries, which he liberally endowed, and by the foreign clergy whom

he brought over in shoals from France and Italy, and planted in the best pre-

ferments of the English church), was at length prevailed upon to establish this

fatal encroachment, and separate the ecclesiastical court from the civil: whether

actuated by principles of bigotry, or by those of a more refined policy, in order

to discountenance the laws of King Edward, abounding with the spirit of Saxon

(a) CtUeberrimohute amventui epitcopiu et aldermamu iiittr ntnto; quorum alter jura divina, alter humana

populum edoceto. LL. Eadgttr. c. 5.

(b) Oecret. part 2, cata. ll;gu.l, e. 41. (ej Ibid.

district courts; and may also hold ft criminal court for tbe trial of all crimes and offences arising

within the district. From the special terms held by one judge appeals may bo taken to the

general term held by all or a quorum of all.

The court of claims has authority to hear and determine all claims founded upon any law

of congress or regulation of the executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied,

•with the government of the United States, and all claims which may be referred to it by

congress; also all set-offs, counter-claims, claims for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, or

other demands whatsoever on the part of the government, against any person making claim

against the government in said court.

The supreme court consists of one chief justice and eight associate justices, appointed by tho

president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, during good behavior.

There are nine judicial circuits, for each of which a circuit judge is appointed in like manner

and with the like tenure. The circuit courts arc held by one justice of the supreme court and

the circuit judge, or by the latter and the district judge, or may be held by any one of the three

sitting alone. Where two sit together and disagree in opinion, the point of disagreement is

certified to the supreme court for its decision.

There is one district court for each state, and in some states, two or more. Each district

has a district judge appointed in the same manner and for the same term as the justices of the

supreme court. The supreme court of the District of Columbia consists of four justices, and the

court of claims of five, with the like tenure. The territorial judges hold their offices only during

the pleasure of the president.
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r*go-i liberty, is not altogether *certain. But the latter, if not the cause, was

*• -• undoubtedly the consequence, of this separation : for the Saxon laws were

soon overborne by the Norman justiciaries, when the county court fell into disre-

gard by the bishop's withdrawing his presence, in obedience to the charter of

the conqueror; (d) which prohibited any spiritual cause from being tried in the

secular courts, and commanded the suitors to appear before the bishop only,

Avhose decisions were directed to conform to the canon law. (e)

King Henry the First, at his accession, among other restorations of the laws

of King Edward the Confessor, revived this of the union of the civil and eccle-

siastical courts. (/) Which was, according to Sir Edward Coke, (y) after the

great heat of the conquest was past, only a restitution of the ancient law of

England. This, however, was ill-relished by the popish clergy, who, under the

guidance of that arrogant prelate, Archbishop Auselm, very early disapproved

of a measure that put them on a level with the profane laity, and subjected,

spiritual men and causes to the inspection of the secular magistrates: and,

therefore, in their svnod at Westminster, 3 Hen. I, they ordained that no bishop

should attend the discussion of temporal causes; (/<) which soon dissolved this

newly affect0"* union. And when, upon the death of King Henry the First,

F *641 *^ie usurPer Stephen was brought in and supported by the clergy, we find

"• J one article of the oath which they imposed upon him was, that ecclesiastical

persons and ecclesiastical causes should be subject only to the bishop's jurisdic-

tion, (i) And as it was about that time that the contest and emulation began
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between the laws of England and those of Home, (k) the temporal courts adher-

ing to the former, and the spiritual adopting the latter as their rule of proceed-

ing, this widened the breach between them, and made a coalition afterwards

impracticable; which probably would else have been effected at the general

reformation of the church.

In briefly recounting the various species of ecclesiastical courts, or, as they

are often styled, courts Christian (curies christianitatis) I shall begin with the

lowest, and so ascend gradually to the supreme court of appeal. (I)

1. The archdeacon's court is the most inferior court in the whole ecclesiastical

polity. It is held, in the archdeacon's absence, before a judge appointed by him-

self, and called his official; and its jurisdiction is sometimes in concurrence

with, sometimes in exclusion of, the bishop's court of the diocese. From hence,

however, by statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, an appeal lies to that of the bishop.

2. The consistory court of every diocesan bishop is held in their several cathe-

drals, for the trial of all ecclesiastical causes arising within their respective dio-

ceses. The bishop's chancellor, or his commissary, is the judge; and from his

sentence an appeal lies, by virtue of the same statute, to the archbishop of each

province respectively.

3. The court of arches is a court of appeal belonging to the archbishop of

F *6."1 Canterbury; whereof the judge is called *the dean of the arches, because

' ' -1 he anciently held his court in the church of Saint Mary le bow (sancta

Maria de arcubus), though all the principal spiritual courts are now holden at

doctors' commons. His proper jurisdiction is only over the thirteen peculiar

parishes belonging to the archbishop in London ; but the office of dean of the

arches having been for a long time united with that of the archbishop's prin-

fdj TInle Hist. C. L. 102. ScMen, in Endm. p. 6, I. 24. 4 Inst. 2W>. Wilk. LL. Angl. Sax. 2fl2.

fe) A'tiHn* epiacopus velarchulinconusde tryibusepiscopaliansampliusinhundredplacita tenennt, necamttm,

gute ml regimen anitnarum pertinet, ad indicium eeatlttrium hominum (tdducant i sed quicvnque sceunttum

epUcnpnlei lego, ile qnamuque caiaa vtlculpa interpellate/turit, ad locum, quern ad hoc epiicopia elrgerit et

nomimtverit. veniat .• ibiijue de aroja vet culpa sun reanondeat i et non aecundum hundred, eed secundun

canoncs et tpiKcopalr.s leges, rectum Deo et eptucopu suo facial.

(f) )'i>lo et prmciiiiH, ut omncj< de comitatu eantad comitatus el hundreda, sicut/ecerint tempore rents Edwartli.

{Cart. Hen. J, in Spelin. cod. vet legum. 303.) Ami what is here obscurely hinted at. is fuilv explained by his

coili; of laws cxtnnt in the veil book nf the exchequer, i Imnuh in general but ofdoiiblfnl authority, (dip. S.)

Gcitcralia comitatuutn placltn certis loci* et victim* teneantur. Intersint autem episcopi, cvmites. if c.; et agantur

primodtbitu rcrae cltrutiimitatu jura, nectmda. reffii placita, postremo causa, ringulorum dignii tatufac-

ti'iuii'ii,-: ejriileantur.

(a) '2 Inst. 70. (h) Nf epiycopi sfeculnrium plficitontm offlcium sttitcipiant. Spelra. Cod. 301.

(t) Spelm. Cod. 310. (k) Sec- Book I, liilrocl. i 1.

(1) For further particular!, see Bum's oxleriatitical law, Wood's institute a/the common law, and Oughton'g

oraojudhwrum.
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cipal official, he now, in right of the last mentioned office (as doth also the official

principal of the archbishop of York), receives and determines appeals from the

sentences of all inferior ecclesiastical courts within the province. And from him

an appeal lies to the king in chancery (that is, to a court of delegates appointed

under the king's great seal) by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, as supreme head of

the English church, in the place of the bishop of Eome, who formerly exercised

this jurisdiction; which circumstance alone will furnish the reason why the pop-

ish clergy were so anxious to separate the spiritual court from the temporal.

4. The court of peculiars is a branch of and annexed to the court of arches.

It has a jurisdiction over all those parishes dispersed through the province of

Canterbury in the midst of other dioceses, which are exempt from the ordinary's

jurisdiction, and subject to the metropolitan only. All ecclesiastical causes

arising within these peculiar or exempt jurisdictions, are, originally, cognizable

by this court; from which an appeal lay formerly to the pope, but now by the

*statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, to the king in chancery. r*661

5. The prerogative court is established for the trial of all testamentary "- -I

causes, where the deceased hath left bona notaUlia within two different dioceses.

In which case the probate of wills belongs, as we have formerly seen, (m) to the

archbishop of the province, by way of special prerogative. And all causes relat-

ing to the wills, administrations, or legacies of such persons are, originally, cog-

nizable herein, before a judge appointed by the archbishop, called the judge of

the prerogative court; from whom an appeal lies by statute 25 Hen. VIII,c. 19,
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to the king in chancery, instead of the pope, as formerly.

I pass by such ecclesiastical courts as have only what is called a voluntary,

and not a contentious, jurisdiction; which are mei'ely concerned in doing or

selling what no one opposes, and which keep an open office for that purpose (as

granting dispensations, licences, faculties, and other remnants of the papal extor-

tions), but do not concern themselves with administering redress to any injury;

and shall proceed to,

6. The great court of appeal in all ecclesiastical causes, viz.: the court of

delegates, judices delegati. appointed by the king's commission under his great

seal, and issuing out of chancery, to represent his royal person, and hear all

appeals to him made by virtue of the before-mentioned" statute of Henry VIII.

This commission is frequently filled with lords, spiritual and temporal, and

always with judges of the courts at Westminster, and doctors of the civil law.

Appeals to Rome were always looked upon by the English nation, even in the

times of popery, with an evil eye; as being contrary to the liberty of the sub-

ject, the honour of the crown, and the independence of the whole realm; and

were first introduced in very turbulent times in the sixteenth year of King

Stephen (A. D. 1151), at the same period (Sir Henry Spelman observed) that

the civil and canon laws were first imported into England, (n) But, in a few

years after, to obviate this growing practice, the constitutions made at Clarendon,

11 Hen. II, on account of the disturbances raised by Archbishop Becket and

other zealots of the holy see, expressly declare, (o) that appeals in causes eccle-

siastical ought to lie, from the archdeacon to the diocesan ; from the diocesan

to the archbishop of the province; and from the archbishop to the king; and

are not to proceed any farther without special license from the crown. But the

unhappy advantage that was given in the reigns of King John, and his son

Henry the Third, to the encroaching *power of the pope, who was ever r*n~-i

vigilant to improve all opportunities of extending his jurisdiction hither, L -"

at length rivited the custom of appealing to Rome in causes ecclesiastical so

strongly that it never could be thoroughly broken off, till the grand rupture

happened in the reign of Henry the Eighth ; when all the jurisdiction usurped

by the pope in matters ecclesiastical was restored to the crown, to which it

originally belonged: so that the statute 25 Hen. VIII, was but declaratory

of the ancient law of the realm, (p) But in case the king himself be party in

any of these suits, the appeal does not then lie to him in chancery, which would

(m) Book H, ch. 32. (n) Cod. vet. leg. 815. (o) Chap. 8. (p) 4 Inst. 341.
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be absurd; but, by the statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, to all the bishops of the

realm, assembled in the upper house of convocation. (1)

7. A commission of review is a commission sometimes granted, in extraordi-

nary cases, to revise the sentence of the court of delegates; when it is appre-

hended they have been led into a material error. This commission the king may

grant, although the statutes 24 and 25 Hen. VIII, before cited, declares the sen-

tence of the delegates definitive : because the pope as supreme head by the canon

law, used to grant such commission of review ; and such authority as the pope

heretofore exerted is now annexed to the crown (q) by statutes 26 Hen. VIII, c.

1, and 1 Eliz. c. 1. But it is not matter of right, which the subject may demand,

ex dcbito justitim: but merely a matter of favour, and which, therefore, is often

denied.

These are now the principal courts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: (2) none of

which are allowed to be courts of record; no more than was another much

more formidable jurisdiction, but now deservedly annihilated, viz.: the court

of the king's high commission in causes ecclesiastical. This court was erected

and united to the regal power (r) by virtue of the statute 1 Eliz. c. 1, instead of

a larger jurisdiction which had before been exercised under the pope's authority.

F*681 ^ was ^tended *t° vindicate the dignity and peace of the church, by

*• •• reforming, ordering, and correcting the ecclesiastical state and persons,

and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts, and

enormities. Under the shelter of which very general words, means were found
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in that and the two succeeding reigns, to vest in the high commissioners extra-

ordinary and almost despotic powers, of fining and imprisoning; which they

exerted much beyond the degree of the offence itself, and frequently over offences

by no means of spiritual cognizance. For these reasons this court was justly

abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 11. And the weak and illegal attempt that

(q) Ibid. (r) 4 Inst. 324.

(1) Tlie jurisdiction of the court of delegates has now been transferred to the judicial committee

of the privy council. See note, p. 69. post.

(2) Ten" radical changes have recent! v been made iu the jurisdiction of these courts. Under

statutes 20 and 21 Vic. c. 77, and 21 and 22 Vic. cc. 56 and 95, a distinct and separate probate

court has been organized, which exercises the powers in probate cases formerly possessed by the

ecclesiastical courts. The probate court is presided over by a single judge, who holds his office

during good behaviour, and who must be an advocate of ten years standing, or a barrister of fif-

teen years standing, One or more of the common law judges may sit with" the probate judge in

holding the court, and under 21 and 22 Vic. e. 95, the judges of probate and admiralty may sit for

each other. The judge of the court of probate may send issues of fact for trial to the courts of

law, or he may try them with a jury in his own court,. He has the usual powers of courts of

record over the practitioners in his court, and in proper cases he may appoint receivers pcndente

lite. Hut he has no jurisdiction of suits for legacies or for the distribution of assets. In conten-

tious causes an appeal lies to the honse of lords. Wills are either probated " in solemn form," in

which case the parties interested are duly cited, and the decision is conclusive as regards both

real and personal property, or " in common form," in which case parties may contest their vali-

dity whenever drawn in question afterwards, by giving notice of their intention so to do. In

cases of small estates, where the personal property is sworn to be under 200(. and the real estate

under 300?. the county court has jurisdiction, with an appeal to the probate court. The formal

business in probate cases is transacted by registrars. There are forty district registries, each of

which has its registrar appointed by the judge of the probate court, and holding office during

good behavior, and one principal registry at London with four life registrars. The registrars iiust

be attorneys or solicitors; they cannot proceed in contentious causes, and m other cases they

may refer difficult questions to the judge for his decision.

Besides the loss of probate powers, jurisdiction of matrimonial causes was taken from the ecclesi-

astical courts by statute 20 and 21 Vic. c. 85, aud conferred upon the court for divorce and mat-

rimonial causes. Authority over cases of brawling, except between persons in holy orders, was taken

away bv 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32 ; that over suits for defamation was abolished by 18 and IS) Vic. c.

41; and that over proceedings to enforce church rates wastnkenaway by 31and32Vic. c. 103. The

authority of these courts is now mainly confined to the examination of charges of heresy, of im-

moral or scandalous conduct on the part of persous in holy orders, and of irregularities in con-

ducting the services of the church. The few other coses of which they may take cognizance are

unimportant, aud need not be enumerated here.
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•was made to revive it, during the reign of King James the Second, served only

to hasten that infatuated prince's ruin.

II. Next, as to the courts military. The only court of this kind known to,

and established by, the permanent laws of the land, is the court of chivalry,

formerly held before the lord high constable and earl marshal of England jointly,

but since the attainder of Stafford, duke of Buckingham, under Hen. VIII, and

the consequent extinguishment of the office of lord high constable, it hath usu-

ally, with respect to civil matters, been held before the earl marshal only, (n)

This court, by statute 13 Ric. II, c. 2, hath cognizance of contracts and other

matters touching deeds of arms and war, as well out of the realm as within it.

And from its sentences an appeal lies immediately to the king in person, (t)

This court was in great reputation in the time of pure chivalry, and afterwards

during our connexions with the continent, by the territories which our princes

held in France: but is now grown almost entirely out of use, on account of

the feebleness of its jurisdiction, and want of power to enforce its judgments; as

it can neither fine nor imprison, not being a court of record. («)

III. The maritime courts, or such as have power and jurisdiction to determine

all maritime injuries, arising upon the *seas, or in parts out of reach r*gQi

of the common law, are only the court of admiralty, and its courts of •• -"

appeal. The court of admiralty is held before the lord high admiral of England,

or his deputy, who is called the judge of the court. (3) According to Sir Henry

Spclman, (w) and Lambard (x) it was first of all erected by King Edward the
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Third. Its proceedings are according to the method of the civil law, like those

of the ecclesiastical courts; upon which account it is usually held at the same

place with the superior ecclesiastical courts, at doctors' commons in London. It

is no court of record, any more than the spiritual courts. From the sentences

of the admiralty judge an appeal always lay, in ordinary course, to the king in

chancery, as may be collected from statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, which directs

the appeal from the archbishop's courts to be determined by persons named in

the king's commission, " like as in case of appeal from the admiral-court." But

this is also expressly declared by statute 8 Eliz. c. 5, which enacts, that upon

appeal made to the chancery, the sentence definitive of the delegates appointed

by commission shall be final.

Appeals from the vice-admiralty courts in America, and our other planta-

tions and settlements, may be brought before the courts of admiralty in

England, as being a branch of the admiral's jurisdiction, though they may

also he brought before the king in council. (4) But in case of prize vessels,

taken in time of war, in any part of the world, and condemned in any courts of

(t) 1 LOT. 230. Show. Parl. Cns. 60. (t) 4 Inst. 123. (u) 7 Mod. 127.

(w) Gloa. 13. (x) Arckelon. 41.

(3) [The practice of the court of admiralty has been improved and its jurisdiction extended by

statute 3 and 4 Vic. o. 60.]

(4) The judicial committee of the privy council is now tho ultimate court of appeal in admi-

ralty cases, eases from the colonial courts and in ecclesiastical cases. This court is composed of

the 'president of the council, the lord chancellor, the chief justices of the queen's bench and com-

mon pleas, the lord chief baron, the master of the rolls, the lords justices of the court of appeal in

chancery, the vice-chancellors, the chief judge of the court of bankruptcy, judges and ex-judges

of the court of probate and the court of admiralty, two members who have been judges in India

or the colonies, and two persons especially designated by the crown. The Archbishops aud

bishops are also members of this committee in cases of criminal proceedings in ecclesiastical

courts against clerks in holy orders. Four members of this court constitute a quorum for

the transaction of business. See statutes 2 aud 3 William IV, c. 9-2; 3 and 4 "William IV, o.

41, and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 38. Tho court may take testimony anew on appeal, and in proper cases

may send issues to a court of law for trial.

In addition to the courts here mentioned, a very important one has since been created, for

the hearing of appeals in criminal cases. It is composed of the judges of the superior courts

of common law, but five of them, including one of the chief justices or the chief baron, con-

stitute a quorum. The hearings are upon a case made, aud tho court either pronounces

such judgment as the case requires, or remits the record with the proper directions to the court

toelow.
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admiralty or vice-admiralty as lawful prize, the appeal lies to certain commis-

sioners of appeals consisting chiefly of the privy council, and not to judges

delegates. And this by virtue of divers treaties with foreign nations; by which

particular courts are 'established in all the maritime countries of Europe for

the decision of this question, whether lawful prize or not: (5) for this being a

question between subjects of different states, it belongs entirely to the law of

nations, and not to the municipal laws of either country to determine it. The

r*70l orig'nal court to which this question is *permitted in England is the

L J court of admiralty; (6) and the court of appeal is in effect the king's privy

council, the members of which are, in consequence of treaties, commissioned

under the great seal for this purpose. In 1748, for the more speedy determina-

tion of appeals, the judges of the courts of Westminster-hall, though not privy

counsellors, were added to the commission then in being. But doubts being

conceived concerning the validity of that commission, on account of such

addition, the same was confirmed by statute 22 Geo. II, c. 3, with a proviso,

that no sentence given under it should be valid, unless a majority of the com-

missioners present were actually privy counsellors. But this did not, I appre-

hend, extend to any future commissions: and such an addition became indeed

totally unnecessary in the course of the war which commenced in 1756; since

during the whole of that war, the commission of appeals was regularly

attended .tid all its decisions conducted by a judge (7) whose masterly acquaint-

ance witn the law of nations was knoVn and revered by every state in
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Europe, (y)

CHAPTER VI.

OF COURTS OF A SPECIAL JURISDICTION.

Iif the two preceding chapters we have considered the several courts, whose

jurisdiction is public and general; and which are so contrived that some or

other of them mav administer redress to every possible injury that can arise in

the kingdom at large. There yet remain certain others, whose jurisdiction is

(y) See the sentiments of the president Montesquieu, nncl 11. Vtitlel (a subject of the klnif of Prussia.)

on the answer transmitted by the English cmirt to his Prussian majesty's Exposition df» motift, <fc., A D.

1753. (Montesquieu's letters, 5 ilar. 1753. Vattel-s drott de yent, I. t, c. 7, i 84.)

(5) [And in order to give effect to this, the prize acts passed at the commencement of a war

usually provide, that ships mid poods token from the enemy, whether by the royal navy or

by privateers, must first be condemned in some court of admiralty as lawful prize, before'any

right in point of solid enjoyment can accrue to the captors; and specific directions are pre-

scribed for duly proceeding to such sentence. See the 1!) Geo. Ill, c. 67; 1 Wils. 2^9; 4

Rob. 55.]

(6) [This seems incorrect, for questions of this nature are tried in the prize court, which is

quite distinct from the admiralty court, otherwise called the instance court. The whole sys-

tem of litigation and jurisprudence in the prize court is peculiar to itself. See Pongl. 594.

The judge of the admiralty court, though also the judge of the prize court, is appointed^ by a

commission under the great seal, which enumerates particularly, as well as generally, every

object of this jurisdiction, but not a word of prize. See Dougl. 614. The judge of the piizo

court is appointed, and the court authorized, by a commission under the great seal directed to

him, to will and require the court of admiralty, and the lieutenant and judge of the same

court, his surrogate or surrogates, and they are thereby authorized and required to proceed

upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prize and reprisals, of all ships and goods that are

or shall be taken, and to hear and determine according to the course of the admiralty and the law

of nations.]

(7) Lord Mansfield is the judge here referred to.

The national equity and admiralty courts of the United States are mentioned in t.ho note to

page 60. The several states have no admiralty courts, and some of them have no separate

courts of equity, but equitable remedies are administered in the courts of law. Cognizance

of probate cases is ill tie state governments exclusively, and courts of probate jurisdiction
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private and special, confined to particular spots, or instituted only to redress

particular injuries. These are:

I. The forest courts, instituted for the government of the king's forests, in

different parts of the kingdom, and for the punishment of all injuries done to

the king's deer or venison, to the vert or greensward, and to the covert in which

such deer are lodged. These are the courts of attachments, of regard, of

sweinmote and of justice-seat. The court of attachments, wood-mote, or forty

days court, is to be held before the verderors of the forest once in every forty

days; (a) and is instituted to inquire into all offenders against vert and veni-

son ; (b) who may be attached by their bodies, if taken with the mainour (or

mainoeuvre, a manu), that is, in the very act of killing venison, or stealing

wood, or preparing so to do, or by fresh and immediate pursuit after the act is

done; (c) else they must be attached by their goods. And in this forty days

court the foresters or keepers are to bring in their attachments, *or present- r*rvoi

ments de viridi et venationej and the verderors are to receive the same, L J

and to enroll them, and to certify them under their seals to the court of justice-

seat, or sweinmote: (d) for this court can only inquire of, but not convict

offenders. 2. The court of regard or survey of dogs, is to be holden every third

year, for the lawing or expedition of mastiffs, which is done by cutting off

the claws and ball (or pelote) of the fore-feet, to prevent them from running

after deer, (e) No other dogs but mastiffs are to be thus lawed or expeditated,

for none other were permitted to be kept within the precincts of the forest; it
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being supposed that the keeping of these, and these only, was necessary for the

defence of a man's house. (/) 3. The court of sweinmote is to be holden before

the verderors, as judges, by the steward of the sweinmote, thrice in every

year, (g) the sweins of freeholders within the forest composing the jury. The

principal jurisdiction of this court is, first, to inquire into the oppression and

grievances committed by the officers of the forest; "de super-oner at ione forest-

ariorum, et aliorum ministrornm forestce; et de eorum oppressionibiis popitlo

regis illatis; " and, secondly, to receive and try presentments certified from the

court of attachments against offences in vert and venison, (h) And this court

may not only inquire but convict also, which conviction shall be certified to the

court of justice-seat under the seals of the jury; for this court cannot proceed

to judgment, (i) But the principal court is, 4. The court of justice-seat, whicn

is held before the chief justice in eyre, or chief itinerant judge, capitalis jttsti-

iiarius in itinere, or his deputy; to hear and determine all trespasses within

the forest, and all claims of franchises, liberties and privileges, and all pleas

and causes whatsoever therein arising, (k) It may also proceed to try pre-

sentments in the inferior courts of the forest, and to give judgment upon con-

viction of the sweinmote. And the chief justice may therefore, after present-

ment made, or indictment found, but *not before, (I) issue his warrant r*~oi

to the officers of the forest to apprehend the offenders. It may be held L r J

every third year; and forty days' notice ought to be given of its sitting. This

court may fine and imprison for offences within the forest, (MI) it being a court

of record: and therefore a writ of error lies from hence to the court of king's

bench, to rectify and redress any mal-admiuistrations of justice; («) or the

chief justice in eyre may adjourn any matter of law into the court of king's

bench, (o) These justices in eyre were instituted by King Henry II, A. I).

1184; (p) and their courts were formerly very regularly held; but the last

(n) Cart, iefarttt. 9 Hen. Ill, e. 8. (b) 4 Inet 289. (e) Carth. 79.

- " (f) 4Inst. 3<H. (g) Cart, deforat. c. 8.

'"14 lust. a»l.

. , .._,_._. . . . .313. (n) Ibid.Kfl.

(o) Ibtd. •:'-''.! (p) Ilovodcu.

{(ij cars. aejarcMi. u tten. jji, c. o. ioj * inni. aov.

(d) Cart, iteforext. c. 16. fej IbU. c. 6. (f) 4 It

(h) .-Stat. 34 K.lw. I, c. 1. (i) 4 lust. 2S9. (k) 4 I

(I) St.it. 1 Ertw. Ill, c. 8. 7 Ric\ II, c. I. fm) 4 lust. 1

exist in all the states under different mimes and with more or less extensive powers. In some

gtate.s they have complete jurisdiction of all questions of adminisration and distribution, to the

pxclnsion of the ponrta of chnnc'cry; and in some, also, the equity jurisdiction in the case of

infants is transferred, with more or less modification, to those courts.

47

V3 COURTS OF A SPECIAL JURISDICTION. [Book III.

court of justice-seat of any note was that holden in the reign of Charles I, before

the earl of Holland; the rigorous proceedings at which are reported by Sir Wil-

liam Jones. After the restoration another was held,^»ro forma only, before the

earl of Oxford ; (q) but since the ffira of the revolution in 1688, the forest lawa

have fallen into total disuse, to the great advantage of the subject.

II. A second species of restricted courts is that of commissioners of sewers. (1)

This is a temporary tribunal, erected by virtue of a commission under the great

seal; which formerly used to be granted pro re nata at the pleasure of the

crown, (r) but now at the discretion and nomination of the lord chancellor, lord

treasurer, and chief justices, pursuant to the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5. Their

jurisdiction is to overlook the repairs of sea banks and sea walls; and the

cleansing of rivers, public streams, ditches, and other conduits, whereby any

waters are carried off; and is confined to such county or particular district as

the commission shall expressly name. The commissioners are a court of record,

and may fine and imprison for contempt; (s) and in the execution of their duty

may proceed by jury, or upon their own view, and may take order for the

r*7;n removal of any annoyances, or the 'safeguard and conservation of the

L J sewers within their commission, either according to the laws and customs

of Romney-marsh, (t) or otherwise at their own discretion. They mav also

assess such rates, or scots, upon the owners of lands within their district, as

they shall judge necessary; and, if any person refuses to pay them, the com-

missioners may levy the same by distress of his goods and chattels; or they may,
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by statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5, sell his freehold lauds (and by the 7 Ann. c. 10,

his copyhold also), in order to pay such scots or assessments. But their conduct

is under the control of the court of king's bench, which will prevent or punish

any illegal or tyrannical proceedings, (u) And yet, in the reign of King James I

(8 November, 161C), the privy council took upon them to order, that no

action or complaint should be prosecuted against the commissioners, unless

before that board; and committed several to prison who had brought such

actions to common law, till they should release the same: and one of the reasons

for discharging Sir Edward Coke from his office of lord chief justice was for

countenancing those legal proceedings, (v) The pretence for which arbitrary

measures was no other than the tyrant's plea, (w) of the necessity of unlimited

powers in works of evident utility to the public, " the supreme reason above all

reasons, which is the salvation of the king's lands and people." But now it ia

clearly held, that this (as well as all other inferior jurisdictions) is subject to the

discretionary coercion of his majesty's court of king's bench, (x)

III. The court of policies of assurance, when subsisting, is erected in pur-

suance of the statute 43 Eliz. c. 12, which recites the immemorial usage of

policies of assurance, " by means whereof it cometh to pass, upon the loss or

p-vg-i perishing *of any ship, there followeth not the undoing of any man, but

L ' J the loss lighteth rather easily upon many than heavy upon few, and rather

upon them that adventure not, than upon those that do adventure: whereby all

merchants, especially those of the younger sort, are allured to venture more

willingly and more freely : and that heretofore such assurers had used to stand

so justly and precisely upon their credits, as few or no controversies had arisen

thereupon; and if any had grown, the same had from time to time been ended,

and ordered by certain grave and discreet merchants appointed by the lord mayor

of the city of London ; as men, by reason of their experience, fittest to under-

stand and speedily decide those causes:" but that of late years divers persons

had withdrawn themselves from that course of arbitration, and had driven the

«1) Xorth's Life of Lord Gnllfonl. 4.1. (r) ¥. N. B. 113. (») Shi. 14.1.

(t) Romoey marsh, In the county of Kent, a tr:ic-tcoinain|n^24.000 acres. Is (jovenied by certain ancient mid

eqmtnble laws of sewers, composed by Henry lie Bath«, a venerable jiuljre in the reign <>r Knur Henrv tlie

Third; from whiohUws all commissioners of sewera In Lngland may recelvellghtand direction. (4Inst~27l> i

fuj Cro. Jac. :wa. (v) Moor, 825, 8«t. See page !&. (v) Milt, uarad. lost, iv, SW.

(xj I Vent. 66. Sack. 148.

(1) The law regarding these commissioners has since been materially altered. See statutes 3

aad 4 TVui. IV, c. 22, and 24 and 25 Tie. c. 133
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assured to bring separate actions at law against each assurer: it therefore ena-

bles the lord chancellor yearly to grant a standing commission to the judge of

the admiralty, the recorder of London, two doctors of the civil law, two com-

mon lawyers, and eight merchants; any three of which, one being a civilian or

a barrister, are thereby, and by the statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 23, empowered

to determine in a summary way all causes concerning policies of assurance in

London, with an appeal (by way of bill) to the court of chancery. But the

jurisdiction being somewhat defective, as extending only to London, and to no

other assurances but those on merchandize, (y) and to suits brought by the

assured only, and not by the insurers, (z) no such commission has of late years

issued: but insurance causes are now usually determined by the verdict of a

jury of merchants, and the opinion of the judges in case of any legal doubts;

whereby the decision is more speedy, satisfactory, and final, though it is to be

wished that some of the parliamentary powers invested in these commis-

sioners, especially for the examination of witnesses, either beyond the seas or

speedily going out of the kingdom, (a) could at present be adopted by the courts

of Westminster-hall, without requiring the consent of parties. (2)

*IV. The court of marshalsea, and the palace-court at Westminster, r*«g-i

though two distinct courts, are frequently confounded together. The <• ••

former was originally holden before the steward and marshal of the king's house,

and was instituted to administer justice between the king's domestic servants,

that they might not be drawn into other courts, and thereby the king lose their
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service, (b) It was formerly held in, though not a part of, the aula regis; (c)

and, when that was subdivided, remained a distinct jurisdiction: holding plea

of all trespasses committed within the verge of the court, where only one of the

parties is in the king's domestic service (in which case the inquest shall be

taken by a jury of the country), and of all debts, contracts, and covenants,

where both of the contracting parties belong to the royal household; and then

the inquest shall be composed of men of the household only, (d) By the stat-

ute of 13 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 3, (in affirmance of the common law), (e) the verge of

the court in this respect extends for twelve miles round the king's place of resi-

dence. (/) And, as this tribunal was never subject to the jurisdiction of the

chief justiciary, no writ of error lay from it (though a court of record) to the

king's bench, but only to parliament, (a) till the statutes of 5 Edw. Ill, c. 2, and

10 Edw. III.st. 2 c.3, which allowed such writ of error before the king in his palace.

But this court being ambulatory, and obliged to follow the king in all his progreses

BO that, by the removal of the houshold, actions were frequently discontinued, (A)

and doubts having arisen as to the extent of its jurisdiction, (i) King Charles 1,

in the sixth year of his reign, by his letters patent, erected a new court of record,

called the curia palatti or palace- court, to be held before the steward of the

household and knight- marshal, and the steward of the court, *or his r*~«-i

deputy; with jurisdiction to hold plea of all manner of personal actions L -1

whatsoever, which shall arise between any parties within twelve miles of his

majesty's palace at Whitehall, (k) The court is now held once a week, together

with the ancient court of marshalsea, in the borough of Southwark: and a

writ of error lies from thence to the court of king's bench. But if the cause is

of any considerable consequence, it is usually removed on its first commence-

ment, together with the custodv of the defendant, either into the king's bench

or common pleas, by a writ of habeas corpus cum causa; and the inferior busi-

rjr,) Sty!. 16«. (z) \ Show. 398. (a) Stat 13 and 14 Car. H, c. 22, « 3 and 4.

(l> 1 Bulstr. 211. (c) Flct. I. 2, e. 2.

(d) Artie, tup. cart. 28 Eilw. I, c. 3. Stat. 5 Edw. HI. c. 2. 10 Edw. HI, st 2, c. 2. (e) 2 Inst. 648.

(f) By the ancient Saxon constitution, thcpaxregia, or privilege of the king's palace, extended from his

palnce gate to the distance of three miles, three CuiTonjts, three acres, nine fnet, nine palms, and nine barley-

corns; umtppeursfromarragnientofthe textui Rofftntit. cited in Dr. llicke'srfiiserdif. epistol. 114.

(a) \ Bulstr. 211. 10 Rep. 79. (h) F. N. B. 241. 2 Inst. MS. (ij 1 Bulstr. 208.

fyj 1 Hid. IHI. Sail. 439.

(2) The courts at Westminster have now the power of ordering the examination of witoesseH

who are abroad.
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ness of the court hath of late years been much reduced, by the new courts of

conscience erected in the environs of London ; in consideration of which the

four counsel belonging to these courts had salaries granted them for their lives

by the statute 23 Geo. II, e. 37,

V. A fifth species of private courts of a limited, thongh extensive, jurisdic-

tion are those of the principality of Wales; which, upon its thorough reduction,

and the settling of its polity in the reigu of Henry the Eighth, (I) were erected

all over the country; principally by the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, e, 26,

though much had before been done, and the wav prepared by the statute of

Wales, 12 Edw. I, and other statutes. By the statute of Henry the Eighth

before-mentioned, eourts-baron, hundred, and county courts are there established

as in England. A session is also to be held twice in every year in each county,

by judges (m) appointed by the king, to be culled the great sessions of the

several counties m Wales: in which all pleas of real and personal actions shall

be held, with the same form of process and in as ample a manner as in the court

of common pleas at Westminster: («) and writs of error shall lie from judg-

ments therein (it being a court of record) to the court of king's bench at West-

minster. But the ordinary original writs of process of the king's courts at

F*78l ^e8tm'ns^er do not inn i'1*0 the principality of Wales: (o) thongh *pro-

«• -I cess of execution does; (p) as do also all prerogative writs, as writs of ctr-

tiorari, quo minus, mandamu*, and the like, (q) And even in causes between

subject and subject, to prevent injustice through tiimilv factions or prejudices,
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it is held lawful (in causes of freehold at least, and it is usual in all others) to

bring an action m the English courts, and try the same in the next English

county adjoining to that part of Wales where the cause arises, (r) and wherein

the venue is laid. But, on the other hand to prevent trifling and frivolous suits,

it is enacted by statute 13 Geo. Ill, e. 51, that in personal actions, fried in any

English county, where the cause of action arose, and the defendant resides

in Wales, if the plaintiff shall not recover a verdict for ten pounds, he shall

be nonsuited and pay the defendant's costs, unless it be certified by the judge

that the freehold or title came principally in question, or that the cause was

proper to be tried in such English eonnty. And if any transitory action, the

cause whereof arose and the defendant is resident in Wales, shall be brought in

any English county, and the plaintiff shall not recover a verdict for ten pounds,

the plaintiff shall be nonsuited, and shull pay the defendant's costs, deducting

thereout the sum recovered by the verdict. (3)

VI. The court of the duchy chamber of Lancaster is another special juris-

diction, held before the chancellor of the duchy or his deputy, concerning

all matter of equity relating to lands holden of the king in the right of the

duchy of Lancaster; (*) which is a thing very distinct from the county

palatine (which hath also its separate chancery, for sealing of writs, and the

like), (i) and comprises much territory which lies ut a vast distance from it; as

particularly a very large district surrounded by the city of Westminster. The

proceedings in this court are the same as on the equity side in the courts

of exchequer and chancery; (u) so that it seems not to be a court of record;

and indeed it has been holdon that those courts have a concurrent jurisdic-

tion with the dnchy court, and may take cognizance of the same causes, (v)

T*79l *^1I- Another species of private courts, which are of a limited local

•• J jurisdiction, and have at the same time an exclusive cognizance of pleas,

U) See Book I, lirirwtoo. »4. (M) Stat. 18 Kli/.. e. 8.

(n) See. Tor further regulations of the practice ol' these' courts, stat. 6 Ellz. c. 35. 8 Eliz. e. M. 8 Goo. I,

e. »,««. »Geo. n, e. 14. ttUeo. Ill, c. 51.

(ol 2 Rofl. Bep. HI. , (a) 2 BuMr. 1M. '_'Smnul I'.U. Raym. 20B. (7) Cro. Jac. 484.

(n Vangh. «». Hard. M. «) Hob. 77. » Lev. 24. (<) 1 Ventr. 257. (ui 4 Inst. SOfl.

(v) 1 Chan. Bep. «. Toili. 145. Hardr. 171.

(3) These distinctions are now abolished, and by statutes 11 Geo. IV, and 1 "Wm. IV, c. 70,

$ 14, 5 Vic. c. 33, $ 2, and 8 Vic. c. 11, the administration of justice in Wales is in every respect

rendered uniform with that of England, aud the writs of the superior courts of common law

run into that principality.
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in matters both of law and equity, (to) are those which appertain to the coun-

ties palatine of Chester, Lancaster, and Durham, and the royal franchise of

Ely. (a;) (4) In all these, as in the principality of Wales, the king's ordinary

Wits, issuing under the great seal out of chancery, do not run; that is they

are of no force. For as originally all Jura regalia were granted to the lords of

these counties palatine, they had of course the sole administration of justice, by

their own judges, appointed by themselves and not by the crown. It would

therefore be incongruous for the king to send his writ to direct the judge of

another's court in what manner to administer justice between the suitors. But

when the privileges of these counties palatine and franchises were abridged by

statute 27 Henry VIII, c. 24, it was also enacted that all writs and process

should be made in the king's name, but should be tested or witnessed in the

name of the owner of the franchise. Wherefore all writs, whereon actions are

founded, and which have current authority here, must be under the seal of the

respective franchises; the two former of which are now united to the crown,

and the two latter under the government of their several bishops. And the

judges of assize, who sit therein, sit by virtue of a special commission from the

owners of the several franchises, and under the seal thereof; and not by the

usual commission under the great seal of England. Hither also may be referred

the courts of the cinq tie ports, or five most important havens, as they formerly

were esteemed in the kingdom, viz.: Dover, Sandwich, Bomney, Hastings, und

Hythe; to which Winchelsea and Rye have been since added; which have
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also similar franchises in many respects (y) with the counties palatine, and

particularly an exclusive jurisdiction (before the mayor and jurats of the ports),

in which exclusive jurisdiction the king's ordinary writ does not run. A writ

of error lies from the mayor and jurats of each port to the lord warden of

the cinque ports, in his court of Shepwqy ; and from the court of Shepway

to the king's *benoh. (z) So likewise a writ of error lies from all the other r +QQ-I

jurisdictions(to the same supreme court of judicature, (a) as an ensign >• J

of superiority reserved to the crown at the original creation of the franchises.

And all prerogative writs (as those of habeas corpus, prohibition, certiorari

and mandamus) may issue for the same reason to all these exempt jurisdic-

tions ; (b) because the privilege, that the king's writ runs not, must be intended

between party and party, for there can be no such privilege against the king, (c)

VIII. The stannary courts in Devonshire and Cornwall, tor the administra-

tion of justice among the tinners therein, are also courts of record, but of the

same private and exclusive nature. They are held before the lord warden and

his substitutes, in virtue of a privilege granted to the workers in the tin mines

there, to sue and be sued only in their own courts, that they may not be drawn

from their business, which is highly profitable to the public, by attending their

law-suits in other courts, (d) The privileges of the tinners are confirmed by a

charter, 38 Edw. I, and fully expounded oy a private statute, (e) 50 Edw. Ill,

which has since been explained by a public act, 16 Car. I, c. 15. • What relates

to our present purpose is only this: that all tinners and labourers in and about

the stanneries shall, during the time of their working therein bona fide, be

privileged from suits of other courts, and be only impleaded in the stannary

court in all matters, excepting pleas of land, life, and member. No writ of error

lies from hence to any court in Westminster-hall; as was agreed by all the

judges (/) in 4 Jac. I. But an appeal lies from the steward of the court to the

under-warden; and from him to the lord-warden; and thence to the privy

(ic) 4 In»t. 213,118. Finch, It. 453. (x\ See Book I, Introd. 91. (y) 1 Sid. 166.

(z) Jcnk. 71. Dt/versvte det aiurtet, t. bank If rou. 1 Silt. 358.

(o) tiro. 4br~ t. error, 74, Ml. IJavis. 63. i lust.38. 214, 218. (b) I Sid. 92. (c) Cro. Jac. 543.

(d) 4 Iiut 232. («) See this at length in 4 Inst 232. ' ' (/) 4 Inst. 231.

(4) The counties palatine of Lancaster and Durham are now united to tbe crown (6 and 7

•VFm. IV. c. 19), while that of Chester has been by statutes 11 Geo. IV, and 7 \Vm. IV, c. 70,

abolished, and that of Ely by statutes 6 and 7 TVin. IV, c. 87, and 7 ^ui. IV., and 1 Vio. e. 53,

also extinguished.
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coiincil of the priiice of Wales, as duke of Cornwall, (#) when he hath had liverj

or investiture of the same. (A) And from thence the appeal lies to the king him-

self, in the last resort, (t) (5)

F *811 *^' '^e 8evera' courts within the city of London, (_;*) and other cities,

L •* boroughs, and corporations throughout the kingdom, held by prescrip-

tion, charter, or act of parliament, are also of the same private and limited

species. It would exceed the design and compass our present inquiries, if I

were to enter into a particular detail of these, and to examine the nature and

extent of their several jurisdictions. It may in general be sufficient to say,

that they arose originally from the favour of the crown to those particular dis-

tricts, wherein we find them erected, upon the same principle that hundred-

courts, and the like, were established; for the convenience of the inhabitants,

that they may prosecute their suits and receive justice at home: that, for the

most part, the courts at Westminister-hall have a concurrent jurisdiction with

these, or else a superintendency over them, (k) and are bound by the statute 19

Geo. Ill, c. 70, to give assistance to such of them as are courts of record, by

issuing writs of execution, where the person or effects of the defendant are not

within the inferior jurisdiction : and that the proceedings in these special courts

ought to be according to the course of the common law, unless otherwise

ordered by parliament; for though the king may erect new courts, yet he cannot

alter the established course of law.

But there is one species of courts, constituted by act of parliament, in the
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city of London, and other trading and populous districts, which in their pro-

ceedings so vary from the course of common law, that they may deserve a more

particular consideration. I mean the courts of requests, or courts of conscience,

for the recovery of small debts. The first of these was established in London,

so early as the regin of Henry the Eighth, by an act of their common council;

which however was certainly insufficient for that purpose and illegal, till con-

firmed by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 15, which has since been explained and amended

by statute 14 Geo. II, c. 10. The constitution is this: two aldermen, and four

commoners, sit twice a week to hear all causes of debt not exceeding the

F*82l *ya*ue °f fortv shillings; which they examine in a summary way, by

L °*J the oath of the parties or other witnesses, and make such order therein

as is consonant to equity and good conscience. The time and expense of

obtaining this summary redress are very inconsiderable, which make it a great

benefit to trade; and thereupon divers trading towns and other districts have

obtained acts of parliament, for establishing in them courts of conscience upon

nearly the same plan as that in the city of London.

The anxious desire that has been shown to obtain these several acts, proves

clearly that the nation in general is truly sensible of the great inconvenience

arising from the disuse of the ancient county and hundred courts; wherein

causes of this small value were always formerly decided, with very little trouble

and expense to the parties. But it is to be feared that the general remedy which

of late hath been principally applied to this inconvenience (the erecting these

new jurisdictions) may itself be attended in time with very ill consequences:

as the method of proceeding therein is entirely in derogation of the common

law; as their large discretionary powers create a petty tyranny in a set of stand-

ing commissioners; and as the disuse of the trial by jury may tend to estrange

the minds of the people from that valuable prerogative of Englishmen, which

( a) Ibid. 230. (A) 3 Bnlstr. 183. !i1 DncldrMge, Hist, of Cornw. M.

(j) Tlie chief of those in London arc the slterWi courts, bolden before their steward or jndge : from

which a writ ol'error lies to the court of hustings before the mayor, recorder, anil sheriffs ; and from

thence to justices appointed bv the kind's commission, who nsed to nit in the church of St. Martin le grand.

(F. N. B. 8-2.) And from the judgment of thosejustices a writ of error lies immediately to the honao ol lord*.

1/,-i Sulk. 144, -.!';:;.

(5) [As the law now is, from the decisions of the vice-warden, both in equity and at common

law, an appeal lies to the lord-warden, assisted by two or more members of the judicial eoro-

mitte of the privy council, or judges of equity, or courts of law at "Westminster; and every

judgment of the lord-warden is subject to an appeal to the house of lords.]
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has already been more than sufficiently excluded in many instances. How mnch

rather is it to be wished that the proceedings in the county and hundred courts

could again be revived, without burdening the freeholders with too frequent and

tedious attendances; and at the same time removing the delays that have insen-

sibly crept into their proceedings, and the power that either party has of

transferring at pleasure their suits to the courts at Westminster! Ancl we may

with satisfaction observe, that this experiment has been actually tried, and has

succeeded, in the populous county of Middlesex; which might serve as an

example for others. For by statute 23 Geo. II, c. 33, it is enacted, 1. That a

special county court should" be held at least once a month in every hundred of

the county of *Middlesex, by the county clerk. 2. That twelve free- r*gq-i

holders of that hundred, qualified to serve on juries, and struck by the L -"

sheriff, shall- be summoned to appear at such court by rotation; so as none shall

be summoned oftener than once a year. 3. That in all causes not exceeding the

value of forty shillings, the county clerk and twelve suitors shall proceed in a

summary way, examining the parties and witnesses on oath, without the formal

process anciently used: and shall make such order therein as they shall judge

agreeable to conscience. 4. That no plaints shall be removed out of this court,

by any process whatsoever; but the determination herein shall be final. 5. That

if any action be brought in any of the superior courts against a person resident

in Middlesex, for a debt or contract, upon the trial whereof the jury shall find

less than 40s. damages, the plaintiff shall recover no costs, but shall pay the
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defendant double costs; unless upon some special circumstances, to be certified

by the judge who tried it. 6. Lastly, a table of very moderate fees is prescribed

and set down in the act; which are not to be exceeded upon any account what-

soever. This is a plan entirely agreeable to the constitution and genius of the

nation: calculated to prevent a multitude of vexatious actions in the superior

courts, and at the same time to give honest creditors an opportunity of recover-

ing small sums; which now they are frequently deterred from by the expense

of a suit at law: a plan which, one would think, wants only to be generally

known in order to its universal reception.

X. There is yet another species of private courts, which I must not pass over

in silence, viz.: the chancellor's courts in the two universities of England. (6)

"Which two learned bodies enjoy the sole jurisdiction, in exclusion of the king's

courts, over all civil actions and suits whatsoever, when a scholar or privileged

person is one of the parties; excepting in such cases where the right of freehold

is concerned. And these, by the university charter, they are at liberty to try

and determine, either according to the common law of the land, or according to

their own local customs, at their discretion; which has generally led them to

carry on their process in a *course much conformed to the civil law, for r *g, -•

reasons sufficiently explained in a former book. (1) ' ' "

These privileges were granted, that the students might not be distracted from

their studies by legal process from distant courts, and other forensic avocations.

And privileges of this kind are of very high antiquity, being generally enjoyed

by all foreign universities as well as our own, in consequence (I apprehend) of a

constitution of the Emperor Frederick, A. D. 1158. (m) But as to England in

•particular, the oldest charter that I have seen, containing this grant to the

university of Oxford, was-28 Hen. Ill, A. D. 1244. And the same privileges were

confirmed and enlarged by almost every succeeding prince, down to King Henry

the Eighth; in the fourteenth year of whose reign, the largest and most exten-

(/i Book I, Inir.i.1, i 1. (m) Cod. 4, tit 13.

(6) [As the object of the privilege is, that students and others connected with the universi-

ties should not be distracted from the studies and duties to be there performed, the party

proceeded against must in general be a resident member of the university, and that fact must

be expressly sworn, or be collected from the affidavit The privilege of Cambridge differs

from that of Oxford: in the former, it only extends to causes of action accruing in the town

and its suburbs; but in Oxford it extends to nil personal causes arising anywhere. R. T.

Hardw. 241; 2 Wils. 406; Bac. Ab., Universities.]
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give charter of all was granted. One similar to which was afterwards granted

to Cambridge, in the third year of Queen Elizabeth. Bnt jet, notwithstanding

these charters, the privileges granted therein, of proceeding in a course different

from the law of the land, were of so high a natare that they were held to be

invalid; for though the king might erect new courts, yet he conld not alter the

course of law by his letters patent. Therefore, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,

an act of parliament was obtained, (») confirming all the charters of the two

universities, and those of 14 Hen. VIII and 3 Eliz. by name. Which Messed

nut, as Sir Edward Coke entitles it, (o) established this high privilege without

any doubt or opposition r.(p) or, as Sir Matthew Hale,(ff) very fully expresses

the sense of the common law and the operation of the act of parliament.

" Although King Henry the Eighth, 14 A. R sui, granted to the university a

liberal charter, to proceed according to the use of the university, viz.: by a

course much conformed to the civil law, yet that charter had not been sufficient

to have warranted such proceedings without the help of ah act of parliament.

r*gc i And, therefore, in 3 Eliz. *an act passed, whereby that charter was in

L -• effect enacted; and it is thereby that at this day they have a kind of civil

law procedure, even in matters that are of themselves of common law cogni-

zance, where either of the parties is privileged."

This privilege, BO for as relates to civil causes, is exercised at Oxford in the

chancellor's court; the judge of which is the vice-chancellor, his deputy or

assessor. From his sentence an appeal lies to delegates appointed by the con-
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gregation; from thence to other delegates of the house of convocation-; and if

they all three concur in the same sentence it is final, at least by the statutes of

the university, (r) according to the rule of the civil -law. («) But> if there be

any discordance or variation in any of the three sentences, an appeal lies ia the

last resort to judges delegates appointed by the crown under tne great seal in

chancery. {7)

I have now gone through the several species of private, or special coarts, of

the greatest note in the kingdom, instituted for the local redress of private

wrongs; and must, in the close of all, make one general observation from Sir

Edward Coke: (t) that these particular jurisdictions, derogating from the .general

jurisdiction of the courts of common law, are ever strictly restrained, and can-

not be extended farther than the express letter of their privileges will most

explicitly warrant.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE COGNIZANCE OF PRIVATE WRONGS.

WE are now to proceed to the cognizance of private wrongs; that is, to

consider in which of the vast variety of courts, mentioned in the three pre-

ceding chapters, every possible injury that can be offered to a man's person or

property is certain of meeting with redress.

The authority of the several courts of private and special jurisdiction, or of

what wrongs such Courts have cognizance, was necessarily remarked as those

respective tribunals were enumerated; and therefore need not be here again

repeated; which will confine our present inquiry to the cognizance of civil

injuries in the several courts of public or fre'neral jurisdiction. And the order

in which I shall pursue this inquiry, will DC by showing: 1. What actions may

(n) 13 Eliz. c. 29. (o) 4 lust. 227. (p) Jenk. Cent. Jpl. 88. Cent. 8 pi. S3. Hard. BOt. Godbolt. 201.

(?) Hist. C. L. 35. (r) TU. 21, 419. (») Cod. 7. 70, 1. (() 2 lost. 548.

(7) [The privilege of the university of Oxford is ftilly stated in 1 Q. B. 952. In the matter of

ike ctwncellar, fc.
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he brought or what injuries remedied, in the, ecclesiastical courts. 2. What in

the military. 3. What in the maritime. And, 4. What in the courts of com-

mon law.

And, in regard to the three first of these particulars, I must beg leave not

BO much to consider what hath at any time been claimed or pretended to belong

to their jurisdiction, by the officers and judges of those respective courts; but

"what the common law allows and permits to be so. For these eccentrical tribu-

nals (which are principally guided by the rules of the imperial and canon laws),

as they subsist and are *admitted in England, not by any right of their r*oy]

own, (ft), but upon bare sufferance and toleration from the municipal laws, L J

must nave recourse to the laws of that country wherein they are thus adopted, to

be informed how far their jurisdiction extends, or what causes are permitted, and

what forbidden, to be discussed or drawn in question before them. It mat-

ters not, therefore, what the pandects of Justinian, or the decretals of Gregory,

have ordained. They are here of no more intrinsic authority than the laws of

Solon and Lycnrgus : curious perhaps for their antiquity, respectable for their

equity, and frequently of admirable use in illustrating a point of history. JSTor

is it at all material in what light other nations may consider this matter of

jurisdiction. Every nation must and will abide by its own municipal laws.;

which various accidents conspire to render different in almost every country in

Europe. We permit some kinds of suite to be of ecclesiastical cognizance,

which other nations have referred entirely to the temporal courts; as concern-
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ing wills and successions to intestate's chattels; and perhaps we may, in our

turn, prohibit them from interfering in some controversies, which on the con-

tinent may be looked upon as merely spiritual. In short the common law of

England is the one nniform rule to determine the jurisdiction of our courts:

and, if any tribunals whatsoever attempt to exceed the limits so prescribed

them, the king's courts of common law may and do prohibit them; and in some

cases punish their judges, (b)

Having premised this general caution, I proceed now to consider,

L The wrongs or injuries cognizable by the ecclesiastical courts. I mean

such as are offered to private persons or individuals; which are cognizable by

the ecclesiastical court, -not for reformation of the offender himself or party

injuring (pro salute animcs, as is the case with immoralities in general when

unconnected with private injuries), but for the sake of the party injured, to

make him a satisfaction and redress for *the damage which he has sns- r*gg-i

tained. And these I shall reduce under three general heads; of causes ^ ^

pecuniary, causes matrimonial, and causes testamentary.

1. Pecuniary causes, cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts are such as arise

either from the withholding ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neglecting some

act relating to the chnrch, whereby some damage accrues to the plaintiff^

towards obtaining a satisfaction for which he is permitted to institute a suit in

the spiritual court. (1)

The principal of these is the subtraction or withholding of tithes from the

parson or vicar, whether the former be a clergyman or a lay appropriates1, (e)

But herein a distinction mast be taken: for the ecclesiastical courts have no

jurisdiction to try the riffht of tithes unless between spiritual persons; (d)

but in ordinary cases, between spiritual men and lay men, .are only to compel

the payment of them, when the right is not disputed, (e) By the statute or

rather writ (/) of circumspecte agatitt (g) it is declared that the court Christian

shall not be prohibited from holding plea, "si rectorpetat versus parochianos

(a) See book 1, Introd. U. fbj Hal. Hist. C. L. c. S. (c) Stat. 32 Hon. VIII, tj. 7.

f<U 3 Itoll. Abr. 409, 310. Bro. Atr. t. jnritdictian, 88. (e) 2 In«t. S64, 486, «0.

(f) Sec BurringtoD, 123. 3 Pryn. Kec. 336. (g) 13 Kilw. I, at. 4, or rather 9 Jvhv. II.

(1) This jurisdiction became unimportant under the operation of statute 6 and 7 Win. IT, o.

71, and subsequent statutes for the commutation of tithes. And the statute 31 and 32 Tic. c.

109, tabes away wholly the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to compel the payment of

church rates.
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oblationes et decimas debitas et consuetas:" so that if any dispute arises whether

such tithes be due and accustomed, this cannot be determined in the ecclesiasti-

cal court, hut before the king's courts of the common law; as such question

affects the temporal inheritance, and the determination must bind the real

property. But where the right does not come into question,but only the fact,

whether or no the tithes allowed to be due are really subtracted or withdrawn,

this is a transient personal injury, for which the remedy may properly be had

in the spiritual court; viz: the recovery of the tithes, or their equivalent By

statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 13, it is enacted that if any person shall carry off

F*891 k*8 predial tithes (viz : of corn, hay, or the like), before the tenth part *is

I- J duly set forth, or agreement is made with the proprietor, or shall wil-

lingly withdraw his tithes of the same, or shall stop or hinder the proprietor of

the tithes or his deputy from viewing or carrying them away; such offender

shall pay double the value of the tithes, with costs to be recovered before the

ecclesiastical judge, according to the king's ecclesiastical laws. By a former

clause of the same statute, the treble value of the tithes, so subtracted or with-

held, may be sued for in the temporal courts, which is equivalent to the double

value to be sued for in the ecclesiastical. For one may sue for and recover

in the ecclesiastical courts the tithes themselves, or a recompense for them,

by the ancient law; to which the suit for the double value is superadded

by the statute. But as no suit lay in the temporal courts for the sub-

traction of tithes themselves, therefore the statute gave a treble forfeiture,
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if sued for there; in order to make the course of justice uniform by giving

the same reparation in one court as in the other, (h) However, it now

seldom happens that tithes are sued for at all in the spiritual court; for if

the defendant pleads any custom, modus, composition, or other matter whereby

the right of tithing is called in question, this, takes it out of the jurisdiction

of the ecclesiastical judges: for the law will not suffer the existence of such a

right to be decided by the sentence of any single, much less an ecclesiastical,

judge; without the verdict of a jury. But a more summary method than

either of recovering small tithes under the value of 40*., is given by statute 7

and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 6, by complaint to two justices of the peace; and, by another

statute of the same year, c. 34, the same remedy is extended to all tithes with-

held by Quakers under the value of ten pounds. (2)

Another pecuniary injury, cognizable in the spiritual courts, is the non-pay-

ment of other ecclesiastical dues to the clergy: as pensions, mortuaries, compo-

sitions, offerings and whatsoever falls under the denomination of surplice-fees,

for marriages or other ministerial offices of the church : all which injuries are

r*90l rearessed by a decree for their actual *payment. Besides which, all offer-

•!• J ings, oblations and obventions not exceeding the value of 40s. may be

recovered in a summary way before two justices of the peace, (t) But care

must betaken that these are real and not imaginary dues; for if they be con-

trary to the common law, a prohibition will issue out of the temporal courts to

stop all suits concerning them. As where a fee was demanded by the minister

of the parish for the baptism of a child, which was administered in another

place; (k) this, however authorized by the canon, is contrary to common

right: for of common right, no fee is due to the minister even for performing

such branches of his duty, and it can only be supported by a special custom ; (j)

but no custom can support the demand of a fee without performing them at all.

For fees also, settled and acknowledged to be due to the officers of the ecclesi-

astical courts, a suit will lie therein ; but not if the right of the fees is at all

disputable; for then it must be decided by the common law. (m) It is also

said, that if a curate be licensed, and his salary appointed by the bishop, and he

be not paid, the curate has a remedy in the ecclesiastical court; (M) but, if he

.nst. 2SO. ({J Stat. 7 and 8 W. III. 0.6. (k) Halk. 33S.

(!) Ibid. ;;::i. Lord Hiiyin. 490, J-V,n. Fitz. H. (m) \ Ventr. 165. (n) 1 Barn. eccl. Inw, 433.

(2) See the preceding note.
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be not licensed, or hath no such salary appointed, or hath made a special agree-

ment with the rector, he must sue for a satisfaction at common law; (o) either

by proving such special agreement, or else by leaving it to a jury to give damages

upon a quantum meruit, that is, in consideration of what he reasonably deserved

in proportion to the service performed. (3)

Under this head of pecuniary injuries may also be reduced the several matters

of spoliation, dilapidations, and neglect of repairing the church and things

thereunto belonging; for which a satisfaction may be sued for in the ecclesiasti-

cal court

Spoliation is an injury done by one clerk or incumbent to another, in taking

the fruits of his benefice without any *right thereunto, but under a pre- I-$Q, -i

tended title. It is remedied by a decree to account for the profits so L J

taken. This injury, when the jus patronatus or right of advowson doth not

come in debate, is cognizable in the spiritual court: as if a patron first presents

A to a benefice, who is instituted and inducted thereto; and then, upon pre-

tence of a vacancy, the same patron presents B to the same living, and he also

obtains institution and induction. Now, if the fact of the vacancy be disputed,

then that clerk who is kept out of the profits of the living, whichever it be,

may sue the other in the spiritual court for spoliation, or taking the profits

of his benefice. And it shall there be tried, whether the living were or were

not vacant: upon which the validity of the second clerk's pretensions must

depend, (p) But if the right of patronage comes at all into dispute, as if one
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patron presented A, and another presented B, there the ecclesiastical court

hath no cognizance, provided the tithes sued for amount to a fourth part of the

value of the living, but may be prohibited at the instance of the patron by the

king's writ of indicavit. (q) So also if a clerk, without any colour of title, ejects

another from his parsonage, this injury must be redressed in the temporal courts:

for it depends upon no question determinable by the spiritual law (as plurality

of benefices or no plurality, vacancy or no vacancy), but is merely a civil injury.

For dilapidations, which are a kind of ecclesiastical waste, either voluntary,

by pulling down ; or permissive, by suffering the chancel, parsonage-house and

other buildings thereunto belonging to decay ; an action also lies, either in the

spiritual court by the canon law, or in the courts of common law; (r) (4) and

it may be brought by the successor against the predecessor if living, or, if dead,

then against his executors. It is also said to be good cause of deprivation, if

the bishop, parson, vicar or other ecclesiastical person dilapidates the buildings,

or cuts down timber growing on the patrimony of *the church, unless r ^o -i

for necessary repairs: (*•) and that a writ of prohibition will also lie "- J

against him in the courts of common law. (t) By statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, if any

spiritual person makes over or alienates his goods with intent to defeat his suc-

cessors of their remedy for dilapidations, the successor shall have such remedy

against the alienee, in the ecclesiastical court, as if he were the executor of

his predecessor. And by statute 14 Eliz. c. 11, all money recovered for dilap-

idations shall within two years be employed upon the buildings, in respect

whereof it was recovered, on penalty of forfeiting double the value to the

crown.

(o) 1 Freem. 70. (p) Tf. y. B. 36.

(q) Circumtpecte agatif i 13 Kdw. I. st. 4 Artie. Cteri. 9 Ertw. II, c. 2. F. N. B. 46.

(r) Cart. 224. 3 Lev. 2US. fij 1 Koll. Kep. 86. 11 Hep. 96. Gotlb. 2S9. (t) 3 Bulstr. 138. 1 Boll. Rep. 335.

(3) [Now a proceeding in the ecclesiastical conrt is the only remedy.for the statute 1 and 2

Tic. c. 106, $ 83, re-enacting a similar provision of the 12 Anne, St. 2, c. 12 and 57 Geo. Ill, e.

99, gives to the bishop a power to summarily hear and determine any difference between tho

incumbent of a benefice and his curate touching the stipend of the latter, and to enforce the

payment of it by monition and by sequestration of the profits of the benefice. And the 109th

section of the same statute, also re-enacting a similar provision of the 57 Geo. Ill, c. 99,

enacts that wherever jurisdiction is given to a bishop or archbishop under the provisions of that

act, all other and concurrent jurisdiction shall wholly cease.]

(4) The usual and more effectual remedy i« in the courts of common law, by action on the case.

See Radcliffe v. D'Oyly, 2 T. H. 630.
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As to the neglect of reparations of the church, church-yard and the like, the

spiritual court has undoubted cognizance thereof; (n) and a suit may he

brought therein for non-payment of a rate made by the church-wardens for

that purpose. (&) And these are the principal pecuniary injuries, which are cog-

nizable, or for which suits may be instituted in ecclesiastical courts.

2. Matrimonial causes, or injuries respecting the rights of marriage, are

another, and a much more undisturbed, branch of the ecclesiastical jurisdic-

tion. Though, if we consider marriages in the light of mere civil contracts,

they do not seem to be properly of spiritual cognizance, (v) But the Romanists

having very early converted this contract into a holy sacramental ordinance,

the church of course took it under her protection, upon the division of the two

jurisdictions. And, in the hands of such able politicians, it soon became an

engine of great importance to the papal scheme of an universal monarchy over

Christendom. The numberless canonical impediments that were invented, and

occasionally dispensed with, by the holy see, not only enriched the coffers of

the church, but gave it a vast ascendant over princes of all denominations;

whose marriages were sanctified or reprobated, their issue legitimated or bastard-

ized, and the succession to their thrones established or rendered precarious,

r«,gqi according *to the humor or interest of the reigning pontiff; besides a

*• •" thousand nice and difficult scruples, with which the clergy of those ages

puzzled the understandings and loaded the consciences of the inferior orders of

the laity; and which could only be unravelled and removed by these their
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spiritual guides. Yet, abstracted from this universal influence, which affords

so good a reason for their conduct, one might otherwise he led to wonder, that

the same authority, which enjoined the strictest celibacy to the priesthood,

should think them the proper judges in causes between man and wife. These

causes, indeed, partly from the nature of the injuries complained of, and partly

from the clerical method of treating them, (w) soon became too gross for the

modesty of a lay tribunal. And causes matrimonial are now so peculiarly

ecclesiastical, that the temporal courts will never interfere in controversies or

this kind, unless in some particular cases. As if the spiritual court do proceed

to call a marriage in question after the death of either of the parties; this the

courts of common law will prohibit, because it tends to bastardize and disin-

herit the issue; who cannot so well defend the marriage, as the parties them-

selves when both of them living might have done, (x)

Of matrimonial causes, one of the first and principal is, 1. Causa jactitation-is

matrimonu ; when one of the parties boasts or gives out that he or she is mar-

ried to the other, whereby a common reputation of their matrimony may ensue.

On this ground the party injured may libel the other in the spiritual court;

and, unless the defendant undertakes and makes out a proof of the actual mar-

riage, he or she is enjoined perpetual silence upon that head; which is the only

remedy the ecclesiastical courts can give for this injury. 2. Another species of

•matrimonial causes was, when a party contracted to another brought a suit in

the ecclesiastical court to compel a-celebration of the marriage in pursuance of

such contract; but this branch of causes is now cut off entirely by the act for

r fcg,-i preventing clandestine marriages, "26 Geo. II, *c. 33, which enacts, that

•• J for the future no suit shall be had in any ecclesiastical court, to compel a

celebration of marriage in fade ecclesia, for or because of any contract of mat-

rimony whatsoever. 3. The suit for restitution of conjugal rifffitx is also another

species of matrimonial causes: which is brought whenever either the husband

or wife is guilty of the injury of «ubstraction, or lives separate from the other

'without any sufficient reason; in which case the ecclesiastical jurisdiction will

(u) Cirernnrpecte agatis. 5 Rep. 06. (v) Wttrb. alliance. 173.

(»•) Soinu "I'llic inipiiri-Ki books, that are exutnt in niiy language, arc those written by the popish

clergy on the subjects of matrimony and divorce. (x) Inst. 614.

(5) A i-mmimry remedy before two justices of the peace is now given. See Rex r.

5 M. and S. 248; Richards v. Dyke, 11 Law J. Rep. (K. S.) Q. B. 275.

<5hap. 7.] JURISDICTION OF EcoLESustiCA*. COORTS. &i

compel them to come together again, if either party be weak enough to desire

it, contrary to the inclination of the other. 4. Divorces also, of which, and

their several distinctions, we treated at large in a former book, (y) afre causes

thoroughly matrimonial, and cognizable by the ecclesiastical judge. If it

becomes improper, through some supervenient cause arising ex post facto, that

the parties should live together any longer; as through intolerable cruelty,

adultery, a perpetual disease, and the like; this nnfitness or inability for the

narriage state may be looked upon as an injury to the suffering party: and for

this the ecclesiastical law administers the remedy of separation, or a divorce a

'mensa et fhoro. But if the cause existed previous to the marriage, and was

'such a one as rendered the marriage unlawful ab initio, as consanguinity, cor-

poral imbecility, or the like; in this case the law looks upon the marriage to

nave been always null and void, being contracted infraudem %t«, and decrees

not only a separation from bed and board, but a vinculo matrimonii itself.

5. The last species of matrimonial causes is a consequence drawn from one of

the species of divorce, that a mensa et thoro ; which is tire suit for alimony, a

term which signifies 'maintenance: which suit the wife, in case of separation,

may have against her husband, if he neglects or refuses to make her SB allowance

'suitable to their station in life. This is an injury to the wife, and the court

Christian will redress it by assigning her a competent maintenance, and com-

pelling the husband by ecclesiastical censures to pay it. But no alimony wttl

be assigned in case of a divorce for adultery on her part; forws that amounts
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to a forfeiture of her *dower after his death, it is also a sufficient reason C*QK-I

Why she should not be partaker ef his estate when living. (6) ' '*!

3. Testamentary causes are the only remaining species belonging to the eccle-

siastical jurisdiction ; (7) which, as they are certainly of a mere temporal nature,

(z) may seem at first view a little oddly ranked among matters of a spiritual

cognizance. And, indeed, (as was in some degree observed in a former book)

(a) they were originally cognizable in the king s courts of common law, viz.: the

county courts; (b) and afterwards transferred to the jurisdiction of the chiirch,

'by the favour of the crown, as a natural consequence of granting to the bishops

the administration of intestates' effects.

This spiritual jurisdiction of testamentary causes is a peculiar constitution of

this island; for in almost allother (e~ven in popish) countries all matters testa-

mentary are under 'the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate. And that this

privilege is enjoyed by the clergy in England, not-as a matter of ecclesiastical

right, but by the special favour and indulgence of the municipal law, and as it

should seem by some public act of the great council, is freely acknowledged by

Lindewode, the ablest canonist of the fifteenth century. Testamentary causes,

he observes, belong to the ecclesiastical courts ''rfe consuetuditte Anglice,et super

consensu rcgio et miorum procerum in talibus ab antiquo concesso." (c) The same

was, about a century before, very openly professed in a canon of Archbishop

Stratford, viz.: that the administration of intestates' goods was " ab olim'

granted to the ordinary, "cmsemru -re§w et magnativm regni Anglite.{d) The

fy) Book I, ch. 15. ft) Warbnrt. alliance. 173. (a) nook II, ch. 32.

(l>) Hickes'e Dititr. Epittoliir. p. 8, 88. (c) Provincial. 1. 3, t. 18, fol. 178. (e

(A) Ibid. 1. S, t. 88,/W. S68.

(6) Jurisdiction in matrimonial and divorce r;m-rs is now transferred to the divorce court,

created by statute 20 and 21 Tic. c. 85, and made perpetual by subsequent statutes. The judge

of probate, lord chancellor and judges of the superior common law courts compose this court,

bnt the judge of probate is the judge ordinary, and may sit alone. In addition to its juris-

diction to declare marriages null and to divorce parties, this court also has cognizance of actions

for criminal conversation, which are not now allowed to be brought in the common law courts.

It has jurisdiction, also, of cases in which a declaration of legitimacy is sought. In divorce cases

it may give alimony, and 'make order concerning the care and custody of children. Issues of

fact may be ordered to be tried by jury in this court, or sent to a court of common law for trial.

An appeal lies from the judge ordinary to the full court, and from the full coart, on decrees for

nullity of marriaeo or divorce, to the house of lords.

(7) This jurisdiction, considerably enlarged, is now vested in the court of probate. See statutes

20 and 21 Vic. c. 77, and 21 and 22 Vic. cc. 56 and 95. See note to page 67, ante.
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constitutions of Cardinal Othobon also testify, that this provision " olim a prce-

latis cum approbations regis et baronum dicitur emanasse." (e) And Arch-

bishop Parker, (/) in Queen Elizabeth's time, affirms in express words, that

originally in matters testamentary, " non ullam habebant episcopi authoritatem,

prcBter earn quam a rege acceptam referebant. Jus testamenta probandi non

F*96l *habebant •' administrationis potestatem cuique delegare non poterant."

*• -" At what period of time the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of testaments and

intestacies began in England, is not ascertained by any ancient writer: and

Lindewode (g) very fairly confesses, "cujus regis temportbus hoc ordinatum sit,

non reperio." We find it indeed frequently asserted in our common law books,

that it is but of late years that the church hath had the probate of wills. (A)

But this must only be understood to mean that it hath not always had this pre-

rogative : for certainly it is of very high antiquity. Lindewode, we have seen,

declares that it was "ab antique ;" Stratford, in the reigu of King Edward III,

mentions it as "ab olim ordinatum;" and Cardinal Othobon, in the 52 Hen. Ill,

speaks of it as an ancient tradition. Bracton holds it for clear law in the same

reign of Henry III, that matters testamentary belonged to the spiritual court, (i)

And, yet earlier, the disposition of intestates' goods "per visum ecclesioe" was

one of the articles confirmed to the prelates by King John's magna carta. (j)

Matthew Paris also informs us that King Richard I ordained in Normandy

" quod distributio rerum quo} in testamento relinquuntur autoritate ecclesia

fiet." And even this ordinance, of King Richard, was only an introduction of
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the same law into his ducal dominions, which before prevailed in this kingdom :

for in the reign of his father, Henry II, Glanvil is express, that "si quis aliquid

dixerit contra testamentum, placitum illud in curia christianitatis audiri debet

et terminari." (k) And the Scots book, called reaiam majestatem, agrees verbatim

with Glanvil in this point. (I)

It appears that the foreign clergy were pretty early ambitious of this branch

F*97l °fp°wer> DUt their attempts to assume *it on the continent were effect-

*• J ually curbed by the edict of the Emperor Justin, (/«) which restrained the

insinuation or probate of testaments (as formerly) to the office of the magicter

census; for which the emperor subjoins this reason: "Absurdum et enim clericis

est, immo etiam opprobriosum, si peritos se velint os tenders disceptationum esse

forensium." But afterwards, by the canon law, (n) it was allowed that the

bishop might compel, by ecclesiastical censures, the performance of a bequest to

pious uses. And, therefore, as that was considered as a cause quce secundum

canones et episcopates leges ad regimen animarum pertinuit, it fell within the

jurisdiction of the spiritual courts by the express words of the charter of King

William I, which separated those courts from the temporal. And afterwards,

•when King Henry I, by his coronation-charter, directed that the goods of an

intestate should be divided for the good of his soul, (o) this made all intestacies

immediately spiritual causes, as much as a legacy to pious uses had been before.

This, therefore, we may probably conjecture, was the era referred to by Strat-

ford and Othobon, when the king, by the advice of the prelates, and with the

consent of his barons, invested the church with this privilege. And, accord-

ingly, in King Stephen's charter it is provided that the goods of an intestate

ecclesiastic shall be distributed pro salute animce ejus, ecclesm consilio ; (p) which

latter words are equivalent to per visum ecclesi(s,m the great charter of King

John, before mentioned. And the Danes and Swedes (wlho received the rudi-

ments of Christianity and ecclesiastical discipline from England about the

beginning of the twelfth century), have thence also adopted the spiritual cogni-

zance of intestacies, testaments, and legacies, (q)

(e) Cap. 23. (f) Sec 9 Itcp. 38. fg) Fol. 28.1.

(h) Flu. Abr. tit. testament, pi. 4. 2 Roll. Abr. 217. fl Rep. 37. Vanph. 207.

(ij I. 5, de exceptionOnu, c. 10. (j) Cap. 27, edit. Oxon. (k) I. 7, c, 38. (I) I. 2, c. 88.

(m) Cod. 1, 3, 41. (n) Decretal. », 20, 17. Gill). Rep. 204, 205.

(o) Si quis baronum sett hominum meorum—pecvniam swim non dedfrit vet dare digpomerit, uxor gua rirt

liberi, "in parentet et kgitimi hominet eju», earn pro anima cjus dvridant, sicut ei» melias rirumjlient.

(Text. Koffent. c. 84, p. 61.)

(p) Lord LyUlet. Hen. II, vol, I, 538. Hearno ad CM. A'cuftr. 711. (yj Stlcruhook, ilejureStieon. I. 3, e. 8.
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This jurisdiction, we have seen, is principally exercised with us in the con-

sistory courts of every diocesan *bishop, and in the prerogative court of r*oo-i

the metropolitan, originally; and in the arches court and court of dele- "- J

gates, by way of appeal. It is divisible into three branches; the probate of wills,

the granting of administrations, and the suing for legacies. The two former of

which, when no opposition is made, are granted merely ex officio et dibito

justitice, and are then the object of what is called the voluntary, and not

Ihe contentious jurisdiction. But when a caveat is entered against proving the

will or granting administration, and a suit thereupon follows to determine either

the validity of the testament, or who hath a right to administer; this claim and

obstruction by the adverse party are an injury to the party entitled, and as such

are remedied by the sentence of the spiritual court, either by establishing the

will or granting the administration. Subtraction, the withholding or detaining

of legacies, is also still more apparently injurious, by depriving the legatees of

that right with which the laws of the land and the will of the deceased have in-

vested them; and, therefore, as a consequential part of testamentary jurisdiction,

the spiritual court administers redress herein, by compelling the executor to pay

them. But in this last case the courts of equity exercise a concurrent jurisdic-

tion with the ecclesiastical courts, as incident to some other species of relief

prayed by the complainant; as to compel the executor to account for the

testator's -effects, or assent to the legacy, or the like. For, as it is beneath the

dignity of the king's courts to be merely ancillary to other inferior jurisdictions,
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the cause, when once brought there, receives there also its full determination.

These are the principal injuries for which the party grieved either must, or

may, seek his remedy in the spiritual courts. But before I entirely dismiss this

head, it may not be improper to add a short word concerning the method of

proceeding in these tribunals, with regard to the redress of injuries.

It must (in the first place) be acknowledged, to the honour of the spiritual

courts, that though they continue to this *day to decide many questions r*qn-i

which are properly of temporal cognizance, yet justice is in general so ably *• •*

and impartially administered in those tribunals (especially of the superior kind),

and the boundaries of their power are now so well known and established, that

no material inconvenience at present arises from this jurisdiction still continuing

in the ancient channel. And should an alteration be attempted, great con-

fusion would probably arise, in overturning long-established forms, and new-

modelling a course of proceedings that has now prevailed for seven centuries.

The establishment of the civil law process in all the ecclesiastical courts was

indeed a masterpiece of papal discernment, as it made a coalition impracticable

between them and the national tribunals, without manifest inconvenience and

hazard. And this consideration had undoubtedly its weight in causing this

measure to be adopted, though many other causes concurred. The time when

the pandects of Justinian were discovered afresh, and rescued from the dust of

antiquity, the eagerness with which they were studied by the popish ecclesiastics,

and the consequent dissensions between the clergy and the laity of England,

have formerly (r) been spoken to at large. I shall only now remark npon those

collections, that their being written in the Latin tongue, and referring so much

to the will of the prince and his delegated officers of justice, sufficiently recom-

mended them to the court of Rome, exclusive of their intrinsic merit. To keep

the laity in the darkest ignorance, and to monopolize the little science, which

then existed, entirely among the monkish clergy, were deep-rooted principles of

papal policy. And, as the bishops of Rome affected in all points to mimic the

imperial grandeur, as the spiritual prerogatives were moulded on the pattern of

the temporal, so the canon law process was formed on the model of the civil law:

the prelates embracing with the utmost ardor a method of judicial proceedings

which was carried on in a language unknown to the bulk of the people, which ban-

ished the intervention of a jury (that bulwark of *Gothic liberty), and

which placed an arbitrary power of decision in the breast of single man.

(r) Book I, Introd. J 1.
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The proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts are therefore regulated according

to the practice of the civil and canon laws; or rather according to a mixture of

both, corrected and new-modelled by their own particular usages, and the inter-

position of the courts of common law. For, if the proceedings in the spiritual

court be ever so regularly consonant to the rules of the Roman law, j-et

if they be manifestly repugnant to the fundamental maxims of the munici-

pal laws, to which upon principles of sound policy the ecclesiastical process

ought in every state to conform (*) as if they require two witnesses to prove a

fact, where one will suffice at common law); in such cases a prohibition will be

awarded against them, (t) But under these restrictions, their ordinary course

of proceeding is; first by citation, to call the party injuring before them. Then,

by libel, libellus, a little book, or by articles drawn out in a formal allegation,

to. set forth the complainant's ground of complaint. To this succeeds the

defendanfs answer upon oath, when if he denies or extenuates the charge, they

proceed to proofs by witnesses examined, and their depositions taken down in

writing, by an officer of the court. If the defendant has any circumstances to

offer in his defence, he must also propound them in what is called his defensive

allegation, to which he is entitled in his turn to the plaintiff's answer upon

oath, and may from thonce proceed to proofs as well as his antagonist The

canonical doctrine of purgation, whereby the parties were obliged to answer

upon oath to any matter, however criminal, that might be objected against, them

(though long ago overruled in the court of chancery, the genius of the
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English law having broken through the bondage imposed on it by its clerical

chancellors, and asserted the doctrines of judicial as well as civil liberty), contin-

ued to the middle of the last century to be upheld by the spiritual courts; when

the legislature was obliged to interpose, to teach them a lesson of similar mode-

r*1011 ra^on> % *he "statute of 13 Car. II, c. 12, it is enacted, that it shall

I J not be lawful for any bishop or ecclesiastical judge, to tender or adminis-

ter to any person whatsoever, the oath usually called the oath ex officio, or any

other oath whereby he may be compelled to confess, accuse, or purge himself of

any criminal matter or thing, whereby he may be liable to any censure or

punishment. When all the pleadings and proofs are concluded, they are

referred to the consideration, not of a jury, but of a single judge; who takes

information by hearing advocates on both sides, and thereupon forms his inter-

locutory decree or definitive sentence at his own discretion: from which there

generally lies an appeal, in the several stages mentioned in a former chapter; (w)

though if the same be not appealed from in fifteen days, it is final, by the stat-

ute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19.

But the point in which tha.*e jurisdictions are the most defective, is that of

enforcing their sentences wh<fti pronounced; for which they have no other pro-,

cess but that of excommunication; which is described (v) to be twofold; the less,

and the greater excommunication. (8) The less is an ecclesiastical censure, ex-,

eluding the party from the participation of the sacraments: the greater proceeds

farther, and excludes him not only from these, but also from the company of

all Christians. But, if the judge of any spiritual court excommunicates a

man for a cause of which he hath not the legal cognizance, the party may have

(•} War!., alliance, 179. ft) 2 Roll. Abr, 800, 302. (u> Ch«p. 6. (vj Co. Liu. 133.

(8) [The act, 53 Geo. Ill, o. 127, prohibits excommunication, and the writ de excommunicate

eapieudo us a mode of enforcing performance or obedience to ecclesiastical orders and decrees;

and iuatead of the sentence of excommunication in those cases, the court is to pronounce

the defendant contumacious, and the ecclesiastical judge is to scud his xii/itifimi-it in the

prescribed form to the chancery, from which a writ de eontumace capiewlo is to issue in the pre-

scribed form, and which is to have the game force a« the ancient writ. There is a similar net us

to Ireland. 54 Goo. Ill, o. 6U In other easeg, not of disobedience to the orders and decrees of

the court, there may be excommunication, and a writ de excommunicato capiendo as heretofore.

In the proceedings under this statute, it must clearly appear, that the eoolesiantical court had

jurisdiction, and that the form of proceedings has been duly objeired. 5 Bar. and Al. T'J 11

3Dowl. andR. 570.]
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an action against him at common law, and be is also liable to be indicted at the

suit of the ting, (w)

Heavy as the penalty of excommunication is, considered in a serious light,

there are, notwithstanding, many obstinate or profligate men, who would des-

pise the brulum fulmen of mere ecclesiastical censures, especially when pro-

uounced by a petty surrogate in the country, for railing or contumelious words,

for non-payment of fees, or costs, or for other trivial causes. The common

law therefore compassionately steps in to *the aid of the ecclesiastical r*io21

jurisdiction, and kindly lends a supporting hand to an otherwise totter- L •«

ing authority. Imitating herein the policy of our British ancestors, among

whom, according to Caesar, (x) whoever were interdicted by the Druids from

their sacrifices, " in numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur: db Us omnes

decedunt, attitum eorum sermonemque defugiunt. ne quid ex contaffione incom-

modi accipiant: neque iis petenhbus jus redditur, neque honos ullus commu-

nicatur." And so with us oy the common law an excommunicated person is

disabled to do any act that is required to be done by one that is probus et

legalis homo. He cannot serve upon juries, cannot be a witness in any court,

and, which is the worst of all, cannot bring an action, either real or personal,

to recover lands or money due to him. (y) Nor is this the whole: for if, within

forty days after the sentence has been published in the church, the offender does

not submit and abide by the sentence of the spiritual court, the bishop may

certify such contempt to the king in chancery. Upon which there issues out a
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writ to the sheriff of the county, called, from the bishop's certificate, a signi-

ficavit; or from its effects a writ de excommunicate capiendo; and the sheriff

shall thereupon take the offender, and imprison him in the county gaol, till he

is reconciled to the church, and such reconciliation certified by the bishop;

upon which another writ de excommunicato deliberando, issues out of chancery

to deliver and release him. (z) Thisprocess seems founded on the charter of

separation (so often referred to) of William the Conqueror. " Si aliquis per

superbiam elatus adjustitiam episcopalem venire nolnerit, exeommunicBter ; et,

si opus fuerit, ad hoc vindicandum fortitudo et justitia regis sive vicecomitis

adhibeatur." And in case of subtraction of tithes, a more summary and expe-

ditions assistance is given by the statutes of 27 Hen. VIII, c 20, and 32 Hen.

VIII, c. 7, which enact, that upon complaint of any contempt or misbehaviour

to the ecclesiastical judge by the defendant in any suit for tithes, any privy

counsellor, or any *two justices of the peace (or, in case of disobedience ,- „., „„ -.

to a definitive sentence, any two justices of the peace), may commit *• *

the party to prison without bail or mainprize, till he enters into a recognizance

with sufficient sureties to give due obedience to the process and sentence of the

court. These timely aids, which the common and statute laws have lent to the

ecclesiastical jurisdiction, may serve to refute that groundless notion which

some are too apt to entertain, that the courts at Westminster-hall are at open var-

iance with those at doctors' commons. It is true that they are sometimes obliged

to use a parental authority, in correcting the excesses of these inferior courts,

and keeping them within their legal bounds; but, on the other hand, they afford

them a parental assistance in repressing the insolence of con tumaciousdelinquents,

and rescuing their jurisdiction from that contempt, which for want of sufficient

compulsive powers would otherwise be sure to attend it. (9)

IL I am next to consider the injuries cognizable in the court ^military, or

court of chivalry. The jurisdiction of which is declared by statute 18 Ric. II,

(te) a Inst. «S. (jj lie Mlo Kail. I.e. (y} Litt. f««. (x) F. N. B. 63.

(!)) [The jurisdiction of these court* in cases of brawling, except as between persons in holy

orders, h.-i- been taken away by 23 and 24 Vic, e. 38, which has given power to justices of the

peace to fine or imprison persons found guilty of unlawfully interfering with any clergymen in

holy order* during the service, or of making disturbance in churches or chapels, churchyards or

burial grounds. And the jurisdiction to entertain suits for defamation was abolished by 18 and

la Vic. c. 41.]
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c. 2, to be this: "that it hath cognizance of contracts touching deeds of arms

or of war, out of the realm, and also of things which touch war within the

realm, which cannot be determined or discussed by the common law; together

with other usages and customs to the same matters appertaining." So that

wherever the common law can give redress, this court hath no jurisdiction,

which has thrown it entirely out of use as to the matter of contracts, all such

being usually cognizable in the courts of Westminster-hall, if not directly, at

least by fiction of law; as if a contract be made at Gibraltar, the plaintiff may

suppose it made at Northampton; for the locality, or place of making it, is of

uo consequence with regard to the validity of the contract.

The words, " other usages and customs," support the claim of this court,

1. To give relief to such of the nobility and gentry as think themselves aggrieved

in matters of honour; and 2. To keep up the distinction of degrees and

r*1041 "quality- Whence it follows, that the civil jurisdiction of this court of

I- -I chivalry is principally in two points; the redressing injuries of honour,

and correcting encroachments in matters of coat-armour, precedency, and other

distinctions of families.

As a court of honour, it is to give satisfaction to all such as are aggrieved in

that point; a point of a nature so nice and delicate, that its wrongs and injuries

escape the notice of the common law, and yet are fit to be redressed somewhere.

Such, for instance, as calling a man a coward, or giving him the lie; for which,

as they are productive of no immediate damage to his person or property, no
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action will lie in the courts at Westminster: and yet they are such injuries as

will prompt every man of spirit to demand some honourable amends, which by

the ancient law of the land was appointed to be given in the court of chivalry.(rt)

But modern resolutions have determined, that how much soever such a juris-

diction may be expedient, yet no action for words will at present lie therein, (b)

And it hatn always been most clearly holden, (c) that as this court cannot med-

dle with any thing determinable by the common law, it therefore can give no

pecuniary satisfaction or damages, inasmuch as the quantity and determination

thereof is ever of common law cognizance. And, therefore, this court of chiv-

alry can at most only order reparation in point of honour; as, to compel the

defendant mendacium sibi ipsi imponere, or to take the lie that he has given,

upon himself, or to make such other submission as the laws of honour may

require, (d) Neither can this court, as to the point of reparation in honour,

hold plea of any such word or thing, wherein the party is relievable by the courts

of common law. As if a man gives another a blow, or calls him thief or mur-

derer; for in both these cases the common law has pointed out his proper rem-

edy by action.

T*105l *^8 *** *^e °^er P0^ °f ^s civil jurisdiction, the redressing of

1 ' ' encroachments and usurpations in matters of heraldry and coat-armour:

it is the business of this court, according to Sir Matthew Hale, to adjust the

right of armorial ensigns, bearings, crests, supporters, pennons, &c.; and also

rights of place of precedence, where the king's patent or act of parliament (which

cannot be overruled by this court) have not already determined it.

The proceedings in this court are by petition, in a summary way; and the

trial not by a jury of twelve men, but by witnesses, or by combat, (e) But as it

cannot imprison, not being a court of record, and as by the resolutions of the

superior courts it is now confined to so narrow and restrained a jurisdiction, it

has fallen into contempt and disuse. The marshalling of coat-armour, which

was formerly the pride and study of all the best families in the kingdom, is now

greatly disregarded; and has fallen into the hands of certain officers and attend-

ants upon this court, called heralds, who consider it only as a matter of lucre,

and not of justice: whereby such falsity and confusion have crept into their

records, (which ought to be the standing evidence of families, descents, and

coat-armour,) that, though formerly some credit has been paid to their testi-

fa) Year-book. ST Hen. VI, 21. Sclilen of duels, o. 10. Hal. Hint. C. L. S7.

(b) Salk. 633. 7 Mod. 129. 2 Hawk. P. C. o. 4. (oj Hal. IIli. C. L. 37.

(dj 1 Boll. Abr. 128. (e) Co. Utt. 261.
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mony, now even their common seal will not be received as evidence in any court

of justice in the kingdom. (/) But their original visitation books, compiled

•when progresses were solemnly and regularly made into every part of the king-

dom, to inquire into the state of families, and to register such marriages and

descents as were verified to them upon oath, are allowed to be good evidence of

pedigrees, (c/) And it is much to be wished that this practice of visitation at

certain periods wete revived; for the failure of inquisitions post mortem, by the

abolition of military tenures, combined with the negligence of the heralds in

omitting their usual progresses, has rendered the proof of a modern descent

*for the recovery of an estate, or succession to a title of honour, more

difficult than that of an ancient. This will be indeed remedied for the

future, with respect to claims of peerage, by a late standing order (h) of the house

of lords; directing the heralds to take exact accounts, and preserve regular en-

tries of all peers and peeresses of England, and their respective descendants;

and that an exact pedigree of each peer and his family shall, on the day of his

first admission, be delivered into the house by garter, the principal king-at-arms.

But the general inconvenience, affecting more private successions, still continues

without a remedy.

III. Injuries cognizable by the courts maritime, or admiralty courts, are the

next object of our inquiries. These courts have jurisdiction and power to try

and determine all maritime causes; or such injuries, which, though they are in

their nature of common law cognizance, yet being committed on the high seas,
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out of the reach of our ordinary courts of justice, are therefore to be remedied

in a peculiar court of their own. All admiralty causes must be therefore causes

arising wholly upon the sea, and not within the precincts of any county, (i)

For the statute 13 Eic. II, c. 5, directs that the admiral and his deputy shall

not meddle with any thing, but only things done upon the sea; and the statute

15 Ric. II, c. 3, declares that the court of the admiral hath no manner of cogni-

zance of any contract, or of any other thing, done within the body of any county,

either by land or by water; nor of any wreck of the sea: for that must be cast on

land before it becomes a wreck. (;') But it is otherwise of things flotsam, jet-

sam, and ligan ; for over them the admiral hath jurisdiction, as they are in and

upon the sea. (k) If part of any contract, or other cause of action, doth arise

upon the sea, and part upon the land, the common law excludes the admiralty

court from its jurisdiction ; for, part belonging properly to one cognizance and

part to another, the common or general law takes place of the particular. (/)

'Therefore, though pure maritime acquisitions, which are earned and r +^ -,

become due on the high seas, as seamen's wages, are one proper object L " '

of the admiralty jurisdiction, even though the contract for them be made upon

land; (m) yet, in general, if there be a contract made in England, and to be

executed upon the seas, as a charter-party or covenant that a ship shall sail to

Jamaica, or shall be in such a latitude by such a day; or a contract made upon

the sea to be performed in England, as a bond made on shipboard to pay money

in London or the like; these kinds of mixed contracts belong not to the admi-

ralty jurisdiction, but to the courts of common law. (n) And indeed it hath

been farther holden, that the admiralty court cannot hold plea of any contract

under seal, (o) (10)

(f) 2 Boll Abr. 686. 2 Jon. 224. (g) Comb. 83. (k) May. 1767.

ft) Co. Litt. 200. Hob. 7». ()) See book I, ch. 8. ftj 6 Hop. 10S. (1) Co. Litt. 261.

(inj 1 Ventr. 146. (n) Hob. 12. Hal. J1U. C. L. 35. (o) Hob. 212.

(10) [The case cited scarcely warrants the text. For the admiralty has jurisdiction over an

hypothecation-bond, although it was executed on land and under seal. Menetone v. Gibbous,

3~T. R. 267. Cases which are said to have determined the point mentioned in the text occurred

upon seamen's wages; over which the admiralty had undoubted jurisdiction, but in such it was

ruled that the special agreement took it away. See Howe v. Sappier. 4 Burr. 1950, cited

in and in effect overruled by Menetone «. Gibbous. The cases which have been mentioned in

addition to that cited from Hob. 21'i, and Howe v. Napier, are Day ». Searle, 2 Str. 9(58, and

Opy c. Addison, 12 Mod. 38; Salk. 31, S. C. And it JimiM upon "the whole seem that when-
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And also, as the courts of common law have obtained a concurrent jurisdiction

with the court of chivalry with regard to foreign contracts, by supposing them

made in England ; so it is no uncommon thing for a plaintiff to feign that a

contract, really made at sea was made at the royal exchange, or other inland

place, in order to draw the cognizance of the suits from the courts of admiralty

to those of Westminster-hall. j(p) This the civilians exclaim against loudly, as

inequitable and absurd; and Sir Thomas Ridley (q) hath very gravely proved it

to be impossible for the ship in which such cause of action arises to be really at

the royal exchange in Cornhill. But our lawyers justify this fiction, by alleging

(as before) that the locality of such contracts is not at all essential to the merits

of them; and that learned civilian himself seems to have forgotten how much

such fictions are adopted and encouraged in the Roman law; that a son killed

in battle is supposed to live forever for the benefit of his parents; (r) and that

by the fiction of postliminium and the lex CorneJia, captives, when freed from

bondage, were held to have never been prisoners, («) and such as died in captivity

were supposed to have died in their own country. (/)

F *108 1 * Where the admiral's court hath not original jurisdiction of the cause,

"- -" though there should arise in it a question that is proper for the cogni-

zance of that court, yet that doth not alter nor take away the exclusive jurisdic-

tion of the common law. (n) And so vice versa, if it hath jurisdiction of the

original, it hath also jurisdiction of all consequential questions, though properly

determinable at common law. (v) Wherefore, among other reasons, a suit for
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beaconage of a beacon standing on a rock in the sea may be brought in the court

of admiralty, the admiral having an original jurisdiction over beacons, (w) In

case of prizes also in time of war, between our own nation and another, or be-

tween two other nations, (11) which are taken at sea, and brought into our ports,

the courts of admiralty have an nndisturbed and exclusive jurisdiction to deter-

mine the same according to the law of nations, (x) (12)

(p) 4 Inst. 134. (q) View of the civil law, b. 3. p. 1, JS. frjlit*t.l,t;t.sr>.

(t) FT. 49, 15, It, ( 8. (t) jy. 49, 15,18. fu) Comb. 482.

f c; Jj) Kep. S3. S Lev. 25. Hard. 183. (<>•) I Sid. 1W. (x) 2 Show. 232. Comb. 444.

ever the admiralty court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, as in the hypothecation of a

ship, the mere seal upon land will not take it away. And now by statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 655, s.

6, the court may in certain cases adjudicate on claims for services and repairs, although not oa

the high seas; and by 9 and 10 Vic. c. 99, its jurisdiction in matters of wreck and salvage is

regulated.] The admiralty court act, of 1861, now regulates the procedure and practice ui the

court.

In the United States the admiralty and prize jurisdiction is in the district courts of the United

States, and is very full and complete in civil cases. See 1 Kent, 353, et seq.; Conklin's Treatise,

part 3 ; Parsons on Maritime Law Late decisions of the supreme court of the United States

seem to give these courts substantially the some jurisdiction in respect to the great interior lakes

which they possess in respect to the ocean.

The criminal jurisdiction of these courts is only such as by acts of congress is conferred upon

them; U. S. f. McGill, 4 Ball. 426; U. S. n. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; U. S. r. Wiltbergcr, 5 id.

76; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320. These acts, however, are designed to confer jurisdiction of

all cases properly cognizable in admiralty.

(11) This remark is not accurate. The validity of maritime captures must be determined in a

court of the captor's government, sitting either iu his own countrv or in that of its ally. "Wheat.

Int. Law, part 4, c. 2, $$ 13-16 ; Hnllcck Int. Law, 749, and authorities cited ; 1 Kent, 103.

(12) Mr. Justice Coleridge calls attention to the fact that the author takes no notice of what

is very material, that there"are, in fact, two courts: the admiralty court, or, more properly, the

instance court, of which he has hitherto been speaking, and the prize court. Both these courts

have, indeed, the same judge, but ill the former he sits bv virtue of a commission under the great

scul, which enumerates the objects of his jurisdiction, but specifies nothing relative to prize;

while in the latter ho sits by virtue of a commission which issues in every war, under the great

seal of the lord high admiral, requiring the court of admiralty, and the lieutenant and judge of

the same court, " to proceed upon all aud all manner of captures, seizures, prizes and reprisals of

all ships and goods that are or shall be taken," »Vr.

Now by statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 65, the court of admiralty has jurisdiction of questions of boot;

at war, and by statute 13 and 14 Vic. cc. 26 and 27, jurisdiction of questions relating to tho

attack and capture of pirates. And by statute 7 and 8 Vic. e. 2, and 12 and 13 Vic. c. 96, offences

committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty may be tried in the ordinary criminal

courts.
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The proceedings of the courts of admiralty bear much resemblance to those of

the civil law, but are not entirely founded thereon: and they likewise adopt and

make use of other laws, as occasion requires ; such as the Ehodian laws and the

laws of Oleron. (y) For the law of England, as has frequently been observed,

doth not acknowledge or pay any deference to the civil law considered as such;

but merely permits its use in such cases where it judged its determinations

equitable, and therefore blends it, in the present instance, with other marine

laws: the whole being corrected, altered and amended by acts of parliament and

common usage; so that out of this composition a body of jurisprudence is ex-

tracted.- which owes its authority only to its reception here by consent of the

crown and people. The first process in these courts is frequently by arrest of

the defendant's person: (z) and they also take recognizance or stipulations of

certain fidejussors in the nature of bail, (a) and in case of default may *im- r *i QQI

prison both them and their principal, (b) They may also fine and im- L J

prison for a contempt in the face of the court (e) And all this is supported by

immemorial usage, grounded on the necessity of supporting a jurisdiction so

extensive; (d) though opposite to the usual doctrines of the common law; these

being no courts of record, because in general their process is much conformed

to that of the civil law. (e)

IV. I am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of the

common law. And herein I shall for the present only remark, that all possible

injuries whatsoever, that do not fall within the exclusive cognizance of either
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the ecclesiastical, military, or maritime tribunals, are for that very reason within

the cognizance of the common law courts of justice. For it is a settled and

invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when withheld

must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress. The definition and

explication of these numerous injuries, and their respective legal remedies, will

employ our attention for many subsequent chapters. But before we conclude

the present, I shall just mention two species of injuries, which will properly fall

now within our immediate consideration: and which are, either when justice is

delayed by an inferior court that has proper cognizance of the cause; or, when

such inferior court takes upon itself to examine a cause and decide the merits

without a legal authority.

1. The first of these injuries, refusal or neglect of justice, is remedied either

by writ of procedendo, or of mandamus. A. writ of procedendo ad judicium

issues out of the court of chancery, where judges of any subordinate court do

delay the parties; for that they will not give judgment, either on the one side or

on the other, when they ought so to do. In this case a writ of procedendo shall be

awarded, commanding them in the king's name to proceed to judgment; but

without specifying any particular judgment, for- that (if errroneous) may

*be set aside in the course of appeal, or by writ of error or false judg- r *i i Q i

ment: and upon farther neglect or refusal, the judges of the inferior >• •"

court may be punished for their contempt, by writ of attachment, returnable in

the king^s bench or common pleas. ( f)

A writ of mandamus is, in general, a command issuing in the king's name

from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or

inferior court of judicature within the king's dominions, requiring them to do

some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and

duty, and which the court of king's bench has previously determined, or at least

supposes, to be consonant to right and justice. It is a high prerogative writ, of

a most extensively remedial nature; and may be issued in some cases where the

injured party has also another more tedious method of redress, as in the case of

admission or restitution to an office; (13) but it issues in all cases where the

It) Hale, Hit*. C. L. Sfl. Co. Lltt. 11. (z) Clerke jjrnz cur. aim. I 13.

(a) IMd. f 11. 1 Boll. Abr. Ml. Rayro. 78. Lord Kaym. 1238. (b) 1 Roll. Abr. 531. Godb. 193. <XO.

:e) 1 Ventr. 1. (d) 1 Keb. 552. (e) Bro. Abr. t. error, 177. (f) F. N. B. 153, 154, 210.

(13) The writ of mandamus is only issued where there is a clear legal right, and the party has

BO other adequate remedy. Shipley v. Book, 10 Johns. 484; People v. Stevens, 5 Hill, 616;
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party hath a right to have any thing done, and hath no other specific means of

compelling its performance. A mandamus therefore lies to compel the admis-

sion or restoration of the party applying to any office or franchise of a public

nature, whether spiritual or temporal; to academical degrees; to the use of a

meeting-house, &c.: it lies for the production, inspection, or delivery of public

books and papers ; for the surrender of the regalia of a corporation ; to oblige

bodies corporate to affix their common seal; to compel the holding of a court;

and for an infinite number of other purposes, which it is impossible to recite

minutely. But at present we are more particularly to remark, that it issues to

the judges of any inferior court, commanding them to do justice according to

the powers of their office, whenever the same is delayed. For it is the peculiar

business of the court of king's bench to superintend all inferior tribunals, and

therein to enforce the due exercise of those judicial or ministerial powers, with

which the crown or legislature have invested them: and this not only by

r*lll 1 res';ra'n'ni) their excesses, but also by quickening *their negligence, and

L -I obviating their denial of justice. A mandamus may therefore be had to

the courts of the city of London, to enter up judgment; (g) to the spiritual

courts to grant an administration, to swear a church-warden, and the like. This

writ is grounded on a suggestion, by the oath of the party injured, of his own

right, and the denial of justice below; whereupon, in order more fully to satisfy

the court that there is a probable ground for such interposition, a rule is made

(except in some general cases, where the probable ground is manifest) directing
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the party complained of to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not

issue: and, if he shows no sufficient cause, the writ itself is issued, at first in

the alternative, either to do thus, or signify some reason to the contrary; to

which a return, or answer, must be made at a certain day. And, if the

inferior judge, or other person to whom the writ is directed, returns or signifies

an insufficient reason, then there issues in the second place & peremptory manda-

mus, to do the thing absolutely; to which no other return will be admitted, but

a certificate of perfect obedience and due execution of the writ. If the inferior

judge or other person makes no return, or fails in his respect or obedience, he

is punishable for his contempt by attachment. But, if he, at the first, returns

a sufficient cause, although it should be false in fact, the court of king's bench

will not try the truth of the fact upon affidavits ; but will for the present believe

him, and proceed no farther on the mandamus. But then the party injured

(g) Raym. 2M.

People v. Judges of Oneida C. P., 21 "Wend. 20; People v. Supervisors, 11 N. T. 563; People v.

Judges of Branch C. C., 1 Doug. Mich. 319 ; St. Luke's Church v. Slack, 7 Gush. 226; James v.

Commissioners, 13 Peun. St. 72. The court will exercise a discretion in awarding or refusing it.

"Weber v. Zimmerman, 23 Md. 45 ; Ex parte Stickney, 40 Ala. 1(50.

Its office is to compel the performance of a ministerial act, but not to control the exercise of

judicial discretion. Ferris r. Munu, 2 J>*. J. 161; Lamar v. Marshall, 21 Ala. 772; People r. Au-

ditor General, 3 Mich. 427; Ex parte Davenport. 6 Pet. 661.

It cannot command an act to be done which, without the writ, the officer or court would have

no power to perform. Johnson r. Lucas, 11 Humph. 306; State v. Judge, <te., 15 Ala.740; State

v. Beloit, 21 Wis. 250.

It may compel an inferior court to take action, but cannot require it to come to any particular

conclusion. Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 Pick. 242 ; People v. Inspectors, do., 4 Mich. 187;

TJ. S. «. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42; Hoyt, ex parte, 13 Pet. 290; Elkins v. Athern, 2 Denio, 191;

State v. La Fayetto County Court, 41 Mo. 222. But where on inferior court takes unauthorized

action it may be compelled by this writ to vac-ate it if the party has no other remedy. Ex parte

Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 647; People r. Judges, Ac., 1 Cow. 576; Ten Eyck ». Farlee, 1 Harr. 269;

People v. Judges, <tc., 1 Doug. Mich. 434.

Though generally used to enforce the performance of public duties, it may also be resorted to

for the enforcement of private rights when withheld by public or corporate officers. People v.

"Walker, 9 Mich. 328; Case ?:. Wresler, 4 Ohio, N. S. 561; Nourse v. Merriam, 8 Cash. 11; Helm

r. Swiggett, 12 Ind. 194. But in the case of neglected public duties, a private citixcu will not

generally be permitted to move for this writ; the attorney general is the proper relator. Sanger

v. County Cm'rs, 25 Me. 291; Heffuorp. Commonwealth, 28 Penn. St. 108; Hamilton v. State, 3

Ind. 458 ; People ». Regents of University, 4 Mich. 98.

The supremo court ot the United States issues this writ in cases falling within the federal juris-

diction, and the supreme court of each state also issues it in proper coses. And in somo oi ilia
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may have an action against him for his false return,, and (if found to be false by

the jury) shall recover damages equivalent to the injuries sustained; together

with A peremptory mandamus to the defendant to do his duty. (14) Thus much

for the injury of neglect or refusal of justice,

2. The other injury, which is that of encroachment of jurisdiction, or calling

one coram non judice, to answer in a court that has no legal cognizance of the

cause, is also a grievance, for which the common law has provided a remedy by

the writ ot prohibition,

*A prohibition is a writ issuing properly only out of the court of king's .-„* -, Oi

bench, being the king's prerogative writ; but, for the furtherance of justice, >- -"

it may now also be had in some cases out of the court of chancery, (h) common

pleas,(t)or exchequer, (&)(15) directed to the judge and parties of a suit in any infe-

rior court, commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon sugges-

tion, that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does

not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognizance of some other court. This

writ may issue either to inferior courts of common law; as, to the courts of the

counties palatine or principality of Wales, if they hold plea of land or other

matters not lying within their respective franchises; (I) to the county-courts

or courts-baron, where they attempt to hold plea of any matter of the value of-

forty shillings: (m) or it may be directed to the courts Christian, the university

courts, the court of chivalry, or the court of admiralty, where they concern

themselves with any matter not within their jurisdiction; as if the first should
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attempt to try the validity of a custom pleaded, or the latter a contract made or

to be executed within tnis kingdom. Or, if, in handling of matters clearly

within their cognizance, they transgress the bounds prescribed to them by the

laws of England; as where they require two witnesses to prove the payment of

a legacy, a release of tithes, (n) or the like; in such cases also a prohibition will

be awarded. For, as the fact of signing a release, or of actual payment, is not

properly a spiritual question, but only allowed to be decided m those courts,

because incident or accessory to some original question clearly within their

jurisdiction; it ought therefore, where the two laws differ, to be decided not

according to the spiritual, but the temporal law; else the same question might

be determined different ways, according to the court in which the suit is depend

ing : an impropriety, which no wise government can or ought to endure,

*and which is therefore a ground of prohibition. (16) And if either the r*i i o-i

judge or the party shall proceed after such prohibition, an attachment'- -"

may be had against them, to punish them for the contempt, at the discretion of

(ft) 1 P. Wms. 476. «) Hob. 15. (t) Palmer, 523. (J) Lord Eaym. 1108.

(m) Fiuch, L. 451. (n) Cro. Elk. «6«. Hob. 188.

states inferior courts are allowed to issue the writ. A peremptory mandamus is not often issued

in the first instance, but the case is heard on an alternative writ, or on an order to show cause,

and the peremptory writ is awarded, if at all, as the final result.

(14) [However by statute 1 "Win. IV, o. 21 g. 3, the prosecutor may now in all cases of man-

damus (as he could by statute 9 Anne, c. 20, in certain special cases) plead to or traverse the

matters in any return, and proceed and obtain damages as in an action for a false return, with-

out the necessity of bringing such action as heretofore ; and by section 6 the costs on all appli-

cations for mandamus are to be in the discretion of the court. And now by statute 6 and 7

Vic. c. 67, on such return being made, the person prosecuting the writ may object to the validity

of such return by way of demurrer.!

(15) In the United States it may be issued by the supreme court to the United States dis-

trict courts when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. And hi the

jeveral states, the supreme court of the state may issue the writ in proper cases. See Appo t>.

People, 20 N. Y. 531; People v. "Wayne Circuit Court, 11 Mich. 393; State v. Nathan, 4 liich.

513; Mayo e. James, 12 Grat. 17. State ». Clark County Court, 41. Mo. 44.

(16) [The temporal courts cannot take notice of the practice of ecclesiastical conrts, or enter-

tain a question whether, in any particular cause admitted to bo of ecclesiastical cognizance,

the practice has been regular. The only instances in which the temporal courts can interfere by

way of prohibiting any particular proceeding in an ecclesiastical suit, are those in which

something is done contrary to the general law of the land, or manifestly out of the jurisdiction

of the court. Ex parte Smith, 3 A. and E. 724.]
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the court that awarded it; (o) and an action will lie against them, to repair

the party injured in damages.

So long as the idea continued among the clergy, that the ecclesiastical state

was wholly independent of the civil, great struggles were constantly maintained

between the temporal courts and the spiritual, concerning the wnt of prohibi-

tion and the proper object of it; even from the time of the constitutions of

Clarendon, made in oppositon to the claims of Archbishop Becket, in 10 Hen. II,

to the exhibition of certain articles of complaint to the king by Archbishop

Bancroft, in 3 Jac. I, on behalf of the ecclesiastical courts: from which, and

from the answers to them signed by all the judges of Westminster-hall, (p)

much may be collected concerning the reasons of granting and methods of pro-

ceeding upon prohibitions. A short summary of the latter is as follows: The

party aggrieved in the court below applies to the superior court, setting forth in

a suggestion upon record the nature and cause of his complaint, in being drawn

ad aliud^ examen, by a jurisdiction or manner of process disallowed by the laws

of the kingdom: upon which, if the matter alleged appears to the court to be

sufficient, the writ of prohibition immediately issues; commanding the jndge

not to hold, and the party not to prosecute the plea. (17) But sometimes the

point may be too nice and doubtful to be decided merely upon a motion: and

then for the more solemn determination of the question, the party applying

for the prohibition is directed by the court to declare in prohibition ; that is, to

prosecute an action, by filing a declaration against the other, upon a supposi-
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tion or fiction (which is not traversable) (a) that he has proceeded in the suit

below, notwithstanding the writ of prohibition. And if, upon demurrer and

argument, the court shall finally be of the opinion, that the matter suggested is

T *1141 £oo<^ an(l sufficient ground of *prohibition in point of law, then pudg-

' -I ment with nominal damages shall be given for the party complaining,

and the defendant, and also the inferior court, shall be prohibited from proceed-

ing any farther. On the other hand, if the superior court shall think it no com-

petent ground for restraining the inferior jurisdiction, then judgment shall bo

given against him who applied for the prohibition in the court above, and a

writ of consultation shall be awarded; so called, because, upon deliberation and

consultation had, the judges find the prohibition to be ill-founded, and therefore

by this writ they return the cause to its original jurisdiction, to be there deter-

mined, in the inferior court. And, even in ordinary cases, the writ of prohi-

bition is not absolutely final and conclusive. For though the ground be a

proper one in point of law, for granting the prohibition, yet if the fact that

gave rise to it be afterwards falsified, the cause shall be remanded to the prior

jurisdiction. If, for instance, a custom be pleaded in the spiritual court; a pro-

hibition ought to go, because that court has no authority to try it: but if the

fact of such a custom be brought to a competent trial, and be there found false,

a writ of consultation will be granted. For this purpose the party prohibited

may appear to the prohibition, and take a declaration, (which must always pur-

sue the suggestion), and so plead to issue upon it; denying the contempt and

traversing the custom upon which the prohibition was grounded ; and if that

issue be found for the defendant, he shall then have a writ of consultation. The

(a) F. X. B. 40. (}>) 3 InsL 601413. (q) Barn. Not. 4tn, 148.

(17) [The general grounds for a prohibition to the ecclesiastical courts are either a defect of

jurisdiction or a defect in the mode of trial. If any fact be pleaded in the court below, and

the parties are at issue, the court has no jurisdiction to try it, because it cannot proceed accord-

ing to the rules of the common Jaw ; and in such case a prohibition lies. Or where the spir-

itual court has no original jurisdiction, a prohibition may be granted even after sentence.

But where it has jurisdiction and gives a wrong judgment, it is the subject-matter of appeal,

and not of prohibition. Lord Keuyon, 3 T. R. 4. But when a prohibition is granted after

sentence, the want of jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the proceedings of the spirit-

ual court. Id. Cowp. 422. See also 4 T. R. 382. Sec also 2 H. Bl. 69, 100; 3 East, 47-J. The

ancient practice as to the writ of prohibition has been much simplified and improved by statute 1

Vm. IV, c. 21.]
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writ of consultation may also be, and is frequently, granted by the court with-

out any action brought; when, after a prohibition issued, upon more mature

consideration the court are of opinion that the matter suggested is not a good

and sufficient ground to stop the proceedings below. Thus careful has the law

been, in compelling the inferior courts to do ample and speedy justice; in pre-

venting them from transgressing their due bounds; and in allowing them the

undisturbed cognizance of such causes as by right, founded on the usage of the

kingdom or act of parliament, do properly belong to their jurisdiction.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS OF PERSONS.

THE former chapters of this part of our Commentaries having been employed

in describing the several methods of redressing private wrongs, either by the

mere act of the parties, or the mere operation of law; and in treating of the

nature and several species of courts; together with the cognizance of wrongs

or injuries by private or special tribunals, and the public ecclesiastical, military,

and maritime jurisdictions of this kingdom ; I come now to consider at large,

and in a more particular manner, the respective remedies in the public and

general courts of common law, for injuries or private wrongs of any denomina-

tion whatsoever, not exclusively appropriated to any of the former tribunals.

And herein I shall, first, define the several injuries cognizable by the courts of

common law, with the respective remedies applicable to each particular injury:
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and shall, secondly, describe the method of pursuing and obtaining these reme-

dies in the several courts.

First, then, as to the several injuries cognizable by the courts of common

law, with the respective remedies applicable to each particular injury. And, in

treating of these, I shall at present confine myself to such wrongs as may be

committed in the mutual intercourse between subject and subject; which the

king, as the fountain of justice, is officially bound to redress in the ordinary

forms of law: reserving such 'injuries or encroachments as may occur r*iigi

between the crown and the subject, to be distinctly considered here- L -I

after, as the remedy in such cases is generally of a peculiar and eccentrical

nature.

Now, since all wrong may be considered as merely a privation of right, the

plain, natural remedy for every species of wrong is the being put in possession

of that right, whereo'f the party injured is deprived. This may either be effected

by a specific delivery or restoration of the subject-matter in dispute to the legal

owner; as when lands or personal chattels are unjustly withheld or invaded:

or, where that is not a possible, or at least not an adequate remedy, by making

the sufferer a pecuniary satisfaction in damages; as in case of assault, breach

of contract, &c.: to which damages the party injured has acquired an incom-

plete or inchoate right, the instant he receives"the injurj-; (a) though such right

be not fully ascertained till they are assessed by the intervention of the law.

The instruments whereby this remedy is obtained (which are sometimes con-

sidered in the light of the remedy itself) are a diversity of suits and actions,

which are defined by the Mirror (b) to be " the lawful demand of one's right:

or, as Braeton and Fleta expresses it, in the words of Justinian, (c) jus prose-

quendi in judicio quod alicui debetur.

The Romans introduced, pretty early, set forms for actions and suits in their

law, after the example of the Greeks; and made it a rule that each injury

(a) See book II, ch. 29. (&) C. 2, i 1. (c) lust. 4, 6, pr.
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should be redressed by its proper remedy only. " Actiones," say the pandects,

" composite sunt, quibus inter se homines disceptarcnt: guns actiones ne popii-

lus prout vellet institueret, cerfas soleniiesque esxe valuerunt." (d) The forms

of these actions were originally preserved in the books of the pontifical col-

lege, as choice and inestimable secrets ; till one Cneins Flavins, the secretary of

Appius Claudius, stole a copy and published them to the people, (e) The

r*117l """concealment was ridiculous: but the establishment of some standard

*• J was undoubtedly necessary to fix the true state of a Cjuestion of right;

lest in a long and arbitrary process it might be shifted contmually, and be at,

length no longer discernible. Or, as Cicero expresses it, (/) " sunt jura, sunt

formula, de omnibus rebus constitute, ne quis aut in yenere injurits, aut

ratione actionis, errare possit. Expresses enim sunt ex uniuscuj usque darnno,

dolore, incommode, calamitate, injurin, publics a prastore formula, ad quas

privata Us accommodatur. And in the same manner our Bracton, speaking

of the original writs upon which all our actions are founded, declares them

to be fixed and immutable, unless by authority of parliament, (g) And all the,

modern legislatures of Europe have found it expedient, from the same reasons,

to fall into the same or a similar method. With us in England the several suite,

or remedial instruments of justice, are from the subject of them distinguished

into three kinds; actions personal, real and mixed. (1)

Personal actions are such whereby a man claims a debt or personal duty,

or damages in lieu thereof: and likewise, whereby a man claims a satisfaction
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in damages for some injury done to his person or property. The former are

said to be founded on contracts, the latter upon forts or wrongs: and they ar&

the same which the civil law calls " act'tones in personam, qua adversus eum

intenduntur, qui ex confractu vel delicfo obliyatus est aliquid dare vel con-

cedcre." (h) Of the former nature are all actions upon debtor promises; of

the latter all actions for trespasses, nuisances, assaults, defamatory words, and

the like.

Real actions (or, as they are called in the Mirror, (j) feudal actions), which

concern real property only, are such whereby the plaintiff, here called the

demandant, claims title to have any lands or tenements, rents, commons, or

F *1181 °ther hereditaments, in fee-simple, fee-tail, or for term of life. By these

L ' actions formerly all disputes concerning real estates were decided: but

they are now pretty generally laid aside in practice, upon account of the great

nicety required in their management; and the inconvenient length of their pro-

cess : a much more expeditious method of trying titles being since introduced

by other actions personal and mixed.

Mixed actions are suits partaking of the nature of the other two, wherein

some real property is demanded, and also personal damages for a wrong sus-

tained. As, for instance, an action of waste, which is brought by him who hath

the inheritance, in remainder or reversion, against the tenant for life, who hath

committed waste therein, to recover not only the land wasted, which would make

it merely a real action ; but also treble damages, in pursuance of the statute of

Gloucester, (k) which is & personal recompense; and so both being joined

together, denominate it a mixed action.

Under these three heads may every species of remedy by suit or action in the

courts of common law be comprised. But in order effectually to apply the

remedy, it is first necessary to ascertain the complaint. I proceed, therefore,

now to enumerate the several kinds and to inquire into the respective natures

(d) Ff. 1. 2. 2, $ 9. (e) Cic. pro Murnna. f 11, tie oral. 1.1, c. 41. (f) Pro Qu. llofcio. J 8.

(g) Sunt qucedam breviti formata sitper certia coxibtts de curnt, et de communi consilw totius regtii appro-

Ixita et conctssa. qua quidem nuUatenut mutari poterint abique coiueiau et voluntate eorttm. L. 5, </« extep-

tionitMs, c. 17. f -I.

(h) lust. 4, 6, 15. (ij C. 2, } 6. (1) 8 Edw. I, c. 15.

(1) All real and mixed actions are now abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, cc. 27, 36,

except actions for dower, qnare impcdit and ejectment, and a new proceeding in ejectment was

substituted for that form of notion by the common law procedure act of 1852.

TZ

Ghap. 8.] INJURIES AFFECTING PERSONAL SECURITY. 118

of all private wrongs, or civil injuries which may be offered to the rights of

either a man's person or his property; recounting at the same time the respect-

ive remedies which are furnished by the law for every infraction of right. But

I must first beg leave to premise, that all civil injuries are of two kinds, the one

without force or violence, as slander or breach of contract; the other, coupled

with force and violence, as batteries or false imprisonment. (I) Which latter

species savour something of the criminal kind, being always attended with some

violation of the peace; for which, in strictness of law, a fine ought to be paid

to the king, as *well as a private satisfaction to the party injured, (m)

And this distinction of private wrongs, into injuries ivifh and without

force, we shall find to run through all the variety of which we are now to treat.

In considering of which, I shall follow the same method that was pursued with

regard to the distribution of rights: for as these are nothing else but an in-

fringement or breach of those rights, which we have before laid down and

explained, it will follow that this negative system of wrongs must correspond

and tally with the former positive system of rights. As, therefore, we divide (ri)

all rights into those of persons and those of tilings, so we must make the same

general distribution of injuries into such as affect the rights of persons, and

Biich as affect the rights of property.

The rights of persons, we may remember, were distributed into absolute and

relative: absolute, which were such as appertained and belonged to private men,

considered merely as individuals, or single persons; and relative, which were
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incident to them as members of society, and connected to each other by various

ties and relations. And the absolute rights of each individual were defined to

be the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of

private property, so that the wrongs or injuries affecting them must consequently

be of a corresponding nature.

I. As to injuries which affect the personal security of individuals, they are

either injuries against their lives, their limbs, their bodies, their health, or their

reputations.

1. With regard to the first subdivision, or injuries affecting the life of man,

they do not fall under our present contemplation; being one of the most atro-

cious species of crimes, the subject of the next book of our Commentaries. (2)

(I) Finch, L. 184. (m) Finch. L. 198. Jenk. Cent. 185. fnj See book I, ch. 1.

(2) [For injury to life, in general, cannot be the subject of a civil action; the civil remedy

being merged in the offence to the public. Therefore an action will not lie for batterv of witc

or sen-ant, whereby death ensued. Styles, 347; 1 Lev. 247; Yelv. 89, 90; 1 Ld. Raym. 339.

The remedy is by indictment for murder, or, formerly, by appeal, which the wife might have

for killing her husband, provided she married not a^ain before or pending her appeal; or the

heir male for the death of his ancestor, and which differed principally from an indictment in

respect of its not being in the power of the king to pardon the offender without the appeUor's

consent. See post, book 4, 312 ; 5 Burr. 2(543. But appeals of murder, treason, felony, and

other offences, were abolished by 59 Geo. Ill, c. 46, 8. 1. In general, all felonies suspend the

civil remedies: Styles. 346, 347; and before conviction of the offender there is no remedy

against him at law or in equity: id; 17 Ves. 331; but after conviction and punishment on an

indictment of the partv for stealing, the party robbed may support trespass or trover against

the offender. Styles, 347; Latch. 144; Sir Win. Jones, 147; 1 Lev. 247; Bro. Ab. tit. Tres-

pass. And after an acquittal of the defendant, upon an indictment for a felonious assault

upon a party by stabbing, him, the latter may maintain trespass to recover damages for the

civil injury, if it be not shown that he colluded in procuring such acquittal. 12 East, 409. In

some cases, by express enactment, the civil remedy is not affected by the criminality of the

offender.]

That no civil action will lie at the common law for causing the death of a human being,

see Whitford v. Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465 ; Carey v. Berkshire R. R. Co., 1 dish. 475; Ohio

and M. R. R. Co. ». Tiudall, 13 Ind. 366; Eden v. L. and F. R. R. Co., 14 B. Monr. 204. But

where death does not at once ensue, a person entitled to the services of the person injured may

recover for the loss accruing between the injury and the death, and this recovery will not

be barred by the death. Long ». Morrison, 14 Ind. 595 ; Hyatt r. Adams, 16 Mich. 180.

And now, bv statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 93, whenever the death of a person shall be caused by

such wrongful act, neglect or default, as would, if death had not ensned, have entitled the

party injured to maintain an action for damages, the person who would have beeu liable to
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f *1201 *^' *!' .^ne *wo next 8Pec'es °f injuries, affecting the limbs or bodies

J of individuals, I shall consider in one and the same view. And these

may be committed, 1. By threats and menaces of bodily hurt, through fear of

which a man's business is interrupted. A menace alone, without a consequent

inconvenience, makes not the injury: but to complete the wrong, there must be

both of them together, (o) The remedy for this is in pecuniary damages to be

recovered by action of trespass vi et armis ; (p) this being an inchoate, though

not an absolute violence. 2. By assault; which is an attempt or offer to beat

another, without touching him: as if one lifts up his cane, or hia fist in a

threatening manner at another; or strikes at him, but misses him; this is an

assault, insultus, which Finch (q) describes to be "an unlawful setting upon one's

person." This also is an inchoate violence, amountingconsiderablyliigher than

pare threats; and, therefore, though no actual suffering is proved, yet the party

injured may have redress by action of trespass vi et armis • wherein he shall

recover damages as a compensation for the injury. (3) 3. By lattery ; which is

the unlawful oeating of another. The least touching of another's person wil-

fully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw the line between differ-

ent degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage

of it; every man's person being sacred, and no other having a right to meddle

with it, in any the slightest manner. (4) And, therefore, upon a similar prin-

ciple the Cornelian law de injur Us prohibited pulsation as well as verberation;

distinguishing verberation, which was accompanied with pain, from pulsation,
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which was attended with none, (r) But battery is, in some cases, justifiable or

lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent, or master, gives moderate

correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice. So also on the principle

of self-defence: for if one strikes me first, or even only assaults me, I may strike

in my own defence; and, if sued for it, may plead sow assault demesne, or that

r »j2i -i it was the plaintiff's *own original assault that occasioned it So like-

L J wise in defence of my goods or possession, if a man endeavors to deprive

me of them, I may justify laying hands upon him to prevent him; and in case

Co) Finch. L. 803. (f) Resist. 104. 27 Ail. 11. 7 Ed. IV, 21.

(q) Fluch, L. 204. (r) Pf- «. 10, 6.

such action may be sued by the executor or administrator, for the benefit of the wife, husband,

parent, or child of the person deceased. The damages awarded are apportioned among the

persons for whose benefit the action is brought, as the jury may direct Similiar statutes hare

been passed in the United States.

The English doctrine above stated in this note — that the civil remedy for an injury by

a felony is suspended until the criminal remedy has been pursued — is generally held inapplicable

in the United States, where the duty of prosecuting for public offences is devolved upon a public

officer. See cases collected, 1 Bish. Or. L. $ 329, et seq.]

(3) [An assault is an attempt or offer, accompained by a degree of violence, to commit some

bodily harm, by any means calculated to produce the end, if carried into execution. Level-

ling a gun at another within a distance, from which, supposing it to have been loaded, the

contents might wound, is an assault. Bac. Ab. Assault, A. Abusive words alone cannot con-

stitute an assault, and indeed may sometimes so explain the aggressor's intent, as to prevent an

act, prima facie an assault, from amounting to such an injury; as when a man, during assize

time, in a threatening posture, half drew his sword from its scabbard, and said, if it were not

that it is assize time, I would run you through the body; this was held to be no assault, the

•words explaining that the party did not mean any immcdinte injury. 1 Mod. 3; Bui. N. P. 15;

Yin. Ab. Trespass, A. 2. The intention as well as the act constitutes an assault. 1 .Mud. 3,

caselS.]

(4) [A battery is an unlawful touching the person of another by the aggressor himself, or

any other substance put in motion by him. 1 Saund. 29, b. n. 1; id. 13 and 14, n. 3. Taking

a hat off the head of another is no battery. 1 Saund. 14. It must be either wilfully com-

mitted, or proceed from want of due care: Stra. 596; Hob. 134; Plowd. 19; otherwise it. is

tin inn a in absque injuria, and the party aggrieved is without remedy : 3 Wils. 303; Bac. Ab.

Assault and Battery, B.; but the aosence of intention to commit the injury contititntcs no ex-,

cuse, where there has been a want of due care. Stra. 596. Hob. 134. Plowd. 19. Bnt if a

person unintentionally push against another in the street, or if without any default in tha

rider a horse runs away and goes against another, no action lies. 4 Mod. 405. Every batteWy

includes an assault: Co. Litt. '253: and the plaintiff may recover for the assault only, thoughAe

declares for an assault and battery. 4 Mod. 405.]
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he persists with violence, I may proceed to beat him away, (s) Thus, too, in the

exercise of an office, as that of churchwarden or beadle, a man may lay hands

upon another to turn him out of church, and prevent his "disturbing the congre-

gation, (t) And, if sued for this or the like battery, he may set forth the whole

case, and plead that he laid hands upon him gently, molliler manus imposuit,

for this purpose. On account of these causes of justification, battery is defined

to be the unlawful beating of another; for which the remedy is, as for assault, by

jiction of trespass vi et arm-is: wherein the jury will give adequate damages.

4. By wounding ; which consists in giving another some dangerous hurt, and is

only an aggravated species of battery. 5. By mayhem; which is an injury still

more atrocious, and consists in violently depriving another of the use of a

member proper for his defence in fight. This is a battery, attended with this

aggravating circumstance, that thereby the party injured is forever disabled

from making so good a defence against future external injuries, as he otherwise

might have done. Among these defensive members are reckoned not only arms

and legs, but a finger, an eye, and a fore tooth, («) and also some others, (v) But

the loss of one of the jaw teeth, the ear, or the nose, is no mayhem at common

law; as they can be of no use in fighting. The same remedial action of tres-

pass vi et armis lies also to recover damages for this injury, an injury which

(when wilful) no motive can justify, but necessary self-preservation. If the

ear be cut off, treble damages are given by statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 6, though

this is not mayhem at common law. And here I must observe, that for these
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four last injuries, assault, battery, wounding, and mayhem, an indictment may

be brought as well as an action; and frequently both are accordingly prose-

cuted; the one at the suit of the crown for the crime against the public; the

*otber at the suit of the party injured, to make him a reparation in dam- ,*,.,.,]

ages. (5) • L j.,_ |

4. Injuries affecting a man's health (6) are where, by any unwholesome prac-

tices of another, a man sustains any apparent damage in his vigour or consti-

tution. As by selling him bad provisions or wine; (to) by the exercise of a

noisome trade, which infects the air in his neighbourhood; (2) or by the neglect

or unskilful management of his physician, surgeon, or apothecary. For it hath

been solemnly resolved, (y) that mala praxis is a great misdemeanor and offence

at common law, whether it be for curiosity and experiment or by neglect; because

it breaks the trust which the party had placed in his physician, and tends to the

patient's destruction. Thus, also, in the civil law, (z) neglect or want of skill in

physicians or surgeons, "vulpes adnumerantur, veluti si medicus curationem

dereliquerit, male quempiam secuerit, aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit."

These are wrongs or injuries unaccompanied by force, for which there is a rem-

(») 1 Finch, L. SOI. '«) 1 81(1. 301. («) PIneh, L. 204. (v) 1 Hawk. P. C. 111.

(it>) 1 Roll. Abr. 90. (z) 9 Rep. 52. Halt. 183. (y) Lord Boym. 2U. (*) Inst. I, 3, 8, 7.

(5) [The party injured may proceed by indictment and by action at the same time, and the

court will not compel him to stay proceedings in either. 1 Bos. and P. 191.]

(6) [The law implies a contract on the part of medical men, as well as those of other pro-

fessions, to discharge their duty in a skillful and attentive manner; and the law will grant

redress to the party injured by their neglect or ignorance, by an action on the case, as for a

tortious misconduct. I Saund. 314, n. 2; 1 Ld. Raym. 2l3, 214; Reg. Brevium, 205,206; 2

"Wils. 359; 8 East, 348. And in that case the surgeon could not recover any fees. Peake C. N. P.

59; see 2 New Rep. 136. But, in the case of a physician whose profession is honorary, he is

not liable to an action: Peake C. K. P. 96, 123; 4 T. R. 317; though he may be punished by

the college of physicians. Com. Dig. tit. Physician; Tin. Ab. tit! Physician. If the party

employ a person as surgeon, knowing him not to be one, he has no civil remedy. 1 Hen. B.

161; Bac. Ab. Action on the Case, F; 2 Wils. 359; fi East, 348.]

In the United States the physician is entitled to recover compensation for his services, and

is also liable to an action on the case for any injury to his patient resulting from his negligence

or want of skill. Hill, on Torts, 238; Hanke «. Hooper, 7 C. and P. 81; Landon v. Humphrey,

9 Conn. 209; Ritchey ». West, 23 111. 385; Craig c. Chambers, 17 Ohio St. 253. Payment of tho

physician's fees is not requisite to make him liable for want of ordinary care. McNevins v.

Lowe, 40 111. 385.
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edy in damages by a special action of trespass upon the case. This action of

trespass, or transgression, on the case, is an universal remedy, given for all per-

sonal wrongs and injuries without force; so called because the plaintiff's whole

case or cause of complaint is set forth at length in the original writ, (a) For

though in general there are methods prescribed, .and forms of actions previously

settled, for redressing those wrongs, which most usually occur, and in which the

very act itself is immediately prejudicial or injurious to the plaintiff's person or

property, as battery, non-payment of debts, detaining one's goods, or the like;

i * I •>•• I yet where *any special consequential damage arises, which could not bo

! "'•' foreseen and provided for in the ordinary course of justice, the party

injured is allowed, both by common law and the statute of Westm. 2, c. 24, to

bring a special action on his own case, by a writ formed according to the peculiar

circumstances of his own particular grievance, (b) For wherever the common

law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action ; (c) and,

therefore, wherever a new injury is done, a new method of remedy must be

pursued, (d) And it is a settled distinction, (e) that where an act is done which

is in itself an immediate injury to another's person or property, there the remedy

is usually by an action of trespass vi et armis ; but where there is no act done,

but only a culpable omission ; or where the act is not immediately injurious, but

onlv by consequence and collaterally; there no action of trespass vi et armis

wilt lie, but an action on the special case, for the damages consequent on such

omission or act. (?)
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5. Lastly: injuries affecting a man's reputation or good name are, first, by

malicious, scandalous and slanderous words, (8) tending to his damage and dero-

(rtl For example : " Rex Hcecomiti salutem, Si A. fectrii te securem de clamore guo protequendo, tune pong

per radium et talvol plegio» B. quod tit corem jtuiitariia noltrit apud tfettatotuaterium iu octabit Hindi

Michaflit. ottentvntt quare cum idem It. ad dextrum oculttm ipttiwn A. castttiliter Irvmm bfne et competeiiter

curandum apud S. pro qitadem pccunicn aummtt jtrtv minibus tolttla attumpaistct, idem B. curam mam circn

oculum prrpdictum tarn negligenter et improrifle apposuit. qtnttl idem A. dp/edit ipsiiw B. vitum o&UiprtKiiict\

totalitrr amisit, ad damnum iptint A. rtyinti libramm, ut dicit. Et habeas ibi nominaplegiorum et hoc bra*.

Teitt meipto apud Wettmomuterium," Ac. Kegatr. Jim. 105.

(i>> Sec page 52. (c) 1 Salk. 40. B Mod. 54. (d) Cro. Jac. 478.

(e) 11 Mod. 180. Lord Kaym. 1402. Stra. (35.

(7) [See the author's celebrated judgment in the case of Scott ». Shepherd, 2 Bl. Rep. 892,

the principle of which has been since repeatedly recognized. No distinction arises from the

lawfulness or unlawfulness of the act; if one, turning round suddenly, were to knock another

down, whom he did not see, without intending it, no doubt, said Mr. .1. Lawrence, the action

must be trespass vi et armis. Neither will it vary the case that, besides the immediate injury;

there is an ulterior consequential injury : for it is the former on which the action is supported;

the latter is merely an aggravation of the damages. Leame r. Bray, 3 East, 593.]

(8) [With respect to an imputation of the guilt ot some offence punishable as an infamous

crime, or with imprisonment; tho accusation must be precise, or have such an allusion to

some prior transaction that the hearers of the slander must necessarily have understood that

the slanderer meant to impute the plaintiff's guilt of some punishable offence ; for though the

rule of construing words in mitiori sown is now exploded: 5 East, 463; Fitzg. 253; Bui. N. P.

4; 10 Mod. 198; yet an innuendo or construction cannot be given to words which they do not

necessarily import, either of themselves, independently of any other circumstances, or with

necessary reference to some other circumstances occurring at the time of the accusation.

f. T. R. 691; 4 Co. 17, b; 11 Mod. 99; 4 Esp. N. P. 218; 8 East, 427. On this account it is

not actionable to call a person "villain," "cheat," "rascal," "swindler," or "rogue," or to say

he is " forsworn," without a colloquium of some proceeding in a court of justice, in which the

party had been examined on oath. 6 T. R. 691; 2 H. Bla. 531; 2 Wils. 404. 87; 8 East, 428;

1 Bos. and Pul. :«1; 2 Saund. 307; 4 Co. 15, b; 2 Ventr. 28; 2 Buls. 150; Holt's Law of Libel,

176. The term "forsworn" does not, in legal consideration, necessarily import perjury or

false swearing in a regular judicial proceeding, and consequently docs not necessarily impute

to the party the guilt of having committed a punishable crime. 6 T. R. 694; 4 Co. 15; 2 liulst.

150; Holt's Law of Libel. 176.

But if either of the above expressions, not actionable in themselves, be accompanied by any

other circumstances tending to throw the imputation of a punishable crime on the party

accused, and be so understood by the hearers, they are actionable. 6 T. R. 694. So. on tho

other hand, words prima facie importing a charge of guilt, as to call a person " thief," may bo

qualified by tho expressions and other circumstances, evincing that the accuser did not mean

to insinuate that the party had been guilty of such crime, and in that case no action will bo

sustainable; as, if the words be "you are a thief, for you stole my tree," the stealing of which

is not felony; or where the witnesses called to prove the blander, admit that they do not
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gation. As if a man maliciously and falsely utter any slander or false tale of

another; which may either endanger him in law, by impeaching him of some

heinous crime, as to say that a man hath poisoned another, or is perjured; (f)

or which may exclude him from society, as to charge him with having an. inlec-

(f) Finch, L. 185.

believe the defendant meant to impute that the plaintiff had been guilty of felony. Cro. Jac.

114 ; B. N. P. 5; Peake, K. P. 4 ; 4 Co. 19; Stra. 142; 2 Esp. R. 218 ; 2 New R. 335.

The accusation of a mere intent, propensity or inclination to commit a crime, <tc., is not

actionable, because it only imputes an inchoate immorality, and not the actual commission of

a crime for which the party accused could be punished. 4 Co. Rep. 16, b, 18, b; 4 Esp. R. 219;

Cro. Jac. 158; IRol. Ab. 41; Freem.46;7Taunt. 431; 4 Price, 46. But an accusation of se-

ducing another to commit a crime, as subornation of perjury, is actionable: 1 Rol. Ab. 41; or of

soliciting a servant to steal. 3 Wils. 186; 2 East. 5; but see Salk. 696.

A verbal imputation of the breach of any moral virtue, duty or obligation, such as chastity,

piety, <tc. (which, though it may depreciate a person in the opinion of society, and subject

him to censure in the ecclesiastical court, does not expose him to punishment in the temporal

courts), is not actionable, 4 Taunt. 355; though if in writing, it will be otherwise. 3 Wils.

187. But when the accusation is partly of an offence punishable in the ecclesiastical courts,

and partly in the temporal, or where special damage has been sustained, the latter courts will

afford redress.

2. With respect to the imputation of having a contagious disorder. Man being formed for soci-

ety, and standing in almost constant need of the advice, comfort and assistance of his follow-
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creatures, it is highly reasonable that any words which import the charge of having a conta-

gious distemper, should be in themselves actionable, because all prudent persons will avoid

the company of a person having such a distemper. 2 Wils. 403, 404. The mere accusation of

having had a disease, is not actionable, because it alludes to a past disease. 2 T. R. 473, 474; 2

Stra. 1189.

3. As lo slander affecting a person in his office or trout. When profit or emolument is attached

to them, any words which directlv impute an nnfitness, either in respect of morals or inability

to discharge the duty of the office, are actionable. 1 Salk. 695, 698; 2 Esp. 500 ; 5 Rep. 125;

1 Stra. 617; 2 Ld. Raym. i:(69; 4 Rep. 16, a.; Bull. N. P. 4. But iu an office merely honorary,

to which no profit, <tc., is attached, a verbal accusation of incapacity, <to., is not actionable.

5 Co. Rep. 125; 4 Rep. 16, a.; Salk. 695, 698 ; 2 Esp. 500 ; 3. Wils. 177. In an office of trust and

emolument, an imputation of an intent or inclination to commit a criminal breach of duty, is

actionable, which is an exception to the before-mentioned rule. Salk. 695; 1 Stra. 617 ; 2 Ld.

Kaym. 1369, 1480; 4 Rep. 16, a.; 3 Wils. 177 ; 2 Saund. 307 ; Cro. Jac. 339, b, 1, 9; Bull. X. P.

6; Holt's Law of Libel, 197. A verbal imputation, that the plaintiff gave to the commission-

ers of the admiralty 200f. for a warrant to be purser of a man-of-war, would be actionable,

as imputing a corruption of a public trust, and a crime in tempting to corruption. 5

Burr. 2699.

4. As to slander affecting a person in his trade, profession or occupation. Words which impute

the want of integrity or capacity, whether mcutal or pecuniary, in the conduct of a profes-

sion, trade, <tc., iu which the party is engaged, are actionable. Thus an action will lie for

accusing a clergyman of incontinence. <fcc., for which he may be deprived : 4 Co. 17; or a

barrister, attorney or artist of inability, inattention or want of integrity: 3 Wils. 187 ; 2 Bla.

K. 750; 3 Wils. 59; 7 Moore, 200; 3 Bro. and B. 297; 3 B. and A. 702, or a person in trade

(however inferior), (1 Lev. 115) of fraudulent or dishonorable conduct, or of being in insolvent

circumstances. Ld. Raym. 1480. And to say of one who carries on the business of a corn

vendor, " You are a rogue and swindling rascal, you delivered me 100 bushels of oats worse by

6». a bushel than I bargained for," is actionable, and entitles him to a verdict without proof of

special damage. 3 Bing. 104. But an action is not sustainable for saying a tradesman has

charged an exorbitant sum for his goods, <fcc., unless fraud be imputed, etc. Boc. Ab. tit.

Slander, B. 4. In all these cases the words are actionable, without proof of special damage,

because they have a certain tendency to injure the person accused. Bac. Ab. Slander, B. 4.

Words actionable in respect of special damage. The special damage sufficient to support an

action must be a certain actual loss (as of a particular marriage), or the acquaintance or

friendship of some specified person: 1 Rol. Ab. 36 ; 1 Lev. 261; 2 Bos. and Pul. 284 ; 1 Sauud.

243; 3 B. and P. 372, 374, 376: 1 Taunt. 39; or where in consequence of the imputation of

incontinence, cast upon a dissenting preacher at a licensed chapel, the congregation refuse to

allow him to preach there any more, and discontinue the emolument they would otherwise

have given him, he may maintain an action for the consequential damage. 8 T. R. 130.

Probable damage has been in some instances declared sufficient, as to say to a father of

an heir apparent, that he is a bastard, in consequence whereof the father has declared a

design of disinheriting him, and does actually convey away the estate. 1 Rol. Ab. 38; Cro.

Jac. 213; tied vide, 3 Wils. 188. Yet having incurred the danger of being turned out of doors

from the parents' displeasure, from calumnious imputation, is not sufficient. 1 Lev. 261; 1

Taunt. 39. The special damage mnst be incident and natural to the words spoken, and not tho

consequence of the unlawful act of a third person. 3 East, 1.
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tious disease; or which may impair or hart his trade or livelihood, as to call a

tradesman a bankrupt, a physician a quack, or a lawyer a knave. (g) Words

spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other great officer of the realm,

which are called acandalum magnatum, are held to be still more heinous: (h)

(g) Ibid. 186. (h) 1 Ventr. 60

II. FALSITY OP ran IMPUTATION. To render any imputation against the character actiona-

ble, it must be false: 5 Co. 125; 6 Hob. 253; and though the falsity of the imputation is in

general to be implied till the contrary be shown : 2 East, 436; 1 Sanud. 242; yet the defend-

ant may, in any civil action, plead specially, though he cannot gire in evidence under the

general issue that the slanderous representation was true. "Willes, 20; 1 Sum H 1. 130. The in-

stance of a master making an unfavorable representation of his servant, upon an application for

his character, seems to be an exception, in that case there being a presumption from the occa-

sion of speaking, that the words were true. 1 T. R. Ill; 3 Bos. and Pul. 5b7.

III. THE PUBLICATION. The sending a libel to the party libelled is a sufficient publication

to subject the libeller to an indictment, as tending to a breach of the peace. 2 Bla. Rep. 1038; 1

T. R. 110; 1 Saund. 132, n. 2; 4 Esp. N. P. 117; 2 Esp. 623; 2 East's Rep. 361; 2 Eel. 58; 2

Stark. 245. But it is essential to the support of an action, that there be a publication by the

defendant of the libel or words to a third person, and also that such person understood the

words in the sense the plaintiff wishes to establish, or that they necessarily have that meaning.

1 Rol. Ab. 74; Cro. Eli*. 857, 861; 1 Saund. 242, n. 3 ; 2 id. 307 ; Bac. Ab. Slander, D. If A

send a manuscript to the printer of a periodical work, and does not restrain the printing
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and publishing it, and ho print and publish it, A is liable as the publisher, and liable to an

action: 5 Dow. 201; and proof that the defendant know that letters addressed to the plaintiff

were usually opened by his clerk, is evidence to go to a jury, of his intention that the libel

should be read by a third person, so as to amount to an actionable publication ; 2 Stark, 63; and

proof of the delivery of a copy of a newspaper, containing a libel, to the stamp office, is sufficient

proof of publication. 4 B. and C. 35. Every copy of a libel sold by defendant is a separate

publication, and a separate offence. 1 Chitty R. 451.

IT. THE OCCASION. To render words actionable, they must be uttered without legal occa-

sion. On some occasions it is justifiable to utter slander of another, in others it is excusable,

provided it be uttered without express malice. It is justifiable for a barrister to use scandal-

izing expressions in support of his client's cause, and pertinent thereto. 1 Maule and Sel.

280; I Holt's Rep. 531; 1 B. and A. 232. And no false or scandalous matter contained in

articles of the peace exhibited to justices, or any other proceedings in a regular court of jus-

tice, where the court has jurisdiction (Dyer 285; 4 Co. 14; Holt's L. L. 179), or before the

house of commons (1 Saund. 131-133, n. 1; 1M. and S. 280; 3 Taunton, 456), will be actionable.

A petition or memorial, addressed by a tradesman to the secretary of war, complaining of the

conduct of a half pay officer in not paying his debts, and stating the facts of his case bona

fide, is not actionable as a libel. And evidence showing the occasion of the writing, and his

belief of the facts stated, may be given under the general issue. 5 B. and A. 642; 1 Dow.

and Ry. 252. The declaration of a court-marital, that the charge of the prosecutor was

malicious and groundless, and that his conduct in falsely calumniating the accused was highly

injurious to the service, will not subject the president to an action for a libel for having deliv-

ered such declaration, annexed to their sentence of acquittal of the officer accused, to the

judge advocate (2 N. R. 341) or to the commander-in-chief. It is a privileged communica-

tion, and cannot be produced in evidence, or an office copy thereof. 4 Moore, 563; 2 Bro.

and Bing. 130. But an order to a governor abroad to dismiss an officer does not, therefore,

authorize his publishing the grounds of dismissal. 3 Taunt. 456. A servant cannot main-

tain an action against his former master for words spoken or written, giving him a character,

even though the master make specific charges of fraud, unless the latter prove the falsehood

and malice of the charges. Bull. N. P. 8; 3 Esp. 201; 1 Camp. 267; 1 T. R 110; 4 Burr.

2425. A master is not generally bound to prove the truth of the character he gives to a

servant, yet if he officiously state any trivial misconduct of the servant to a former master, in

order to prevent him giving a second character, and then himself, upon application, give the

servant a bod character, the truth of which he is not able to prove, an action is maintainable

against him. 3 B. and P. 587. So a letter written, or words spoken, to a father in relation to

Borne supposed fault of his children, are excusable. 2 Brownl. 151 ; 2 Burnl. E. L. 126, 779;

1 Fin. Ab. 540, 60. Or if the words are innocently read, as a story out of history: Cro. Jac.

91; or were spoken in a sense not defamatory: 4 Rep. 12; or confidentially, as a warniug

against the mal-practices of another. 1 Camp. 267. The repeating or reading a libel out of

merriment, if malicious, is actionable: 9 Rep. 39; but if there be no malice, it is said to be

otherwise. Moore, 627; 9 Rep. 59. It is not libellous to ridicule a literary composition, or

the author of it, as far as he has embodied himself with his work; and if he is not followed

into domestic lite for purposes of personal slander, he cannot maintain on action for any dam-

age he may suffer in consequence of being thus rendered ridiculous. 1 Camp. 355; 1 Esp.

Rep. 28 and 194; Selwyn. N. P. 1044. So a fair comment on a public entertainment or per-

formance is lawful: 1 Esp. R. 28; but it i« otherwise if the critic introduce facts and com-

ments, or abuse, not connected with the work, for the purpose of defaming the private char
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and though they be such as would not be actionable in the case of a common

person, yet, when spoken in disgrace of such high and respectable characters,

they amount to an atrocious injury; *which is redressed by an action r DM 04.1

on the case, founded on many ancient statutes; (i) as well on behalf of <- *

(<) Westm. 1. 3 Edw. I, 0. 34. 2 BIc. II, o. B. 12 Bio. II, c. 11.

acter of the author. 1 Camp. 355; Solw. JT. P. 1044; 3 Bing. R. 88. And where the slan-

derous comments are upon a petition to the house of commons, and likewise the petitioner,

the criticism is not privileged. 4 Bing. R. 88. The editor of a pnbh'o newspaper is not jus-

tified in calumnious attacks on the private character of the editor of another newspaper. 2

Stark. 93.

With respect to the reports of judicial proceedings, fc. To publish a full, true, and entire

account of proceedings in courts of justice upon a trial, or in parliament, is not in general libel-

Ions. 8 T. R. 268; 1 B. and P. 525; 7 Hub. 267; 7 East, 503. But a party will not be justi-

fied in publishing coHclmioim unfavorable to another, which he draws himself from the evidence

delivered in a court of justice, instead of stating the evidence itself. 4 B. and A. 605. Espe-

cially if such conclusion bo calculated to produce a more unfavorable impression than the orig-

inal proceeding itself. 7 East, 49:$; 7 Moore, 200; 3 Brod. and B. 297; 3 B. and A. 702. Nor

can a correct account of the proceedings in a court of justice be published, if such account con-

tain matter of a scandalous, blasphemous, or criminal tendency; and if it do, it is a ground for

a criminal information. 3 i;. and A. 167. And the publication of the proceedings ol a court of

law, containing matter defamatory of a person who is neither a party to the suit, nor present at

the time of the inquiry, seems to amount to a libel. 3 B. and A. 702 ; 7 East, 503; 1 M. and S.
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278. And if the publication of proceedings before a coroner's inquest, or a preliminary inquiry

before a magistrate, however, correct in the statement, contains libellous matter of another, it

is actionable. 3 B. and 0. 583.

V. THE MALICE OB MOTIVE. Malice is also considered essential to the support of an action

for slanderous words. But malice is to be presumed until the contrary be proved: 4 B. and C.

247, 585; 1 Saund. 242, u. 2; 1 T. R. Ill, 544; 1 East, 563; 2 id. 436; 2 New. R. 335; Bui. X.

P. 8; except in those cases where the occasion prima facie excuses the publication: 4 B. and

C. 247; as in the before-mentioned instance of a master giving the character of his servant, in

which the plaintiff must prove express malice; or that the imputation was wholly false, from

•which malice may be inferred. 1 T. R. Ill; 3 B. and P. 587. But if the plaintiff can prove

that the defendant acted maliciously under the mask of the fonner excusable occasions, an

action is always sustainable. 3 B. and P. 587, 150 ; 9 Rep. 59; 2 East, 426. And on the same

ground that a lunatic has been held liable to make compensation, civilly, for any injury he may

do (15 Tin. 160; 12 Mod. 332; 3 Rol. Ab. 547; Co. Litt. 247), it should seem that when an

injury has been sustained by the flippant and inconsiderate unfounded report of another, though

not malicious, an action is sustainable. In the case of written slander, the intent is to be col-

lected from the paper itself, unless explained by the mode of publication and other circum-

stances ; and the defendant must be presumed to intend that which his act is likely to produce:

4 B. and A. 95; 4 B. and C. 247; and as to what coustitutes malice, see 3 B. and C. 584; 2 B.

and C. 257.

Secondly, Written slander. A libel, in its most extensive meaning, signifies any malicious

defamation, expressed either in printing, writing, pictures, or effigies. 5 Co. Rep. 125, 126; 1

Saund. 132, n. 2 ; 2 Camp. 511. The rules which we have noticed in respect to verbal slander

arc, for the most part, applicable to libels; with the exception of one important distinction,

that slanderous occupations, reduced into writing, are not the less actionable because not impu-

ting a crime punishable in the temporal courts; for any written slander, though merely tending

to render the party subject to disgrace, ridicule, or contempt, is actionable, though "it do not

impute any definite crime, punishable in the temporal courts; as, to write that a person is a

swindler or hypocrite, or that a woman has been guilty of fornication, or that a man is an itchy

old toad. 1 B. and P. 331; 2 H. Bl. 532; 2 Wils. 404 ; 1 T. R. 748 ; Hard. 470; 2 B. and P.

748 ; Holt's Law of Libel, 212; 2 Salk. 697 ; 8 Holt Rep. 554 ; 4 Tannt. 355. So, an action is

sustainable for a libel imputing to a person gross want of feeling; as that, although he was

aware of the death of a person occasioned by his improperly driving a carriage, he had attended

a public ball in the evening of the same day. 1 Chitty R. 480; 2 B. and C. 678; 4 Dowl. and

R. 230. This distinction proceeds from the difference between the degrees of malignity, and the

extent of the injury with respect to slander written or spoken; the former being more deliberate,

more capable of extensive circulation, and more permanent in its injurious consequences, than

the latter. 2 East, 430 ; Hard. 470, 472; Burr. 980; Fitzg. 253. Another distinction between

them is, that written slander is indictable, as tending to a breach of the peace, whereas verbal

is not indictable, unless against a magistrate in the execution of his office: 1 Stra. 420; 2 id.

1157; Salk. 689, 698; Holt's Law of 'Lib. 169, and cases there referred to; Holt's Rep. 654; or

calculated to provoke a person to fight a duel.

A* to BLANDER op TITLE, see in general Vin. Ab. Slander of Title, pi. 16; 2 B. and C. 486.

The slander is actionable if a malicious motive be proved. 4 Burr. 2422. But to say thot a

reader cannot make a good title, believing at the same time that he cannot, from a supposed

forfeiture of the estate, is not actionable. 3 Taunt. 246; see also 1 M. and S. 301, 639, 644.
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the crown, to inflict the punishment of imprisonment on the slanderer, as on

behalf of the party, to recover damages for the injury sustained. (9) Words also

tending to scandalize a magistrate, or person in a public trust, are reputed more

highly injurious than wheii spoken of a private man. (k) It is said, that for-

merly no actions were brought for words, unless the slander was such as (if

true) would endanger the life of the object of it. (I) But too great encourage-

ment being given by this lenity to false and malicious slanderers, it is now held

that, for scandalous words of the several species before-mentioned (that may

endanger a man by subjecting him to the penalties of the law, may exclude him

from society, may impair his trade, or may affect a peer of the realm, a magis-

trate, or one in public trust), an action on the case maybe had, without proving

any particular damage to have happened, but merely upon the probability that

it might happen. But with regard to words that do not thus apparently, and

upon the face of them, import such defamation as will of course be injurious, it

is necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particular damage to have hap-

pened; which is called laying his action with a per quod. As it I say that such

a clergyman is a bastard, he cannot for this bring any action against me, unless

he can show some special loss by it; in which case he may bring his action

against me, for saying he was a bastard, per quod he lost the presentation to such

a living. (•/») In like manner, to slander another man's title, by spreading such

injurious reports as, if true, would deprive him of his estate (as to call the issue

in tail, or one who hath land by descent, a bastard), is actionable, provided any
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special damage accrues to the proprietor thereby; as if he loses an opportunity

of selling the land. (») But mere scurrility, or opprobious words, which neither

in themselves import, nor are in fact attended with, any injurious effects, will

not support an action. So scandals, which concern matters merely spiritual, as

r*i9Sl ^° ca^ a *m!m heretic or adulterer, are cognizable only in the ecclesias-

L -I tical court; (o) unless any temporal damage ensues, which may be a

foundation for a per quod. Words of heat and passion, as to call a man a rogue

and rascal, if productive of no ill consequence, and not of any of the dangerous

species before-mentioned, are not actionable: neither are words spoken in a

friendly manner, as by way of advice, admonition, or concern, without any

tincture or circumstance of ill-will: for, in both these cases, they are not mali-

ciously spoken, which is part of the definition of slander, (p) (10) Neither (as

was formerly hinted) (q) are any reflecting words made use of in legal proceed-

ings, and pertinent to the cause in hand, a sufficient cause of action for slan-

der, (r) Also if the defendant be able to justify, and prove the words to be true,

no action will lie, (s) even though special damage hath ensued: for then it is 110

slander or false tale. As if I can prove the tradesman a bankrupt, the physician

a quack, the lawyer a knave, and the divine a heretic, this will destroy their

(k) Lord Eayra. 1369. (1) 2 Vent. 28. (m) 4 Rep. 17. 1 Lev. 248. fnj Cro. Jac. 213. Cro. Ellz. 197.

(o) Noy «4 1 Freem. 277. (p) Finch, L. IS1 1T~ -• r'— *••-"• '-•«• -

(r) Dyer, 285. Cro. Jac. 90. (a) 4 Rep. 13.

No action will lie when the slanderer prevents the sale of the land by assorting a claim in him-

self, though unfounded, unless it bo knowingly bottomed in fraud. 4 Rep. 18.]

Upon this subject in general, see the recent work on libel and blander by Mr. Townsend,

where the authorities arc very fully collected.

(9) This action is now obsolete.

(10) [And now by statute C and 7 Tic. c. 96 (amended by statute 8 and 9 Tic. c. 75), in any

action for defamation, the offer of an apology is admissible in evidence in mitigation of damages;

and in an action against a newspaper for libel, the defendant may plead that it was inserted

•without malice.]

The defendant in an action for slander may give in evidence under the general issue, in miti-

gation of damages, any such facts as, without showing the truth of the charge, tend to show

that defendant believo'd it, and thus to rebut the presumption of malice. Wagner r. Holbrnii-

ner, 7 Grill, 296; Scott v. McKinnish, 15 Ala. 662 ; Bisboy v. Shaw, 1:2 N. T. 67; Hart r. Keed,

1 B'. Monr. 166; Farr v. Raseo, 9 Mich. 353; Chapman v. Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365; Kennedy t\

Dear, 6 Port. 90; Blickenstaff t>. Perrin, 27 Ind. 527. As to damages in actions against pub-

lishers of newspapers, for the publication of an article inserted by a subordinate, see Daily Post

Co. u. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447 ; Jones v. Mackie, Law Rep. 3 Ex. 1.
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respective actions: for though there may be damage sufficient accruing from it,

yet, if the fact be true, it is damnum absque injuria; and where there is no

injury, the law gives no remedy. And this is agreeable to the reasoning of the

civil law;(<) " Sum qui nocentem infamat, non est cequum et bonum ob earn rein

condemnari ; delicta enim nocentium nota esse oportet et expedit."

A second way of aifecting a man's reputation is by printed or written libels,

pictures, signs, and the like; which set him in an odious or ridiculous (u) light,

and thereby diminish his reputation. With regard to libels in general, there

are, as in many other cases, two remedies: one by indictment, and another by

action. The former for the public offence; for every libel has a tendency to the

breach of the peace, by provoking the person libelled to break it: which oifence

is the same (in point of law) whether *the matter contained be true or r *i og n

false; and therefore the defendant, on an indictment for publishing a L " ' '

libel, is not allowed to allege the truth of it by way of justification, (w) (11)

But in the remedy by action on the case, which is to repair the party in damages

for the injury done him, the defendant may, as for words spoken, justify the

truth of the facts and show that the plaintiff has received no injury at &\\.(x)

What was said with regard to words spoken, will also hold in every particular

Tvith regard to libels by writing or printing, and the civil actions consequent

thereupon: but as to signs or pictures, it seems necessary always to shew, by

proper inuendos and averments of the defendant's meaning, the import and

application of the scandal, and that some special damage has followed; (12)
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otherwise it cannot appear, that such libel by picture was understood to be lev-

elled at the plaintiff, or that it was attended with any actionable consequences.

A third way of destroying or injuring a man's reputation is by preferring

malicious indictments or prosecutions against him; (13) which, under the mask

ft} ly. a, 10, IS. fuj 4 Sbow.SU. HMod. 99. fa} 5 Kap. 125. fxj Hob. 253. 11 Mod. 99.

(11) Bat now by statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 96, the defendant in any indictment or information

for libel may plead the truth of the matters charged, and also that it wag for the public benefit

that the same should be published; and this plea, if sustained, constitutes a good defence, but

if not sustained, the court may, in pronouncing sentence, consider whether the guilt of the defend-

ant was aggravated or mitigated by the plea.

In the United States, by constitutional or statutory provisions, the truth is made a defence to

a criminal prosecution, if published with good motives and for justifiable ends.

(12) [To support an an ion for a libellous sign or picture, the learned judge says, it is neces-

sary to show, that some special damage Itas followed; but there is no ground for this opinion,

and a picture intending to make any one ridiculous is equally actionable as if the same effect

had been produced by any other mode of publication, though no damage can be proved.]

(19) [Malicious prosecutions are of a criminal or civil nature. To enable a party aggrieved to

support an action for a criminal prosecution, four circumstances must occur. Gilb. L. and 10.

185; 12 Mod. 208; 1 T. R 493 to 551.

1. Falsehood in the charge.

2. Want of probable canse for instituting it.

3. Malice in the prosecutor.

4. Damage to the accused party.

L It is cri.-rniiiil that the falsehood of 1lm charge should have been substantiated by a verdict,

or the decision of the court in which it is instituted, or by the proceedings having been other-

wise legally determined, before the party aggrieved commence his action for the injury HUS-

tained. 2 T. R. 225; 1 Saund. 228; Bui. N. P. 11; 1 Esp. Rep. 79; Dougl. 215; Yelv. 116;

Hob. 267.

•Ally. It is necessary that the prosecution should have been carried on without probable cause,

before an action can be brought against the prosecutor. 3 Dow. Rep. 160. It is a mixed pro-

position of law and fact, whether there was probable cause, and whether the circumstances,

alleged tn show it probable, are true, and existed as a matter of fact. But whether or not, sup-

posing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law. 1 T. R. 520,

534; 5 Bui. N. P. 14; 4 Burr. 1974; 2 Bar. and C. 693; 5 Dow. and R. 107.

3dly. Miilif'' also is essential to the support of this action; it is not, however, necessary in

all cases for the plaintiff to prove by positive evidence, that the defendant was actuated by

malice, but he may establish it by inference or collateral proof, and the plaintiff having estab-

lished want of probable cause, malice may thence be implied. 1 T. R. 455, 518; 9 Bast, 361;

1 Camp. 202, 5504; Willes, 520. Malice is not to be inferred from the mere proof of the

plaintiff's acquittal for want of the prosecutor's appearing when called; 9 East, 361; or from

proof that the bill was returned not found. 1 Marsh. 12; 5 Taunt. 187; but see 4 Bar. and
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of justice and public spirit, are sometimes made the engines of private spite and

enmity. For this, however, the law has given a very adequate remedy in dama-

ges, either by an action of conspiracy, (y) which cannot be brought but against

two at the least; or, which' is the more usual way, by a special action OB the

(If) JTneh, L. 3K.

Ores. 24. The defendant, however, mav repel this presumptive evidence, by showing suffi-

cient grounds for suspicion in point of fact, or to induce him to suspect the guilt of the

party accused. Cro. Jac. 193; Selw. N. P. 106; 1 Bol. Ab. 113; Gilb. L. and E. 188; 3 Dow.

K. 160.

4th. Damage. There are three descriptions of damages, either of which is sufficient to support

an action, bnt one of them most be proved or the action will foil, viz.: 1st. To the person by

imprisonment. 2d. To the reputation by scandal. 3d. To the property by expense.

1st. To theperson by tmprisimment. 1st. Whenever imprisonment is occasioned by a malicious,

unfounded cnminnl prosecution, it is a sufficient damage to support an action, although the deten-

tion might have been momentary, and the party released on bail.

2d. To the reputation by scandal. Most criminal prosecutions charge th« party accused

with gome breach of moral duty, and th<mgh. a« observed by Chief Justice Hoft (Hob. 266),

when the court in which the proceeding is adopted luis sufficient jurisdiction over the subject

matter, the unfounded proceeding cannot be treated as a libel in respect to the maxim estectttio

juris non habit injuriam; yet the party defamed may proceed by action for the maliciously

preferring such charge. Any charge which would be a libel if not preferred in the coarse of

legal proceeding, may be considered as sufficiently defamatory to enable the party to support
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an action for malicious prosecution. Bat an indictment for a mere trespass, as an assault, dues

not sufficiently scandalize the party accused to enable him, on the ground of injury to bis repu-

tation, to support an action. 12 Mod. 210; Gilb. C. L. and E. 2ft!; 2 B. and A. 494; 3 Dow.

and R. 669.

3dly. To the property by expenses is sufficient ground for supporting an action. Jones v.

Gwynne, Gilb. L. and E. 185, 202.

The remedy for a malicious prosecution of regular proceedings, is invariably an action on the

ease, and trespass cannot be sustained. Hob. 266.

Malicious proceedings of a civil nature are by malicious arrest, issuing a commission of

bankruptcy, Ac. It seems before the statutes entitling the defendant in civil actions to costs

if the suit terminated in his favor, be might support an action against the plaintiff, if the

proceeding wag malicious and without probable cause . Go. Idtt. 161, n. 4, a. b. c. 162, (a); 3

Lev. 210; 2 Wils. 305 ; Styles, 379; Hob. 266; 4 Mod. 13. 14. Bnt since tile statute, 4 Jac. I, c.

3, which gives costs to a defendant in all actions in case of a nonsuit or verdict against the

plaintiff, and other statutes giving costs to defendant in other stages of the cause, it seems that

no action can be supported merely in respect of a civil suit maliciously instituted, exeept in

some cases under particular legislative provisions: 1 Salfc. 14; and therefore no action is sus-

tainable for a vexations ejectment. 1 B. and P. 305. But when the plaintiff in a civil action

has maliciously adopted a step not absolutely necessary for the ascertainment of "his right, as

in the case of an tmfounded arrest, or an arrest for too large a sum : 1 Lev. 275; or on one side

of an account: 3 B. and C. 139; (in any of which cases he might have proceeded in common

process) the party in.jnred by such arrest may support an action. 2 Wils. 305. A git is neces-

sary the avenues of justice should not be narrowed, the courts do not encourage actions for

malicious suits: 2 Wils. 307 ; but as a civil suit is not, like a criminal prosecution, carried on for

the benefit of the public, less favor and indulgence is to be shown to a plaintiff who maliciously

arrests another, than to the prosecutors of an indictment. la order to sustain such action, four

points must concur, viz:

1. Falsehood in the demand.

2. Want of probable cause.

3. Malice in the defendant.

4. Damage bv arrest or imprisonment.

1. Falsehood in the iJfmmiil. 1st. With regard to the falsehood in the demand, the roles

applicable to a criminal proceeding, equally affect a civil suit. 1 Salk. 1516; 2 T. R. 225; 1

Esp. Rep. 79; 14 East, 302; Selw. 106. If there bo a set-off reducing the plaintiff*a demand,

his maliciously inserting only one side of the account is actionable. 3 B. and C. 139. _ The suit

must have been decided by some legal means, before an action for a malicious action can be

commenced. 1 Esp. B. 80.

2dly. Want of probable cause, also, as in criminal proceedings, is necessary, and the same

rules prevail with regard to it. And though in point of fact an action may turn out to l>e

nnfonnded, yet if there were reasonable ground to apprehend that the sum for which the

party was arrested was due, no action can be supported. 3 Esp. R. 34. _ Where A arrested

B upon the advice of his special pleader, that he bad a cause of action, bnt afterwards

discontinued on being ruled to declare, and B brought an action for a malicious arrest, with-

out any reasonable or probable cause, it was held, that the reasonableness or probability of

the cause was a mixed question of law and fact for the jury to decide: and that, it they

believed the defendant acted buna Jidc upon the advice he had received, he was entitled to a

Chap. 8.] INJURIES AFFECTING PERSONAL LIBERTY. 126

ease for a false and malicious prosecution, (z) In order to carry on the former

(which gives a recompense for the danger to which the party has been exposed)

it is necessary that the plaintiff should obtain a copy of the record of his indict-

ment and acquittal; but, in prosecutions for felony, it is usual to deny a copy

of the indictment, where there is any, the least, probable cause to found such

prosecution upon, (a) For it would be a very great discouragement to the pub-

lic justice of the kingdom, if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of sus-

picion, were liable to be sued at law whenever their indictments miscarried.

*But an action on the ease for a malicious prosecution may be founded

upon an indictment, whereon no acquittal can be had; as if it be rejected

by the grand jury, or be coram non judiee, or be insufficiently drawn. For it is

not the danger of the plaintiff, but the scandal, vexation, and expense, upon

which this action is founded, (b) However, any probable cause for preferring it

is sufficient to justify the defendant.

II. We are next to consider the violation of the right of personal liberty.

This is effected by the injury of false imprisonment, (14) for which the law has

not only decreed a punishment, as a heinous public crime, but has also given a

private reparation to the party; as well by removing the actual confinement for

the present, as, after it is over, by subjecting the wrong-doer to a civil action, on

account of the damage sustained by the loss of time and liberty.

To constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are two points requisite:

1. The detention of the person: and 2. The unlawfulness of such detention.
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Every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a com-

mon prison, or in a private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining

one in the public streets, (c) Unlawful, or false, imprisonment consists in such

confinement or detention without sufficient authority; which authority may

arise either from some process from the courts of justice, or from some warrant

from a legal officer having power to commit, under his hand and seal, and ex-

pressing the cause of such commitment ;(rf) or from some other special cause

warranted, for the necessity of the thing, either by common law, or act of parlia-

ment ; such as the arresting of a felon by a private pea-son without warrant,

the impressing of mariners for the public service, or the apprehending of

waggoners for misbehaviour in the public highways, (e) False imprisonment

(x) F. N. B. 116. r«J Carth. 421. Lord Raym. 253. (b) 10 Mod. 219, MO. Stra. 691.

(c) 2 lust. Ss9. (dj 1 Md. 88,591. (e) Stat. 13 Goo. Ill, c. 78.

verdict, but if otherwise, they ought to find for the plaint if!'. 2 B. and C. 693: 4 Dow. and

K. 107.

3dlv. Malice in tlte defendant. Malice also is an essential requisite to the support of this action.

In ordinary cases, however, want of probable cautie being proved, malice (as in criminal prosecu-

tions) may bo implied. I T. K. 545,518; 9 East, 361; 3 Camp. 139. See further, 1 Bos. and

Pnl. 38H; 2 id. 129; 4 B. and C. 21.

4th]y. With respect to the damage necessary to the support of this action, it has already

been observed, that as a defendant is entitled to costs, his pecuniary interest is not, in legal

consideration, affected bv a civil action, though indeed the costs allowed are rarely equal to

the expenditure incurred by a defence. His character also, as we have already seen, is not

affected, and the imprisonment of his person is therefore the only legal damage which entitles

him to compensation. An action on the case may he supported for maliciously issuing a

commission of bankruptcy, notwithstanding the specific remedy provided by the bankrupt

laws. Willes, 581; 2 Wils. 146; 3 Campb. 58. So also if the plaintiff in an 'action adopt an

irregular proceeding as issuing a second^!, fa. pending the first. Hop. 205, 266; 1 Brownl. 12.

So a plaintiff is bound to accept from a defendant in custody under a <•«. ga., the debt and

costs, when tendered, in satisfaction of his debt, and to sign an authority to the sheriff to dis-

charge the defendant ont of custody, and an action on the ca.se will lie against a plaintiff for

having maliciously refused so to do. And the refusal to sign the discharge is sufficient j»n«Mi

facie evidence of malice, in the absence of circumstances to rebut the presumption. 4 B. and

C.26.]

(14) [lint the merely giving charge of a person to a peace-officer, not followed by any actual

apprehension of the person, does not amount to an imprisonment, though the party to avoid it

attend at a police office. 1 Esp. Kep. 431; 2 New. Rep. 211. The circumstance of an imprison-

Bjcut being committed under a mistake constitutes no excuse. 3 Wils. 309.]

.As to uuseimprisonment, see 1 Hill, on Torts,231, et. seq. Addison on Torts, ch. 12 $$ 2and3.
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F *1281 a'so may ar*se by executing a lawful warrant or process at an *unlawful

L " -1 time, as on a Sunday; (f) for the statute hath declared, that such service

or process shall be void. (15) This is the injury. Let us next see the remedy:

which is of two sorts; the one removing the injury, the other making satisfaction

for it.

The means of removing the actual injury of false imprisonment are fourfold.

1. By writ of mainprize. 2. By writ of de odio et atia. 3. By writ de homing

replegiando. 4. By writ of habeas corpus.

1. The writ of mainprize, mamtcaptio, is a writ directed to the sheriff (either

generally, when any man is imprisoned for a bailable offence, and bail hath been

refused; or specially, when the offence or cause of commitment is not properly

bailable below), commanding him to take sureties for the prisoner's appearance,

usually called mainpernors, and to set him at large, (g) Mainpernors differ

from bail, in that a man's bail may imprison or surrender him up before the

stipulated day of appearance; mainpernors can do neither, but are barely sure-

ties for his appearance at the day: bail are only sureties, that the party be

answerable for the special matter for which they stipulate; mainpernors are

bound to produce him to answer all charges whatsoever, (h)

2. The writ de odio et atia was anciently used to be directed to the sheriff,

commanding him to inquire whether a prisoner charged with murder was com-

mitted upon just cause of suspicion, or merely propter odium et atiam, for

hatred and ill-will; and if upon the inquisition due cause of suspicion did not

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

appear, then there issued another writ for the sheriff to admit him to bail.

This writ, according to Bracton, (»') ought not to be denied to any man, it being

expressly ordered to be made out gratis, without any denial, by magna carta, c. 26,

r j. go I an(i statute West. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 29. But the statute *of Gloucester, 6

L -I Edw. I, c. 9, restrained it in the case of killing by misadventure or self-

defence, and the statute 28 Edw. Ill, c. 9, abolished it in all cases whatsoever:

but as the statute 42 Edw. Ill, c. 1. repealed all statutes then in being, contrary

to the great charter, Sir Edward Coke is of opinion (k) that the writ de odio et

atia was thereby revived.

3. The writ de homine replegiando (I) lies to replevy a man out of prison or

out of the custody of any private person (in the same manner that chattels

taken in distress may be replevied, of which in the next chapter), upon giving

security to the sheriff that the man shall be forthcoming to answer any charge

against him. And if the person be conveyed out of the sheriff's jurisdiction,

the sheriff may return that he is eloigned, elongatus; upon which a process

issues (called a capias in withernam) to imprison the defendant himself, withont

bail or mainprize, (m) till he produces the party. But this writ is guarded with

so manv exceptions, (n) that it is not an effectual remedy in numerous instances,

especially where the crown is concerned. The incapacity therefore of these

three remedies to give complete relief in every case hath almost entirely anti-

quated them; and hath caused a general recourse to be had, in behalf of persons

aggrieved by illegal imprisonment, to

4. The writ of habeas corpus, the most celebrated writ in the English law.

Of this there are various kinds made use of by the courts at Westminster, for

removing prisoners from one court into another for the more easy administra-

tion of justice. Such is the habeas corpus ad respondendum, when a man hath

a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior

court; in order to remove the prisoner, and charge him with this new action in

m Stat. 29 Cnr. II, c. 7. Sulk. 78. 6 Mod. 95.

fa) F. N. B. 250. I Hiil. P. C. 141. Coke on Bail and Mnlnp. ch. 10.

(h) Coke on Ball ami Mninp. eh. 3. * Inst. 17i>. (i) £• 3, tr, 2, o. 8. ft) S In St. 4S, 55, 315

(I) F. N. B. (M. (m) Raytn. 474.

(H) Nisi captut at per ipecialr. pntceptum no'trum. ml capitnUt juitUiarii nottri, relpro morte Arannu,

vel i>ro foreita noslra. vet pro aliquo alio retto, quart semndum consutudinfm Any Ha non sit rtplegiatiiit.

Keijiitr. 77.

(15) [But the statute has exeepted cases of treason, felony and breach of tho peace, in •which

the execution of a lawful warrant or process is allowed upon a Sunday.]
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the court above, (o) Such is that ad satisfaciendum, when a prisoner hath

*had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff is desirous r *.JOA -•

to bring nim up to some superior court to charge him with process of I- J

execution, (p) Such also are those adprosequendum testificandum, deUbcrandum,

&c,, which issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner, in order to prose-

cute or bear testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction

wherein the fact was committed. Such is, lastly, the common writ ad facien-

dum et recipicndum which issues out of any of the courts of Westminster-

hall, when a person is sued in some inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to

remove the action into the superior court; commanding the inferior judges to

produce the body of the defendant, together with the day and cause of his

caption and detainer (whence the writ is frequently denominated an habeas

corpus cum causa) to do and receive whatsoever the king's court shall consider

in that behalf. This is a writ grantable of common right, without any motion

in court, (q) and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in the court below. But

in order to prevent the surreptitious discharge of prisoners, it is ordered by

statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 13, that no habeas corpus shall issue to remove any

prisoner out of any gaol, unless signed by some judge of the court out of

which it is awarded. And to avoid vexatious delays by removal of frivolous

causes, it is enacted by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 23, that, where the judge of an

inferior court of record is a barrister of three years' standing, no cause shall be

removed from thence by habeas corpus or other writ, after issue or demurrer
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delibeiately joined: that no cause, if once remanded to the inferior court by

writ of procedendo or otherwise, shall ever afterwards be again removed;

and that no cause shall be removed at all, if the debt or damages laid

in the declaration do not amount to the sum of five pounds. But an

expedient (r) having been found out to elude the latter branch of the statute,

by procuring a nominal plaintiff to bring another action for five pounds or

upwards (and then by the course of the coujt, the habeas corpus removed both

actions together), it is therefore enacted by statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, that the

inferior *court may proceed in such actions as are under the value of r^n-i -\

five pounds, notwithstanding other actions may be brought against the L J

same defendant to a greater amount. And by statute 19 Geo. Ill, c. 70, no cause,

under the value of ten pounds, shall be removed by habeas corpus, or otherwise,

into any superior court, unless the defendant so removing the same, shall give

special bail for payment of the debt and costs.

But the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement, is

that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining an-

other, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day

and cause of his caption and detention, ad faciendum, subjiciendum, et recipien-

dum, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding such

writ shall consider in that behalf, (s) This is a high prerogative writ, and

therefore by the common law issuing out of the court of king's bench not only

in term-time, but also during the vacation, (t) (16) by a, fiat from the chief jus-

tice or any other of the judges, and running into all parts of the king's domin-

ions ; for the king is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of

an v of his subjects is restrained, (u) wherever that restraint may be inflicted. If

it issues in vacation, it is usually returnable before the judge himself who awarded

it, and he proceeds by himself thereon; (v) unless the term shall intervene, and -

then it may be returned in court, (w) Indeed, if the party were privileged in

the courts of common pleas and exchequer, as being (or supposed to be) an offi-

foj 2 Mod. 1W. (p) 2 Lilly Prnc,. Beg. 4. (a) 2 Mod. 306.

(r) Bolmn. InttU. Legal. 85, ccfit. 1708. (t) St. Trials, viii, 143.

(t) T\\cpluHe»hal>en* corpus directed to Berwick in 13 Eliz. (cited Burr. 256), was tastc'd die Jovis prox

pott qwinden' Sancti Martini. It appears, by referring to the dominical letter of that year, that this auiij.

data (Nov. 2.1) happened that year on a Saturday. The Thursday after was therefore the 30th of November

—two dnyd after the expiration of the term.

(v) Cro. Jan. 543. fr; Burr. 6S8. (v) Ibid. 460, 642, 608.

(16) [See Leonard Watson's Cose, 9 Ad. uud E. 731.]
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cer or suitor of the court, an luibeas corpus ad subjiciendum might also by com-

mon law have been awarded from thence ; («) and, if the cauae of imprison-

ment were palpably illegal, they might have discharged him: (y) but, if he

were committed for any criminal matter, they could only have remanded him,

or taken bail for his appearance in the court of king's bench (z) which occa-

sioned the common pleas for some time to discountenance such applications*

F *132 1 s'nce *ne *mention of the king's bench and common pleas, as co-

L -I ordinate in this jurisdiction, by statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, it hath been

holden, that every subject of the kingdom is equally entitled to the benefit of

the common law writ, in either of those courts, at his option, (a) (17) It hath

also been said, and by very respectable authorities, (b) that the like habeas corpus

may issue out of the court of chancery in vacation ; but upon the famous ap-

plication to Lord Nottingham by Jenks, notwithstanding the most diligent

searches, no precedent could be found where the chancellor had issued such a

writ in vacation, (c) and therefore his lordship refused it (18.)

r*;2Inst 55. 4Inst. 290. 1H>1. P. C. 141. SVentr. 24. fy) Van/rh. 155.

(z) Carter, 221. t Jon. 18. fa) 2 Mod. IftS. Wood's Case. 0. B. Hill. 11 Goo. TIL

(b) 4 lust. i82, 2 Ilnl. F. C. 147. (<:) Lord Nott. M3S. Kep. July, 111711.

(17) [And now out of the court of exchequer. See 56 Geo. Ill, c. 100, R. 2.]

(18) [It was determined, after a very elaborate investigation of all the authorities by Lord

Eldon in Growler's Case, that the lord chancellor con issue the writ of habeas corpus at common

law in vacation, overruling the decision in Jenks's Case. See 2 Swarat. L
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The benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, which was limited by the former acts to cases of

commitment or detainer for criminal, or supposed criminal, matter has been still further ex-

tended by the 59 Geo. Ill, c. 100, Which enacts, that any one of the judges may issue a writ

of habeas corpus in vacation, returnable immediately, before himself or any other judge of the

same court in cases other than for criminal matter 'or for debt ; and the non-observance of such

writ is to be deemed a contempt of court. But if the writ be awarded so late in the vacation

that the return cannot be conveniently made before term, then it is to be made returnable in

court at a (lay certain. And if the writobe awarded late in term, it be may be made returnable

in vacation in like manner. The act applies to Ireland as well as England, and the writ may

run into enmities palatine, cinque ports, and privileged places, &<••., Berwick-npon Tweed, and

the isles of Guernsey, Jersey, or Man.

The writ of habeas corpus is the privilege of the British subject only, and therefore cannot be

obtained by an alien enemy, or a prisoner of war. See the case of the three Spanish sailors, 2

Blk. 1324 ; 2 Burr. 765. The relief in such cases is by application to the secretary at war. On

a commitment by either house uf parliaineut for contempt or breach of privilege, the courts at

Westminster cannot discharge on a habeas corpus ; although on the return of the writ such

commitment should appear illegal ; for they have no power to control the privileges of parlia-

ment. 2 Hawk. «. 15, t. 73 ; 8 T. R. 314.

The writ of habeas corpus, whether at common law or under 31 Car. II, c. 2, does not issue as

a matter of course upon application in the first instance, but must be grounded on on affidavit,

upon which the court are to exercise their discretion whether the writ shall issue or uot.

3 B. and A. 420 ; 2 Chitty R. 207. A habeas corpus cum causa does not lie to remove proceedings

from an inferior jurisdiction, into the court of K. B., unless it appears that the defendant is

actually or virtually in the custody of the court below. 1 B. and C. 513 ; 2 Dowl. and R.

722. The court of K. B. will grant a habeas corpus to the warden of the Fleet, to take a pris-

oner confined there for debt before a magistrate, to be examined from day to day respecting a

charge of felony or misdemeanor. 5 B. and A. 730. The court of exchequer will not grant

a habeas corpus to enable the defendant in an information, who ig confined in a county gaol

for a libel under -the sentence of another court, to attend at Westminster to conduct hia do-

fence in person ; — the application should be made to the court by whom the defendant was

sentenced. 9 Price, 147. Nor will the court of K. B. grant a writ of habeas corpus to bring up

a defendant under sentence of imprisonment for a misdemeanor, to enable him to show cause in

person against a rule for a criminal information. 3 B. and A. 679, n. "Where there are articles of

separation between the husband and wife, if the husband afterwards confine her, she may have

a habeas corpus and be set at liberty. 13 Knst, 173, n. A habeas corpus will be granted in th«

first instance, to bring up an infant who has absconded from his father and was detained by

a third person without his consent. 4 Moore, 366. The court will not grant a habeas corpus to

bring up the body of a feme-covert on an affidavit that she is desirous of disposing of her sep-

arate property, and that her husband will not admit the necessarv parties, and that she is con-

fined by illness and not likely to live long ; nor will they, under such circumstances, grant a

rule to show cause why the necessarv parties should not be admitted to see her, for if there be

no restraint of personal liberty, the" matter is only cognizable in a court of equity. 1 Chitty

K. 654. The court on affidavit, suggesting probable cause to believe that a helpless and ig-

norant female foreigner wag exhibited for money without her consent, granted a rule on her
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IB the king's bench and common pleas it is necessary to apply for it by mo-

tion to the court, (rf) as in the case of all other prerogative writs (certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, &c.), which do not issue as of mere course, without

showing some probable cause why the extraordinary power of the crown is called

in to the partjns assistance. For, as was argued by Lord Chief Justice Vaughau,

(e) " it is granted on motion, because it cannot be had of course ; and there is,

therefore, no necessity to grant it; for the court ought to be satisfied that the

party hath a probable cause to be delivered." And this seems the more reason-

able, because (when once granted) the person to whom it is directed can return

no satisfactory excuse for not bringing up the body of the prisoner.(/) So that

if it issued of mere course, without showing to thecourt or judge some reasonable

ground for awarding it, a traitor or felon under sentence of death, a soldier or

mariner in the king's service, a wife, a child, a relation, or a domestic, confined for

insanity, or other prudential reasons, might obtain a temporary enlargement by

suing out habeas corpus, though sure to be remanded as soon as brought up to

the court And, therefore, Sir Edward Coke, when chief justice, did not scruple,

in 13 Jac. I, to deny a habeas corpus to one confined by the court of admiralty

for piracy; there appearing, upon his own showing, sufficient grounds to

*confine him. (g) On the other hand, if a probable ground be shown, r *i oq i

that the party is imprisoned without just cause, (h) and therefore hath "• J

a right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus is then a writ of right, which

" may not be denied, but ought to be granted to every man that is committed,
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or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained, though it be by the command of

the king, the privy council, or any other." (i)

In a former part of these Commentaries (k) we expatiated at large on the

personal liberty of the subject This was shown to be a natural inherent right,

which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some

great and atrocious crime, and which ought not to be abridged in any case

without the special permission of law. A doctrine coeval with the first rudi-

ments of the English constitution, and handed down to us, from our Saxon

ancestors, notwithstanding all their struggles with the Danes, and the violence

of the Norman conquest: asserted afterwards and confirmed by the conqueror

himself and his descendants; and though sometimes a little impaired by the

ferocity of the times, and the occasional despotism of jealous or usurping

(il) 5 Mod. aort. 11.cv. 1. (t) Bushel's Case, 2 Jon. 13. (f) Cro. Jac. 643.

fgj 3 Bnlstr. 27. See also 2 Roll. Ecp. 138. (h} S lust. CIS.

(ij Com. Jour. 1 Apr. Hfcis. (k) Book I, cb. 1.

keepers to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue to bring her before the

court, and directed an examination before the coroner and attorney of the court, in the pres-

ence of the parties applying and applied against. Ex parte Hottentot Venus, 13 East, 195.

The writ will be granted to a military officer under arrest for charges of misconduct, if he be not

brought to trial pursuant to the articles of war, as soon as a court-martial can be conveniently

assembled, unless the delay is satisfactorily explained. '2 M. and S. 428. The court will grant

a habeas corpus to bring 'up the body of a bastard child within the ago of nurture, for the

purpose of restoring it to its mother, from whom it had been taken, first by fraud, and then by

force, without prejudice to the question of guardianship, which belongs to the lord chancellor.

7 East, 579. Where a prisoner is brought up under a habeas corpus issued at common law, he

may controvert the truth of the return by virtue of the 5(i Geo. Ill, c. 100, } 4. 4 B. and C. 136.

Prisoner committed for manslaughter, upon the return of the habeas corpus was allowed to

give bail in the country, by reason of his poverty, which rendered him unable to appear with

Bail in court. 6 M. and S. 108; 1 B. and A. 209; 2 Chit. Rep. 110.

With respect to the return. It ocems efficient to set forth, that the defendant is in custody

under the sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction to inquire of the offence and pass

such sentence, without setting forth the particular circumstances necessary to warrant such a

sentence, 1 East, 306; 5 Dow. 199, 200. The court will not extend matter dehors the return,

in support of the sentence or proceeding against the prisoner: 2 M. and S. 226; nor go into

the merits, But decide upon the return of a regular conviction prima facie. 7 East, 376.

Where a defendant was committed by an ecclesiastical judge of appeal for contumacy in not

paying costs, and the significavit only described the suit to be " a certain cause of appeal and

complaint of nullity," without showing that the defendant was committed for a cause within

the jurisdiction of the spiritual judge, it was held, that the defendant was entitled to be dis-

charged on habeas corpus. 5 B. and A. 791; 1 bowl, and By. 460.]

•
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princes, yet established on the firmest basis by the provisions of magna earta,

and a long succession of statutes enacted under Edward III. To assert an

absolute exemption from imprisonment in all cases, is inconsistent with every

idea of law and political society; and in the end would destroy all civil liberty,

by rendering its protection impossible: but the glory of the English law con-

sists in clearly defining the times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore,

and to what degree the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful. This it

is, which induces the absolute necessity of expressing upon every commitment

the reason for which it is made: that the court npon an habeas corpus muy

examine into its validity; and according to the circumstances of the case may

discharge, admit to bail, or remand the prisoner.

f *1S41 *And yet early in the reign of Charles I, the court of king's bench,

L J relying on some arbitrary precedents (and those perhaps misunderstood)

determined (I) that they could not upon an habeas corpus either bail or deliver

a prisoner, though committed without any cause assigned, in case he was com-

mitted by the special command of the king, or by the lords of the privy

council. This drew on a parliamentary inquiry, and produced the petition of

right, 3 Car. I, which recites this illegal judgment, and enacts that no freeman

hereafter shall be so imprisoned or detained. But when, in the following

year, Mr. Selden and others were committed by the lords of the council, in

pursuance of his majesty's special command, under a general charge of " notable

contempts and stirring up sedition against the king and government," the
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judges delayed for two terms (including also the long vacation) to deliver an

opinion how far such a charge was bailable. And when at length they agreed

that it was, they however annexed a condition of finding sureties for the good

behaviour, which still protracted their imprisonment, the chief justice, Sir

Nicholas Hyde, at the same time declaring, (m) that " if they were again

remanded for that cause, perhaps the court would not afterwards grant a

habeas corpus, being already made acquainted with the cause of the imprison-

ment." But this was heard with indignation and astonishment by every lawyer

present: according to Mr. Selden's own (ri) account of the matter, whose

resentment was not cooled at the distance of four-and-twenty years.

These pitiful evasions gave rise to the statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, § 8, whereby

it is enacted, that if any person be committed by the king himself in person,

F *135 1 or y n^8 Pr*vv *council>or by any °f the members thereof, he shall have

L -I granted unto him, without any delay upon any pretence whatsoever, a

writ of habeas corpus, upon demand or motion made to the court of king's

bench or common pleas; who shall thereupon, within three court days after

the return is made, examine and determine the legality of such commitment,

and do what to justice shall appertain, in delivering, bailing, or remanding

such prisoner. let still in the case of Jenks, before alluded to, (o) who in 1670

was committed by the king in council for a turbulent speech at Guildhall, (p)

new shifts and devices were made use of to prevent his enlargement by law,

the chief justice (as well as the chancellor) declining to award a writ of habeas

corpus ad subjiciendum, in vacation, though at last he thought proper to award

the usual writs ad deliberandum, &c., whereby the prisoner was discharged at

the Old Bailey. Other abuses had also crept into daily practice, which had

in some measure defeated the benefit of this great constitutional remedy. The

party imprisoning was at liberty to delay his obedience to the first writ, and

might wait till a second and a third, called an alias and a pluries, were issued,

before he produced the party; and many other vexatious shifts were practiced

to detain state-prisoners in custody. But whoever will attentively consider

the English history, may observe, that the flagrant abuse of any power, by the

crown or its ministers, has always been productive of a struggle; which either

(I) St.ito Tr. vil. 136. (m) Kid. 240.

(n) " Etiam judicum tune primariuf, nisi illud faceremus, rescript* ittiuf forensit, qui libcrtatis per*

sonalis omnitnotitE vindcx tegittmus eitfere solus, usum omnimoftum palam pronuntiftrii (svi semper similis)

nolii* ptrpetuo in patterum dtaiegandum. Quott. ut mliontmiiiiiim jurti prmitgium, Kx'eittioribut lac untrerni

crnsuum." ( Vinuic.Mar. clau». edit. A. />. VKR.i

(uj Vane 13:!. (pj Slate Tr. vii, 471.
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discovers the exercise of that power to be contrary to law, or (if legal) restrains

it for the future. This was the case in the present instance. 'The oppression

of an obscure individual gave birth to the famous habeas corpus act. 31 Car. II,

c, 2, which is frequently considered as another magna carlo, (fj) of the kingdom;

and by consequence and analogy has also in subsequent times reduced the gen-

eral method of proceeding on these writs (though not within the reach of that

statute, but issuing merely at the common law) to the true standard of law and

liberty. (19)

*The statute itself enacts, 1. That on complaint and request in writ- r ^gg ••

ing by or on behalf of any person committed and charged with any L ' -"

crime, (unless committed for treason or felony expressed in the warrant; or as

accessory, or on suspicion of being accessory, before the fact, to any petit-

treason or felony: or upon suspicion of such petit-treason or felony, plainly

expressed in the warrant; or unless he is convicted or charged in execution

by legal process), the lord chancellor or anv of the twelve judges, in vacation,

upon viewing a copy of the warrant, or affidavit that a copy is denied, shall

(unless the party has neglected for two terms to apply to any court for his

enlargement) award a habeas corpus for such prisoner, returnable immediately

before himself or any other of the judges; and upon the return made shall

discharge the party, if bailable, upon giving security to appear and answer to

the accusation in the proper court of judicature. 2. That such writs shall be

indorsed, as granted in pursuance of tliis act, and signed by the person award-
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ing them. 3. That the writ shall be returned and the prisoner brought up,

within a limited time according to the distance, not exceeding in any case

twenty days. 4. That officers and keepers neglecting to make due returns, or

not delivering to the prisoner or his agent within six hours after demand a

copy of the warrant of commitment, or shifting the custody of a prisoner from

one to another, without sufficient reason or authority (specified in the act), shall

for the first offence forfeit 100?., and for the second offence 200?., to the party

frieved, and be disabled to hold his office. 5. That no person once delivered

y habeas corpus, shall be recommitted for the same offence, on penalty of 500?.

6. That every person committed for treason or felony shall, if he requires it the

first week of the next term, or the first day of the next session of oyer and ter-

miner, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted to bail: unless the

king's witnesses cannot be produced at that time: and if acquitted, or if not

indicted and tried in the second term, or session, he shall be discharged from

his imprisonment for such imputed offence: but that no person, after the

assizes shall be *open for the county in which he is detained, shall be r „,, ™ -i

removed by habeas corpus, till after the assizes are ended; but shall be L "' '

left to the justice of the judges of assize. 7. That any such prisoner may

move for and obtain his habeas corpus, as well out of the chancery or ex-

chequer, as out of the king's bench or common pleas; and the lord chancellor

or judges denying the same, on sight of the warrant, or oath that the same

is refused, forfeit severally to the party grieved the sum of 500?. 8. That this

writ of habeas corpus shall run into the counties palatine, cinque ports, and

other privileged places, and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. 9. That no

inhabitant of England (except persons contracting, or convicts praying, to be

transported; or, having committed some capital offence in the place to which

they are sent), shall be sent prisoner to Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or

any places beyond the seas, within or without the king's dominions; on pain

that the party committing, his advisers, aiders, and assistants, shall forfeit to

(<i) See book 1, ch. 1.

(19) Mr. Hallam (Const Hist. ch. xiii), gives a different account of the passing of the

habeas corpus act, and shows that the case of Jenks had very little to do -with it. The act

conferred no new rights, but only furnished more complete means for enforcing those -vrhich

existed before. Hallatn's Const. Hist. ch. xiii; Beeching's Case, 4 B. and C. 136; Matter of

Jackson, 15 Mich. 43H.
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the party aggrieved a sum not leas than 500?., to be recovered with treble costs;

shall be disabled to bear any office of trust or profit; ahull incur the penalties

of prefmunire; and shall be incapable of the king's pardon.

This is the substance of that great and important statute: which extends (we

may observe) only to the case of commitments for such criminal charge, as can

produce no inconvenience to public justice by a temporary enlargement of the

prisoner: all other cases of unjust imprisonment being left to the Imbeds corpu*

at common law. But even upon writs at the common law it is now expected

by the court, agreeable to ancient precedents (r) and the spirit of the act of

parliament, that the writ should be immediately obeyed, without waiting for

any alias or pluries; otherwise an attachment will issue. By which admirable

regulations, judicial as well as parliamentary, the remedy is now complete for

removing the injury of unjust and illegal confinement. A remedy the more

necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from the ill-nature, but

r ,^30 -, sometimes from the mere inattention of'government For it frequently

"• -1 happens in foreign countries (and has happened in England during tem-

porary suspensions («) of the statute), that persons apprehended upon suspicion

nave suffered a long imprisonment, merely because they were forgotten. (20)

The satisfactory remedy for this injury of false imprisonmeat is by an action

of trespass vi et armis, usually called an action of false imprisonment: which is

generally, and almost unavoidably, accompanied with a charge of assault and

battery also : and therein the party shall recover damages for the injury he has
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received; and also the defendant is, as for all other injuries committed with

force, or vi et armis, liable to pay a fine to the king for the violation of the pub-

lic peace. (21)

IIL With regard to the third absolute right of individuals, or that of private

property, though the enjoyment of it, when acquired, is strictly a personal right,

yet as its nature and original, and the means of its acquisition or loss, fell more

directly under our second general division, of the rights -of things; and as, of

course, the wrongs that affect these rights must be referred to the corresponding

division in the present book of our Commentaries; I conceive it will be more

commodious and easy to consider together rather than in a separate view, the

injuries.

(r) Knrr. 856. (•) Scel.ook I, page IK.

(20) [Besides the efficacy of the writ of habeas corpiis in liberating the subject from illegal

confinement, in a public prison, it also extends its influence to remove every unjust restraint of

personal freedom in private life, though imposed by a husband or a father ; but when women

or infants are brought before the court by an linlmts corpus, the court will only set them free

from an unmerited or unreasonable confinement, and will not determine the validity of a

marriage, or the right to the guardianship, but will leave them at liberty to choose where they

will go; and if there be any reason to apprehend that they will be seized in returning from

the court, they will be sent home under the protection of an officer. But if a child is too yonng

to have any discretion of its own, then the court will deJiver it into the custody of its parent,

or the person who appears to be its legal guardian. See 3 Burr. 1434, where all the prior cases

are considered by Lord Mansfield.

If an equivocal return is made to an habeas corpus, the court will immediately grant an

attachment. 5 T. K. 89.]

As a general role the protection of personal liberty in the United States is left to state juris-

dictions, and the highest court in each state, and the judges thereof, and generally some other

courts and judicial officers, are empowered to issue the writ of habeas corpus for that purpose.

The federal courts of record and the judges thereof have, however, a jurisdiction conferred

upon them in cases of imprisonment under pretence of federal authority, and also in certain

other cases of imprisonment, where the questions involved make the writ important to the

enforcement of some national authority, or are such as might involve the country iu difficulty

with a foreign nation. See 1 Statutes at Largo, 81; 4 id. 634; 5 id. 539. On this subject in gen-

eral the valuable treatise of Mr. Hnrd on the writ of habeas corpus should be consulted. The state

courts may issue the writ in the case of confinement under federal authority, but when return

i.s made that the party is held under such authority, they cnnnnot proceed further, and the legality

of the imprisonment must be determined by the federal tribunals. Ableman ». Booth. 21 How. 506.

(21) [Since the common law procedure act, 1852, this fine to the king (for which formerly

judgment was awarded by the court as a matter of form) no longer appears in thu judgment.]
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that may be offered to the enjoyment, as well as to the rights, of property. And

therefore I shall here conclude the head of injuries affecting the absolute rights

of individuals.

We are next to contemplate those which affect their relative rights; or such

as are incident to persons considered as members of society, and connected to

each other by various ties and relations ; and, in particular, such injuries as may

be done to persons under the four following relations, husband and wife, parent

•4nd child, guardian and ward, master and servant.

*I. Injuries that may be offered to a person, considered as ahusbtmd,

'

or criminal conversation with her ; and beat-ing or otherwise abusing her. 1. As

to the first sort, abduction, or taking her away, this may either be by fraud and

persuasion, or open violence : though the law in both cases supposes force and

constraint, the wife having no power to consent; and therefore gives a remedy

by writ of ravishment, or action of trespass m et armis, de uxore rapta et abducta.(t)

This action lay at the common law ; and thereby the husband shall recover, not

the possession (u) of his wife, but damages for taking her away : and by statute

Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 13, the offender shall also be imprisoned two years, and

l>e fined at the pleasure of the king. Both the king and the husband may there-

fore have this action ; (to) and the husband is also entitled to recover damages

in an action on the case against such as persuade and entice the wife to

live separate from him without a sufficient cause, (a;) The old law was so
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strict in this point, that if one's wife missed her way upon the road, it was not

lawful for another man to take her into his house unless she was benighted

and in danger of being lost or drowned : (y) but a stranger might carry her

behind him on horseback to market to a justice of the peace for a warrant

-against her husband, or to the spiritual court to sue for a divorce, (z) 2. Adultery,

or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it is, as a public crime, left

by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts ; yet, considered as a civil

injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law gives a satisfaction to the

husband for it by action of trespass vi et armis against the adulterer, wherein

the damages recovered are usually very large and exemplary. (23) But these

are properly increased and diminished by circumstances; (a) as the rank and

fortune of the plain tiff and defendant; the relation or *connexion between r^iAQ-i

them ; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded on her previous *• • J

behaviour and character, and the husband's obligation by settlement or other-

wise to provide for those children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious.

In this case, and upon indictments for polygamy., a marriage in fact must be

proved ; though generally, in other cases, reputation and cohabitation arc auffi-

riJT.TX.lt.8i. (•») S In»t. 434. (*•) Ifnd. (xj Lnw of nM print, 1».

(VJ Jiro. Abr. t. irejpaw, tin. (t) Era. Abr. 407, 440. (a) Law of nitipriut, 28.

(22) [If the husband 1ms parted with the right to the society of his wife, absolutely and per-

manently, has been said that he cannot support an action for a supposed injury during the

separation; bnt if agreement to separate is only conditional, or temporary, it is otherwise.

& T. K. 360 ; Puako Rep. 7 ; 6 East, 244 ; 2 Smith, 356. And if the husband has consented to

or facilitated the injury, he cannot sue. Bull. N. P. 27; 2 T. R. 116; 4 id. 655; 5 id. 3T>0;

3 Wood. 246 : mlrnii n'mi fit injuria. So if the wife be suffered to live as a prostitute with the

privity of her husband, and the defendant has been thereby drawn in to commit the act of

which the husband complain*, the action cannot be maintained: Bull. N. P. 27 ; Peakc R. 39;

but if the husband is ignorant of her prostitution, then it goes only in mitigation of damages :

Bull. N". P. 27 ; ag will his negligence or inattention to the conduct of his wife with the defend-

ant. 4 T. R. K>1. So, according to Lord Kenyon's opinion, if the husband has himself been

guilty of incontinency, he cannot sue : 4 Esp. 16; but Lord Alvanley, in a subsequent case, was

of opinion that such conduct only affected the damages. 4 Esp. R. 237. The court will

not grant a new trial in an action for criminal conversation, merely because the damages appear

to them to be excessive (4 T. R. 651), althouzh they have the power to do so. Ib. 659, u. (u).]

(23) [An action on the case may be brought, but trespass has been usually adopted. Cham-

berlin v. Hazlewood, 5 M. and \V .' 517.]

Mr. Grecnlcuf thinks the action on the case preferable. 2 Greenl. Ev. $ 40, n.

91

140 REMEDIES FOU WRONGS IN COMMON LAW COURTS. [Book III.

cient evidence of marriage, (b) 3. The third injury is that of beating a man's

wife, or otherwise ill-using her; for which, if it be a common assault, battery,

or imprisonment, the law gives the usual remedy to recover damages, by action

of trespass vi et armis, which must be brought in the names of the husband and

wife jointly: but if the beating or other mal-treatment be very enormous, so

that thereby the husband is deprived for any time of the company and assistance

of his wife, the law then gives him a separate remedy by an action of trespass

in nature of an action upon the case, for this ill-usage, per quod consortium

amisit; in which he shall recover a satisfaction in damages. (<•)

II. Injuries that may be offered to a person considered in the relation of a

parent (24) were likewise of two kinds: 1. Abduction, or taking his children

away; and, 2. Marrying his son and heir without the father's consent, whereby

during the continuance of the military tenures he lost the value of his marriage.

But this last injury is now ceased, together with the right upon which it was

grounded; for, the father being no longer entitled to the value of the marriage,

the marrying his heir does him no sort of injury for which a civil action will lie.

As to the other, or abduction, or taking away the children from the father, that

is also a matter of doubt whether it be a civil injury or no; for, before the aboli-

tion of the tenure in chivalry, it was equally a doubt whether an action would

lie for taking and carrying away any other child besides the heir; some holding

that it would not, upon the supposition that the only ground or cause of action

was losing the value of the heir^s marriage; and others holding that an action
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would lie for taking away any of the children, for that the parent had an interest

in them all, to provide for their education, (d) If, therefore, before the abolition

F*1411 °^ these tenures it was an injury to the father to take *away the rest

*• J of his children, as well as his heir (as I am inclined to think it was), it

still remains an injury, and is remediable by writ of ravishment, or action of

(bj Burr. 2057. fcj Cro. Jac. Ml, 538. (d) Cro. KHz. 770.

(24) The American authorities follow the English in holding that, in an action for debauching

the plaintiff's daughter, it is necessary to declare upon an injury to the plaintiff in the relation

of master and servant, and to give some evidence from which a loss of service may be implied.

Lee r. Hodges, 13 Grat. 726; McDaniel r. Edwards, 7 Ired. 408. If, therefore, the daughter at

the time of the seduction was actually in the service of another, as his indentured apprentice

or otherwise, the parent cannot maintain this action: South r. Denniston, 2 Watts, 474; Dain

v. Wyckoff, 7 N. Y. 191; Parker v. Meek. 3 Sueed, 29; unless the daughter was under age, and

was absent from home at the time with the consent of the parent, and with the right on his

part to recall her at any time. Martin v. Payne, 9 Johns. 3S7 ; Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459;

Mulvehall «. Millward, 11 N. Y. 343; BoydtJ. Byrd, 8 Blackf. 113; Bolton ». Miller, 6 Ind.

262; Hornketh r. Barr, 8 S. and R. 36. Or unless she was in the service of the defendant, who

had employed her with the fraudulent purpose of seduction. Dain v. Wyckoff, 18 N. Y. 45.

It is of no importance that the daughter is over twenty-one if she actually resides with her

father: Kelley r. Donnelly, 5 Md. 211; Vossel r. Cole, 10 Mo. 634; but if, being over age,

she is also not living with her father when the seduction takes place, he cannot bring the suit,

notwithstanding she returns to his house before her confinement. Nickleson r. Stryker, 10

Johns. 115. The recovery is therefore nominally based upon loss of services; but proof of

the slightest loss is sufficient; Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Geo. 603; and a loss of services will

be presumed if the plaintiff had a right to require them: Anderson v. Ryan, 3 (Him. 583 ; and

the jury may give substantial damages to compensate for the parent's anxiety and sense

of disgrace: Kendrick r. McCrary, 11 Geo. 603; Travis r. Barger, 24 Barb. 614; Dain v.

Wyckuff, 7 N. Y. 191; though these alone will not support the action. See Knight r. Wilcox,

14 N. Y. 414.

Thus it will he seen that the action is nominally for one thing, and the recovery in fact for

another; and the anomaly is so great that it has often been made the subject of comment by

courts. The New York cases upon this subject are particularly instructive. Compare espec-

ially Clark r. Fitch, 2 Wend. 459, with Bartley p. Richtmyer, 4 N. Y. 43. The legislation of several

of the states has relieved the law of some odium by authorizing suit to be brought in these cases by

the father, mother, or some other person tor the benefit of the woman, and without averment or

proof of loss of service.

It follows, from what is above stated, that any one who at the time holds the legal relation

of master to the person seduced—whether parent, guardian or employer—or with whom she lives,

.".i'il fur whom she performs services, whether for compensation agreed upon or not, may maintain

the action.
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'trespass vi et armis, defilio, velfilia, rapto vel abducto; (e) in the same manner

as the husband may have it, on account of the abduction of his wife.

III. Of a similar nature to the last is the relation of guardian and ward,

and the like actions mutatis mutandis, as are given to fathers, the guardian also has

for recovery of damages, when his ward is stolen or ravished away from him. (f)

And though guardianship in chivalry is now totally abolished, which was the

only beneficial kind of guardianship to the guardian, yet the guardian in socage

was always (g) and is still entitled to an action of ravishment, if his ward or

pupil be taken from him: but then he must account to his pupil for the dam-

ages which he so recovers, (h) And, as guardian in socage was also entitled at

common law to a writ of right of ward, de custodia terra et hceredis, in order

to recover the possession and custody of the infant, (i) so I apprehend that he

is still entitled to sue out this antiquated writ. But a more speedy and sum-

mary method of redressing all complaints relative to wards and guardians hath

of late obtained by an application to the court of chancery; which is the

supreme guardian, and has the superintendent jurisdiction of all the infants in

the kingdom. And it is expressly provided by statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, that

testamentary guardians may maintain an action of ravishment or trespass, for

recovery of any of their wards, and also for damages to be applied to the use and

benefit of the infants, (k)

IV. To the relation between master and servant, and the rights accruing

therefrom, there are two species of injuries incident. The one is, retaining a
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man's hired servant before his time is expired; the other is beating or confining

him in such a manner that he is not able to perform his work. As *to r *. .„ -,

the first, the retaining another person's servant during the time he has I J

agreed to serve his present master; this, as it is an nngentlemanlike, so it is also

an illegal act For every master has by his contract purchased for a valuable

consideration the service of his domestics for a limited time; the inveigling

or hiring his servant, which induces a breach of this contract, is therefore

an injury to the master; and for that injury the law has given him a remedy

by a special action on the case; and he may also have an action against the

servant for the non-performance of his agreement. (I) But, if the new master

•was not apprised of tjie former contract, no action lies against him, (m) unless

he refuses to restore the servant, upon demand. The other point of injury, is

that of beating, confining, or disabling a man's servant, which depends upon

the same principle as the last; viz.: the property which the master has by his

contract acquired in the labor of the servant In this case, besides the remedy

of an action of battery or imprisonment, which the servant himself as an indi-

vidual may have against the aggressor, the master also, as a recompense for his

immediate loss, may maintain an action of trespass vi et armis • in which he

must allege and prove the special damage he has sustained by the beating of his

servant, per quod servitium arnisit; (n) and then the jury will make him a pro-

portionable pecuniary satisfaction. And similar practice to which, we find also

to have obtained among the Athenians; where masters were entitled to an action

against such as beat or ill-treated their servants, (o) (25)

We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice is only taken of the

wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolution

of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom: while

the loss of the inferior by such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for

which may be this: that the inferior hath no kind of property in the company,

care, or assistance of the superior, as the *superior is held to have in •- $, ,,, -i

those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or >• •"

injury. The wife cannot recover damages for beating her husband, for she hath

fe) F.N. B. 80. ffllbid. 139. (g) Ibid. (k) Hale on F. N. I». 139.

(II V. N. B. 139. ftjt P. Wins. 103 (I) \f. N. B. 1«7. (m) 1 bid. Winch. 51.

(nj » Bap. 113. 10 Bap. 330. (o) Pott. Antiq. b, 1. o. 86.

(25) See note 24, p. 140.
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no separate interest in anything during her coverture. The child hath no prop-

erty in his father or guardian; as they have in him, for the sake of giving him

education and nurture. Yet the wife or the child, if the husband or parent be

slain, have a peculiar species of criminal prosecution allowed them, in the nature

of a civil satisfaction ; which is called an appeal, (26) and which will be con-

sidered in the next book, And so the servant, whose master is disabled, does

not thereby lose his maintenance or wages. He had no property in his master;

and if he receives his part of the stipulated contract, he suffers no injury, and

is therefore entitled to no action, for any battery or imprisonment which such

master may happen to endure.

CHAPTER IX.

OF INJURIES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.

ITS the preceding chapter we considered the wrongs or injuries that affected

the rights of persons, either considered as individuals, or as related to each

other; and are at present to enter upon the discussion of such injuries as affect

the rights of property, together with the remedies which the law has given to

repair or redress them.

And here again we must follow our former division (a) of property into per-

sonal and real: personal, which consists in goods, money, and all other movable

chattels, and things thereunto incident; a property which may attend a man's

person wherever he goes, and from thence receives its denomination: and real

property, which consists of such things as are permanent, fixed, and immova-
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ble ; as lands, tenements,- and hereditaments of all kinds, which are not annexed,

to the person, nor can be moved from the place in which they subsist.

First then we are to consider the injuries that may be offered to the rights of

personal property; and, of these, first, the rights of personal property in pos-

session, and then those that are in action only, (b)

I. The rights of personal property in possession, are liable to two species of

injuries: the amotion or deprivation of that possession; and the abuse or dam-

age of the chattels, while the possession continues in the legal owner. The

former, or deprivation of possession, is also divisible into two branches; the un-

just and unlawful taking them away; and the unjust detaining them, though

the original taking might be lawful.

F *145 1 *^" ^n<^ nr8^ °^ Hn un^awfa^ taking. The right of property in all

*- J external things being solely acquired by occupancy, as has been formerly

stated, and preserved and transferred by grants, deeds, and wills, which are a

continuation of that occupancy; it follows, as a necessary consequence, that

when I have once gained a rightful possession of any goods or chattels, either

by a just occupancy or by a legal transfer, whoever, either by fraud or force, dis-

possesses me of them, is guilty of a transgression against the law of societv,

which is a kind of secondary law of nature. For there must be an end of all

social commerce between man and man, unless private possession be secured

from unjust invasions: and, if an acquisition of goods by either force or fraud

were allowed to be a sufficient title, all property would soon be confined to the

most strong, or the most cunning; and the weak and simple-minded part of

mankind (which is by far the most numerous division) could never be secure of

their possessions.

(a) See book II, clmp. 9. (b) IMd. 45.

(26) The remedy by appeal was abolished by statute 59 Geo. Ill, o. 46, and an action for

damages is now given by statute 9 and 10 Yic. c. 93. See note p. 119, ante.
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The wrongful taking of goods being thus most clearly an injury, the next

consideration is, what remedy the law of England has given for it. And this is,

in the first place, the restitution of the goods themselves so wrongfully taken,

with damages for the loss sustained by such unjust invasion; which is effected

by action of replevin, (1) an institution which the Mirror, (c) ascribes to Glanvil,

cnief justice to King Henry the Second. This obtains only in one instance

of an unlawful taking, that of a wrongful distress: and this, and the action

of detinue (of which I shall presently say more) are almost the only actions in

which the actual specific possession of the identical personal chattel is restored

to the proper owner. For things personal are looked upon by the law as of a

nature so transitory and perishable, that it is for the most part impossible either

to ascertain their identity, or to restore them in the same condition as when

they came to the hands of the wrongful possessor. And since it is a maxim

that" lex neminem cogit ad vana, seu impossibilia" it therefore ""contents r *i AR 1

itself in general with restoring, not the thing itself, but a pecuniary L -*

equivalent to the party injured; by giving him a satisfaction in damages. But

in the case of a distress, the goods are from the first taking in the custody of the

law, and not merely in that of the distrainor; and therefore they may not only

be identified, but also restored to their first possessor, without any material

change in their condition. And being thus in the custody of the law, the tak-

ing them back by force is looked upon as an atrocious injury, and denominated a

rescous, for which the distrainor has a remedy in damages, either by writ of
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rescous, (d) in case they are going to the pound, or by writ de parco fracto, or

pound-breach, (e) in case they were actually impounded. He may also, at his

option, bring an action on the case for this injury: and shall therein, if the

distress were taken for rent, recover treble damages. (/) The term rescous is

likewise applied to the forcible delivery of a defendant, when arrested, from the

officer who is carrying him to prison. In which circumstances the plaintiff has

a similar remedy by action on the case, or of rescous: (g) (2) or, if the sheriff

makes a return of such rescous to the court out of which the process issued, the

rescuer will be punished by attachment, (h)

An action of replevin, the regular way of contesting the validity of the trans-

action, is founded, I said, upon a distress taken wrongfully and without sufficient

cause: being a redelivery of the pledge, (t) or thing taken in distress, to the

owner; upon his giving security to try the right of the distress, and to restore

it if the right be adjudged against him (/) after which the distrainor may

keep it, till tender made of sufficient amends; but must then redeliver it to the

owner, (k) And formerly, when the party distrained upon intended to dispute

the right of the distress, he had no other process by the old common law than

by a writ of replevin replegiari facias; (I) which issued out of chancery, com-

manding the sheriff to deliver the distress to the owner, and *aftewards r,,. „ ^

to do justice in respect of the matter in dispute in his own county court. L J

I C. 2, » 8. (d) F. If. B. 101.

) 6 Mod. 211. (A) Cro. Jw.. <

) 8 Kop. 147. (I) F. N. B. 68.

<c) C. 2, t 8. (d) F. If. B. 101. (e) Ibid. 100. (/) Slut, 2 W. ft M. Sew. J. o. 6.

(0)6 Mod. 211. (A) Cro. Jan. 419. Salk. 580. (fl See page IS. (f> Co. Litt. 145.

(1) Replevin is the universal remedy in the United States where chattels have been wrong-

fully taken or are wrongfully detained from the plaintiff, and he seeks to recover them in

p/ni'ir instead of a satisfaction in damages. It is a statutory action, and the statutes are con-

siderably variant. The plaintiff must have either a general or a special property in the

chattels. Speaking generally we may say that the plaintiff is required to show his right by

affidavit when he sues out the writ; that the officer seizes the property, if to be found, and

delivers it to the plaintiff, on receiving bond with sureties for its return iu case the action is

not sustained; that if the plaintiff recovers in such cases, he takes judgment for any damages

he may have proved, while if the plaintiff is defeated, the defendant takes judgment either for

a return of the property, or for its value, together with such damages as he may have shown.

But if the officer does not find the property t so that it may be delivered to the plaintiff, the

case nevertheless proceeds to judgment, and if the plaintiff recovers, he may, at his option.

have the proper wnt for 1U delivery in execution.

(2) The action of rescons has fallen into disuse, and it la usual now to bring an action on

the case.
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But this being a tedious method of proceeding, the beasts or other goods were

long detained from the owner, to his great loss and damage, (m) For which

reason the statute of Marlbridge (n) directs, that (without suing a writ out of

the chancery) the sheriff immediately, upon plaint to him made, shall proceed to

replevy the goods. And, for the greater ease of the parties, it is farther provided

by statute 1 P. and M. c. 12, that the sheriff shall make at least four deputies in

each county, for the sole purpose of making replevins. Upon application, there-

fore, either to the sheriff or one of his said deputies, security is to be given, in

pursuance of the statute of Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 2. 1. That the party replevy-

ing will pursue his action against the distrainor, for which purpose he puts in

plegios de prosequendo, or pledges to prosecute; and, 2. That if the right be

determined against him, he will return the distress again; for which purpose he

is also bound to find plegios de retorno habendo. Besides these pledges, the

sufficiency of which is discretionary and at the peril of the sheriff, the statute

11 Geo. II, c. 19, requires that the officer granting a replevin on a distress for

rent, shall take a bond with two sureties in a sum of double the value of the goods

distrained, conditioned to prosecute the suit with effect and without delay,

and for return of the goods; which bond shall be assigned to the avowant or

person making cognizance, on request made to the officer; and, if forfeited, may

be sued in the name of the assignee. (3) And certainly as the end of all dis-

tresses is only to compel the party distrained upon to satisfy the debt or duty owing

from him, this end is as well answered by such sufficient sureties as by retain-
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ing the very distress, which might frequently occasion great inconvenience to the

owner; and that the law never wantonly inflicts. The sheriff, on receiving such

security, is immediately, by his officers, to cause the chattels taken in distress to

be restored into the possession of the party distrained upon: unless the distrainor

claims a property in the goods so taken. For if, by this method of distress, the

f *1481 distrainor *happens to come again into possession of his own property in

"• •• goods which before he had lost, the law allows him to keep them, with-

out any reference to the manner by which he thus has gained possession; being

a kind of personal remitter, (o) If, therefore, the distrainor claims any such

property, the party replevying must sue out a writ de proprietate probanda, in

which the sheriff is to try, by an inquest, in whom the property previous to the

distress subsisted. (p) And if it be found to be in the distrainor, the sheriff can

proceed no farther; but must return the claim of property to the court of king's

bench or common pleas, to be there farther prosecuted, if thought advisable, and

there finally determined, (q)

But if no claim of property be put in, or if (upon trial) the sheriff's inquest

determines it against the distrainor; then the sheriff is to replevy the goods

(making use of even force, if the distrainor makes resistance), (r) in case the

goods be found within his county. But if the distress be carried out of the

county, or concealed, then the sheriff may return that the goods, or beasts, are

eloigned, elongata, carried to a distance, to places to him unknown; and there-

upon the party replevying shall have a writ of capias in withernam, in vetito

(or more properly, repetito) natnio ; a term which signifies a second or reciprocal

distress, (s) in lieu of the first which was eloigned. It is therefore a command

to the sheriff to take other goods of the distrainor, in lieu of the distress for-

merly taken, and eloigned or withheld from the owner, (t) So that there is now

distress against distress; one being taken to answer the other, by way of

reprisal, (M) and as a punishment for the illegal behaviour of the original dis-

(m) 2 Inst. 139. (n) 52 Hen. in, o. 21. (o) See page 19. (p) Fmob, L. 316.

(17) Co. I.it!. I IS. Finch, I,. 420. (r) 2 fust. 183.

!») Smith's Comraonw. b. 8, c. 10. 4 Inst. 141. Hlckes's Thunur. 1M. («) F. N. B. 69. 78.

(«) In the old northern languages the word withernam is used as equivalent to repritalt. iStlernhook. de

jure Sueon. I. 1, o. 10.)

(3) But now by statute 19 and 20 Via. o. 108, the registrar of the county court of the district in

which the distress is taken may grant replevins; the replcvisor giving such security as the

registrar may direct, that he will pursue his action against the distrainor, either in one of the

superior courts of law, or in the county court.
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trainor. For Which reason, goods taken in loithernam cannot be replevied till

the original distress is forthcoming. (<•)

*But in common cases, the goods are delivered back to the party •- *i <n -i

replevying, who is then bound to bring his action of replevin ; which *• •*

may be prosecuted in the county court, be the distress of what value it may. (w)

But either party may remove it to the superior courts of king's bench or com-

mon pleas, by writ of recordari or pone; (x) the plaintiff at pleasure, the defen-

dant upon reasonable cause; (y) and also in the course of proceeding any right

of freehold comes in question, the sheriff can proceed no farther; (z) so that it is

usual to carry it up in the first instance to the courts of Westminster-hall. (4)

Upon this action brought, and declaration delivered, the distrainor, who is now

the defendant, makes avowry; that is, he avows taking the distress in his own

right, or the right of his wife; (a) and sets forth the reason of it, as for rent arrere,

damage done, or other cause: or else, if he justifies in another's right, as his

bailiff or servant, he is said to make cognizance; that is, he acknmoledges the

taking, but insists that such taking was legal, as he acted by the command

of one who had a right to distrain; and on the truth and legal merits of this

avowry or cognizance the cause is determined. If it be determined for the

plaintiff, viz.: that the distress was wrongfully taken; he has already got his

goods back into his own possession, and shall keep them, and moreover recover

damages, (b) But if the defendant prevails, by the default or nonsuit of the

plaintiff, then he shall have a writ de rctoruo liabendo, whereby the goods or
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chattels (which were distrained and then replevied) are returned again into his

custody; to be sold, or otherwise disposed of, as if no replevin had been made.

And at the common law, the plaintitf might have brought another replevin,

and so in infinitmn to the intolerable vexation of the defendant. Wherefore the

statute *of Westm. 2, c. 3, restrains the plaintift, when nonsuited, from I-*IKQ'I

suing out any fresh replevin; but allows him a, judicial writ, issuing out •• *

of the original record, and called a writ of second deliverance, in order to have

the same distress again delivered to him, on giving the like security as before.

And, if the plaintiff be a second time nonsuit, or if the defendant has judgment

upon verdict or demurrer in the first replevin, he shall have a writ of return

irreplevisable; after which no writ of second deliverance shall be allowed, (c)

But in case of a distress for rent arrere, the writ of second deliverance is ia

effect (d) taken away by statute 17 Car. II, c. 7, which directs that, if the plain-

tiff be nonsuit before issue joined, then upon suggestion made on the record

in nature of an avowry or cognizance; or if judgment be given against him

on demurrer, then, without any such suggestion, the defendant may have a

writ to inquire into the value of the distress by a jury, and shall recover the

amount of it in damages, if less than the arrear of rent; or, if more, then so

much as shall be equal to such arrear, with costs; or, if the nonsuit be after

issue joined, or if a verdict be against the plaintiff, then the jury impannelled to

fr) Kaym. 475. The substance of this rale composed the terms of that famous question, with which

Sir Thomas Moore (when a student on hU travels) is said to have puzzled a pragmatical professor in

the university of Bruges in Flanders; who gave a universal challenge to dispute with any person in

science ; in bmni tcibili, et de quallbtt ente. Upon which Mr. Moore sent him this question, " utrun

an rlit caructn, aiptn in ri'litn nnmio tint irrfpliyiiiilin." whether beasts of the plough, taken la taiHt-

fTmiiti. are incapable of being replevied. (Hodtiesd. c. 5.)

(w)t Iiwt. 139. (x) Ibid. 2S. (y) F. N. B. 69, 70. (z) Finch, L. 317.

(a) t Sannd. 19S. (b) F. N. B. 88. (e) » Inet. MO. (d) \ Ventr. 6*.

(4) [Now however, by statute 9 and 10 Tic. c. 95, s. 119, all actions of replevin in cast's of dis-

tress for rent in atrear or damage feasant shall be brought without writ in the new county court,

and (section 120) in the court holden for the district wherein the distress was taken. But (sec-

tion 121) in case either party declare to the court that the title to any hereditament, or to any

toll-market, fair, or franchise ia in question, or that the rent or damage in respect of which thie

distress was taken exceeds 20Z., and becomes bound, with two sureties, to prosecute the suit

•without delay, and to prove that such title was in dispute, or that there was ground for believ-

ing the rent or damage to exceed 201., then the action may be removed before any court compe-

tent to try the same, which is done not by reeordari, but by writ of certiorari, the new county

courts being courts of record, which the shiremotes were not.]

See also statute 19 and 80 Yio. o. 108, «. 67.
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try the cause shall assess such arrears for the defendant : and if (in any of these

cases) the distress be insufficient to answer the arrears distrained for, the defen-

dant may take a farther distress or distresses, (e) But otherwise, if, pending a

replevin for a former distress, a man distrains again for the same rent or service,

then the party is not driven to his action of replevin, but shall have a writ of

recaption (/) and recover damages for the defendant the redistrainor'B contempt

of the process of the law.

In like manner, other remedies for other unlawful takings of a man's goods

consist only in recovering a satisfaction in damages. And if a man takes the

goods of another out of his actual or virtual possession, without having a lawful

title so to do. it is an injury ; which, though it does not amount to felony unless

it be done aniino furandi, is nevertheless a transgression, for which an action of

F*1511 tresPa*s t>l gt drmis *w\l\ lie ; wherein the plaintiff shall not recover the

*• •• thing itself, but only damages for the loss of it. (5) Or, if committed

without force, the party may, at his choice, have another remedy in damages by

action of trover and conversion, of which I shall presently say more.

2. Deprivation of possession may also be by an unjust detainer of another's

goods, though the original faking was lawful. As if I distrain another's cattle

damage-feasant, and before they are impounded he tenders me sufficient

amends ; now, though the original taking was lawful, my subsequent detain-

ment of them after tender of amends is wrongful, and he shall have an action

of replevin against me to recover them : (g) in which he shall recover damages
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only for the detention and not for the caption, because the original taking was

lawful. Or, if I lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it, this

injury consists in the detaining, and not in the original taking, and the regular

method for me to recover possession is by action of detinue, (/i) In this action

of detinue it is necessary to ascertain the thing detained, in such manner as that

it may be specifically known and recovered. Therefore it cannot be brought for

money, corn, or the like; for that cannot be known from other money or corn ;

unless it be in a bag or sack, for then it may be distinguishably marked. In

order, therefore, to ground an action of detinue, which is only for the detaining,

these points are necessary: (i) 1. That the defendant came lawfully into posses-

sion of these goods, as either by delivery to him, or finding them ; 2. That the

plaintiff have a property ; 3. That the goods themselves be of some value ; and,

4 That they be ascertained in point of identity. Upon this the jury, if they

find for the plaintiff, assess the respective values of the several parcels detained,

and also damages for the detention. And the judgment is conditional ; that the

plaintiff recover the said goods, or (if they cannot be had) their respective

values, and also the damages for detaining them. ( /") (6) But there is one disad-

fej Stnt. 17 Car. II, o. 7. (f) F. N. B. 71. (g) F. N. B. «9. 3 Rep. 1*7. fkj F. N. B. 1S8.

CO Co. Lilt. 488. ()) Co. fentr. 170. Cro.Jac. Ikll.

(5) [In order to sushi in trespass for taking goods, the actual or constructive possession mast

be vrsirii in the plaintiff at the time the act complained of was done. For instance, the lord

before seizure may bring the action against a stranger who should carry off an estray or

•wreck ; for the right of possession, and thence the constructive possession, is in him. So the

executor has the right immediately on the death ol the testator, and the right draws after it a

constructive possession. 1. T. R. 480 ; 9 Saund. 47, in notes. See 1 Chitty on PI. 4th ed. 151

to 159.]

To entitle one to maintain trespass de bonii nsportatis the taking must have bpen wrongful

and against the will of the plaintiff, but need not have been with actual force. Gibbs r. Chase,

10 Mass. 125. If the plaintiff delivers the property to defendant under a fraudulent purchase,

he cannot, on discovery of the fraud, bring trespass. MoCarty ». Viokory, 12 Johns. 848. And

see Prince v. Puckett, 12 Ala. 832. But an officer who has rightfully taken possession of prop-

ertr by virtue of process may sometimes render himself a trespasser ab mi tin, by abnso of his

authority by any act of unlawful forco. See 2 Greenl. Ev. $ 615. And the same is true of any

person who abuses an authority the law confers upon him. See post, p. 213.

(6) In an action of detinue, if the plaintiff recovered, and the subject of the gnit possessed

peculiar value so that a recovery of the damages might not be an adequate remedy,' the court of

equity sometimes interfered to compel specific d«hvery, but this is now unnecessary, as the

courta of common law possess the same power under the common law procedure act of 1854.

98

Chap. 9.] ACTION OF TROVER. 151

vantage which attends this action; viz.: that the defendant is herein permitted

to wage his law, that is to *exculpate himself by oath, (k) and thereby r +-. ^ -i

defeat the plaintiff of his remedy: which privilege is grounded on the *• -"

confidence originally reposed in the bailee by the bailor, in the borrower by the

lender, and the like; from whence arose a strong presumptive evidence, that in

the plaintiff's own opinion the defendant was worthy of credit But for this

reason the action itself is of late much disused, and has given place to the action

of trover. (7)

This action of trover (8) and conversion was in its original an action of tres-

pass upon the case, for recovery of damages against sucli person as had found

another's goods, and refused to deliver them on demand, but converted them to

his own use; from which finding and converting it is called an action of trover

and conversion. The freedom of this action from wager of law, and the less

degree of certainty requisite in describing the goods, (I) gave it so considerable

(k) Co. Litt. 298. (I) Salk. 65*.

(7) "Wager of law was abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Win. IT, c. 42, g. 13, and since then the

action of detinue is said to be brought more frequently than formerly. For curious historical

information regarding Wager of Law, see Superstition and Force by H. C. Lea.

(8) [On the action of trover in general, see 1 Chitty's Pl< 4th ed. 135 to 145. Absolute and

exclusive property, with actual possession, is not necessary; for a factor to whom goods have

been consigned, and who has never received them, may maintain such an action. 1 Bos. and Pul.

47. But in order to maintain trover, the plaintiff must have a right of property (though special
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and subject to the claims of others) and a right of immediate possession, (as thu owner has against

a wrongdoer, where the goods have been delivered to a carrier): 7 T. R. 12; and therefore where

goods leased, as furniture with a house, have been wrongfully taken by the sheriff in execution,

the lessor cannot maintain trover against the sheriff pending the lease, because till the term has

expired he has no right of possession. Id. 9; 1 Ry. and Mood. 99. But the landlord may main-

tain trover against a purchaser of machinery taken out of a null, and afterwards sold under a li.

fa., by the sheriff, although the tenant's term has not expired. 5 B. aud A. 826; 2 Dowl. and

Ry. 1. And against a mere wrongdoer the simple fact of possession is usually sufficient evidence

of ownership. 7 T. E. 397; 7 Taunt. 302; 4 East, 130; 5 Esp. R. 88. So bailees of goods (2

Bing. 173 ; Ld. Raym. 275; B. N. P. 33 ; 1 Mod. 31; Stra. 505), as carriers, consignees, pawnees,

trustees (2 Saund. 47, a.), agisters of cattle, one who borrows a horse to till his land (Bro. Trcs.

67), and churchwardens (2 Stra. 852; 2 P. Wins. 126; 2 Saund. 47, c.), may maintain this action

against any one who converts the property. But a special property, which may be sufficient as

against a stranger, gives no right against one who has the general property. 1 T. R. 658.

Where the sheriff under a writ of fi. fa. against A. sells the goods of B. though by public sale,

the purchaser is liable to the latter in trover. 3 Stark. 130; 5 B. and A. 826; 2 Dowl. and R. 1

S. P. Where A shipped goods by the order of, and for B in London, and shortly afterwards

ascertained that B had stopped payment, and he then endorsed and forwarded the bill of ladiug

to the plaintiff, directing him to take possession of the goods, held, that on the defendants' (the

carriers) refusal to deliver them to the plaintiff, he had a sufficient title to sue for them in trover.

'2 Bing. 260. See also 5 M. and S. 350, as between vendor and assignee of factor to the vendee.

As between foreign merchants and pledgee of his consignee, see 5 Moore. 518.

A conversion seems to consist in any tortioua act, by which the defendant deprives the

plaintiff of his goods, either wholly, or but for a time. 3 B. and A. 685. The mere abuse of

a chattel by a bailee is no conversion : Gil. L. Ev. 265, 2d ed.; but if he use it contrary to the

design of the bailment, it is otherwise; as if a man lend his horse to go to York, and the

bailee go to Carlisle. 2 Bulst. 309. Mere noufeasance is not a conversion: 2 B. and P. 438;

as that an agent employed to sell goods has neglected to sell them. If the goods come to the

bands of the defendant by delivery, finding, or bailment, a demand and refusal should be

proved at the trial, but in cases of tortious taking or actual conversion, proof of demand and

refusal is unnecessary. 1 Sid. 264. The ordinary presumptive proof of a conversion consists

in evidence of a demand of the goods by the plaintiff, and a refusal to deliver them by the

defendant: 6 Mod. 212; 6 East, 540; 5 id. 407; but the court cannot infer a conversion from

Buch proof, it must be found by the jury. 2 Mod. 242; 10 Coke, 57 ; 2 Roll. Ab. 693 ; IT R.

478; Hob. 181. If the refusal be absolute, aud there be no evidence to justify or explain it,

the jury ought to find a conversion. 1 Esp. R. 31; Clay, 122, pi. 114. But a qualified refusal,

as because the holder does not know to whom the goods belong: 1 Esp. R. 83; 2 Buls. 312;

Bull. K. P. 46; or that the claimant has not proved his right: 3 Camp. 215 ; or a servant refus-

ing to deliver them, without an order from his employers (5 B. and A. 247), or referring the

plaintiff to his master (id.), or a false assertion of a carrier, that be has delivered the goods : 1

Camp. 409; in all these cases the facts do not amount to a conversion.]

As to the meaning of conversion, see Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. aud N. 296; Pillott e. "Wil-

kinson, 2 H. and C. 72. Addisou on Torts, eh. 7. j 1.
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an advantage over the action of detinue, that by a fiction of law actions of

trover were at length permitted to be brought against any man who had in his

possession, by any menus whatsoever, the personal goods of another, and sold

them or used them without the consent of the owner, or refused to deliver them

when demanded. The injury lies in the conversion: for any man may take the

goods of another into possession, if he finds them; but no finder is allowed to

acquire a property therein, unless the owner be forever unknown: (»«) and

therefore he must not convert them to his own use, which the law presumes him

to do, if he refuses them to the owner: for which reason such refusal alone is,

prima facie, sufficient evidence of a conversion. (») The fact of the finding, or

trover, is therefore now totally immaterial: for the plaintiff needs only to sug-

gest (as words of form) that lie lost such goods, and that the defendant found

them: and if he proves that the goods, are his property, and that the defendant

had them in. his possession, it is sufficient. Bnt a conversion must be fully

proved: and then in this action the plaintiff shall recover damages, eqnal to the

value of the thing converted, but not the thing itself: which nothing will

recover but an action of detinue or replevin.

f *lr<?l *"^s *° ^ie Damage *na^ may be offered to things personal, while in

L -" the possession of the owner, as hunting a man's deer, shooting his dogs,

poisoning his cattle, or in anywise taking from the value of any of his chattels,

or making them in a worse condition than before, these are injuries too obvious

to need explication. I have only therefore to mention the remedies given by the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

law to redress them, which are in two shapes; by action of trespass vi et armis,

where the act is in itself immediately injurious to another's property, and there-

fore necessarily accompanied with some degree of force ; and by special action

on the case, where the act is in itself indifferent, and the injury only consequen-

tial, and therefore arising without any breach of the peace. In both of which

suits the plaintiff shall recover damages, in proportion to the injury which he

proves that his property has sustained. And it is not material whether the

damage be done by the defendant himself, or his sen-ants by his direction ; for

the 'action will lie against the master as well as the servant, (o) And, if a man

keeps a dog or other brute animal, xiaed to do mischief, as by worrying sheep, or

the like, the owner must answer for the consequences, if he knows of such evil

habit. (/>) (9)

II. Hitherto of injuries affecting the right of things personal, in possession.

We are next to consider those which regard things in action only; or such rights

as are founded on, and arise from, contracts; the nature and several divisions

of which were explained in the preceding volume. (</) The violation, or non-

performance, of these contracts might be extended into as great a variety of

wrongs, as the rights which we then considered; but I shall now consider them

in a more comprehensive view, by here making only a twofold division of con-

tracts ; viz., contracts express, and contracts implied; and pointing out the

injuries that arise from the violation of each, with their respective remedies.

Express contracts include three distinct species; debts, covenants, and pro-

mises.

(M) See book I, oh. 8; book II. oh. 1 mi'l si. (n) K> Rep. S*. (<>) N..y's MBS. o. 44.

(/') Cm. Car. -'".I, 487. (q) See Book H, ch. 80.

(9) [As to what is evidence of knowledge, sec 4 Camp. 198; 3 Stra. 1264; 2 Egp. 482. But

the owner is not answerable for the first mischief done by a dog, a bull or other tame animal.

Bull. N. P. 77 ; 12 Mod. 333; Ld. Raym. 60d Yet if he should carry his dog into a field,

where he himself is a trespasser, and the dog should kill sheep, this, though the first offence,

might be stated and proved as an aggravation of tbo trespass. Bwr. 2092; 2 1*V. 172. If a

man sets traps in his own grounds, but baited with such strong-scented articles as allare the

neighboring dogs from the premises of the owners, or from the highways, the owner of a dog

injured may maintain an action upon the ease. 9 East, 227; but see Ilott». Wilkes, 3 Bar. and

Aid. 304.1

As to the liabilitv of the owner of a vicious animal for an injury committed by him, see Tan

Leuvcnt!. Lyke, 4 benio, 127; 8. 0., 1 N. Y. 515; Buckley r. Leonard, 4 Deniq, 500; Earharttr.

Youugblood, 27 Penn. St. 331.
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*1. The legal acceptation of debt is, a sum of money due by cer- r *j ^ -i

tain and express agreement: as, by a bond for a determinate sum; L

a bill or note; a special bargain; or a rent reserved on a lease; where the quan-

tity is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any subsequent valuation

to settle it. The non-payment of these is an injury, for which the proper

remedy is by action of debt, (r) to compel the performance of the contract and

recover the specifical sum due. (.1) This is the shortest and surest remedy;

particularly where the debt arises upon a specialty, that is, upon a deed or

instrument under seal. So also, if I verbally agree to pay a man a certain price

for a certain parcel of goods, and fail in the performance, an action of debt lies

against me; for this is also a determinate contract: but if I agree for no settled

price, I am not liable to an action of debt but a special action on the case,

according to the nature of my contract. And indeed actions of debt are now

seldom brought but upon special contracts under seal; wherein the sum due is

clearly and precisely expressed: for, in case of such an action upon a simple

contract, the plaintiff labours nnder two difficulties. First, the defendant has

here the same advantage as in an action of detinue, that of waging his law, or

purging himself of the debt by oath, if he thinks proper, (t) Secondly, in an

action of debt the plaintiff must prove the whole debt he claims, or recover

nothing at all. For the debt is- one single cause of action, fixed and deter-

mined ; and which, therefore, if the proof varies from the claim, cannot be

looked upon as the same contract whereof the performance is sued for. If, there-
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fore, I bring an action of debt for 301., I am not at liberty to prove a debt of

201. and recover a verdict thereon; («) any more than if I bring an action of

detinue for a horse, I can thereby recover an ox. For I fail in the proof of that

contract, which my action or complaint has alleged to be specific, express, and

determinate. (10) But in an action on the case, on what is called an indebitatus

assumpsit which is not brought to compel a specific performance of the contract,

but to recover damages for its *non-performance, the implied asxump- r* i KR i

sit, and consequently the damages for the breach of it, are in ther nature >• •"

indeterminate; and will therefore adapt and proportion themselves to the truth

of the case which shall be proved, without being confined to the precise demand

stated in the declaration. For if any debt be proved, however less than the

sum demanded, the law will raise a promise pro tnnto, and the damages will of

course be proportioned to the actual debt So that I may declare that the

defendant, being indebted to me in 301. undertook or promised to pay it, but

failed; and lay my damages arising from such failure at what sum I please; and

the jury will, according to the nature of my proof, allow me either the whole in

damages, or any inferior sum. And, even in actions of debt, where the contract

is proved or admitted, if the defendant can show that he has discharged any

part of it, the plaintiff shall recover the residue, (v)

The form of the writ of debt is sometimes in the debet and detinet, and some-

times in the detinet only: that is, the writ states, either that the defendant

owes and unjustly detains the debt or thing in question, o.1 only that he unjustly

detains it. It is brought in the debet as well as detinet, when sued by one of

the original contracting parties who personally gave the credit against the

other who personally incurred the debt, or against his heirs, if they are bound

to the payment; as by the obligee against the obligor, the landlord against the

tenant, &c. But, if it be brought by or against an executor for debt due to or

from the testator, this not being his own debt, shall be sued for in the detinet

only, (w) So also if the action be for goods, for corn, or a horse, the writ shall

be in the detinet only; for nothing but a sum of money, for which I (or my

(T) F. N. n. 119. (>) See Appendix, No. Ill, f 1. (t) 4 Hep. 94.

(u) Bro. Ley gagtr, 93. Dyer, 419. t Roll. Abr. 70S. 1 Show. 215.

(v) 1 Roll, li-'p. 257. Solk. mi. (,:•) F. N. B. 119.

(10) [This is no longer the case, for it is now completely settled, that the plaintiff in an action

of debt may prove and recover less than the sum demanded in the writ. See Bla. R. 1221; X

Hen. Bla M; 11 East, 6*.]
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ancestors in my name) have personally contracted, is properly considered as my

debt. And indeed a writ of debt in the detinet only, for goods and chattels, is

neither more nor less than a mere writ of detinue; and is followed by the very

same judgment. (x)

2. A covenant also contained in a deed, to do a direct act or to omit one, is

another species of express contracts, the violation or breach of which is a civil

injury. As if a man covenants to be at York by such a day, or not to exercise

F *1561 a *tra^e iQ a particular place, and is not at York at the time appointed.

' -1 or carries on his trade in the place forbidden, these are direct breaches

of his covenant; and may be perhaps greatly to the disadvantage and loss of

the covenantee. (11) The remedy for this is by a writ of covenant; (y) which

directs the sheriff to command the defendant generally to keep his covenant

with the plaintiff (without specifying the nature of the covenant), or show

good cause to the contrary; and if he continues refractory, or the covenant is

already so broken that it cannot now be specifically performed, then the subse-

quent proceedings set forth with precision the covenant, the breach and the loss

which has happened thereby; whereupon the jury will give damages in pro-

portion to the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and occasioned by such breach

of the defendant's contract.

There is one species of covenant, of a different nature from the rest; and

that is a covenant real, to convey or dispose of lands, which seems to be partly

of a personal and partly of a real nature, (z) For this the remedy is b^y a
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special writ of covenant, for a specific performance of the contract concerning

certain lands particularly described in the writ. It therefore directs the sheriff

to command the defendant, here called the deforciant, to keep the covenant

made between the plaintiff and him concerning the identical lands in question;

and upon this process it is that fines of land are usually levied at common

law, (a) the plaintiff or person to whom the fine is levied, bringing a writ of

covenant, in which he suggests some agreement to have been made between him

and the deforciant, touching those particular lands, for the completion of which

he brings this action. And for the end of this supposed difference, the fine

or finalis concordia is made, whereby the deforciant (now called cognizor)

acknowledges the tenements to be the right of the plaintiff, now called the

cognizee. And moreover, as leases for years were formerly considered only as

contracts (b) or covenants for the enjoyment of rents and profits, and not as

T *157 1 *ne conveyance *°f anv real interest in the land, the ancient remedy for

L -1 the lessee, if ejected, was by a writ of covenant against the lessor, to

recover the term (if in being) and damages in case the ouster was committed

(x) Rast. Entr. 174. fyj F. X. B. 14S. (*) HaL on F. N. B. 146.

(a} See BookII, ch. Jl. (b) Ibid. 9.

(11) [By an express covenant a man is bound to perform what he covenants at all events.

Thus, where in a lease there is an express unqualified covenant on the part of the tenant to

pay rent, he is obliged to pay it during the term, although the house be burned down and ho

do not enjoy the use of it. Shudbrick «. Salmond, 3 Burr. 1637; Belfour v. Weston, 1 T. K.

310. This is certainly a great hardship to lessees, where they are not by the provisions of their

leases obliged to rebuild; and in such coses we accordingly find that recourse has been had

to a court of equity to obtain an injunction against the lessor proceeding at law for the recov-

ery of the rent; which has generally been granted on condition of the lessee surrenderiujf the

lease. Cambden v. Morton, in Cane. E., 4 Geo. Ill, MS.; Selw. X. P. 472; Browns;. Quilter,

Amb. 619.

The covenantor is also answerable for even the act of God, as damage by lightning, Jtc., if he

have not excepted it in his covenant. Brecknock and Abergavenny Canal Navigation v. Prit-

clmrd, 6 T. R. 750.

It may not be unnecessary to point out a distinction between covenants in general anil

those secured by a penalty or forfeiture. In the latter ca.*e the obligee has his election either

to bring an action of debt for the penalty or to proceed upon the covenant and recover in

damages more or less than the penalty, toties quoties ; but he cannot have recourse to both.

Lowe v. Peers, 4 Burr. 2228. See further on covenants, in Harg. and Butler's notes on Co.

Litt.]
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by the lessor himself: or if the term was expired, or the ouster was committed

by a stranger, claiming by an elder title, then to recover damages only, (c) (12)

No person could at common law take advantage of any covenant or condi-

tion, except such as were parties or privies thereto ; and, of course, no grantee

(el Bro. Ahr. t. covenant, 33. F. X. B. US.

(12) [The importance of the subject of the above paragraph requires that it should be more

fully noticed. With respect to the parties who may sue on a covenant : First, the covenantee

may sue the covenantor upon all lawful covenants, either expressed in the deed or implied by

law ; upon the former in respect of the privity of contract created by the deed, and upon the

latter, in respect of the privity of estate in the thing in respect of which the law creates the

covenant Bachelonre v. Gage, Sir W. Jones, '££', ; Anon., 1 Sid. 447 ; Auriol o. Mills, 4 T.

a. 98.

For a personal thing the law does not create a covenant, and implied covenants are therefore

confined to real property. Coin. Dig. Covenant A. 4.

The covenantee mast be a party to the deed by which the covenant is created. Thus if a

deed, purporting to be made between two or more parties, contain a covenant expressed to be

for the benefit of one not a party to it. and to be made with him, yet not he, but the party to

the deed, is the covenautee, and must sue upon it Per Tindal, C. .1 .. in Bushell r. Beavan, 1

Biug. N. C. 120 ; Berkley v. Hardy, 5 B. and C. 355. And it is the same in covenants created

by deeds-poll, in which cases the person with whom a covenant is made becomes in fact a party

to the deed. Com. Dig., Fait, I >. 1.

Secondly, in what cases the heir of the covenantee may sue. These are upon such covenants
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as are qundammodo annexed or appurtenant to the laud or other hereditament which has de-

scended to him, or, as it is usually expressed, which run with the land, and a privity of contract

is transferred from the covenantor to the heir in respect of the estate descended. The expres-

sion running with the estate in the land is more correct than running with the land. Webb v.

Russel, :) T. K. 393. For instance, the heir of a lessor, though not named, may sue for the

breach of a covenant to repair premises which have come to him as such. Lougher v. Williams,

2 Lev. 9-2; Glover t>. Cope, Skm. 305.

Thirdly, when an executor may sue upon a covenant. Upon all covenants not running with

the land, and of which the heir canuot take advantage, the executor of the covenantee must

sue. 2 H. Bl. 310 ; 3 T. R. 393, 401 ; Com. Dig. Covenant 1. The heir cannot take advantage

of covenants annexed to a term of years ; for that does not descend to him, but passes to the

executor. And with respect to covenants annexed to the inheritance, if there has been a breach

of them in the lifetime of the testator, occasioning damages to his personal estate, the executor

is the proper party to sue. 2 Lev. 26 ; 1 M. and S. 355 ; 1 Harsh. 107 ; 5 Taunt 418 ; 4 M . and

S. 53, 188.

Fourthly, the devisee of a reversion, and the legatee of a term, stand in the situation, the one

of an heir, the other of an assignee. Roe r. 1 1 ay Icy, 12 East, 464.

Fifthly, when the grantee or assignee may sue, of which there are two kinds, the grantee or

assignee' of the reversion, and the assignee of the term. And first, as to the grantee or assignee

of the reversion. It seems that even at common law, the grantee of a reversion might take

advantage of a covenant in law, and the words in the text must not be taken to refer to such

covenants. Harper v. Burgh, 2 Lev. 206; Vyan v. Arthur, 1 B. and C. 415, per Bailey, J.

But upou expressed covenants, although annexed to the estate, and for its benefit, the better

opinion is, that the assignee of the reversion could not sue at common law. Thursby v. Plant,

1 W. Saund. 240, n. 3. His rights, in this respect, therefore, depend entirely upon the 32 Hen.

VIII, c. 34.

enant upon

and 1 Smith

thing demised, and not to collateral covenants. The reason for this seems to have been, that

as the remedy by entry (Co. Litt. 215, b.) is confined to forfeitures by force of such conditions

as either are "incident to the reversion, or for the benefit of the estate, the remedy by action

should be confined in like manner. And, indeed, if this construction had not boen adopted, he

who came to the reversion by grant, or assignment, would have been in a better position than he

who came to it by descent. The effect of the statute is to put the assignee of the reversion in

the same situation, and to give him the same remedy, as the heir had at common law. It cre-

ates a privity of contract in respect of the estate which the assignee hath, and not merely a

privity of estate. Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 398. And, therefore, an action founded upon the

statute is transitory. Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. 237. According to the preamble, it extends

only to reversions upon estates for life or years. Co. Litt. 215, a. ; Matures t. Westwood, Cro.

Eliz. 617. And copyhold lands are within it. Glover v. Cope, 3 Lev. 327. As to who is a

grantee or assignee within its meauiug, it has been held that a grantee of part of the reversion

(as if the reversion be granted for a term of years), is such : Attoe r. llcmings, 2 Bulstr. 281 ;

Burton e. Barclay, 7 Bins. 745; and so, also, is an assignee of the reversion in part of the prem-

ises. Twynam t>. Pickard, 2 B. and A. 105. But the assignee must have th« same reversion as

the lessor had at the time of granting the lease (Webb r. Russell, supra; Whitton v. Peacock,

2 Bing. X. C. 411), and must claim through him. Thus, a lord who enters for a forfeiture cau-
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or assignee of any reversion or rent. To remedy which, and more effectually to

secure to the king's grantees the spoils of the monasteries then newly dissolved,

the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, gives the assignee of a reversion (after notice of

such assignment) (>l) the same remedies agaii'tst the particular tenant, by entry

or action, for waste or other forfeitures, non-payment of rent, and non-perform-

ance of conditions, covenants and agreements, as the assignor himself might

have had ; and makes him equally liable, on the other hand, for acts agreed to

be performed by the assignor, except in the case of warranty.

8. A promise is in the nature of a verbal covenant, and wants nothing but the

solemnity of writing and sealing to make it absolutely the same. If, therefore,

it be to do any explicit act, it is an express contract, as ranch as any covenant;

and the breach of it is an equal injury. The remedy indeed is not exactly the

same: since, instead of an action of covenant, there only lies an action upon

the case, for what is called the as»umpsit or undertaking of the defendant; the

failure of performing which is the wrong or injury done to the plaintiff, the

damages whereof a jury are to estimate and settle. As if a builder promises,

undertakes, or assumes to Cains, that he will build and cover his house within

a time limited, and fails to do it; Cains has an action on the case against the

builder, for this breach of his express promise, undertaking or assumpsit; and

shall recover a pecuniary satisfaction for the injury sustained by such delay. (13)

So also in the case before-mentioned, of a debt by simple contract, if tho debtor

(rf) (Jo. I.Hi. *1S. Moor. 878. Gro. Jao. 146.
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not take advantage of the covenants. Co. Litt. 215, b.; Chaworth v. Phillips, Moore, 876. Sec-

ondly, the assignee of the terra may sue at common law, upon all covenants that run with the

land. Spencer's Case, 4th, 5th and 7th resolutions. And his action is by force of the privity of

estate, and the venue is therefore local. Stevenson v. Lambard. 2 East, 580.

Thus far of the persons who may sue upon a covenant; next, of those who may be sued there-

on. It is hardly necessary to observe, that the covenantor may be sued upon all his lawful cov-

enants by force of the privity of contract. And when he has covenanted for himself aud nig

heirs, the heir may be sued, but is only liable to the extent of the estate that has descended to

him. Bae. Ab. Heir and Ancestor, F.; Willes, 585. And the executor may also be sued, be-

tween whom and the heir there is this difference, that whether the covenant does or does not

run with the land, the former is bound, although not named, unless it be such as in its nature ia

determined by the death of the covenantor. Hyde ». Dean of Windsor, Cro. Eliz. 553. With

respect to breaches committed since the death ot the covenantor, the heir or executor may be

bued as assignee of the reversion, or of the term, on such covenants as run with the land, except

that with respect to rent, the liability of the executor does not exceed what the property yields.

Tremeere v. Morison, 1 Bing N. C. 07-99; Derisley v. Custance, 4 T. R. 75; Tilney ». if orris.

Carth. 519; 1 Ld. Raym. 453; Salk. 309, S. C.; 1 Bulstr. 23, per Fleming, C. J. The situa-

tion of a devisee or legatee of the reversion, and a legatee of the term, is the same with respect

to being sued as to suing. Dyer, 257, a.; Com. Dig. Covenant, C. (2) Lastly, the grantee or

assignee of the reversion and the assignee of the term are liable to be sued upon covenants that

run with the land, with this distinction, that when the covenant extends to a thing in est>e,

parcel of the demise, the assignee is bound, although not named ; but where it concerns a thing

not in esse at the time of making the demise, but to be done thereafter, he must be named!

Spencer's Cose, 1st and ad resolutions.

Between the assignee of the reversion and tho assignee of the terra there is, however, this

difference, that the former is liable by force of the statute; the latter, at common law, by force

of privity of estate.

It only remains to notice what covenants run with the land. According to the 4th resoln-

wo

ficulty.

exceed the limits of this note, and the student is therefore advised to peruse the valuable note

on this subject to 1 Smith's Leading Coses, 29. It should be added that it is questionable

whether the statute extends to the assignee of the reversion of a term created by writing, and

not by a deed under seal. See Brydges ». Lewis, 11 L. J. Eep. (N. S.) Q. B. 268.

The writ of covenant real was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27.]

(13) [" It is worthy of remark, that the learned commentator has not either named, described

or even alluded to the consideration requisite to support an aasumpstt; and what is more re-

markable, the example put by him in the text in order to illustrate the nature of the action, is,

in the terms in which it is there stated, a case of nudum pactum. See 1 Koll. Ab. 9, 1, 41;

Doct, and Stud. 2, ch. 24 ; aud 5 T. R. 143 ; that the promise will not lie for a mere uoufeosauce,

unless the promise is founded on a consideration." S.-l\v. N. P. 45.]
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promises to pay it and does not, this breach of promise entitles the creditor to

his action oa the case, instead of being driven to an action of debt, (e) Thus

likewise a promissory note, or note of hand not under seal, to pay money at a

day certain, is an express assumgsit; and the payee at common law, or, by cus-

tom and act of parliament, the indorsee (/), may recover the value of the note

in damages, if it remains unpaid. Some agreements, indeed, though never so

expressly made, are deemed of so important a nature, that they ought not to

rest in verbal promise only, which cannot be proved but by the memory (which

sometimes will induce the perjury) of witnesses. To prevent which the statute

of frauds and perjuries, 29 Car. II, c. 3, enacts, that in the five *follow- r *i eg -i

ing cases no verbal promise shall be sufficient to ground an action upon, *• -"

but at the least some note or memorandum of it shall be made in writing, and

signed by the party to be charged therewith: 1. Where an executor or admin-

istrator promises to answer damages out of his own estate. 2. Where a man

undertakes to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another. 3. Where

any agreement is made, upon consideration of marrriuge. 4 Where any con-

tract or sale is made of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest

therein. 5. And lastly, where there is any agreement that is not to be per-

formed within a year from the making thereof. In all these cases a mere verbal

assumpsit is void. (14)

From these express contracts the transition is easy to those that are only

implied by law. Which are such as reason and justice dictate, and which there-
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fore the law presumes that every man has contracted to perform; and upon this

presumption makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-per-

formance.

Of this nature are, first, such as are necessarily implied by the fundamental

constitution of government, to which every man is a contracting party. And

thus it is that every person is bound and hath virtually agreed to pay such

particular sums of money as are charged on him by the sentence, or assessed by

(e) 4 Bep. 94. {/) See book 11, ch. 30.

(14) [These provisions in the statute have produced many decisions, both in the courts of

law and equity. See 3 Cbitty's Com. L. per tot. It is now settled, that if two persons go to a

shop, and one order goods, and the other say, " If he does not pay I will," or " I will sea you

paid, he is not bound unless his engagement is reduced into writing. In all such cases the

question is, who is the buyer, or to whom the credit is given, and who is the surety: and that

question, from all the circumstances, must be ascertained by the jury: for if the person for

•whose use the goods are furnished be liable at all, any promise by a third person to discharge

the debt must be in writing, otherwise it is void. 2. T. R. 80; H. BI. Rep. 120; 1 Bos. and Pul.

158. Mutual promises to marry need not be in writing; the statute relates only to agreements

made in consideration of the marriage. A lease not exceeding three years' from the making

thereof, and in which the rent reserved amounts to two-thirds of the improved value, is good

without writing; but all othor parol leases or agreements for any interest in lands, have the

effect of estates at will only. Bull. Jf. P. 279. All declarations of trusts, except such as

result by implication of law, must be made in writing. 29 Car. II, o. 3, R*. 7 and 8. If a

promise depends upon a coutingency, which may or may not fall within a year, it is not withiu

the statute; as a promise to pay a sum of money upon a death or marriage, or upon the return

of a ship, or to leave a legacy by will, is good by parol; for such a promise may by possibility

be performed within the year. 3 Burr. 1U78; 1 Salk. 280; 3 id. 9, Ac. Partial performance

within the year, where the original undertaking is that the whole is to extend to a longer

period, does not take the case out of the statute. 11 East, 142. But even a written undertakiiig

to pay the debt of another is void, unless a good consideration appears in the writing;

and the consideration, if any, cannot be proved by parol evidence. 5 East, 10. If a growing

crop is purchased without writing, the agreement, before part execution, may be put an end to

by parol notice. 6 East, 602. But a court of equity will decree a specific performance of a

verbal contract, when it is confessed by a defendant in his answer; or when there has been a

part performance of it. 3 Yes. Jan. 39, 378 and 712. If one party only signs an agreement, he

is bound by it; and if an agreement is by parol, but it is agreed it shall'be reduced into writing,

and this is prevented bv the fraud of one of the parties, performance of it will be decreed.

2 Bro. 564, 565, 566; see 3 Woodd. teot. Iviii. and Fonblanqne Tr. of Eq. b. 1, c. 3, ss. 8 and 9,

•where this subject is fully aud learnedly discussed.]

Upon the subject of this note in general, see Browne on Statute of Frauds. And as to specific

performance, sec Story Eq. Juris. }§ 750 to 7eB, aud Fry on specific performance.
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the interpretation of the law. For it is a part of the original contract, entered

into by all mankind who partake the benefits of society, to submit in all points

to the municipal constitutions and local ordinances of that state, of which each

individual is a member. Whatever, therefore the laws order any one to pay,

that becomes instantly a debt, which he hath before-hand contracted to dis-

charge. And this implied agreement it is, that gives the plaintiff a right to

institute a second action, founded merely on the general contract, in order to

recover such damages or sum of money, as are assessed by the jury and

adjudged by the court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff in any

former action. So that if he hath once obtained a judgment against another

r f, gg -I for a certain sum, and neglects to take out execution *thereupon,he may

•• J afterwards bring an action of debt upon this judgment, (g) and shall

not be put upon the proof of the original cause of action; but upon showing

the judgment once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the law

immediately implies, that by the original contract of society the defendant hath

contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it. This method seems to have been

invented, when real actions were more in use than at present, and damages

were permitted to be recovered thereon; in order to have the benefit of a writ

of capias to take the defendant's body in execution for those damages, which

process was allowable in an action of debt (in consequence of the statute 25

Edw. Ill, c. 17), but not in an action real. Wherefore, since the disuse of those

real actions, actions of debt upon judgments in personal suits have been pretty
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much discountenanced by the courts, as being generally vexatious and oppres-

sive by harassing the defendant with the costs of two actions instead of one.

On the same principle it is (of an implied original contract to submit to the

rules of the community whereof we are members), that a forfeiture imposed

by the by-laws and private ordinances of a corporation upon any that belong

to the body, or an amercement set in a court-leet or court-baron upon any of

the suitors to the court (for otherwise it will not be binding), (h) immediately

create a debt in the eye of the law: and such forfeiture or amercement, if

unpaid, work an injury to the party or parties entitled to receive it: for which

the remedy is by action of debt, (i)

The same reason may with equal justice be applied to all penal statutes,

that is, such acts of parliament whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for transgressing

the provisions therein enacted. The party offending is here bound by the

fundamental contract of society to obey the directions of the legislature, and

pay the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law requires. The usual

T *160 1 aPPlicati°n °f tn'8 forfeiture is *either to the party aggrieved, or else to

I iwi J any of the king's subjects in general. Of the former sort is the forfeit-

ure inflicted by the statute of Winchester (k) (explained and enforced by several

subsequent statutes) (I) upon the hundred wherein a man is robbed, which is

meant to oblige the hundredors to make hue and cry after the felon; for if they

take him they stand excused. But otherwise the party robbed is entitled to

prosecute them by a special action on the case for damages equivalent to his

loss. And of the same nature is the action given by statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22,

commonly called the black act, against the inhabitants of any hundred, in order

to make satisfaction in damages to all persons who have suffered by the offences

enumerated and made felony by that act. But more usually these forfeitures

created by statute are given at large to any common informer; or, in other

words, to any such person or persons as will sue for the same: and hence such

actions are called popular actions because they are given to the people in

general. (»«) Sometimes one part is given to the king, to the poor, or to some

public use, and the other part to the informer or prosecutor: and then the

suit is called a qui tain action, because it is brought by a person, " qui tarn

pro domino rege, &c., quam pro se ipso in hoc parte sequitur." If the king

therefore himself commences this suit, he shall have the whole forfeiture, (n)

(a) Roll. Abr. 600, 601. (h) Law of niripHut, 107. (i) 5 Rep. 64. Hob. 209.

ft) 13 Kdw. I. c. 1. (I) 27 Eliz. c. la. 2tf Car. II. c. 7. 8 Ueo. II, c. 10. 88 Geo. H, c. M.

(mj See Hook II, ch. 29. (nj 2 llawk. P. t). «8.
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But if any one hath begun a qui tarn, or popular, action, no other person can

pursue it: and the verdict passed upon the defendant in the first suit is a

oar to all others, and conclusive even to the king .himself. This has fre-

quently occasioned offenders to procure their own friends to begin a suit,

in order to forestal, and prevent other actions: which practice is in some meas-

ure prevented by a statute made in the reign of a very sharp-sighted prince in

penal laws, 4 Hen. VII, c. 20, which enacts that no recovery, otherwise than by

verdict, obtained by collusion in an action popular, shall be a bar to any other

•action prosecuted bonafide, A provision that seems borrowed from *the r *•. fil -i

rule of the Roman law, that if a person was acquitted of any accusa- L -I

tion, merely by the prevarication of the accuser, a new prosecution might bo

commenced against him. (o)

A second class of implied contracts are such as do not arise from the express

determination of any court, or the positive direction of any statute; but from

natural reason and the just construction of law. Which class extends to all

presumptive undertakings or assumpsits; which though never perhaps actually

made, yet constantly arise from this general implication and intendment of the

courts of judicature, that every man hath engaged to perform what his duty or

justice requires. Thus,

1. If I employ a person to transact any business for me, or perform any work,

the law implies that I undertook or assumed to pay him so much as his labour

deserved. And if I neglect to make him amends, he has a remedy for this
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injury by bringing his action on the case upon this implied assumpsit; wherein

he is at liberty to suggest that I promised to pay him so much as he reasonably

deserved, and then to aver that his trouble was really worth such a particular

sum, which the defendant has omitted to pay. But this valuation of his trouble

is submitted to the determination of a jury; who will assess such a sum in

damages as they think he really merited. This is called an assumpsit on a

quantum meruit.

2. There is also an implied assumpsit on a quantum valebat, which is very

similar to the former, being only where one takes up goods or wares of a trades-

man, without expressly agreeing for the price. There the law concludes that

both parties did intentionally agree, that the real value of the goods should be

paid; and an action on the case may be brought accordingly, if the vendee

refuses to pay that value.

*3. A third species of implied assumpsits is when one has had and r „« „„ -,

received money belonging to another, without any valuable consideration *• -I

given on the receiver's part: for the law construes this to be money had and

received for the use of the owner only; and implies that the person so receiving

promised and undertook to account for it to the true proprietor. And if lie

unjustly detains it, an action on the case lies against him for the breach of such

implied promise and undertaking; and he will be made to repay the owner in

damages, equivalent to what he has detained in violation of such his promise.

This is a very extensive and beneficial remedy, applicable to almost every case

where the defendant has received money which ex oequo et bono he ought to

refund. It lies for money paid by mistake, or on a consideration which happens

to fail, or through imposition, extortion, or oppression, or where any undue

advantage is taken of the plaintiffs situation, (p)

4. Where a person has laid out and expended his own money for the use of

another, at his request, the law implies a promise of repayment, and au action

will lie on this assumpsit. (q)

6. Likewise, fifthly, upon a stated account between two merchants, or other

persons, the law implies that he against whom the balance appears has engaged

to pay it to the other; though there be not any actual promise. And from this

implication it is frequent for actions on the case to be brought, declaring that

the plaintiff and defendant had settled their accounts together, insimnl compu-

tassent (which gives name to this species of assumpsit), and that the defendant

(o) Ff. a, IS. 8. (p) Burr. 1012. (q) Carth. 446. t Kcb. 99.
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engaged to pay the plaintiff the balance, but has since neglected to do it. But

if no account has been made up, then the legal remedy is by bringing a writ of

account, de computo; (r) commanding the defendant to render a just account

F *1631 *° *^e pk"ntlff> *or 8now tne court good cause to the contrary. In this

I J action if the plaintiff succeeds, there are two judgments: the first is, that

the defendant do account (quod computet) before auditors appointed by the court;

and, when such account is finished, then the second judgment is, that he do

pay the plaintiff so much as he is found in arrear. This action by the old corn-

man law, (») lay only against the parties themselves, and not their executors;

because matters of account rested solely on their own knowledge. But this

defect, after many fruitless attempts in parliament, was at last remedied by

statute 4 Ann. c. 16, which gives an action of account against the executors and

administrators. (15) But, however, it is found by experience that the most

ready and effectual way to settle these matters of account is bv bill in a court

of equity, where a discovery may be had on the defendant's oath, without rely-

ing merely on the evidence which the plaintiff may be able to produce. Where-

fore actions of account to compel a man to bring in and settle his accounts, are

now very seldom used; though when an account is once stated, nothing is more

common than an action upon the implied assumpsit to pay the balance.

6. The last class of contracts, implied by reason and construction of law,

arises upon this supposition, that every one who undertakes any office, employ-

ment, trust or duty, contracts with those who employ or entrust him, to perform
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it with integrity, diligence, and skill. And, if by his want of either of those

Qualities any injury accrues to individuals, they have therefore their remedy in

damages by a special action on the case. A few instances will fully illustrate

this mutter. If an officer of the public is guilty of neglect of duty, or a palpable

breach of it, of non-feasance or of mis-feasancc; as, if the sheriff does not exe-

cute a writ sent to him, or if he wilfully makes a false return thereof; in both

these cases the party aggrieved shall have an action on the case, for damages to

be assessed by a jury, (t) If a sheriff or gaoler suffers a prisoner, who is taken

F *lfi41 "P?11 mesne process, (that *is, during the pendency of a suit) to escape,

L J he is liable to an action on the case, (u) But if, after judgment, agaoler

or a sheriff permits a debtor to escape, who is charged in execution for a certain

sum ; the debt immediately becomes his own, and he is compellable by action

of debt, being for a sum liquidated and ascertained, to satisfy the creditor his

whole demand: which doctrine is grounded (to) on the equity of the statute of

Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 11, and 1 Kic. II, c. 12. An advocate or attorney that

betray the cause of their client, or being retained, neglect to appear at the trial,

by which the cause miscarries, are liable to an action on the case, for a repara-

tion to their injured client, (x) (16) There is also in law always an implied con-

tract with a common inn-keeper> to secure his guest's goods in his inn; with a

common carrier, or bargemaster, to be answerable for the goods he carries; with

a common farrier, that he shoes a horse well, without laming him; with a com-

(r) F. N. B. 116. (») Co. LItt. 90. («) Moor. 4S1. 11 Rep. 99. («) Cro. Eliz. 025. Comb. 09.

(»•) Bro. Mr. t.parliament, 19. 2 In-t. 382. (x) Finch, L. 1S8.

(15) And by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, c. 42, an action may be maintained by or against the

personal representatives of any person deceased, for any Trrong committed by or against

him, in respect of property, real or personal, within six calendar months before such person's

death, and any damages recovered against such representatives are made payable in the regular

order of administration.

(16) There is no implied undertaking on the part of an attorney, solicitor, or counsellor,

that the business he takes charge of shall be successful, or that his advice shall always bo

sound and reliable. What he is responsible for is ordinary skill, diligence and care in the

exercise of his profession, having reference to the nature of the business he undertakes to do :

Holmes v. Pock, 1 R. I. 242; Miller r. Wilson, 24 Pcnn. St. 114; Cox r. Sullivan, 7 Goo. 144 ;

Clus.sman ». Merkel, 3 Bosw. 402; Walker v. Goodman, 21 Ala. (541; and for any failure to

exercise these, an action on the case may be maintained bv his client against him. For the

rules of fairness and good faith which the law requires to be observed iu thin relation, sco Story

Eq. Juriu. $ 310-313.
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mon tailor, or other workman, that he performs his business in a workmanlike

manner; in which, if they fail, an action on the case lies to recover damages for

such breach of their general undertaking, (y) (17) But if I employ a person to

transact any of these concerns, whose common profession and business it is not,

the law implies no such general undertaking, but, in order to charge him with

damages, a special agreement is required. Also, if an inn-keeper, or other

victualler, hangs out a sign and opens his house for travellers, it is an implied

engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way; and upon this uni-

versal asmmpsit an action on the case will lie against him for damages, if he

without gooa reason refuses to admit a traveller, (z) If any one cheats me with

false cards or dice, or by false weights and measures, or by selling me one com-

modity for another, an action on the case also lies against him for damages,

upon the contract which the law always implies, that every transaction is fair

and honest, (a)

In contracts likewise for sales, it is constantly understood that the seller

undertakes that the *commodity he sells is his own; (18) and if it proves r *, „- -\

otherwise, an action on the case lies against him, to exact damages for L *

this deceit. In contracts for provisions, it is always implied that they are whole*

some; and if they be not, the same remedy may be had. Also if he, that selleth

any thing, doth upon the sale warrant it to be good, the law annexes a tacit

contract to his warranty, that if it be not so, he shall make compensation to the

buyer; else it is an injury to good faibh, for which an action on the case will lie
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to recover damages. (b) The warranty must be upon the sale ; for if it be made

after, and not at the time of the sale, it is a void warranty: (c) for it is then

made without any consideration; neither does the buyer then take the goods

upon the credit of the vendor. Also the warranty can only reach to things in

») 11 Hop. 54. 1 Sauna. 312. (z) 1 Ventr. 333. (a) 10 Rep. 80.

. ) F. N. B. 94. (c) Finch, L. 189.

(17) Upon these subjects, which are vory brond, and embrace rnscs almost infinite in

variety, the reader will of course consult the elementary treatises on bailments, carriers, con-

tracts, &c.

(18) [A warranty on the sale of a personal chattel, as to the right thereto, is generally im-

plied : 3 T. R. 57; Peake C. N. P. 94 ; Cro. Jac. 474; 1 Salk. 810; Doug. 16; bnt not ae to

Che right of real property. Doagl. 654; 2 B. and P. 13; 3 id. 166. Nor in a warranty of sound-

ness, goodness, or value of a horse, or other personalty, implied: 3 Campb. 351; -J East, 314,

448; and if a ship be sold, with all faults, the vendor will not be liable to an action in respect to

latent defects which he knows of, unless he used some artifice to conceal them from the pur-

chaser. 3 Camp. 154, 506. But if it is the usage of the trade to specify defects, (as in case of

nales of drugs, if they are sea damaged) and noue are specified, an implied warranty arises: 4

Taunt. 847 ; and a warranty may be implied from the production of a sample, in a parol sale

by sample : 4 Camp. 22, 144,169; 4 B. and A. 387; 3 Stark. 32; and see notes ; and if the oulk

of the goods do not correspond with the sample, it would be a breach of the warranty. If

the contract describe the goods as of a particular denomination,, there is an implied warranty,

that they shall be of a merchantable quality of the denomination mentioned in the contract.

4 Camp. 144; 3 Chit. Com. Law, 303; 1 Stark. 504; 4 Taunt. 853; 5 B. and A. !MO. In all

contracts for the sale ofprovisions, there is an implied contract that they shall be wholesome.

1 Stark. 384; 2 Camp. 391; 3 id. 286. An implied warranty arises in the «ale of goods where

ao opportunity of an inspection is given : 4 Camp. 144, 160; 6 Taunt. 108; and if goods are

ordered to be manufactured, a stipulation that they shall be proper is implied : 4 Camp. 144;

6 Taunt. 108; especially if for a foreign market. 4 Camp. 169: 5 Taunt. 108. where a

horse has been warranted sound, any infirmity rendering it unfit for immediate use, is nn nn-

Boundneas. 1 Stark. 127. The question of unsoundness is for the opinion of a jury. 7 Taunt.

153. If not so stipulated, an action for the breach of warranty may be supported without re-

turning the horse, or even giving notice of the unsouudness, and although the jun Chaser h.ivn

resold the horse. 1 Hen. Bla. 17; 1 T. R. 136; 2 id. 745. Bnt unless the horse bo returned

as soon as the defect is discovered, or if the horse has been long worked, the purchaser cannot

recover back the purchase money on the count for money had and received: 1 T. R. i:«5; 5

East, 449; 7 id. 274; 2 Camp. 410; 1 New Rep. 260; and in all cases the vendee should object

within a reasonable time; 1J. B. Moore", 166; and in these cases, or when the purchaser has

doctored the horse, he has no defence to aii action by the vendor for the price, but must proceed

in a cross action on the warranty. 1 T. R. 136; 5 East, 449; 7 id. 274 ; 2 Camp. 410 ; 1 N. It.

860; 3 Esp. Rep. 82. 4 id. 95.]

As to implied warranties, see, further, note to book 2, p. 451.

•'
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being at the time of the warranty made, and not to things infuturo: as, that

a horse is sound at the buying of him, not that he will be sound two years

hence. (19) But if the vendor Tcnew the goods to be unsound, and hath used

any art to disguise them, (d) or if they are in any shape different from what he

represents them to be to the buyer, this artifice shall be equivalent to an express

warranty, and the vendor is answerable for their goodness. A general warranty

will not extend to guard against defects that are plainly and obviously the object

of one's senses, as if a horse be warranted perfect, and. wants either a tail or an

ear, unless the buyer in this case be blind. But if cloth is warranted to be of

such a length, when it is not, there an action on the case lies for damages; for

that cannot be discerned by sight, but only by a collateral proof, the measuring

it (<?) Also if a horse is warranted sound, and he wants the sight of an eye,

though this seems to be the object of one's senses, yet as the discernment of such

defects is frequently matter of skill, it hath been held that an action on the case

lieth to recover damages for this imposition. (/)

Besides the special action on the case, there is also a peculiar remedy, entitled

F *lfir 1 an ac^on °f dcwiti (d) t° giye damages *in some particular cases of

L J fraud, (20) and principally where one man does any thing in the name of

another, by which he is deceived or injured; (h) as if one brings an action in

another's name, and then suffers a nonsuit, whereby the plaintiff becomes liable

to costs: or where one obtains or suffers a fraudulent recovery of lands, tenements,

or chattels, to the prejudice of him that hath right As when by collusion the
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attorney of the tenant makes default in a real action, or where the sheriff returns

that the tenant was summoned when he was not so, and in either case he loses

the land, the writ of deceit lies against the demandant, and also the attorney or

the sheriff and his officers; to annul the former proceedings, and recover back the

land, (i) It also lies in the cases of warranty before mentioned, and other personal

injuries committed contrary to good faith and honesty, (k) But an action on the

cose, for damages, in the nature of a writ of deceit, is more usually brought upon

these occasions. (I) And indeed it is the only (m) remedy for the lord of a manor,

in or out of ancient demesne, to reverse a fine or recovery had in the king's

courts of lands lying within his jurisdiction; which would otherwise be thereoy

turned into frank fee. And this may be brought by the lord against the parties

and cestuy que use of such fine or recovery; and thereby he shall obtain judg-

ment, not only for damages (which are usually remitted), but also to recover his

court, and jurisdiction over the lands, and to annul the former proceedings, (n)

Thus much for the non-performance of contracts express or implied; which

includes every possible injury to what is by far the most considerable species of

personal property, viz.: that which consists in action merely, and not in posses-

sion. Which finishes our inquiries into such wrongs as may be offered to per-

sonal property, with their several remedies by suit or action.

(d) 2 Boll. Eep. 5. («) Finch, L. 189. (/) Salk. ail. (ff) F. N. B. 95. (k) Law or»wi print, 30.

(«) Booth, real actions, i'll. Bast. Kntr. '.Ml. 223. Sec usge 40.1. (k) F. N. B. 98.

(i) Booth, 253. Co. Entr. K. (m) 3 Ley. 419. (n) llast. Entr. 100, 6. 3 Lev. 415. Lntw. 711, 749.

(19) [Lord Mansfield declared, in a case in which the sentence in the text was cited, "there is

no doubt but you may warrant a future event." Doug. 735. ]

(20) This action was abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, o. 27, J 30.
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CHAPTER X.

OF INJURIES TO REAL BROPERTY ; AND FIRST OF DISPOS-

SESSION, OR OUSTER OF THE FREEHOLD.

I COME now to consider such injuries as affect that species of property which

the laws of England have denominated real; as being of a more substantial and

permanent nature than those transitory rights of which personal chattels are the

object.

Keal injuries, then, or injuries affecting real rights, are principally six: 1.

Ouster; 2. Trespass; 3. Nuisance; 4. Waste: 5. Subtraction; 6. Disturbance.

Ouster, or dispossession, is a wrong or injury that carries with it the amotion

of possession : for thereby the wrong-doer gets into the actual occupation of the

land or hereditament, and obliges him thatnath a right to seek his legal remedy,

in order to gain possession, and damages for the injuries sustained. And such

ouster, or dispossession, may either be of the freehold, or of chattels real. Ouster

of the freehold is effected by one of the following methods: 1. Abatement; 2.

Intrusion; 3. Disseisin; 4. Discontinuance; 5. Deforcement All of which in

their order, and afterwards their respective remedies, will be considered in the

present chapter.

1. And first, an abatement is where a person dies siezed of an inheritance,

and before the heir or devisee enters, a stranger *who has no right makes r *igo i

entry, and gets possession of the freehold: this entry of him is called "- ••

an abatement, and he himself is denominated an abater, (a) It is to be observed
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that this expression, of abating which is derived from the French, and signifies

to quash, beat down, or destroy, is used by our law in three senses. The first,

which seems to be the primitive sense, is that of abating or beating down a

nuisance, of which we spoke in the beginning of this book; (b) and in a like

sense it is used in statute Westm. 1,3 Edw. I, c. 17; where mention is made of

abating a castle or fortress; in which case it clearly signifies to pull it down,

and level it with the ground. The second signification of abatement is that of

abating a writ or action, of which we shall say more hereafter: here it is taken

figuratively, and signifies the overthrow or defeating of such writ, by some fatal

exception "to it. The last species of abatement is that we have now before us;

which is also a figurative expression to denote that the rightful possession or

freehold of the heir or devisee is overthrown by the rude intervention of a

stranger.

This abatement of a freehold is somewhat similar to an immediate occupancy

in a state of nature, which is effected by taking possession of the land the same

instant that the prior occupant, by his death, relinquishes it. But this, how-

ever agreeable to natural justice, considering man merely as an individual, is

diametrically opposite to the law of society, and particularly the law of England:

which for the preservation of public peace, hath prohibited, as far as possible, all

acquisitions by mere occupancy: and hath directed that lands, on the death of

the present possessor, should immediately vest either in some person, expressly

named and appointed by the deceased, as his devisee; or, on default of such ap-

pointment, in such of his next relations as the law hath selected and pointed out

as his natural representative or heir. Every entry, therefore, of a mere stranger

by way of intervention between the ancestor and heir, or person next entitled,

Which keeps the heir or devisee out of possession, is one of the highest injuries

to the right of real property.

*2. The second species of injury by ouster, or amotion of possession r *ion -<

from the freehold, is by intrusion: wliich is the entry of a stranger, after *• -1

a particular estate of freehold is determined, before him in remainder or rever-

sion. And it happens where a tenant for term of life dieth seised of certain,

lands and tenements, and a stranger entereth thereon, after such death of the

(>') Finch', L. IK. (\>) Page 5.
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tenant, and before any entry of him in remainder or reversion, (c) This entry

and interposition of the stranger differ from an abatement in this: that an

abatement is always to the prejudice of the heir,or immediate devisee; an intru-

sion is always to the prejudice of him in remainder or reversion. For example;

if A dies seised of lands in fee-simple, and before the entry of B his heir C enters

thereon, this is an abatement; but if A be tenant for life, with remainder to B

in fee-simple, and after the death of A, C enters, this is an intrusion. Also if A

be tenant for life on lease from B, or his ancestors, or be tenant by the curtesy,

or in dower, the reversion being vested in B; and after the death of A, C enters

and keeps B out of possession, this is likewise an intrusion. So that an intru-

sion is always immediately consequent upon the determination of a particular

estate; an abatement is always consequent upon the descent or devise of an

estate in fee-simple. And in either case the injury is equally great to him whose

possession is defeated by this unlawful occupancy.

3. The third species of injury by ouster, or privation of the freehold, is by

disseisin* Disseisin is a wrongful putting out of him that is seised of the free-

hold, (d) The two former species of injury were by a w rongful entry where the

possession was vacant; but this is an attack upon him who is in actual posses-

sion, and turning him out of it. Those were an ouster from a freehold in law;

this is an ouster from a freehold in deed. Disseisin may be effected cither in

F *170 1 corP°rea^ inheritances, *or incorporeal. Disseisin of things corporeal,

I ' J as of houses, lands, &c., must be by en try and actual dispossession of the
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freehold; (e) as if a man enters either by force or fraud into the house of

another, and turns, or at least keeps, him or his servants out of possession.

Disseisin of incorporeal hereditaments cannot be an actual dispossession: for

the subject itself is neither capable of actual bodily possession or dispossession:

but it depends on their respective natures, and various kinds; being in general

nothing more than a disturbance of the owner in the means of coming at, or

enjoying them. With regard to freehold rent in particular, our ancient law

books (/) mentioned five methods of working a disseisin thereof: 1. By enclos-

ure; where the tenant so encloseth the house or land, that the lord cannot come

to distrain thereon, or demand it: 2. By forestaller, or lying in wait; when the

tenant besetteth the way with force and arms, or by menaces of bodily hurt

affrights the lessor from coming: 3. By resents; that is, either by violently

retaking a distress taken, or by preventing the lord with force and arms from

taking any at all: 4 By replevin; when the tenant replevies the distress at such

time when his rent is really due: 5. By denial; which is when the rent being

lawfully demanded is not paid. All, or any of these circumstances amount to

a disseisin of rent; that is, they wrongfully put the owner out of the only pos-

session, of which the subject-matter is capable, namely, the receipt of it. But

all these disseisins of hereditaments incorporeal are only so at the election and

choice of the party injured; if, for the sake of more easily trying the right, he

is pleased to suppose himself disseised, (g) Otherwise, as there can be no actual

dispossession, he cannot be compulsively disseised of any incorporeal hereditament

And so, too, even in corporeal hereditaments, a man may frequently suppose

himself to be disseised, when he is not so in fact, for the sake of entitling him-

self to the more easy and commodious remedy of an assize of novel disseisin

(which will be explained in the sequel of this chapter), instead of being

F *1711 Driven *° ^e more tedious process of a writ of entry. (A) The true

•- J injury of compulsive disseisin seems to be that of dispossessing the ten-

ant, and substituting oneself to be the tenant of the lord in his stead ; in order

to which in the times of pure feudal tenure the consent or connivance of the loru>

•who upon every descent or alienation personally gave, and who therefore alone

Could change, the seisin or investiture, seems to have been considered as neces-

sary. But when in process of time the feudal form of alienations wore off, and

the lord was no longer tho instrument of giving actual seisin, it is probable that

(r) Co. J.itt. 277. F. X. B. WJ, 904. (rf) Co. LIU. 177. [•>) Co. I.ill. I si.

I/, Finch, L. 166,166. Liu. ( 237, Ac. (g) Uu. H MS, 5S). (ft) llt,njk. parr. e. 7. 1 Burr. 110.

na
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the lord's acceptance of rent or service, from him who had dispossessed another,

might constitute a complete disseisin. Afterwards, no regard was had to the

lord's concurrence, but the dispossessor himself was considered as the sole dis-

seisor: and this wrong was then allowed to be remedied by entry only, without

any form of law, as against the disseisor himself; but required a legal process

against his heir or alienee. And when the remedy by assize was introduced

under Henry II, to redress such disseisins as had been committed within a few

years next preceding, the facility of that remedy induced others, who were

wrongfully kept out of the freehold, to feign or allow themselves to be disseised,

merely for the sake of the remedy.

These three species of injury, abatement, intrusion, and disseisin, are such

wherein the entry of the tenant ab initio, as well as the continuance of his pos-

session afterwards, is unlawful. But the two remaining species are where the

entry of the tenant was at first lawful, but the wrong consists in the detaining

of possession afterwards.

4. Such is, fourthly, the injury of discontinuance; (1) which happens when

he who hath an estate-tail, maketh a larger estate of the land than by law he is

entitled to do: (i) in which case the estate is good, so far as his power extends

who made it, but no farther. As if tenant in tail makes a feoffment in fee-

simple, or for the life of the feoffee, or in 'tail; all *which are beyond r ,j»g -,

his power to make, for that by the common law extends no farther than <- '" "

to make a lease for his own life; in such case the entry of the feoffee is lawful
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during the life of the feoffor; but if he retains the possession after the death of

the feoffor, it is an injury, which is termed a discontinuance: the ancient legal

estate, which ought to have survived to the heir in tail, being gone, or at least

suspended, and for a while discontinued. For, in this case, on the death of the

alienors. neither the heir in tail, nor they in remainder or reversion expectant

on the determination of the estate-tail, (2) can enter on and possess the lauds so

alienated. Also, by the common law, the alienation of a husband who was

seised in the right of his wife, worked a discontinuance of the wife's estate: till

the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28 provided, that no act by the husband alone shall

work a discontinuance of, or prejudice, the inheritance or freehold of the wife;

but that, after his death, she or her heirs may enter on the lands in question.

Formerly, also, if an alienation was made by a sole corporation, as a bishop or

dean, without consent of the chapter, this was a discontinuance. (_;') But this

is now o^uite antiquated by the disabling statutes of 1 Eliz. c. 19, and 13 Eliz.

c. 10, which declare all such alienations absolutely void ab initio, and, there-

fore, at present no discontinuance can be thereby occasioned. (3)

( i) Pinch, L. 190. (i) F. H. B. 19t

(1) [The term " discontinuance" is used to distinguish those cases where the party, whose free-

hold is onsted, can restore it by action only, from those in which he may restore it by entry.

Kow things which lie in grant cannot either be devested or restored by entry. The owner

therefore of anything which lies in grant has in no stage, and under no circumstances, any

other remedy but by action. The books often mention both disseisins and discontinuances of

incorporeal hereditaments, but these disseisins and discontinuances are only at the election of

the party, for the purpose of availing himself of the remedy by action. Co. Lilt. 330 b. n.

But a disseisin or discontinuance of corporeal hereditaments necessarily operates as a dissei-

sin or discontinuance of all the incorporeal rights or incidents which the disseisee or discon-

tinuee has himself in, upon, or out of the land affected by the disseisin or discontinuance.

Ib. 332, a. n. 1. Conveyances by feoffment and .livery, or by fine or recovery by tenant in tail

in possession, work a discontinuance; but if by covenant to stand seised to uses, under the

statute, lease and release, bargain and sale, they do not: Co. Litt. 330, a. n. 1; unless accom-

panied with a fine, as one and the same assurance in the two latter instances: 10 Co. 95; but

if the fine be a distinct assurance, it is otherwise. 2 Burr. 704. See ante, book 2, 301. See

further, Adams on Ejectment, 35, >vc.; 2 Saund. index, Discontinuance; 2 D. and R. 373; 1 B.

and C. 238.[

(2) This is no longer the law. See statute 3 and 4 Win. IT, o. 27, } 39; also 8 and 9 Vie.

c. 106, $ 4.

(3) And a discontinuance in any case would now appear to be impossible, Riuce the statutes

mentioned in the last note, the second of which declares that a feoffment made after October I,

1845, shall not have a tortious operation, so as to create an estate by wrong.
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5. The fifth and last species of injuries by ouster or privation of the freehold,

where the entry of the present tenant or possessor was originally lawful, but his

detainer has now become unlawful, is that by deforcement. This, in its moat

extensive sense, is nomen generali&simwn; a much larger and more compre-

hensive expression than any of the former: it then signifying the holding of

any lands or tenements to which another person hath a right, fa) So that this

includes as well an abatement, an intrusion, a disseisin, or a discontinuance, as

any other species of wrong whatsoever, whereby he that hath right to the free-

hold is kept out of possession. But as contradistinguished from the former, it is

F *1731 on^ 8UC*1 a Detainer °f tne *freehold, from him that hath the right

' J of property, but never had any possession under that right, as falls

within none of the injuries which we have before explained. As in case where

a lord has a seignory, and lands escheat to him propter defectum sangvinis, but

the seisin of the lands is withheld from him; here the injury is not abatement,

for the right vests not in the lord as heir or devisee; nor is it intrusion, for it

vests not in him who hath the remainder or reversion ; nor is it disseisin, for

the lord was never seised; nor does it at all bear the nature of any species of

discontinuance ; but, being neither of these four, it is therefore a deforcement. (I)

If a man marries a woman, and during the coverture is seised of lands, and

alienes, and dies; is disseised, and dies; or dies in possession; and the alienee,

disseisor, or heir, enters on the tenements and doth not assign the widow her

dower; this is also a deforcement to the widow, by withholding lands to which
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she hath a right, (m) In like manner, if a man lease lands to another for term

of years, or for the life of a third person, and the term' expires by surrender,

efflux of time, or death of the cestity que vie ; and the lessee or any stranger,

who was at the expiration of the term in possession, holds over, and refuses to

deliver the possession to him in remainder or reversion, this is likewise a deforce-

ment, (n) Deforcements may also arise upon the breach of a condition in law:

as if a woman gives lands to a man by deed, to the intent that he marry her,

and he will not when thereunto required, but continues to hold the lands: this

is such a fraud on the man's part that the law will not allow it to devest the

woman's right of possession; though, his entry being lawful, it does devest

the actual possession, and thereby becomes a deforcement, (o) Deforcements

may also be grounded on the disability of the party deforced: as if an infant do

Tiiiiki: an alienation of his lands, and the alienee enters and keeps possession ;

now, as the alienation is voidable, this possession as against the infant (or, in

case of his decease, as against his heir) is after avoidance wrongful, and, there-

F*1741 ^ore> a Deforcement, (p) The same happens, *when one of non-sane

I- -I memory alienes his lands or tenements, and the alienee enters and holds

possession ; this may also be a deforcement, (q) Another species of deforcement

is, where two persons have the same title to land, and one of them enters and

keeps possession against the other: as where the ancestor dies seised of an estate

in fee-simple, which descends to two sisters as coparceners, and one of them

enters before the other, and will not suffer her sister to enter and enjoy her

moiety; this is also a deforcement, (r) Deforcement may also be grounded

on the non-performance of a covenant real: as if a man, seised of lands, cove-

nants to convey them to another, and neglects or refuses so to do, but continues

possession against him ; this possession, being wrongful, is a deforcement: (*)

whence, in levying a fine of lands, the person against whom the fictitious

action is brought upon a supposed breach of covenant, is called the deforciant.(±)

And, lastly, by way of analogy, keeping a man by any means out of a freehold

office is construed to be a deforcement; though, being an incorporeal heredita-

ry Co. Lltt. 277. (I) F. N. B. 14S. (m) Ibid. 8,147.

(n) Finch, L. M3. F. N. B. *H. 205, 6, 7. See Book II,.<;h.», g. 1SJ. (0) F. N. B. 205.

(n) Finch, L. W3. F. N. B. SOI. 80S, 6, 7. See Book II, r,h.», p. 1

(pj Finch, L. 2S4. F. N. B. US. (q) Finch, OM. F. N. ]

(r) Finch, L. 293, 294. F. N. B. 197. (») S. N. B. 146.

(4) This proceeding was abolished by .-statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 74,
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inent, the deforciant has no corporeal possession. So that whatever injury

(withholding the possession of a freehold) is not included under one of the four

former heads, is comprised under this of deforcement.

The several species and degrees of injury by ouster being thus ascertained and

defined, the next consideration is the remedy; which is, universally, the resti-

tution or delivery of possession to the right owner: and, in some cases, damages

also for the unjust amotion. The methods whereby these remedies, or either of

them, may be obtained, are various.

1. The first is that extrajudicial and summary one, whichweslightly touched

in the first chapter of the present book, (t) of entry by the legal owner, when

another person, who hath no right, hath previously taken possession of lands or

tenements. In this case the party entitled may make a formal, but peaceable,

entry thereon, declaring that thereby he takes possession; which notorious act

of ownership is equivalent to a feudal investiture by the lord: (u) or he may

enter on any *part of it in the same county, declaring it to be in the name r*i75]

of the whole: (v) bat if it lies in different counties he must make dif- L -I

ferent entries; for the notoriety of such entry or claim to the pares or freeholders

of Westmoreland, is not any notoriety to the pares or freeholders of Sussex. Also

if there be two disseisors, the party disseised must make his entry on both; or if

one disseisor has conveyed the lands with livery to two distinct feoffees, entry

must be made on both: (w) for as their seisin is distinct, so also must be the

act which devests that seisin. If the claimant be deterred from entering by
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menaces or bodily fear, he may make claim, as near to the estate as he can, with

the like forms and solemnites: which claim is in force for only a year and a

day. (x) And this claim, if it be repeated once in the space of every year and

day (which is called continual claim), has the same effect with, and in all

respects amounts to, a legal entry, (y) Such an entry gives a man seisin, (z) or

puts into immediate possession him that hath right of entery on the estate, and

thereby makes him complete owner, and capable of conveying it from himself

by eitherdescent or purchase. (5)

This remedy by entry takes place in three only of the five species of ouster,

viz.: abatement, intrusion, and disseisin; (a) for, as in these the original entry

of the wrongdoer was unlawful, they may therefore be remedied by the mere

entry of him who hath right. But, upon a discontinuance or deforcement, the

owner of the estate cannot enter, but is driven to his action: for herein the

original entry being lawful, and thereby an apparent right of possession being

gained, the law will not suffer that right to be overthrown by the mere act or

entry of the claimant Yet a man may enter (b) on his tenant by sufferance:

for such tenant hath HO freehold, but only a bare possession; which may be

defeated, like a tenancy at will, by the mere entry of the owner. But if the

owner thinks it more expedient to suppose or admit (c) such tenant to have

*gained a tortious freehold, he is then remediable by writ or entry, ad r^ „„-,

terminum qui prateriit. (6) L ' J

On the other hand, in case of abatement, intrusion, or disseisin, where entries

are generally lawful, this right of entry may be tolled, that is, taken away by

descent Descents, which take away entries, (d) (7) are when any one, seised by

(«) See page S. («) See book II. ch. 14, p. SOB. (r) LIU. } 417. (») Co. Lltt. 25Z.

(x) I.in » 422. (y) Ibid. H 419, 423. (*) On. Litt. 1ft. (a) Ibid. 237.238.

(6) Sec book II, p. 190, (c) Co. I,in 97. u/i Liu. It 385-413.

(5) [But now by Htatiite 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27 8. 10, no person nhall be deemed t<> have

been in possession of any land within the meaning of that act, merely by reason of having made

an entry thereon; and by section 11 no continual or other claim mion or near any land shall

preserve any right of making an entry. The distinction between the law as laid down by Block-

stone and the present law an to an entry is, that by the former a bare entry on laud was attended

with a certain effect in keeping a right alive, whereas by the latter it has no effect whatever

unless there be a change of possession. When this take's place, the remedy by entry is still in

operation; when not, an entry is of no avail, and thin remedy no longer exists.]

- (6) The statute mentioned in the last note abolishes this proceeding.

(7) [The right of entry is no longer taken away by descent. Statute 3 and 4 'Wm. IV, c. 27.

B. 39. This mid the two following paragraphs are not applicable to the present state of the law.]
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any means whatsoever of the inheritance of a corporeal hereditament, dies;

whereby the same descends to his heir: in this case, however feeble the right of

the ancestor might be, the entry of any other person who claims title to the free-

hold is taken away; and he cannot recover possession against the heir by this

summary method, but is driven to his action to gain a legal seisin of the estate.

And this, first, because the heir comes to the estate by act of law, and not by

his own act; the law therefore protects his title, and will not suffer his posses-

sion to be devested, till the claimant hath proved a better right. Secondly,

because the heir may not suddenly know the true state of his title; and there-

fore the law, which is ever indulgent to heirs, takes away the entry of such

claimant as neglected to enter on the ancestor who was well able to defend his

title; and leaves the claimant only the remedy of an action against the heir, (e)

Thirdly, this was admirably adapted to the military spirit of the feudal tenures,

and tended to make the feudatory bold in war; since his children could not, by

any mere entry of another, be dispossessed of the lands whereof he died seised.

And, lastly, it is agreeable to the dictates of reason and the general principles of

law.

For, in every complete title (f) to lands, there are two things necessary; the

possession or seisin, and the right or property therein: (g) or, as it is expressed

in Fleta, juris et seisincs conjunctio. (h) Now if the possession be severed from

the property, if A has the jits proprietatis, and B by some unlawful means has

gained possession of the lands, this is an injury to A; for which the law gives a
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|-^,~~1 remedy, by putting *him in possession, but does it by different means

L -"according to the circumstances of the case. Thus, as B, who was him-

self the wrongdoer, and hath obtained the possession by either fraud or force,

hath only a bare or naked possession, without any shadow of right; A, therefore,

who hatlii both the right of property and the right of possession, may put an end

to his title at once, by the summary method of entry. But, if B, the wrong-

doer dies seised of the lands, then B's heir advances one step farther towards a

good title: he hath not only a bare possession, but also an apparent jusposses-

sionis, or right of possession. For the law presumes, that the possession which

is transmitted from the ancestor to the heir, is a rightful possession, until the

contrary be shown: and therefore the mere entry of A is not allowed to evict

the heir of B; but A is driven to his action at law to remove the possession of

the heir, though his entry alone would have dispossessed the ancestor.

So that in general it appears, that no man can recover possession by mere

entry on lands, which another hath by descent. Yet this rule hath some excep-

tions (i) wherein those reasons cease, upon which the general doctrine is grounded;

especially if the claimant were under any legal disabilities, during the life of the

ancestor, either of infancy, coverture, imprisonment, insanity, or being out of

the realm: in all which cases there is no neglect or laches in the claimant, and

therefore no descent shall bar, or take away his entry, (k) And this title of

taking away entries by descent, is still farther narrowed by the statute 32 Hen.

VIII, c. 33, which enacts that if any person disseises or turns another out of

possession, no descent to the heir of the disseisor shall take away the entry of him

that has a right to the land, unless the disseisor had peaceable possession five

years next after the disseisin. But the statute extendeth not to any feoffee or

donee of the disseisor, mediate or immediate: (?) because such a one by the gen-

F*1781 u'ne fen(*a' constitutions always came into the tenure solemnly *and with

L •" the lord's concurrence, by actual delivery of seisin, that is, open and pub-

lic investiture. On the other hand, it is enacted by the statute of limitations,

21 Jac. I, c. 16, that no entry shall be made by any man upon lands, unless

within twenty years after his right shall accrue. And by statute 4 and 5 Ann.

c. 16, no entry shall be of force to satisfy the said statute of limitations, or to

(«) Co. Lltt. 237 OT See book IT, eh. 13. (o) Mirror, o 4. J 27. (ft) L. S. c. IS, ) 5.

t») see the piirllnnlar cases montioneil by Littleton, b. 3, oh. 6. the principles of which Are well explained

in Oittiert's late of tenures.

(k> Co. Litl. 846. {1} Ibid. 254.
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avoid a fine levied of lands, unless an action be thereupon commenced within

one year after, prosecuted with effect (8)

Upon an ouster, by the discontinuance of tenant in tail, we have said that no

remedy by mere entry is allowed; but that, when tenant in tail aliens the lands

entailed, this takes away the entry of the issue in tail, and drives him to his

action at law to recover the possession. (TO) For, as in the former cases, the

law will not suppose, without proof, that the ancestor of him in possession,

acquired the estate by wrong; and therefore, after five years' peaceable possession,

and a descent cast, will not suffer the possession of the heir to be disturbed by

mere entry without action; so here the law will not suppose the discontinuor to

have aliened the estate without power so to do, and therefore leaves the heir in

tail to his action at law, and permits not his entry to be lawful. Besides, the

alienee, who came into possession by a lawful conveyance, which was at least

good for the life of the alienor, hath not only a bare possession, but also an

apparent rigM of possession; which is not allowed to be devested by the mere

entry of the claimant, but continues in force till a better right be shown, and

recognized by a legal determination. And something, also, perhaps, in framing

this rule of law, may be allowed to the inclination of the courts of justice, to go

as far as they could in making estates-tail alienable, by declaring such aliena-

tions to be voidable only, and not absolutely void.

In case of deforcement, also, where the deforciant had originally a lawful

possession of the land, but now detains it wrongfully, he still continues to have
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the presumptive prima *facie evidence of right; that is, possession law- r „-.*,„ -,

fully gained. Which possession shall not be overturned by the mere *• i'aJ

entry of another; but only by the demandant's showing a better right in a

course of law.

This remedy by entry must be pursued according to statute 5 Ric. II, st. 1,

c. 8, in a peaceable and easy manner; and not with force or strong hand. For,

if one turns or keeps another out of possession forcibly, this is an injury of both

a civil and a criminal nature. The civil is remedied by immediate restitution;

which puts the ancient possessor in statu quo: the criminal injury, or public

wrong, by breach of the king's peace, is punished by fine to the king. For, by

the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 9, upon complaint made to any justice of the peace,

of a forcible entry, with strong hand, on lands or tenements; or a forcible

detainer after a peaceable entry; he shall try the truth of the complaint by jury,

and, upon force found, shall restore the possession to the party so put out; and

in such case, or if any alienation be made to defraud the possessor of his right

(which is likewise declared to be absolutely void), the offender shall forfeit, for

the force found, treble damages to the party grieved, and make fine and ransom

to the king. But this does not extend to such as endeavour to keep possession

manu forti, after three years' peaceable enjoyment of either themselves, their

ancestors, or those under whom they claim; by a subsequent clause of the same

statute, enforced by statute 31 Eliz. c. 11.

II. Thus far of remedies, where the tenant or occupier of the land hath gained

only a mere possession, and no apparent shadow of right. Next follow another

class, which are in use where the title of the tenant or occupier is advanced one

step nearer to perfection; so that he hath in him not only a bare possession,

which may be destroyed by a bare entry, but also an apparent rigid of possession,

which cannot be removed but by orderly course of law; in the process of which._

(m) Ibid. 325.

(8) [However, by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, one period of limitation is established for all

lands and rents; and it is enacted by section 2, that after the 31st of December, 1H33, no

person shall make an entry or bring an action to recover any land but within twenty years

next after the time at which the right to make such entry or bring such action shall have first

accrued to gome person through whom he claims, or if snch right shall not have accrued to

any person through whom he claims, then within twenty years next after the time at which

the right to make such entry or bring such action shall first have accrued to the person mak-

ing or bringing the same.]
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it must be shown, that though he hath at present possession, and, therefore, hath

T *1801 *^.e PresumP.tive right, yet there is a right of possession, superior to his,

I J residing in him who brings the action.

These remedies are either by a writ of entry, or an assize; (9) which are

actions merely possessory; serving only to regain that possession, whereof the

demandant (that is, he who sues for the land) or his ancestors have been unjustly

deprived by the tenant or possessor of the freehold, or those under whom he

claims. They decide nothing with respect to the right of property ; only restor-

ing the demandant to that state or situation in which he was (or by law ought

to have been) before the dispossession committed. But this without any preju-

dice to the right of ownership: for, if the dispossessor has any legal claim, he

may afterwards exert it, notwithstanding a recovery against him in these pos-

sessory actions. Only the law will not suffer him to be his own judge, and either

take or maintain possession of the lands, until he hath recovered them by legal

means: («) rather presuming the right to have accompanied the ancient seisin,

than to reside in one who had no such evidence in his favour.

1. The first of these possessory remedies is by writ of entry; which is that

which disproves the title of the tenant or possessor, by showing the unlawful

means by which he entered or continues possession, (o) The writ is directed to

the sheriff, requiring him to " command the tenant of the land that he render

(in Latin, prwcipe quod reddat) to the demandant the land in question, which

he claims to be his right and inheritance; and into which, as he saith, the said
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tenant had not entry but by (or after) a disseisin, intrusion, or the like, made to

the said demandant, within the time limited by law for such actions; or that

upon refusal he do appear in court on such a day, to show wherefore he hath not

done it" (p) This is the original process, the prcecipe upon which all the rest

of the suit is grounded: wherein it appears that the tenant is required, either

F *1811 *° Deliver *seisin of the lands, or to show cause why he will not. This

*• -• cause may be either a denial of the fact of having entered by or under

such means as are suggested, or a justification of his entry by reason of title in

himself or in those under whom he makes claim: whereupon the possession of

the land is awarded to him who produces the clearest right to possess it.

In our ancient books we find frequent mention of the degrees within which

writs of entry are brought If they be brought against the party himself that

did the wrong, then they only charge the tenant himself with the injury; "non

habuit ingressum nisi per intrusionem quam ipse fecit." But if the intruder,

disseisor, or the like, has made any alienation of the land to a third person, or

it has descended to his heir, that circumstance must be alleged in the writ, for

the action must always be brought against the tenant of the land; and the

defect of his possessory title, whether arising from his own wrong or that of

those under whom he claims, must be set forth. One such alienation or descent

makes the first (0)1 degree, which is called the per, because then the form of a

writ of entry is this, that the tenant had not entry, but by the original wrong-

doer, who alienated the land, or from whom it descended to him: "non habuit

ingressum, nisi per Gulielmum, qui se in illud intrusit, et illud tenenti dimi-

sit." (r) A second alienation or descent makes another degree, called the per

and cui; because the form of a writ of entry, in that case, is, that the tenant

had not entry, but by or under a prior alienee, to whom the intruder demised it;

" non habuit ingressum nisi per Ricardum, cui Gulielmus illud dimisit, qui se

in illud intrusit." (s) These degrees thus state the original wrong, and the title

of the tenant who claims under such wrong. If more than two degrees (that

is, two alienations or descents) were past, there lay no writ of entry at. the coin-

(n) Mir. c. 4, 1 14. (ol Finch, L. 261. (pi Sc« book II, Append. No. V, 5 1.

(g) Finch, L. 2B2. Booth, indeed (of real actions, 172). makea the first degree to consist of the original

wronz done, the second in the per, and the third in the per and cui. But the difference is immaterial.

(r) Booth, 181. (s) Finch, L. 263. F. X. B. 203, 201.

(9) These writs were abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, c. 27, $ 36.
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mon law. For, as it was provided, for the ^quietness of men's inherit- r *., go i

anceSj that no one, even though he had the true right of possession, L •"

ehould enter upon him who had the apparent right by descent or otherwise, but

he was driven to his writ of entry to gain possession; so, after more than two

descents or two conveyances were passed, the demandant, even though he had

the right both of possession and property, was not allowed this possessory ac-

tion ; but was driven to his writ of right, a long and final remedy, to punish his

neglect in not sooner putting in his claim, while the degree subsisted, and for

the ending of suits, and quieting of all controversies, (t) But by the statute of

Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 30, it was provided, that when the number of alien-

ations or descents exceeded the usual degrees, a new writ should be allowed

without any mention of degrees at all. And, accordingly, a new writ has beeii

framed, called a writ of entry in the post, which only alleges the injury of the

wrongdoer, without deducing all the intermediate title from him to the tenant;

stating it in this manner: that the tenant hod not entry unless after, or subse-

quent to, the ouster or injury done by the original dispossessor; "non habuit

tnyressitm nisi post intrusionem quam Gulielmus in illud fecit;" and rightly

concluding, that, if the original title was wrongful, all claims derived from

thence must participate of the same wrong. Upon the latter of these writs it is

(the writ of entry sur disseisin in the post) that the form of our common recov-

eries of landed estates («) is usually grounded; which, we may remember, were

observed in the preceding volume (v) to be fictitious actions brought against the
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tenant of the freehold (usually called the tenant to the prmcipe, or writ of

entry), in which, by collusion, the demandant recovers the land.

This remedial instrument, or writ of entry, is applicable to all the cases of

ouster before-mentioned, except that of discontinuance by tenant in tail, and

some peculiar species of deforcements. Such is that of deforcement of dower,

by not assigning any dower to the widow within the time limited by *law; r *i QO-I

for which she has her remedy by writ of dower, unde nihil habet. (w) L -"

But if she be deforced of part only of her dower, she cannot then say that nihil

habet; and, therefore, she may have recourse to another action, by writ of right

of dower; which is a more general remedy, extending either to part or the

whole; and is (with regard to her claim) of the same nature as the g^rand writ

of right, whereof we shall presently speak, is with regard to claims in fee-sim-

ple, (x) (10) On the other hand, if the heir (being within age), or his guardian,

assign her more than she ought to have, they may be remedied by a writ of

admeasurement of dower, (y) But, in general, the writ of entry is the universal

remedy to recover possession, when wrongfully withheld from the owner. It

were, therefore, endless to recount all the several divisions of writs of entry,

which the different circumstances of the respective demandants may require,

and which are furnished by the laws of England: (z) being plainly and clearly

chalked out in that most ancient and highly venerable collection of legal forms,

the registrum omnium brevium, or register of such writs as are suable out of

the king's courts, upon which Fitzherbert's natura brevium is a comment; and

(t) 2 Inst. 153. (ujSee book II. Append. No. V. (n) Bookl!, ch. 21. (w) F. N. B. 147.

(x) Ibid. 16. (y) F. N. B. 148. Finch. L. 314. Stat \Vc»tm. 2. 13 Ed. I, o. 7.

ffj See tiracton, 1. 4, tr. ',. c. 6,4 4. BrlUon, c. 114. fol. 2(54. The most usual were, 1. The wrlta of entry

mi- disseisin, and at intrusion. (V. N. B. r.il.2cc;j which arc brought to remedy either of those species of

onster. 2. The writs ofdumfuit infra rttatem, and dumfttit non compos mentis, (Ibid. 182, -202) which lie

for a person of full age, or one who hath recovered Ilia understanding, after having fwhen under age or

Insnne^ aliened his lands; or for the heirs of such aiienor. 3. The writs of cui in vita, and cui ante di-

rorlium, (Ibid. 193. 204J for a woman. wh«n a widow or divorced, whose huaband during the coverture

(cui in vita sua, vet cui ante divortium, ipsa contradicere nonpotttit) hath aliened her estate. 4. The writ

i"l communem legem, (Hid. -Ml) for the ruversioner after the alienation and death of the particular tenant

for life. 5. The writs in casu proviso and in consimUi casu, (Ibid. 2Q.~>, 20ttj which lav not ad communem

legem. but are given by stat. (iloc. 6 Edw. I, c. 7. anil Westm. 2. 13 Edw. I, c. 81, for the reversioner after

the alienation, but during the life, of the tenant in dower or other tenant fbr life. 6. The writ ad termi-

num qui pmteriit, (Ibid 201 > for the revcreioner, when the possession Is withheld bv the lessee or a

stranger alter the determination of a lease for years. 7. The writ causa matrimonti prrclocuti, (Ibid. 205 J

for a woman who giveth land to a man in fee or for life, to tho intent that he may marry her, and he doth

not. And the like in case of other deforcements.

(10) Both these writs were abolished by the common law procedure act, I860, and a writ of

summons from the common pleas substituted.
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r *, g i -I in which every man who *is injured will be sure to find a method of

L J relief exactly adapted to his own case, described in the compass of a few

lines, and yet without the omission of any material circumstance. So that the

wise and equitable provision of the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 24, for fram-

ing new writs when wanted, is almost rendered useless by the very great perfec-

tion of the ancient forms. And. indeed, I know not whether it is a greater

credit to our laws to have such a provision contained in them, or not to have

occasion, or at least very rarely, to use it.

In the time of our Saxon ancestors, the right of possession seems only to have

been recoverable by writ of entry, (a) which was then usually brought in the

county court. And it is to be observed, that the proceedings in these actions

were not then so tedious when the courts were held, and process issued from

and was returnable therein at the end of every three weeks, as they became after

the conquest, when all causes were drawn into the king's courts, and process

issued only from term to term: which was found exceedingly dilatory, being at

least four times as slow as the other. And hence, a new remedy was invented

in many cases to do justice to the people, and to determine the possession in the

proper counties, and yet by the king's judges. This was the remedy by assise,

which is called by statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. 1, c. 24, festinwn remedium, in

comparison with that by a writ of entry; it not admitting of many dilatory

pleas and proceedings, to which other real actions are subject. (5)

2. The writ of assize is said to have been invented by Glanvil, chief justice to
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Henry the Second; (c) and, if so, it seems to owe its introduction to the parlia-

ment held at Northampton, in the twenty-second year of that prince's reign;

when justices in eyre were appointed to go round the kingdom in order to take

these assizes: and the assizes themselves (particularly those of mart d'ancestor

and novel disseisin) were clearly pointed out and described, (d) As a writ of

F*18"l en*;ry *'s a real action (11) which disproves the title of the tenant by

L J showing the unlawful commencement of his possession ; so an assize is

a real action, which proves the title of the demandant merely by showing his, or

his ancestor's, possession ; (e) and these two remedies are in all other respects so

totally alike, that a judgment or recovery in one is a bar against the other; so

that, when a man's possession is once established by either of these possessory

actions, it can never be disturbed by the same antagonist in any other of them.

The word assize is derived by Sir Edward Coke (/) from the Latin assideo, to

sit together: and it signifies, originally, the jury who try the cause, and sit to-

gether for that purpose. By a figure it is now made to signify the court or juris-

diction, which summons this jury together by a commission of assize, or ad

assisas capiendas; and hence the judicial assemblies held by the king's commis-

sion in every county, as well to take these writs of assize, as to try causes at nisi

prius, are termed in common speech the assizes. By another somewhat similar

figure, the name of assize is also applied to this action, for recovering possession

of lands; for the reason, saith Littleton. (g) why such writs at the beginning

were called assizes, was, for that in these writs the sheriff is ordered to summon

a jury, or assize; which is not expressed in any other original writ. (A)

This remedy, by writ of assize, is only applicable to two species of injury by

ouster, viz.: abatement, and a recent or novel disseisin. If the abatement hap-

pened upon the death of the demandant's father or mother, brother or sister,

uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, the remedy is by an assize of mart d'ancestor, or

the death of one's ancestor. This writ directs the sheriff to summon a jury

(a) Gilb. Ton. 44. fb) Booth, 262. (c) Mirror, c. 2, t 25.

(rtj I 9. Si domimufeodi neoat haredibvt defbncti saitinam ejutdemfeodi. jtittiiiarii Aominl rtgit faciant

intiefirri, remgnitionem per xfi If gales homines, mialem taitinum dtfunctut inde holm it, die qilafuit vina et

mortmii; et, ncut recognition fuerit. Ua haraKbus ejus reitituant. > 10. Justitiarii Jomini rtgit /octant

feri recogiiitioiiem de disiairints/actit tuner atttoam, a tempore quo dominui rex rent* «'n Anglian proxinu

pott paremfactam inter iptum et regem Jillum mum. fSpelm. Cod. 330.}

fej Kinch, L. 284 (f) 1 Inst. 153. (g) I 2S4. fh) Co. Lltt. 199.

(11) [The writs of assize and entry are now abolished. See statute 3 and 4 Vm. IT, c. ST.]
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or assize who shall view the land in question, and recognize whether such an-

cestor was seized thereof on the day of his death, and whether the demandant

be the next heir: (£) soon after which the judges came down by the king's com-

mission to take the recognition of assize: when, if *these points arc r #-iaa -•

found in the affirmative, the law immediately transfers the possession L J

from the tenant to the demandant. If the abatement happened on the death

of one's grandfather or grandmother, then an assize of mart d'ancestor no

longer lies, but a writ of ayle or de avo : if on the death of the great-grand-

father or great-grandmother, then a writ of besayle, or de proavo: but if it

mounts one degree higher, to the tresayle, or grandfather's grandfather, or if the

abatement happened upon the duath of" any collateral relation, other than those

before-mentioned, the writ is called a writ of cosinage, or de consanguineo. (k) (12)

And the same point shall be inquired of in all these actions ancestrel, as in anas-

size of mart d''ancestor ; they being of the very same nature: (I) though they differ

in this point of form, that these ancestrel writs (like all other writs ofpracipe)

expressly assert a title in the demandant, (viz.: the seisin of the ancestor at his

death and his own right of inheritance), the assize asserts nothing directly, but

only prays an inquiry whether those points be so. (m) There is also another an-

cestrel writ, denominated a nuper obiit, to establish an equal division of the land

in question, where, on the death of an ancestor, who has several heirs, one

enters and holds the others out of possession, (ri) But a man is not allowed to

have any of these actions ancestrel for an abatement consequent on the death of
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any collateral relation, beyond the fourth degree; (o) though in the lineal ascent

he may proceed ad infinitum. (p) For there must be some boundary; else the

privilege would be universal, wliich is absurd: and therefore the law pays no re-

gard to the possession of a collateral ancestor, who was no nearer than the fifth

degree.

It was always held to be law, (q) that where lands were devisable in a man's

last will by the custom of the place, there an assise of mart d'ancestor did not

lie. For, where lands were so devisable, the right of possession could never be

determined by a process, which inquired only of these two points, the seisin of

the ancestor, and the heirship of the demandant. And hence it may be reason-

able to conclude, that when the *statute of wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, made r *i o« i

ftll socage lands devisable, an assize of mort d'ancestor no longer could *- J

be brought of lands held in socage; (r) and that now, since the statute 12 Car.

II, c. 24 (which converts all tenures, a few only excepted, into free and common

Bocage), no assize of mart d'ancestor can be brought of any lands in the king-

dom, but that, in case of abatements, recourse must be properly had to the writs

of entry.

An assize of novel (or recent) disseisin is an action of the same nature with the

assize of mort d'ancestor before-mentioned, in that herein the demandant's posses-

sion must be shown. But it differs considerably in other points; particularly in

that it recites a complaint by the demandant of the disseisin committed in terms

of direct averment; whereupon the sheriff is commanded to reseize the land and

all the chattels thereon, and keep the same in his custody till the arrival of the

justices of assise (which in fact hath been usually omitted); (s) and in the

mean time to summon a jury to view the premises, and make recognition of the

assize before the justices, (t) At which time the tenant may plead either the

general issues mil tort, mil disseisin or any special plea. And if, upon the gen-

eral issue, the recognitors find an actual seisin in the demandant, and his sub-

sequent disseisin by the present tenant; he shall have judgment to recover his

seisin, and damages for the injury sustained: being the only case in which dam-

(fl F. N. B. 195. Finch, L. 290. (t) Finch. L. *H, 867.

(?) Stnt. \Vcstm. 2. 13 Kdw. I, c. SO. (m) Z Inst. 389. (n) F. N. B. 197. Finch, L. 203.

(ol Hale on F. N. B. 221. (p) Fill. Abr. tit. tonnage. 16.

(<?) Hracton. J. 4 de atrit. morti* anteceuorit, c. 13, (8. F. N. B. 190. (r) See 1 Leon. 267.

(it) Bract. 137. fcUil, Murlbr. o. 16. (w) 2 lust. 83, «t. (.r,) L. 4, e. 49. (1/1 32 Hen. V] II. c. 2.

(12) All the writs mentioned were abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV. c. 27.
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ages were recoverable in any possessory action at the common law ; («) the ten-

ant being in all other cases allowed to retain the intermediate profits of the land,

to enable him to perform the feudal services. But costs and damages were an-

nexed to many other possessory actions by the statutes of Marlberge, 52 Hen.

F "188 1 ' c< *6' an^ °^ Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1. And *to prevent frequent and

L J vexatious disseisins, it is enacted by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. Ill,

c. 3, that if a person disseised recover seisin of the land again by assize of novel

disseisin, and again be disseised of the same tenements by the same disseisor, he

shall have a writ of re-disseisin ; and if he recover therein, the re-disseisor shall

be imprisoned ; and by the statute of Marlberge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 8, shall also

pay a fine to the king: to which the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 26, hath

superadded double damages to the party aggrieved. In like manner, by the

same statute of Merton, when any lands or tenements are recovered by assize of

mart d'ancestor, or other jury, or any judgment of the court, if the party be

afterwards disseised by the same person against whom judgment was obtained,

he shall have a writ of post-disseisin against him ; which subjects the post-dis-

Beisor to the same penalties as a re-disseisor. The reason of all which, as given

by Sir Edward Coke, (w) is because such proceeding is a contempt of the king's

courts, and in despite of the law ; or, as Bracton more fully expresses it, (x)

" talis qui ita convictus fuerit, dupliciter delinquit contra regem : quia facit

disseisinam et roberiam contra pacem suam; etetiam ausu temerario irrita facit

ea, qum in curia domini regis rite acta sunt : et propter duplex delictum tnerito
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sustinere debet pcenam duplicatam."

In all these possessory actions there is a time of limitation settled, beyond

which no man shall avail himself of the possession of himself or his ancestors,

or take advantage of the wrongful possession of his adversary. For, if he be

negligent for a long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to lend

him any assistance, to recover the possession merely, both to punish his neg-

lect (nam leges vigilcmtibus, non dormientibus, subveniunt), and also because

it is presumed that the supposed wrongdoer has in such a length of time pro-

cured a legal title, otherwise he would sooner have been sued. This time of

limitation by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. Ill, c. 8, and Westm. 1. 3 Edw. I,

c. 39, was successively dated from particular eras, viz. : from the return of King

F *189 1 J°hn fr°m Ireland, and from the coronation, &c., of King Henry *the

L J Third. But this date of limitation continued so long unaltered, that it

became indeed no limitation at all ; it being above three hundred years from

Henry the Third's coronation to the year 1540, when the present statute of lim-

itations (_//) was made. This, instead of limiting actions from the date of a par-

ticular event, as before, which in process of years grew absurd, took another and

more direct course, which might endure forever : by limiting a certain period,

as fifty years for lands, and the like period (z) for customary and prescriptive

rents, suits and services (for there is no time for limitation upon rents created

by deed, or reserved on a particular estate), (a) and enacting that no person

should bring any possessory action, to recover possession thereof merely upon

the seisin, or dispossession of his ancestors, beyond such certain period. (13)

But this does not extend to services, which by common possibility may not

happen to become due more than once in the lord's or tenant's life ; as fealty, and

the like. (b) And all writs, grounded upon the possession of the demandant him-

self, are directed to be sued out within thirty years after the disseisin com-

plained of; for if it be an older date, it can with no propriety be called a fresh,

recent, or novel disseisin ; which name Sir Edward Coke informs us was origin-

(») Booth, 211. Bract. 4, 1, 19, ( 7. (t) F. N. B. 177.

< .) Ho Berthelet's original edition of the statute, A. D. 1540 ; and Cay's, Pickering's, and Ruffhead's edi-

tions. examined with the record. Rastell's and other intermediate editions, which Sir Edward Coke ri

last '•''>> and other subsequent writers have followed, make It ouly forty years for rents, Ac.

(a) 8 Rep. 65. (b) Co. Litt. 116.

(13) This is no longer the law ; actions for the recovery of land or rent mnst now be bronght

•within twenty years alter the right accrues. Statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 27, s. 2.
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ally given to this proceeding, because the disseisin mnst have been since the last

eyre or circuit of the justices, which happened once in seven years, otherwise the

action was gone, (c) And we may observe, (d) that the limitation prescribed by

Henry the Second at the first institution of the assize of novel disseisin was from

his own return into England, after the peace made between him and the young

king, his son; which was but the year before. (14)

What has been here observed may throw some light on the doctrine of

remitter, which we spoke of in the second "chapter of this book; and r *, <.Q -i

which we may remember was where one who hath right to lands, but is L J

out of possession, hath afterwards the freehold cast upon him by some subse-

quent defective title, and enters by virtue of that title. In this case the law

remits him to his ancient and more certain right, and by an equitable fiction

supposes him to have gained possession in consequence, and by virtue thereof:

and this, because he cannot possibly obtain judgment at law to be restored to

his prior right, since he is himself the tenant of the land, and therefore hath

nobody against whom to bring his action. This determination of the law

might seem superfluous to an hasty observer; who perhaps would imagine, that

since the tenant hath now both the right and also the possession, it little signi-

fies by what means such possession shall be said to be gained. But the wisdom

of our ancient law determined nothing in vain. As the tenant's possession was

gained by a defective title, it was liable to be overturned by showing that defect,

in a writ of entry; and then he must have been driven to his writ of right, to
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recover his just inheritance; which would have been doubly hard, because dur-

ing the time he was himself tenant, he could not establish his prior title by any

possessory action. The law therefore remits him to his prior title, or puts him

in the same condition as if he had recovered the land by writ of entry. With-

out the remitter, he would have had jus, et seisinam separate; a good right, but

a bad possession: now, by the remitter, he hath the most perfect of all titles,

juris et seismte conjunctionem.

III. By these several possessory remedies the right of possession may be

restored to him that is unjustly deprived thereof. But the right of possession

Sthough it carries with it a strong presumption) is not always conclusive evi-

ence of the right of property, which may still subsist in another man. For,

as "one man may have the possession, and another the right of posses- r ^g., -,

sion, which is recovered by these possessory actions; so one .man may *• J

have the right of possession, and so not be liable to eviction by any possessory

action, and another may have the right of property, which cannot be otherwise

asserted than by the great and final remedy of a writ of right, or such corres-

pondent writs as are in the nature of a writ of right. (15)

This happens principally in four cases: 1. Upon discontinuance by the alien-

ation of tenant in tail: whereby he who had the right of possession hath

transferred it to the alienee ; and therefore his issue, or those in remainder or

reversion, shall not be allowed to recover by virtue of that possession, which the

tenant hath so voluntarily transferred. 2, 3. In case of judgment given against

either party, whether by his own default, or upon trial of the merits, in any

possessory action; for such judgment, if obtained by him who hath not the true

ownership, is held to be a species of deforcement; which, however, binds the

right of possession, and suffers it not to be ever again disputed, unless the right

of property be also proved. 4. In case the demandant, who claims the right is

barred from these possessory actions by length of time and the statute of limi-

tations before-mentioned: for an undisturbed possession for fifty years ought

not to be devested by any thing, but a very clear proof of the absolute right of

(c) 1 lost. 153. Booth, 210. (<i) See page 184.

(14) Fnr the present limitations to actions, see note, book 2, p. 264.

J15) [Now that the action of ejectment, which is founded upon a right of possession, is the

y mode of recovering land, this distinction is in effect destroyed. And not one of the four

oases that follow can now happen.]
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property. In these four cases the law applies the remedial instrument of either

the writ of right itself, or such other writs as are said to be of the same nature.

1. And first, upon an alienation by tenant in tail, whereby the estate-tail is

discontinued, and the remainder or reversion is by failure of the particular

estate displaced, and turned into a mere right, the remedy by action of for-

medon (secundum formamdoni), which is in the nature of a writ of right, (e) and

is the highest action that tenant in tail can have. (/) For he cannot have an

absolute writ of right, which is confined only to such as claim in fee-simple: and

for that reason this writ of formedon was granted him by the statute de donis or

r *i no -\ *Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 1, which is therefore emphatically called his

"• •" writ of right (y) This writ is distinguished into three species : a for-

medon in the descender, in the remainder, and in the reverter. A writ offorme-

don in the descender lieth, where a gift in tail is made, and the tenant in tail

alienes the lands entailed, or is disseised of them, and dies; in this case the heir

in tail shall have this writ of formedon in the descender, to recover these lands

so given in tail against him wno is then the actual tenant of the freehold. (A)

In which action the demandant is bound to state the manner and form of the

gift in tail, and to prove himself heir secundum for mam doni. A formedon in

the remainder lieth, where a man giveth lauds to another for life or in tail, with

remainder to a third person in tail or in fee, and he who hath the particular estate

dieth without issue inheritable, and a stranger intrudes upon him in remainder

and keeps him out of possession, (i) In this case the remainder-man shall have
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his writ of formedon in the remainder, wherein the whole form of the gift is

stated, and the happening of the event upon which the remainder depended.

This writ is not given in express words by the statute de donis; but is founded

upon the equity of the statute, and upon this maxim in law, that, if any one

hath a right to the land, he ought also to have an action to recover it. A. forme-

don in the reverter lieth, where there is a gift in tail, and afterwards by the death

of the donee or his heirs without issue of his body the reversion falls in upon

the donor, his heirs or assigns: in such case the reversioner shall have this writ

to recover the lands, wherein he shall suggest the gift, his own title to the rever-

sion minutely deprived from the donor, and the failure of issue upon which his

reversion takes place, (i) This lay at common law, before the statute de donis,

if the donee aliened before he had performed the condition of the gift, by hav-

ing issue, and afterwards died without any. (I) The time of limitation in a

r ngjj -I formedon by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 16, is twenty years; within *which

*• ' •* space of time after his title accrues, the demandant must bring his action,

or else he is forever barred.

2. In the second case; if the owners of a particular estate, as for life, in

dower, by the curtesy, or in fee-tail, are barred of the right of possession by

a recovery had against them through their default or non-appearance in a pos-

sessory action, they were absolutely without any remedy at the common law: as

a writ of right does not lie for any but such as claim to be tenants of the fee-

simple. Therefore the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 4, gives a new writ for

such persons, after their lands have been so recovered against them by default,

called a quod ei deforceat; which, though not strictly a writ of right, so far

partakes of the nature of one, as that it will restore the right to him who has

been thus unwarily deforced by his own default, (m) But, in case the recovery

were not had by his own default, but upon defence in the inferior possessory

action, this still remains final with regard to these particular estates, as at the

common law: and hence it is, that a common recovery (on a writ of entry in

the post) had, not by default of the tenant himself, but (after his defence made

and voucher of a third person to warranty) by default of such vouchee, is now

the usual bar to cut off an estate-tail. (M)

3. 4. Thirdly, in case the right of possession be barred by a recovery upon the

merits in a possessory action, or lastly by the statute of limitations, a claimant

ff) Tln-.h. T-. 1O1. (f) Co. Litt. 336. („) p. N. B. 2S5. (h) Ibid. 411, 212. (i) Ibid. 217.

ft) Ibid. 219. si Kop. si (I) Finch, L. 2(58. (m) F. JT. B. 155. fnJSecbookU.ch.il.
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in fee-simple may have a mere writ of right; which is in its nature the highest

writ in the law, (o) and lieth only of an estate in fee-simple, and not for him who

hath a less estate. This writ lies concurrently with all other real actions, in

which an estate of fee-simple may be recovered: and it also lies after them,

heing as it were an appeal to the mere right, when judgment hath been had as

to the possession in an inferior possessory *action. (p) But though a r *IQA-I

writ of right may be brought, where the demandant is entitled to the «• J

possession, yet it rarely is advisable to be brought in such cases; as a more

expeditious and easy remedy is had, without meddling with the property, by

proving the demandant's own, or his ancestor's, possession, and their illegal

ouster, in one of the possessory actions. But, in case the right of possession be

lost by length of time, or by judgment against the true owner in one of these

inferior suits, there is no other choice: this is then the only remedy that can be

had; and it is of so forcible a nature, that it overcomes all obstacles, and clears all

objections that may have arisen to cloud and obscure the title. And, after issue

once joined in a writ of right, the judgment is absolutely final; so that a recov-

ery had in this action may be pleaded in bar of any other claim or demand, (g)

The pure, proper, or mere writ of right lies only, we have said, to recover

lands in fee-simple, unjustly withheld from the true proprietor. But there are

also some other writs which are said to be in the nature of a writ of right, be-

cause their process and proceedings do mostly (though not entirely) agree with

the writ of right: but in some of them the fee-simple is not demanded; and in
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others not land, but some incorporeal hereditament Some of these have been

already mentioned, as the writ of right of dower, of formedon, &c., and the

others will hereafter be taken notice of under their proper divisions. Nor is

the mere writ of right alone, or always, applicable to every case of a claim of

lands in fee-simple: for if the lord's tenant in fee-simple dies without heir

whereby an escheat accrues, the lord shall have a writ of escheat, (r) which is in

the nature of a writ of right. (*) And if one of two or more coparceners de-

forces the other, by usurping the sole possession, the party aggrieved shall have a

writ of right, derationabiliparte,(t) which may be grounded on the *seisin r „, Q- -,

of the ancestor at any time during his life; whereas, in a nuper oMit "• J

(which is a possessory remedy) (u) he must be seised at the time of his death.

But, waiving these and other minute distinctions, let us now return to the gen-

eral writ of right.

This writ ought to he first brought in the court-baron (w) of the lord, of whom

the lands are holden ; and then it is open or patent: but if he holds no court, or

hath waived his right, remisit curiam suam, it may be brought in the king's

courts by writ of prcecipe originally; (a:) and then it is a writ of right close ; (y)

being directed to the sheriff and not the lord. («) Also, when one of the king's im-

mediate tenants in capite is deforced, his writ of right is called a writ ofprtscipe in

capite (the improper use of which, as well as of the former praeipequiadominus

remisit curiam, so as to oust the lord of his jurisdiction, is restrained by magna

carta), (a) and, heing directed to the sheriff, and originally returnable in the

king's courts, is also a writ of right close, (b) There is likewise a little writ of

right close, secundum consuetudinem manerii, which lies for the king's tenants

in ancient demesne, (c) and others of a similar nature, (d) to try the right of their

lands and tenements in the court of the lord exclusively, (e) But the writ of

right patent itself may also at any time be removed into tne county court, by

writ of tolt, (f) and from thence into the king's courts by writ of pone (g) or re-

cordari facias, at the suggestion of either party that there is a delay or defect

of justice, (h)

fo) F. N. B. 1. fpj IbU. 1, 5. (q) Ibid. «. Co. Litt. 158.

(r) F. N. B. 14S. (>} Booth, 135. ft) F. N. B. 9. fu} See pajre 1S6.

(w) Append. No. I, U. (x) V. N. B. 2. Finch, L. 313. (y) Booth. !)1.

(*) Append. No. I. J 4. (a) C. 24. fbj F. N. B. ». (cj See book II, ch. 6.

fa} Kitchen, tit. copyhold.

ft) Brarton. 2. 1. c. 11, /. 4, tr. 1. c. 9, anil tr. 3, o. IB, f 9. Old Tennr. t. tenir en toeage. Old N. B. f.

aarae, and /. brief <U recto claut. F. N. B. H.

f/J Append. Xo. I, ^ 2. (g) Ibid, f 8. (h) F. N. B. 3. 4.

.
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In the progress of this action, (t) the demandant must allege some seisin of

the lands and tenements in himself, or else in some person under whom he

f *1961 Claml8>an(i then derive the right *from the person so seised to himself;

L J to which the tenant may answer by denying the demandant's right, and

averring that he has more right to hold the lands than the demandant has to de-

mand them: and this right of the tenant being shown, it then puts the demand-

ant upon the proof of his title: in which, if he fails, or if the tenant hath shown

a better, the demandant and his heirs are perpetually barred of their claim; but

if he can make it appear that his right is superior to the tenant's he shall re-

cover the land against the tenant and his heirs forever. But even this writ of

right, however superior to any other, cannot be sued out at any distance of time.

For by the ancient law no seisin could be alleged by the demandant, but from

the time of Henry the First; (k) by the statute of iferton, 20 Hen. Ill, c. 8,

from the time of Henrv the Second; by the statute of Westm. 1, 3 Edward I,

c. 39, from the time of Richard the First; and now, by statute 32 Henry VIII,

c. 2, seisin in a writ of right shall be within sixty years. So that the possession

of lands in fee-simple uninterruptedly, for threescore years, is at present a suf-

ficient title against all the world; and cannot be impeached by any dormant

claim whatsoever. (16)

I have now gone through the several species of injury by ouster and dis-

possession of the freehold, with the remedies applicable to each. In consid-

ering which I have been unavoidably led to touch upon such obsolete and
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abstruse learning, as lies intermixed with, and alone can explain the reason

of, those parts of the law which are now more generally in use. For, without

contemplating the whole fabric together, it is impossible to form any clear

idea of the meaning and connection of those disjointed parts which still form

a considerable branch of the modern law; such as the doctrine of entries and

remitter, the levying of fines, and the suffering of common recoveries. Neither

indeed is any considerable part of that, which I have selected in this chapter

r*1071 from among the venerable monuments of our ancestors, so *abso-

L J lutely antiquated as to be out of force, though the whole is certainly out

of use: there being but very few instances for more than a century past of

prosecuting any real action for land by writ of entry, assize, formedon, writ of

right, or otherwise. The forms are indeed preserved in the practice of common

recoveries; but they are forms and nothing else; for which the very clerks that

pass them are seldom capable to assign the reason. But the title of lands is

now usually tried in actions of ejectment or trespass ; of which in the following

chapters. (1?)

(I) Append. No. I. { 5. (!;) Glaiw. t. 2, o. 3. Co. 1,1 tt. 114.

(16) [This IB far from being universally true; for an uninterrupted possession for sixty years

•will not create a title where the claimant or demandant had no riirlit to enter within that time;

as where an estate in tail, for life, or for years, continues above sixty years, still the reversiouer

may enter and recover the estate; the possession must be adverse, and Lord Coke says, " it

has been resolved, that although a man has been out of possession of land for sixty years, yet if

his entry is not tolled he may enter and bring any action of his own posession; and if his entry

be congeable, and he enter, he may have an action of his own possession." 4 Co. 11, li. ]

(17) [The real actions mentioned in this chapter are now abolished, and the title to lands is

now always tried, as it was usually in the time of Blackstone, by an action of ejectment or of

trespass.]

Real and mixed actions, except ejectment, are now almost universally abolished or become

obsolete in the United States, and ejectment is the usual remedy to try title to lands. The

proceedings in that action have also, by statute been divested of all useless forms, and made

perfectly simple.
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CHAPTER XL

OF DISPOSSESSION, OR OUSTER OF CHATTELS REAL.

HAVING in the preceding chapter considered with some attention the several

species of injury by dispossession or ouster of the freehold, together with the

regular and well-connected scheme of remedies by actions real, which are given

to the subject by the common law, either to recover the possession only, or else

to recover at once the possession, and also to establish the right of property;

the method which I there marked out leads me next to consider injuries by ouster

of chattels real; that is, by amoving the possession of the tenant from an estate

by statute-merchant, statute-staple, recognizance in the nature of it, or elegit;

or from an estate for years.

I. Ouster, or amotion of possession, from estates held hy statute, recognizance,

or elegit is only liable to happen by a species of disseisin, or turning out of the

legal proprietor, before his estate is determined by raising the sum for which it

is given him in pledge. And for such ouster, though the estate be merely a

chattel interest, the owner shall have the same remedy as for an injury to a free-

hold ; viz., by assize of novel disseisin, (a) (1) But this depends upon the

several statutes, which *create these respective interests, (b) and which •- +-IQQ i

expressly provide and allow this remedy in case of dispossession. Upon «• ••

which account it is that Sir Edward Coke observes, (c) that these tenants are said

to hold their estates ut liberum tenementum, until their debts are paid: because

by the statutes they shall have an assize, as tenants of the freehold shall have;
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and in that respect they have the similitude of a freehold, (d)

II. As for ouster, or amotion of possession from an estate for years; this

happens only by a like kind of disseisin, ejection, or turning out, of the tenant

from the occupation of the land during the continuance ofnis term. For this

injury the law has provided him with two remedies, according to the circum-

stances and situation of the wrongdoer: the writ of ejectionefirma; which lies

against any one, the lessor, reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger who is

himself the wrongdoer and has committed the injury complained of: and the

writ of quare ejecit infra terminum; which lies not against the wrongdoer or

ejector nimself, but his feoffee or other person claiming under him. These

are mixed actions, somewhat between real and personal; for therein are two

things recovered, as well restitution of the term of years, as damages for the

ouster or wrong,

1. A writ then of ejectione firma, or action of trespass in ejectment, (2) lieth

where lands or tenements are let for a term of years; and afterwards the lessor,

reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger, doth eject or oust the lessee of his

term, (e) In this case he shall have his writ of ejection to call the defendant to

answer for entering on the lands so demised to the plaintiff for a term that is not

yet expired, and ejecting him. (/) And by this writ the plaintiff shall recover

back his term, or the remainder of it, with damages.

*Since the disuse of real actions, this mixed proceeding is become the •- *QQQ -i

common method of trying the title to -lands or tenements. It may not *• •"

therefore be improper to delineate, with some degree of minuteness, its history,

the manner of its process, and the principles whereon it is grounded.

fa) F. N. B. 178.

(b) SUit. Wentm. 2. 13 Edw. I, c. IS. Stat. de mercatoritna. 27 Edvr. HI. c. 9. Stat. 23 Hen. VIII, c. 6,} 9.

(c) 1 Inst 43. (dj See book II, ch. 10. (e) F. N. B. MO. (f) See Appendix, No. II, i 1.

(1) The aswize of novel disseisin in now abolished, and ejectment Is the present remedy.

(2) [In general ejectment will lie to recover possession of any thing whereon an entrj: can be

made, and whereof the sheriff can deliver possession. But an ejectment cannot be maintained

for things that lie merely in grant, not capable of being delivered in execution, as an advowson,

common in gross: Cro. Jac. 146; a piscary: Id., Cro. Car. 492; 8 Mod. 277; 1 Brownl. 143;

ctiittru, per Ashurst, jr. 1 T. B. 361.J
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We have before seen, (g) that the writ of covenant, for breach of the contract

contained in the lease for years, was anciently the only specific remedy for

recovering against the lessor a term from which he had ejected his lessee,

together with damages for the ouster. But if the lessee was ejected by a stranger,

claiming under a title superior (/«) to that of the lessor, or by a grantee of the

reversion (who might at any time by a common recovery have destroyed the

term), (i) though the lessee might still maintain an action of covenant against

the lessor, for non-performance of his contract or lease, yet he could not by any

means recover the term itself. If the ouster was committed by a mere stranger,

without any title to the land, the lessor might indeed by a real action recover

possession of the freehold, but the lessee had no other remedy against the ejector

but in damages, by a writ of ejections firma, for the trespass committed in

ejecting him from his farm, (k) But afterwards, when the courts of equity

began to oblige the ejector to make a specific restitution of the land to the

party immediately injured, the courts of law also adopted the same method of

doing complete justice; and, in the prosecution of a writ of ejectment, intro-

duced a species of remedy not warranted by the original writ nor prayed by the

r *2011 Declaration (which are *calculated for damages merely, and are silent as

L J to any restitution), viz.: a judgment to recover the term, and a writ of

possession thereupon. (I) This method seems to have been settled as early as the

reign of Edward IV; (m) though it hath been said (n) to have first begun under

Henry VII, because it probably was then first applied to its present principal
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use, that of trying the title to the land. (3)

The better to apprehend the contrivance, whereby this end is effected, we

must recollect that the remedy by ejectment is, in its original, an action brought

by one who hath a lease for years, to repair the injury done him by dispossession.

In order therefore to convert it into a method of trying titles to the freehold, it

was first necessary that the claimant do take possession of the lands, to em-

power him to constitute a lessee for years, that may be capable of receiving this

injury of dispossession. For it would be an offence, called in our law mainte-

nance (of which in the next book), to convey a title to another, when the grantor

is not in possession of the land; and indeed it was doubted at first, whether this

occasional possession, taken merely for the purpose of conveying the title, excused

the lessor from the legal guilt of maintenance, (o) When, therefore, a person,

who hath right of entry into lands, determines to acquire that possession, which

is wrongfully withheld by the present tenant, he makes (as by law he may) a

formal entry on the premises; and being so in the possession of the soil, he

there, upon the laud, seals and delivers a lease for years to some third person or

lessee: and, having thus given him entry, leaves him in possession of the prem-

ises. This lessee is to stay upon the land, till the prior tenant, or he who had

the previous possession, enters thereon afresh and ousts him; or till some other

person (either by accident or by agreement beforehand) conies upon the land, and

r *202l turns him *out or eJects hi™- For this injury the lessee is entitled to

L -I his action of ejectment against the tenant, or this casual ejector, which-

ever it was that ousted him, to recover back his term and damages. But where

this action is brought against such a casual ejector as is before mentioned, and

not against the very tenant iu possession, the court will not suffer the tenant to

(g) See page 1ST. (h) F. N. B. 148. ft) See book n, oh. 9.

(It) P. 8, Kic. II. Ejectioneflrma riett </«<• un action de tretpati en »on nature, et /<• plaintiff' ne recorem

terms que eat a venir, nient plut que en trtspaaa home recorera damage* pur treapaat nteittfait. mea afeser;

met il convient a tuer par action de covenant til comen f> i/ n recoverer son terme / quod tota curia concetnt.

Et per Belknup, la comen ley eat, lou home eat ouate deaon termepareatnmger, il avera ejectitnie jiraHrr rrr*fts

ceaty que luy ouate: et til aoit ouate par »on letaor. briefe de corenant; et ti par letteeou grantee de rerenioa

briefe tie covenant ceraut aon leaaor. et countera eapecial count, ftc. (Fitz. Abr. t. eject, firm. 2.) See UracL

I. 4, tr. 1. c. :*>.

(I) See Append. No. II, I 4, prope.tn.

(m) 7 Hilt". IV. 6. Per Kali-lax ; ti home port ejectione Jlmue, le plaint'if reeovera ton terme qui at erere,

$i bien come in quart ejecit infra terminum; et, ti nul toit arrere, donques tout in damaget. (Bro. Abr.

i, ouare ejecit infra terminum, 6.)

(n) F. N. B. •;-<>. (o) 1 Cb. Bep. Append. 38.

(3) See on this subject the note to Doe il. Foole r. Enington, 1 A. aud E. 756.
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lose his possession without any opportunity to defend it. Wherefore it is a

standing rule, that no plaintiff shall proceed in ejectment to recover lauds

against a casual ejector, without notice given to the tenant in possession (if any

there be), and making him a defendant if he pleases. And, in order to main-

tain the action, the plaintiff must, in case of any defence, make out four points

before the court; viz., title, lease, entry, and ouster. First, he must show a good

title in his lessor, which brings the matter of right entirely before the court,

then, that the lessor, being seized or possessed by virtue of such title, did make

him the lease for the present term; thirdly, that he, the lessee or plaintiff, did

enter or take possession in consequence of such lease; and then, lastly, that the

defendant ousted or ejected him. Whereupon he shall have judgment to recover

his term and damages; and shall, in consequence, have a writ of possession,

which the sheriff is to execute by delivering him the undisturbed and peaceable

possession of his term.

This is the regular method of bringing an action of ejectment, in which the

title of the lessor comes collaterally and incidentally before the court, in order

to show the injury done to the lessee by this ouster. This method must be still

continued in due form and strictness, save only as to the notice to the tenant,

whenever the possession is vacant, or there is no actual occupant of the prem-

ises ; and also in some other cases. But, as much trouble and formality were

found to attend the actual making of the lease, entry, and ouster, a new and

more easy method of trying titles by writ of ejectment, where there is any actual
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tenant or occupier of the premises in dispute, was invented somewhat more

than a century ago, by the lord chief justice, Rolle, (p) who then sat in the

court of upper bench; so called during the exile of King Charles the r *„,)„ -i

*Second. This new method entirely depends upon a string of legal ^

fictions; no actual lease is made, no actual entry by the plaintiff, no actual

ouster by the defendant; bnt all are merely ideal, for the sole purpose of trying

the title. To this end, in the proceedings (q) a lease for a term of years is stated

to have been made, by him who claims the title, to the plaintiff who brings the

action, as by John Rogers to Richard Smith, which plaintiff ought to be some

real person, and not merely an ideal fictitious one who hath no existence, as is

frequently though unwarrantably practised; (r) it is also stated that Smith, the

lessee, entered; and that the defendant William Stiles, who is called the casual

ejector, ousted him; for which ouster he brings this action. As soon as this

action is brought, and the complaint fully stated in the declaration, (s) Stiles,

the casual ejector, or defendant, sends a written notice to the tenant in posses-

sion of the lands, as George Saunders, informing him of the action brought by

Richard Smith, and transmitting him a copy of the declaration; withal assur-

ing him that he, Stiles the defendant, has no title at all to the premises, and

shall make no defence; and therefore advising the tenant to appear in court

and defeud his own title: otherwise he, the casual ejector, will suffer judgment

to be had against him; and thereby the actual tenant, Saunders, will inevitably

be turned out of possession, (fy On receipt of this friendly caution, if the

tenant in possession does not within a limited time apply to the court to be ad-

mitted a defendant in the stead of Stiles, he is supposed to have no right at all;

and, upon judgment being had against Stiles the casual ejector, Saunders the

real tenant will be turned out of possession by the sheriff.

But, if the tenant in possession applies to be made a defendant, it is allowed

him upon this condition; that he enter into a rule of court (u) to confess, at

the trial of the cause, three of the four requisites for the maintenance of the

plaintiffs action; viz.: the lease of Rogers, the lessor, the entry of Smith,

*the plaintiff, and his ouster by Saunders himself, now made the defend- r *2041

ant instead of Stiles: which requisites being wholly fictitious, should *• l

the defendant put the plaintiff to prove them, he must of course be nonsuited

for want of evidence; but by such stipulated confession of lease, entry, and

fa) StyL Pract. Reg. 108 (edit. WSIJ. (q) See Append. No. H. H 1. 4. (rj 8 Mod. 309.

ftJ Append. No. II?» «. (t) I Md. (u) IMd.i*.
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ouster, the trial will now stand upon the merits of the title only. This done,

the declaration is altered by inserting the name of George Saunders instead of

William Stiles, and the cause goes down to trial under the name of Smith (the

plaintiff), on the demise of Rogers (the lessor), against Saunders, the new

defendant. And therein the lessor of the plaintiff is bound to make out a clear

title, otherwise his fictitious lessee cannot obtain judgment to have possession

of the laud for the term supposed to be granted. But, if the lessor makes out

his title in a satisfactory manner, then judgment and a writ of possession shall

go for Richard Smith, the nominal plaintiff, who by this trial has proved the

right of John Rogers, his supposed lessor. Yet, to prevent fraudulent recov-

eries of the possession, by collusion with the tenant of the land, all tenants are

obliged by statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, on pain of forfeiting three years' rent, to

give notice to their landlords, when served with any declaration in ejectment:

and any landlord may by leave of the court be made a co-defendant to the

action, in case the tenant himself appears to it; or, if he makes default, though

judgment must be then signed against the casual ejector, yet execution shall oe

stayed, in case the landlord applies to be made a defendant, and enters into the

common rule; a right, which indeed the landlord had long before the provision

of this statute; (v) in like manner as (previous to the statute of Westm. 2, c. 3)

if in a real action the tenant of the freehold made default, the remainder-man

or reversioner had a right to come in and defend the possession; lest, if judg-

ment were had against the tenant, the estate of those behind should be turned
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to a naked right, (w) (4) But, if the new defendants, whether landlord, or ten-

ant, or both, after entering into the common rule, fail to appear at the trial, and

to confess lease, entry, and ouster, the plaintiff, Smith, must indeed be there

nonsuited, for want of proving those requisites; but judgment will in the end

be entered against the casual ejector Stiles; for the condition on which Saund-

ers, or his landlord, was admitted a defendant is broken, and, therefore, the

F *20{>1 pl*'11^ 's Put aga'n in the *same situation as if he never had appeared

[ A)oj ftj. ajj. j.Qe congequence Of which (we have seen) would have been, that

judgment would have been entered for the plaintiff, and the sheriff, by virtue

of a writ for that purpose, would have turned out Saunders, and delivered pos-

session to Smith. The same process, therefore, as would have been had, pro-

vided no conditional rule had been ever made, must now be pursued as soon as

the condition is broken. (5)

(v) Styl. Prao. Reg. 108, 111, S65. 7 Mod. 70. Snlk. 237. Burr. 1301. (to) Bracton, 1. S, e. 10, > 14.

(4) As to who may defend ai landlord under this statute, soe 4 T. R. 122; 8 id. 645; 6 Bing.

613; Bull. N. P. 95; Selw. N. P. 10th ed. 722.

(5) [New proceedings for the recovery of land have been created by the common law proce-

dure act, 1852, and the former action of ejectment has given way altogether to the new proce-

dure. The form of action which has been abolished was valuable in this respect: that it

allowed no questions to be raised except that of title. If the person who brought the action

had a right to possession, he was entitled to recover without regard to whether the person in

possession, or who took defence to the notion, had ousted him or not. The new action is also

an action for the recovery of the land, without regard to any other claim which may exist be-

tween the parties.

An action of ejectment is now commenced by the issue of a writ directed to the person in

possession by name, and to all persons entitled to defend the possession of the property claimed,

which property must be described in the writ with reasonable certainty. The writ must state

the names of all the persons in whom the title is alleged to be, and it commands the persons

to whom it is directed, to appear, within sixteen days after service, in the court from which it

issued, to defend the possession of the property sued for, or such part thereof as they may

think fit. It must also contain a notice that in default of appearance they will be turned out of

possession.]

In the United States ejectment is now generally commenced by filing declaration or com-

plaint against the party in possession, setting forth, in general terms, that the plaintiff is enti-

tled to the possession of the premises, describing the same, and that he claims the same in fee-

simple (or otherwise, as the case may be), and that the defendant unlawfully withholds the

same. A copy of this declaration or complnint is served on the defendant, and unless ho

pleads or answers to it within the time prescribed by statute or rule of court, judgment may

pass against him by default. In some states parties not in possession, but who claim rights in
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The damages recovered in these actions, though formerly their only intent,

are now usually (since the title has been considered as the principal question)

very small and inadequate; amounting commonly to one shilling, or some other

trivial sum. In order, therefore, to complete the remedy, when the possession

has been long detained from him that had the right to it, an action of trespass

also lies, after a recovery in ejectment, to recover the mesne profits which the

tenant in possession has wrongfully received. (6) Which action may be brought

iu the name of either the nominal plaintiff in the ejectment, or his lessor,

against the tenant in possession : whether he be made party to the ejectment, or

Euffers judgment to go by default, (x) In this case the judgment in ejectment

is conclusive evidence against the defendant, for all profits which have accrued

since the date of the demise stated in the former declaration of the plaintiff;

but if the plaintiff sues for any antecedent profits, the defendant may make a

new defence. (7)

Such is the modern way of obliquely bringing in question the title to lands

and tenements, in order to try it iu this collateral manner; a method which is

now universally adopted in almost every case. It is founded on the same prin-

ciple as the ancient writs of assize, being calculated to try the mere possessory

title to an estate; and hath succeeded to those real actions, as being infinitely

more convenient for attaining the end of justice; because the form of the

proceeding being entirely fictitious, it is wholly in the power of the court to

direct the application of "that fiction, so as to prevent fraud and chicane, and
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eviscerate the very truth of the title. The writ of ejectment and its nominal

parties (as was resolved by all the *juds;es) (y) are "judicially to be con- r *oo6l

sidered as the fictitious form of an action, really brought by the lessor L '

of the plaintiff against the tenant in possession: invented, under the control

and power of the court, for the advancement of justice in many respects; and

to force the parties to go to trial on the merits, without being entangled in the

nicety of pleading on either side." (8)

But a writ of ejectment is not an adequate means to try the title of all

estates; for on those things whereon an entry cannot in fact be made, no entry

shall be supposed by any fiction of the parties. Therefore an ejectment will

not lie of an advowson, a rent, a common, or other incorporeal heredita-

ment : (z) except for tithes in tho hands of lay appropriators, by the express

purview of statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 7, which doctrine hath since been extended

by analogy to tithes in the hands of the clergy: (a) nor will it lie in such cases,

where the entry of him that hath right is taken away by descent, discontinu-

ance, twenty years' dispossession, or otherwise.

(xl Bnrr. 883. (y) Mich. 32, Geo. n. Burr. 688. («) Brownl. 129. Cro. Car. 492. Stra. M.

(a) Cro. Cur. 301. 2 Lord K;t> m. 789.

the premises, are allowed to be mode co-defendants, and in others, ejectment mav bo brought

to try conflicting rights when the premises are not occupied at all. In general, means are

prescribed by which the defeated party in tho action can have a second trial as of right. If

the plaintiff succeeds, he is allowed to have damages assessed by a proceeding in the samu

suit

And in many of the states statutes will be found allowing tho defendant, who has been in

possession claiming title, to recover of the successful plaintiff the value of his improvements

or " betterments" in certain classes of cases.

(6) This subject is covered by the common law procedure act, 1852.

(7) [The defendant may plead the statute of limitations, and by that means protect himself

from the payment of all niesno profits, except those which have accrued within the last six

years. Bull N. P. 88.]

(8) [Actions of ejectment, as has been observed, have succeeded to those actions called pos-

sessory actions; but an inconvenience was found to result from them which did not follow

from real actions, to which it has been found necessary to apply a remedy. Real actions

could not be brought twice for the name thing; but a person might bring as many ejectments

as he pleased; which rendered the rights of parties subject to eudless litigation. To remedy

this, therefore, when two or more verdicts have been had upon tho same title, and to the

satisfaction of the court, the courts of equity will now grant a perpetual injunction to

restrain the party from bringing any further ejectment. See Barefoot v. Fry. Buub. 158, pi.

228; Selw. N. P. 780.]

131

206 TRESPASS OF REAL PROPERTT. [Book III.

This action of ejectment is, however, rendered a very easy and expeditions

remedy to landlords whose tenants are in arrear, by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 28,

which enacts that every landlord, who hath by his leaae a right of re-entry in

case of non-payment of rent, when half a year's rent is due, and no sufficient

distress is to be had, may serve a declaration in ejectment on his tenant, or fix

the same upon some notorious part of the premises, which shall be valid, with-

out any formal re-entry or previous demand of rent. And a recovery in such

ejectment shall be final and conclusive, both in law and equity, unless the rent

and all costs be paid or tendered within six calendar months afterwards.

2. The writ of quare ejerit infra terminum lieth, by the ancient law, where

F *207l *^e wrong(loer or ejector is not himself in *possession of the lands, but

"- -I another who claims under him. As where a man leaseth lands to an-

other for years, and, after, the lessor or reversioner cntereth, and maketh a

feoffment in fee, or for life, of the same lands to a stranger: now the lessee can-

not bring a writ of ejections firmce or ejectment against the feoffee: because he

did not eject him, but the reversioner; neither can he have any such action to

recover his term against the reversioner, who did oust him; because he is not

now in possession. And upon that account this writ was devised, upon the

equity of the statute Westm. 2, c. 24, as in a case where no adequate remedy was

already provided, (b) And the action is brought against the feoffee for deforc-

ing', or keeping out, the original lessee, during the continuance of his term;

and herein, as in the ejectment, the plaintiff shall recover so much of the term
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as remains; and also shall have actual damages for that portion of it, whereof

he has been unjustly deprived. But since the introduction of fictitious ousters,

whereby the title may be tried against any tenant in possession (by what means

soever he acquired it), and the subsequent recovery of damages by action of

trespass for mesne profits, this action is fallen into disuse. (9)

CHAPTEB XII.

OF TRESPASS.

IK the two preceding chapters we have considered such injuries to real prop-

erty, as consisted in an ouster, or amotion of the possession. Those which

remain to be discussed are such as may be offered to a man's real property with-

out any amotion from it.

The second species, therefore, of real injuries, or wrongs that affect a man's

lands, tenements, or hereditaments, is that of trespass. Trespass in its largest

and most extensive sense, signifies any transgression or offence against the law

of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live; whether it relates to

a man's person, or his property. Therefore beating another is a trespass; for

which (as we have formerly seen) an action of trespass vi et annis in assault

and battery will lie; taking or detaining a man's goods are respectively tres-

passes ; for which an action of trespass m et armis, or on the case in trover and

conversion, is given by the law: so also non-performance of promises or under-

takings is a trespass, upon which an action of trespass on the case in asmtmpsit

is grounded: and, in general, any misfeasance, or act of one man whereby

another is injuriously treated or damnified, is a transgression or trespass in its

largest sense; for which we have already seen (a) that whenever the act itself

is directly and immediately injurious to the person or property of another,

(») F. \. B. 198. (a) See page 12;.

(!)) It was abolished by statute 3 and 4 ~Wm. IV, o. 27, s, 36.
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*and therefore necessarily accompanied with some force, an action of

trespass m ef armis will lie; but, if the injury is only consequential, a

special action of trespass o* the case may be brought (1)

But in the limited and confined sense in which we are at present to consider

it, it signifies no more than an entry on another man's ground without a lawful

authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property.

For the right of meum and iuum, or property in lands, being once established,

it follows as a necessary consequence, that this right must be exclusive; that is,

that the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his soil;

every entry therefore thereon, without the owner's leave, and especially if con-

trary to his express order, is a trespass or transgression. The Roman laws seem

to have made a direct prohibition necessary, in order to constitute this injury;

" qui af ii'ii it//> fundum ingreditur,potest a domino, si is provider it, prohiberi ne

ingrediaiur." (b) But the law of England, justly considering that much incon-

venience may happen to the owner, before he has an opportunity to forbid the

entry, has carried the point much farther, and has treated every entry upon

another's land (unless by the owner's leave, or in some very particular cases), as

an injury or wrong, for satisfaction of which an action of trespass will lie; but

determines the quantum of that satisfaction, by considering how far the offence

was wilful or inadvertent, and by estimating the value of the actual damage

sustained.

Every unwarrantable entry on another's soil the law entitles a trespass by
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breaking his close: the words of the writ of trespass commanding the defend*-

ant to show cause quare clausum querentis fregit. For every man's land is,

in the eye of the law, enclosed and set apart from his neighbour's: and that

either by a visible and material fence, as one field is divided from another by a

hedge; or by an ideal, invisible boundary, *existing only in the contem- ,- *oio 1

plation of law, as when one man's land adjoins to another's in the L ••

same field. And every such entry or breach of a man's close carries necessarily

along with it some damage or other; for, if no other special loss can be assigned,

yet still the words of the writ itself specify one general damage, viz.: the tread-

ing down and bruising his herbage. (c)(2)

(6) /tut. 2, 1,12. (c) F. X. B. 87, 68.

(1) [See these distinctions fully considered, 1 Chitty on PI. 115 to 122, and 149 to 172. The

distinctions between actions of trespass ci et armis for an immediate injury, and actions of

trespass upon the case for a consequential damage, are frequently very subtle: see the sub-

ject much considered in 2 Bl. Rep. 892. In a case where an action of trespass vi et armis was

brought against tie defendant for throwing a lighted pqnib in a public market, which fell

upon a stall, the owner of which, to defend himself and his goods, took it up and threw it to

another part of the market, where it struck the plaintiff and put out his eye; the question

was much discussed, whether the person injured ought to have brought an action of trespass

vi et ill-mix, or an action upon the case; and one of the four judges strenuously contended

that it ought to have been an action upon the case. But I should conceive, that the question

was more properly this, viz.: whether an action of trespass vi et armis lay against the origi-

nal'pr the intermediate thrower, or whether the act of the second thrower was involuntary,

(which sci-iiis to have been the opinion of the jury), or wilful and mischevious, and if so,

whether the first thrower alone ought not to have been answerable for the consequences.

For if A throws a stone at B, which, after it lies quietly at his foot, B takes up and throws

again at C, it is presumed that C has his action against B only; but if it is thrown at B,

and B, by warding it off from himself, gives it a different direction, in consequence of which

it strikes C, in that case, it is wholly the act of A, and B must be considered merely as an

inanimate object, which may chance to divert its course. In the case of Leaine v. Bray,

3 East, 593, it was decided, that if one man drives a carriage, being on the wrong side of the

road, against another carriage, though unintentionally, ilir action ought to be trespass n et

armis, and the court declare generally, that if the injurious act be the immediate result of

tte force originally applied by the defendant, and the plaintiff be injured by it, it is the sub-

ject of an »i• i ioii of trespass ti et armis by all the cases both ancient and modern. ]

(2) [In an action of trespass for entering the grounds of another person, and sporting over

them, the jury may take into consideration, in determining their verdict, not only the actual

damage sustained by the plaintiff, bnt circumstances of aggravation and insult on the part of

the defendant. Merest v. Harvey, 1 Marsh. 139; 5 Taunt. 442.]
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One must have a property (either absolute or temporary) in the soil, and

actual possession by entry, to be able to maintain an action of trespass; or, at

least, it is requisite that the party have a lease and possession of the vesture

and herbage of the land, (d )(3) Thus, if a meadow be divided annually among

the parishioners by lot, then after each person's several portion is allotted, they

may be respectively capable of maintaining an action for the breach of their

several closes: (e) for they have an exclusive interest and freehold therein for the

time. But before entry and actual possession, one cannot maintain an action

of trespass, though he hath the freehold in law. (/) And therefore an heir, be-

fore entry, cannot have this action against an abater; though a disseisee might

have it against the disseisor, for the injury done by the disseisin itself, at which

time the plaintff was seised of the land: but he cannot have it for any act done

after the disseisin, until he hath gained possession by re-entry, and then he may

well maintain it for the intermediate damage done; for after his re-entry the

law, by a kind of jus poatliminii, supposes the freehold to have all along con-

tinued in him. (g) Neither, by the common law, in case of an iutrusion or de-

forcement, could the party kept out of possession sue the wrongdoer by a mode

of redress which was calculated merely for injuries committed against the laud

while in the possession of the owner. But now by the statute 6 Anne, c. 18, if

a guardian or trustee for any infant, a husband seized jure uxoris, or a person

having any estate or interest determinable upon a life or lives, shall, after the

r $„,.. -I *determination of their respective interests, hold over and continue in
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"• ' possession of the lands or tenements, without the consent of the person

entitled thereto, they are adjudged to be trespassers; and any reversioner or re-

mainder-man, expectant on any life-estate, may once in every year, by motion to

the court of chancery, procure the cesluy que vie to be produced by the tenant

to the land, or may enter thereon in case of his refusal or wilful neglect. And

by the statutes of 4 Geo. II, c. 28, and 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case, after the deter-

mination of any term of life, lives, or years, any person shall wilfully hold over

the same, the lessor or reversioner is entitled to recover by action of debt, either

at the rate of double the annual value of the premises, in case he himself hath

demanded and given notice in writing to the tenant to deliver the possession;

or else double the usual rent, in case the notice of quitting proceeds from the

tenant himself, having power to determine his lease, and he afterwards neglects

to carry that notice into due execution.

(d) Dyer, 285. 2 Roll. Abr. 549. (e) Cro. Eliz. 421. (/) 2 Boll. Abr. 553. (g) 11 Rep. 5.

(3) [As to the possession and title essential, see Chitty on PI. 159 to 166. An exclusive in-

terest in the crop, without an interest in the soil, is sufficient to sustain an action of trespass.

3 Burr. 1826; Bro. Abr. Tres. 273; Bull. N. P. 85. But possession, actual or constructive,

must be proved. 1 East, 244; 4 Taunt. 547; 6 East, 602. Trespass will not lie for entering a

pew or seat, because the plaintiff have not the exclusive possession, the possession of the church

being in the parson. 1 T. R. 430. If trees are excepted in the lease, the land whereon they

grow is necessarily excepted also, consequently the landlord may maintain trespass for break-

ing fcw close, if the tenant cut down the trees. Selw. N. P. 1287. Where two fields are sepa-

rated by a hedge and ditch, the hedge prima facie belongs to the owner of the field in which

the ditch is iiot. If there is a ditch on each side, the ownership of the hedge must be prored

by acts of ownership. Id. 1288. A person may cut his ditch to the edge of his own land,

but if he goes beyond he is a trespasser on his neighbor's land, though he may cut as wide as

he pleases on his own land. 3 Taunt. 138.]

To entitle one to maintain trespass he must have possession: Mather e. Ministers, <fcc.;

3 S. and R. 509; "Wheeler v. Hotchkiss, 10 Conn. 225; unless the lands are wild or vacant, in

which case the party having title has sufficient constructive possession for the purposes of thio

suit. Goodrich v. Hathaway, 1 Tt. 485; Van Rensselaer v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Johns. 377. See

Gardner ». Heart, 1 N. T. 528. In other cases it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show title;

but every unwarrantable entry upon a peaceable possession is a trespass. Palmer v. Aldridge,

16 Barb. 131; Wells v. Howeu, 19 Johns. 385; Brown v. McCloud, 3 Head. 280. And one who

uses the highway for purposes other than those for which the public easement exists, is liable in

trespass to the owner of the fee. Avery v. Maxwell, 4 N. H. 36; Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick.

357; Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390. If lands are occupied by a tenant, he, and not the lessor,

must bring trespass against a stranger for unlawful disturbance of the possession. Campbell v.

Arnold, 1 Johns. 511.
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A man is answerable for not only his own trespass, but that of his cattle also :

for, if by his negligent keeping they stray upon the land of another, (and much

more if he permits, or drives them on,) and they there tread down his neigh-

bor's herbage, and spoil his corn or his trees, this is a trespass for which the

owner must answer in damages, and the law gives the party injured a double

remedy in this case; by permitting him to distrain the cattle thus damage-

feasant, or doing damage, till the owner shall make him satisfaction : or else by

leaving him to the common remedy in foro contentioso, by action. And the

action that lies in either of these cases of trespass committed upon another's

land, either by a man himself or his cattle, is the action of trespass vi et armis;

whereby a man is called upon to answer, quare vi et armis clausum ipsius A

apud B fregit, et blada ipsius A ad valentiam centum solidorum ibidem nuper

crescentia cum quibusdam averiis depastus fuit, conculcavit, et con&umpsit, &c. :

(A) for the law always couples the idea of force with that of intrusion upon the

roperty of another. And herein, if any unwarrantable act of the *de- r*oi21

endant or his beasts in coming upon the land be proved, it is an act of L '

trespass for which the plaintiff must recover some damages; such, however, as

the jury shall think proper to assess.

In trespasses of a permanent nature, where the injury is continually renewed,

(as by spoiling or consuming the herbage with the defendant's cattle), the decla-
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ration may allege the injury to have been committed by continuation from one

given day to another (which is called laying the action with a continuando),

and the plaintiff shall not be compelled to bring separate actions for every day s

separate offence, (i) But where the trespass is by one or several acts, each of

which terminates in itself, and being once done cannot be done again, it cannot

be laid with a continuando; yet if there be repeated acts of trespass committed,

(as cutting down a certain number of trees), they may be laid to be done, not

continually, but at divers days and times within a given period, (k) (4)

In some cases trespass is justifiable ; or rather entry on anotner s land or

house shall not in those cases be accounted trespass : as if a man comes thither

to demand or pay money, there payable; or to execute, in a legal manner, the

process of the law. Also a man may justify entering into an inn or public

house, without the leave of the owner first specially asked ; because when a man

professes the keeping such inn or public house, he thereby gives a general

license to any person to enter his doors. So a landlord may justify entering to

distrain for rent ; a commoner to attend his cattle, commoning on another's

land ; and a reversioner, to see if any waste be committed on the estate ; for the

apparent necessity of the thing. (I) Also it hath been said, that by the common

law and custom of England, the poor are allowed to enter and glean upon

another's ground after the harvest, without *being guilty of trespass : (m\ .- *oi 31

which humane provision seems borrowed from the Mosaical law. (n) (5) *• -I

fh) Reeletr. 94. (1) « Roll. Abr. 545. Lord K:iym. 240.

fl-j Sulk. 638, 639. Lonl Raym. W.I. 7 Mod. 152. (I) S Rep. 146.

(ml Gilb. Ev. -.'.VI. Trials per pail. ch. 15, p. 438.

(n) Levit. c. 19, v. 9, and c. 23, v. 22. Deal. c. 24, v. 19, Ac.

(4) [The latter mode prevails in modern practice, and the form of declaring with a eontinn-

anilu has iiniwn obsolete. Under the statement that the defendant, on a day named, and on

divers other days and times between that day and the commencement of the suit, trespassed, the

plaintiff may prove any number of trespasses within those limits, though none are specified ex-

cept those on the earliest day named. 1 Stark. R. 351.]

(5) [Two actions of trespass have been brought in the common pleas against gleaners, •with.

an intent to try the general question, viz. : whether such a right existed. ~In the first, the de-

fendant pleaded that he, being a poor, necessitous, and indigent person, entered the plaintiff's

close to glean ; in the second, the defendant's plea was as before, with the addition that ho was

an inhabitant legally settled within the parish : to the plea in each case there was a general de-

murrer. Mr. J. Gould delivered a learned judgment in favor of gleaning, but the other three

judges were clearly of opinion, that his claim had no foundation in law ; that the only authority

to support, it was an extrajudicial dictum of Lord Hale; that it was a practice incompatible with

the exclusive enjoyment of property, and was productive of vagrancy, aud many mischievous

consequences. 1 1 i . Bl. Rep. 51, 53, u. (a).]
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In like manner the common law warrants the hunting of ravenous beasts of

prey, as badgers and foxes, in another man's land; because the destroying snch

creatures is said to be profitable to the public, (o) (6) But in cases where a man

misdemeans himself, or makes an ill use of the authority with which the law

intrusts him, he shall be accounted a trespasser nli i nil in : (p) as if one comes

into a tavern and will not go out in a reasonable time, but tarries there all night

contrary to the inclinations of the owner; this wrongful act shall affect and

have relation back even to his first entry, and make the whole a trespass, (q)

But a bare nonfeasance, as not paying for the wine he calls for, will not make

him a trespasser: for this is only a breach of contract, for which the taverner

shall have an action of debt or astumpstit against him. (r) So if a landlord dis-

trained for rent, and wilfully killed the distress, this by the common, law made

him a trespasser ab initio: (s) and so indeed would any other irregularity have

done, till the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, which enacts, that no subsequent irregu-

larity of the landlord shall make his first entry a trespass; but the party injnred

shall have a special action of trespass or on the case, for the real specific injury

sustained, unless tender of amends hath been made. But still, if a reversioner,

who enters on pretence of seeing waste, breaks the bouse, or stays there all

night; or if the commoner who comes to tend his cattle, cuts down a tree; in

these and similar cases, the law judges that he entered for this unlawful pur-

pose, and therefore, as the act which demonstrates such his purpose is a tres-

pass, he shall be esteemed a trespasser ab initio. (/) So also in the case of hunt-
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ing the fox or the badger, a man cannot justify breaking the soil, and digging

T *214l ki™ ou'i °f n'8 earth: for though *the law warrants the hunting of such

*• ' noxious animals for the public good, yet it is held (u) that such things

must be done in an ordinary and usual manner; therefore, as there is an ordi-

nary course to kill them, viz., by hunting, the court, held that the digging for

them was unlawful.

A man may also justify in an action of trespass, on account of the freehold

and right of entry being in himself; and this defence brings the title of the

estate in question. This is therefore one of the ways devised, since the disuse

of real actions, to try the property of estates; though it is not so usual as that

by ejectment, because that, being now a mixed action, not only gives damages

for the ejection, but also possession of the land; whereas in trespass, which is

merely a personal suit, the right can be only ascertained, but no possession de-

livered ; nothing being recovered but damages for the wrong committed.

In order to prevent trifling and vexatious actions of trespass, as well as other

Srsonal actions, it is (inter alia) enacted by statutes 43 Eliz. c. 6, and 22 and 23

n\ II, c. 9, § 136, that where the jury, who try an action of trespass, give less

damages than forty shillings, the plaintiff shall be allowed no more costs than

damages, unless the judge shall certify under his hand that the freehold or title

of the land came chiefly in question. But this rule now admits of two excep-

tions more, which have been made by subsequent statutes. One is by statute 8

and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 11, which enacts, that in all actions of trespass, wherein it shall

appear that the trespass was wilful and malicious, and it be so certified by the

judge, the plaintiff shall recover full costs. Every trespass is wilful, where the

defendant has notice, and is especially forewarned not to come on the land; as

every trespass is malicious, though the damage may not amount to forty shil-

T *215l ^n?8' wnere the intent of the defendant plainly appears .to *be to "harass

L -I and distress the plaintiff. The other exception is by statute 4 and 5 W.

(o) Cro. Jac. 831. (p) Finch, L. 47. Cro. Jac. 148. (q) 2 RolL Abr. 661. (T) 8 Rep. 147.

(•) Finch, L. 47. (t) 8 Rep. 148. (u) Cro. Jac. 321.

(f>) The law was otherwise declared by Lord Ellenboroagh in Earl of Essex v. Capel (2 Chit

Game Law, 1381), with the qualification, however, that there may l>e such a public nuisance by

a noxious animal as may justify tlia running him to his earth. In the case of animals chased for

sport or game, merely, it is clear that one cannot justify going upon the lands of another in pur-

suit without his license. Sntton t>. Moody, 1 L. Raym. 251; Deane c. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 534;

Hume v. Oldacre, 1 Stark. 351.

136

Chap. 13.] NUISANCE. 215

and M. c, 23, which gives full costs against any inferior tradesman, apprentice,

or other dissolute person, who is convicted of a trespass in hawking, hunting,

fishing, or fowling, upon another's land. Upon this statute it has been adjudged,

that if a person be an inferior tradesman, as a clothier for instance, it matters

not what qualification he may have in point of estate; but, if he be guilty of

such trespass, he shall be liable to pay full costs, (w) (7)

CHAPTER XIII.

OF NUISANCE.

A THIRD species of real injuries to a man's lands and tenements, is by

nuisance. Nuisance, nocumentum, or annoyance, signifies any thing that work-

eth hurt, inconvenience or damage. And nuisances are of two kinds : public or

common nuisances, which affect the public, and are an annoyance to all the king's

subjects; for which reason we must refer them to the class of public wrongs, or

crimes and misdemeanors: and private nuisances, which are the objects of our

present consideration, and may be defined, anything done to the hurt or annoy-

ance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another, (a) We will there-

fore, first, mark out the several kinds of nuisances, and then their respective

remedies.

I. In discussing the several kinds of nuisances, we will consider first, such

nuisances as may affect a man's corporeal hereditaments, and then those that

may damage such as are incorporeal.

I. First, as to corporeal inheritances. If a man builds a house so close to
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mine that his roof overhangs my roof, and throws the water off his roof upon

mine, this is a nuisance for which an action will lie. (b) Likewise to erect a

house or other building so near to mine, that it obstructs my ancient

*lights and windows, is a nuisance of a similar nature, (c) But in this r *„.„ -,

latter case it is necessary that the windows be ancient; that is, have "• *" -"

subsisted there a long time without interruption; otherwise there is no injury

done. For he hath as much right to build a new edifice upon his grounds as I

have upon mine; since every man may erect what he pleases upon the upright

or perpendicular of his own soil, so as not to prejudice what has long been

enjoyed by another; and it was my folly to build so near another's ground, (d) (1)

Also if a person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the house of

another, that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air unwhole-

some, (2) this is an injurious nuisance, as it tends to deprive him of the use and

benefit of his house, (e) A like injury is, if one's neighbour sets up and exercises

any offensive trade; as a tanner's, a tallow-chandler's, or the like; for though these

are lawful and necessary trades, yet they should be exercised in remote places;

for the rule, is "sic utere two ut alienum non ladas:" this therefore is an

actionable nuisance. (/) (3) So that the nuisances which affect a man's dwelling

(w) Lord Raym. 149. (a) Finch, I.. 188. (b) F. N. B. 184. (a) 0 Hep. 88.

(<IJ Cru Eliz. 118. Sulk. 439. (e) 9 Rep. 88. (f) Cro. Car. 510.

(7) The statute 4 and 5 "W. and. M. o. 23, is now repealed. The statutes previously mentioned

are also now repealed, and new provisions substituted.

(1) Mr. Washbnrn says there is a strong tendency of the law in America against allowing a

right of light and air to be acquired as an easement by mere enjoyment, however long continued.

Sec the cases and statutes referred to by him in 2 "Washb. Eeal Prop. 62, et seq., and in his work

on easements. And see note vol. 2, p. 395.

(2) See White's Case, 1 Bun-. 333; Howard r. Lee, 3 Sandf. 281; Cropsey ». Murphy, 1 Hilt.

126; Whalen t>. Keith, 35 Mo. 87. .

(3) See Catlin v. Talentine, 9 Paige, 575; Dargan «. "Waddill, 9 Ired. 244; Peck v. Elder, 3

Sandf. 126; Hackney v. State, 8 Ind. 492. Ashbrook c. Commonwealth, 1 Bush. 139; Ottawa

Gas Light Co. v. Thompson. 39 HI. 578.
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may be reduced to these three: 1. Overhanging it; which is also a species of

trespass, for cujusest solumejus est usque adccelum: 2. Stopping ancient lights:

and, 3. Corrupting the air with noisome smells: for light and air are two indis-

pensable requisites to every dwelling. (4) But depriving one of a mere matter

of pleasure, as of a fine prospect by ouilding a wall, or the like: this, as it

abridges nothing reallj convenient or necessary, is no injury to the sufferer, and

is therefore not an actionable nuisance, (g)

As to nuisance to one's lands: if one erects a smelting-house for lead so

near the land of another, that the vapour and smoke kill nis corn and grass,

and damage his cattle therein, this is held to be a nuisance. (A) And by con-

sequence it follows, that if one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet

being done in that place necessarily tends to the damage of another's property,

r *2181 ik is a nui*"106: f°r it is incumbent on *him to find some other place

L J to do that act, where it will be less offensive. So also, if my neighbor

ought to scour a ditch, and does not, whereby my land is overflowed, this is an

actionable nuisance, (i)

With regard to other corporeal hereditaments: it is a nuisance to stop or

divert water that uses to run to another's meadow (5) or mill; (k) to corrupt

or poison a water-course, by erecting a dye-house or a lime-pit for the use of

trade, in the upper part of the stream; (I) or in short to do any act therein

that in its consequences must necessarily tend to the prejudice of one's neighbour.

So closely does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel moral-
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ity, of " doing to others as we would they should do unto ourselves."

2. As to incorporeal hereditaments, the law carries itself with the same

equity. If I have a way, annexed to my estate, across another's land, and he

obstructs me in the use of it, either by totally stopping it, or putting logs

across it, or ploughing over it, it is a nuisance: for in the first case I cannot

enjoy my right at all, and in the latter I cannot enjoy it so commodiously as

I ought.'(m) Also, if I am entitled to hold a fair or market, and another "per-

son sets up a fair or market so near mine that he does me a prejudice, it is a

nuisance to the freehold which I have in my market or fair. (n) But in ordei

to make this out to be a nuisance, it is necessary, 1. That my market or fair be

the elder, otherwise the nuisance lies at my own door. 2. That the market be

erected within the third part of twenty miles from mine. For Sir Matthew

Hale (o) construes the dieta, or reasonable day's journey mentioned by Bracton,

(p) to be twenty miles; as indeed it is usually understood, not only in our own

law, (q) but also in the civil (r) from which we probably borrowed it So that

F *2191 ^ *^e new mark^ b® n°t within seven miles of the old one, it is no

L -I *nuisance: for it is held reasonable that every man should have a market

within one-third of a day's journey from his own home; that the day being

divided into three parts, he may spend one part in going, another in returning,

and the third in transacting his necessary business there. If such market or

fair be on the same day_ with mine, it isprima facie a nuisance to mine, and

there needs no nroof of it, but the law will intend it to be so; but if it be on

any other day, it may be a nuisance; though whether it is so or not, cannot be

intended or presumed, but I must make proof of it to the jury. If a ferry is

fa) 9 Rep. 58. (h) 1 Roll. Abr. 89. fi) Hale on F. N. B. 427. ft) F. JJ. B. 184.

(Ij 9 Rep. 59. 2 Boll. Abr. 141. (m) F. ST. B. 1(8. 4 lloll. Abr. 140. (n) F. N. B. 184. 2 Roll. Abr. 140.

(o) Hale on F. N. B. 184. (p) L. 4, c. 46. (q) 2 Inst. 567. (r) ff. 2, II, 1.

(4) See Smith r. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517. Or corrupting the water which is used for ordi-

nary family purposes. Lewis t'. Stein, 16 Ala. 214. And noises on adjoining premises may con-

stitute such an impediment to the enjoyment of one's property as to entitle him to treat them as

a nuisance. Pish v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 311. Sparhawk v. Union, <fcc., K. B. Co. 54 Penn. St. 401.

Or a dog which comes upon one's premises, and barks or howls about them by day or night.

Brill <•. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354.

(5) [After twenty years' uninterrupted enjoyment of a spring of water, an absolute right

to it i« gained by the occupier of the close in which it issues above ground ; and the owner of

an adjoining close cannot lawfully cut a drain whereby the supply of water bv the spring is

diminished. BaUtton ». Bensted, 1 Campb. 463. And see Bealey ». Shaw, 6 iJast, 208. ] See

also Wheotley r. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528; Earl ». De Hart, 1 Beas. 2(30.
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erected on a river, so near another ancient ferry as to draw away its custom, it

is a nuisance to the owner of the old one. For where there is a ferry by pre-

scription, the owner is bound to keep it always in repair and readiness for the

ease of all the king's subjects; otherwise he may be grievously amerced: («) it

would be therefore extremely hard, if a new ferry were suffered to share his

profits, which does not also share his burthen. But where the reason ceases,

the law also ceases with it; therefore it is no nuisance to erect a mill so near

mine, as to draw away the custom, unless the miller also intercepts the water.

Neither is it a nuisance to set up any trade, or a school, in a neighbourhood or

rivalship with another: for by such emulation the public are like to be gainers;

and, if the new mill or school occasion a damage to the old one, it is damnum

absque injuria. (t)

II. Let us next attend to the remedies, which the law has given for this injury

of nuisance. And here I must premise that the law gives no private remedy

for any thing but a private wrong. Therefore no action lies for a publie or

common nuisance, but an indictment only: because, the damage being common

to all the king's subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of it; or

if he could, it would be extremely hard, if every subject in the kingdom were

allowed to harass the offender with separate actions. For this reason, no person,

natural or corporate, can have an action for a public nuisance, or punish it;

but only the king in his public *capacity of supreme governor, and pater- r ^on -•

familias of the kingdom, (it) Yet this rule admits of one exception; •- J
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where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of

the king's subjects, by a public nuisance; in which case he shall have a private

satisfaction by action. As if, by means of a ditch dug across the public way,

which is a common nuisance, a man or his horse suffer any injury by falling

therein ; there for this particular damage, which is not common to others, the

party shall have his action, (w) (6) Also if a man hath abated, or removed, a

nuisance which offended him (as we may remember it was stated in the first

chapter of this book, that the party injured hath a right to do), in this case

he is entitled to no action, (x) For he had choice of two remedies; either with-

out suit, by abating it himself, by his own mere act and authority; or by suit,

(«) 2 Roll. Abr. 140. (t) Hale on F. N. B. 18*. («) Vaugh. Ml, 8*2.

(to) Co. Lltt. 66. 6 Rep. 73. (z) 9 Rep. 66.

(I'o [But the particular damage in this cose must be direct, and not consequential, as by

being delayed in a journey of importance. Bull. N. P. 26; Carthew. 194. And if the plaint-

iff has not acted with ordinary care and skill, with a view to protect himself from the mis-

chief, he cannot recorer. 11 East, 60; 2 Taunt. 314. It is npon the same principle that

parties, siitToring special damage by a public nuisance, are entitled, under 5 W. and M. c. 11, s.

3, to receive their ^expenses inprosccuting an indictment against the party guilty of the

96 j TV ill

nuisance. See 16 East, 196; Willos. 71; Cro. Eliz. 664. It a party living in the neighbor-

hood, and who has been in the habit of passing to and fro on a highway, is obliged by a

nuisance thereto to take a more circuitous route in his transit to and from the nearest market

town to his house, it is a private injury, for which he may sue as well as indict. 3 M. and S.

472. So, being delayed four hours by an obstruction in a highway, and beiujj thereby prevented

from performing the same journey, as many times in a day as if the obstruction had not existed,

is a sufficient injury to entitle a jwriy to sue for the obstruction. 2 Bingh. 283. So, if iin;

nuisance prevent the plaintiff navigating his barges on a public navigable creek, and compel

him hi convey his goods out of the same over a great distance of land, it is actionable. I M.

and S. 101. But the more obstruction of the plaintiff in his business (1 Esp. N. P. C. 148; 4

11. and S. 103), or delaying him a little while in a journey (Garth. 191), is not such a damage

as will entitle the party to his action; the damages ought to be direct, not consequential.

Carth. 191.

There are also various other injuries which partake of both a criminal and civil nature, for

which both an indictment as well as an action will lie, as for a forcible eutrv, enticing away a

servant, using false weights, disobeying an order of justices, extortion, or for a libel, <tc.]

To entitle one to maintain an action for private damages in a case of public nuisance, it is not

sufficient that he be incommoded in the same manner as the rest of the public, but he must sus-

tain some private and peculiar injury and specific damage. Pierce y. Dart, 7 Cow. 609; Lansing

r. Smith, 8 id. 146. But several persons may have an action for injuries which each suffers ia

respect to his own rights, where such injury is additional to the general inconvenience of the pub-

lic. Scott P. Bay, 3 Md. 431.
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in which he may both recover damages, and remove it by the aid of the law:

but, having made his election of one remedy, be is totally precluded from tho

other.

The remedies by suit are, 1. By action on the case for damages; in which the

party injured shall only recover a satisfaction for the injuries sustained; but can-

not thereby remove the nuisance. Indeed every continuance of a nuisance is

held to be a fresh one ; (y) and therefore a fresh action will lie, and very exem-

plary damages will probably be given, if, after one verdict against him, the

defendant has the hardiness to continue it. Yet the founders of the law of Eng-

land did not rely upon probabilities merely, in order to give relief to the injured.

They have therefore provided two other actions; the assize of nuisance, and the

writ of quod permittat prosternere: which not only give the plaintiff satisfaction

for his injury past, but also strike at the root and remove the cause itself, the

nuisance that occasioned the injury. These two actions, however, can only be

brought by the tenant of the freehold; so that a lessee for years is confined to

his action upon the case, (z) (7)

F *221 1 *^' ^n amze °f nuisance is a writ: wherein it is stated that the partjr

L Mi J injured complains of some particular fact done, ad nocumentum liberi

tenements sui, and therefore commanding the sheriff to summon an assize, that

is, a jury, and view the premises, and have them at the next commission of

assizes, that justice may be done therein : (a) and, if the assize is found for the

plaintiff, he shall have judgment of two things: 1. To have the nuisance abated;
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and, 2. To recover damages, (b) Formerly an assize of nuisance only lay against

the very wrongdoer himself, who levied or did the nuisance; and did not lie

against any person to whom he had alienated the tenements, whereon the nui-

sance was situated. This was the immediate reason for making that equitable

provision in statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 24, for granting a similar writ, in

casu consimili, where no former precedent was to be found. The statute enacts

that " de cfetero non recedant qucrentes a curia domini regis, pro eo quod tene-

mentum transfertur de uno inalium; and then gives the form of a new writ

in this case: which only differs from the old one in this, that, where the assize

is brought against the very person only who levied the nuisance, it is said " quod

A (the wrongdoer) in juste levavit tale nocumentum ;" but, where the lands are

aliened to another person, the complaint is against both; " quod A (the wrong-

doer) et B (the alienee) levaverunt." (c) For every continuation, as was before

said, is a fresh nuisance; and therefore the complaint is as well grounded against

the alienee who continues it, as against the alienor who first levied it.

3. Before this statute, the party injured, upon any alienation of the land

wherein the nuisance was set up, was driven to his quod permittat prosternere,

which is in the nature of a writ of right, and therefore subject to greater delays.

(d) This is a writ commanding the defendant to permit the plaintiff to abate,

F*2221 9u°d permittat prosternere, the nuisance complained of; *and unless

L -1 he so permits, to summon him to appear in court, and show cause why

he will not (e) And this writ lies as well for the alienee of the party first in-

jured, as against the alienee of the party first injuring; as hath been determined

by all the judges. (/) And the plaintiff shall have judgment herein to abate

the nuisance, and to recover damages against the defendant

Both these actions, of assize of nuisance, and of quod permittat prosternere,

are now out of use, and have given way to the action on the case; in which, as

was before observed, no judgment can be had to abate the nuisance, but only

(!/} 1 l.pon. pi. 129. Cro. Eliz. 402. <z) Finch, L. 239. 'a) F. \. B. 183. (b) 9 Rep. 55.

(0 Ibid. (d)2Inst. 406. («) F. N. B. 12*. (/) 6 Rep. 100, 101.

(7) Both are now abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, c. 27.

In the United States the remedy to recover damages for a private injury by either public or

private nuisance, is by action on the case. The preventive remedy, is by writ of injunction from

the courts of equity. Webb v. Portland Manuf. Co., 3 Sura. 189; Walker v. Shepardson, 2 Wis.

884. A party does not bar himself of an action for damages by abating the nuisance. Pierce v.

Dart, 7 Cow. 609; Gloason v. Gary, 4 Conn. 418,
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to recover damages. (8) Yet, as therein it is not necessary that the freehold

should be in the plaintiff and defendant respectively, as it must be in these real

actions, but it is maintainable by one that hath possession only, against another

that hath like possession, the process is therefore easier: and the effect will be

much the same, unless a man has a very obstinate as well as an ill-natured

neighbour: who had rather continue to pay damages than remove his nuisance.

For in such a case, recourse must at last be had to the old and sure remedies,

which will effectually conquer the defendant's perverseness, by sending the sheriff

with his posse comitatus, or power of the county, to level it.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF WASTE.

THE fourth species of injury, that may be offered to one's real property is by

waste, or destruction in lands and tenements. What shall be called waste was

considered at large in a former book, (a) as it was a means of forfeiture, and _

thereby of transferring the property of real estates. I shall therefore here only beg'

leave to remind the student, that waste is a spoil and destruction of the estate,

either in houses, woods, or lands; by demolishing not the temporary profits only,

but the very substance of the thing, thereby rendering it wild and desolate; which

the common law expresses very significantly by the word vastum: and that this

vastum, or waste, is either voluntary, or permissive; the one by an actual and

designed demolition of the lands, woods, and houses; the other arising from

mere negligence, and want of sufficient care in reparations, fences, and the like.
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So that my only business is at present to show to whom this waste is an injury;

and, of course, who is entitled to any, and what, remedy by action.

I. The persons who may be injured by waste, are such as have some interest

in the estate wasted; for if a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple, (1) with-

out any incumbrance or charge on the premises, he may commit whatever waste

his *own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable r $0241

or accountable for it to any one. And, though his heir is sure to be the >- •"

sufferer, yet nemo est hares viventis; no man is certain of succeeding him, as

well on account of the uncertainty which shall die first, as also because he has it

in his power to constitute what heir he pleases, according to the civil law notion

of an hares natus and an hares foetus: or, in the more accurate phraseology of

our English law, he may alien or devise his estate to whomever he thinks proper,

and by such alienation or devise may disinherit his heir at law. Into whose

hands soever therefore the estate wasted comes, after a tenant in fee-simple,

though the waste is undoubtedly damnum, it is damnum absque injuria.

One species of interest, which is injured by waste, is that of a person who has

a right of common in the place wasted; especially if it be common of estovers,

or a right of cutting and carrying away wood for house-bote, plough-bote, &c.

Here, if the owner of the wood demolishes the whole wood, and thereby destroys

all possibility of taking estovers, this is an injury to the commoner, amounting

to no less than a disseisin of his common of estovers, if he chooses so to consider

(a) Si'o Book II, ob. 18.

(8) This action may be brought by a reversionor where the nuisance affects injuriously his

reversionary interest. Jackson ». Pesked, 1 M. and S. 834 ; Alston v. Scales, 9 Bing. 3; Biddies-

ford v. OnsW, 3 Lev. 209; Tucker ». Newman, 11 Ad. and El. 40.

(1) [A tenant in fee-tale has the same uncontrolled and unlimited power in oomiiiittinjr waste,

as a tenant in fee-simple, unless expressly restrained from committing waste by the terms of tho

deed or will under which he claims.
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it; for which he has his remedy to recover possession and damages hy assize, if

entitled to a freehold in such common; but if he has only a chattel interest,

then he can only recover damages by an action on the case for this waste and

destruction of the woods, out of which his estovers were to issue, (b)

But the most usual and important interest, that is hurt by this commission,

of waste, is that of him who hath the remainder or reversion of the inheritance,

after a particular estate for life or years in being. Here, if the particular tenant

(be it the tenant in dower or by curtesy, who was answerable for waste at the

T *225 1 common law> (c) OT ^e lessee for life or years, *who was first made liable

' """' -> by the statutes of Marlbridge (d) and of Gloucester), (e) if the particular

tenant, I say, commits or suffers any waste, it is a manifest injury to him that

has the inheritance, as it tends to mangle and dismember it of its most desirable

incidents and ornaments, among which timber and houses may justly be reck-

oned the principal. To him therefore in remainder or reversion, to whom the

inheritance appertains in expectancy, (/) the law hath given an adequate remedy.

For he, who hath the remainder for life only, is not entitled to sue for waste;

since his interest may never perhaps come into possession, and then he hath

suffered no injury. Yet a parson, vicar, archdeacon, prebendary, and the

like, who are seized in right of their churches of any remainder or reversion, may

have an action of waste; for they, in many cases, have for the benefit of the church

'and of the successors a fee-simple qualified; and yet, as they are not seized in

their own right, the writ of waste shall not say, ad ex haredationem ipgius, as for
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other tenants in fee-simple; but ad exharedationem eccksicB, in whose right the

fee-simple is holden. (g)

II. The redress for this inquiry of waste is of two kinds; preventive, and cor-

rective : the former of which is by writ of estrepement, the latter by that of

waMe. (2)

1. Estrepement is an old French word, signifying the same as waste or extir-

pation : and the writ of estrepement lay at the common law, after judgment

obtained in any action real, (A) and before possession was delivered by the sheriff;

to stop any waste which the vanquished party might be tempted to commit

in lands, which were determined to be no longer his. But as in some cases the

demandant may be justly apprehensive, that the tenant may make waste or

estrepement pending the suit, well knowing the weakness of his title, therefore

the statute of Gloucester (i) gave another writ of estrepement pendente placito,

r ^qfi i commanding the sheriff firmly *to inhibit the tenant " nefaciat vastum

I- •! vel estrepementum pendente placito dicto indiscusso." (k) And, by virtue

of either of these writs the sheriff may resist them that do, or offer to do, waste;

and if otherwise he cannot prevent them, he may lawfully imprison the wasters,

or make a warrant to others to imprison them: or, if necessity require, he may

take the posse comitatus to his assistance. So odious in the sight of the law is

waste and destruction. (I) In suing out these two writs this difference was for-

merly observed; that in actions merely possessory, where no damages are

recovered, a writ of estrepement might be had at any time pendente lite, nay

even at the time of suing out the original writ, or first process: but in an action

where damages were recovered, the demandant could only have a writ of

estrepement, if he was apprehensive of waste after verdict had; (m) for, with

regard to waste done before the verdict was given, it was presumed the jury

would consider that in assessing the quantum of damages. But now it seems

to be held, by an equitable construction of the statute of Gloucester, and in

advancement of the remedy, that a writ of estrepement, to prevent waste, may

be had in every stage, as well of such actions wherein damages are recovered, as

(b) F. N. B. S9. 9 Hep. 112. fa} t Inst. 299. (d) 52 Hen. HI, 0. 23. ftj 6 Edw. I. c. 5.

XI Co-Utt. 63. (g) Ibid. Ml. —.-•--. »~. .,..„<, . _- '..._'._

:l) 2 I list. 32». (m) F. X. B. 60, 61.

F. K. B. iw. »oep. in. (cj z inst. zw. faj 5t Hen. HI, o. 23. (t) 6 Edw. I, c. 5.

m Co. Utt63. (g) IMd. Ml^ ^ (hj 2 Inst. 328. (i) 6 Edw. I, c. 13. (k) Kcgistr. 77.

(2) Both these writs are now abolished. The remedy to recover damages is by action on the

case, and to recover possession is by ejectment.
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of those wherein only possession is had of the lands; for peradventnre, saith

the law, the tenant may not be of ability to satisfy the demandant his full dam-

ages, (n) And therefore now, in an action of waste itself, to recover the place

wasted and also damages, a writ of estrepement will lie, as well before as after

judgment For the plaintiff cannot recover damages for more waste than is

contained in his original complaint; neither is he at liberty to assign or give in

evidence any waste made after the suing out of the writ: it is therefore reason-

able that he should have this writ of preventive justice, since he is in his present

suit debarred of any farther remedial, (o) If a writ of estrepement, forbidding

waste, be directed and delivered to the tenant himself, as it may be, and he

afterwards proceeds to commit waste, an action may be carried on upon the

*foundation of this writ; wherein the only plea of the tenant can be, r *oo7 "I

non fecit vastum contra prohibitionem: and, if upon verdict it be found L J

that he did, the plaintiff may recover costs and damages, (p) or the party may

proceed to punish the defendant for the contempt: for, if after the writ directed

and delivered to the tenant or his servants, they proceed to commit waste, the

court will imprison them for this contempt of the writ, (q) But not so, if it

be directed to the sheriff, for then it is incumbent upon him to prevent the

estrepement absolutely, even by raising the posse comitatus, if it can be done no

other way.

Besides this preventive redress at common law, the courts of equity, upon bill

exhibited therein, complaining of waste and destruction, will grant an injunc-
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tion in order to stay waste, until the defendant shall have put in his answer, and

the court shall thereupon make further order. Which is now become the most

usual way of preventing waste.

2. A writ of waste (3) is also an action, partly founded upon the common law,

and partly upon the statute of Gloucester; (r) and may be brought by him who

hath the immediate estate of inheritance in reversion or remainder against the

tenant for life, tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, or tenant for years. This

action is also maintainable in pursuance of statute (s) Westm. 2, by one tenant

in common of the inheritance against another, who makes waste in the estate

holden in common. The equity of which statute extends to joint-tenants, but

not to coparceners; because by the old law coparceners might make partition,

whenever either of them thought proper, and thereby prevent future waste, but

tenants in common and joint tenants could not; and therefore the statute gave

them this remedy, compelling the defendant either to make partition, and take

the place wasted to his own snare, or to give security not to commit any farther

waste. (/) But these tenants in common and joint-tenants are *not r *oog i

liable to the penalties of the statute of Gloucester, which extends only L ^ • J

to such as have life-estates, and do waste to the prejudice of the inheritance.

The waste however must be something considerable; for if it amount only to

twelve pence, or some such petty sum, the plaintiff shall not recover in an action

of waste: nam de minimi* non curat lex. (u) (4)

This action of waste is a mixed action; partly real, so far as it recovers land;

and partly personal, so far as it recovers damages. For it is brought for both

(n)lbid. «1. (XI 6 Rep. 115. (p) Moor. 100. fq) Hob. 85. (r) 6 Edw. I, o. 6.

ft} 13 Edw. I. c. JZ. ft) 2 1 nst.. 403, 404. (u) Finoh, L.».

(3) This writ, before it was abolished, had almost entirely fallen into disuse, having given way

to the more simple proceeding by special action on the case. And this action may be brought

not only in those cases in which a writ of waste might formerly have been maintained, but also

in any other case where by the wrongful act or default of a party in possession an injury ocean

to the rights of one entitled to succeed him in the possession. A purchaser at a judicial sale,

where the .defendant had a right of redemption, may maintain this action, after his title becomes

absolute, against one who had previously, but after the sale, committed waste on the premises.

Thomas r. Crofut, 14 N. T. 474; Stout ». Keycs, 2 Doug. Mich. 184.

(4) See this maxim illustrated in Broom's Legal Maxims, 106. Generally the emallness of in-

jnry will not preclude the maintenance of an action: Pindar v. Wadsworth, 2 East, 154; but the

difficulty in drawing a precise line between what is and what is not waste in all cases, is suffi-

cient reason for taking no notice of slight injuries.
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those purposes; and, if the waste be proved, the plaintiff shall recover the thing

or place wasted, and also treble damages by the statute of Gloucester. The writ

of waste calls upon the tenant to appear and show cause why he hath commit-

ted waste and destruction in the place named, ad exhceredationem, to the disin-

herison of the plaintiff, (w) And if the defendant makes default, or does not

appear at the day assigned him, then the sheriff is to take with him a jury of

twelve men, and go in person to the place alleged to be wasted, and there in-

quire of the waste doue, and the damages; and make a return or report of

the same to the court, upon which report the judgment is founded, (x) For

the law will not suffer so heavy a judgment, as the forfeiture and treble dam-

ages, to be passed upon a mere default, without full assurance that the fact is

according as it is stated in the writ But if the defendant appears to the writ,

and afterwards suffers judgment to go against him by default, or upon a nihil

did/ (when he makes no answer, puts in no plea, in defence), this amounts to a

confession of the waste; since having once appeared, he cannot now pretend

ignorance of the charge. Now, therefore, the sheriff shall not go to the place to

inquire of the fact, whether any waste has, or has not been committed; for this

is already ascertained by the silent confession of the defendant: but he shall

only, as in defaults upon other actions, make inquiry of the quantum of dam-

ages, (y) The defendant, on the trial, may give m evidence any thing that

proves there was no waste committed, as that the destruction happened by light-

ning, tempest, the king's enemies, or other inevitable accident, (z) But it is no
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defence to say, that a stranger did the waste, for against him the plaintiff hath

no remedy: though the defendant is entitled to sue such stranger in an action

of trespass vi et armis, and shall recover the damages he has suffered in conse-

quence of such unlawful act. (a) (5)

When the waste and damages are thus ascertained, either by confession, ver-

dict, or inquiry of the sheriff, judgment is given in pursuance of the statute of

Gloucester, c. 5, that the plaintiff shall recover the place wasted; for which he

has immediately a writ of seisin, provided the particular estate be still subsist-

r *99Q 1 *nS (f°r> *f ^ k° expired> *there can be no forfeiture of the land), and

[ **9 J aigo that the plaintiff shall recover treble the damages assessed by the

jury, which he must obtain in the same manner as all other damages, in actions

personal and mixed, are obtained, whether the particular estate be expired, or

still in being.

CHAPTER XV.

OF SUBTRACTION.

SUBTRACTION, which is the fifth species of injuries affecting a man's real

property, happens when any person who owes any suit, duty, custom, or service

to another, withdraws or neglects to perform it. It differs from a disseisin, in

that this is committed without any denial of the right, consisting merely of non-

performance ; tJtat strikes at the very title of the party injured, and amounts to

an ouster or actual dispossession. Subtraction, however, being clearly an injury,

is remediable by due course of law: but the remedy differs according to the

(IB, F. N. B. 55. (*) Poph. 24. (y) Cro. Ellz. 18, J90.

(2) Co. LIU. 53. (a)lavrotnt*iprtot, WO.

(5) But one having a vested interest in reversion, may maintain a special action on the case

against a stranger who commits waste to the injury of the inheritance. Randall r. Cleveland, 6

Conn. 328; Elliot v. Smith, 2 N. H. 430; Chase ». Hozleton, 7 id. 171; Ripka r. Sergeant, 7 W.

and S. 1. The tenant may also sue for the injury to his possession. Id. Or the landlord may

hold the tenant responsible for the injury by the stranger. Fay v. Brewer, 3 Pick. 203. Threat-

ened waste may be restrained by injunction.
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nature of the services, whether they be due by virtue of any tenure, or by

custom only.

I. Fealty, suit of court, and rent, are duties and services usually issuing and

arising ratione tenures, being the conditions upon which the ancient lords

granted out their lands to their feudatories; whereby it was stipulated that they

and their heirs should take the oath of fealty or fidelity to their lord, which was

the feudal bond, or commune vinctilum, between lord and tenant; that they

should do suit, or dulj attend and follow the lord's courts, and there from time

to time give their assistance, by serving on juries, either to decide the property

of their neighbours in the court-baron, or correct their misdemeanors in the

court-leet; and, lastly, that they should yield to the lord certain annual stated

returns, in military attendance, in provisions, in arms, in matters of ornament

or pleasure, in rustic employments or *praedial labours, or (which is in- ,- *.-><>•< i

•"

star omnium) in money, which will provide all the rest ; all which are L

comprised under the one general name of reditus, return, or rent. And tho

subtraction or non-observance of any of these conditions, by neglecting to swear

fealty, to do suit of court, or to render the rent or service reserved, is an injury

to the freehold of the lord, by diminishing and depreciating the value of his

seigniory.

The general remedy for all these is by distress ; and it is the only remedy at

the common law for the first two of them. The naure of distresses, their inci-
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dents and consequences, we have before more than once explained : (a) it may

here suffice to remember, that they are a taking of beasts, or other personal

property, by way of pledge to enforce the performance of something due from

the party distrained upon. And for the most part it is provided that distresses

be reasonable and moderate ; but in the case of distress for fealty or suit of court,

no distress can be unreasonable, immoderate, or too large : (b) for this is the only

remedy to which the party aggrieved is entitled, and therefore, it ought to be

such as is sufficiently compulsory ; and, be it of what value it will, there is no

harm done, especially as it cannot be sold or made away with, but must be re-

stored immediately on satisfaction made. A distress of this nature, that has no

bounds with regard to its quantity, and may be repeated from time to time,

until the stubbornness of the party is conquered, is called a distress infinite ;

which is also used for some other purposes, as in summoning jurors, and the like.

Other remedies for subtraction of rents or services are, 1. By action of debt,

for the breach of this express contract, of which enough has been formerly said.

This is the most usual remedy, when recourse is had to any action at all for the

recovery of pecuniary rents, to which species of render almost all free services

are now reduced, since the abolition of the military tenures. But for a free-

hold rent, reserved on *a lease for life, &c., no action of debt lay by the r ^oo -i

common law, during the continuance of the freehold out of which it •- -1

issued ; (c) for the law would not suffer a real injury to be remedied by an action

that was merely personal. However, by the statutes 8 Ann. c. 14, and 5 Geo.

Ill, c, 17, actions of debt may now be brought at any time to recover such free-

hold rents. 2. An assize of mort d' ancestor or novel disseisin will lie of rents

as well as of lands ; (d) if the lord, for the sake of trying the possessory right,

will make it his election to suppose himself ousted or disseised thereof. This is

now seldom heard of ; and all other real actions to recover rents, being in the

nature of writs of right, and therefore more dilatory in their progress, are en-

tirely disused, though not formally abolished by law. (1) Of this species how-

ever is, 3. The writ de consuetudinibus et servitiis, which lies for the lord

against his tenant, who witholds from him the rents and services due by cus-

tom, or tenure, for his laud, (e) This compels a specific payment or perform-

(•II Sec pages 6, 14S. (ft) Finch, L. 289. (c) 1 Roll. Abr. 995.

(</) F. N . II. 198. («) I but. 191.

(1) It is since abolished by Btatute 3 and 4 "Win. IV, o. 27.
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ance of the rent or service; and there are also others, whereby the lord shall

recover the land itself in lieu of the duty withheld. As, 4. The writ of ceasa-

vit; which lies by the statutes of Gloucester, 6 Edward I, c. 4, and of Westm.

2, 13 Edw. I, cc. 21 and 41, when a man who holds lands of a lord by rent or

other services, neglects or ceases to perform his services for two years together;

or where a religious house hath lands given it, on condition of performing some

certain spiritual service, as reading prayers or giving alms, and neglects it; in

either of which cases, if the cesser or neglect have continued for two years, the

lord or donor and his heirs shall have a writ of cessamt to recover the land it-

self, eo quod tenens in faciendis servitiis per biennium jam cessavit. (/) In

like manner, by the civil law. if a tenant who held lands upon payment of rent

or scrvises, or "jure emphyteutico," neglected to pay or perform them per tot-nm

triennium, he might be ejected from such empyteutic lands, (g) But by the

statute of Gloucester, the cessavit does not lie for lands let upon fee-farm rents,

unless they have lain fresh and uncultivated for two years, and there be

F *2331 *uo'; sufficient distress upon the premises; or unless the tenant hath so

*- J enclosed the land that the lord cannot come upon it to distrain.(A) For

the law prefers the simple and ordinary remedies, by distress or by the actions

just now mentioned, to this extraordinary one of forfeiture for a cessavit: and

therefore the same statute of Gloucester has provided farther, that, upon tender

of arrears and damages before judgment and giving security for the future

performance of the services, the process shall be at an end, and the tenant shall
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retain his land; to which the statute of Westm. 2, conforms so far as may

stand with convenience and reason of law. (i) It is easy to observe, that the

statute (k) 4 Geo. II, c. 28 (which permits landlord, who have a right of re-entry

for non-payment for rent, to serve an ejectment on their tenants, when half a

year's rent is due, and there is no sufficient distress on the premises), is in some

measure copied from the ancient writ of cessavit: especially as it may be satis-

fied and put an end to in a similar manner, by tender of the rent and costs

within six months after. And the same remedy is, in substance, adopted by

statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, § 16, which enacts that, where any tenant at rack-rent

shall be one year's rent in arrcar, and shall desert the demised premises, leaving

the same uncultivated or unoccupied, so that no sufficient distress can be had:

two justices of the peace (after notice affixed on the premises for fourteen days

without effect) may give the landlord possession thereof, and thenceforth the

lease shall be void. 5. There is also another very effectual remedy, which takes

place when the tenant, upon a writ of assize for rent, or on a replevin, disowns

or disclaims his tenure, whereby the lord loses his verdict: in which case the lord

mav have a writ of right, sur disclaimer, grounded on this denial of tenure; and

shall, upon proof of the tenure, recover back the land itself so holden, as a pun-

ishment to the tenant for such his false disclaimer. (I) This piece of retaliating

justice, whereby the tenant who endeavours to defraud his lord is himself de-

F *234 1 Pr've" °f the estote, a8 it evidently proceeds upon feudal principles, *so

L J it is expressly to be met with in the feudal constitutions: (»») " vasallus,

qui abnegavit feudum ejusve conditionem, exspoliabitur.

And, as on the one hand the ancient law provided these several remedies to

obviate the knavery and punish the ingratitude of the tenant, so on the other

hand it was equally careful to redress the oppression of the lord ; by furnishing

1. The writ of ne injuntc vexes; (n) which is an ancient writ founded on that

chapter (o) of magna carta which prohibits distresses for greater services than

are really due to the lord; being itself of the prohibitory kind, and yet in the

nature of a writ of right (p) It lies where the tenant in fee-simple and his an-

cestors have held of the lord by certain services; and the lord hath obtained

seisin of more or greater services, by the inadvertent payment or performance of

them by the tenant himself. Here the tenant cannot in an avowry avoid the

lord's possessory right, because of the seisin given by his own hand; but is

(f) Ibid. 208. (o) Cod. 4, 00. 2. (hi F. N. B. 809. 2 Inst. 298. «) 2 Inst. 401,160.

li) See once 206. (0 Finch, L. 270, 271. (m) Feud. I. 2, *. 20.

in) F. N. B. 10. (o) C. 10. (p) Booth, 12C.
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driveu to this writ, to devest the lord's possession, and establish the mere right

of property, by ascertaining the services, and reducing them to their proper

standard. But this writ does not lie for tenant in tail; for he may avoid such

seisin of the lord, obtained from the payment of his ancestors, by plea to an

avowry in replevin, (q) 2. The writ of mesne, de media; which is also in the

nature of a writ of right, (r) and lies, when upon a subinfeudation the mesne,

or middle lord, (s) suffers his under-tenant, or tenant paravail, to be distrained

upon by the lord paramount, for the rent due to him from the mesne lord, (t)

And in such case the tenant shall have judgment to be quitted (or indemnified)

by the mesne lord; and if he makes default therein, or does not appear origin-

ally to the tenant's writ, he shall be forejudged of his mesnalty, and the tenant

shall hold immediately of the lord paramount himself. («) (2)

*IL Thus far of the remedies for subtraction of rents or other ser- r $0351

vices due by tenure. There are also other services due by ancient cus- L -"

torn and.prescription only. Such is that of doing suit to another's mill: where

the persons, resident in a particular place, by usage time out of mind, have been

accustomed to grind their corn at a certain mill; and afterwards any of them

go to another mill, and withdraw their suit (their secta a sequendo) from the

ancient mill This is not only a damage, but an injury to the owner; because

this prescription might have a very reasonable foundation; viz.: upon the erec-

tion of such mill by the ancestors of the owner for the convenience of the in-

habitants, on condition, that when erected, they should all grind their corn there
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only. And for this injury the owner shall have a writ de secta ad molendinum,

(w) commanding the defendant to do his suit at that mill, quam ad illudfacere

debet, et solet, or show good cause to the contrary: in which action the valid-

ity of the prescription may be tried, and if it be "found for the owner, he shall

recover damages against the defendant, (a;) In like manner and for like rea-

sons, the register (y) will inform us, that a man may have a writ of secta ad

furnum, secta ad torrale, et ad omnia alia hujusmodi ; for suit due to his fur-

num, his public oven or bake-house; or to his torrale, his kiln, or malt-house ;

when a person's ancestors have erected a convenience of that sort for the bene-

fit of the neighbourhood, upon an agreement (proved by immemorial custom)

that all the inhabitants should use and resort to it when erected. But besides

these special remedies for subtractions, to compel the specific performance of

the service due by custom; an action on the case will also lie for all of them, to

repair the party injured in damages. And thus much for the injury of sub-

traction.

(gl F. N. B. 11. 2 lost (r) Booth, ISO. (»i Sec book II, eh. S. pp. S9,00. (*) F. N. B 133

(«} 2Inst 374. (iff) F. N. B. 143. (*) Co. Eutr. 461. (y) Fol. 153.

(2) The several -writs here mentioned were formally abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV,

c. 27. They were before not the usual remedies for these wrongs. An action on the case

might have been maintained by the tenant at the common law against the landlord for dis-

training for more rent than was due: Taylor Land, and Ten.. } 7%),etS9q.; and if the tenant

through any error or mistake paid to the landlord more than was due. he might recover it back in

an action for money had and received to his use, as paid without consideration. For the gen-

eral principle in these cases, see Onion Bank v. Bank of U. S., 3 Mass. 74; Bank of Commerce

«. Union Bank, 3 X. Y. 230; Little v. Derby, 7 Mich. 325. And if an under-tenant is dis-

trained upon, or is compelled in order to protect his own interest to pay rent to the original

landlord, he is entitled to treat the payment as one made to the use of tne mesne tenant, and

may deduct it from his oxvn rent, or 'recover it back from the mesno tenant if nothing was

owing to him. As to the obligation of the megue tenant to indemnify the under-tenant gen-

erally, see Taylor Laud, and Ten., $ 738.
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CHAPTER XVI.

OF DISTURBANCE.

THE sixth and last species of real injuries is that of disturbance ; which is usually

» wrong done to some incorporeal hereditament, by hindering or disquieting the

owners in their regular and lawful enjoyment of it. (a) I shall consider five sorts

of this injury, viz.: 1. Disturbance of franchises. 2. Disturbance of common,

3. Disturbance of ways. 4. Disturbance of tenure. 5. Disturbance of patronage.

I. Disturbance of franchises happens when a man has the franchise of hold-

ing a court-leet, of keeping a fair or market, of free-warren, of taking toll, of

seizing waifs or estrays, or, (in short) any other species of franchise whatsoever;

and he is disturbed or incommoded in the lawful exercise thereof. As if

another by distress, menaces, or persuasions, prevails upon the suitors not to

appear at my court; or obstructs the passage to my fait or market; or hunts in my

free-warren; or refuses to pay me the accustomed toll; or hinders me from

seizing the waif or estray, whereby it escapes or is carried out of my liberty; in

every case of this kind, all which it is impossible here to recite or suggest, there

is an injury done to the legal owner; his property is damnified; and the profits

arising from such his franchise are diminished. To remedy which, as the law has

F *2371 &'ven uo otner writ, he is *thereforeentitled to sue for damages by a special

' " J action on the case: or, in case of toll, may take a distress if he pleases, (b)

II. The disturbance of common conies next to be considered; where any act

is done, by which the right of another to his common is incommoded or dimin-
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ished. Tnis may happen, in the first place, where one who hath no right of

common, puts his cattle into the land; and thereby robs the cattle of the com-

moners of their respective shares of the pasture. Or if one, who hath a right

of common, puts in cattle which are not commonable, as hogs and goats;

which amounts to the same inconvenience. But the lord of the soil may (by

custom or prescription, but not without) put a stranger's cattle into the com-

mon ; (c) and also, by a like prescription for common appurtenant, cattle that

are not commonable may be put into the common. (</) The lord also of the

soil may justify making burrows therein, and putting in rabbits, so as they do

not increase to so large a number as totally to destroy the common, (e) But in

general, in case the beasts of a stranger, or the uncommonable cattle of a com-

moner, be found upon the land, the lord or any of the commoners may distrain

them damage-feasant:(/) or the commoner may bring an action on the case

to recover damages,provided the injury done be anything considerable: so that

he may lay his action with a per quod, or allege that thereby he was deprived

of his common. But for a trivial trespass the commoner has no action: but

the lord of the soil only, for the entry and trespass committed, (g)

Another disturbance of common is by surcharging it; or putting more cattle

therein than the pasture and herbage will sustain, or the party hath a right to

do. In this case he that surcharges does an injury to the rest of the owners, by

I 2381 depriving them of their respective portions, or at least Contracting

*- ' J them into a smaller compass. This injury by surcharging can, properly

speaking, only happen, where the common is appendant or appurtenant,, (It) and

of course limitable by law; or where when in gross, it is expressly limited and

certain; for when a man hath common in gross, sans nombre, or icithovf

stint, he cannot be a surcharges However, even where a man is said to have

common without stint, still there must be left sufficient for the lord's own

beasts; (f) for the law will not suppose that, at the original grant of the common,

the lord meant to exclude himself. (1)

jo) Finch. L. 187. (M Cro. Eliz. .188. (o) 1 BoU. Alir. 396.

(d) Co. LIU. 142. (e) Cro. Eliz. 876. Cro. Jae. 195. Lntw. 108. (/)9Kcp. 119.

(ff] Ibid. (ft) See book II, ch. 3. (<) 1 Roll. Abr. :'-.'->

(1) [The modem doctrine upon this subject is somewhat different, for it is no*- held, that a

prescription for a solo aud suvoral pasture, <fcc., iu exclusion of the owner of the soil for fie
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The usual remedies for surcharging the common, are either by distraining so

many of the beasts as are above the number allowed, or else by an action of

trespass, both which may be had by the lord: or lastly, by a special action on

the case for damages; in which any commoner may be plaintiff., (;') But the

ancient and most effectual method of proceeding is by a writ of admeasurement

of pasture. This lies either where a common appurtenant or in gross is certain

as to number, or where a man has common appendant or appurtenant to his

land, the quantity of which common has never yet been ascertained. In either

of these cases, as well the lord, as any of the commoners, is entitled to this writ

of admeasurement; which is one of those writs that are called vicontiel, (k)

being directed to the sheriff, (vicecomiti,) and not to be returned to any superior

court, till finally executed by him. It recites a complaint that the defendant

hath s\\rcharge<l,superoneravit, the common: and therefore commands the sher-

iff to admeasure and apportion it; that the defendant may not have more than

belongs to him, and that the plaintiff may have his rightful share. And upon

this suit all the commoners shall be admeasured, as well those who have not, as

those who have surcharged the common; as well the plaintiff as the defendant

(I) The execution of this writ must be by a jury of twelve men, who are upon

their *oaths to ascertain, under the superintendence of the sheriff, what r «OQQ i

and how many cattle each commoner is entitled to feed. And the rule «• ^

for this admeasurement is generally understood to be, that the commoner shall

not turn more cattle upon the common, than are sufficient to manure and stock
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the land to which his right of common is annexed: or, as our ancient law ex-

pressed it, such cattle only as are levant and couchant upon his tenement; (m)

which being a thing uncertain before admeasurement, has frequently, though

erroneously, occasioned this unmeasured right of common to be called a com-

mon without stint, or sans nombrej (n) a thing which, though possible in law,

(0) does in fact very rarely exist.

If, after the admeasurement has thus ascertained the right, the same defend-

ant surcharges the common again, the plaintiff may have a writ of se<»nd sur-

charge, de secunda superoneratione, which is given by the statute Westm. 2, 13

Edw. I, c. 8, and thereby the sheriff is directed to inquire by a jury, whether the

defendant has in fact again surcharged the common contrary to the tenure of

the last admeasurement: and if he has, he shall then forfeit to the king the

supernumerary cattle put in, and also shall pay damages to the plaintiff, (p)

This process seems highly equitable: for the first offence is held to be committed

through mere inadvertence, and therefore there are no damages or forfeiture on

the first writ, which was only to ascertain the right which was disputed: but the

second offence is a wilful contempt and injustice; and therefore punished very

properly with not only damages, but also forfeiture. And herein the right, being

once settled, is never again disputed; but only the fact is tried, whether there

be any second surcharge or no: which gives this neglected proceeding a great

advantage over the modern method, by action on the case, wherein the quam-

tum of common belonging to the defendant must be proved upon every fresh

trial, for every repeateu offence.

There is yet another disturbance of common, when the owner of the r ^OAO n

land, or other person, so encloses or otherwise obstructs it, that the com- L * J

(j) Proem. 278. CJfcJZInat. 369. Finch. L. 314. (1) F. N. B. 125. (m) Bro. Abr. Ht. prescription, 28.

(n) Hard. 117. foj Lord Kay m. 407. (p) F. N. B. 148. 1 Inst. 870.

whole year Is good : 2 Lev. 2; Pollexf. 13; I Mod. 74; for it does not exclude the lord from

all the profits of the soil, as he is entitled to the mines, trees, and quarries. And though a

man canuot prescribe to have common eo nomine for the whole year m exclusion of the lord.

(1 Lev. 26H; 1 Tent. 395), still the lord may, by custom, be restrained to a qualified right of

common during a part of the year. Telv. 129. And it is said the lord may be restrained,

together with the commoners, from nsing the common at all during a part of the year. 1 Saund.

353, n. (2). See also 2 H. Bl. 4. And it is said to have boon clearly held that the commoners

mav prescribe to have common in exclusion of the lord for a part of the year. 2 Boll. Abr

367. L. pi. 1.]
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moner is precluded from enjoying the benefit to which he is by law entitled.

This may be done, either by erecting fences, or by driving the cattle off the

laud,or by ploughing up the soil of the common, (</) Or it may be done by

erecting a warren therein, and stocking it with rabbits in such quantities that

they devour the whole herbage, and thereby destroy the common. For in such

case, though the commoner may not destroy the rabbits, yet the law looks upon

this as an injurious disturbance of his right, and has given him his remedy by

action against the owner, (r) This kind of disturbance does indeed amount to

a disseisin, and if the commoner chooses to consider it in that light, the law has

given him an assize of novel-disseisin, against the lord, to recover the possession

of his common. («) Or it has given a writ of quod permit tat, against any stranger,

as well as the owner of the land, in case of such a disturbance to the plaintiff e.a

amounts to a total deprivation of his common; whereby the defendant shall be

compelled to permit the plaintiff to enjoy his common as he ought, (t) But if

the commoner docs not choose to bring a real action to recover seisin, or to try

the right, he may, (which is the easier and more usual way) bring an action on

the case for his damages, instead of an assize or a quod per mitt at. (u) (2)

There are cases, indeed, in which the lord may enclose and abridge the com-

mon ; for which, as they are no injury to any one, so no one is entitled to any

remedy. For it is provided by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. Ill, c. 4, that the

lord may approve, that is, enclose and con vert to the uses of husbandry (which

is a melioration or approvement,) any waste grounds, woods, or pastures, in
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which his tenants have common appendant to their estates; provided he leaves

F *2411 *sun^c'en* common to his tenants, according to the proportion of their

L J land. And this is extremely reasonable; for it would be very hard if

the .lord, whose ancestors granted out of these estates to which the commons are

appendant, should be precluded from making what advantage he can of the rest

of his manor; provided such advantage and improvement be no way derogatory

from the former grants. The statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 46, extends this

liberty of approving, in like manner, against all others that have common appur-

tenant, or in gross, as well as against the tenants of the lord, who have their

common appendant; and farther enacts, that no assize of novel-disseisin, for

common, shall lie against a lord for erecting on the common any windmill,

sheep-house, or other necessary buildings therein specified : which, Sir Edward

Coke says, (to) are only put as example; and that any other necessary improve-

ments may be made by the lord, though in reality they abridge the common,

and make it less sufficient for the commoners. (3) And, lastly, by statutes 29

Geo. II, c. 36, and 31 Geo. II, c. 41, it is particularly enacted, that any lords of

wastes and commons, with the consent of the major part, in number and value,

of the commoners, may enclose any part thereof, for the growth of timber and

underwood. (4)

III. The third species of disturbance, that of ways, is very similar in its

nature to the last: it principally happening when a person, who hath a right

to a way over another's grounds, by grant or prescription, is obstructed by

enclosures, or other obstacles, or by ploughing across it; by which means he

cannot enjoy his right of way, or, at least, not in so commodious a manner as

(?> Cro. Eliz. 193. (r) Cro. Jac. 195. («) F. N. B. 179. (t) Finch, L. 275. F. N. B. 128.

(«I Cro. Jac. 195. (to) 2 last. 476.

(2) These real actions having been abolished by statute 3 and 4 'Wm. IV, c. 27, the action on

the case is now the only remedy.

(3) [The cultivation of common lands, and the enclosure and management of them, are now

carried on under private acts of parliament, subject to, and adopting the regulations laid down

in, the 13 Geo. Ill, c. 81, and 41 Geo. Ill, c. 109, which are incorporated into all special enclos-

ure acts.]

(4) The statute last mentioned was amended by statute 1 and 2 Geo. IT, c. 23; 6 and 7 Tiv"m.

IV, c. 115 ; and 3 and 4 Vic. c. 31; under which, lords of wastes and commons, with the con-

sent of two-thirds in number and value of the commoners, may enclose any part thereof for th«

growth of timber and underwood.
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•he might have done. If this be a way annexed to his estate, and the obstruc-

tion is made by the tenant of the land, this brings it to another species of

injury; for it is then a nuisance, for which an assize will lie, as mentioned in a

'former chapter, (z) But if the right of way, thus obstructed by the tenant, be

only in gross (that is, annexed to a man's person and unconnected with any

lands or *tenements) or if the obstruction of a way belonging to an r *„ ,„ ]

house or land is made by a stranger, it is then in either case merely a *- A' " '

disturbance: for the obstruction of a way in gross is no detriment to any

lands or tenements, and therefore does not fall under the legal notion of a

nuisance, which must be laid, ad nocumentum liberi tenements; (y) and the

obstruction of it by a stranger can never tend to put the right of way in dis-

pute: the remedy, therefore, for these disturbances is not by assize or any real

action, but by the universal remedy of action on the case to recover damages, (z)

IV. The fourth species of disturbance is that of disturbance of tenure, or

breaking that connexion which subsists between the lord and his tenant, and

to which the law pays so high a regard, that it will not suffer it to be wantonly

dissolved by the act of a third person. To have an estate well tenanted is an

advantage that every landlord must be very sensible of; and, therefore, the

driving away of a tenant from off his estate is an injury of no small conse-

quence. So that if there be a tenant at will or any lands or tenements, and a

stranger, either by menaces and threats, or by unlawful distresses, or by fraud and

circumvention, or other means, contrives to drive him away, or inveigle him to
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leave his tenancy, this the law very justly construes to be a wrong and injury to

the lord, (a) and gives him a reparation in damages against the offender by a

special action on the case. (5)

V. The fifth and last species of disturbance, but by far the most considerable,

is that of disturbance of patronage; which is an hindrance or obstruction of a

patron to present his clerk to a benefice.

This injury was distinguished at common law from another species of injury,

called usurpation; which is an absolute ouster or dispossession of the patron,

and happens when a stranger, that hath no right, presenteth a clerk, ana he is

thereupon *admitted and instituted, (b) In which case, of usurpation, r ^A^ i

the patron lost by the common law not only his turn of presenting pro *• -I

hac vice, but also the absolute and perpetual inheritance of the advowson, so

that he could not present again upon the next avoidance, unless in the mean

time he recovered his right by a real action, viz.: a writ of right of advowson. (c)

The reason given for his losing the present turn, and not ejecting the usurper's

clerk, was that the final intent of the law in creating this species of property

being to have a fit person to celebrate divine service, it preferred the peace of

the church (provided a clerk were once admitted and instituted) to the right

of any patron whatever. (6) And the patron also lost the inheritance of his

advowson, unless he recovered it in a writ of right, because by such usurpation

he was put out of possession of his advowson, as much as when by actual entry

and ouster he is disseised of lands or houses; since the only possession, of which

an advowson is capable, is by actual presentation and admission of one's clerk.

(x) C. 13, p. 218. (y) F. N. B. 183. (z) Hale on F. N. B. 186. T,otw. Ill, 118.

(,n Hal. Anal. c. 40. 1 Itoll. Abr. 108. (b) Co. I.iit. '277. (<•) 6 Bep. 49.

(5) [This species of disturbance is perhaps unknown at the present day.]

(6) [Aud this preference of the peace of the church to the litigated rights of patrons, was held

to prevail in all cases without any regard to infancy, coverture, or any such like disability of the

patron. For it was a maxim of the common law, " that he who came in by admission and insti-

tution, came in by a judicial act, and the law presumes that the bishop who has the care of

the souls of all within his diocese, for which he shall answer at his fearful and final

account (in respect of which he ought to keep and defend them against all heretics, and schis-

matics, and other ministers of the devil), will not do or assent to any wron^ to bo done to their

patronages, which is of their earthly possession; but if the church be litigious, that he will

inform himself of the truth by a jure patronatus, and so do right." 6 Coke, 49.]

The writ of right of advowson was abolished with other real actions.
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As, therefore, when the clerk was once instituted (except in the case of the king,

when Jie must also be inducted) (d) the church became absolutely full; so the

usurper by such plenarty, arising from his own presentation, became in fact

seized of the advowson: which seisin it was impossible for the true patron to

remove by any possessory action, or other HUMUS, during the plenarty or fulness

of the church: and when it became void afresh, he could not then present,

since another had the right of possession. The only remedy, therefore, which

the patron had left, was to try the mere right in a writ of right of advowson;

which is a peculiar writ of right, framed for this special purpose, but in every

other respect corresponding with other writs of right: (e) and if a man recov-

ered therein, he regained the possession of his advowson, and was entitled to pre-

sent at the next avoidance. (/) But in order to such recovery he must allege a

Eresentation in himself or some of his ancestors, which proves him or them to

ave been once in possession: for, as a grant of the advowson, during the fulness

F *2441 °^ ^e cnurcn> conveys *no manner of possession for the present, there-

L J fore, a purchaser, until he hath presented, hath no actual seisin whereon

to ground a writ of right, (g) Thus stood the common law.

But, bishops in ancient times, either by carelessness or collusion, frequently

instituting clerks upon the presentation of usurpers, and thereby defrauding

the real patrons of their right of possession, it was in substance enacted by

statute \V estm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 5, § 2, that if a possessory action be brought

within six months after the avoidance, the patron shall (notwithstanding such
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usurpation and institution) recover that very presentation ; which gives back to

him the seisin of the advowson. Yet still, if the true patron omitted to bring

his action within six months, the seisin was gained by the usurper, and the

patron, to recover it, was driven to the long and hazardous process of a writ

of right. To remedy which it was farther enacted by statute 7 Ann. c. 18, that

no usurpation shall displace the estate or interest of the patron, or turn it to a

mere right; but that the true patron may present upon the next avoidance, as

if no such usurpation had happened. So that the title of usurpation is now

much narrowed, and the law stands upon this reasonable foundation : that if a

stranger usurps my presentation, and I do not pursue my right within six

months, I shall lose that turn without remedy, for the peace of the church, and

as a punishment for my own negligence; but that turn is the only one I shall

lose thereby. Usurpation now gains no right to the usurper, with regard to any

future avoidance, but only to the present vacancy: it cannot indeed be remedied

after six months are past; but, during those six months, it is only a species of

disturbance.

Disturbers of a right of advowson may, therefore, be these three persons: the

pseudo-patron, his clerk, and the ordinary: the pretended patron, by presenting

to a church to which he has no right, and thereby making it litigious or disput-

f*245l aw"e» the, clerk, by demanding or obtaining institution *which tends

L ' to and promotes the same inconvenience; and the ordinary, by refusing

to admit the real patron's clerk, or admitting the clerk of the pretender. These

disturbances are vexatious and injurious to him who hath the right: and, there-

fore, if he be not wanting to himself, the law (besides the writ of right of advow-

son, which is a final and conclusive remedy) hath given him two inferior posses-

sory actions for his relief: an assize of darrein presentment, and a writ of quare

impedit; in which the patron is always the plaintiff, and not the clerk. For the

law supposes the injury to be offered to him only, by obstructing or refusing the

admission of his nominee ; and not to the clerk, who hath no right in him till

institution, and of course can suffer no injury.

1. An assize of darrein presentment, or last presentation, lies when a man, or

his ancestors, under whom he claims, nave presented a clerk to a benefice, who

is instituted; and afterwards upon the next avoidance a stranger presents a

clerk, and thereby disturbs him that is the real patron. In which case the

patron shall have this writ (A) directed to the sheriff to summon an assize or

(d) Ibid. (e) F. U. B. 30. (f) Ilni. 36. (g) 2 Inst. 357. (hj F. N. B. 31.
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jury, to inquire who was the last patron that presented to the church now

vacant, of which the plaintiff complains that he is deforced by the defendant :

and, according as the assize determines that question, a writ shall issue to the

bishop; to institute the clerk of that patron, in whose favour the determination

is made, and also to give damages, in pursuance of statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I,

c. 5. This question, it is to be observed, was before the statute 7 Ann. before

mentioned, entirely conclusive, as between the patron or his heirs and a stranger :

for, till then, the full possession of the advowson was in him who presented last

and his heirs: unless, since that presentation, the clerk had been evicted within

six months, or the rightful patron had recovered the advowson in a writ of

right; which is a title superior to all others. But that statute having given a

right to any person to bring a quare impedit, and to recover (if his title be good)

notwithstanding the last presentation, by whomsoever "made ; assizes r *ntp -i

of darrein presentment, now not being in any wise conclusive, have L ^

been totally disused, as indeed they began to be before ; a quare impedit being

more general, and therefore a more usual action. For the assize of darrein

presentment lies only where a man has an advowson by descent from his ances-

tors ; but the writ of quare impedit is equally remedial whether a man claims

title by descent or by purchase, (i)

2. I proceed therefore, secondly, to inquire into the nature (&) of a writ of

quare impedit, now the only action used in case of the disturbance of patron-

age : and shall first premise the usual proceedings previous to the bringing of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the writ. (7)

Upon the vacancy of a living, the patron, we know, is bound to present within

six calendar months, (1) otherwise it will lapse to the bishop. But if the pre-

sentation be made within that time, the bishop is bound to admit and institute

the clerk, if found sufficient; (m) unless the church be full, or there be notice of

any litigation. For if any opposition be intended, it is usual for each party to

enter a caveat with the bishop, to prevent his institution of his antagonist's

clerk. An institution after a caveat entered is void by the ecclesiastical law ;

(M) but this the temporal courts pay no regard to, and look upon a caveat as a

mere nullity, (o) But if two presentations be offered to the bishop upon the

same avoidance, the church is then said to become litigious; and, if nothing far-

ther be done the bishop may suspend the admission of either, and suffer a lapse

to incur. Yet if the patron or clerk on either side request him to award &jus

patronatus, he is bound to do it A jus patronatus is a commission from the

bishop, directed usually to his chancellors and others of competent learning :

who are to summon a jury of six clergymen and six laymen, to inquire into and

examine who is the *rightful patron ; (p) and if, upon such inquiry r

*•

made and certificate thereof returned to the commissioners, he admits

and institutes the clerk of that patron whom they return as the true one, the

bishop secures himself at all events from being a disturber, whatever proceed-

ings may be had afterwards in the temporal courts.

The clerk refused by the bishop may also have a remedy against him in the

spiritual court, denominated a duplex querela : (q) which is a complaint in the

nature of an appeal from the ordinary to his next immediate superior ; as from

a bishop to the archbishop, or from an archbishop to the delegates ; (8) and if

the superior court adjudges the cause of refusal to be insufficient, it will grant

institution to the appellant.

Thus far matters may go on in the mere ecclesiastical course ; but in contested

presentations they seldom go so far: for, upon the first delay or refusal of the

(l) 2 I M-t . 355. (tj See Boswell'n Case, 6 Bop. 48. (I) See book II, c. 18. (m) See book I, cb. II.

(n) 1 Burn, 2W. (o) 1 Boll. Rep. 191. (p) I Burn, 16. 17. (q) Ibid. 113.

(7) This writ was expressly excepted in statutes 3 and 4 TVm. IV, c. 27, which abolished real

and mixed actions generally; but it was finally abolished by the common law procedure act,

1860, and a writ of summons from the common pleas substituted.

(8) [Now to the judicial committee of the privy council.]
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bishop to admit his clerk, the patron usually brings his writ of quare impedit

against the bishop, for the temporal injury done to his property, m disturbing

him in the presentation. And, if the dulay arises from the bishop alone, as upon

pretence of incapacity, or the like, then he only is named in the writ; but if

there be another presentation set up, then the pretended patron and his clerk

are also joined in the action ; or it may be brought against the patron and clerk,

leaving out the bishop; or against the patron only. But it is most advisable to

bring it against all three: for if the bishop be left out, and the suit be not de-

termined till the six months are past, the bishop is entitled to present by lapse;

for he is not party to the suit; (r) but, if he be named, no lapse can possibly

accrue till the right is determined. If the patron be left out, and the writ be

brought only against the bishop and the clerk, the suit is of no effect, and the

writ shall abate: (s) for the right of the patron is the principal question in the

T *248 1 cause- (0 H the *clel>k be left out, and has received institution before

' " •" action brought (as is sometimes the case), the patron by this suit may

recover his right of patronage, but not the present turn ; for he cannot have

judgment to remove the clerk, unless he be made a defendant, and party to the

suit, to hear what he can allege against it For which reason, it is the safer

way to insert all three in the writ.

The writ of quare impedit (u) commands the disturbers, the bishop, the

pseudo-patron, and his clerk, to permit the plaintiff to present a proper person,

(without specifying the particular clerk) to such a vacant church, which per-
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tains to his patronage; and which the defendants, as he alleges, do obstruct;

and unless they so do, then that they appear in court to show the reason why

they hinder him.

Immediately on the suing out of the quare impedit, if the plaintiff suspects

that the bishop will admit the defendant's or any other clerk, pending the suit,

he may have a prohibitory writ, called a ne admittas; (iv) which recites the con-

tention begun in the king's courts, and forbids the bishop to admit anv clerk

whatsoever till such contention be determined. And if the bishop doth, after

the receipt of this writ, admit any person, even though the patron's right may

have been found in w> jure paironatus, then the plaintiff, after he has obtained

judgment' in the quare impedit, may remove the incumbent, if the clerk of a

stranger, by writ of scire facias: (x) and shall have a special action against the

bishop, called a quare incumbravit; (9) to recover the presentation, and also sat-

isfaction in damages for the injury done him by incumbering the church with

a clerk, pending the suit, and after the ne admittas received, (y) But if the

bishop has incumbered the church by instituting the clerk, before the ne ad-

mittas issued, no quare incumbravit lies: for the bishop hath no legal notice,

F *249 1 ^ ^ie wr^ °^ ne a<^ln^as ls served upon *him. The patron is there-

•• J fore left to his quare impedit merely; which, as was before observed,

now lies (since the statute of Westm. 2) as well upon a recent usurpation within

six months past, as upon a disturbance without any usurpation had.

In the proceedings upon a quare impedit, the plaintiff must set out his title

at length, and prove at least one presentation in himself, his ancestors, or those

under whom he claims; for he must recover by the strength of his own right,

and not by the weakness of the defendant's: (z) and he must also show a disturb-

ance before the action brought, (a) Upon this the bishop and the clerk usually

disclaim all title: save only, the one as ordinary, to admit and institute; and

the other as presentee of the patron, who is left to defend his own right. And

upon failure of the plaintiff in making out his own title, the defendant is put

upon the proof of his, in order to obtain judgment for himself, if needful.

But if the right be found for the plaintiff, on the trial, three farther points are

also to be inquired: 1. If the church be full, and, if full, then of whose presen-

(r) Cro. Jac. 98. (t\ Hob. SIS. «) 7 Hop. 25. (u) F. N. B. 33. (») Ibid. 37.

(*) 2 Sid. 93. (y) F. N. B. 48. («) Vaugh. 7, 8. (a) Hob. 199.

(9) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, e. 27.
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tation: for if it be of the defendant's presentation, then the clerk is removable

by writ brought in due time. 2. Of what value the living is: and this in order

to assess the damages which are directed to be given by the statute of Westm. 2.

3. In case of plenarty upon an usurpation, whether six calender (b) months

have passed between the avoidance and the time of bringing the action: for

then it would not be within the statute, which permits an usurpation to be

devested by a quare impedit, brought infra tempns semestre. So that plenarty

.is still a sufficient bar in an action of quare impedit, brought above six months

after the vacancy happens; as it was universally by the common law, however

early the action was commenced.

If it be found that the plaintiff hath the right, and hath commenced his

action in due time, then he shall have "judgment to recover the pre- r tazQ -t

sentation; and, if the church be full by institution of any clerk, to •- •"

remove him: unless it were filled pendente lite by lapse to tne ordinary, he not

being party to the suit; in which case the plaintiff loses his presentation pro

Juic vice, but shall recover two years' full value of the church from the defend-

ant, the pretended patron, as a satisfaction for the turn lost by his disturbance;

or in case of insolvency, the defendant shall be imprisoned for two years^ (c)

But if the church remains still void at the end of the suit, then whichever

party the presentation is found to belong to, whether plaintiff or defendant,

shall have a writ directed to the bishop ad admittendum chricum, (d) reciting

the judgment of the court, and ordering him to admit and institute the clerk
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of the prevailing partv; and, if upon this order he does not admit him, the

patron may sue the bishop in a writ of quare non admissit, (e) and recover ample

satisfaction in damages.

Besides these possessory actions there may be also had (as hath before been

incidentally mentioned) a writ of right of advowson, (10) which resembles other

writs of right: the only distinguishing advantage now attending it being, that

it is more conclusive than a quare impedit; since to an action of quare impedit

& recovery had in a writ of right may be pleaded in bar.

There is no limitation with regard to the time within which any actions

touching advowsons are to be brought; at least none later than the times of

Richard I, and Henry III: for by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 5, the statute of limita-

tions, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2, is declared not to extend to any writ of right of advow-

son, quare impedit, or assize of darrein presentment or jus patronatus. And

this upon very good reason: because it may very easily happen that the title to

an advowson may not come in question, nor the right have opportunity to be

tried, within sixty years; which is the longest period of limitation assigned by

the statute of Henry III. For Sir Edward Coke (/) tells us, that there was

a parson of one of his *churches, that had been incumbent there above r *o-i 1

fifty years; nor are instances wanting wherein two successive incum- L ° J

bents have continued for upwards of a hundred years, (g) Had, therefore, the

last of these incumbents been the clerk of a usurper, or had he been presented

by lapse, it would have been necessary and unavoidable for the patron, in case

of a dispute, to have recurred back above a century; in order to have shown a

clear title and seisin by presentation and admission of the prior incumbent.

But though, for these reasons, a limitation is highly improper with respect only

to the length of time; yet, as the title of advowson is, for want of some limita-

tion, rendered more precarious than that of any other hereditament (especially

since the statute of Queen Anne hath allowed possessory actions to be brought

upon any prior presentation, however distant), it might not perhaps be amiss if

a limitation were established with respect to the number of avoidances; or,

(») 2 Inst. 361. (c) Stilt. Wcstm. 2; 13 Edw. I, o. 5, ? 3. (d) F. N. B. 38.

(c) Ibid. 47. (/) 1 Inst. 115.

(g) Two successive inoninbents of the rectory of ChelsfleUl-ettm-Farnborough. In Kent, continued one

hundred and one yean, of whom the former was admitted in 1600, the latter in 1700, aud died in 1751.

(10) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.
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rather, if a limitation were componnded of the length of time and the number

of avoidances together; for instance, if no seisin were admitted to be alleged

in any of these writs of patronage, after sixty vears and three avoidances were

past. (11)

In a writ of quare impedit, which is almost the only real action that remains

in common use, and also in the assize of darrein presentment, and writ of right,

the patron only, and not the clerk, is allowed to sue the disturber. But, by

virtue of several acts of parliament, (h) there is one species of presentations, in

which a remedy, to be sued in the temporal courts, is put into the hands of the

clerks presented, as well as of the owners of the advowson. I mean the pre-

sentation to such benefices as belong to Roman Catholic patrons; which, accord-

ing to their several counties, are vested in and secured to the two universities

of this kingdom. And particularly by the statute of 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 14, s. 4,

a new method of proceeding is provided, viz.: that, besides the writs of quare

impedit, which the universities, as patrons, are entitled to bring, they, or their

F *2521 c'el'^8> may ^e ftt liberty to tile a bill *in equity against any person pre-

L J senting to such livings, and disturbing their right of patronage, or his

cestuy que trust, or any other person whom they have cause to suspect; in order

to fiompel a discovery of any secret trusts for the benefit of papists, in evasion

of those laws whereby this right of advowson is vested in those learned bodies;

and also (by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 17) to compel a discovery whether any

grant or conveyance, said to be made of such advowson, were made bona fide to

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:02 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

a protestant purchaser, for the benefit of protestants, and for a full considera-

tion ; without which requisites, every such grant and conveyance of any advow-

son or avoidance is absolutely null and void. This is a particular law, and

calculated for a particular purpose: but in no instance but this does the common

law permit the clerk himself to interfere in recovering a presentation of which he

is afterwards to have the advantage. For, besides that he has (as was before

observed) no temporal right in him till after institution and induction; and, as

he therefore can suffer no wrong, is consequently entitled to no remedy; this

exclusion of the clerk from being plaintiff seems also to arise from the very

great honour and regard which the law pays to its sacred function. For it looks

upon the cure of souls as too arduous and important a task to be eagerly sought

for by any serious clergyman; and, therefore, will not permit him to contend

openly at law for a charge and trust which it presumes he undertakes with dif-

fidence.

But when the clerk is in full possession of the benefice, the law gives him the

same possessory remedies to recover his glebe, his rents, his tithes, and other

ecclesiastical dues, by writ of entry, assize, ejectment, debt, or trespass (as the

case may happen), which it furnishes to the owners of lay property. Yet he

shall not have a writ of right, nor such other similar writs as are grounded upon

the mere right; because ho hath not in him the entire fee and right; (i) but he

is entitled to a special remedy called a writ of juris utrum, which is sometimes

F *2f>3 1 styled the parson's writ of right, (k) 'being the highest writ which he

L -I can have. (?)(12) This lies for a parson or a prebendary at common law,

(ft! Stat 3 Jac. I, c. 5. 1 W. and M. c. 26. 12 Anne, st. S, c. U. 11 Geo. U, o. 17.

(i) F. N. B. 49. <*) Booth, fcil. (I) F. X. B. *S.

(11) [This alteration in the law recommended by the learned commentator hag recently been

carried into effect by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV", c. 27, by which (section 30) it is enacted that

no advowson shall be recovered after three incumbencies occupying a period of sixty years

adverse possession: incumbencies after lapse are to be reckoned within the period, but not

incumbencies after promotion to bishopricks (section 31); and no advowson shall be recovered

after one hundred years adverse possession, although three incumbencies have not elapsed.

Section 33. ]

The statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 54, applies the same period of limitations to a quare impedit or

any other action or suit to enforce a right in a bishop as patron to collate to or bestow auy

ecclesiastical Ixmetice.

(12) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, c. 27.
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and for a vicar by statute 14 Edw. Ill, c. 17, and is in the nature of an assize,

to inquire whether the tenements in question are frankalmoign belonging to the

church of the demandant, or else the lay fee of the tenant, (m) And thereby

the demandant may recover lauds and tenements belonging to the church, which

were alienated by the predecessor; or of which he was disseised; or which were

recovered against him by verdict, confession, or default, without praying in aid

of the patron and ordinary; or on which any person has intruded since the

predecessor's death. (») But since the restraining statute of 13 Eliz. c. 10,

whereby the alienation of the predecessor, or a recovery suffered by him of the

lands of the church, is declared to be absolutely void, this remedy is of very little

use, unless where the parson himself has been deforced for more than twenty

years; (o) for the successor, at any competent time after his accession to the

benefice, may enter, or bring an ejectment

CHAPTER XVII.

OF INJURIES PROCEEDING FROM, OR AFFECTING, THE

CROWN.

HAVING in the nine preceding chapters considered the injuries, or private

wrongs, that may be offered by one subject to another, all of which are redressed

by the command and authority of the king, signified by his original writs re-

turnable iu the several courts of justice, which thence derive a jurisdiction of

examining and determining the complaint; I proceed now to inquire into the

mode of redressing those injuries to which the crown itself is a party: which
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injuries are either where the crown is the aggressor, and which, therefore, can-

not, without a solecism, admit of the same kind of remedy; (a) or else is the

sufferer, aud which then are usually remedied by peculiar forms of process, ap-

propriated to the royal prerogative. In treating, therefore, of these, we will

consider, first, the manner of redressing those wrongs or injuries which a sub-

ject may suffer from the crown, and then of redressing those which the crown

may receive from a subject.

L That the king can do no wrong, is a necessary and fundamental principle

of the English constitution : meaning only, as has formerly been observed, {b)

that, iu the first place, whatever may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs

is not *chargeable personally on the king; nor is he, but his ministers, r *agg i

accountable for it to the people: and, secondly, that the prerogative L •"

of the crown extends not to do any injury: for, being created for the benefit of

the people, it cannot be exerted to their prejudice, (c) Whenever therefore it

happens, that, by misinformation, or inadvertence, the crown hath been induced

to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no action will lie

against the sovereign, ((I) (for who shall command the king ?)(c) yet the law

hath furnished the subject with a decent and respectful mode of removing that

invasion, by informing the king of the true state of the matter in dispute: and,

as it presumes that to know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable, in

the royal breast, it then issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders

to the judges to do justice to the party aggrieved.

The distance between the sovereign and his subjects is such, that it rarely can

happen that any personal injury can immediately and directly proceed from the

prince to any private man; and, as it can so seldom happen, the law in decency

supposes that it never will or can happen at all; because it feels itself incapable

(m) Registrar, 82. (») F. N. B. 48. 49. (o) Booth. 221.

(a) Bro. Abr. tit. petition. It; tit. prerogative. 2. (b) Book I, ch. 7, pp. 243-21B.

(c) TlowU. 187. (d) Jenkins, 78. (t) Klnch, L. 83.

|
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of furnishing any adequate remedy, without infringing the dignity and destroy-

ing the sovereignty of the royal person, by setting up some superior power with

authority to call him to account The inconveniency therefore of a mischief

that is barely possible, is (as Mr. Locke has observed) (/) well recompensed by

the peace of the public and security of the government, in the person of the

chief magistrate being set out of the reach of coercion. But injuries to the

rights of property can scarcely be committed by the crown without the inter-

vention of its officers; for whom the law in matters of right entertains no res-

pect or delicacy, but furnishes various methods of detecting the errors or mis-

conduct of those agents, by whom the king has been deceived, and induced to

do a temporary injustice. (1)

[ *256 1 *1ne common law methods of obtaining possession or restitution

' -I from the crown, of either real or personal property, are, 1. By petition

de droit, or petition of right: which is said to owe its original to King Edward

the First, (g) 2. By monstrans de droit, manifestation or plea of right: both of

which may be preferred or prosecuted either in the chancery or exchequer. (A)

The former is of use, where the king is in full possession of any hereditaments

or chattels, and the petitioner suggests such a right as controverts the title of

the crown, grounded on facts disclosed in the petition itself; in which case he

must be careful to state truly the whole title of the crown, otherwise the peti-

tion shall abate (i) and then, upon this answer being endorsed or underwritten

by the king, soit droit fait al partie (let right be done to the party), (;') a com-
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mission shall issue to inquire of the truth of this suggestion: (k) after the re-

turn of which the king's attorney is at liberty to plead in bar; and the merits

shall be determined upon issue or demurrer, as in suits between subject and

subject Thus, if a disseisor of lands, which are holden of the crown, dies

seized without any heir, whereby the king is prima facie entitled to the lands,

and the possession is cast on him either by inquest of office, or by act of law

without any office found; now the disseissee shall have remedy by petition of

right, suggesting the title of the crown, and his own superior right before the

disseisin made. (1) But where the right of the party, as well as the right of the

crown, appears upon record, there the party shall have monstrans de droit,

which is putting in a claim of right grounded on facts already acknowledged

and established, and praying the judgment of the court, whether upon those

facts the king or the subject hath the right. As if, in the case before supposed,

the whole special matter is found by an inquest of office (as well the disseisin,

as the dying without any heir), the party grieved shall have monstrans de droit

F*2"7l a* ^e common law. (wi) But as this seldom happens, and the *rem-

L *°' J e(jy by petition was extremely tedious and expensive, that by monstrans

was much enlarged and rendered almost universal by several statutes, particu-

larly 36 Edw. Ill, c. 13, and 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 8, which also allow inquisitions

of office to be traversed or denied, wherever the right of a subject is concerned,

except in a very few cases, (n) These proceedings are had in the petty-bag

office in the court of chancery : and, if upon either of them the right be deter-

mined against the crown, the judgment is, quod manus domini regis amoveantur

et possess io restituatur petenti, salvo jure domini regis; (o) which last clause is

always added to judgments against the king, (p) to whom no laches is ever

imputed, and whose right (till some late statutes) (q) was never defeated by any

limitation or lerjgth ot time. And by such judgment the crown is instantly

out of possession ; (r) so that there needs not the indecent interposition of his

own officers to transfer the seisin from the king to the party aggrieved. (2)

( f\ On Govt p. 2, I SOS. (g) Bro. Ahr. tit. prerogative, 2. Fitz. Abr. tit. error, 8.

k) Skin 009 (V Finch. L 458. (?) StaD. Tr. vii, 13*. (t) Skin. 808. Kust. Entr. 401.

It) Uro Abr' tit. petition, -JO. 4 Rep. M. (mi 4 Rep. So. (n) Skin. 608. (o) 8 Inet. BBS. Bast. Entr. 48S.

(p) Finch, L.4SO. (g) 21 Jac! I, c. 2. 9 Goo.Ill, c. IB. (r) Finch, L. 459.

(1) See notes to the Banker1* Case, Broom Const. Law, 235, and cases cited.

(2) The proceedings here mentioned are inapplicable in the United Statea. If the rights

of a citizen are invaded by an officer of either i lie state or general government, he is generally
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II. The methods of redressing such injuries as the crown may receive from

the subject are,

1. By such usual common-law actions, as are consistent frith the royal pre-

rogative and dignity. As therefore the king, by reason of his legal ubiquity,

cannot be disseised or dispossessed of any real property which is once vested in

him, he can maintain no action which supposes a dispossession of the plaintiff;

such as an assize or an ejectment :(s) but he may bring a quare impedit, (t)

which always supposes the complainant to be seized or possessed of the advow-

son: and he may prosecute this writ, like every other by him brought, as well

in the king's bench (w) as the common pleas, or in whatever court he pleases.

So, too, he may bring an action of trespass for taking away his goods; but such

actions are not usual (though in strictness maintainable) for breaking his close,

or other injury done upon his soil or possession, (w) It would be equally

tedious *and difficult to run. through every minute distinction that r *OKQ i

might be gleaned from our ancient books with regard to this matter; *• •"

nor is it in any degree necessary, as much easier and more effectual remedies are

usually obtained by such prerogative modes of process, as are peculiarly confined

to the crown.

2. Such is that of inquisition or inquest of office: which is an inquiry made by

the king's officer, his sheriff, coroner, or escheator, virtute officii, or by writ to

them sent for that purpose, or by commissioners specially appointed, concerning

any matter that entitles the king to the possession of lands or tenements, goods
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or chattels, (a;) This is done by a jury of no determinate number; being either

twelve, or less, or more. As, to inquire, whether the king's tenant for life died

seized, whereby the reversion accrues to the king; whether A, who held imme-

diately of the crown, died without heirs; in which case the land belongs to the

king by escheat: whether B be attainted of treason ; whereby his estate is for-

feited to the crown: whether C, who has purchased lands, be an alien; which

is another cause of forfeiture: whether D be an idiot a nativitate ; and therefore,

together with his lands, appertains to the custody of the king; and other ques-

tions of like import, concerning both the circumstances of the tenant, and the

value and identity of the lands. These inquests of office were more frequently in

practice than at present, during the continuance of the military tenures amongst

us : when, upon the death of evei-y one of the king's tenants, an inquest of ofhce

was held, called an inquisino post mortem, to inquire of what lands he died seized,

who was his heir, and of what age, in order to entitle the king to his marriage,

wardship, relief, primer-seisin, or other advantages, as the circumstances of the

case might turn out. To superintend and regulate these inquiries, the court

of wards and liveries were instituted, bv statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 46, which was

abolished at the restoration of King Charles the Second, together with the op-

pressive tenures upon which it was founded.

ftJ Bro. Abr. tit. prerogative, 89. ft) F. N. B. 32. (u) Dyverfyte de» courtet, e. tank le roy.

(wj Bro. Abr. tit. prerog. ISO. F. N. B. 90. Year-book, 1 Hen. IV, 4. (x) Finch, I.. 3*1, 324, 325.

entitled to maintain against such officer the action -which would be suitable if he were a private

citizen merely; though if the officer ie proceeding under legislative authority in the exercise of

the right of eminent domain, the citizen, if the proceedings are regular, and a proper remedy is

given him by statute, must follow that remedy. But where it is found necessary to proceed

against the government itself, it becomes important t« see whether the government has made

provision by law for suits against itself or not. A sovereignty is not suable in it* own courts

except by its permission, and some of the states make provision by statute for such suits, and

eome do not Where they do not, and provide no other remedy, the citizen must appeal to the

legislature for redress. And this is so in case of persons not citizens, for the federal courts are no

longer open to suits on behalf of individuals "against states. Const, of U. 8., llth amend-

ment, And claims upon the general government for redress—except such as are cognizable by

the U S.. Court of Claims—must be presented to congress. See U. S. ». McLemore, 4 How.

2*-6; Hill t>. U. S. 9 How. 386. Ante, Book I, 243 n.

The proceedings on behalf of a subject to obtain redress from the crown are simplified

and made more effective by statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 34, which gives the party a trial in the

proper court of law or equity, upon an issue made up substantially as in a suit between indi-

viduals. '
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r *2591 *With regard to other matters, the inquests of office still remain in

L -" force, and are taken upon proper occasions; being extended not only to

lands, but also to goods and chattels personal, as in the case of wreck, treasure-

trove, and the like; and especially as to forfeitures for offences. For every jury

which tries a man for treason or felony, every coroner's inquest that sits upon a

felo de se, or one killed by chance-medley, is not only with regard to chattels,

but also as to real interests, in all respects an inquest of office: and if they find

the treason or felony, or even the flight of the party accused, (though innocent),

the king is thereupon, by virtue of this office found, entitled to have his forfeit-

ures; and also, in the case of chance-medley, he or his grantees are entitled to

such things by way of deodand, as have moved to the death of the party.

These inquests of office were devised by law, as an authentic means to give

the king his right by solemn matter of record; without which he in general

can neither take nor part from any thing, (y) For it is a part of the liberties

of England, and greatly for the safety of the subject, that the king may not

enter upon or seize any man's possessions upon bare surmises without the

intervention of a jury, (z) It is however particularly enacted by the statute 33

Hen VIII, c. 20, that, in case of attainder for high treason, the king shall have

the forfeiture instantly, without any inquisition of office. And, as the king

hath (in-general) no title at all to any property of this sort before office found,

therefore by the statute 18 Hen. VI, c. 6, it was enacted, that all letters patent

or grants of lands and tenements before office found, or returned into the
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exchequer, shall be void. And by the bill of rights at the revolution, 1 W. and

M. st. 2, c. 2, it is declared, that all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures

of particular persons before conviction (which is here the inquest of office) are

illegal and void; which indeed was the law of the land in the reign of Edward

the Third, (a)

r *2fiO 1 *With regard to real property, if an office be found for the king, it

L J puts him in immediate possession, without the trouble of a formal entry

provided a subject in the like case would have had a right to enter; and the

king shall receive all the mesne or intermediate profits from the time that his

title accrued, (b) As, on the other hand, by the articuli super cartas, (c) if the

king's escheator or sheriff seize lands into the king's hand without cause, upon

taking them out of the king's hand again, the party shall have the mesne profits

restored to him.

In order to avoid the possession of the crown, acquired by the finding of

such office, the subject may not only have his petition of right, which discloses

new facts not found by the office, and his monsfrans de droit, which relies on

the facts as found: but also he may (for the most part) traverse or deny the

matter of fact itself, and put it in a course of trial by the common law process

of the court of chancery: yet still, in some special cases, he phath no remedy

left but a mere petition of right, (d) These traverses as well as the monstrans

de droit, were greatly enlarged and regulated for the benefit of the subject, by

the statutes before mentioned, and others, (e) And in the traverses thus given

by statute, which came in the place of the old petition of right, the party

traversing is considered as the plaintiff; (f) and must therefore make out hfs

own title, as well as impeach that of the crown, and then shall have judgment

quod maims domini regis amoveantur, &c.

3. Where the crown hatli unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent,

which ought not to be granted, (g) or where the patentee hath done an act that

r *-2fi1 1 amouu''8 fc° a forfeiture of *the grant, (h) the remedy to repeal the patent

L * J is by writ of scire facias in chancery, (f) This may be brought either

on the part of the king in order to resume the thing granted; or, if the grant

be injurious to a subject, the king is bound of right to permit him (upon his

petition) to use his royal name for repealing the patent in a scire facias, (k)

fu) Ji.iil. 82. f*) Glib. Hist. Exfih. 132. Hop. 347. (a) 2 Inst. 49.

(I i Finch. L. 398, 8J8. (c) 28 Kdvr. I, st. a, c. 19. fit) Fliioh. L. 324.

ft) Stat. 34 Edw. Ill, o. 13. 38 Ed v. III. o. IS. 2 and .1 Edw. VI, c. 8. (/) Law of Nla! Prlns. 201, -Mi.

(g) See Itoolt II, cb. 21. (It) Dyer, 198. (i) 3 l.i?\. 220. 4Inst. CIS. (k) 2 Ventr. :iu.
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And so also, if upon office untruly found for the king, he grants the land over

to another, he who is grieved thereby, and traverses the office itself, is entitled

before issue joined to a scire facias against the patentee, in order to avoid the

grant. (0(3) ' .

4. An information on behalf of the crown, filed in the exchequer by the

king's attorney-general, is a method of suit for recovering money or other chat-

tels, or for obtaining satisfaction in damages for any personal wrong (m) com-

mitted in the lands or other possessions of the crown. It differs from an infor-

mation filed in the court of king's bench, of which we shall treat in the next

book; in that this is instituted to redress a private wrong, by which the property

of the crown is affected; (hat is calculated to punish some public wrong, or

heinous misdemeanor in the defendant. It is grounded on no writ under seal,

but merely on the intimation of the king's officer, the attorney-general, who

"gives the court to understand and be informed of" the matter in question:

upon which the party is put to answer, and trial is had, as in suits between

subject and subject The most usual informations are those of intrusion and

debt: intrusion, for any trespass committed on the lands of the crown, (n) as

by entering thereon without title, holding over after a lease is determined, taking

the profits, cutting down timber, or the like; and debt, upon any contract for

moneys due to the king, or for any forfeiture due to the crown upon the breach

of a penal statute. This is most commonly used to recover forfeitures occa-

sioned by transgressing those laws which are enacted for the establishment
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*and support of the revenue; others, which regard mere matters of

police and public convenience, being usually left to be enforced by com-

mon informers, in the qui tarn informations or actions, of which we have for-

merly spoken, (o) But after the attorney-general has informed upon the breach

of a penal law, no other information can be received, (p) There is also an

information in rem, when any goods are supposed to become the property of the

crown, and no man appears to claim them, or to dispute the title of the king.

As anciently in the case of treasure-trove, wrecks, waifs, and estrays, seized by

the king's officer for his use. Upon such seizure, an information was usually

filed in the king's exchequer, and thereupon a proclamation was made for the

owner (if any) to come in and claim the effects; and at the same time there

issued a commission of appraisement to value the goods in the officer's hands;

after the return of which, and a second proclamation had, if no claimant

appeared, the goods were supposed derelict, and condemned to the use of the

crown, (q) And when, in later times, forfeitures of the goods themselves, as

well as personal penalties on the parties, were inflicted by act of parliament for

transgressions against the laws of the customs and excise, the same process was

adopted in order to secure such forfeited goods for the public use, though the

offender himself had escaped the reach of justice.

5. A writ of quo warranto is in the nature of a writ of right for the king,

against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by

what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right, (r) It

lies also in case of non-user or long neglect of a franchise, or mis-user or abuse

of it; being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what warrant he

exercises such a franchise, having never had any grant of it, or having forfeited

it by neglect or abuse. (4) This was orignally returnable before the king's

(1) Bro. Abr. tit ictrt/aclat. f», 188. (m) Moor. Sit. (n) do. Jftc. 211. 1 Leon. 48. s.v. ii. 49.

(o) See page 162. (p) Hardr. 201. (q) Glib. HUt. of Exoh. o. 18. (r) Finch, L. 323. 2 Ingt. 282.

(3) This remedy is si ill retained, and is resorted to in the United States; the writ generally

issuing from the highest court of law in the state. See in general Tidd. Pr. 104)0, et seq.

(4) [It must not be forgotten, that, although it is said the writ of quo warranto lies against

him who claims or usurps any office, a limitation is implied by the fact that it is in the nature

of a writ of right for the king. Upon this principle, when an application was made for a quo

\rarranto information, to try the validity of an election to the office of churchwarden, Lord

Kioiviin said, that this was not an usurpation on the rights or prerogatives of the crown, for
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r „„£, -I justices at Westminster; (*) but afterwards only *before the justices in

"- J eyre, by virtue of the statutes of quo warranto, 6 Edw. I, c. 1, and 18

Edw. I, st. 2; (t) bnt since those justices have given place to the king's tempo-

rary commissioners of assize, the judges on the several circuits, this branch of

the statutes hath lost its effects; (u) and writs of quo warranto (if brought at all)

must now be prosecuted and determined before the king's justices at Westmin-

ster. And in case of judgment for the defendant, he shall have an allowance

of his franchise; but in case of judgment for the king, for that the party is

entitled to no such franchise, or hath disused or abused it, the franchise is either

seized into the king's hands, to be granted out again to whomever he shall

please; or, if it be not such a franchise as may subsist in the hands of the

crown, there is merely judgment of ouster, to turn out the party who

usurped it. (w)

The judgment on a writ of quo warranto (being in the nature of a writ of

right) is final and conclusive, even against the crown, (x) Which, together with

the length of its process, probably occasioned that disuse into which it is now

fallen, and introduced a more modern method of prosecution, by information

filed in the court of king's bench by the attorney-general, in the nature of a

writ of quo warranto j wherein the process is speedier, and the judgment not

quite so decisive. This is properly a criminal method of prosecution, as well to

punish the usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to oust him,

or seize it for the crown ; but hath long been applied to the mere purposes of
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trying the civil right, seizing the franchise or ousting the wrongful possessor;

the fine being nominal only.

During the violent proceedings that took place in the latter end of the reign

of King Charles the Second, it was, among other things, thought expedient to

new-model most of the corporation-towns in the kingdom; for which purpose

r *2fi41 manv °f tnos.e *bodies were persuaded to surrender their charters, and

L M* J informations in the nature of quo warranto were brought against others,

upon a supposed, or frequently a real, forfeiture of their franchises by neglect

or abuse of them. And the consequence was, that the liberties of most of

them were seized into the hands of the king, who granted them fresh charters

with such alterations as were thought expedient; and, during their state of

anarchy, the crown named all their magistrates. This exertion of power, though

perhaps in summo jure it was for the most part strictly legal, gave a great and

just alarm; the new-modelling of all corporations being a very large stride

towards establishing arbitrary power; and, therefore, it was thought necessary,

at the revolution, to bridle this branch of the prerogative, at least so far as

regarded the metropolis, by statute 2 W. and M. c. 8, which enacts that the

franchises of the city of London shall never hereafter be seized or forejudged

for any forfeiture or misdemeanor whatsoever.

This proceeding is, however, now applied to the decision of corporation dis-

putes between party and party, without any intervention of the prerogative, by

virtue of the statute 9 Ann. c. 20, which permits an information, in nature of

quo warranto, to be brought with leave of the court, at the relation of any

person desiring to prosecute the same (who is then styled the relator), against

any person usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding any franchise or

office in any city, borough, or town corporate; provides for its speedy determin-

ation ; and directs that, if the defendant be convicted, judgment of ouster

(as well as a fine) may be given against him, and that the relator shall pay or

receive costs according to the event of the suit (5)

ft) Old Nat. Brer. fol. 107, edit. 1534. (t) 8 In«t. 498. Rust. Entr. 540. (H) t Insl. 498.

(u) Cro. Jac. i.v.i. 1 Show, 80. (x) 1 Sid. si.i. 2 Show. 47. J2 Mod. fc».

•which only l he old writ of qno warranto lay; and that on information in nature of a quo

tcarranto could only be granted in such cased. 4 T. R. 381. See also 2 Stra. 1196; Bott. pi.

107. And the writ was also refused in a case of forfeiture of a recorder's place. 2 Stra. dl». ]

(5) [The court of king's bench, having a discretionary power of granting informations in the

nature of quo warranto, had long ago established a general rule to guide their discretion, vu:
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6. The writ, of mandamus (y) is also made by the same statute, 9 Ann. c. 20,

a most full and effectual remedy, in the first place, for refusal of admission

where a person is entitled to an office or place in-anv such corporation; and,

secondly, for wrongful removal, when a person is legally possessed, r »„„. -•

*These are injuries, for which, though redress for the party interested "- *"''''

may be had by assize, or other means, yet as the franchises concern the public,

and may affect the administration of justice, this prerogative writ also issues

from the court of king's bench; commanding, upon good cause shown to the

court, the party complaining to be admitted or restored to his office. And the

statute requires, that a return be immediately made to the first writ of manda-

mus; which return may be pleaded to or traversed by the prosecutor, and his an-

tagonist may reply, take issue, or demur, and the same proceedings may be had,

as if an action on the case had been brought, for making a false return; and,

after judgment obtained for the prosecutor, he shall have a peremptory writ of

mandamus to compel his admission or restitution; which latter (in case of an

action) is effected by a writ of- restitution, (z) So that now the writ of manda-

mun, in cases within this statute, is in the nature of an action; whereupon the

party applying and succeeding may be entitled to costs, in case it be the fran-

chase of a citizen, burgess, or freeman; (a) and also, in general, a writ of error

may be had thereupon. (b)

This writ of mandamus may also be issued, in pursuance of the statute 11

Geo. I, c. 4, in case within the regular time no election shall be made of the
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mayor or other chief officer of any city, borough, or town corporate, or (being

made) it shall afterwards become void; requiring the electors to proceed to

election, and proper courts to be held for admitting and swearing in the magis-

trates so respectively chosen. (6)

ft) See page 110. (z) 11 Rep. 7a. (a} Stat 12 Gco. Ill, c. 21. (b) 1 P. Wms. 351.

not to allow in any case an information in the nature of quo warranto against any person who

had been twenty years in the possession of his franchise: see 4 Burr. 19BU; but having reason

to consider this "too extensive a limit, they resolved upon a new rule, viz.: not to allow- such au

information against any person who had been six years in possession. 4 T. K. 884. The legisla-

ture, however, thinking this too sudden a change in tho practice of the court, and because it did

not extend to informations filed by tho attorney-general, enacted, by 32 Geo. Ill, c. 58, that to

any information in the nature of quo warrants, for the exercise of any corporate office or fran-

chise, the defendant might plead that he had been in possession of, or had executed, the office

for six years or more.

By statutes 7 Wm. IV, I Vic. c. 78, and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 89, the application to the court in the

case of one claiming to exercise the office of mayor, alderman or burgess, in any borough within

the municipal corporation act, must be made within twelve months alter the election of the de-

fendant, or the time at which he became disqualified.

la the United States the proceeding to try au alleged usurpation of an office or franchise is by

an information in the nature of a quo wurranta, or some statutory substitute to which the same

principles are applicable. The books of practice iu the several states will give the proceedings.

Si-e also Aug. and A. on Corp. $ 731 et seq. Tn Howcll's State Trials, vol. 8, p. 1039 ct. seq.,

will be found the proceedings in the quo trarranto cases against the city of London and other

corporations in the time of (.'harle* II, which are referred to in the text.

mit

Co^ ,. . , „ .

181); to restore a schoolmaster of a grammar-school founded by the crowu. (Stra. 58.) So tci

restore a member of au university who had been improperly suspended from his degrees. In

like manner a mandamus will lie to compel a dean and chapter to nil up a vacancy among

canons residentiary: IT. R. 652; so to the ecclesiastical court: 1 Veutr. 115; so to grant

the probate of a will to au executor: 1 Voutr. 335; so a mandamus lies to the judg^e of the

prerogative court of Canterbury to grant administration to the husband of the wife's estate.

•K-hen the husband has done nothing to depart from his right. Stra. 891, 1118. A mandamus

\rill lie to justices to nominate overseers of the poor, although tho time mentioned in the 43

Eliz. has expired. Stra. 11£). So to appoint a surveyor of the highways where the justices

bad not appointed at the time mentioned in the statute 13 fteo. Ill, o. 78; 4 East, 1 •!-; BO to

eign and allow a poor's rate, absolute iu the first instance: Say. R. 160; so to admit a copy-

holder, directed to the lord of the manor: 2 T. R. 197, 484; 6 East, 431; so also to the lord.
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We have now gone through the whole circle of civil injuries and the redress

which the laws of England have anxiously provided for each. In which the

student cannot but observe that the main difficulty which attends their discus-

sion arises from their great variety, which is apt at our first acquaintance to

breed a confusion of ideas, aud a kind of distraction in the memory : a diffi-

r *og(j I culty not a little increased *by the very immethodical arrangetnent in

' " -1 which they are delivered to us by our ancient writers, and the numer-

ous terms of art in which the language of our ancestors has obscured them.

Terms of art there will unavoidably be in all sciences; the easy conception and

thorough comprehension of which must depend upon the frequent and familiar

use; aud the more subdivided any branch of the science is, the more terms must

be used to express the nature of these subdivisions, and murk out with sufficient

precision the ideas they are meant to convey. But I trust that this difficulty,

however great it may appear at first view, will shrink to nothing upon a nearer

and more frequent approach ; and, indeed, be rather advantageous than of any

disservice, by imprinting on the student's mind a clear aud distinct notion of

the nature of these several remedies. Aud, such as it is, it arises principally

from the excellence of our English laws; which adapt their redress exactly to

the circumstances of the injury, and do not furnish one aud the same action for

different wrongs, which are impossible to be brought within one aud the same

description: whereby every man knows what satisfaction he is entitled to ex-

pect from the courts of justice, and as little as possible is left in the breast of
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the judges, whom the law appoints to administer, and not to prescribe, the rem-

edy. And I may venture to affirm that there is hardly a possible injury, that

can be offered either to the person or property of another, for which the par'y

injured may not find a remedial writ, conceived in such terms as are properly

and singularly adapted to his own particular grievance.

In the several personal actions which we have cursorily explained, as debt,

trespass, detinue, action on the case, and the like, it is easy to observe how

plain, perspicuous and simple the remedy is, as chalked out by the ancient com-

mon law. In the methods prescribed for the recovery of landed and other per-

manent property, as the right is more intricate, the feudal, or rather Norman

remedy, by real actions, is somewhat more complex and difficult, and attended

with some delays. And since, in order to obviate those difficulties, and retrench

F *2(57 1 tnose "delays, we have permitted the rights of real property to be

>• J drawn into question in mixed or personal suits, we are (it must be

owned) obliged to have recourse to such arbitrary fictions and expedients, that,

unless we had developed their principles, and traced out their progress and his-

tory, our present system of remedial jurisprudence (in respect of landed prop-

erty) would appear the most intricate and unnatural that ever was adopted by a

free aud enlightened people.

But this intricacy of our legal process will be found, when attentively consid-

ered, to be one of those troublesome, but not dangerous evils, which have their

root in the frame of our constitution, and which, therefore, can never be cured,

without hazarding every thing that is dear to us. In absolute governments,

when new arrangements of property and a gradual change of manners have

destroyed the original ideas on which the laws were devised and established,

the prince by his edict may promulge a new code, more suited to the present

emergencies. But when laws are to be framed by popular assemblies, even

of the representative kind, it is too herculean a task to begin the work of leg-

islation afresh, and extract a new system from the discordant opinions of more

than five hundred counsellors. A single legislator, or an enterprising sovereign,

to hold and the burgesses to attend a court, to present the conveyances of burgoge tenements.

1 \Vils. 283; 1 Blk. Rep. 60; Bull.X. P. 200.

It in a general rule that a maudainus does not lie unless the party applying has no other spe-

cific lojral remedy. 1 T. K. 404 ; 3 id. 652. See Doujr. 526.

As to the cases in which mandamus will lie generally, see siipra, p. 110, note.
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a Solon or Lycnrgus, a Justinian or a Frederick, may at any time form a con-

cise, and perhaps an uniform, plan of justice: and evil betide that presump-

tuous subject who questions its wisdom or utility. But who, that is acquainted

with the difficulty of new-modelling any branch of our statute laws (though re-

lating but to roads or to parish settlements), will conceive it ever feasible to

alter any fundamental point of the common law, with all its "appendages and

consequents, and set up another rule in its stead? When, therefore, by the

gradual influence of foreign trade and domestic tranquility, the spirit of our

military tenures began to decay, and at length the whole structure was removed,

the judges quickly perceived that the forms and delays of the old feudal actions

(guarded with their several outworks of essoins, vo'uchers, aid-prayers, and a

hundred other formidable intrenchments) were ill-suited to that *more r *opo n

simple and commercial mo'de of property which succeeded the former, >• -I

and required a more speedy decision of right, to facilitate exchange and aliena-

tion. Yet they wisely avoided soliciting any great legislative revolution in the

old established forms, which might have been productive of consequences more

numerous and extensive than the most penetrating genius could foresee; but

left them as they were to languish in obscurity and oblivion, and endeavoured,

by a series of minute contrivances, to accommodate such personal actions as

were then in use to all the most useful purposes of remedial justice: and where,

through the dread of innovation, they hesitated at going so far as perhaps their

good sense would have prompted them, they left an opening for the more liberal
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and enterprising judges, who have sat in our courts of equity, to show them

their error by supplying the omissions of the courts of law. And, since the new

expedients have been refined by the practice of more than a century, and are

sufficiently known and understood, they in general answer the purpose of doing

speedy and substantial justice, much better than could now be eifected by any

great fundamental alterations. 'The only difficulty that attends them arises

from their fictions and circuities; but, when once we have discovered the proper

clue, that labyrinth is easily pervaded. Our system of remedial law resembles

an old Gothic castle, erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for a modern

inhabitant The moated ramparts, the embattled towers, and the trophied

halls, are magnificent and venerable, but useless, and therefore neglected. The

inferior apartments, now accommodated to daily use, are cheerful and commo-

dious, though their approaches may be winding and difficult.

In this part of our disquisitions, I however thought it my duty to unfold, as

far as intelligibly I could, the nature of these real actions, as well as of personal

remedies. And this not only because they are still in force, still the law of the

land, though obsolete and disused; and may, perhaps, in their turn, be hereaf-

ter, with some necessary corrections, called out again into common use; but

also because, as a sensible *writer has well observed, (c) " whoever con- r unon -i

eiders how great a coherence there is between the several parts of the >• •*

law, and how much the reason of one case opens and depends upon that of an-

other, will, I presume, be far from thinking any of the old learning useless,

which will so much conduce to the perfect understanding of the modern." And,

besides, I should have done great injustice to the founders of our legal constitu-

tion, had I led the student to imagine that the remedial instruments of our law

were originally contrived in so complicated a form as we now present them to

his view: had I, for instance, entirely passed over the direct and obvious reme-.

dies by assizes and writs of entry, and only laid before him the modern method

of prosecuting a writ of ejectment.

(e} Hawk. Abr. Co. LIU. pref.
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CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE PURSUIT OF REMEDIES BY ACTION; AND

FIRST, OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT.

HAVING, under the head of redress Jy suit in courts, pointed out in the pre-

ceding pages, in the first place, the nature and several species of courts of

justice, wherein remedies are administered for all sorts of private wrongs; and,

in the second place, shown to which of these courts in particular application

must be made for redress, according to the distinction of injuries, or, in other

words, what wrongs are cognizable by one court, and what by another; I pro-

ceeded, under the title of injuries cognizable by the courts of common law, to

define and explain the specifical remedies by action, provided for every possible

degree of wrong or injury; as well such remedies as are dormant and out of

use, as those which are in every day's practice, apprehending that the reason of

one could never be clearly comprehended without some acquaintance with the

other: and I am now, in the last place, to examine the manner in which these

several remedies are pursued and applied, by action in the courts of common

law; to which I shall afterwards subjoin a brief account of the proceedings in

courts of equity.

f *2711 **n treat'n£ °f remedies by action at common law, I shall confine

' •* myself to the modern method of practice in our courts of judicature.

For, though I thought it necessary to throw out a few observations on the na-

ture of real actions, however at present disused, in order to demonstrate the
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coherence and uniformity of our legal constitution, and that there was no in-

jury so obstinate and inveterate, but which might in the end be eradicated by

some or other of these remedial writs; yet it would be too irksome a task to

perplex both my readers and myself with explaining all the rules of proceeding

in those obsolete actions, which are frequently mere positive establishments, the

forma etfigurajudicii,&nA conduce very little to illustrate the reason aud funda-

mental grounds of the law. Wherever I apprehend they may at all conduce to

this end, I shall endeavour to hint at them incidentally.

What, therefore, the student may expect in this and the succeeding chapters,

is an account of the method of proceeding in and prosecuting a suit upon any

of the personal writs we have before spoken of, in the court of common pleas at

Westminster, that being the court originally constituted for the prosecution of

all civil actions. It is true that the courts of king's bench and exchequer, in

order, without intrenching upon ancient forms, to extend their remedial influ-

ence to the necessities of modern times, have now obtained a concurrent juris-

diction and cognizance of very many civil suits: but, as causes are therein con-

ducted by much the same advocates and attorneys, and the several courts and

their judges have an entire communication with each other, the methods and

forms of proceeding are in all material respects the same in all of them. So

that, in giving an abstract or history (a) of the progress of a suit through the

F *272 I court °^ common pleas, we *shall at the same time give a general

L ' account of the proceedings of the other two courts; taking notice,

however, of any considerable difference in the local practice of each. And the

same abstract will, moreover, afford us some general idea of the conduct of a

faj In deducing this history the student must not expect authorities to be constantly cited, as practical

knowledge is not so much to be learned from any books ol'law as from experience ami attendance ou tlio

courts. The compiler must therefore be frequently obliged to rely upon Ills own observations.—which in

general he hath been studious to avoid where those of any other might be had. To accompany and illus-

trate these remarks, such gentlemen as are designed tor the profession will llnil It necessary to peruse Hie

books of entries, ancient and modern, which arc transcripts of proceedings that have been had in sonic:

particular actions. A book or two of technical learning will also be found very convenient, from which a

man of liberal education and tolerable understanding may glean pro re nata as much as is sufficient for

his purpose. These books of practice, as they lire called, are nil pretty much on a level in point of com-

position and solid instruction, so that that whirh bears the latest edition is usunlly the best. But Gilbert's

History ami Practice of the Court of Common 1'lcas is a book of a very different stamp; and though (like

the res't of his posthumous works) it has suffered most grossly by ignorant or careless transcribers, yet it

traced out the reason of many parts of our modern practice, from the feudal institutions aud the primitive

construction of our courts, in a most clear and ingenious manner.
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cause in the inferior courts of common law, those in cities and boroughs, or in

the court-baron, or hundred, or county court: all which conform (as near as

may be) to the example of the superior tribunals to which their causes may

probably be, in some stage or other, removed.

The most natural and perspicuous way of considering the subject before us,

"will be (I apprehend) to pursue it in the order and method wherein the proceed-

ings themselves follow each other; rather than to distract and subdivide it by

any more logical analysis. The general therefore and orderly parts of a suit are

these; 1. The original writ: 2. The process: 3. The pleadings: 4. The issue

or demurrer: 5. The trial: 6. The judgment and its incidents: 7. The proceed-

ings in the nature of appeals. 8. The execution.

First, then, of the original, or original writ; (1) which is the beginning or

foundation of the suit When a person hath received an injury, and thinks it

worth his while to demand satisfaction for it, he is to consider with himself, or

take advice, what redress the law has given for that injury; *and there- r *O"Q T

upon, is to make application or suit to the crown, the fountain of all L J

justice, for that particular specific remedy which he is determined or advised

to pursue. As, for money due on bond, an action of debt; for goods detained

without force, an action of detinue or trover; or, if taken with force, an action

of trespass vi et armis; or to try the title of lands, a writ of entry or action of

trespass in ejectment; or for any consequential injury received, a special action

on the case. To this end he is to sue out, or purchase by paying the stated fees,
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an original, or original writ, from the court of chancery, which is the officina

jjixtitlce, the shop or mint of justice, wherein all the king's writs are framed.

It is a mandatory letter from the king in parchment, sealed with his great seal,

(b) and directed to the sheriff of the county wherein the injury is committed or

supposed so to be, requiring him to command the wrongdoer, or party accused,

either to do justice to the complainant, or else to appear in court, and answer

the accusation against him. Whatever the sheriff does in pursuance of this

writ, he must return or certify to the court of common pleas, together with the

writ itself: which is the foundation of the jurisdiction of that court, being the

king'.s warrant for the judges to proceed' to the determination of the cause.

For it was a maxim introduced by the Normans, that there should be no pro-

ceeding in common pleas before the king's justices without his original writ;

because they held it unfit that those justices, being only the substitutes of the

crown, should take cognizance of any thing but what was thus specially referred

to their judgment, (c) However, in small actions below the value of forty shil-

lings, which are brought into the court baron or county court, no royal writ is

necessary; but the foundation of such suits continues to be (as in the times of

the Saxons) not by original writ, but by plaint; (d) that is, by a private memo-

rial tendered in open court to the judge, wherein the party injured sets forth his

cause of action; and the judge is bound of common right to administer justice

therein, without any special *mandate from the king. Now, indeed, r #074 i

even the royal writs are held to be demandable of common right, on *- *

paying the usual fees: for any delay in the granting them, or setting an unusual

or exorbitant price upon them, would be a breach of magna carta, c. 29, " nvlli

vendemus nnlli negabimus, ant differemus, justitiam vel rectum."

Original writs are either optional or peremptory; or, in the language of our

lawyers, they are either a prtecipe, or a si te fecerit securwn. (e) The prcecipe

is in the alternative, commanding the defendant to do the thing required,

or show the reason wherefore he hath not done it. (/) The use of this writ is

where something certain is demanded by the plaintiff, which it is incum-

bent on the defendant himself to perform; as, to restore the possession of laud,

(b) Finch, L. 237. (c) Flet. 1.1, c. 31. (d) Mirr. o. 2,! 3.

(e) Fincli, L. 257. (f) Append. No. in, f I.

(1) This writ io ns longer in nse; a simpler proceeding by summons from the court in •which

the suit is to be brought having been substituted.
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to pay a certain liquidat?d debt, to p Tform a sp?cific covenant, to render an

account, and the like: in all which cases the writ is drawn up in the form of

prcecipe or command, to do thus, or show cause to the contrary; giving the

defendant his choice, to ivdivss the injury, or -i:md the suit. The other species

of original writs is called a si fecerit te securum, from the words of the writ;

which directs the sheriff to cause the defendant to appear in court, without any

option given him, provided the plaintiff gives the sheriff security effectually to

prosecute his claim, (g) This writ is in use, where nothing is specifically de-

manded, but only a satisfaction in general: to obtain which, and minister

complete redress, the intervention of some judicature is necessary. Such are

writs of trespass, or on the case, wherein no debt or other specific thing is sued

for in certain, but only damages to be assessed by a jury. For this end, the

defendant is immediately called upon to appear in court, provided the plaintiff

gives good security of prosecuting his claim. Both species of writs are tested,

or witnessed in the king's own name; "witness ourself at Westminster," or

wherever the chancery may be held.

F *275 I *The security here spoken of, to be given by the plaintiff for prosecut-

•• J ing his claim, is common to both writs, though it gives denomination

only to the latter. The whole of it is at present become a mere matter of form :

and" John Doe and Richard Roe are always returned as the standing pledges

for this purpose. The ancient use of them was to answer for the plaintiff, who

in case he brought an action without cause, or failed in the prosecution of it
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when brought, was liable to an amercement from the crown for raising a false

accusation; and so the form of judgment still is. (/*) In like manner, as by

the Gothic constitutions no person was permitted to lay a complaint against

another, "nisi sub scriptura aut speciftcatione trium testium, quod actionetn

vellet persequif (i) and as bv the laws of Sancho I, king of Portugal, damages

were given against a plaintiff who prosecuted a groundless action, (k)

The day on which the defendant is ordered to appear in court, and on which

the sheriff is to bring in the writ and report how far he has obeyed it, is called

the return of the writ: it being then returned by him to the king's justices at

Westminster. And it is always made returnable at the distance of at least fif-

teen days from the date or teste, that the defendant may have time to come up

to Westminster, even from the most remote part of the kingdom; and upon some

day in one of the four terms in which the court sits for the dispatch of business.

These terms are supposed by Mr. Selden (I) to have been instituted by William

the Conqueror: but Sir Henry Spelman hath clearly and learnedly shown, that

they were gradually formed from the canonical constitutions of the church;

being indeed no other than those leisure seasons of the year, which were not

occupied by the great festivals or fasts, or which were not liable to the general

avocations of rural business.

F *276 1 *Throughout all Christendom, in very early times, the whole year

L J was one continual term for hearing and deciding causes. For the

Christian magistrates, to distinguish themselves from the heathens, who were

extremely superstitious in the observation of their dies fasti et nefasti, went

into a contrary extreme, and administered justice upon all days alike. Till at

length the church interposed and exempted certain holy seasons from being

profaned by the tumult of forensic litigations. As, particularly, the time of

advent and Christmas, which gave rise to the winter vacation; the time of

lent and easter, which created that in the spring; the time of pentecost,

which produced the third; and the long vacation, between midsummer and

Michaelmas, which was allowed for the hay-time and harvest. All Sundays

also, and some particular festivals, as the days of the purification, ascension, and

some others, were included in the same prohibition: which was established by

a canon of the church, A. D. 517, and was fortified by an imperial constitution

of the younger Theodosius, comprised in the Theodosian code, (m)

(a) Append. No. II, 51. (ft) Finch, I>. 189. 282. (t) Stternhook, dejure Oath. 1. 3, 0. 7.

(kj .Mm). Un. Hist, xxil, 46. (J) Jan. Angl. I. 9, i 9. (m) Spelm. of the Terms.
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Afterwards, when our own legal constitution came to be settled, the com-

mencement and duration of our law terms were appointed with an eye to those

canonical prohibitions; and it was ordered by the laws of King Edward the

Confessor, («) that from advent to the octave of the epiphany, from sfptuages-ima

to the octave of easier, from the ascension to the octave of pentecost, and from

three in the afternoon of all Saturdays till Monday morning, the peace of God

and the holy church shall be kept throughout all the Kingdom. And so

extravagant was afterwards the regard that was paid to these holy times, that

though the author of the Mirror (o) mentions only one vacation of any con-

siderable length, containing the months of August and September, yet Britton

is express, (p) that in the reign of King Edward the First no secular plea could

be held, nor any man sworn on the *evangelists, (q) in the times of r *o771

advent, lent, pentecost, harvest, and vintage, the days of the great <- *

litanies, and all solemn festivals. But he adds, that the bishops did nevertheless

grant dispensations (of which many are preserved in Rymer's/eorfera), (r) that

assizes and juries might be taken in some of these holy seasons. And soon

afterwards a general dispensation was established by statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw.

I, c. 51, which declares, that "by the assent of all th'e prelates, assizes of novel

disseisin, mart d'ancestor, and darrein presentment, shall be taken in advent,

septuagesima, and lent; and that at the special request of the king to the bishops."

The portions of time, that were not included within these prohibited seasons,

fell naturally into a fourfold division, and, from some festival day that imme-
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diately preceded their commencement, were denominated the terms of St. Hilary,

of Easter, of the holy Trinity, and of St. Michael: which terms have been since

regulated and abbreviated by several acts of parliament; particularly Trinity

term by statute 32 Hen. Vlfl, c. 21, and Michaelmas term by statute Ic Car. 1,

c. 6, and again by statute 24 Geo. II, c. 48. (2)

There are in each of these terms stated days called days in bank, dies in banco:

that is, days of appearance in the court of common bench. They are generally

at the distance of about a week from each other, and have reference to some fes-

tival of the church. On some one of these days in bank all original writs must

be made returnable; and therefore they are generally called the returns of that

term: whereof every term has more or less, said by the Mirror (*) to have been

originally fixed by King Alfred, but certainly settled as early as the statute of

51 Hen. Ill, st. 2. But though many of the return days are fixed upon Sundays,

yet the court never sits to receive these returns till the Monday after: (() and

therefore no proceedings can be held, or judgment can be given, or supposed to

be given, on the Sunday. («)

*The first return in every term is, properly speaking, the first day in r

that term : as, for instance, the octave of St. Hilary, or the eighth'day «•

inclusive after the feast of that saint: which falling on the thirteenth of January,

the octave therefore or first day of Hilary term is tne twentieth of January.

And thereon the court sits to take essoigns, or excuses, for such as do not appear

according to the summons of the writ: wherefore this is usually called the

essoign day of the term.. But on every return-day in the term, the person sum-

moned has three days of grace, beyond the day named in the writ, in which to

make his appearance; and if he appears on the fourth day inclusive, quarto die

post, it is sufficient. For onr sturdy ancestors held it beneath the condition of

a freeman to appear, or to do any other act, at the precise time appointed. The

feudal law therefore always allowed three distinct days of citation, before the

(») C. 3, t.'i' temporOnu et rticbus pad*. (o) C. 3, ( 8- (pj C. 53. (q) See page 69.

(r) Temp. Hen. lll,pat*im. (i)C.6,n. ft) Be&lstr. 19. Salk. 627. 6 Mod. 250.

(VL) 1 Jon. 196. Swann & Broome, B. R. Mich. 5 Geo. Ill, et in Dom. /Vm-. 17G6.

(2) Xow Hilary term begins the llth and ends the 31st day of January; Easter term begins

the loth day of April and ends the 8th day of May; Trinity term begins the 22d day of May

and enda the 12th day of June; and Michaelmang term begins the 2d and ends the 25th day

of November. See statutes 11 Geo. IV and 1 "Wm. IV, e. 70; and 1 Wm. IV sess. 2, c. 3, s. 2.
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defendant was adjudged contumacious for not appearing; (v) preserving in this

respect the German custom, of which Tacitus thus speaks: (w) " illud ex libertate

vitiiim, quod non simul nee jussi conveniunt; sed et alter et tertius dies cuncta-

tione co-euntium absumitur." And a similar indulgence prevailed in the Gothic

constitution: "illud eniin nimice liber tatis indicium, concessa tolies impunilas.

non parendi; nee enim trinis judicii commsibus pceiutm perditce causes contumaz

meruil." (x) Therefore, at the beginning of each term, the court does not

usually (y) sit for dispatch of business till the fourth or appearance day, as in

Hilary term on the twenty-third of January; and in Trinity term, by statute 32

Hen. VIII, c. 21, not till the fifth day, the fourth happening on the great popish

festival of Corpus Christi; (z) which days are therefore called and set down in

the almanacks as the first days of the term, and the court also sits till the quarto

die post or appearance day of the last return, which is therefore the end, of each

of them. (3)

CHAPTER XIX.

OF PROCESS.

THE next step for carrying on the suit, after suing out the original, is called

the process; being the means of compelling the defendant to appear in court.

This is sometimes called original process, being founded upon the original writ;

and also to distinguish it from mesne or intermediate process, which issues, pend-

ing the suit, upon some collateral interlocutory matter; as to summon juries,

witnesses, and the like, (a) Mesne process is also sometimes put in contradis-
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tinction to final process, or process of execution; and then it signifies all such

process as intervenes between the beginning and end of a suit.

But process, as we are now to consider it, is the method taken by the law to

compel a compliance with the original writ, of which the primary step is by

given the party notice to obey it. This notice is given upon all real prcecipes,

and also upon all personal writs for injuries not against the peace, by summons;

which is a warning to appear in court at the return of the original writ, given

to the defendant by two of the sheriff's messengers called summoners, either in

person or left at his house or land : (b) in like manner as in the civil law the

first process is by personal citation, in jus vocando.(c) This warning on the

land is given, in real actions, by erecting a white stick or wand on the defend-

ant's grounds (d) (which stick or wand among the northern nations is called the

F *°801 baculus *mmcia^orius); (e) and by statute 31 Eliz. c. 3, the notice must

i J also be proclaimed on some Sunday before the door of the parish church.

If the defendant disobeys this verbal monition, the next process is by writ of

attachment or pone, so called from the words of the writ, (/) "pone per radium

et salt-as pleyios, put by gage and safe pledges A B the defendant," &c. This is

a writ not issuing out of chancery, but out of the court of common pleas, being

(v) Feud. I. 2. t. 2J. fvj De Mor. Germ. c. 11. ftj Stiernhook dejtire Qotk. I. 1, c. 6.

(l/J See 1 Bulstr. 35.

(z) .See Spclmaii, on the Terms, cb. 17. Note, that if the feast of St. John the Baptist, or midsnmmer-

day, Bills on the morrow of Corpus Chriiti day, (as it did A. D. 1014, 1688. anil 1708, and will again A. D.

1791,) Triiii!;. mil term then cammencet, and the courts sit on that day, though In other years it is no juri-

dical day. Vet, in 1702 1713 and 1724, when midsummer-day fell upon what was regularly the last day of

the term, the courts did not then sit, but it waa regarded like a Sunday, and Ibe term wan prolonged to the

twcntr-flfth of June. Hot. C. B. Bnmb. 176.

(a) 'Finch. L. 436. (b) Ibid. S44, 332, (e) ff. 2, 4, 1. (d) Dalt. of Sher. c. SI.

(t) Stiernh. dejure Sueon. I 1, c. ft (f) Appendix, No. Ill, > 1.

(3) The whole practice of the superior courts has since been greatly simplified and improved

by statute and rules of court. The statutes on which the practice now mainly depends are the

common law procedure acts of 1852, and 1804 and 1860, and the summary procedure on bills of

exchange act, 1655. See note. p. 280. infra.
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grounded on the non-appearance of the defendant at the return of the original

•writ; and thereby the sheriff ia commanded to attach him, by taking gayv, that

is, certain of his goods, which he shall forfeit if he doth not appear; (</) or by

making him find safe pledges or sureties who shall be amerced in case of his non-

appearance. (A) This is also the first and immediate process, without any pre-

vious summons, upon actions of trespass vi et armis, or for other injuries, which

though not forcible are yet trespasses against the peace, as deceit and conspiracy; (i)

where the violence of the wrong requires a more speedy remedy, and therefore

the original writ commands the defendant to be at once attached, without any

precedent warning. (/) (1)

If after attachment, the defendant neglects to appear, he not only forfeits this

security, but is moreover to be farther compelled by writ of distringas, (k) or dis?

tress infinite; which is a subsequent process issuing from the court of common

pleas, commanding the sheriff to distrain the defendant from time to time, and

continually afterwards, by taking his goods and the profits of his lands, which

are called issues, and which by the common law he forfeits to the king if he

doth not appear. (I) But now the issues may be sold, if the court shall so direct,

And here by the common, as well as the civil law, the process ended in case

of injuries without force: the defendant, if he had any substance, being gradually

stripped of it all by repeated distresses, till he rendered obedience to the king's

writ; and, if he had no substance, the law held him incapable of making satis-

faction, and therefore looked upon all further process as nugatory. And besides,
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upon feudal principles, the person of a feudatory was not liable to be attached

for injuries merely civil, lest thereby his lord should be deprived of his personal

(e) Finch. L. 345. Lord Raym. 278. (») Dalt of Slier, c. 32. (i} Finch, L. 805, 352.

('./I Appendix, No. II, i 1. (t) Appendix, No. III. i -J. (J) Fluch, L. :»•_•.

(n) Slat. 10 Geo. 1C, o. SO. In! tf. 2, 4,19.

(1) [A considerable change was made bv statute 2 "Win. IT, c. 39, in the mode of commenc-

ing personal actions. In these the use of the original writ was abolished, and the process in

all such actions, in cases where it was not intended to hold the defeudeut to bail, or to proceed

against a member of parliament, according to the provisions of the bankrupt laws, it was

enacted should be according to the form contained in the schedule to the act, and which process

was thenceforth to issue from either of the superior courts, and to be called a writ of sum-

mons. In every such writ and copy thereof the place and county of the residence, or sup-

posed residence, of the party defendant was to be mentioned, and every such writ was to bo

served in the manner heretofore and in the county therein mentioned ; and the person serving

the same was required to endorse on the writ the day of the month and week of the sen-ice

thereof. The provisions as to writs of summons of the statute 2 Win. IV, c. 39, were extended

bv statute 1 and 2 Vic. c. 110, to all personal actions in her majesty's superior courts of law at

"Westminster; but the process or writ of summons in personal actions is now regulated by the

common law procedure act, 1852, which provides a form of writ similar to thtit given by the

statute '2 Wm. IV, c. 49, except that no county need be mentioned therein, while it is specially

provided that the defendant may be served in any county. This writ is directed to the defend-

ant, whom it commands that, within eight days after the sen-ice of the writ on him, inclusive

of the day of such service, he do cause an appearance to be entered for him in the court in

which the action is brought, in an action at the suit of the plaintiff, and requires the defendant

to take notice that in default of his doing so the plaintiff may proceed to judgment and exe-

cution. The writ is tested, i. e., witnessed in the name of the chief justice or chief baron, or, in

case of vacancv, of a senior puisne judge of the court out of which it issues, and dated on the

day on which it issued. A memorandum is subscribed to it, directing its execution withiu six

months from the day of its date, after which period it ceases to be of force unless renewed.

The defendant may apply to set it aside, if served after the six months; if it cannot be served

within that period, the plaintiff may have it renewed from time to time, until service be effected. ]

(2) [The proceeding by dintringas and outlawry is abolished by the " common law procedure

act 1852," and now if the defendant keeps out of the way, or personal service of the writ can-

not' be effected, the plaintiff must still use reasonable efforts to serve the defendant; and upon

an affidavit showing such efforts to have been made, and either that the writ has oome to tho

defendant's knowledge, or that he wilfully evades sen-ice of it, and that he has not appeared to

the writ, the plaintiff can obtain an order from the court or a judge authorizing him to proceed

as if personal service had been effected.]
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services. But, in case of injury accompanied with force, the law, to punish the

breach of the peace, and prevent its disturbance for the future, provided also a

process against the defendant's person in case he neglected to appear upon the

former process of attachment, or had no substance whereby to be attached; sub-

jecting his body to imprisonment by the writ of capias ad respondendum. (o)

But this immunity of the defendant's person, in case of peaceable though fraudu-

lent injuries, producing great contempt of the-law in indigent wrongdoers, a

capias was also allowed to arrest the person, in actions of account, though no

breach of the peace be suggested, by the statutes of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c.

23, and Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 11, m actions of debt and detinue, by statute 25

Edw. Ill, c. 17, and in all actions on the case, by statute 19 Hen. VII, c. 9.

Before which last statute a practice had been introduced of commencing the suit

by bringing an original writ of trespass quare clausum fregit, for breaking the

plaintiffs close vi et armis : which by the old common law subjected the defend-

ant's person to be arrested by writ of capias: and then afterwards, by conniv-

ance of the court, the plaintiff might proceed to prosecute for any other less

forcible injury. This practice (through custom rather than necessity, and for

f *2821 savmS some trouble and expense, in suing out a special original *adapted

L -I to the particular injury) still continues in almost all cases, except

in actions of debt; though now, by virtue of the statutes above cited and others,

a capias might be had upon almost every species of complaint

If therefore the defendant being summoned or attached makes default, and
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neglects to appear; or if the sheriff returns a nihil, or that the defendant hath

nothing whereby he may be summoned, attached, or distrained ; the capia-s now

usually issues: (p) being a writ commanding the sheriff to take the body of

the defendant if he may be found in his bailiwick or county, and him safely to

keep, so that he may have him in court on the day of the return, to answer to

the plaintiff of a plea of debt or trespass, &c., as the case may be. This writ,

and all other subsequent to the original writ, not issuing out of chancery, but

from the court into which the original was returnable, and being grounded on

what has passed in that court in consequence of the sheriff's return, are called

judicial, not original writs; they issue under the private seal of that court, and

not under the great seal of England; and are tested, not in the king's name,

but in that of the chief (or, if there be no chief, of the senior) justice only.

And these several writs, being grounded on the sheriff's return, must respect-

ively bear date the same day on which the writ immediately preceding was

returnable.

This is the regular and ordinary method of process. But it is now usual in

practice, to sue out the capias in the first instance, upon a supposed return of

the sheriff; especially if it be suspected that the defendant, upon notice to the

action, will abscond; and afterwards a fictitious original is drawn up, if the

party is called upon so to do, with a proper return thereupon, in order to give the

proceedings a colour of regularity. When this capias is delivered to the sheriff, he

by his under-sheriff grants a warrant to his inferior officers or bailiffs, to execute

it on the defendant. And, if the sheriff of Oxfordshire (in which county the in-

jury is supposed to be committed and the action is laid) cannot find the defcud-

r *983 1 an*'m ^*s Juris<liction> *he returns that he is not found, non est inventus

L *"•' J in his bailiwick: whereupon another writ issues, called a testatum

capias, (q) directed to the sheriff of the county where the defendant is supposed

to reside, as of Berkshire, reciting the former writ, and that it is testified, testa-

tum est, that the defendant lurks or wanders in his bailiwick, wherefore he is

commanded to take him, as in the former capias. But here, also, when the action

is brought in one county, and the defendant lives in another, it is usual, for sav-

ing trouble, time and expense, to make out a testatum capias at the first; sup-

posing not only an original, but also a former capias, to have been granted

which in fact never was. And this fiction being beneficial to all parties, is

readily acquiesced in and is now becoming the settled practice; being one among

(o) 3 Bep. 12. (p) Appendix, No. m, 5 2. (?) Ibid.
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many instances to illustrate that maxim of law, that in fictions juris consistit

aqultas. (3)

But where a defendant absconds, and the plaintiff would proceed to an out-

lawry against him, an original writ must then be sued out regularly, and after

that a capias. And if the sheriff cannot find the defendant upon the first writ

of capias, and returns a non est inventus, there issues out an alias writ, and ufter

that a pluries, to the same effect as the former: (r) only after these words " we

command you," this clause is inserted, "as we hiwe. formerly," or, "as we have

often commanded you:"—"sicut alias," or''sicutp\ur\es,prcBcipimus." And, if

a non est inventus is returned upon all of them, then a writ of exigent or exiyi

facias may be sued out, («) which requires the sheriff to cause the defendant to

be proclaimed, required, or exacted, in five county courts successively, to vender

himself; and if he does, then to take him as in a capias: but if he does not

appear, and is returned quinto exactus, he shall then be outlawed by the coro-

ners of the county. Also by statutes 6 Hen. VIII, c. 4, and 31 Eliz. c. 3, whether

the defendant dwells within the same or another county than that wherein the

exigent is sued out, *a writ of proclamation (t) shall issue out at the same r *„£, -,

time with the ezjigw^, commanding the sheriff of the county, wherein the •- *' '

defendant dwells, to make three proclamations thereof in places the most notori-

ous, and most likely to come to his knowledge, a month before the outlawry

shall take place. Such outlawry is putting a man out of protection of the law

so that he is incapable of bringing an action for redress of injuries; and it is also
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attended with a forfeiture of all one's goods and chattels to the king. And

therefore, till sometime after the conquest, no man could be outlawed but for

felony; but in Bracton's time, and somewhat earlier, process of outlawry was

ordained to lie in all actions for trespasses vi et annis. («) And since his days, by

a variety of statutes (the same which allow the writ of capias before mentioned),

process of outlawry doth lie in divers actions that are merely civil; provided

they be commenced by original and not by bill, (v) If after outlawry the defend-

ant appears publicly, he may be arrested by a writ of capias utlagatum, (w) and

committed till the oulawry be reversed. "Which reversal may be had by

the defendant's appearing personally in court or by attorney, (x) (though in the

king's bench he could not appear by attorney, (y) till permitted by statute 4 and

5 W. and M., c. 18); and any plausible cause, however slight, will in general be

sufficient to reverse it, it being considered only as a process to compel an appear-

ance. But then the defendant must pay full costs, and put the plaintiff in the

same condition, as if he had appeared before the writ of exigi facias was awarded.

Such is the first process in the court of common pleas. In the king's bench

they may also (and frequently do) proceed in certain causes, particularly in

actions of ejectment and trespass, by original writ, with attachment and capias

thereon; (z) returnable, not at Westminster, where the common pleas are now

fixed, in consequence of magna cart'a, but " ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia,"

wheresoever the king shall then be in 'England ; the king's bench being p +aa- \

removable into any part of England at the pleasure and discretion of the L '" ° '

crown. But the more usual method of proceeding therein is without any

original, but by a peculiar species of process entitled a bill of Middlesex: and

therefore so entitled, because the court now sits in that county; for if it sate in

Kent, it would then be a bill of Kent, (a) For though, as the justices of this

court have, by its fundamental constitution, power to determine all offences and

trespasses, by the common law and custom of the realm,(6) it needed no original

(r) Ibid. (») IMd. (t) IbM. (u) Co. Lilt. 128. (t>) 1 Slrt. 159.

(») Appendix. So. ni. } 9. (») i Boll. Hop. 490. Itegul. C. B., A. D. IBM, o. 13.

an Cro. Jac. 818. Sulk. 4H6. (*) Appendix. No. II, f 1.

(a) Thus, when the court sate at Oxford by reason or liir plngiie, Mich. IBM, the process win by bill of

OxtorttMre. Trye's Jut. Fttizar. 101.

(ft) Bro. Abr. Ut. Oyer and Termtner, 8.

(3) Arrest upon mosne process was almost entirely abolished by statute 1 and 2 Tic. o. 110.

Bee also statutes 14 and 15 Vic. c. 52, 32 and 33 Tie. c. 62, and note (3) p. 289, post.
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writ from the crown to give it cognizance of any misdemeanor in the connty

wherein it resides ; yet, as by this court's coming into any county, it immediately

superseded the ordinary administration of justice by the general commissions of

eyre and of oycr and tenniner, (c) a process of its own became necessary within

the county where it sate, to bring in such persons as were accused of committing

any forcible injury. The bill of Middlesex (d) (which was formerly always

founded on a plaint of trespass quare clausum fregit, entered on the records of

the court) (e) is a kind of capias, directed to the sheriff of that county, and com-

manding him to take the defendant, and have him before our lord the king at

Westminster on a day prefixed, to answer to the plaintiff of a plea of trespass.

For this accusation of trespass it is, that gives the court of king's bench juris-

diction in other civil causes, as was formerly observed; since when once the

defendant is taken into custody of the marshal, or prison-keeper of this court,

for the supposed trespass, he being then a prisoner of this court, may here be

prosecuted for any other species of injury. Yet, in order to found this jurisdic-

tion, it is not necessary that the defendant be actually the marshal's prisoner;

F *286 1 ^or' M soon as ^e aPPears» or Pu*s 'n bail> *° the *procesg, he is deemed

' "' -1 by so doing to be in such custody of the marshal, as will give the court

a jurisdiction to proceed. (/) And, upon these accounts, in the bill or process

a complaint of trespass is alwavs suggested, whatever else may be the real cause

of action. This bill of Middlesex must be served on the defendant by the

sheriff, if he finds him in that county; but, if he returns "wow est inventus,"
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then there issues out a writ of latitat, (g) to the sheriff of another county, as

Berks ; which is similar to the testatum capias in the common pleas, and recites

the bill of Middlesex and the proceedings thereon, and that it is testified that

the defendant"latitat et discurrit," lurks and wanders about in Berks; and

therefore commands the sheriff to take him, and have his body in court on the

day of the return. But, as in the common pleas the testatum capias may be

sued out upon only a supposed, and not an actual, preceding capias; so in the

king's bench a latitat is usually sued ont upon only a supposed, and not an

actual, bill of Middlesex. So that, in fact, a latitat may be called the first

process in the court of king's bench, as the testatum capias is in the common

pleas. Yet, as in the common pleas, if the defendant lives in the county wherein

the action is laid, a common capias suffices ; so in the king's bench, likewise, if

he lives in Middlesex, the process must still be by bill of Middlesex only.

In the exchequer the first process is by writ of quo minus, in order to give

the court a jurisdiction over pleas between party and party. In which writ (/*)

the plaintiff is alleged to be the king's farmer or debtor, and that the defendant

hath done him the injury complained of quo minus sufficient existit, by which

he is the less able to pay the king his rent, or debt. And upon this the defend-

ant may be arrested as upon a capias from the common pleas.

Thus differently do the three courts set out at first, in the commencement of

a suit, in order to" entitle the two courts of king's bench and exchequer to hold

plea in causes between subject and subject, which by the original constitution

of Westminster-hall they were not empowered to do. Afterwards, when the

cause is once drawn into the respective courts, the method of pursuing it is

T *2871 Prc^y mu°h the same in all of them. *If the sheriff has found the

" •" defendant upon any of the former writs, the capias latitat, &c., he was

anciently obliged to take him into custody, in order to produce him in court

upon the return, however small and minute the cause of action might be. For,

not having obeyed the original summons, he had shown a contempt of the court,

and was no longer to be trusted at large. But when the summons fell into

disuse, and the capias became in fact the first process, it was thought hard to

imprison a man for a contempt which was only supposed : and therefore in com-

mon cases by the gradual indulgence of the courts (at length authorized by

statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, which was amended by 5 Geo. II, c. 27, made perpetual

(e) Bro. Alir. tit. Jturitdlction. B6. 3 Inet. 27. (<») Appendix, No. HI, J 3. («) Tryc's Jut FOiKr.

(/) 4 Inst. 72. (g) Appendix, So. Ill, i 3. (») /Wd. »1.
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by 21 Geo. II, c. 3, and extended to all inferior courts by 19 Geo.III, c. 70), the

sheriff or proper officer can now only personally serve the defendant with the

copy of the writ or process, and with notice in writing to appear by his attorney

in court to defend this action; which in effect reduces it to a mere summons.

And if the defendant thinks proper to appear upon this notice, his appearance is

recorded, and he puts in sureties for his future attendance and obedience ; which

sureties are called common bail, being the same two imaginary persons that

were pledges for the plaintiffs prosecution. John Doe and Itichard Eoe. Or, if

the defendant does not appear upon the return of the writ, or within four (or, in

some cases, eight) days after, the plaintiff may enter an appearance for him, as if

he had really appeared; and may file common bail in the defendant's name, and

proceed thereupon as if the defendant had done it himself.

But if the plaintiff will make affidavit, or assert upon oath, that the cause of

action amounts to ten pounds or upwards, then he may arrest the defendant,

and make him put in substantial sureties for his appearance, called special bail.

In order to which, it is required by statute 13 Car. II, st. 2, c. 2, that the true

cause of action should be expressed in the body of the writ or process: else no

security can be taken in a greater sum than 40/. This statute (without any

such intention in the makers) had like to have ousted the king's bench of

*all its jurisdiction over civil injuries without force; for, as the bill of r *ogg i

Middlesex was framed only for actions of trespass, a defendant could L *''' '

not be arrested and held to bail thereupon for breaches of civil contracts. But
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to remedy this inconvenience, the officers of the king's bench devised a method

of adding what is called a clause of ac etiam to the usual complaint of trespass:

the bill of Middlesex commanding the defendant to be brought in to answer the

plaintiff of a plea of trespass, and also to a bill of debt: (i) the complaint of tres-

pass giving cognizance to the court, and that of debt authorizing the arrest. In

imitation of which, Lord Chief Justice North a few years afterwards, in order to

save the suitors of his court the trouble and expense of suing out special origi-

nals, directed that in the common pleas, besides the usual complaint of breaking

the plaintiff's close, a clause of ac etiam might be also added to the writ oi

capias, containing the true cause of action; as, " that the said Charles the de-

fendant may answer to the plaintiff of a plea of trespass in breaking his close:

and also ac etiam, may answer him, according to the custom of the court, in a

certain plea of trespass upon the case, upon promises, to the value of twenty

pounds, &c. (j) The sum sworn to by the plaintiff is marked upon the back

of the writ; and the sheriff, or his officer the bailiff, is then obliged actually to

arrest or take into custody the body of the defendant, and, having so done, to

return the writ with a cepi corpus endorsed thereon.

An arrest must be by corporal seizing or touching the defendant's body; (4)

after which the bailiff may jiustify breaking open the house in which he is (5)

to take him; otherwise he has no such power; but must watch his opportunity

to arrest him. For every man's house is looked upon by the law to be his castle

(I) Trve's Ju» FVaar. 102. .Appendix. No. HI, } 3.

(j) Lilly's Pract. Keg. tit. ac etiam. North's Life of Lord Gullford, 99. This work is strongly recom-

mended to the student's perusal.

(4) [But this does not seem to be absolutely necessary, for if a bailiff come into a room and tell

the defendant he arrests him, and lock the door, it is sufficient. C. T. Hardw. 301; '2 Xew, Rep.

211; Bull Jf. P. 82. Bare words, however, will not constitute an arrest. 1 Ry. and M. 25. It

is sufficient that the officer have the authority, bo near, and acting in the arrest, without being

the person who actually arrests. Cowp. C5.

If the defendant be wrongfully taken without process (2 Anst. 461; 1 N. R. 135), or after it is

returnable (2 H, Bla. 29), he cannot be lawfully detained in custody under subsequent process

at the suit of the same plaintiff, though be may at the suit of third persons. 2 B. and A. 743 ; 1

Chit Run. 579, S. C.]

(5) [This appears to be stated too extensively; it is the defendant's own dwelling which by

law is said to be his castle; for if he be in the house of another, the bailiff or sheriff may break

and Pinter it to effect his purpose, but he ought to be very certain that the defendant be, at the

time of such forcible entry, in the house. See Johnson v. Leigh, 6-Taont. 246.]

,
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of defence and asylum, wherein he should suffer no violence. (6) Which princi-

ple is carried so far in the civil law that for the most part not so much as a

common citation or summons, much less an arrest, can he executed upon a man

, *oaq -i within his own walls, (k) Peers of the realm, members *of parliament,

' J and corporations are privileged from arrests; and of course from out-

lawries. (I) And against them the process to enforce an appearance must be by

summons and distress infinite, (m) instead of a capias. Also clerks, attorneys,

and all other persons attending the courts of justice (for attorneys, being officers

of the court, are always supposed to be there attending), are not liable to be

arrested by the ordinary process of the court, but must be sued by bill (called

usually a bill of privilege) as being personally present in court, (ri) (7) Clergy-

men performing divine service, and not merely staying in the church with" a

fraudulent design, are for the time privileged from arrests, by statutes 50 Edw. Ill,

c. 5, and 1 Ric. II, c. 16, as likewise members of convocation actually attending

thereon, by statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 1. Suitors, witnesses, and other persons,

necessarily attending any courts of record upon business, are not to be arrested

during their actual attendance, which includes their necessary coming and

returning. (8) And no arrest can be made in the king's presence, nor within

ft) Ff. 2, 4.18-41. (I) WhltlockofParl. 206, 207. (m) See page 2*>.

<„! Bra. Abr. tit. Nile, 29. 12 Mod. IBS. •

(6) [A bailiff before he has made the arrest cannot break open an outer door of a house;

but if he enter the outer door peaceably, he may then break open the inuer door, though it be
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the apartment of a lodger, if the owner himself occupies part of the house. Cowp. 1; 2 Moore,

207 ; 8 Taunt. 250, S, C. But if the whole house to let in lodgings, as each lodging is then

considered a dwelling-house, in which burglary may be stated to have been committed, it has

been supposed that the door of each apartment would be considered an outer door, which

could not be legally broken open to execute an arrest. Cowp. 2. But to justify breaking open

an inner door belonging to a lodger, admittance must be first demanded, unless defendant

is in the room. 3 B. and P. 2'23; 4 Taunt. 619. And the breaking open an inner door of

a stranger cannot be justified on a suspicion that defendant is in the room. 5 Taunt. 765, 6th

ed. 246.]

(7) [These privileges are allowed not so much for the benefit of attorneys as their clients: 2

Wils. 44 ; 4 Burr. Sill; 3 Dong. 331; and are therefore confined to attorneys who practice : 2

Wils. 232; 4 Burr. 2113; 2 Bla. Rep. 1086; 1 Bos. and Pul. 4; (2 Lutw. 1667, contra); or at

least have practiced within a year; for it is a rnle that such attorneys as have not been attending

their employment in the king's bench for the space of a year, unless hindered by sickness, be not

allowed their privilege of attorneys. 2 M. and S. 605.]

(8) The law of arrest has been greatly modified in England by the statutes abolishing arrest

and imprisonment for debt except in a few specified cases (the one now in force being 32 aud

33 Vic. c. 62), and also in the United States by constitutional and statutory provisions for the

game purpose. But an arrests in civil suits are still allowed in some cases, we refer here to a

few of the cases in which an exemption from arrest, on general principles, can still be claimed.

Thus, ambassadors accredited to a foreign country, and their servants, while passing through

tho country to enter upon their duties, are privileged: Novello v. Toogood, 1 B. and C. 554;

Holbrookt>. Henderson, 4 Sandf. 619; members of congress and of state legislatures, while in

attendance upon the body to which they belong, or upon any of its committees, aud for a reason-

able time before and after to fto aud return: Cush. Leg. A.ssom., part 3, ch. 2; members of state

conventions: Bolton v. Martin, 1 Dall. 296; electors, attending an election, or awaiting the

counting of the votes: Swift v. Chamberlain, 3 Conn. 537 ; parties and attorneys, while attend-

ing court during the trial, or hearing of the causes in which they are interested or employed,

aud while waiting for the same to be reached on the docket: Clark v. Grant, 2 Wend. 257;

MoN'iel's Case, 6 Mass. 245; Vincent v. Watson, 1 Rich. 194; Wilson v. Nettleton, 12 111.61;

witnesses, in attendance on court or other judicial or legislative tribunal: BOUTS p. Tucker-

man, 7 Johns. 538; Ex parte Edme, 9 S. and H. 147; Sauford v. Chase, 3 Cow. 381; In re

Dickerson, 3 Hair. 517; \orris v. Beach, 2 John. 294 ; Cush. Log. Assomb. J 997 ; jurors, at-

tending court in the performance of their duties: Brooks v. Chesley, 4 H. and McH. 295; bail,

attending to justify: Rimmer r. Green, 1 M. and S. 638; bankrupts and insolvents dulv dis-

charged, as to all the demands covered by the discharge: Wilson p. Kemp, 3 M. and S. 595;

Chaft'ee r. Jones, 19 Pick. 200. And in all these cases where the privilege is given by the law for

the purpose of attendance at some particular place in a special character, it covers the stay aud

a reasonable time for going and returning: Randall v. Gurnoy, 3 B. and A. 252 ; Childerston v.

Barrett, 11 East, 439; Clark p. Grant. 2 Wend. 257 ; but if the party goes out of his way on other

business he loses his privilege. Chaffeep. Jones, 19 Pick. 260.

The privilege will not prevent the service of process, which only requires common bail:

Hunter v. Cleveland, 1 Brev. 107; Hopkins ». Coburn, 1 Wend. 292; Catlett v. Morton, 4
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the verge of his royal palace, (o) nor in any place where the king's justices are

actually sitting, '.the king hath moreover a special prerogative (which indeed

is very seldom exerted, (p) that he may by his writ of protection privilege a

defendant from all personal, and many real, suits for one year at a time, and no

longer; in respect of his being engaged in his service out of the realm, (q) And

the king also by the common law might take his debtor into his protection, so

that no one might sue or arrest him till the king's debts were paid: (r) but by

the statute 25 Edw. Ill, st 5, c. 19, notwithstanding such protection, another

creditor may proceed to judgment against *him, with a stay of execution, r noon 1

till the king's debt be paid; unless such creditor will undertake for the *- *""'

king's debt, and then he shall have execution for both. And lastly, by statute

29 Car. II, c. 7, no arrest can be made, nor process served, upon a Sunday, ex-

cc-pf, for treason, felony, or breach of the peace. (9)

When the defendant is regularly arrested, he must either go to prison, for

safe custody: or put in special bail to the sheriff. (10) For the intent of the

arrest being only to compel an appearance in court at the return of the writ,

that purpose is equally answered, whether the sheriff detains his person, or takes

sufficient security for his appearance, called bail (from the French word bailler,

to deliver), because the defendant is bailed, or delivered to his sureties, upon

their giving security for his appearance: and is supposed to continue in their

friendly custody instead of going to gaol. The method of putting in bail to

the sheriff is by entering into a bond or obligation, with one or more sureties,
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not fictitious persons, as in the former case of common bail, but real, substan-

tial, responsible bondsmen), to insure the defendant's appearance at the return

of the writ; which obligation is called the bail bond, (s) 11) The sheriff, if he

pleases may let the defendant go without any sureties; but that is at his own

peril: for, after once taking him, the sheriff is bound to keep him safely, so as

to be forthcoming in court; otherwise an action lies against him for an escape (12)

But on the other hand, he is obliged, by statute 23 Hen. VI, c. 10, to take (if it

be tendered) a sufficient bail-bond: and by statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, the sheriff

shall take bail for no other sum than such as is sworn to by the plaintiff, and

endorsed on the back of the writ.

Upon the return of the writ, or within four days after, the defendant must

appear according to the exigency of the writ. This appearance is effected by

putting in and justifying bail to the action; which is commonly called putting

in bail above. If this be not done, and the bail that were taken by *the r ^(^ -•

sheriff below are responsible persons, the plaintiff may take an assign- L ' '

nieut from the sheriff of the bail-bond (under the statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16),

(o) See book IV, 270. The verge of the palace of Westminster extends, by stat. 28 Hen. VTH, c. 12, from

Chm-ing Cross to Westminster hall.

(p) Sir E<1 ward Coke informs us (1 I n-t. 131) that herein " he could say nothing of his own experience :

for albeit Queen Elizabeth maintained many war-, yet she granted lew or no protections: and her reason

was that hu was no fit subject to be employed in her service, that was subject to other men'sactions.lest she

might be thought to delay justice." But King William, in 1602, granted one to Lord Cutts, to protect him from

being outlawed by his tailor (it Lev. 3321: which is the last that appears upon our books.

(q) Finch, L. «4. 3 Lev. 334. (r) F. N. B. 88. Co. Litt. 131. (•) Appendix, No. HI, (o.

Litt. 122; Le Grand v. Bedinger, 4 Monr. 540; nor the service of a common summons or declara-

tion, on which no bail is taken. Case r. Rorabacker, 15 Mich. 537.

(9) This statute extends not only to process properly so called, but also to all notices on

•which rules are made; and hence it has been held that service of notice of plea filed on a

Sunday, is void: 8 East, 547; Tidd. Prac. 218; Field v. Park, 20 Johns. 140. But aa«r a

negligent escape the defendant may be retaken on Sunday. 2 Lid. Raym. 1028; 2 Salk. 626;

Tidd. Prac. 218.

(10) The statute 43 Geo. Ill, o. 46, allowed a deposit of money instead of bail. See Tidd

Prac. 8th ed. 226.

(11) [An agreement by a third person with a sheriff's officer to put in good bail, <fec. (1 T. R.

416), or an attorney's undertaking to the office for defendant's appearance (7 T. R. 109), or to

give bail bond in due time, are void, and no action lies on it; but il given to the plaiutiif in the

action, it is valid. 4 East, 568.]

(12) [Sheriff cannot sue defendant for money paid, when he has discharged him out of custody

on mesue process, without a bail bond, and has, in consequence of his non-appearance, beefl

obliged to pay debt and costs, 8 East, 171.]
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and bring an action thereupon against the sheriff's bail. Bnt if the bail, so

accepted by the sheriff, be insolvent persons, the plaintiff may proceed against

the sheriff himself, by calling npon him, first, to return the writ (if not already

done), and afterwards to bring in the body of the defendant. And if the sher-

iff does not then cause sufficient bail to be put in-and perfected above, he will

himself be responsible to the plaintiff.

The bail above, or bail to the action, must be put in either in open court, or

before one of the judges thereof; or else, in the country, before a commissioner

appointed for that purpose by virtue of the statute 4 W. and M. c. 4, which

must be transmitted to the court. These bail, who must at least be two in

number, must enter into a recognizance (() in court or before the judge or com-

missioner, in a sum equal (or in some cases double) to that which the plaintiff

hath sworn to; whereby they do jointly and severally undertake, that if the

defendant be condemned in the action he shall pay the costs and condemna-

tion, or render himself a prisoner, or that they will pay it for him: which

recognizance is transmitted to the court in a slip of parchment entitled a bail

piece, (u) And, if excepted to, the bail must be perfected, that is, they must

justify themselves in court, or before the commissioner in the country, by

swearing themselves housekeepers, and each of them to be worth the full sum

for which they are bail, after payment of all their debts. This answers in some

measure to the stipulatio or sahsdatio of the Roman laws (v) which is mutually

given by each litigant party to the other: by the plaintiff, that he will prosecute

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

his suit, and pay the costs if he loses his cause; in like manner as our law still

requires nominal pledges of prosecution from the plaintiff; by the defendant,

that he shall continue in court, and abide the sentence of the judge, much like

our special bail; but with this difference, that the fide-jussores were there abso-

F *2021 ^u^e'y bound judimtum solvere, to see the costs and condemation *paid

' " •" at all events: whereas our special bail may be discharged, by surrender-

ing the defendant into custody, within the time allowed by law; for which pur-

pose they are at all times entitled to a warrant to apprehend him. (w) (13)

Special bail is required (as of course) only upon actions of debt, or actions on

the case in trover or for money due, where the plaintiff can swear that the canse

of action amounts to ten pounds: but in actions where the damages are pre-

carious, being to be assessed ail libitum by a jury, as in actions for words, eject-

ment, or trespass, it is very seldom possible for a plaintiff to swear to the amount

of his cause of action ; and therefore no special bail is taken thereon, unless by

a judge's order or the particular directions of the court, in some peculiar species

of injuries, as in cases of mayhem or atrocious battery; or upon such special

circumstances as make it absolutely necessary that the defendant should be

kept within the reach of justice. Also in actions against heirs, executors, and

administrators, for debts of the deceased, special bail is not demandable; for the

(tj Ibid. (nj Ibid, (v) Inst. I 4, Ml. If. I. 2, t. 8. (V) Show. 202. 6Mod. 231.

(13) [And the bail mar render the defendant in their discharge, even after judjrment; and

they may take him on A Sunday : 6 Mod. 231; but see 2 Bla. R. 1273; or during his examina-

tion before commissioners of bankrupt; 1 Atk. 238; 5 T. R. 210; or going into a court of

justice : 1 Sel. Prnc. 180; 3 Stark. 132 ; 1 D. and K. M. P. 0. 20 ; and they may justify enter-

ing the house of a stranger (the outer door being open) to take the defendant though he be

not in the house : 2 Hen. Bla. 120 ; and if the defendant iB in custody, either in a civil action

or upon a criminal charge, they may in K. B. have a writ of habeas corpus to bring him up to

the court, to be surrendered in their discharge. 7 T. R. 220. When the principal is takon,

one of the bail, it is said, must always remain with him : 1 Sel. Pr. 180; but a third person

may assist in the taking and detaining defendant, though the bail do not continue present

3 Taunt. 425.]

The bail are the keepers of their principal, and they may arrest him on the bail piece •where

ever they can find him, even though not within the jurisdiction of the court in which bail was

taken. Anon. Show. 214 ; Parker «. Bidwcll, 3 Conn. 84; Harp v. Osgood, 2 Hill, 216. And

this right they may exercise by agent as well as in person: Nicolla t!. Ingersoll, 7 Johns. 145;

Parker t>. Bidwcll, 3 Conn. 84"; and they may break doors, if necessary, to make the arrest.

Bead v. Case, 4 Conn. 166; Nieolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns, 145.
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action is not so properly against them in person, as against the effects of the

deceased in their possession. But special bail is required even of them, in ac-

tions for a devagtauit,or wasting the goods of the deceased; that wrong being

of their own committing.

Thus much for process; which is only meant to bring the defendant into

court, in order to contest the suit, and abide the determination of the law.

When he appears either in person as a prisoner, or out upon bail, then follow

the pleadings between the parties, which we shall consider at large in the next

chapter.

CHAPTER XX.

OF PLEADING.

PLEADIKGS are the mutual altercations between the plaintiff and defendant;

which at present are set down and delivered into the proper office in writing,

though formerly they were usually put in by their counsel ore tenus, or viva

voce, in court, and then minuted down by the chief clerks, or prothonotaries;

whence in our old law French the pleadings are frequently denominated the

parol. (1)

(1) [Pleading is the statement in a logical and legal form of the facts which constitute the

plaintiff's cause of action, or the defendant's ground of defence; it is the formal mode of alleg-

ing on the record that which would be the support, or the defence, of the party in evidence.

Per Bullcr, J., 3 T. R. 159 ; Dougl. 278. " It is (as also observed by the same learned judge,

in Dougl. Rep. 159), one of the first principles of pleading, that there is only occasion to state
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facts, which must be done for the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to declare

the law arising upon those facts, and of apprising the opposite party of what is meant to be

proved, in order to give him an opportunity to answer or traverse it." And see the observa-

tions of Lord C. J. De Grey, Cowp. 682. From this it will bo seen, that the science of special

pleading may be considered under two heads: 1. The facts necessary to be btated. 2. The

mode of stating them. In these considerations, the reader must be contented with a general

outline of the law upon the subject.

1st. TUB FACTS NECESSARY TO BESTATKD. Ko more should be stated than is essential to

constitute the cause of complaint, or the ground of defence. Cowp. 683; 1 Lord Ray. 171.

And the facts only should be stated, and not arguments or inferences, or matter of law. Cowp.

684; 5 East, 275. The party can only succeed on the facts, as they are alleged and

proved.

There are various facts which need not be stated, though it may be essential that they should

be established in evidence, to entitle the partv pleading to succeed.

Thus there are facts of which the court will, from the nature of its office, take notice without

303; 3 M. and S. 67 ; 11 Ves. 292; 3 Camp. 61, 67. The time and place of holding parliaments,

and their course of proceedings, need not be stated: 1 Lord Raym. 343, 210; 1 Sannd.

131; but their journals must. Lord Raym. 15: Cowp. 17. Public statutes, and the fncte they

ascertain: 1 T. K. 145; Com. Dig. Pleader, c. 76; the ecclesiastical, civil, and marine laws

(Bro. Quare Impedit, pi. 12; Lord Ray. 338), need not be stated, but private acts (Lord Ray.

381; DougL 97), and foreign (2 Cart. 273; Cowp. 174), and plantation and forest (2 Leon.

200) laws, must Common law rights, duties, and general customs, customs of gavelkiud, and

borough English (Dougl. 150; Lord Ray. 175, 1542; Carth. 83; Co. Litt. 175; Lord Raym.

1025; Cro. Car. 561), need not be stated; but particular local customs must. 1 Hoi. Ken.

509; 9 East, 185; Stra, 187, 1187; Dougl. 387. The almanac is part of the law of the land,

and the courts take notice thereof, and the days of the week, and of the movable feasts, and

terms. DougL 380; Salk. 269; 1 Roll. Ab. 524, c. pi, 4; 6 Mod. 81; Salk. 626. So the

division of Enylaiid into counties will be noticed without pleading (2 lust. 557; Marsh. 124),

but not so of a less division (id.), nor of Ireland. 1 Chit. Rep. 28, 32; 3 B. aud A. 301; S. C.,

'Z D. and R. 15; IB. and C. 16, S. C. The court will take judicial notice of the incorporated

towns, of the extent of ports, and the river Thames. Stra. 469; 1 H. Bla. 356. So it will

take notice of the meaning of English words and terms of art, according to their ordinary

acceptation: 1 RoL Ab. 86, 525; also of the names and quantities of legal weights and mea-
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The first of these is the declaration, narratio, or count, anciently called the

tale; (a) in which the plaintiff sets forth his cause of complaint at length, being

indeed only an amplification or exposition of the original writ npon which his

action is founded, with the additional circumstances of time and place, when

and where the injury was committed. But we may remember, (b) that in the

king's bench, when the defendant is brought into court by bill of Middlesex,

(a) Appendix, No. II, » 2; No. 111. j 6. (In See pages 285, 283.

the course of proceedings therein ; as the court of exchequer in Wales, aud the counties pala-

tine : 1 Lord Kaym. 154; 1 Sauna. 73; but the courts are not bound, ex ufficin, to take notice

who were, or are the judges of another court at Westminster : 2 Andr. 74 ; Stra. 1226; nor are

the superior courts, ex officio, bound to uotice the customs, laws, or proceedings of inferior

courts of limited jurisdiction (1 Roll. Kep. 10j; Lord Kayui. 11134; Cro. Eliz. 502), unless indeed

in courts of error. Cro. Car. 17'J.

Where the law presumes a fact, as that a person is innocent of a fraud or crime, or that a

transaction is illegal, it need not be stated. 4 M. and S. 105; 2 Wils. 147 ; Co. Lit. 78, b.; 1 B.

and A. If.:!.

Matter which should come more properly from the other side, as it is presumed to lie more in

the knowledge of the other party, or i< ;m answer to the chargu of tho party pleading, need not

be stated, unless in pleus of estoppel aud alien euomy; but this rule must be acted upon with

caution; for if the fact in any way constitutes a couditiou precedent, to enable the party to

avail himself of the charge "stated in his pleading, such fact should be' stated. Com. Dig.

Pleader, c. bl ; 1 Leon. Is; 2 Sauud. 02, b.; 4 Camp. 20; 11 East, 6:18; and see cases 1 Chit,
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on PI. 20(3; Stephen. 354.

Though the facts of a case must be stated in pleading, it is not necessary to state that which

is a mere matter of evidence of such fact. 9 I4ep. 9, b.; 9 Edw. Ill, 5, b. 6, a.; Willos, 130;

Kaym. 8.

And though the general rule is, that facts only are to he stated, yet there are Rome instances

in which the statement in the pleading is proper, though it does not accord with the real facts,

the law allowing a fiction, as in ejectment, trover, detinue, Ac. 2 Hurr. (>67; 1 N. R. 140.

No fact that is not essential to substantiate the pleading should be stated. Tho statement of

immaterial or irrelevant matter is not only censurable on the ground of expense; but frequently

to the cause, so that no allegation whatever on the subject was necessary, it will be rejected as

surplusage, it being a maxim that utiie per inutile nou vitiutur. See cases, &c., in Chit, on PI.

20s, 209, 210. Besides this, the pleading must not state two or more facts, either of which

would of itself, independently of the other, constitute a sufficient ground of action or defence.

Co. Litt. 30-1, a. ; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 3:i, E. 2; 1 Chit, on PI. 20d.

2dly. THK MODS OF STATING FACTS. The facts should be r>tated logically, in their natural

order; as, on the part of the plaintiif, his right, the injury aud consequent damage; and these,

with certainty, precision, and brevity. The facts, as stated, must not be insensible or repug-

nant, nor ambiguous or doubtful in meaning, nor argumentative, uor in the alternative, nor by way

of recital, but positive, and according to their legal effect aud operation. Dongl. 666, 667; 1

Chit, on PI. 211; Stephen, 37b to 405.

Certainty signifies, a clear aud distinct statement, so that it may be understood by the oppo-

site party, by the jury, who are to ascertain the truth of such statement, and by the" court, who

are to give judgment. Cowp. 6^2; Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 17. Less certainty is requisite, when

the law presumes that the knowledge of the facts is peculiarly in the opposite narty; and so

when it is to be presumed that the party pleading is not acquainted with minute eircmnstances.

13 East, 112; Com. Dig. Pleader. C. 2C; ci East, 85. General statements of facts admitting of

almost any proof, are objectionable : 1 M. and S. 441; 3 id. 144 ; but where a subject compre-

hends multiplicity of matter, there, in order to avoid prolixity, general pleading is allowed. 2

Saund. 411, n. 4; 8 T. K. 462.

In the construction of facts stated in pleading, it is a general rule, that orerv- thing sh»ll bo

taken most strongly against the p:irty pleading : 1 Saund. 259, u. 8 ; or rather, if the meaning of

tho words be equivocal, they thall be construed most strongly against the party pleading them:

2 H. Bla. 530; for it is to bo intended, that every person states his case as favorably to himself

as possible: Co. Litt. 20, 30; but the language is to have a reasonable iuteuduient and con-

struction : Com. Dig. Pleader, C. 25; and if the sense be clear, mere exceptions ought not to bo

regarded : 5 East, 529; and where an expression is capable of different meanings, that shall bo

taken which will support the averment, aud not the other which would defeat it. 4 Taunt. 492;

5 East, 257. After verdict, an expression should be construed in such sense as would sustain

the verdict. 1 B. and C. 297.]

In this connection the student would do well to read the admirable introduction to Stephen

on Pleading, by Prof. Saml. Tyler.
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upon a supposed trespass, in order to give the court a jurisdiction, the plaintiff

may declare in whatever action, or charge him with whatever injury, he thinks

proper; unless he has held him to bail by a special ac etiam, which the plaintiff

is then bound to pursue. And so also, m order to have the benefit of a capias

to secure the defendants' person, it was the ancient practice, and is therefore

still warrantable in the common *pleas to sue out a writ of trespass r $004]

qitare clau-sum fregil, for breaking the plaintiff's close: and when the >• '

defendant is once brought in upon this writ, the plaintiff declares in whatever

action the nature of his true injury may require; as in an action of covenant,

or on the case for breach of contract, or other less forcible transgression: (ej

unless, by holding the defendant to bail on a special ac etiam, he has bound

himself to declare accordingly. (2)

In local actions, where possession of land is to be recovered, or damages for

an actual trespass, or for waste, &c., affecting land, the plaintiff must lay his

declaration or declare his injury to have happened in the very county and place

that it really did happen; (3) but iu transitory actions, for injuries that might

have happened anywhere, as debt, detinue, slander, and the like, the plaintiff

may declare in what county he pleases, and then the trial must be had in that

county in which the declaration is laid. Though, if the defendant will make

affidavit that the cause of action, if any, arose not in that but in another county,

the court will direct a change of the venue, or visne (that is, the vicinia, or

neighbourhood, in which the injury is declared to be done), and will oblige the
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plaintiff to declare in the other county; unless he will undertake to give mate-

rial evidence in the first. For the statutes 6 Ric. II, c. 2, and 4 Hen. IV, c. 18,

having ordered all writs to be laid in their proper counties, this, as the judges

conceived, empowered them to change the venue, if required, and not to insist

rigidly on abating the writ: which pmctice began in the reign of James the

First, (d) And this power is discretionally exercised, so as to prevent, and not

to cause, a defect of justice. Therefore, the court will not change the venue to

any of the four northern counties, previous to the spring circuit; because there

the assizes are holden only once a year, at the time of the summer circuit. And

it will sometimes remove the venue from the proper jurisdiction (especially of

a narrow and limited kind), upon a suggestion, duly supported, that a fair and

impartial trial cannot be had therein, (e)

(c) « Ventr. 259.

(d) ttastall, tit. Dette, 184, b. Fitz. Abr. tit. Britfe, 18. Sulk. 070. Trye's Jut. FUlz. 231. Styl. Pract.

Bes. (edit. UB7) 331.

(e) Stra. 874, Mylock v. Saladine. Trin. 4 Gco. Ill, B. R.

(2) [And even then, the plaintiff will only lose the benefit of the bail, and the court -will not

set aside the proceeding*. 7 T. R. SO; 8 id. 27; 5 Moore, 483; 6 T. R. 363.

The declaration should in other respects correspond with the process, as in the names and

numbers of the parties, the character or right in which they sue or are sued; but as, accord-

ing to the present practice of the courts, oyer of the writ cannot be craved, and a variance

between the writ and declaration cannot in any case bo pleaded in abatement: 1 Sauml. 318;

3 B. and P. 395; and as there are several instances in which the court will not sot aside the pro-

ceeding on account of a variance between the writ and declaration (6 T. R. 384), many of the

older decisions are no longer applicable in practice. But if the defect appear on the face of

the declaration, the plaintiff may plead in abatement, or demur accordingly. As to these gen-

eral requisites, see 1 Chit, on PI. 222 to 229.]

(3) [Actions for every kind of injury to real property are local, as for nuisances, waste, &c.,

unless there be some contract between the parties, on which to ground the action. 1 Taunt.

379: 11 East, 226. And if the land be out of this kingdom, the plaintiff has no remedy in

the English courts, if there be a court of justice to resort to where the land is situate. 4 T. R.

503; 1 Strft. 646; Cowp. 180; 6 East, 598. Where an injury has been caused in one county to

laud, &c., in another, or when the action is founded upon two or more material facts, which

took place in different counties, the venue may be laid in either. 2 Taunt. 252, overruling 2

Catnpb. 266; 7 Co. 1; 3 Leon. 141; 7 T. R. 583; 1 Chit on PI. 242.

In an action upon a lease for the uon-payment of rent, or other breach of covenant, when

the action is founded on the jmvitij of contract, it is transitory ; but not so when the action is

founded on the privity of estate. 3 T. R. 394; 3 Co. 23; 1 Saund. 237; Tidd, 431; 1 Chit.

244 to 246.]

The power of changing the venue was extended by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IT, c. 42, § 22, to

local actions.
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f *295 1 *** *8 ?^nera^y "stial, in actions upon the case, to set forth several

' •" cases by different counts in the same declaration ; so that, if the plaintiff

fails in the proof of one, he may succeed in another. (4) As, in an action on

the case upon an assumpait for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff usually

counts or declares, first, upon a settled and agreed price between him and the

defendant; as that they bargained- for twenty pounds : and lest he should fail

in the proof of this, he counts likewise upon a quantum valebant; that the

defendant bought other goods, and agreed to pay him so mnch as they were

reasonably worth ; and then avers that they were worth other twenty pounds ;

and so on in three or four different shapes; (5) and at last concludes with

declaring, that the defendant had refused to fulfil any of these agreements,

whereby he is endamaged to such a value. And if he proves the case laid in

any one of his counts, though he fails in the rest, he shall recover proportion-

able damages. This declaration always concludes with these words: "And

thereupon he brings suit" &c., " inde producit sectam," &c. (6) By which words,

suit or secla (a sequendo), were anciently understood the witnesses or followers

of the plaintiff. (/) For, in former times, the law would not put the defendant

to the trouble of answering the charge, till the plaintiff had made out at least

a probable case, (g) But the actual production of the suit, the secta, or fol-

lowers, is now antiquated, and hath been totally disused, at least ever since the

reign of Edward the Third, though the form of it still continues.

At the end of the declaration are added also the plaintiff's common pledges

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of prosecution, John Doe and Eichard Roe, (7) which, as we before observed, (h)

are now mere names of form ; though formerly they were of use to answer to

the king for the amercement of the plaintiff, in case he were nonsuited, barred

of his action, or had a verdict or judgment against him. (?') For, if the plaintiff

neglects to deliver a declaration for two terms after the defendant appears, or is

guilty of other delays or defaults against the rules of law in any subsequent

f *296 1 *staSe °f t^6 action, he is adjudged not to follow or pursue his remedy

' '" J as he ought to do, and thereupon a nonsuit or non prosequiter, is en-

tered; and he is said to he nonpros 'd. (8) And for thus deserting his complaint,

(/) Sold, on Fur-test', c. 21. (#) Bract. 400. Flet. J. 2, c. 63.

(h) See page 274. (i) 3 Bulstr. 276. 4 lost. 180.

(4) But several connts for the same cause of action are not now allowed, as a general rule,

and the court, on motion, may order them stricken out. Reg. Gen. Trin. T. 1853

(5) [The variations should be substantial ; for if the different connts be so similar that the

Eauie evidence would support each of them, and be of any considerable length, and vex-

atiously inserted, the court would, on application, refer it to the master for examination, and to

strike out the redundant counts ; and in gross cases direct the costs to be paid by the attorney.

1 X. R. 289 ; Rep. T. Hardw. 139. And as to striking out superfluous counts, see Tidd, 8th

ed. 667, 648. In 2 Bing. 412, nine counts were allowed in an action for slander, though the

words used were very few. See 1 Chit, on PI. 350, 351, 352, as to the insertion of several

counts. There must be no misjoinder of different counts ; and, in order to prevent the con-

fusion which might ensue, if different forms of action, requiring different pleas and different

judgments, were allowed to be joined in one action, it is a general rule, that actions in form

ex contractii cannot be joined with those in form ex dclicto. Thus, assurnpsit and debt (2

Smith, 618 ; 3 id. 114), or assumpsit and an action on the case, as for a tort, cannot be joined : 1

T. R. 276, 277; 1 Vent. 366; Carth. 189; nor assumpsit with trover: 2 Lev. 101; 3 id. 99;

1 Salk. 10; 3 Wils. 354; 6 East, 335; 2 Chitty R. 343; nor trover with detinue. TTilles, 118;

1 Chit, on PI. 182. Debt and detinue may, however, be joined, although the judgments bo

different. 2 Saund. 117. And see further, as to what is a misjoiuder, 1 Chit, on PL 199.

Unless the subsequent count expressly refers to the preceding, no defect therein will be aided

by such preceding count. Bae. Ab. Pleas and Pleader, 16, 1.]

" (G) [It does not so conclude in actions against attorneys and other officers of the court, but

thus : " and therefore he prays relief, <fec." Andr. 247 ; Barnes, 3, 167.

In actions at the suit of an executor or administrator, immediately after the conclusion, to

the damage, <tc., and before the pledges, a profert of the letters testamentary, or letters of

administration, should be made. Bac. Ab. Executor, C ; Dougl. 5, in notes. But omission is

aided, unless defendant demur specially. 4 Ann. c. 16, $ 1.]

(7) This form was not essential (3 T. R. 157). and it is now obsolete.

(8) [But unless the defendant take advantage of the plaintiff's neglect, by signing such judg-

ment, the plaintiff may deliver his declaration at any time within a year next after tho return
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after making a false claim or complaint (profalso clamore suo), he shall not

only pay costs to the defendant, but is liable to be amerced to the king. A

retraxtt differs from a nonsuit, in that the one is negative, and the other posi-

tive : the nonsuit is a mere default and neglect of the plaintiff, and therefore he

is allowed to begin his suit again, upon payment of costs; but a retraxit is an

open and voluntary renunciation of his suit in court, and by this he forever

loses his action. A discontinuance is somewhat similar to a nonsuit; for when

a plaintiff leaves a chasm in the proceedings of his cause, as by not continuing

the process regularly from day to day, and time to time, as he ought to do, the

suit is discontinued, and the defendant is no longer bound to attend: but the

plaintiff must begin again, by suing out a new original, usually paying costs to

his antagonist. Anciently, by the demise of the king, all suits depending in

his courts were at once discontinued, and the plaintiff was obliged to renew the

process, by suing out a fresh writ from the successor; the virtue of the former

writ being totally gone, and the defendant no longer bound to attend in con-

sequence thereof; but, to prevent -the expense as well as delay attending this

rule of law, the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 7, enacts, that by the death of the king

no action shall be discontinued; but all proceedings shall stand good as if the

same king had been living.

When the plaintiff hath stated his case in the declaration, it is incumbent on

the defendant within a reasonable time to make his defence, and to put in &plea;

else the plaintiff will at once recover judgment by default, or nihil dicit of the
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defendant.

Defence, in its true legal sense, signifies not a justification, protection, or guard,

•which is now its popular signification; but merely an opposing or denial, (from

the French verb defender) of the truth or validity of the complaint. It is the

contestatio litis of the civilians: a general assertion that the plaintiff hath.no

ground of action, which assertion is afterwards extended *and main- r #0071

tained in his plea. For it would be ridiculous to suppose that the defend- L *'''J

ant comes and defends (or, in the vulgar acceptation, justifies) the force and

injury, in one line, and pleads that he is not guilty of the trespass complained of,

in the next. And therefore, in actions of dower, where the demandant doth not

count of any injury done, but merely demands her endowment, (k) and in assizes

of land, where also there is no injury alleged, but merely a question of right

stated for the determination of the recognitprs or jury, the tenant makes no

defence. (I) In writs of entry, (m) where no injury is stated in the count, but

merely the right of the demandant and the defective title of the tenant, the ten-

ant comes and defends or denies his right, jus suwm; that is (as I understand

it, though with a small grammatical inaccuracy), the right of the demandant, the

only one expressly mentioned in the pleadings, or else denies his own right to

be such, as is suggested by the count of the demandant. And in writs of right,

(M) the tenant always comes and defends the right of the demandant and his

seisin, jus pradtcti S. et seisinam ipsius (o) (or else the seisin of his ancestor,

upon which he counts, as the case may be), and the demandant may reply, that

the tenant unjustly defends his, the demandant's, right, and the seisin on which

he counts, (p) All which is extremely clear, if we understand by defence an op-

position or denial, but it is otherwise inexplicably difficult, (q)

The courts were formerly very nice and curious with respect to the nature of

the defence, so that if no defence was made, though a sufficient plea was pleaded,

the plaintiff should recover judgment: (r) and therefore the book entitled

novce narrationes or the new talys, (s) at the end of almost every count, narra-

(*) Rastal, Kul. 234. (I) Booth ofReal Actions, 118. (m) Book II. Appendix, No. V, f 2.

(n| Appendix, No. I, « 5. |ol Co. Entr. I8S. (p) Nov. ffar. 2:!0, edit 1531.

io) The true reason of this, says Booth <"'>» Real Actions, Si, \uj. I could never yet lind ; so little did he

understand of principles!

(r) Co. Litt. 127. («) Edit. 1834.

of the writ. 3 T. R. 123; 5 id. 35; 7 id. 7 ; sed vide 2 N. R. 404. As to when the defendant

is entitled to, and how he should sign, a judgment of, and costs on non pros., see Tidd, 8th ed.,

index, tit. Non Pros.]
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tio, or tale, subjoins such defence as is proper for the defendant to make. For

a general defence or denial was not prudent in every situation, since thereby the

propriety of the writ, the competency of the plaintiff, and the cognizance of the

l"*298 1 com'^ were allowed. By defending the force and injury, *the defendant

' " ' waived all pleas of misnomer; (t) and by defending the damages, all

exceptions to the person of the plaintiff; and by defending either the one or the

other when and where it should behove him, he acknowledged the jurisdiction of

court, (u) But of late years these niceties have been very deservedly discounte-

nanced: (w) though they still seem to be law, if insisted on. (x)

Before defence made, if at all cognizance of the suit must be claimed or de-

manded ; when any person or body corporate hath the franchise, not only of

holding pleas within a particular limited jurisdiction, but also of the cognizance

of pleas: and that, either without any words exclusive of other courts, which

entitles the lord of the franchise, whenever any suit that belongs to his jurisdic-

tion is commenced in the courts at Westminster, to demand the cognizance there-

of: or with such exclusive words, which also entitle the defendant to plead to the

jurisdiction of the court, (y) Upon this claim of cognizance, if allowed, all pro-

ceedings shall cease in the superior court, and the plaintiff is left at liberty to

pursue his remedy in the special jurisdiction. As, when a scholar, or other privi-

leged person, of the universities of Oxford or Cambridge, is impleaded in the courts

at Westminster, for any cause of action whatsoever, unless upon a question of

freehold, (z) In these cases, by the charters of those learned bodies, confirmed
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by act of parliament, the chancellor or vice-chancellor may put in a claim of

cognizance; which, if made in due time and form, and with due proof of the

facts alleged, is regularly allowed by the courts, (a) It must be demanded before

full defence is made (b) or imparlance prayed; for these are a submission to the

jurisdiction of the superior court, and the delay is a laches in the lord of the fran-

chise: and it will not be allowed, if it occasion a failure of justice, (c) or if an

action be brought against the person himself, who claims the franchise, unless

he hath also a power in such case of making another judge, (d) (9)

F *299 1 * After defence made, the defendant must put in his plea. But, before

L *au J ne defends, if the suit is commenced by capias or latitat, without any

special original, he is entitled '•o demand one imparlance, (e) or licenha loquendi;

and may, before he pleads, have more time granted by consent of the court; to

see if he can end the matter amicably without farther suit, by talking with the

plaintiff: a practice which is (/) supposed to have arisen from a principle of

(t) Theloal. dig. I. M. o. 1. p, 357.

(M) En la defence sent iij chones entandantz,* per tant mtU defends tort et force home, doyt entendre miil te

excuse de tort a tug surmi/s per counte. et fait lepartie iifple i et per tant quit defendt leidamngei. it affirm le

partie able 'letitre reJtuoiutit; et per tant qitil de/ende ou et qtuint u dccera. il accepte la poiar de court fie COH-

uatre ou trier lour pie. Mod. temnd. cur. 40S. edit. 1.W4. Si'e also Co. Litt. 127.

(w) Salk. 217. Lord Barm. 2*!. (z) Carth. 230. Lord Uayra. 217.

(y) 2 Lord Ray in. 83tt. iO Mo 1. 120. (zi See page 83. (01 Harclr. 605.

(61 Hast. 128, 'Ac. CO 2 Ventr. 363.

(rf) Hob. 87. Year-book, M.H Hen. VI. an. In this latter case the chancellor of Oxford claimed cognizance

of an action of trespass brought against himself, which wua disallowed, because lie should notbojud|re in hia

own cause :—The argument nincl by Serjeant It >lf.; 0:1 behulfof tlie eosfni/.iince iscnrioaa and worth Irana-

cribinj? :—^eo bous dirai unfaljle. 'En aftcun tempt/ait un pape. et acrtU fait un grand offence, et le cardinals

vim/rent a luyetduouent a luy. •'peccasti;" till ait, '-jndicame?' et il» dwoymt, " non possumuf, quiacapiti

ex crclesitv t judica tetpttum .•" et /' apoatol dit, "judico me cremari ;•' et.fuit comlntstus ,' et apreifuit HH sainct.

£1 in cm cat ilfuit sonjuge dement, et isiinl n' eitpan inconvenient que un home ioitjuye demene.

(e) Appendix. No. HI, t 6. (/I Uilb. Hist. Com. I'l. 35.

(9) [But a party may waive, and preclude himself from taking anv objection to a decision

on this account: for if a defendant agree to refer the matter to the plaintiff, he cannot object

to the award that the plaintiff was judge in his own cause. Thus in Matthew v. Ollcrton, 4

Mod. 226; Comb. 213; Hard. 44, which was an action of debt upon an award, and a verdict

for the plaintiff; and. upon its being moved in arrest of judgment, the exception taken was

that the matter in difference was referred to the plaintiff himself, who made an award. Scd

non attoca-tur. And the ease of Serjeant Hards was remembered by Dolhen, justice, viz. : the

Serjeant took a horse from my lord of Canterbury's bailiff, for a deodand, and the archbishop

brought his action ; and it coming to a trial at the assize in Kent, the Serjeant, by rale of court,

referred it to the archbishop to set the price of the horse, which was done accordingly ; and the

Serjeant afterwards moved the court to set aside the award for the reason now offered, but it was

denied by Lord Hale and per totam curiam.]

184

Chap. 20.] PLEADINGS IN SPITS AT LAW. 299

religion, in obedience to that precept of the gospel, '•' agree with thine adversary

quickly, whilst thou art in the way with him." (g) And it may be observed that

this gospel precept has a plain reference to the Roman law of the twelve tables,

which expressly directed the plaintiff and defendant to make up the matter,

while they were in the way, or going to the praetor, — in via, rem uti pacunt

orato. There are also many other previous steps which may be taken by a

defendant before he puts in nis plea. He may, in real actions, demand a view

of the thing in question, in order to ascertain its identity and other circum-

stances. He may crave oyer (h) of the writ, or of the bond, or other specialty

upon which the action is brought : that is, to hear it read to him ; the general-

ity of defendants in the times of ancient simplicity being supposed incapable

to read it themselves, whereupon the whole is entered verbatim upon the record,

and the defendant may take advantage of any condition or other part of it, not

stated in the plaintiffs declaration. (10) *In real actions also the tenant

may pray in aid, or call for assistance of another, to help him plead,

because of the feebleness or imbecility of his own estate. Thus a tenant for

life may pray in aid of him that hath the inheritance in remainder or reversion ;

and an "incumbent may pray in aid of the patron and ordinary: that is, that

they shall be joined in the action, and help to defend the title. Voucher also

is the calling in of some person to answer the action, that hath warranted the

title to the tenant or defendant. This we still make use of in the form of com-

mon recoveries, (i) which are grounded on a writ of entry; a species of action
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that we may remember relies chiefly on the weakness of the tenant's title, who

therefore vouches another person to warrant it. If the vouchee appears, he is

made defendant instead of the voucher: but, if he afterward makes default,

recovery shall be had against the original defendant; and he shall recover over

an equivalent in value against the deficient vouchee. In assizes, indeed, where

the principal question is, whether the demandant or his ancestors were 'or were

not in possession till the ouster happened, and the title of the tenant is little

(if at all) discussed, there no voucher is allowed ; but the tenant may bring a

writ of warrantia charlce against the warrantor, to compel him to assist him

with a good plea or defence, or else to render damages and the value of the land,

if recovered against the tenant. (_/) In many real actions also, (k) brought by

or against an infant under the age of twenty-one years, and also in actions of

debt brought against him, as heir to any deceased ancestor, either party may

suggest the nonage of the infant, and pray that the proceedings may be deferred

till his full age; or (in our legal phrase) that the infant may have "his age, and

that the parol may demur, (11) that is, that the pleadings may be stayed; and

then they shall not proceed till his full age, unless it be apparent that he can-

not be prejudiced thereby. (1) But, by the statutes of Westm. 1, 3 Ed\v. I, c. 46,

and of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 2, in write of entry sur disseisin in some par-

ticular cases, and in actions ancestral brought by *an infant, the parol r *r>Q*i -i

shall not demur: otherwise he might be deforced of his whole propert\% L -I

and even want of maintenance till he came of age. So likewise in a writ of

dower the heir shall not have his age; for it is necessary that the widow's claim

be immediately determined, else she may want a present subsistence, (m) Nor

shall an infant patron have it in a quare impedit, (n) since the law holds it

necessary and expedient that the church be immediately filled.

When these proceedings are over, the defendant must then put in his excuse

or plea. Pleas are of two sorts ; dilatory pleas, and pleas to the action. Dilatory

(a) Matt v. 25. (h) Appendix. No. m, f 6. (i) Book II, Appendix, No. V, } 2. fjl F. N. B. 135.

ft; Dyer, 137. (I) Finch, L. SIX). (m) 1 Roll. Abr. 137. (n) Ibid. 139

(10) [Bnt now a defendant is not allowed oyer of the writ. 1 B. and P. 646 ; 3 id. 395 ; 7

East, 383. As to the demand and giving of oyer, and the manner of setting out deeds, ic., therein,

see 1 Saund, 9. (1), 289, (2) ; 2 id. 9. (12, 13"), 46, (7). 366. (1). 405. (1). 410 (2) ; Tidd, 8th ed.

635 to 6m and index, tit. Oyer ; 1 Chit, on PI. 369 to 375.]

(11) But now the parol may not demur in actions, suits or other proceedings against infants.

VOL. II.— 24 185

301 PLEADINGS IN SUITS AT LAW. [Book III.

pleas are such as tend merely to delay or put off the suit, by questioning the

propriety of the remedy, rather than by denying the injury: pleas to the action

are such as dispute the very cause of suit The former cannot be pleaded after

a general imparlance, which is an acknowledgment of the propriety of the

action. For imparlances are either general, of which we have before spoken,

and which are granted of course; or special, with a saving of all exceptions to

the writ or count, which may be granted by the prothonotary; or they may-

be still more special, with a saving of all exceptions whatsoever which are granted

at thediscretion of the court. (0)

1. Dilatory pleas are, 1. To the jurisdiction of the court: alleging, that it

ought not to hold plea of this injury, it arising in Wales or beyond sea; or

because the land in question is of ancient demesne, and ought only to be

demanded in the lord's court, &c. 2. The disability of the plaintiff, by reason

whereof he is incapable to commence or continue the suit; as, that he is an

alien enemy, outlawed, excommunicated, attainted of treason or felony, under a

prceiimnire, not in rerum natura (being only a fictitious person), an infant, a

feme-covert, or a mon k professed. (12) 3. In abatement, which abatement is either

r *3Q2 -] of the *writ or the count, for some defect in one of them ; as by misnam-

-" ing the defendant, which is called a misnomer; giving him a wrong addi-

tion, as esquire instead of knight; or other want of form in any material

respect. (13) Or, it may be, that the plaintiff is dead; for the death of either

party is at once an abatement of the suit. (14) And in actions merely personal,
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foj 12 Hod. 629.

(12) [As to this plea, see 1 Chit, on PI. 387, 388. Whenever the subject-matter of the plea or

defence is, that the plaintiff cannot maintain any action at any time, in respect of the supposed

cause of action, it may, and usually should, he pleaded in bar; bnt matter which usually defeats

the present proceeding, and does not show that the plaintiff is forever precluded, should in general

be pleaded in abatement. 4 T. K. 227. Some matter* may be pleaded either in abatement or

bar; as outlawry for felony, alien enemy, or attainder, <fco. Bac. Ab. Abatement, N.; Com. Dig.

Abatement, K.

The defendant may also plead in abatement, his, or her, own personal disability; as in case

of coverture, when the husband ought to have been joined. 3 T. K. 687; Bau. Ab. Abate-

ment. G.]

(13) [Pleas in abatement to the writ, are so termed rather from their effects, than from their

being strictlv such pleas; for as oyer of the writ can no longer be craved, no objection can be

taken by pfea to matter which is merely contained in the writ. 3 B. ami P. 399; 1 B. and P.

645. But if the mistake in the writ be carried also into the declaration, or rather if the declara-

tion, which is presumed to correspond with the writ or bill, be incorrect in respect of some

extrinsic matter, it is then open to the defendant to plead in abatement to the writ or bill: 1 B.

and P. 648 ; and as to such pleas, see 1 Chit, on PI. 390 to 394. Consequently, a misnomer of the

defendant, or giving him a wrong addition, or other want of form in the writ, unless it be con-

tained in the declaration, is not now pleadable in abatement. See 1 Saund. 318 n. 3; 3 B. and

P. 395. And the defendant, to take advantage of any defect in the writ, should in general, before

appearance, move to set it aside for irregularity. 1 B. and P. 647; 5 Moore, 168.

But now the writ itself may be amended ; and further restrictions have by the common law

procedure act, 1852, been imposed on pleas in abatement, in addition to those previously imposed

by statute 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42. By that statute (section 8), no plea in abatement for the non-

joinder of any person as a co-defendant shall be allowed unless it shall be stated in such plea that

such person is resident within the jurisdiction of the conrt, and unless the place of residence of

such person shall be stated with certainty in an affidavit verifying the plea. And by section 11

no pica in abatement for a misnomer shall be allowed in any personal action; but in all cases in

which a misnomer would, but for that act, have been pleadable, the defendant may cause the

declaration to be amended at the cost of the plaintiif, by inserting the right name upon a judge's

summons founded on an affidavit of the right name. And by section 12. in all actions upon bills

of exchange or promissory notes, or other written instruments, the parties to which are designated

by the initials of some contraction of the Christian or first names, it is sufficient in every affidavit

to hold to bail, and in the process or declaration to designate such persons by the same initial

letter or contraction of the Christian or first name.]

(14) [But now by the common law procedure act, 1852, an action shall no longer abate by

the death of either party, bnt may be continued by the legal representative of a sole plaintiff, on

his entering (by leave of the court) a suggestion of the plaintiffs death on the record ; or by a

surviving plaintiff when the cause of action survives; or against the legal representatives of a

defendant.]
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arising ex delicto, for wrongs actually done or committed by the defendant, as

trespass, battery, and slander, the rule is that actio personalis montur cum per-

sona ; (p) and it never shall be revived either by or against the executors or

other representatives. For neither the executors of the plaintiff have received,

nor those of the defendant have committed, in their own personal capacity, any

manner of wrong or injury. (15) But in actions arising ex contracts, by breach

of promise and the like, where the right descends to the representatives of the

plaintiff, and those of the defendant have assets to answer the demand, though

the suits shall abate by the death of the parties, yet they may be revived against

or by the executors: (q) being indeed rather actions against the property than

the person, in which the executors have now the same interest that their testator

had before.

These pleas to the jurisdiction, to the disability, or in abatement, were for-

merly very often used as mere dilatory pleas, without any foundation of truth,

and calculated only for delay; but now by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, no dilatory

plea is to be admitted, without affidavit made of the truth thereof, or some

probable matter shown to the court to induce them to believe it true. And

with respect to the pleas themselves, it is a rule, that no exception shall be

admitted against a declaration or writ, unless the defendant will in the same plea

give the plaintiff a better; (r) that is, show him how it might be amended, that

there may not be two objections upon the same account. Neither, by statute 8

and 9 Win. Ill, c. 31, shall any plea in abatement be admitted in any suit for
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partition of lands; nor shall the same be abated by reason of the death of any

tenant.

*A11 pleas to the jurisdiction conclude to the cognizance of the court: r ^QO -,

praying "judgment, whether the court will have further cognizance of >• ° "' '

the suit;" pleas to the disability conclude to the person; by praying "judgment,

if the said A, the plaintiff, ought to be answered;" and pleas in abatement (when

the suit is by original) conclude to the writ or declaration ; by praying "judg-

ment of the writ, or declaration, and that the same may be quashed," cassetur,

made void, or abated ; but, if the action be by bill, the plea must pray " judg-

ment of the bill," and not of the declaration;" the bill being here the original,

and the declaration only a copy of the bill.

When these dilatory pleas are allowed, the cause is either dismissed from that

jurisdiction; or the plaintiff is stayed till his disability be removed; or he is

obliged to sue out a new writ, by leave obtained from the court: (s) or to amend

and new frame his declaration. But when on the other hand they are overruled

as frivolous, the defendant has judgment of respondent oiister, or to answer over

in some better manner. It is then incumbent on him to plead.

2. A plea to the action; that is, to answer to the merits of the complaint.

This is done by confessing or denying it.

A confession of the whole complaint is not very usual, for then the defend-

ant would probably end the matter sooner; or not plead at all, but suffer judg-

ment to go by default. Yet sometimes, after tender and refusal of a debt, if

the creditor harasses his debtor with an action, it then becomes necessary for

the defendant to acknowledge the debt, and plead the tender; adding, tbat he

has always been ready, tout temps prist, and still is ready, uncore prist, to dis-

charge it: for a tender by the debtor and refusal by the creditor will in all

coses discharge the costs, (t) but not the debt itself; though in some particular

(t) 4 Inst. S15. (q) March. 14. (r) Brownl. ISO. (•) Co. Entr. 271. (t) 1 Vontr. 21.

(15) [Br statute 3 and 4 "Win. IV, e. 42, an action of trespass or trespass on the case, may bo

maintained br the executors or administrators of any deceased person for injury to his real

estate in his lifetime, if such injury were committed "within six calendar months before death,

and the action brought within one year after the time of the death; and an action of trespass

or trespass on the case may also be maintained against executors or administrators for wrongs

committed by the deceased to another's property, real or personal, such injury baring been

committed within six mouths of the death, and the action brought within six months alter ad-

ministration taken.]
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r *JJQ^ -. cases the creditor will totally lose his money. («) (16) *Bnt frequently

' ' -" the defendant confesses one part of the complaint (by a cognovit adio-

nem in respect thereof), and traverses or denies the rest: in order to avoid the

expense of carrying that part to a formal trial, which he has no ground to liti-

(11) 1 .ill. I 338. Co. I.ill, 209.

(16) [As questions relative to the tender of a debt or money are of so frequent occurrence, we

will consider the respective rules and decisions under the following heads: 1st. What is a pood

tender. 2d. In what cases it may be made. Ami lastly, the effect and ad vantages gained by it:

and how these may be superseded.

1. WHAT is A GOOD TENDER. It is a general rule, thnt in order to constitute a pood legal tender,

the party should not only be ready to pay, and make an actual offer of the sum due. but actually

produce the same, unless such production be dispensed with by the express declaration of the

creditor that he will not accept it. or by some equivalent act. 10 East, 101; 5 Esp. R. 48; 3 T.

R. 684 ; Peake C. N. P. 88; 1 Crouip. 152; 2 M. and S. 86; 7 Moore, 59. If the plaintiff do not

object to receive the money, it is not sufficient for the defendant to prove that he had the money

with him, and held it in a bag under his arm, he ought to have laid it down for him. Id ; Bull.

N. P. 157; 6 Esp. 46. If A says, I am not aware of the exact balance, but if any be due I am

ready to pay it, this is no tender. 15 East. 428.

With respect to the nature of the money tendered, it should bo in the current coin of the

realm, and not in bank notes ; and see the 56 Geo. Ill, c. 68, s. 11, by which gold coin is declared

the only legal tender. But a tender in bank notes is good, unless particularly objected to on

that account at the time. 3 T. R. 5M ; 2 B and P. 526. So is a tender of foreign coin made
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current here by roval proclamation. 5 Rep. 114, b. So is a tender of provincial bank notes, or a

draft on a banker, unless so objected to. Peake N. P. 3d cd. 237; Tidd. 8th ed. 187, n. f. It

seems, that as any money coined at the mint upon which there is the king's stamp is good, and

that all such money is "good in proportion to its value, without a proclamation, such money

would be a good tender. 2 Salk. 446.

With respect to the amount of the sum tendered, it should in general be an offer of the specific

sum due, unqualified by any circumstance wliatei-cr; and therefore tendering a larger sum, and

making cross demand, is insufficient. 2 D. and R. 305. A tender of 20/. in bank notes, with

n request to pay the difference over fifteen guineas*, is not a good tender as to the fifteen

guineas, though it would have been otherwise if the tender had been in guineas. 3 Campb.

70; 1 id. 181; 6 Taunt. 336. But a tender of a larger sum generally is pood. 5 Rep. 114; 8

T. R. 683; sed vid. 2 Esp. 711. And a tender of a larger sum, and asking change, is good,

provided the creditor do not object to it on that account, but only demands a larger sum.

6 Taunt. 336; Peake C. X. P. 68; 2 Esp. c. 711; 3 Campb. 70; and seel Gow. C. X. P. 121.

A tender of a sum to A, including both a debt due to A, B, and C, and also a debt due to C. is

a good tender of the debt due to the three: 3 T. R. 683; and if several creditors, to whom

money is due in the same right, assemble for the purpose of demanding payment, a tender of

the gross sum, which they all refuse on account of the insufficiency of the amount, is good.

Peake C. 88; 2 T. R. 414.

To constitute a good tender, it must be an unconditional one in payment of the debt; and

therefore where a tender of payment was made, accompanied with a protestation against the

right of the party to receive it, it was held insufficient. 3 Esp. 91. So is a tender accom-

panied with the demand of a receipt in full: 5 Esp. Rep. 48; 2 Campb. 21; scd vid. Peake C. 179;

Stark, on Evid. part 4, 1392, n. (g); or upon condition that it shall bo received as the whole of

the balance due : 4 Campb. 156; or that a particular document shall be given up to be can-

celled. 2 Campb. 21. To constitute a good tender of stock, the buyer must be called on

opening the books (1 Stra. 533), and the defendant must do all in his power to moke it good.

1 Stra. 504.

It is no answer to a plea of tender that the plaintiff had, before the tender, instructed his

attorney to sue out the writ, and that the attorney had applied before the tender for the writ

which was afterwards sued out: 8 T. R. 6itt); and if the plaintiff brings his action, and discon-

tinues it, and commences another, a tender before the latter action is good. 1 Moore, 200. Any

party, being an agent of the debtor, may tender the rainier. 2 M. and S. 86.

"With respect to the persons to whom the tender should be made, it will suffice if it be to the

creditor or any authorized agent. 1 Campb. 477. Tender to an attorney, authorized to issue

out a writ, <Ec., is good. Dougl. 623. And a tender to an agent has been held good, although

the principal had previously prohibited the agent from receiving the money if offered, the

principal having put his business into the hands of his attorney. 5 Taunt. 307 ; 1 Marsh. 55, S.

C. A bailiff, who makes a distress, cannot delegate his authority; therefore a tender to hi8

agent is insufficient; 6 Esp. 95; and a tender to oiie of several creditors is a tender to all. 3 T.

R. 683.

2. IN WHAT CASES A TENDER MAT BE MADE WITH EFFECT. In general, a tender can only

be made with effect in cases when! the demand is of a liquidated sum, or of a sum capable of

liquidation by computation. See 2 Burr. 1120. Therefore a tender cannot be pleaded to an

action for general damages upon a contract: 1 Vent. 356; 2 Bio. Kep. 837; 2 B. and P. 234;
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gate. A species of this sort of confession is the payment of money into court: (v)

which is for the most part necessary upon pleading a tender, and is itself a kind

of tender to the plaintiff; by paying into the hands of the proper officer of the

court as much as the defendant acknowledges to be due, together with the costs

(vi Styl. Prnct. Rex. (edit. 1G57) 201. 2 Keb. 555. Salk. 59G.

3 id. 14: or in covenant, unless for the pannent of money: 7 Taunt. 486; 1 Moore, 200 ; S. C.;

5 Mod. 18 ; 1 Lord Raym. 566; 12 Mod. 376 : 2 H. Bla. 837 ; or for a tort: 2 Stra. 787, 906 ; 7

T. K. 335; or trespass. 2 Wils. 115. It cannot be pleaded to an action for dilapidations: 8 T.

H. 47 ; Stra. 909 ; or for not repairing: 2 Salk. 596 ; or against a carrier for goods spoiled, though

the tender should be of the invoice price : 2 B. and P. 234 ; or for not delivering goods at a cer-

tain price per ton: 3 B. and P. 14; or in an action for a false return : 7 T. R. 335; or for mesne

profits. 2 Wils. 115. Bnt in assumpsit against a carrier for not delivering goods, the defendant

having advertised that ho would not be answerable for any goods beyond the value of 20/., un-

less they were entered and paid for accordingly, a tender of the 20?. would, it seems, bo availa-

ble. 1 H. Bla. 299. So a tender may be made with effect to a demand, for navigation : 7 T. R.

36 ; 1 Stra. 142; or in an action for principal and interest due on bonds for payment of moneys

by instalments. 3 Burr. 1370. So the penalty of a bond may with effect be tendered. 2 Bfa.

1190. So the arrears of a bond for 40f., payable by 5?. per annum. 2 Stra. 814. So a tender

may with effect be made in covenant for rent, or for the advanced rent of 51. per acre for ploughing

meadow grounds. 2 H. Bla. 837 ; 7 Taunt. 486 ; 1 Moore, 200 S. C., and vide 2 Salk. 59ti. So

also on a policy of insurance : 19 Geo. II, o. 37, $ 7; 2 Taunt. 317; or in debt for penalty for ex-

ercising trade contrary to 5 Eliz. c. 4; 1 Bnrr. 431; or for penalty on game laws, being actions
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popular, and not qui tain. 2 H. Bla. 1052; 2 Stra. 1217. Where a party has wrongfully pos-

sessed himself of goods, no tender of freight is necessary in order to enable the party to main-

tain the action. 2 T. K. 285.

Justices of the peace, and in like manner excise and custom-house officers, and surveyors of

highways, are enabled by several statutes to tender amends for any thing done by them'in the

execution of their offices. Also by the 21 Jae. I, c. 16, $ 5, in case of involuntary trespasses,

tender of amends may be mnde.

Lastly, As TO THE EFFECT OF A TENDEE, AND THE ADVANTAGES ACQUIRED BY IT. It should

in the iirst place be observed that the debtor is liable for the non-performance of his contract if

the money be not paid at the time agreed upon ; the mere tendering the money afterward is not

sufficient to discharge him from such liability; it goes only in mitigation of tlanuigea; though

indeed if a jury should find that no damages were sustained by reason of the defendant not ten-

dering the money at the time agreed upon, the defendant would defeat the action by the tender

afterward. See Salk. 622; 8 East, 163; 1 Lord Rayrn. 254; 7 Taunt. 486. The tender of

inouey due on a promissory note, accompanied with a demand of the note, stops the running of

interest. 2 Campb. 269; 8 East, 168; 4 Leon. 209. The tender, if pleaded, admits the con-

tract and facts stated in the declaration. 3 Taunt. 95; Peake, 15; 2 T. R. 275; 4 id. 579.

If, therefore, the defendant's liability is to be disputed, a tender should not bo pleaded. So if

there be a special count, and the defendant mean to deny it, the tender should bo pleaded to the

other counts only : see Tidd. 8th ed. 676; and if there be any doubt as to the sufficiency of the

tender, it is not advisable to plead it, but more expedient to pay the amount into court upon

the common rule; for if the defendant should not succeed in proving the tender, he will have to

pay all the costs of the trial; whereas if the money be paid into court, and the plaintiff cannot

prove more due, he will bo liable to pay all costs subsequent to the time of paying the money

into court. If the sum tendered bo not sufficient, and the plaintiff should succeed on the gen-

eral issue, the plaintiff would still be entitled to the costs of the issue on the plea of tender. 5

East, 2C-2; 5 Taunt. 660. If the defendant bring money into court on a plea of tender, the

plaintiff may take it out, though he deny the tender. 1 B. and P. 332. The plaintiff, it seems,

can gain no advantage by not taking the money out of court; and it has been said, that if the

plaintiff will not take the monev, but takes issue on the tender, and it is found against him, the

defendant shall have It. 1 B. and P. 334, note a.; Lord Raym. 642 : 2 Stra. 1027. If the plain-

tiff should succeed, on the trial, in proving a larger sum to be due than that tendered, though

that sum be below 40*., yet the plaintiff will bo entitled to costs. Dougl. 448.

A tender, not being equivalent to payment itself, and only suspending the plaintiff's remedy

sum not due. 1 Esp. 115; 7 Taunt. 213. Such demand should be made by a person authorized

to give the debtor a discharge. 1 Campb. 478, n. ; 1 Esp. 115. A demand made by the clerk

of the plaintiffs attorney, who was an entire stranger to defendant, is insufficient. 1 Cauipb.

478. A subsequent application to one of two joint debtors, and a refusal, is sufficient. 1 Stark.

323; 4 Esp. 93 ; Noy, 135; Vin. Ab. Evid. T. B. 97. Delivering a letter at defendant's house

to a clerk, who returned with an answer that the debt should be settled, is priina facie evidence

of a demand. 1 Stark. 323. A.prior demand, and refusal, is an answer to the plea of tender.

8 Bast, 168; 1 Saund. 33, n. 2; Boll. N. P. 156; 1 Campb. 478.]
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hitherto incurred, in order to prevent the expense of any farther proceedings.

This may be done upon what is called a motion; which is an occasional applica-

tion to the court by the parties or their counsel, in order to obtain some rule or

order of court, which becomes necessary in the progress of a cause; and it ia

usually grounded upon an affidavit (the perfect tense of the verb affido), being

a voluntary oath before some judge or officer of the court, to evince the truth

of certain facts, upon which the motion is grounded: though no such affidavit

is necessary for payment of money into court. (17) If after the money paid in,

the plaintiff proceeds in his suit, it is at his own peril: for, if he does not prove

more due than is so paid into court, he shall be nonsuited and pay the defend-

ant costs; but he shall still have the money so paid in, for that the defendant

has acknowledged to be his due. (18) In the French law the rule of practice is

grounded upon principles somewhat similar to this; for there, if a person be

sued for more than he owes, yet he loses his cause if he doth not tender so much

as he really does owe.(«?) To this head may also be referred the practice

of what is called a set-off: whereby the defendant acknowledges the justice of

the plaintiffs demand on the one hand; but on the other sets up a demand of

his own, to counterbalance that of the plaintiff, either in the whole or in part: as,

if the plaintiff sues for ten pounds due on a note of hand, the defendant may

set off nine pounds due to himself for merchandise sold to the plaintiff, and in

case he pleads such set-off, must pay the remaining balance in court This an-

F *305 1 8wer8 *verv nearly to the compensatio or stoppage, of the civil law, (x)

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

L -I and depends on the statutes 2 Geo. II, c. 22, and 8 Geo. II, c. 24, which

enact, that where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and defendant,

one debt may be set against the other, and either pleaded in bar or given in

evidence upon the general issue at the trial; which shall operate as payment,

and extinguish so much of the plaintiff's demand. (19)

(IT) Sp. L. b, 6, c. 4, (x) ff. 10, 2, 1.

(17) By the common law procedure act of 1852, the defendant in any action, except for as-

sault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution, or de-

bauching the plaintiffs daughter or servant, may pay into court, by leave of the court or a judge,

a sum of money by way of compensation. The statutes 9 and 10 Vie. c. 93, and 27 and -28 Vic.

c. 95, extend the right to actions for compensation to the family of a person killed by accident,

and under statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 9fi, a plea of apology and payment into court is allowed in cer-

tain actions for libel.

(18) [The effect of the payment of money into court is nearly similar to that of a tender.

Tidd. 8th ed. 676. This is the only case where a party is bound by the payment of money : 2 T.

K. 645; and though paid in b}' mistake, the court will not order it to be restored to defendant;

though perhaps in a case of fraud they would. 2 B. and P. 392.]

(19) [But in such case, notice must be given at the time of pleading the general issue; and

as to the mode of setting off. see 1 Chit, on PI. 4th ed. 494 to 497.

In some cases, this plea or notice is unnecessary, as where the defendant's demand is more in

the nature of a deduction than a set-off. Thus a defendant is in all cases entitled to retain or

claim by way of deduction, all just allowances or demands accruing to him, or payments made

by him, in respect of the same transaction or account which forms the ground of action : this is

not a set-off, but rather a deduction. See 1 Bla. Rep. 651; 4 Burr. 2133, 2221. And where de-

riiands originally cross, and not arising out of the same transaction, have by subsequent express

Agreement been connected, and stipulated to be deducted or set-ori against each other, the bal-

ance is the debt, and the only sum recoverable by suit without any special plea of set-off, though

it is advisable in most cases, and necessary when the action is on a specialty, to plead it. 5 T.

R. 135; 3 id. 599; 3 Taunt. 76; 2 id. 170. In actions at the suit of assignees of bankrupts, a

set-off need not be pleaded or given notice of: 1 T. B. 115, 116 ; 6 id. 58, 59; though tho prac-

tice is so to plead, or give notice of such sot-off.

It may be important here also to observe, that these acts were passed more for the benefit

of the defendants than the plaintiffs, and are not imperative; so that a defendant may have

his right to set off, and bring a cross action for the debt due to him from the plaintiff; 2 Camp.

594; 5 Taunt. 148; though he cannot safely arrest. 3 B. and Cres. 139. And where tho

defendant is not prepared at the time the plaintiff sues him to prove the sot-off, it is best not

to avail himself of it, for if the defendant should attempt but not succeed on the trial in

proving the set-off, he could not afterwards sue for the amount; and a party cannot bring an

action lor what he has succeeded in setting off in a former suit against him; though it the

bet-off were more than sufficient to cover the plaintiff's demand in the former actiou, the
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Pleas, that totally deny the cause of complaint, are either the general issue,

or a special plea, in bar.

1. The general issue, or general plea, is what traverses, thwarts, and denies

at once the whole declaration; without offering any special matter whereby to

defendant therein might then maintain an action for the surplus. 3 Esp. Rep. 104. Though

the defendant does not avail himself of the sot-off, intending to bring a cross action, the

plaiutiif mav defeat it by taking a verdict for the whole sum he proves to be due to him, sub-

ject to be reduced to the sum really due on the balance of accounts, if the defendant will after-

wards enter into a rule not to sue for the debt intended to bo set off; or he may take a verdict

for the smaller sum, with a special indorsement on the postea, as a foundation for the court to

order a stay ot proceedings, if an action should be brought for the amount of the set-off. 1

"life demand, as well of the plaintiff as of the defendant, must be a debt. A set-off is not

allowed in an action for uncertain damages, whether in assumpsit, covenant, or for a tort, trover,

detinue, replevin, or trespass. Bull. N. P. 181; 3 Campb. 329; 4 T. R. 512; 1 Bla. Rep. 394; 2

The only cases in which a set-off is allowed are in assumpsit, debt, and covenant for the non-

payment of money, and for which an action of debt or indebitatus might be sustained : 2 Bla.

Rep 911 • or where a bond in a penalty is given for securing the payment of money

5 id! 539 Ac. See cases in 1 Chit, on PI. 4th ed. 466, 487; Stark, on Evid. 1312, part 4. The

defendant's bringing an action, or obtaining a verdict for a debt, is no waiver of the right to set

off the debt. 2 Burr. 1229; 3 T. R. 186. And a judgment may be pleaded by way of set-off,

though a writ of error be depending upon it: 3 T. R. 188, in notes; but not so after plamtift w

taken in execution 5 M. and S. 103. The debt to be set off must be a legal and subsisting de-
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mand • an equitable debt will not suffice. See 16 East, 36, 136; 7 id. 173. A demand barred

bv the statute of limitations cannot be set off. 2 Stra. 1271; Peake Rep. 121; Bull. N. P. 180.

A"n attorney cannot set off his bill for business done in court, unless he has previously, and in a

reasonable time to be taxed, delivered a bill signed. 1 Esp. C. 449. But it is not necessary

that a month should intervene between the delivery of the bill and the trial. Id.

The debt sought to be recovered and that to be set off, must be mutual, and due in the same

right • therefore a joint debt cannot be set off against a separate demand, nor a separate debt

alainst a joint one (2 Taunt. 173; Montague, 23; 5 M. and S. 439), unless it be so expressly

6 id 58i • and in an action brought by an ostensible and a dormant partner, the defendant may

set off a debt due from the ostensible partuer alouo. 2 Esp. C. 469 ; 7 T. R. 361, n. S. C. ; see

Peake 196 ; 12 Ves. 346 ; 11 id. 27; id. 517 ; 16 East, 130. A debt due to a man iu right of

his wife cannot be set off in an action against him on his own bond. Bull.N. P. 179. A debt

due from a wife dum sola, cannot be set off iu an action brought by the husband alone, unless

the defendant has made himself individually liable. 2 Esp. C. 594. A debt from an executor in

his own right cannot be set off against a debt to the testator (3 Atk. 691), though the executor

is residuary legatee. Id. So a debt which accrued to the defendant in the lifetime of the tes-

tator cannot be set off against a debt that accrued to the executor even in that character after

the testator's death. Bull. N. P. 180; Willes, 103, 106.

Questions of difficulty frequently arise in cases of set-off, where the agent of the party deals

as principal. The rule in these cases is, that if an agent, dealing for a principal, but conceal-

ine that principal, delivers goods in his own name, the person contracting with him has a

ri^htto consider him as the principal; and though the real principal may appear and sue,

vet the purchaser may in such case set off any claim he has against the agent. 7 T. R. 3t>0;

1 M and S 576- 2 Marsh. 501; Holt C. N". P. 124. But a debt due from a broker cannot be

set off in an action by the principal against the purchaser to recover the price of goods sold

bv the broker not disclosing his name. 2 B. and A. 137. And if un agent sells goods as

his own or has a lien upon them, and does not part with the goods unless the purchaser

«orc8slv aerees to pay bun, the purchaser, in an action brought against him by such agent

for the price of the goods, cannot set off a debt due from the owner to the purchaser. 2 Chit.

part 4, 106.]
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evade it. As in trespass either in vi et armis, or on the case, non culpabilis,not

guilty; (y) in debt upon contract, nihil delet, he owes nothing; in debt on bond,

non est factum, it is not his deed; on an assumpsit, non assumpsit, he made no

such promise. Or in real actions, mil tort, no wrong done; mil disseisin, no

disseisin ; and in a writ of right, the mise or issue is, that the tenant has more

right to hold than the demandant has to demand. These picas are called the

general issue, because by importing an absolute and general denial of what is

alleged in the declaration, they amount at once to an issue: by which we mean

a fact affirmed on one side and denied on the other.

Formerly the general issue was seldom pleaded, except when the party meant

•wholly to deny the charge alleged against him. But when he meant to dis-

tinguish away or palliate the charge, it was always usual to set forth the partic-

ular facts in what is called a special plea; which was originally intended to

apprise the court and the adverse party of the nature and circumstances of the

defence, and to keep the law and the fact distinct. And it is an invariable

rule, that every defence which cannot be thus specially pleaded, may be given

r *QQn -I in evidence upon the general issue at the trial. But the science *of

•• " -" special pleading having been frequently perverted to the purposes of

chicane and delay, the courts have of late in some instances, and the legislature

in many more, permitted the general issue to be pleaded, which leaves every

thing open, the fact, the law, and the equity of the case; and have allowed spe-

cial matter to be given in evidence at the trial. And though it should seem as
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if much confusion and uncertainty would follow from so great a relaxation of

the strictness anciently observed, yet experience has shown it to be otherwise ;

especially with the aid of a new trial, in case either party be unfairly surprised

by the other.

2. Special pleas, in bar of the plaintiffs demand, are very various, according

to the circumstances of the defendant's case. As, in real actions, a general re-

lease or a tine, both of which may destroy and bar the plaintiffs title. Or, in

personal actions, an accord, arbitration, conditions performed, nonage of the

defendant, or some other fact which precludes the plaintiff from his action, (z)

A justification is likewise a special plea in bar; as in actions of assault and bat-

tery, son assault demesne, that it was the plaintiffs own original assault; in

trespass, that the defendant did the thing complained of in right of some office

which warranted him so to do; or, in an action of slander, that the plaintiff is

really as bad a man as the defendant said he was.

Also, a man may plead the statutes of limitation («) in bar; (20) or the time

limited by certain acts of parliament, beyond which no plaintiff can lay his

(y) Appendix. No. II ? 4. (*) Ibid. No. Ill, * 6. (a) See pages 188, 196.

Wherever by a contract mutual duties and obligations are laid upon two parties, and one suoa

for a breach by the other, the defendant may meet the demand by a counter-claim for a breach

of duty by the plaintiff. This is called recoupment. 2 Pars, on Con. 247. It differs from sot-

off, in'that the damages recouped must grow out of a breach of the same contract ou which suit

is brought: Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171; Stow v. Yarwood, 14 111. 4:24; also in that tho

damages may be unliquidated, and the defence may be made in cases of tort, provided the tort

springs from" the violation of contract. Stow v. Tarwoon, sunra.

If the defendant's damages exceed the claim established by the plaintiff, the action \rill

thereby be defeated, but the defendant cannot have judgment for tho excess. Brittxiu v. Tur-

ner, 6 N. H. 4rtl; Ward f. Fellers, 3 Mich. 281.

(20) [The statute does not begin to run till the cause of action is complete, and the party is

capable of suing ou it. Cro. Car. 139; 1 Lev. 48 ; Salk. 442 ; 1 Bla. Kep. 354. Ko actlou lies

against a consignee of goods for not accounting and returning the goods undisposed of, until

demand, and therefore the statute does uot begin to run until the time when demand is mode.

1 Taunt. 572. The statute begins to operate only from the time wheu a bill of exchange or

promissory note, <tc., is due, aud not from the date: 1 H. B. 631 ; 5 B. and A. 212; aud no

debt accrues on a bill payable at sight, until it be presented for payment. 2 Taunt. 323. The

statute of limitations begins to run from the date of a note payable on demand. 1 Ves. 344; 2

Selw. 4th ed. 131, 339; Cro. Eliz. 548; and see Chitty on Bills, (ith ed. 373. Where a payee

of a bill of exchange was dead at the time the bill became due, it was held that the

statute did not begin to run until letters of administration were token out: 5 B. and
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cause of action. This, by the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2, in a writ of right, is

sixty years: in assizes, writs of entry, or other possessory actions real, of the

seism of one's ancestors, in lands; and either of their seisin, or one's own, in

rents, suits, and services, fifty years: and in actions real for lands grounded

A. 212; Skin. 555; but where the cause of action is complete in the lifetime of the testator,

then the statute begins to run from that time, nod not from the granting of the probate. Willes,

27. Where a breach of a contract is attended with special damage, the statute rung from tho

time of the breach, which is the gist of the action, and not from the time it was discovered: 3 B.

and A. 628, 288; 4 Moore, 508: 2 Brod. and B. 73, S. 0.; or the damage arose. 5 B. and A.

204. If there is mutual credit between two parties, though the items on both aides are above

six years old, with the exception of one item on each side, which are just within the period, this

is sufficient to take the whole oat of the statute, for every new item and credit in an account

given by one party to the other is an admission of there being some unsettled account between

them. 6 T. It. 189; 2 Saund. 127, a. n. (6) But where all the items are on one side, so that the

account is not mutual, as, for instance, in an account between a tradesman and his customer,

the lost i trm which happens to be within six years, will not draw after it those which are of a

longer standing. Bull. N. P. 149.

The exception in the statute, respecting merchants' accounts, extends only to those cases

where there are mutual and reciprocal accounts and demands between two persons, and where

' such accounts are current and open, and not to accounts stated between them: 2 Yes. 400;

Bull. N. P. 149; Sir W. Jones, 401; 1 Sid. 465; 1 Vent. 89; for no other actions are excopted

but actions of account. Garth. 226; 1 Show. 341, S. 0.; 2 Saund. 127, a.; 2 Mod. 312, and 1 id.
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70; 1 Lev. 298; 4 Mod. 105; Peake, 121; 1 Vern. 456; 2 id. 276. It has been considered, that

by the effects of the above exception, there can be no limitation to a merchant's open and unset-

tled account; this opinion however appears erroneous, and if there is no item in the account, or

acknowledgment of the debt, within six years, the statute will take effect: but as we have be-

fore seen, il even the last item of the account is within six years, that preserves all the preced-

ing items of debt and credit from the operation of the statute: 6 Ves. 580. 15 id. 198; 18 id.

286; 2 id. 200, ace.; sed vide opinion of Lord Hardwicke mentioned in 19 id. 185; 6 T. B. 189,

192, runt.; and from these decisions it appears, that merchants' accounts stand not upon better

grounds, in regard to the statute, than other parties.

The object of this statute was to protect individuals against forgotten claims of so obsolete a

nature that the evidence relatiug to the contract might probably be no longer to be found, and

therefore might lead to perjury. It proceeds also upon the supposition that the debtor has

paid, but after a lapse of time may have lost his voucher. See 5 M. and S. 76, per Bayley, J.;

3 B. and A., per Abbott, J. In cases, therefore, where there is an acknowledgment of

the debtor or contractor, to prove the existence of the debt or obligation, or an express promise

to pay or perform tie same, the statute will not operate to protect him, notwithstanding the

lapse of six veare, or more, since the cause of the action may have accrued. But, if a cause

ofactinn arising from the breach of a contract to do an act at a specific time, be once barred

by the statute, a subsequent acknowledgment by the party that ne broke tho contract will

not, it seems, take the case out of the statute: 2 Camp. 160; and see Peake's livid. 205; 5

Moore, 105; 2 B. and C. 372, S. C.; 5 B. and A. 204; 3 id. 288; and a subsequent acknowl-

edgment of a trespass will not take the case out of the act. IB. and A. 92; 3 Chit. Rep.

249, S. C.

The slightest acknowledgment has been held sufficient: 2 Burr. 1099; Bull. N. P. 149;

Cowp. 548; as where the debtor exclaimed to the plaintiff, " What an extravagant bill yon

have delivered me !" Peake, N. P. 93. So where the defendant met a man in a fair, and said

that he went there to avoid the plaintiff, to whom he was indebted, this was held to save the

statute. Loft. 86. In an action by an administrator, and an agreement for a compromise executed

between intestate and defendant, wherein the existence of the debt sued for was admitted,

was deemed sufficient to take the case out of the statute. 9 Price, 122. It is sufficient to

actually made, is sufficient 2 B. and C. 149; 3 D. and K. 522, S. C.: sed qwere. And it makes

no difference whether the acknowledgment be accompanied with a promise or refusal to pay;

a bare acknowledgment is sufficient. 16 East, 420; 2 Burr. 1099; 5 M. and S. 75; 2 B. and

Ores. 154. The construction of an ambiguous letter or declaration of a defendant, on being

(served with a writ, or requested to pay a debt, neither admitting or denying it, is strong inti-

mation that it is an acknowledgment, since, if the defendant knew he owed nothing, he would

have declared so. 2 T. K. 760; 1 Bing. 266. Where the original agreement is in writing, in

order to take the case out of the statute of frauds, a subsequent promise, or admission of the

liability to perform such agreement, need not be in writing to take the case put of the statute

of limitations. IB. and A. 690. An acknowledgment after action brought is good. Selw. N.

P. tit. Limitations; Burr. 1099. The admission to a third person is sufficient. 3 B. and A. 141;

Loft. 86; 2 B. and C. 154.

On the other hand, where the defendant said, " the executor always promised not to distress

me," this was held no evidence of a promise to the testator, to take the cause out of the statute :
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upon one's own seisin or possession, such possession must have been within

thirty years. By statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 5, this limitation does not extend to

F *-:?071 any su^ ^or advowsons> uP°n reasons given in a *former chapter, (b)

"• J But by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 2, a time of limitation was extended to

(J) See page 250.

6 Taunt. 210; so a declaration, " I cannot afford to pay my new debts, much more my old

ones ;" is insufficient: 4 D. and R. 179; and so where in assumpsit by an attorney to recover

his charges, relative to the grant of an annuity, evidence that the defendant said, " he thought it

had been settled when the annuity was granted, but that he had been in so much trouble since

that he could not recollect any thing about it," is not a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt

to save the statute, notwithstanding proof that plaintiffs bill was not paid when the annuity

was granted. 1 J. B. Moore, 340; 7 Taunt. 603; S. C. The referring plaintiff to the defend-

ant's attorney, who, he added, was in possession of his determination and ability, is not an

admission that any thing is due: 1 New Rep. 20; and where a defendant, on being applied to

by the plaintiff's attorney for the payment of the debt, wrote in auswer, "that he would wait

on the plaintiff' when he should be able to satisfy him respecting the misunderstanding which

had occurred between them," this was holden not sufficient to take the case out of the statute :

Holt C. Jf. P. 380; and see 4 Esp. 184 ; 5 id. 81; a declaration, " I will see my attorney, and-

tell him to do what is right," is insufficient. 3 D. and R. 267. Payment of money into court, on

a special count, will not save the operation of the statute : 3 B. and C. 10; 4 D. and R. 622, S.

0.; ft only admits the debt to the amount paid in. Id. Bumb. 100.

Where the defendant, an executor, who was sued for money had and received from his
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testator, was proved to have said, " I acknowledge the receipt of the money, but the testatrix

that there had besn such a bill, but stated that it had been paid to the deceased partner of the

attorney, who had retained the amount out of the floating balance in his hands, it seems, that,

in order to take the case out of the statute, evidence is inadmissible to show that the bill had

never, in fact, been paid in this manner. 4 B. and A. 568. In all cases, unless the defendant

actually acknowledge that the debt or obligation did originally exist, the statute will not be

avoided. 4 Maule and S. 457 ; 2 Camp. 160.

The acknowledgment of one partner, to bind the other, must be clear and explicit; and,

therefore, it is not sufficient, in order to take a case out of the statute, in an action on a prom-

issory note, to show a payment, by a joint maker of a-note, to the payee within six years, so as

to throw it upon the defendant to show that the payment was not made on account of the note.

1 Stark. 488.

Where one of two joint drawers of a bill of exchange became bankrupt, and under his

commission the endorsees proved a debt (beyond the amount of the bill) for goods sold, <te.,

and they exhibited the bill as a security they then held for their debt, and afterwards received

a dividend ; it was held, that, in an action by the endorsees of the bill against the solvent part-

.1 , . .ft' !i_»; . .. _ J .j _i» -II.L. i. ii... .1: : .1 .1 i .it., . • i , ..

and, teu years after his death, B paid interest on the note, it was holden, in an action thereon

against the executors of A, that the payment of interest by B did not take the case not of the

statute, BO as to make the executors liable. 2 B. and C. 23; 3 D. and R. 200, S. C. An acknowl-

edgment by an accommodation acceptor, within six years, of his liability to the payee, is not

sufficient to take the case out of the statute, for the drawer. 3 Stark. 186.

It is enacted, by 9, tieo. IV, c. 14, that, in actions of debt or upon the case, grounded upon

any simple contract, no acknowledgment or promise by words only should be deemed sufficient

evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take any case out of the operation of

the enactments of the statutes of limitations, or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof,

unless such acknowledgment or promise shall be made or contained by or in some writing to

lie signed by the party chargeable thereby. And that, where there shall be two or more joint

contractors, or executors or administrators of any contractor, no such joint contractor, exec-

utor or administrator, shall lose the benefit of the said enactments, or either of them, so as to

be chargeabe, in respect or by reason only of any written acknowledgment or promise made

and signed by any other or others of them. The act not to alter the effect of any payment of

any principal or interest made by any person whatsoever. .And in actions to be commenced

agaiust two or more such joint contractors, or executors or administrators, if it shall appear

at the trial, or otherwise, that the plaintiff, though barred by either of tie said recited acts, or

this act, as to one or more of such joint contractors, or executors or administrators, shall never-

theless be entitled to recover against any other or others of the defendants, by virtue of a new

acknowledgment or promise, or otherwise, judgment may be given, and costs allowed for the

plaintiff', as to such defendant or defendants against whom he shall recover; and for the other

defendant or defendants against the plaintiff.
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the case of the king, viz., sixty years precedent to 19 Feb. 1623 ; (c) but, this

becoming ineffectual by efflux of time, the same date of limitation was fixed by

statute 9 Geo. Ill, c. 16, to commence and be reckoned backwards, from the time

of bringing any suit or other process, to recover the thing in question; so that

possession for sixty years is now a bar even against the prerogative, in deroga-

tion of the ancient maxim " nullum tempus occurit regi." By another statute,

21 Jac. I, c. 16, twenty years is the time of limitation in any writ of formedon;

and by a consequence, twenty years is also in limitation in every action of eject-

ment, for no ejectment can be brought, unless where the lessor of the plaintiff

is entitled to enter on the lands, (d) and by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 16, no entry

can be made by any man, unless within twenty years after his right shall

accrue. (21) Also, all actions of trespass (quare clausum fregit, or otherwise),

detinue, trover, replevin, account, and case (except upon accounts between mer-

chants), debt on simple contract, or for arrears of rent, are limited by the statute last

mentioned to six years after the cause of action commenced: and actions of assault,

menace, battery, mayhem, and imprisonment, must be brought within four years,

and actions for words within two years, after the injury committed. (22) And by

statute 31 Eliz. c. 5, all suits, indictments, and informations upon any penal stat-

utes, where any forfeiture is to the crown alone, shall be sued within two years;

and where the forfeiture is to a subject, or to the crown and a subject, within one

year after the offence committed, (23) unless where anv other time is specially

limited by the statute. Lastly, by statute 10 Wm. Ill, c. 14, no writ of error,
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scire facias, or other suit, shall be brouglvt to reverse any judgment, fine or re-

covery, for error, unless it be prosecuted within twenty years. (24) The use of

these statutes of limitation is to preserve the peace of the kingdom, and to pre-

vent those innumerable perjuries which might ensue if a man were allowed to

(c) 3 Inst. 189. (d) See page 206.

By action 2, that, if defendant in action on simple contract shall plead in abatement to the

effect that any other person ought to be jointly sued, and issue be joined on such plea, and it

should appear at the trial that the action could not, by reason of the said recited acts, or the

present act, be maintained against the other person named in such plea, the issue joined on such

plea should be found against the party pleading the same.

By action 3, no endorsement or memorandum of payment made after the 1st of January, 1829,

upon any promissory note, bill of exchange, or other writing, by or on behalf of the party to

whom such paymeut shall be made, shall be deemed sufficient proof of such payment, so as

to take the case out of the operation of either of the said statutes.

By section 4, said recited acts and the present act shall apply to the case of any debt on simple

contract, by way of set-off on the part of any defendant, either by plea, notice, or otherwise.

By action 8, no memorandum or other writing made necessary by the act shall be deemed to

be an agreement within the meaning of the stamp acts.]

(21) Some important modifications of the statutes limiting the time for the commencement

of suit, were made by statutes 3 and 4 Win. IT, cc. 27, 42. Actions for the recovery of lands or

rents are required by these statutes to be brought within twenty years, with a saving of

cases of persons under disability, who are allowed ten years alter the disability ceases, but

not to exceed forty years in all. Personal actions, generally, are required to 'be brought

within six years after the right accrues, but suits in trespass, for assault and battery,

must be brought within four years, and suits for verbal slander within two years. Actions

upon specialty may be brought at any time within twenty years. Actions against justices, con-

stables, Ac., for any thing done in the execution of their office, must be Drought within six

calendar months.

The statute 9 Geo. IT, c. 14, above referred to, commonly called Lord Tenterden's act, has been

re-enacted in its main features in many of the American states. As to the defence of the statute

generally, and what is sufficient to take a case out of it, see 2 Pars, on Cont. 341 et seq., and

Angell on Limitation.

(22) In this, as well as in the subsequent statutes, there was a saving in the case of persons

under disability.

(23) [Where the forfeiture is to the crown and a subject, a common informer must sue within

one year, and the crown may prosecute for the whole penalty, at any time within two years after

that year ended.]

Penal actions at the suit of the party aggrieved must now be brought within two years after

the wrong done. Statute 3 and 4 Wm. IT, c. 42.

(24) The time for bringing error is now limited to six years, by the common law procedure act,

1862.
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bring an action for any injury committed at any distance of time. Upon both

r *QQQ I these accounts the law, *therefore, holds, that " interest reipublica lit sit

*• J finis litium :" and upon the same principle the Athenian laws in gene-

ral prohibited all actions where the injury was committed five years before the

complaint was made, (e) If, therefore, in any suit, the injury or cause of action

happened earlier than the period expressly limited by law, the defendant may

plead the statutes of limitations in bar: as upon an assumpsit,or promise to pay

money to the plaintiff, the defendant may plead non assumpsit infra sex annos;

he made no such promise within six years; which is an effectual bar to the com-

plaint (25)

An estoppel is likewise a special plea in bar; which happens where a man hath

done some act, or executed some deed, which estops or precludes him from aver-

ring any thing to the contrary. As if tenant for years (who hath no freehold)

levies a fine to another person. Though this is void as to strangers, yet it shall

work as an estoppel to the cognizor; for if he afterwards brings an action to

recover these lands, and his fine is pleaded against him, he shall thereby be

estopped from saying that he had no freehold at the time, and therefore was

incapable of levying it.

The conditions and qualities of a plea (which, as well as the doctrine of

estoppels, will also hold equally, mutatis mutandis, with regard to other parts

of pleading), are, 1. That it be single and containing only one matter; for

duplicity begets confusion. But by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, a man, with
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leave of the court, may plead two or more distinct matters or single pleas; as. in

an action of assault and battery, these three, not guilty, son assault demesne, and

the statute of limitations. 2. That it be direct and positive, and not argumenta-

tive. 3. That it have convenient certainty of time, place and persons. 4. That

it answer the plaintiff's allegations in every material point 5. That it be so

pleaded as to be capable of trial. (26)

F *3091 *Special pleas are usually in the affirmative, sometimes in the negative;

*• -" but they always advance some new fact not mentioned in the declaration;

and then they must be averred to be true in the common form,—"and this he

is ready to verify." This is not necessary in pleas of the general issue; those

always containing a total denial of the facts before advanced by the other party,

and therefore putting him upon the proof of them.

It is a rule in pleading, that no man be allowed to plead specially such a plea

as amounts only to the general issue, or a total denial of the charge; but in

such ceie he shall be driven to plead the general issue in terms, whereby the

whole question is referred to a jury. But if the defendant, in an assize or action

of trespass, be desirous to refer the validity of his title to the court rather than

the jury, he may state his title specially, and at the same time give colour to the

plaintiff, or suppose him to have an appearance or colour of title, bad indeed in

(e) Pott Ant b. I, c. 21.

(25) In the case of promises, a new promise, or an unqualified acknowledgment of liability,

will be sufficient to keep alive the demand for the full period allowed by the statute in which to

bring suit; but now, by Lord Tenterden's act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, such promise or acknowledgment

is ineffectual unions in writing.

(36) [In addition to these qualities, it should bo observed, that every plea in bar must be

adapted to the nature of the action, and conformable to the count: Co. Litt. 303, a, 285, b ; Bac.

Ab. Pleas, I, per tot.; 1 Rol. Rep. 216; must answer the whole declaration or count, or, rather,

all that it assumes in the introductory part to answer, and no more : Co. Litt. 303, b ; Com. Dig.

Pleader, E. 1, 36; 1 Saund. 28; 2 B. and P. 427; 3 id. 174; must admit or confess the fact it

justifies : 3 T. R. 298; 1 Salk. 394 ; Garth. 360; 1 Saund. 28; must be certain: Com. Dig. tit.

Pleader, E. 5, <fec.; and must be true, and not too large. Hob. 295; Bac. Ab. tit. Pleas, G. 4.

For more particular information as to these qualities, see 1 Chit, on PI. 451 to 463; as to their

forms and particular parts, see id. 467 to 477.

The same rules which prevail in the construction and allowance of a declaration, do so in the

case of pleas in bar. See ante, 289, notes. If the plea be bad in part, it is BO for the whole.

Com. Dig. Pleader, E. 36; 3 T. R. 376; 3 B. and P. 174; 1 Saund. 337. The roles as to surplus-

age in a declaration here also prevail.]
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point of law, but of which the jury are not competent judges. As if his own

true title be, that he claims by feoffment, with livery from A, by force of which

he entered on the lands in question, he cannot plead this by itself, as it amounts

to no more than the general issue, nul tort, nul disseisin, in assize, or not guilty

in an action of trespass. But he may allege this specially, provided he goes

farther and says, that the plaintiff claiming by colour of a prior deed of feofftneut

without livery, entered; upon whom he entered; and may then refer himself

to the judgment of the court which of these two titles is the best in point of

law. (/) (27)

When the plea of the defendant is thus put in, if it does not amount to an

issue or total contradiction of the declaration, but only evades it, the plaintiff

may plead again, and reply to the defendant's plea: either traversing it; that

is, totally denying it; as, if in an action of debt upon bond the defendant pleads

solvit ad diem, that he paid the money when *due, here the plaintiff in r *.,, „ -,

his replication may totally traverse this plea, by denying that the defend- •• -*

ant paid it: or, he may allege new matter in contradiction to the defendant's

plea; as when the defendant pleads no award made, the plaintiff may reply and

set forth an actual award, and assign a breach; (g) or the replication may con-

fess and avoid the plea, by some new matter or distinction consistent with the

plaintiff's former declaration; as, in an action for trespassing upon land whereof

the plaintiff is seised, if the defendant shows a title to the land by descent, and

that therefore he had a right to enter, and gives colour to the plaintiff, the plaint-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

iff may either traverse and totally deny the fact of ihe descent; or he may con-

fess and avoid it, by replying, that true it is that such descent happened, but

that since the descent the defendant himself demised the lands to the plaintiff

for term of life. (28) To the replication the defendant may rejoin, or put

in an answer called a rejoinder. The plaintiff may answer the rejoinder by a

sur-rejoinder j upon which the defendant may rebut j and the plaintiff answer

him by a sur-rebutter. Which pleas, replications, rejoinders, sur-rejoinders,

rebutters, and sur-rebutters, answer to the exceptio, replicatio, duplicatio, tripli-

catio, and quadruplicate of the Roman laws, (h)

The whole of this process is denominated the pleading ; in the several stages

of which it must be carefully observed, not to depart or vary from the title or

defence, which the party has once insisted on. For this "(which is called a

departure in pleading) might occasion endless altercation. Therefore the repli-

cation must support the declaration, and the rejoinder must support the plea,

without departing out of it. As in the case of pleading no award made, in con-

sequence of a bond of arbitration, to which the plaintiff replies, setting forth an

actual award; now the defendant cannot rejoin that he hath performed this

award, for such rejoinder would be an entire departure from his original plea,

which alleged that no such award was made; therefore he has now no other

(/) Dr. A Stud 2, c. 63. (g) Appendix, No. m, { C. (A) Inst. 4, If, Bract i. 5, tr. 5, o. 1.

(27) [But this form of pleading is now abolished, and other facilities for referring quostions

of title directly to the court are given by the common law procedure act, 1852.]

(28) [As to the several replications in general, see 1 Chit, on PI. 4th ed. 500 to 518; and as to

their forms and parts in particular, id. 518 to 555. The general qualities of a replication are,

that it must answer the plea, and answer so much of it as it professes to answer, or it will be

a discontinuance : Com. Dig. tit. Pleader, F. 4, W. 2; 1 Saund. 338; and it must answer the

plea directlv, not argumentative!?: 10 East, 205; it must not depart from the declaration.

2 Saund. 84, a. n. 1; Co. Litt. 304, a.; 2 "Wils. 98; see 1 Chit, on PI. 556 to 560. It must be

certain, and it is said that more certainty is requisite in a replication than a declaration,

though certainty to a common intent is in general sufficient: Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 17; 12

East, 263; and lastly, it must not be double, or, in other words, contain two answers to the

same plea: 10 East, 73; 2 Camp. 176, 177; Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 16; and the plaintiff cannot

reply double under the 4 Ann. c. 16 (Fortes. 335), unless in replevin; 'i B. and P. 368, 376;

and more particularly as to these qualities, see 1 Chit, on PI. 556 to 562. An entire replication

bad In part is bad for the whole. Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 25; 3 T. R. 376; 1 Saund. 28, n. 3.]

tinder the common law procedure act, 1852/there may bd' several replications, rejoinders,

<fcc., by leave of the court.

197

311 PLEADINGS IN SUITS AT LAW. [Book HL

"choice, but to traverse the fact of the replication, or else to demur upon

the law of it.

Yet in many actions the plaintiff, who has alledged in his declaration a general

wrong, may in his replication, after an evasive plea by the defendant, reduce

that general wrong to a more particular certainty, by assigning the injury afresh

with all its specific circumstances in such manner as clearly to ascertain and

identify it, consistently with his general complaint; which is called a new or

novel assignment. As if the plaintiff in trespass declares on a breach of his close

in D; and the defendant pleads that the place where the injury is said to have

happened, is a certain close of pasture in D, which descended to him from B

his father, and so is his own freehold; the plaintiff may reply and assign

another close in D, specifying the abuttals and boundaries, as the real place of

the injury, (i)

It hath previously been observed (k) that duplicity in pleading must be avoided.

Every plea must be simple, entire, connected, and confined to one single point:

it must never be entangled with a variety of distinct, independent answers to

the same matter; which must require as many different replies and introduce a

multitude of issues upon one and the same dispute. For this would often

embarrass the jury, and sometimes the court itself, and at all events would

greatly enhance the expense of the parties. Yet it frequently is expedient to

plead in such a manner as to avoid any implied admission of a fact, which can-

not with propriety or safety be positively affirmed or denied. And this may be
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done by what is called a protestation ; whereby the party interposes an oblique

allegation or denial of some fact, protesting (by the gerund protestando) that

such a matter does or does not exist: and at the same time avoiding a direct

affirmation or denial. Sir Edward Coke hath denned (I) a protestation (in the

f *3121 P**ay dialect of that age) to be " an exclusion of a conclusion." *For

1 '" J the use of it is, to save the party from being concluded with respect to

some fact or circumstance, which cannot be directly affirmed or denied without

falling into duplicity of pleading; and which yet, if he did not thus enter his

protest, he might be deemed to have tacitly waived or admitted. Thus, while

tenure in villenage subsisted, if a villien had brought an action against his lord,

and the lord was inclined to try the merits of the demand, and at the same time

to prevent any conclusion against himself that he had waived his signiory; he

could not in this case both plead affirmatively that the plaintiff was his villein,

and also take issue upon the demand; for then his plea would have been double,

as the former alone would have been a good bar to the action: but he might

have alleged the villeinage of the plaintiff, by way of protestation, and then have

denied the demand. By this means the future vassalage of the plaintiff was

saved to the defendant, in case the issue was found in his (the defendant's)

favor: (m) for the protestation prevented that conclusion, which would other-

wise have resulted from the rest of his defence, that he had enfranchised the

plaintiff; («) since no villein could maintain a civil action against his lord. So

also if a defendant, by way of inducement to the point of nis defence, alleges

(among other matters) a particular mode of seisin or tenure, which the plaint-

iff, is unwilling to admit, and yet desires to take issue on the principal point of

the defence, he must deny the seisin or tenure by way of protestation, and then

traverse the defensive matter. So, lastly, if an award be set forth by the plaint-

iff, and he can assign a breach in one part of it (viz., the non-payment of a sum

of money), and yet is afraid to admit the performance of the rest of the award,

or to aver in general a non-performance of any part of it, lest something should

appear to have been performed: he may save to himself any advantage he might

hereafter make of the general non-performance, by alleging that by protestation;

and plead only the non-payment of the money, (o) (29)

(i) Bro. Abr. tit. trttpatt, 205, 284. (Jt) Page 308. (I) 1 Inst. 184. (ffl) Co. I .ill, 126.

(n) See book II, ch. 6, p. 94. (o) Appendix, Nu in, •! 8.

(29) [No protestation is now required, or allowed indeed, in any pleading; but either party

is entitled to the same advantage as if protestation had been made.]
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*In any stage of the pleadings when either side advances or affirms r*oio -i

any new matter, he usually (as was said) avers it to be true; " and this •• ' J

he is ready to verify." On the other hand, when either side traverses or denies

the facts pleaded by his antagonist, he usually tenders an issue, as it is called;

the language of which is different according to the party by whom the issue is

tendered; for if the traverse or denial comes from the defendant, the issue is

tendered in this manner, " and of this he puts himself upon the country,"

thereby submitting himself to the judgment of his peers: (p) but if the traverse

lies upon the plaintiff he tenders the issue, or prays the judgment of the peers

against the defendant in another form; thus : " and this he prays may be in-

quired of by the country."

But if either side (as, for instance, the defendant) pleads a special negative

plea; not traversing or denying anything that was before alleged, but disclosing

some new negative matter; as, where the suit is on a bond, conditioned to per-

form an award, and the defendant pleads, negatively, that no award was made,

he tenders no issue upon this plea; because it does not yet appear whether the fact

will be disputed, the plaintiff not having yet asserted the existence of anj award;

but when the plaintiff replies, and sets forth an actual specific award, if then

the defendant traverses the replication, and denies the making of any such

award, he then, and not before, tenders an issue to the plaintiff. For when in

the course of pleading they come to a point which is affirmed on one side, and

denied on the other, they are then said to be at issue; all their debates being at
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last contracted into a single point, which must now be determined either in

favor of the plaintiff or of the defendant.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF ISSUE AND DEMURRER.

ISSUE, exitus, being the end of all the pleadings, is the fourth part or stage

of an action, and is either upon matter of law, or matter of fact.

An issue upon matter of law is called a demurrer: and it confesses the facts

to be true, as stated by the opposite party; but denies that, by the law arising

upon those facts, any injury is done to the plaintiff, or that the defendant has

made out a legitimate excuse; according to the party which first demurs,

demoratur, rests or abides upon the point in question. As, if the matter of the

plaintiff's complaint or declaration be insufficient in law, as by not assigning

any sufficient trespass, then the defendant demurs to the declaration: if, on

the other hand the defendant's excuse or plea be invalid, as if he pleads that

he committed the trespass by authority from a stranger, without making out

the stranger's right; here the plaintiff may demur in law to the plea; and so

on in every other part of the proceedings, where either side perceives any

material objection in point of law, upon which he may rest his case.

The form of such demurrer is by averring the declaration or plea, the replica-

tion or rejoinder, to be insufficient *in law to maintain the action or the r ^g^g -,

defence; and therefore praying judgment for want of sufficient matter •• " ' '

alleged, (a) Sometimes demurrers are merely for want of sufficient form in the

writ or declaration. But in case of exceptions to the form or manner of plead-

ing, the party demurring must, by statutes 27 Eliz. c. 5, and 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16,

set forth the causes of his demurrer, or wherein he apprehends the deficiency to

consist. (1) And upon either a general, or such a special demurrer, the opposite

(p)IMd. No. ti, f 4'. (a) Appendix, No. ID, t 6.

(1) [Either party may demur, when the preceding pleadings of his adversary are defective.

A demurrer has been defined to bo, a declaration that the party demurring -will go no further,

i oo
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party must aver it to be sufficient, which is called a joinder in demurrer, (b)

and then the parties are at issue in point of law. Which issue in law, or de-

murrer, the judges of the court before which the action is brought mast de-

termine.

An issue of fact is where the fact only, and not the law, is disputed. And

when he that denies or traverses the fact pleaded by his antagonist has tendered

the issue, thus: "and this he prays may be inquired of by the country;" or,

" and of this he puts himself upon the country;" it may immediately be sub-

joined by the other party, " and the said A. B. doth the like." Which done,

the issue is said to be joined, both parties having agreed to rest the fate of the

cause upon the truth of the fact in question, (c) And this issue of fact

must, generally speaking, be determined, not by the judges of the court, but

by some other method; the principal of which methods is that by the country,

perpais, (in Latin per patriam,) that is, by jury. Which establishment of dif-

ferent tribunals for determining these different issues is in some measure agree-

able to the course of Justice in the Roman republic, where thejudices ordinarii

determined only questions of fact, but questions of law were referred to the de-

cisions of the cenfuminri.(d)

But here it will be proper to observe, that during the whole of these proceed-

ings, from the time of the defendant's appearance in obedience to the king's

F *S16 1 wr^> i* i8 necessary *that both the parties be kept or continued iu court

*- •• from day to day, till the final determination of the suit. For the court
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can determine nothing, unless in the presence of both the parties, in person or

by their attorneys, or upon default of one of them, after his original appearance

and a time prefixed for his appearance in court again. Therefore, in the course

of pleading, if either party neglects to put in his declaration, plea, replication,

rejoinder, and the like, within the times allotted by the standing rules of the

court, the plaintiff, if the omission be his, is said to be nonsuit, or not to follow

and pursue his complaint, and shall lose the benefit of his writ: or, if the

negligence be on the side of the defendant, judgment may be had against him,

for such his default. And, after issue or demurrer joined, as well as in some

of the previous stages of proceeding, a day is continually given, and entered

upon the record, for the parties to appear on from time to time, as the exigence

of the case may require. The giving of this day is called the continuance, be-

cause thereby the proceedings are continued without interruption from one

adjournment to another. If these continuances are omitted, the cause is there-

by discontinued, and the defendant is discharged sine die, without a day, for

this turn: for by his appearance in court he has obeyed the command of the

king's writ: and, unless he be adjourned over to a day certain, he is no longer

bound to attend upon that summons; but he must be warned afresh and the

whole must begin de novo. (2)

Now it may sometimes nappen, that after the defendant has pleaded, nay

even after issue or demurrer joined, there may have arisen some new matter,

which it is proper for the defendant to plead; as that the plaintiff, being a feme-

sole, is since married, or that she has given the defendant a release, and the

like: here, if the defendant takes advantage of this new matter, as early as he pos-

(l>) IMd. (c} I Mil. No. n, ( 4. fd) Clc. de Orator. I. 1, c. 38.

because the other has not shown sufficient matter against him. 5 Mod. 133; Co. Litt. 71, b.

When the pleading is defective in substance, a general demurrer wil 1 suffice; but where the

objection is to the form, the demurrer must be special. Bac.-Ab. Pleas, K 5. A special demur-

rer must not merely show the kind of fault but tne specific fault complained of.]

The common law procedure act, 1852, put an end to special demurrers, substituting for them

a controlling power, vested in the court or a judge, to amend or strike out pleadings on the

application of the opposite party, if they were so framed as to prejudice, embarass, or delay

the fair trial of the action; and as to needless and fictitious averments, the act swept them away

altogether.

(2) [But these continuances are now become mere matter of form, and1 may be entered at any

time to make the record complete.]
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sibly can, viz.: at the day given for his next appearance, he is permitted to plead

it in what is called a plea of puis darrein continuance, or since the last adjourn-

ment. (3) For it would be unjust to exclude him *from the benefit of r +„*„ -,

this new defence, which it was not in his power to make when he pleaded L -I

the former. But it is dangerous to rely on such a plea, without due considera-

tion ; for it confesses the matter which was before in dispute between the

parties, (e) And it is not allowed to be put in, if any continuance has intervened

between the arising of this fresh matter and the pleading of it: for then the

defendant is guilty of neglect, or lacfies, and is supposed to rely on the merits

of his former plea. Also it is not allowed after a demurrer is determined, or

verdict given; because then relief may be had in another way, namely, by writ

of audita querela, of which hereafter. And these pleas puis darrein continu-

ance, when brought to a demurrer in law or issue of fact, shall be determined in

like manner as other pleas.

We have said, that demurrers, or questions concerning the sufficiency of the

matters alleged in the pleadings, are to be determined by the judges of the

court, upon solemen argument by counsel on both sides, and to that end a de-

murrer-book is made up, containing all the proceedings at length, which are

afterwards entered on record; and copies thereof, called paper-books, are de-

liverd to the judges to peruse. The record (/) is a history of the most material

proceedings in the cause entered on a parchment roll, and continued down to

the present time; in which must be stated the original writ and summons, all
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the pleadings, the declaration, view or over prayed, the imparlances, plea, repli-

cation, rejoinder, continuances, and whatever farther proceedings have been

had; all entered verbatim on the roll, and also the issue or demurrer, and joinder

therein.

These were formerly all written, as indeed all public proceedings were, in

Norman or law French, (4) and even the arguments of the counsel and decisions

of the court were in the same barbarous dialect. An evident and shameful

badge, it must be owned, of tyranny and foreign servitude; being *intro- r *oi g -i

duced under the auspices of William the Norman, and his sons: where- >• l '

by the ironical observation of the Roman satirist came to be literally verified,

that " Gallia causidicos docuit facunda Britannos." (g) This continued till the

reign of Edward III; who, having employed his arms successfully in subduing

the crown of France, thought it unbeseeming the dignity of the victors to use

any longer the language of a vanquished country. By a statute, therefore,

passed in the thirty-sixth year of his reign, (h) it was enacted, that for the future

all pleas should be pleaded, shown, defended, answered, debated, and judged in

the English tongue; but be entered and enrolled in Latin. In like manner as

Don Alonso X, King of Castile (the great-grandfather our Edward III),

obliged his subjects to use the Castihaii tongue in all legal proceedings; (i) and

as, in 1286, the German language was established in the courts of the empire, (i)

And perhaps if our legislature had then directed that the writs themselves,

which are mandates from the king to his subjects to perform certain acts, or to

appear at certain places, should have been framed in the English language, ac-

cording to the rule of our ancient law, (1) it had not been very improper. But

the record or enrollment of those writs and the proceedings thereon, which was

calculated for the benefit of posterity, was more serviceable (because more dur-

able) in a dead and immutable language than in any flux or living one. The

(e) Oro. Eliz. 40. (f) Appendix, No. D, H ; No. HI, * 2. (g) Juv. XT, 111. fh) C. 16.

(i) Mod. Vn. Hist, xx, 211. (kj IMd. xxix, 238. (1) Mlrr. o. *, } i.

(3) [This plea, though treated in some respects as a dilatory plea, the court cannot refuse to

receive; 2 Wils. 167; 3 T. K. 554; 1 Marsh. 280; 5 Taunt. 333; 1 Stark. 62; but it must be

verified on oath before it is filed. Freem. 252; 1 Stra. 493; 2 Smith's Rep. 396. It may be

pleaded at nisi prius as well as in bank; but cannot be amended after the assizes are over. Yelv.

181; Freem. 252; Bui. IT. P. 309. See further, I Chitty on PI. 4th ed., 569 to 573.]

See also Stephen on Pleading, 63-66; Gould on Pleading, ch. vi.

(4) [This is disputed, with great reason, by Mr. Serjeant Stephen (Pleading, Appendix, p. xxii),

who thinks that the record was always in Latin.]
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practisers, however, being used to the Norman language, and therefore imagin-

ing they could express their thoughts more aptly and more concisely in that than

in any other, still continued to take their notes in law-French: and, of course,

when those notes came to be published, under the denomination of reports,

they were printed in that barbarous dialect; which, joined to the additional

terrors of a Gothic black letter, has occasioned many a student to 'throw away his

Plowden and Littleton, without venturing to attack a page of them. And yet

in reality, upon a nearer acquaintance, they would have found nothing very"

F *319 1 fb^'dable in the language; which differs in its grammar *and orthog-

L J raphy as much from the modern French, as the diction of Chaucer and

Gower does from that of Addison and Pope. Besides, as the French and Nor-

man languages were concurrently used by our ancestors for several centuries

together, the two idioms have naturally assimilated, and mutually borrowed

from each other: for which reason the grammatical construction of each is so

very much the same, that I apprehend an Englishman (with a week's prepara-

tion) would understand the laws of Normandy, collected in their grand cous-

tumier, as well, if not better, than a Frenchman bred within the walls of Paris.

The Latin, which succeeded the French for the entry and enrollment of pleas,

and which continued in use for four centuries, answers so nearly to the English

(oftentimes word for word) that it is not at all surprising it should generally be

imagined to be totally fabricated at home, with little more art or trouble, than

by adding Koman terminations to English words. Whereas in reality it is a
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very universal dialect, spread throughout all Europe at the irruption of the

northern nations, and particularly accommodated and moulded to answer all

the purposes of the lawyer with a peculiar exactness and precision. This is

principally owing to the simplicity, or (if the reader pleases) the poverty and

baldness of its texture, calculated to express the ideas of mankind just as they

arise in the human mind, without any rhetorical flourishes, or perplexed orna-

ments of style; for it may be observed that those laws and ordinances, of public

as well as private communities, are generally the most easily understood, where

strength and perspicuity, not harmony or elegance of expression, have been

principally consulted in compiling them. These northern nations, or rather

their legislators, though they resolved to make use of the Latin tongue in pro-

mulging their laws, as being more durable and more generally known to their

conquered subjects than their own Teutonic dialects, yet (either through choice

or necessity) have frequently intermixed therein some words of a Gothic original,

T *3201 wh'ch is> more °r less> the case in every country *of Europe, and, there-

*• J fore, not to be imputed as any peculiar blemish in our English legal

Latinity. (m) The truth is, what is generally denominated law-Latin is in reality

a mere technical language, calculated for eternal duration, and easy to be ap-

prehended both in present and future times; and on those accounts best suited

to preserve those memorials which are intended for perpetual rules of action.

The rude pyramids of Egypt have endured from tne earliest ages, while the

more modern and more elegant structures of Attica, Rome, and Palmyra, have

sunk beneath the stroke of time.

As to the objection of locking up the law in a strange and unknown tongue,

this is of little weight with regard to records which few have occasion to read

but such as do, or ought to, understand the rudiments of Latin. And, besides,

it may be observed of the law-Latin, as the very ingenious Sir John Davis («)

observes of the law-French, •' that it is so very easy to be learned, that the meanest

wit that ever came to the study of the law doth come to understand it almost

perfectly in ten days without a reader."

It is true, indeed, that the many terms of art, with which the law abounds, are

sufficiently harsh when Latinized (yet not more so than those of other sciences),

a

oi

ccntu... __„..

(n) Fret. Rep.
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and may as Mr. Selden observes, (o) give offence " to some grammarians of

squeamish stomachs, who would rather choose to live in ignoYance of things

the most useful and important, than to have their delicate ears wounded by the

use of a word unknown to Cicero, Sallust, or the other writers of the Augustan

age." Yet this is no more than must unavoidably happen when things of mod-

ern use, of which the Romans had no idea, and consequently no phrases to

express *them, come to be delivered in the L;itin tongue. It would r ^o^-t n

puzzle the most classical scholar to find an appellation, in his pure *• '

Latinity, for a constable, a record, or a deed of feoffment; it is therefore to be

imputed as much to necessity, as ignorance, that they were styled in our forensic

dialect constabularius, recordum, and feoffamentum. Thus, again, another

uncouth word of our ancient laws (for I defend not the ridiculous barbarisms

sometimes introduced by the ignorance of modern practisers), the substantive

murdrum, of the verb murdrare,- however harsh and unclassical it may seem,

was necessarily framed to express a particular ofience; since no other word in

being, occidere interficere, necare, or the like, was sufficient to express the inten-

tion of the criminal, or quo animo the act was perpetrated; and therefore by no

means came up to the notion of murder at present entertained by our law, viz.:

a killing with malice aforethought.

A similar necessity to this produced a similar eflfect at Byzantium, when the

Roman laws were turned into Greek for the use of the oriental empire: for,

without any regard to Attic elegance, the lawyers of the imperial courts made
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no scruple to translate fidei commissaries, (t>idei%onfuaoaptovr;(p) cubiculum,

Xovpovxheiov ;(q) filium-familias, Tattfa-^afuXtar;^) repudium,penav6iav;(s) com-

promissum, xo^pofuaaov^f) reverentia et obsequium, pevEpevna %ai opoe%ovu>v;(u)

and the like. They studied more the exact and precise import of the words

than the neatness and delicacy of their cadence. And my academical readers

will excuse me for suggesting, that the terms of the law are not more numerous,

more uncouth, or more difficult to be explained by a teacher, than those of logic,

physics, and the whole circle of Aristotle's philosophy, nay even of the politer

arts of architecture and its kindred studies, or the science of rhetoric itself.

Sir Thomas Moore's famous legal question (w) contains in it nothing more dif-

ficult than the *definition which in his time the philosophers currently r *^% n

gave of their materia prima, the groundwork of all natural knowledge; L "•'* J

that it is " neque quid, neque quantum, neque quale, neque aliquid eorum quibus

ens determinatur;" or its subsequent explanation by Adrian Heereboord, who

assures us (x) that •' materia pnma non est corpus, neque per formam corpore-

itatis, neque per simplicem essentiam: est tamen ens, et quidam substantia,

licet incompleta. habetque actum ex se entitativum, et simul est potentia sub-

jectiva." The law, therefore, with regard to its technical phrases, stands upon

the same footing with other studies, and requests only the same indulgence.

This technical Latin continued in use from the time of its first introduction,

till the subversion of our ancient constitution under Cromwell; when among

many other innovations in the law, some for the better and some for the worse,

the language of our records was altered and turned into English. But at the

restoration of King Charles, this novelty was no longer countenanced; the

practisers finding it very difficult to express themselves so concisely or signifi-

cantly in any other language but the Latin. And thus it continued without

any sensible inconvenience till about the year 1730, when it was again thought

proper that the proceedings at law should be done into English, and it was

accordingly so ordered by statute 4 Geo. II, c. 26. This provision was made,

according to the preamble of the statute, that the common people might have

knowledge and understanding of what was alleged or done for and against them

in the process and pleadings, the judgment and entries in a cause. Which

purpose has, I fear, not been answered; being apt to suspect that the people are

now, after many years' experience, altogether as ignorant in matters of law as

(o) Pref. ad Xadmer. fpj Nov. 1, c. 1. (a) Nov. 8, edict. CorutamKnap.

(r) Nov. 117, c. 1. (t) Ibid. o. 8. ft) 7Md. 82. c. 11. (u) JMd. 78, c. 2.

(v) See page 140. (x) PKUotopK. Natural, c. 1,» 28, Ac.
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before. On the other hand, these inconveniences have already arisen from the

alteration ; that now many clerks and attorneys are hardly able to read, much

less to understand, a record even of so modern a date as the reign of George the

T *S231 ^ITS^- A*1^ '* nas mucn enhanced the expense of *all legal proceed-

L J ings; for since the practisers are confined (for the sake of the stamp

duties, which are thereby considerably increased) to write only a stated number

of words in a sheet; (5) and as the English language, through the multitude of

its particles, is much more verbose than the Latin ; it follows that the number

of sheets must be very much augmented by the change, (y) The translation

also of technical phrases, and the names of writs and other process, were found

to be so very ridiculous (a writ of nisi prius, quare impedit, fieri facias, habeas

corpus, and the rest, not being capable of an English dress with any degree of

seriousness) that in two years' time it was found necessary to make a new act,

6 Geo. Ill, c. 14; which allows all technical words to continue in the usual lan-

guage, and has thereby almost defeated every beneficial purpose of the former

statute.

What is said of the alteration of language by the statute 4 Geo. II, c. 26, will

hold equally strong with respect to the prohibition of using the ancient immu-

table court hand in writing the records or other legal proceedings; whereby

the reading of any record that is fifty years old is now become the object of

science, and calls for the help of an antiquarian. But that branch of it. which

forbids the use of abbreviations, seems to be of more solid advantage, in deliver-
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ing such proceedings from obscurity: according to the precept of Justinian; (z)

" ne per scripturam aliquafiat inposterum dubitatio, jubemus nonper siglorum

captiones et compendiosa enigmata ejusdem codicis textum conscribi, sedper litera-

rum consequentiam explanari concedimus." But to return to our demurrer.

When the substance of the record is completed, and copies are delivered to

the judges, the matter of law upon which the demurrer is grounded is upon

solemn argument determined by the court, and not by any trial by jury; and

f *3241 *.JU(lgnient is thereupon accordingly given. As in an action of trespass,

*• J if the defendant in his plea confesses the fact, but justifies it causa

venationis, for that he was hunting; and to this the plaintiff demurs, that is, he

admits the truth of the plea, but denies the justification to be legal: now, on

arguing this demurrer, if the court be of opinion, that a man may not justify

trespass in hunting, they will give judgment for the plaintiff; if they think

that he may, then judgment is given for the defendant. Thus is an issue in

law, or demurrer, disposed of.

An issue of fact takes up more form and preparation to settle it; for here the

truth of the matters alleged must be solemnly examined and established by

proper evidence in the channel prescribed by law. To which examination of

facts, the name of trial is usually confined, which will be treated of at large in

the two succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER XXII.

OF THE SEVERAL SPECIES OF TRIAL.

THE uncertainty of legal proceedings is a notion so generally adopted, and

has so long been the standing theme of wit and good numour, that he who

should attempt to refute it would be looked upon as a man who was either

(y) For instance, these three words, " tecvndum formam slatnti" are now converted into seven, "ac-

cording to the form of the statute."

(*) Ot ooncep. digest. (13.

(5) [This law is now abolished in England.]
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incapable of discernment himself, or else meant to impose upon others. Yet it may

not be amiss, before we enter upon the several modes whereby certainty is meant

to be obtained in our courts of justice, to inquire a little wherein this uncertainty,

so frequently complained of, consists; and to what causes it owes its original.

It hath sometimes been said to owe its original to the number of our mu-

nicipal constitutions, and the multitude of our judicial decisions; (a) which

occasion, it is alleged, abundance of rules that militate and thwart with each

other, as the sentiments or caprice of successive legislatures and judges have

happened to vary. The fact of multiplicity is allowed; and that thereby the

researches of the student are rendered more difficult and laborious; but that,

with proper industry, the result of those inquires will be doubt and indecision,

is a consequence that cannot be admitted. People are apt to be angry at the

want of simplicity in our laws: they mistake variety for confusion, and com-

plicated cases for contradictory. *They bring us the examples of arbi- r *ong i

trary governments, of Denmark, Muscovy, and Prussia; of wild and *• *

uncultivated nations, the savages of Africa and America; or of narrow domes-

tic republics, in ancient Greece and modern Switzerland; and unreasonably

require the same paucity of laws, the same conciseness of practice, in a nation

of freeman, a polite and commercial people, and a populous extent of territory.

In an arbitrary despotic government, where the lands are at the disposal of

the prince, the rules of succession or the mode of enjoyment, must depend upon

his will and pleasure. Hence there can be but few legal determinations relat-
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ing to the property, the descent, or the conveyance of real estates; and the

same holds in a stronger degree with regard to goods and chattels, and the

contracts relating thereto. Under a tyrannical sway trade must be continually

in jeopardy, and of consequence can never be extensive: this therefore puts an

end to the necessity of an infinite number of rules, which the English merchant

daily recurs to for adjusting commercial differences. Marriages are there usually

contracted with slaves; or at least women are treated as such: no laws can be

therefore expected to regulate the rights of dower, jointures, and marriage set-

tlements. Few also are the persons who can claim the privileges of any laws;

the bulk of those nations, viz., the commonalty, boors, or peasants, being merely

villeins and bondmen. Those are therefore left to the private coercion of their

lords, are esteemed (in the contemplation of these boasted legislators) incapable

of either right or injury, and of consequence are entitled to no redress. We

may see, in these arbitrary states, how large a field of legal contests is already

rooted up and destroyed.

Again; were we a poor and naked people, as the savages of America are,

strangers to science, to commerce, and the arts as well of convenience as of

luxury, we might perhaps be content, as some of them are said to be, to refer

all disputes to the next man we met upon the road, and so put a short end

*to every controversy. For in a state of nature there is no room for r $007 n

municipal laws; and the nearer any nation approaches to that state the *- •"

fewer they will have occasion for. When the people of Rome were little better

than sturdy shepherds or herdsmen, all their laws were contained in ten or

twelve tables; but as luxury, politeness, and dominion increased, the civil law

increased in the same proportion; and swelled to that amazing bulk which it

now occupies, though successively pruned and retrenched by the emperors Theo-

dosius and Justinian.

In like manner we may lastly observe, that, in petty states and narrow terri-

tories, much fewer laws will suffice than in large ones, because there are fewer

objects upon which the laws can operate. The regulations of a private family

are short and well known; those of a prince's household are necessarily more

various and diffuse.

The causes therefore of the multiplicity of the English laws are, the extent

of the country which they govern; the commerce and refinement of its inhabi-

(o)See the preface to Sir John Dnvies'a Reports, wherein many ofthe following topics arc dtaciiBaert

more ;il large.
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tants; but, above all, the liberty and property of the subject. These will

naturally produce an infinite fund of disputes, which must be terminated in a

judicial way; and it is essential to a free people, that these determinations be

published and adhered to; that their property may be as certain and fixed as

the very constitution of their state. For though in many other countries every

thing is left in the breast of the judge to determine, yet with us he is only to

declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law. Hence a multitude

of decisions, or cases adjudged, will arise; for seldom will it happen that any

one rule will exactly suit with many cases. And in proportion as the decisions

of courts of judicature are multiplied, the law will be loaded with decrees, that

may sometimes (though rarely) interfere with each other: either because suc-

ceeding judges may not be apprized of the prior adjudication; or because they

may think differently from their predecessors; or because the same arguments

F *3281 ?"^ nc?t occur formerly as at *present; or, in fine, because of the natural

' "" -1 imbecility and imperfection that attends all human proceedings. But

wherever this happens to be the case in any material point, the legislature is

ready, and from time to time, both may, and frequently does, intervene to

remove the doubt; and, upon due deliberation had, determines by a declaratory

statute how the law shall be held for the future.

Whatever instances, therefore, of contradiction or uncertainty may have been

gleaned from our records, or reports, must be imputed to the defects of human

laws in general, and are not owing to any particular ill construction of the
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English system. Indeed, the reverse is most strictly true. The English law is

less embarrassed with inconsistent resolutions and doubtful questions, than any

other known system of the same extent and the same duration. I may instance

in the civil law; the text whereof, as collected by Justinian and his agents, is

extremely voluminous and diffuse; but the idle comments, obscure glosses, and

jarring interpretations grafted thereupon, by the learned jurists, are literally

without number. And these glosses, which are mere private opinions of

scholastic doctors (and not like our books of reports, judicial determinations of

the court), are all of authority sufficient to be vouched and relied on: which

must needs breed great distraction and confusion in their tribunals. The same

may be said of the canon law; though the text thereof is not of half the

antiquity with the common law of England; and though the more ancient any

system of law is, the more it is liable to be perplexed with the multitude of

judicial decrees. When, therefore, a body of laws, of so high antiquity as the

English, is in general so clear and perspicuous, it argues deep wisdom and fore-

sight in such as laid the foundations, and great care and circumspection in such

as have built the superstructure.

But is not (it will be asked) the multitude of law-suits, which we daily see

and experience, an argument against the clearness and certainty of the law

F *32Q 1 ^self? By no means: for *among the various disputes and controversies

L a*8 J which are daily to be met with in the course of legal proceedings, it is

obvious to observe how very few arise from obscurity in the rules or maxims of

law. An action shall seldom be heard of, to determine a question of inheri-

tance, unless the fact of the descent be controverted. But the dubious points

which are usually agitated in our courts, arise chiefly from the difficulty there

is of ascertaining the intention of individuals, in their solemn dispositions of

property; in their contracts, conveyances, and testaments. It is an object,

indeed, of the utmost importance in this free and commercial country, to lay as

few restraints as possible upon the transfer of possessions from hand to hand,

or their various designations marked out by the prudence, convenience, neces-

sities, or even by the caprice, of their owners: yet to investigate the intention

of the owner is frequently matter of difficulty, among heaps of entangled con-

veyances or wills of a various obscurity. The law rarely hesitates in declaring

its own meaning; but the judges are frequently puzzled to find out the meaning

of others. Thus the powers, the interest, the privileges, and the properties of a

tenant for life, and a tenant in tail, are clearly distinguished and precisely set-
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tied by law: but what words in a will shall constitute this or that estate, has

occasionally been disputed for more than two centuries past, and will continue

to be disputed as long as the carelessness, the ignorance, or singularity of

testators shall continue to clothe their intentions in dark or new-fangled

expressions.

But. notwithstanding so vast an accession of legal controversies, arising from

so fertile a fund us the ignorance and wilfulness of individuals, these will bear

no comparison in point of number to those which are founded upon the dis-

honesty, and disingenuity of the parties: by either their suggesting complaints

that are false in fact, and thereupon bringing groundless actions: or by their

denying such facts as are true, in setting up unwarrantable defences: Ex facto

oritur jus: if therefore the fact be perverted or misrepresented, the law which

arises from thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial *And, in order r *„„* -,

to prevent this, it is necessary to set right the fact, and establish the L "'" '

truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of probation or trial, which the

law of the country has ordained for a criterion of truth and falsehood.

These modes of probation or trial form in every civilized country the great

object of judicial decisions. And experience will abundantly show, that above

a hundred of our law-suits arise from disputed facts, for one where the law is

doubted of. About twenty days in the year are sufficient in Westminter-hall,

to settle upon solemn argument) every demurrer, or other special point of law

that arises throughout the nation: but two months are annually spent in decid-
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ing the truth of facts, before six distinct tribunals, in the several circuits of

England: exclusive of Middlesex and London, which afford a supply of causes

much more than equivalent to any two of the largest circuits.

Trial, then, is the examination of the matter or fact in issue: of which there

are many different species, according to the difference on the subject, or thing to

be tried: of all which we will take a cursory view in this and the subsequent

chapter. For the law of England so industriously endeavours to investigate truth

at any rate, that it will not confine itself to one, or to a few, manners of trial j

but varies its examination of facts according to the nature of the facts them-

selves : this being the one invariable principle pursued, that as well the best

method of trial, as the best evidence upon that trial which the nature of the case

affords, and no other, shall be admitted in the English courts of justice.

The species of trials in civil cases are seven. By record; by inspection, or

examination; by certificate; by witnesses; by wager of battle; by wager of law

and by jury.

I. First -then of the trial by record. This is only used in one particular

instance: and that is where a matter of record *is pleaded in any action r „„„.. -i

as a fine, a judgment or the like; and the opposite party pleads, " nul *• -I

tiel record," that there is no such matter of record existing: upon this, issue is

tendered and joined in the following form, " and this he prays may be inquired

of by the record, and the other doth the like;" and hereupon the party pleading

the record has a day given him to bring it in, and proclamation is made in court

for him to "bring forth the record by nim in pleading alleged, or else he shall

be condemned;" and, on his failure, his antagonist shall have judgment to

recover. The trial, therefore, of this issue is merely by the record; for, as Sir

Edward Coke (b) observes a record or enrolment is a monument of so high a

nature and importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if it be pleaded that

there is no such record, it shall not receive any trial by witness, jury, or other-

wise, but only by itself. Thus, titles of nobility, as whether earl or no earl,

baron or no baron, shall be tried by the king's writ or patent only, which is

matter of record, (c) Also in case of an alien, whether alien friend or enemy,

shall be tried by the league or treaty between his sovereign and ours; for every

league or treaty is of record, (d) And also, whether a manor be to be held in

ancient demesne or not, shall be tried by the record of domesday in the king's

exchequer.

(b) i Inet. 117, 260. (c) fi Rep. US. (dft Rep. 81.
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II. Trial by inspection, or examination, is when, for the greater expedition of

a cause, in some point or issue, being either the principal question or arising

collaterally out of it, but being evidently the object of sense, the judges of the

court, upon the testimony of their own senses, shall decide the point in dispute.

For where the affirmative or negative of a question is matter of such obvious

determination,it is not thought necessary to summon a jury to decide it; who

are properly called in to inform the conscience of the court in respect of dubious

facts: and therefore when the fact, from its nature, must be evident to the court

either from ocular demonstration or other irrefragable proof, there the law

r *oo21 departs *from its usual resort, the verdict of twelve men, and relies on

J the judgment of the court alone. As in case of a suit to reverse a fine

for non-age of the cognizor, or to set aside a statute or recognizance entered

into by an infant; here, and in other cases of the like sort, a writ shall issue to

the sheriff; (e) commanding him that he constrain the said party to appear,

that it may be ascertained by the view of his body by the king's justices, whether

he be of full age or not; " ut per aspectum corporis sui constare potent justi-

ciariis nostris, si prasdictus A sit plena cetatis necne." (/) If, however, the

court has, upon inspection, any doubt of the age of the party (as may frequently

be the case), it may proceed to take proofs of the fact; and, particularly, may

examine the infant himself upon an oath of voire dire, veritatem dicere, that is,

to make true answer to such questions as the court shall demand of him; or

the court may examine his motner, his godfather or the like, (y)
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In like manner if a defendant pleads in abatement of the suit that the plaint-

iff is dead, and one appears and calls himself the plaintiff, which the defendant

denies: in this case the judges shall determine by inspection and examination,

whether he be the plaintiff or not (h) Also if a man be found by a jury an

idiot a nativitate, he may come in person into the chancery before the chancel-

lor, or be brought there by his friends, to be inspected and examined, whether

idiot or not: and if, upon such view and inquiry, it appears he is not so, the

verdict of the jury, and all the proceedings thereon, are utterly void and instantly

of no effect, (i)

Another instance in which the trial by inspection may be used, is when upon

an appeal of mayhem, the issue joined is whether it be mayhem or no mayhem,

this shall be decided by the court upon inspection ; for which purpose they may

F*3331 *ca^ *n *^ie ass'stance °f surgeons. (j) (1) And, by analogy to this, in

" "" -" an action of trespass for mayhem, the court (upon view of such mayhem

as the plaintiff has laid in his declaration, or which is certified by the judges

who tried the cause to be the same as was given in evidence to the jury) may

increase the damages at their own discretion; (&) as may also be the case upon

view of an atrocious battery. (I) But then the battery must likewise be alleged

so certainly in the declaration, that it may appear to be the same with the bat-

tery inspected.

Also to ascertain any circumstances relative to a particular day past, it hath

been tried by an inspection of the almanac by the court Thus upon a writ of

error from an inferior court, that of Lynn, the error assigned was that the judg-

ment was given on a Sunday, it appearing to be on 26 February, 26 Eliz., and

upon inspection of the almanacs of that year, it was found that the 26th of Feb-

ruary in that year, actually fell upon a Sunday: this was held to be a sufficient

trial, and that a trial by a jury was not necessary, although it was an error in

fact; and so the judgment was reversed, (m) But in all these cases, the judges,

if they conceive a doubt, may order it to be tried by jury.

(e) 9 Rep. 31.

(/) This question of non-age was formerly, according to Glanvil (I. 13, c. 15), tried by 8 Jury of eight men,

though now it Is tried by inspection.

(a)) Boll. Abr. 673. (ft) 9 Kep. 30. «| Ibid. 31. ( f) 2 Roll. Abr. 578.

(*) 1 Sid. 108. (t) Uardr. 408. (m) Cro. Eliz. 227.

(1; [All appeals of mayhem are now abolished. 59 Oeo. Ill, o. 46.]
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III. The trial by certificate is allowed in such cases, where the evidence of

the person certifying is the only proper criterion of the point in dispute. For,

when the fact in question lies out of the cognizance of the court, the judges

must rely on the solemn averment or information of persons in such a station,

as affords them the most clear and competent knowledge of the truth. As

therefore such evidence (if given to a jury) must have been conclusive, the law,

to save trouble and circuity, permits the fact to be determined upon such certifi-

cate merely. Thns, 1. If the issue be whether A was absent with the king in

his army out of the realm in time of war, this shall be tried («) by the certificate

of the mareschal of*the king's host in writing under his seal, which shall r *„„. -,

be sent to the justices. 2. If, in order to avoid an outlawry, or the like, *• -•

it was alleged that the defendant was in prison, ultra mare, at Bourdeanx, or in

the service of the mayor of Bourdeaux, this should have been tried by the certifi-

cate of the mayor; and the like of the captain af Calais, (o) But when this was

law, (p) those towns were under the dominion of the crown of England. And

therefore, by a parity of reason, it should now hold that in similar cases, arising

at Jamaica or Minorca, the trial should be by certificate from the governor of

those islands. We also find (a) that the certificate of the queen's messenger, sent

to summon home a peeress of the realm, was formerly held a sufficient trial of

the contempt in refusing to obey such summons. 3. For matters within the

realm, the customs of the city of London shall be tried by the certificate of the

mayor and aldermen, certified by the mouth of their recorder; (r) upon a sur-
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mise from the party alleging it, that the custom ought to be thus tried : else it

must be tried by the countrv. (*) As, the custom of distributing the effects of

freemen deceased; of enrolling apprentices; or that he who is free of one trade

may use another; if any of these or other similar points come in issue. But

this rule admits of an exception, where the corporation of London is party, or

interested, in the suit; as in an action brought for a penalty inflicted by the

custom; for there the reason of the law will not endure so partial a trial; but

this custom shall be determined by a jury, and not by the mayor and aldermen,

certifying by the mouth of their recorder, (t) 4. In some cases the sheriff of

London's certificate shall be the final trial: as if the issue be, whether the defend-

ant be a citizen of London or a foreigner, (u) in case of privilege pleaded to be

sued only in the city courts. Of a nature somewhat similar to which is the

trial of the privilege of the university, when the chancellor claims cognizance

of the cause, because one of the parties is a *privileged person. In this r ,,0351

case, the charters confirmed by act of parliament, direct the trial of the •• *" •"

question, whether a privileged person or no, to be determined by the certificate

and notification of the chancellor under seal; to which it hath also been usual

to add an affidavit of the fact: but if the parties be at issue between themselves,

•whether A is a member of the university or no, on a plea of privilege, the trial

shall be then by jury, and not by the chancellor's certificate: (v) because the

charters direct only that the privilege be allowed on the chancellor's certificate,

when the claim of cognizance is made by him, and not where the defendant

himself pleads his privilege: so that this must be left to the ordinary course of

determination. 5. In matters of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as marriage, and, of

course, general bastardy ; and also excommunication and orders, these, and other

like matters, shall be tried by the bishop's certificate, (to) As if it be pleaded in

abatement, that the plaintiff is excommunicated, and issue is joined thereon; or

if a man claims an estate by descent, and the tenant alleges the demandant to be

a bastard; or if on a writ of dower, the heir pleads no marriage; or if the issue

in a quare impedit be, whether or no the church be full by institution; all these

being matters of mere ecclesiastical cognizance, shall be tried by certificate from

the ordinary. But in an action on the case for calling a man bastard, the

defendant having pleaded in justification that the plaintiff was really so, this

(*) I .it t. t102. (o)» Hep. 31. (;>!•-' Boll. Abr. 68*. (a) Dyer, 176,177.

(r) Co. Lltt. 74. 4 Burr. 248. . (•) Bro. Abr. tit. trial, pi. 98. («) Hob. 86.

(u) Co. Lltt. 74. (v) 2 Roll. Abr. B83. (w) Co. LIU. 74. 2 Lev. 200.
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was directed to be tried by a jury: (x) because, whether the plaintiff be found

either a general or special bastard", the justification will be good; and no ques-

tion of special bastardy shall be tried by the bishop's certificate, but by a jury, (y)

For a special bastard is one born before marriage, of parents who afterwards

intermarry: which is bastardy by our law, though not by the ecclesiastical. It

would therefore be improper to refer the trial of that question to the bishop;

T *3Sfi 1 wno> w'iether the child be born before or after marriage, will be *sure to

L J return or certify him legitimate. («) Ability of a clerk presented, («)

admission, institution and deprivation of a clerk, shall also be tried by certificate

from the ordinary or metropolitan, because of these he is the most competent

judge: (b) but induction shall be tried by a jury, because it is a matter of pub-

lic notoriety, (c) and is likewise the corporal investiture of the temporal profits.

Resignation of a benefice may be tried in either way; (d) but it seenis most

properly to fall within the bishop's cognizance. 6. The trial of all customs and

practice of the courts shall be by certificate from the proper officers of those

courts respectively; and, what return was made on a writ by the sheriff or un-

der-sheriff, shall be only tried by his own certificate, (e) And thus much for

those several issues, or matters of fact, which are proper to be tried by certificate.

IV. A fourth species of trial is that by witnesses, per testes, without the inter-

vention of a jury. (2) This is the only method of trial known to the civil law;

in which the judge is left to form in his own breast his sentence upon the credit

of the witnesses examined: but it is very rarely used in our law, which prefers
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the trial by jury before it in almost every instance. Save only that when a

widow brings a writ of dower, and the tenant pleads that the husband is not

dead; this, being looked upon as a dilatory plea, is, in favour of the widow, and

for greater expedition, allowed to be tried by witnesses examined before the

judges: and so, saith Finch, (/) shall no other case in our law. But Sir Edward

Coke (g) mentions some others: as to try whether the tenant in a real action was

duly summoned, or the validity of a challenge to a juror: so that Finch's ob-

servation must be confined to the trial of direct and not collateral issues. And

in every case Sir Edward Coke lays it down, that the affirmative must be proved

by two witnesses at the least. (3)

F *Wi 1 *^' ^~^e uex^ sPec'es °f ^r'a^ 's °f great antiquity, but much disused;

L -I though still in force, if the parties choose to abide by it; (4) I mean the

trial by wager of battle. This seems to have owed its original to the military

spirit of our ancestors, joined to a superstitious frame of mind; it being in the

nature of an appeal to Providence, under an apprehension and hope (however

presumptuous and unwarrantable) that heaven would give the victory to him

who had the right. The decision of suits by this appeal to the God of battles

is by some said to have been invented by the Burgundi, one of the northern or

German clans that planted themselves in Gaul. And it is true, that the first

written injunction of judiciary combats that we meet with is in the laws of

Gundebald, A. D. 501, which are preserved in the Burgundian code. Yet it

does not seem to have been merely a local custom of this or that particular

tribe, but to have been the common usage of all those warlike people from the

earliest times, (h) And it may also seem from a passage in Velleius Patercu-

lus, (i) that the Germans, when first they became known to the Romans were

wont to decide all contests of right by the sword: for when Quintilius Varus

(x) Hob. 179. (t) Dyer, 79. (z) See Introd. to the Great Charter, edit. Oxon. iub anno 1833.

roJSoebookI.ch.il. (b) 11nst. 632. Show.Parl. c. 88. 2 Roll. Abr. 583, &c.

(c) Dyer. 228. (d) 2 Roll. Abr. 688. (t) 9 Eep. SI. (f) L. 423. (g) 1 Inst. 6.

(h) Sold, of Duels, o. 5. (i) L. 2, o. 118.

(2) [By numerous local acts for the recovery of small debts, the claim of a creditor may be

sustained by his own oath without the intervention of a jury.]

(3) [Inconrts of law, in general, it suffices to prove a fact by one witness. In courts of

equity it is sometimes otherwise, and two witnesses are required. Vide post, oh. 27, and notes. ]

(4)" Appeals of murder, treason, felony, <fcc., as well as wager of battle, were abolished by

statute 59 Geo. Ill, c. 46. See, as to wager of battle, book iv, p. 346, n. Also " Superstition

and Force" by H. C. Lea.
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endeavoured to introduce among them the Roman laws and method of trial, it

was looked upon (says the historian) as a "novitas incognitas disciplines, ut solita

armis decernijure terminarentur." And among the ancient Goths in Sweden

we find the practice of judiciary duels established upon much the same footing

as they formerly were in our own country. (_;')

This trial was introduced into England among other Norman customs by

William the Conqueror; but was only used in three cases, one military, one

criminal, and the third civil. The first in the court-martial, or court of chiv-

alry and honour; (k) the second in appeals of felony, (I) of which we shall speak

in the next book; and the third upon issue joined in a *writ of right, r *ooo -i

the last and most solemn decision of real property. For in writsof •- "'" '

right the jus proprietatis, which is frequently a matter of difficulty, is in ques-

tion ; but other real actions being merely questions of the jus possessions,

which are usually more plain and obvious, our ancestors did not in them appeal

to the decision of Providence. Another pretext for allowing it, upon these

final writs of right, was also for the sake of such claimants as might have the

true right, but yet, by the death of witnesses, or other defect of evidence, be

unable to prove it to a jury. But the most curious reason of all is given in the

Mirror, (m) that it is allowable upon warrant of the combat between David for

the people of Israel of the one party, and Goliah for the Philistines of the other

party: a reason which Pope Nicholas I very seriously decides to be inconclu-

sive, (n) Of battle therefore on a writ of right, (o) we are now to speak; and
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although the writ of right itself, and of course this trial thereof, be at present

much disused; yet, as it is law at this day, it may be matter of curiosity at least,

to enquire into the forms of this proceeding, as we may gather them from ancient

authors, (p)

The last trial by battle that was waged in the court of common pleas at West-

minster (though there was afterwards (a) one in the court of chivalry in 1631;

and another in the county palatine of Durham (r) in 1638) was in the thirteenth

year of Queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1571, as reported by Sir James Dyer:(«) and

was held in Tothill-fields, Westminster, " non sine magna juris consultorum

perturbatione," saith Sir Henry Spelman, (t) who was himself a witness of the

ceremony. The form, as appears from the authors before cited, is as follows:

When the tenant in a writ of right pleads the general issue, viz.: that he

hath more right to hold, than the *demandant hath to recover; and r *OOQ n

offers to prove it by the body of his champion, which tender is L •*

accepted by the demandant; the tenant in the first place must produce his

champion, who by throwing down his glove as a gage or pledge, thus wages or

stipulates battle with the champion of the demandant; who, by taking up the

gage or glove stipulates on his part to accept the challenge. Tne reason why it

is waged by champions, and not by the parties themselves, in civil actions, is

because, if any party to the suit dies, the suit must abate and be at an end for

the present; and therefore no judgment could be given for the lands in question,

if either of the parties were slain in tattle: (it) and also that no person might claim

an exemption from this trial, as was allowed in criminal cases, where the battle

was waged in person.

A piece of ground is then in due time set out, of sixty feet square, enclosed

with lists, and on one side a court erected for the judges of the court of common

pleas, who attend there in their scarlet robes; and also a bar is prepared for the

learned Serjeants at law. When the court site, which ought to DC by sunrising,

proclamation is made for the parties, and their champions; who are introduced

by two knights, and are dressed in a coat of armour, with red sandals, bare-legged

from the knee downwards, bareheaded, and with bare arms to the elbows. The

weapons allowed them are only batons, or staves of an ell long, and a four-cor-

fij Stlernb. de Jure Sueon. 11, c. 7. (k) Co. IJtt. 281. (I) 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 44. (») C. 8,»23.

(n) Decret. part. S, tout. 2, on. 6, c. 22. (o) Appendix, No. I, { S.

(p) Ulanril, 1. 2, c. 8. Vet. Nat. Bree. fol. 2. Nov. A'ar. tit. Droit, patent, fol. 221 (edit. 1534), Tear-book

29Edw. Ill, o. 12. Finch, L. 421. Dyer, 801. 2 lust. 217.

(a) Rushw. CoU. vol. 2,j>art2, fol. 112. 19Uym. 322. (rJ Cro. Car. 612. (•) Dyer.301.

(i) Glow, 101. fiij Co. Lilt ait. />//:•< rsytt dff covrtet, 304.

339 THE MODES OF TRIAL. [Book El

nered leather target; so that death -very seldom ensued this civil combat. In

the court military indeed they fought with sword and lance, according to Spel-

man and Eushworth ; as likewise in France only villeins fought with the buckler

and baton, gentlemen armed at all points. And upon this and other circum-

stances the president Montesquieu (v) hath with great ingenuity not only

deduced the impious custom of private duels upon imaginary points of honour,

but hath also traced the heroic madness of knight-erranty, from the same origi-

nal of judicial combats. But to proceed.

F *S401 *When the champions, thus armed with batons, arrive within the

• J lists or place of combat, the champion of the tenant takes his adversary

by the hand, and makes oath that the tenements in dispute are not the right of

the demandant; and the champion of the demandant, then taking the other by

the hand, swears in the same manner that they are: so that each champion is,

or ought to be, thoroughly persuaded of the truth of the cause he fights for.

Next an oath against sorcery and enchantment is to be taken by both the cham-

pions, in this or a similar form; " hear this, ye justices, that I have this day

neither eat, drank, nor have upon me, neither bone, stone, ne grass; nor any

enchantment, sorcery, or witchcraft, whereby the law of God may be abased, or

the law of the devil exalted. So help me God and his saints."

The battle is thus begun, and the combatants are bound to fight till the stars

appear in the evening: and, if the champion of the tenant can defend himself

till the stars appear, the tenant shall prevail in his cause; for it is sufficient for
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him to maintain his ground, and make it a drawn battle, he being already in

possession; but, if victory declares itself for either party, for him is judgment

finally given. This victory may arise, from the death of either of the champi-

ons: which indeed hath rarely happened; the whole ceremony, to say the

truth, bearing a near resemblance to certain rural athletic diversions, which are

probably derived from this original. Or victory is obtained, if either champion

proves recreant, that is, yields, and pronounces the horrible word of craven; &

word of disgrace and obloquy, rather than of any determinate meaning. But a

horrible word it indeed is to the vanquished champion : since as a punishment

to him for forfeiting the land of his principal by pronouncing that shameful

word, he is condemned, as a recreant, amittere liberem legem, that is, to become

infamous, and not to be accounted liber et legalis homo; being supposed by the

event to be proved forsworn, and therefore never to be put upon a jury or

admitted as a witness in any cause.

f *3411 *This is the form of a trial by battle; a trial which the tenant, or

L J defendant in a wril of right, has it in his election at this day to demand;

and which was the only decision of such writ of right after the conquest, till

Henry the Second, by consent of parliament, introduced the grand assize, (10) (5)

a peculiar species of trial by jury, in concurrence therewith; giving the tenant

his choice of either the one or tlie other. Which example, of discountenancing

these judicial combats, was imitated about a century afterwards in France, by

an edict of Louis the Pious, A. D. 1260, and soon after by the rest of Europe.

The establishment of this alternative, Glanvil, chief justice to Henry the Second,

and probably his adviser herein, considers as a most noble improvement, as in

fact it was, of the law. (x)

VI. A sixth species of trial is by wager of law, (6) vadiato legis, as the forego-

ing is called wager of battle, vadiato duelli: because, as in the former case, the

(») Sp. I... b. 29, c. 20, 22. (to) Appendix, No. I, f B.

ix) Est autem magna assisa regale qvoddam beneficrum, dementia jtrim-iph. de concilia procerum. populis

indultum; quo vita hominum, et status integritati tarn salvbriter confulitur, ui, retinendo quod quit poatidet

in liitro tcnrmento soli, dtidli casum dcclinnrf possint homines ambimtum. Ac per hoc continent, insprrtitrr.

et prirmaturtx mortit uUinuim eyadere tuppltcium, rel saltern pereimw iiifntaiir opprobrium illius infetti et

inverecundi verbi. yuod in ore victi turpiter sonat, consecutivitm. Ex cegvitate item maxima prodita eft leoa-

lis ista institutio. Jut enim, quod post mtiltas et Ion gat dUatianet we evincttur per ilutllina, per benejl-

cium ietiui constUutionii commoditu et acceleratiw expeditur. L. 2, o. 7.

(5) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 42.

(6) Wager of law was abolished by statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV, c. 42. See an account of it in

"Superstition and Force," by H. C. Lea, p. 13.
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defendaut gave a pledge, gage, or radium, to try the cause by battle; so here he

was to put m sureties or vadoits, that at such a day he will make his law, that is,

take the benefit which the law has allowed him. (y) For our ancestors consid-

ered, that there were many cases where an innocent man, of good credit, might

be overborne by a multitude of false witnesses; and therefore established this

species of trial, by the oath of the defendant himself, for if he will absolutely

swear himself not chargeable, and appears to be a person of reputation, he shaft

go free and forever acquitted of the debt, or other cause of action.

*This method of trial is not only to be found in the codes of almost all r *o<o "I

the northern nations, that broke in upon the Roman empire, and estab- >- '

lished petty kingdoms upon its ruins; (z) but its original may also be traced as far

back as the Mosaical law. " If a man deliver unto his neighbour an ass, or an

ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to keep; and it die, or be hurt, or driven away, no

man seeing it; then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both, that he hath

not put his hands unto his neighbour's goods; and the owner of it shall accept

thereof, and he shall not make it good." (a) We shall likewise be able to discern

a manifest resemblance, between this species of trial, and the canonical purga-

tion of the popish clergy, when accused of any capital crime. The defendant or

person accused was in both cases to make oath of his own innocence, and to

produce a certain number of compurgators, who swore they believed his oath.

Somewhat similar also to this is the sacramentum decisioms, or the voluntary

and decisive oath of the civil law; (b) where one of the parties to the suit, not
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being able to prove his charge, offers to refer the decision of the cause to the

oath of his adversary; which the adversary was bound to accept, or tender the

same proposal back again; otherwise the whole was taken as confessed by him.

But though a custom somewhat similar to this prevailed formerly in the city of

London, (c) yet in general the English law does not thus, like the civil, reduce

the defendant, in case he is in the wrong, to the dilemma of either confession or

perjury: but is indeed so tender of permitting the oath to be taken, even upon

the defendant's own request, that it allows it only in a very few cases, and in

those it has also devised other collateral remedies for the party injured, in which

the defendant is excluded from his wager of law.

*The manner of waging and making law is this. He that has waged, .- *„ ,„ -i

or given security, to make his law, brings with him into court eleven of >• l" "' '

his neighbour's: a custom, which we find particularly described so early as in

the league between Alfred and Guthrun the Dane; (d) for by the old Saxon con-

stitution every man's credit in courts of law depended upon the opinion which

his neighbours had of his veracity. The defendant, then standing at the end of

the bar, is admonished by the judges of the nature and danger of a false oath, (e)

And if he still persists, he is to repeat this or the like oath: "hear this, ye jus-

tices, that I do not owe unto Richard Jones the sum of ten pounds, nor any

penny thereof, in manner and form as the said Richard hath declared against

me. So help me God." And thereupon his eleven neighbours, or compurga-

tors, shall avow upon their oaths, that they believe in their consciences that lie

suit!) the truth; so that himself must be sworn defidelitate, and the eleven de

credulitate. (/) It is held indeed by later authorities, (g) that fewer than eleven

compurgators will do: but Sir Edward Coke is positive that there must be this

number; and his opinion not only seems founded upon better authority, but

also upon better reason: for, as wager of law is equivalent to a verdict in the

defendant's favour, it ought to be established by the same or equal testimony,

namely, by the oath of twelve men. And so indeed Glanvil expresses it, («)

"jurabit duodecima manu:" and in 9 Henry III, when a defendant in an action

of debt waged his law, it was adjudged by the court "quod defendat se duo-

decima monu." (i) Thus, too, in an author of the age of Edward the First, (k)

we read, " adjudicabitur reus ad legem suarn duodecima manu." And the ancient

(») Co. LIU. MS. (») Sp. L. b. 28, c. 18. Stienib., de jure Suem. 1. 1, c. 9. Feud. I. 1, t. 4,10, 28.

la) Exod. xxli, 10. (6) Cod. 4, 1.12. (c) Bro. Abr. tit. ley anger, 77.

(d) Cap. 3. Wllk. LL. Angl. Sax. (e) Salk. 682. (/) Co. Litt. 298. (g) 2 Vontr. 171.

(A)Z>. l,c. 0. (i) Fltz. Abr. tit. fey, 78. (t) Hengham magna, e. 5.
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treatise, entitled, Diversite des courts, expressly confirms Sir Edward Coke's

opinion. (I)

\ *3441 *" mus' b® however observed, that so long as the custom continned

L ' -I of producing the secta, the suit, or witnesses to give probability to the

plaintiff's demand (of which we spoke in a former chapter), the defendant was

not put to wage his law unless the secta was first produced, and their testimony

was found consistent. To this purpose speaks magna carta, c. 28. " Nuttus

ballivus de ccetero ponat aliquem ad legem manifestam," (that is, wager of battle),

"nee ad juramentum," (that is, wager of law), "simplici loquela sua" (that is,

merely by his count or declaration), " sine testibus fidelibus ad hoc inductis."

Which Fleta thus explains: (»») " si petens sectam produxerit, et concorde« in-

veniantur, tune reus poterit vadiare legem suam contra petentem et contra sectam

suam prolatam; sed si secta variabilis inveniatur, extunc non tenebitur legem

vadiare contra sectam illam." It is true, indeed, that Fleta expressly limits the

number of compurgators to be only double to that of the secta produced; " ut

si duos vel tres testes produxerit ad probandum, opertet quod defensio fiat per

quatuor vel per sex; itaquod pro quolibet teste duos producat juratores, usque

ad duodecim:" so that, according to this doctrine, the eleven compurgators were

only to be produced, but not all of them sworn, unless the secta consisted of six.

But though this might possibly be the rule till the production of the secta was

generally disused, since that time the duodecima manus seems to have been gen-

erally required, (n)
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In the old Swedish or Gothic constitution, wager of law was not only per-

mitted, as it still is in criminal cases, unless the fact be extremely clear against

the prisoner; (o) but was also absolutely required, in many civil cases; which an

author of their own (p) very justly charges as being the source of frequent per-

jury. This, he tells us, was owing to the popish ecclesiastics, who introduced

this method of purgation from their canon law; and, haying sown a plentiful

r *„ -g -I crop of oaths *in all judicial proceedings, reaped afterwards an ample

L ""' •" harvest of perjuries: for perjuries were punished in part by pecuniary

fines, payable to the coffers of the church. But with us in England wager of law

is never required; and is then only admitted, where an action is brought upon

such matters as may be supposed to be privately transacted between the parties,

and wherein the defendant may be presumed to have made satisfaction without

being able to prove it Therefore it is only in actions of debt upon simple con-

tract, or for amercement, (7) in actions of detinue, and of account, where the

debt may have been paid, the goods restored, or the account balanced, without

any evidence of either; it is only in these actions, I say, that the defendant is

admitted to wage his law: (a) so that wager of law lieth not, when there is any

specialty (as a bond or deed), to charge the defendant, for that would be can-

celled, if satisfied; but when the debt groweth by word only; nor doth it lie in

an action of debt, for arrears of an account, settled by auditors in a former

action, (r) And by such wager of law (when admitted) the plaintiff is perpetu-

ally barred; for the law, in the simplicity of the ancient times, presumed that

no one would forswear himself for any worldly thing. («) Wager of law, how-

ever, lieth in a real action, where the tenant alleges he was not legally summoned

to appear, as well as in mere personal contracts. (()

A man outlawed, attainted for false verdict, or for conspiracy or perjury, or

otherwise become infamous, as by pronouncing the horrible word in a trial by

battle, shall not be permitted to wage his law. Neither shall an infant under

the age of twenty-one, for he cannot be admitted to his oath; and, therefore,

«) It covtnl over' ouelHvximavnsdejureroufluy, sc. que Its entendre en lour eoiwcieni qwe U ditoyt voter.

Fol. 305, edit. 1534.

(M) /.. 2, c. 63. (HI Bro. Abr. tit. leugager, 9. (o) Mod. Un. Hist, zrxijl, 22.

(p)Stternhook, dejureSueon. 1.1, c. ». (?) Co. Lltt. 295. (r) 10 Rep. 105.

(•) Co. Lltt. a«i. (t) Finch, L. 423.

(7) [In a court not of record; for if the amercement were imposed by a court of record,

tbe defendant could not wage his law. Co. Lilt. 295, a.]
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on the other hand, the course of justice shall flow equally, and the defendant,

where an infant is plaintiff, shall not wage his law. But a feme-covert, when

joined with her husband, may be admitted to wage her law, and an alien shall

do it in his own language, (u)

*It is moreover a rule, that where a man is compellable by law to do r *nta -i

any thing, whereby he becomes creditor to another, the defendant in L -I

that case shall not be permitted to wage his law: for then it would be in the

power of any bad man to run in debt first, against the inclinations of his creditor,

and afterwards to swear it away. But where the plaintiff hath given voluntary

credit to the defendant, there he may wage his law; for, by giving him such

credit, the plaintiff has himself borne testimony that he is one whose character

may be trusted. Upon this principle it is, that in an action of debt against a

prisoner by a gaoler for his victuals, the defendant shall not wage his law: for

the gaoler cannot refuse the prisoner, and ought not to suffer him to perish for

want of sustenance. But otherwise it is for the board or diet of a man at

liberty. In an action of debt brought by an attorney for his fees, the defend-

ant cannot wage his law, because the plaintiff is compellable to be his attorney.

And so, if a servant be retained according to the statute of laborers, 5 Eliz. c. 4,

which obliges all single persons of a certain age, and not having other visible

means of livelihood, to go put to service; in an action of debt for the wages of

such a servant, the master shall not wage his law, because the plaintiff was

compellable to serve. But it had been otherwise, had the hiring been by special
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contract, and not according to the statute, (v)

In no case where a contempt, trespass, deceit, or any injury with force is

alleged against the defendant, is he permitted to wage his law: (w) for it is im-

possible to presume he has satisfied the plaintiff his demand in such cases,

where damages are uncertain and left to be assessed by a jury. Nor will

the law trust the defendant with an oath to discharge himself, where the private

injury is coupled as it were with a public crime, that of force and violence;

which would be equivalent to the purgation oath of the civil law, which ours

has so justly rejected.

*Executors and administrators, when charged for the debt of the de- r *„. „ -,

ceased, shall not be admitted to wage their law: (x) for no man can with 1- '*"'

a safe conscience wage law of another man's contract; that is. swear that he

never entered into it, or, at least, that he privately discharged it. The king

also has his prerogative; for, as all wager of law imports a reflection on the

plaintiff for dishonesty, therefore there shall be no such wager on actions brought

by him. (y) And this prerogative extends and is communicated to his debtor

and accomptant; for, on a writ of qud minus in the exchequer for a debt on

simple contract, the defendant is not allowed to wage his law. (z)

Thus the wager of law was never permitted, but where the defendant bore a

fair and unreproachable character; and it also was Confined to such cases

where a debt might be supposed to be discharged or satisfaction made in private

without any witnesses to attest it: and many other prudential restrictions

accompanied this indulgence. But at length it was considered, that {even under

all its restrictions) it threw too great a temptation in the waY of indigent or

profligate men; and therefore by degrees new remedies were devised, and new

forms of action were introduced, wherein no defendant is at liberty to wage his

law. So that now no plaintiff need at all apprehend any danger from the hardi-

ness of his debtor's conscience, unless he voluntarily chooses to rely on his

adversary's veracity, by bringing an obsolete, instead of a modern action. There-

fore one shall hardly hear at present of an action of debt brought upon a simple

contract; that being supplied by an action of trespass on the case for the breach

of a promise or assumpsit ; wherein, though the specific debt cannot be recov-

ered, yet damages may, equivalent to the specific debt- And this being an action

of trespass, no law can be waged therein. So instead of an action of detinue to

(u) Co. Litt. 295. (v) IUd. (v) Ibid. Rnym. 286.

(x) Finch, I.. 424. fj/J Ibid. 523. (xj Co. Litt. 296.
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recover the very thing detained, an action of trespass on the case in trover and con-

F *3481 versi°n i8 usually brought; wherein, though the horse or other specific

L J chattel cannot be hod, yet the defendant shall pay damages for the con ver-

sion equal to the value of the chattel; and for this trespass also no wager of law is

allowed. In the room of actions of account, a bill in equity is usually filed;

wherein, though the defendant answers upon his oath, yet such oath is not con-

clusive to the plaintiff: but he may prove every article by other evidence, in

contradiction to what the defendant has sworn. So that wager of law is quite

out of use, being avoided by the mode of bringing the action; but still it is not

out of force. And therefore, when a new statute inflicts a penalty, and gives an

action of debt for recovering it, it is usual to add, in which no wager of law

shall be allowed: otherwise an hardy delinquent might escape any penalty of

the law, by swearing lie had never incurred, or else had discharged it.

These six species of trials, that we have considered in the present chapter,

are only had in certain special and eccentrical cases; where the trial by the

country, per pais, or by jury, would not be so proper or effectual. In the next

chapter we snail consider at large the nature of that principal criterion of truth

in tne law of England.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE TRIAL BY JURY.

THE subject of our next inquiries will be the nature and method of the trial

by jury; called also the trial per pais, or by the country: a trial that hath been
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used time out of mind in this nation, and seems to have been coeval with the first

civil government thereof. Some authors have endeavoured to trace the original

of juries up as high as the Britons themselves, the first inhabitants of our island;

but certain it is that they were in use among the earliest Saxon colonies, their

institution being ascribed by Bishop Nicholson (a) to Woden himself, their

great legislator and captain. Hence it is, that we may find traces of juries in

the laws of all those nations which adopted the feudal system, as in Germany,

France, and Italy; who had all of them a tribunal composed of twelve good

men and true, " boni homines," usually the vassals or tenants of the lord, being

the equals or peers of the parties litigant; and, as the lord's vassals judged

each other in tne lord's courts, so the King's vassals, or the lords themselves,

judged each other in the king's court, (b) In England we find actual mention

of them so early as the laws of T£ing Ethelred, and that not as a new invention, (c)

Stiernhook (d) ascribes the invention of the jury, which in the Teutonic

language is denominated nembda, to Regner, king of Sweden and Denmark,

who was cotemporary with our King Egbert Just as we are apt to impute

T *3501 ^e inven^'°n °f this, and some *other pieces of juridical polity, to the

' ' •" superior genius of Alfred the Great; to whom, on account of his having

done much, it is usual to attribute every thing; and as the tradition of ancient

Greece placed to the account of their own Hercules whatever achievement was

performed superior to the ordinary prowess of mankind. Whereas the truth

seems to be, that this tribunal was universally established among all the

northern nations, and so interwoven in their very constitution, that the earliest

accounts of the one give us also some traces of the other. (1) Its establishment

(a) Dejure Saxonum, p. II. (b) Sp. I.. b. 30, c. 18. Capitul. Ludii. pit. A. D. 819, c. 2.

(c) Wilk. 1,1.. Any/. Sax. 117. (d) Dejure Sutonum, 1.1, c. 4.

(1) [The Athenians, according to Sir \Vm. Jones, had trials by jury. Sir Win. Jones on

Bailment, 74.]

For an account of trial by jury among the northern nations, see History of Trial by Jury, by

William Foreyth.
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however and use, in this island, of what date soever it be, though for a time

greatly impaired and shaken by the introduction of the Norman trial by battle,

was always so highly esteemed and valued by the people, that no conquest, no

change of government, could ever prevail to abolish it. In magna carta it is

more than once insisted on as the principal bulwark of our liberties; but

especially by chapter 29, that no freeman shall be hurt in either his person or

property; " nisi per legate judidum parium suorum vel per legem terra." A

privilege which is couched in almost the same words with that of the emperor

Conrad, two hundred years before: («) nemo beneficium suum perdat, nisi secun-

dum consuetudinem anteces&orum nostrorum et per judicium parium suorum."

And it was ever esteemed, in all countries, a privilege of the highest and most

beneficial nature.

But I will not misspend the reader's time in fruitless encomiums on this

method of trial; but shall proceed to the dissection and examination of it in all

its parts, from whence indeed its highest encomium will arise; since, the more

it is searched into and understood, the more it is sure to be valued. And this

is a species of knowledge most absolutely necessary for every gentleman in the

kingdom: as well because he may be frequently called upon to determine in this

capacity the rights of others, his fellow-subjects; as because his own property,

his liberty, and his life, depend upon maintaining, in its legal force, the consti-

tutional trial by jury.

""Trials by jury in civil causes are of two kinds; extraordinary and r ,„,... -.
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ordinary. The extraordinary I shall only briefly hint at, and confine L d° J

the main of my observations to that which is more usual and ordinary.

The first species of extraordinary trial by jury is that of the grand assize,

which was instituted by King Henry the Second in parliament, as was men-

tioned in the preceding chapter, by way of alternative offered to the choice of

the tenant or defendant in a writ of right, instead of the barbarous and unchris-

tian custom of duelling. For this purpose a writ de magna assisa eligenda is

directed to the sheriff, (/) to return four knights, who are to elect and choose

twelve others to be joined with them, in the manner mentioned by Glanvil; (g)

who, having probably advised the measure itself, is more than usually copious

in describing it; and these, all together, form the grand assize, or great jury, which

is to try the matter of right, and must now consist of sixteen jurors, (h) (2)

Another species of extraordinary juries, is the jury to try an attaint; which

is a process commenced against a former jury, for bringing in a false verdict: (3)

of which we shall speak more largely in a subsequent chapter. At present I

shall only observe, that this jury is to consist of twenty-four of the best men in

the country, who are called the grand jury in the attaint, to distinguish them

from the first or petit jury; and these are to hear and try the goodness of the

former verdict.

With regard to the ordinary trial by jury in civil cases, I shall pursue

the same method in considering it, that I set out with in explaining the

nature of prosecuting actions in general, viz.: by following the order and

course of the proceedings themselves, as the most clear and perspicuous way of

treating it.

*When, therefore, an issue is joined, by these words, " and this the r %ogo i'

said A prays may be inquired of by the country," or," and of this he puts I J •

himself upon the country,—and the said B does the like," the court awards a writ

of venirefacias upon the roll or record, commanding the sheriff " that he cause

to come here on such a day, twelve free and lawful men, liberos et legates homines,

of the body of his county, by whom the truth of the matter may be better known,

and who are neither of kin to the aforesaid A, nor the aforesaid B, to recognize

(e) LL. Longob. 1. 3, t.8. J.4. (f)T. N. B.4. (g)L.2, c. 11,21. (h)Finch, L. 414. 1 Leon. .10.1.

(2) [As the writ of right haa been abolished, thia mode of trial can no longer be resorted to. 1

(3) Abolished by 6 Geo. IT, c. 50, s. 60.
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the truth of the issue between the said parties."(t) And such writ was accord-

ingly issued to the sheriff.

Thus the cause stands ready for a trial at the bar of the court itself; for all

trials were there anciently had, in actions which were there first commenced;

which then never happened but in matters of weight and consequence, all tri-

fling suits being ended in the court-baron, hundred or county courts: and indeed

all causes of great importance or difficulty are still usually retained upon motion,

to be tried at the bar in the superior courts. But when the usage began to

bring actions of any trifling value in the courts of Westminster-hall, it was

found to be an intolerable burthen to compel the parties, witnesses, and jurors,

to come from Westmoreland, perhaps, or Cornwell, to try an action of assault at

Westminster. A practice therefore very early obtained, of continuing the cause

from term to term, in the court above, provided the justices in eyre did not pre-

viously come into the county where the cause of action arose; (/) and if it

happened that they arrived there within that interval, then the cause was

removed from the jurisdiction of the justices at Westminster to that of the

justices in eyre. Afterwards, when the justices in eyre were superseded by the

modern justices of assize (who came twice or thrice in the year into the several

counties, ad capiendus assisas, to take or try writs of assize, of mort d' ancestor,

r *QKO -i novel disseisin, nuisance, *and the like), a power was superadded by

-1 statute Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 30, to these justices of assize to try

common issues in trespass, and other less important suits, with direction to
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return them (when tried) into the court above, where alone the judgment should

be given. And as only the trial, and not the determination of the cause, was

now intended to be had in the court below, therefore the clause of nisi prius

was left out of the conditional continuances before mentioned, and was directed

by the statute to be inserted in the writs of venire facias; that is," that the

sheriff should cause the jurors to come to Westminster (or wherever the king's

court should be held) on such a day in Easter and Michaelmas terms; nisipriu*,

unless before that day the justices assigned to take assize shall come into his said

county." By virtue of which the sheriff returned his jurors to the court of the

justices of assize, which was sure to be held in the vacation before Easter and

Michaelmas terms; and there the trial was had.

An inconvenience attended this provision: principally because, as the sheriff

made no return of the jury to the court at Westminster, the parties were ignorant

who they were till they came upon the trial, and therefore were not ready with

their challenges or exceptions. For this reason, by the statute 42 Edw. Ill, c.

11, the method of trials by nisi prius was altered; and it was enacted that no

inquests (except of assize and gaol delivery) should be taken by writ of nisi

prius, till after the sheriff had returned the names of the jurors to the court

above. So that now in almost every civil cause the clause of nisi prius is left

out of the writ of venire facias, which is the sheriff's warrant to warn the jury:

and is inserted in another part of the proceedings, as we shall see presently.

For now the course is to make the sheriff's venire returnable on the last'retTirn

of the same term wherein issue is joined, viz.: Hilary or Trinity terms; which, from

the making up of the issues therein, are usually called issuable terms. And he

returns the names of the j nrors in a panel (a little pane, or oblong piece of parcli-

r *o-41 ment) annexed to the writ This jury *is not summoned, and therefore,

L J not appearing at the day, must unavoidably make default. For which

reason a compulsive process is now awarded against the jurors, called in the

common pleas a writ of habeas corpora juratorum, and in the king's bench a

distringas, commanding the sheriff to have their bodies or to distrain them by

their lands and goods, that they may appear upon the day appointed. The entry

therefore on the roll or record is, (#) " that the jury is respited, through defect

of the jurors, till the first day of the next term, then to appear at Westminster;

fit Appendix. No. II. » 4.

fij Semper datitur dirt pnrtOmi a jutticiatUt de baneo, mb tatt condttione, " niri jutticiartt itintrantti

print venerint ad parley ilia*.'' Bract. I. 3, tr. 1. c. 11, > 8.

(k) Appendix, No. II, } 4.

218

I

Chap. 23.] TRIAL BY JURY. 354

unless before that time, viz.: on Wednesday the 4th of March, the justices of our

lord the king, appointed to take assizes in that county, shall have come to Ox-

ford, that is, to the place assigned for holding the assizes." And theraipon the

writ commands the sheriff to nave their bodies at Westminster on the said first

day of next term, or before the said justices of assize, if before that time they

come to Oxford, viz.: on the 4th of March aforesaid. And, as the judges are

sure to come aud open the circuit commissions on the day mentioned in the

writ, the sheriff returns and summons the jury to appear at the assizes, and there

the trial is had before the justices of assize and nisiprius: among whom (as

hath been said) (1) are usually two of the judges of the courts of Westminster,

the whole kingdom being divided into six circuits, (4) for this purpose. And thus

we may observe that the trial of common issues, at nisiprius, which was in its

original only a collaterial incident to the original business of the justices of

assize, is now, by the various revolutions of practice, become their principal

civil employment: hardly any thing (5) remaining in use of the real assizes but

the name.

If the sheriff be not an indifferent person; as if he be a party in the suit, or

be related either by blood or affinity to either of the parties, he is not then trusted

to return the jury, but the venire shall be directed to the coroners, who in this,

as in many other instances, are the substitutes of the sheriff, to execute process

when he is deemed an improper person. If any exception lies to the coroners,

the venire shall be directed to two clerks of the court, or two persons of the
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county *named by the court, and sworn, (m) And these two, who are r *OKE i

called elisors, or electors, shall indifferently name the jury, and their L J

return is final; no challenge being allowed to their array.

Let us now pause awhile, and observe (with Sir Matthew Hale) (») in these

first preparatory stages of the trial, how admirably this constitution is adapted

and framed for the investigation of truth, beyond any other method of trial in

the world. For, first, the person returning the jurors is a man of some fortune

and consequence; that so he may be not only the less tempted to commit wilful

errors, but likewise be responsible for the faults of either himself or his officers;

and he is also bound by the obligation of an oath faithfully to execute his duty.

Next, as to the time of their return: the panel is returned to the court upon the

original venire, and the jurors are to be summoned and brought in many weeks

afterwards to the trial, whereby the parties may have notice of the jurors, and

of their sufficiency or insufficiency, characters, connections and relations, that

so they may be challenged upon just cause; while at the same time by means

of the compulsory process (of distringas or habeas copora) the cause is not

like to be retarded through defect of jurors. Thirdly, as to the place of their

appearance; which in causes of weight and consequence is at the bar of the

court; but in ordinary cases at the assizes, held in the dounty where the cause

of action arises, and the witnesses and jurors live: a provision most excellently

calculated for the saving of expense to the parties. For though the preparation

of the causes in point of pleading is transacted at Westminster, whereby the

order and uniformity of proceeding is preserved throughout the kingdom, and

multiplicity of forms is prevented; yet this is no great charge or trouble, one

attorney being able to transact the business of forty clients. But the trouble-

some and most expensive attendance is that of jurors and witnesses at the trial;

which, therefore, is brought home to them in the country where most of them

inhabit. Fourthly, the persons before *whom they are to appear, and r ^eg i

before whom the trial is to be held, are the judges of the superior court. *• *'""'' '

(I) See page 89. (m) Fortesc. de Laud. LL. c. 1*. Co. I,iit L58. (a) Hlat. C. L. c. 12.

(4) Now seven.

(5) [These several writs, generally called the "jury process," are now, however, abolished,

and the juror-; are summoned by the sheriff for the commission day, in virtue of a precept

issued to him for that purpose by the judges of assize; a panel of the jurors so summoned

being made and kept in the sheriff's office, for inspection, seven days before the commission day,

and a copy of it annexed to the record. Com. Law Proc. Act, 1852.]
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if it be a trial at bar; or the judges of assize, delegated from the courts at West-

minster by the king, if the trial be held in the country : persons, whose learning

and dignity secure their jurisdiction from contempt, and the novelty and very

parade of whose appearance have no small influence upon the multitude. The

very point of their being strangers in the county is of infinite service, in pre-

venting those factions and parties which would intrude in every cause of mo-

ment, were it tried only before persons resident on the spot, as justices of the

peace, and the like. And the better to remove all suspicion of partiality, it was

wisely provided by the statutes 4 Edw. Ill, c. 2, 8 Eic. II, c. 2, and 33 Hen.

VIII, c. 24, that no judge of assize should hold pleas in any county wherein he was

born or inhabits. (6) And as this constitution prevents party and faction from

intermingling in the trial of right, so it keeps both the rule and the adminis-

tration of the laws uniform. These justices, though thus varied and shifted

at every assizes, are all sworn to the same laws, have had the same education,

have pursued the same studies, converse and consult together, communicate their

decisions and resolutions, and preside in those courts which are mutually con-

nected and their judgments blended together, as they are interchangeably courts

of appeal or advice to each other. And hence, their administration of justice

and conduct of trials are consonant and uniform; whereby that confusion

and contrariety are avoided, which would naturally arise from a variety of

uncommnnicating judges, or from any provincial establishment. But let us

now return to the assizes.
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When the general day of trials is fixed, the plaintiff or his attorney must

bring down the record to the assizes, and enter' it with the proper officer, in

order to its being called on in course. If it be not so entered, it cannot be

tried; therefore it is in the plaintiffs breast to delay any trial by not carrying

down the record: unless the defendant, being fearful of such neglect in the

plaintiff, and willing to discharge himself from the action, will himself under-

F *3571 ^a^e '° bring on *the trial, giving proper notice to the plaintiff. Which

L l" •" proceeding is called the trial by proviso ; by reason of the clause then

inserted in the sheriff's venire, viz., "proviso, provided that if two writs come to

your hands (that is, one from the plaintiff and another from the defendant),

you shall execute only one of them. But this practice hath begun to be dis-

used, since the statute 14 Geo. II, c. 17, which enacts, that if, after issue joined,

the cause is not carried down to be tried according to the course of the court,

the plaintiff shall be esteemed to be nonsuited, and judgment shall be given for

the defendant as in case of a nonsuit. In case the plaintiff intends to try the

cause, he is bound to give the defendant (if he lives within forty miles of Lon-

don) eight days' notice of trial; and, if he lives at a greater distance, then

fourteen days' notice, in order to prevent surprise: and if the plaintiff then

changes his mind, and does not countermand the notice six days before the

trial, he shall be liable to pay costs to the defendant for not proceeding to trial,

by the same last-mentioned statute. The defendant, however, or plaintiff, may,

upon good cause shown to the court above, as upon absence or sickness of a

material witness, obtain leave upon motion to defer the trial of the cause till

the next assizes. (7)

But we will now suppose all previous steps to be regularly settled, and the

cause to be called on in court. The record is then handed to the judge, to

peruse and observe the pleadings, and what issues the parties are to maintain

and prove, while the jury is called and sworn. To this end the sheriff returns

his compulsive process, the writ of habeas corpora, or distringas, with the panel

of jurors annexed, to the judge's officer in court. The jurors contained in the

(6) This is no longer the law.

(7) This statute, so far as relates to judgment as in case of a nonsuit, ia repealed by the

common law procedure act, 1852, which however provides a mode in which a plaintiff, who un-

reasonably delays his suit, may be forced to proceed to trial, or have judgment for coats against

him.
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panel are either wfiaal or common jurors. Speci-al juries were originally intro-

duced in trials at oar, when the causes were of too great nicety for the dis-

cussion of ordinary freeholders ; or where the sheriff was suspected of partiality,

though not upon such apparent cause as to warrant an exception to him. lie

is in such cases, upon motion in court and a rule granted thereupon, to attend

the prothonotary or other proper officer with his freeholder's book ; and the

officer is to take *indifferently forty-eight of the principal freeholders in r *OKQ i

the presence of the attorneys on both sides; who are each of them to *- •

strike off twelve, and the remaining twenty-four are returned upon the panel

By the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, either party is entitled upon motion to have a

special jury struck upon the trial of any issue, as well at the assizes as at bar ;

he paying the extraordinary expense, unless the judge will certify (in pursuance

of the statute 24 Geo. II, c. 18) that the cause required such special jury.

A common jury is one returned by the sheriff according to the directions of

the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, which appoints that the sheriff or officer shall not

return a separate panel for every separate cause, as formerly ; but one and the

same panel for every cause to be tried at the same assizes containing not less

than forty-eight, nor more than seventy-two jurors : and that their names, being

written on tickets, shall be put into a box or glass ; and when each cause is

called, twelve of these persons, whose names shall be first drawn out of the box,

shall be sworn upon the jury, unless absent, challenged, or excused ; or unless

a previous view of the messuages, lands, or place in question, shall have been
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thought necessary by the court (o) in which case six or more of the jurors

returned, to be agreed on by the parties, or named by a judge or other proper

officer of the court, shall be appointed by special writ of habeas corpora or dis-

tringas to have the matters in question shown to them by two persons named in

the writ; and then such of the jury as have had the view, or so many of

them as appear, shall be sworn on th'e inquest previous to any other jurors.

These acts are well calculated to restrain any suspicion of partiality in the

sheriff, or any tampering with the jurors when returned. (8)

As the jurors appear, when called, they shall be sworn, unless challenged by

either party. Challenges are of two sorts ; challenges to the array, and chal-

lenges to the polls.

""Challenges to the array are at once an exception to the whole panel, r *„(.„ •,

in which the jury are arrayed or set in order by the sheriff in his return; L -'

and they may be made upon account of partiality or some default in the sheriff

or his under officer who arrayed the panel. (9) And generally speaking, the

same reasons that, before the awarding the venire, were sufficient to have

directed it to the coroners or elisors, will be also sufficient to quash the array,

when made by a person or officer of whose partiality there is any tolerable

ground of suspicion. Also, though there be no personal objection against the

sheriff, yet if he arrays the panel at the nomination, or under the direction of

either party, this is good cause of challenge to the array. Formerly, if a lord

of parliament had a cause to be tried, and no knight was returned upon the

jury, it was a cause of challenge to the array: (p) but an unexpected use having

been made of this dormant privilege by a spiritual lord, (g) it was abolished by

statute 24 Geo. II, c. 18. But still, in an attaint, a knight must be returned 011

the jury, (r) Also, by the policy of the ancient law, the jury was to come de

(o) suit . 4 Anne. c. 18. (p) Co. LiU. 15fi. Sold. on Baronage, it, 11.

(q) K. w. Bishop of Worcester, M. 28 Geo. II, B. B. (r)Ca. Litt. IS).

(8) [The qualification of both common and special jurymen is now regulated by statute 6 Geo.

IV. o.50, by which all other acts are repealed.]

(9) Upon a challenge to the array, if the facts are denied the court appoints triers, and if

they pronounce the cause of challenge unfounded, it is overruled. If the facts are admitted,

the court passes upon their sufficiency, and either quashes the panel or overrules the chal-

lenge. Gardner t>. Turner, 9 Johns. 260. In the United States it is believed that an objection

•which would be good as a challenge to the array, is generally raised by motion to quash or set

aside the panel.
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vidnetp, from the neighbourhood of the vill or place where the cause of action

was laid in the declaration: and therefore some of the jury were obliged to be

returned from the hundred in which such vill lay; and if none were returned,

the array might be challenged for defect of hundredors. Thus the Gothic jury,

or nembda, was also collected out of every quarter of the country: " linos,

trinos, vel etiam senos ex singulis territorii quadrantibus." (s) For living in the

neighbourhood, they were properly the very county, or pais, to which both

parties had appealed; and were supposed to know beforehand the characters of

the parties and witnesses, and therefore they better knew what credit to give

to the facts alleged in evidence. But this convenience was overbalanced by another

very natural and almost unavoidable inconvenience; that jurors, coming out of

F *360 1 *^e imme(liate neighbourhood, would be apt *to intermix their prejudi-

' -I ces and partialities in the trial of right. And this our law was so sensible

of, that it for a long time has been gradually relinquishing this practice; the

number of necessary hundredors in the whole panel, which, in the reign of

Edward III, were constantly six, (t) being in the time of Fortescue (M) reduced

to four. Afterwards, indeed, the statute 35 Hen. VIII, c. 6, restored the ancient

number of six, but that clause was soon virtually repealed by statute 27 Eliz. c.

6, which required only two. And Sir Edward Coke (v) also gives us such a

variety of circumstances, whereby the courts permitted this necessary number

to be evaded, that it appears they were heartily tired of it. At length, by statute

4 and 5 Ann. c. 6, it was entirely abolished upon all civil actions, except upon
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penal statutes; and upon those, also, by the 24 Geo. II, c. 18, the jury being

now only to come de corpore comitatus, from the body of the county at large,

and not de vicineto, or from the particular neighbourhood. (10) The array or

the ancient law may also be challenged, if an alien be party to the suit, and,

upon a rule obtained by his motion to the court for a jury de medietate lingua,

such a one be not returned by the sheriff, pursuant to the statute 28 Edw. Ill,

c. 13, enforced by 8 Hen. VI, c 29, which enact, that where either party is an

alien born, the jury shall be one-half denizens, and the other aliens (if so many

be forthcoming in the place), for the more impartial trial; a privilege indulged

to strangers in no other country in the world; but which is as ancient with us

as the time of King Ethelred, in whose statute de monticolis Watties (then

aliens to the crown of England), cap. 3, it is ordained, that "duodeni legates

homines, quorum sex Walk et sex Angli erunt, Anglis et Wallis jus dicunto."

But where both parties are aliens, no partiality is to be presumed to one more

than another; and therefore it was resolved soon after the statute 8 Hen. VI, (w)

that where the issue is joined between two aliens (unless the plea be had before

the mayor of the staple, and thereby subject to the restrictions of statute 27

Edw. Ill, st. 2, c. 8), the jury shall all be denizens. And it now might be a

\ *3611 ques.ti.on> now far tne, *statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, before referred to), hath

L -I in civil causes undesignedly abridged this privilege of foreigners, by the

positive directions therein given concerning the manner of impanelling jurors,

and the persons to be returned in such panel. So that (unless this statute is

to be construed by the same equity which the statute 9 Hen. VI, c. 29, declared

to be the rule of interpreting the statute 2 Hen. V, st, 2, c. 3, concerniag the

landed qualifications of jurors in suits to which aliens were parties) a court

might perhaps hesitate whether it has now a power to direct a panel to be returned

de medietate lingua, and thereby alter the method prescribed for striking a

special jury, or balloting for common jurors. (11)

Challenges to the polls, in capita, areexceptions to particular jurors; and

seem to answer to the recusatio judicis in the civil and canon laws; by the con-

r«; Stiernhook, dejvre Goth. 1. 1. 0. 4. ft) (itlb. Hist C. P. c. 8. (•») Dt Laud. IX. 0. S5.

(•») Inst. 157. ftej Year-book, 21 Hen. VI, 4.

(10 [See an excellent note, Co. Lit. 125, a. b. note 2.]

(11) [From the enactments of the statute 6 Geo. IV, c. 50, and especially section 47 thereof, it

would seem that a jury dp medietate linguae is now allowed only upon trials for felony or mis-

demeanor.]
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stitutions of which a judge might be refused upon any suspicion of partiality.(a;)

By the laws of England, also, in the times of Bracton (y) and Fleta, (z) a judge

might be refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held

that judges and justices cannot be challenged, (a) For the law will not suppose

a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer im-

partial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and

idea. And should the fact at any time prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of

the law will not presume beforehand, there is no doubt but that such misbe-

haviour would draw down a heavy censure from those to whom the judge is

accountable for his conduct.

But challenges to the polls of the jury (who are judges of fact) are reduced to

four heads by Sir Edward Coke; (b) propter honoris respectum ; propter defectum ;

propter affectum ; and propter delictum.

1. Propter honoris respectum ; as if a lord of parliament be empanelled on a

jury, he may be challenged by either party, or he may challenge himself.

*2. Propter defectum ; as if a iuryman be an alien born, this is defect r *ogo l

of birth; if he be a slave or bondman, this is defect of liberty, and he *- '

cannot be liber et legalis homo. Under the word homo, also, though a name

common to both sexes, the female is however excluded, propter defectum sexus:

except when a widow feigns herself with child, in order to exclude the next

heir, and a suppositions birth is suspected to be intended; then upon the writ

de ventre inspiciendo, a jury of women is to be impanelled to try the question,
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whether with child or not. (c) But the principal deficiency is defect of estate

sufficient to qualify him to be a juror. This depends upon a variety of statutes.

And, first, by the statute of West. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 38, none shall pass on juries in

assizes within the county, but such as may dispend 20s. by the year at the least;

which is increased to 40s. by the statutes 21 Edw. I, st. 1, and 2 Hen. V, st. 2,

c. 3. This was doubled by the statute 27 Eliz. c. 6, which requires in every juch

case the jurors to have estate of freehold to the yearly value of 4?. at the least.

But, the value of money at that time decreasing very considerably, this qualification

was raised by the statute 16 and 17 Car. II, c. 3, to 201. per annum, which being

only a temporary act, for three years, was suffered to expire without renewal, to

the great debasement of juries. However, by the statute 4 and 5 W. and M.

c. 24, it was again raised to 101. per annum in England, and 62. in Wales, of

freehold lands or copyhold ; which is the first time that copyholders (as such)

•were admitted to serve upon juries in any of the king5 courts, though they had

before been admitted to serve in some of the sheriff's courts, by statutes 1 Kic.

Ill, c. 4, and 9 Hen. VII, c. 13. And, lastly, by statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, any

leaseholder for the term of five hundred years absolute, or for any term determin-

able upon life or lives, of the clear yearly value of 201. per annum over and above

the rent reserved, is qualified to serve upon juries. (12) When the jury is de

medietate lingum, that is, one moiety of the English tongue or nation, and the

other of any foreign one, no want of lands shall be *cause of challenge r ,.„„„ -,

to the alien; for, as he is incapable to hold any, this would totally defeat L " J

the privilege, (d)

3. Jurors may be challenged propter'affectum, for suspicion of bias or partial-

ity. This may be either a principal challenge, or to the favour. A principal

challenge is such, where the cause assigned carries with itprima fade evident

marks of suspicion, either of malice or favour: as, that a juror is of kin to either

(i) Cod. 3, 1, 16. nrmtitt. 1. 2. t. 28,c. 36, (y) L. 5, e. IS. (z) L. 6, c. 37. (a) Co. Lltt -"U.

(l>) 1 lust. 166. (c) Cro. Mi/.. 660. (,l) See stat. 2 Hen. T, St. 2, e. 3. 8 Hen. VI, c. 29.

(12) [A juror must be twenty-one years old, and if above sirty, he is exempted, though not

disqualified from serving. He must also possess freehold or copyhold property, held by lease

for twenty-one years or longer, of the annual value of twenty pounds, or occupy a house con-

taining not less than fifteen windows. In London, the occupation of a house, shop, or place

of business within the city, or the possession of real or personal property of the value of 1001

constitutes a qualification. 6 and? Geo. IV, p. 50.]
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party within the ninth degree; (e) that he has been arbitrator on either aide;

that he lias an interest in the cause; that there is an action depending between

him and the party; that he has taken money for his verdict; that he has

formerly been a juror in the same cause; that he is the party's master,

servant, counsellor, steward, or attorney, or of the same society or corporation

with him: all these are principal causes of challenge; which, if true, cannot

be overruled, for jurors must be omni exceptione majores. Challenges to the

favour, are where the party hath no principal challenge: but objects only

some probable circumstances of suspicion, as acquaintance and the like', (f)

the validity of which must be left to the determination of triors, whose office

it is to decide whether the juror be favourable or unfavourable. The triors,

in case the first man called be challenged, are two indifferent persons named by

the court; and if they try one man and find him indifferent, he shall be sworn;

and then he and the two triors shall try the next; and when another is found

indifferent and sworn, the two triors shall be superseded, and the two first sworn

on the jury shall try the rest, (g) (13)

4. Challenges propter delictum, are for some crime or misdeameanor, that

affects the juror's credit and renders him infamous. As for a conviction of trea-

son, felony, perjury, or conspiracy; or if for some infamous offence he hath received

F *3641 Ju"f>men'; °f the pillory, tumbrel, or the like ; or to be branded, *whipt,

*• •• or stigmatized; or if he be outlawed or excommunicated, or hath been

attainted of false verdict, pramunire, or forgery; or, lastly, if he hath proved
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recreant when champion in the trial by battle, and thereby hath lost his liberam

legem. A juror may himself be examined on oath of voir dire, verilatem dicere,

within regard to such causes of challenge as are not to his dishonour or discredit;

but not with regard to any crime, or any thing which tends to his disgrace or

disadvantage. (A)

Besides these challenges, which are exceptions against the fitness of jurors,

and whereby they may be excluded from serving, there are also other causes, to

be made use of by the jurors themselves, which are matter of exemption;

whereby their service is excused, and not excluded. As, by statute West 2,13

Edw. I, c. 38, sick and decrepit persons,persons not commorant in the county,

and men above seventy years old ; and by the statute of 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 32,

infants under twenty-one. This exemption is also extended by divers statutes,

customs, and charters, to physicians and other medical persons, counsel, attor-

neys, officers of the courts, and the like; all of whom, if impanelled, must

show their special exemption. Clergymen are also usually excused, out of favour

and respect to their function: but, if they are seized of lands and tenements,

they are, in strictness, liable to be impanelled in respect of their lay-fees, unless

they be in the service of the king or some bishop: " in olsequio domini regi*,

vel alicujus episcopi." (i) (14)

If, by means of challenges, or other cause, a sufficient number of unexcep-

tionable jurors doth not appear at the trial, either party may pray a tale*. A

fe) Finch, L. 401.

(/.) In the nembda, or jury of the ancient Goths, three challenges only were allowed to the favour, bnt

the principal challenges were indefinite. " Litebatpalam excipere, et temper ex prnlmbili miisn tret repudiarit

etiamphires ex cauia prceananti et manifesto." SUernhook.7. 1, c. 4.

(g) Co. Lilt 188. (h) Ibid. 166, b. (i) F, N. B. 186. Reg. Brev. 179.

(13) [The gneBtipn of challenge to the array, and incidentally to the polls and triors, under-

went much discussion in The King v. Edmonds, 4 B, and A. 476.]

The whole subject was very fully considered in the case of Freeman »>. People, 4 Demo, 9,

to which the reader is referred. As to what opinion formed or expressed by a juror will be

sufficient ground for challenge to the favor, see 1 Burr's trial, 416; Osiander's Case, 3 Leigh,

785; People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 307 ; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 499; Smith p. Barnes,

3 Scam. 78; Bradford r. State, J5 Ind. 351; Holt v. People, 13 Mich. 224. Maddox r. State, 32 Ga. 581.

The practice upon challenges varies so much in different states, that the American reader will

expect to consult and bo guided by the book of practice in use in his own state.

As to disqualification from relationship, see Den ». Clark, Coxe, 444; Paddock e. Wells, 2 Barb.

Ch. 332; Hasceig v. Tripp, 20 Mjch. 216.

(14) Clergymen, Roman Catholic priests, and dissenting ministers, are now excused.

224

Chap. 23] TRIAL BY JURY. 364

tales is a supply of such men as are summoned upon the first panel, in order to

make up the deficiency. For this purpose, a writ of decem tales, octo tales, and

the like, was used to be issued to the sheriff at common law, and must be still

so done at a trial at bar, if the jurors make default. But at the assize, or

nisi prius, by virtue of the statute 35 Hen. VIII, c. 6, and other subsequent

*statutes, the judge is empowered, at the prayer of either party, to award r *„,,,, -,

a tales de circumstantibus (j) (15) of persons present in court, to be <- ° '"' '

joined to the other jurors, to try the cause; who are liable, however, to the same

challenges as the principal jurors. This is usually done, till the legal number

of twelve be completed; in which patriarchal and apostolical number Sir Edward

Coke (k) hath discovered abundance of mystery. (I)

When a sufficient number of persons impanelled, or tales-men, appear, they are

then separately sworn, well and truly to try the issue between the parties, and a

true verdict to give according to the evidence; and hence they are denominated

thejury, jurata, and jurors, sc. juratores.

We may here again observe, and, observing, we cannot but admire, how scru-

pulously delicate, and how impartially just, the law of England approves itself,

in the constitution and frame of a tribunal thus excellently contrived for the

test and investigation of truth; which appears, most remarkably. 1. In the

avoiding of frauds and secret management, by electing the twelve jurors out

of the whole panel by lot. 2. In its caution against all partiality and bias, by

quashing the whole panel or array, if the officer returning is suspected to be
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other than indifferent; and repelling particular jurors, if probable cause be

shown of malice or favour to either party. The prodigious multitude of excep-

tions or challenges allowed to jurors, who are the judges of fact, amounts nearly

to the same thing as was practised in the Boman republic, before she lost her

liberty: that the select judges should be appointed by the praetor, with the

mutual consent of the parties *0r, as Tully (m) expresses it: " nemi- r *•>(•(• -i

nem voluerunt majores nostri, non inodo de exislimatione cujusquam, >• •"

sed ne pecuniaria quidem de re minima, esse judicem; nisi qui inter adversaries

convenissit."

Indeed, these selecti judices bore, in many respects, a remarkable resemblance

to our juries: for they were first returned by the prsetor: de decuria senatoria

conscnbuntur ; then their names were drawn by lot, till a certain number waa

completed: in urnam sortito mittuntur, ut de pluribus necessarius numerus

confici posset: then the parties were allowed their challenges: post urnam per-

mittitur accusatori, ac reo, ut ex illo numero rejiciant auos putaverint sibi, aitt

inimicos, aut ex aliqua re inc&mmodos fore: next they struck what we call a

tales; rejections celebrata, in eorum hcum qui rejecti fuerunt subsortiebatur

prator alias, quibus ille judicum legitimus numerus compleretur; lastly, the

judges, like our jury, were sworn; his perfectis, jurdbant in leges judices, wtf

obstricti religione judicarent. (n)

The jury are now ready to hear the merits; and, to fix their attention the

closer to the facts which they are impanelled and sworn to try, the pleadings

are opened to them by counsel on that side which holds the afhrmative of the

question in issue. For the issue is said to lie, and proof is always first requiredj

(j) Appendix, No. H, i 4. <!•) 1 Inst. 155.

(I) Fausanias relates that at the trial of Mare, for murder, In the court denominated Areopagus from that

incident, he was acquitted by a jury composed ottadve pagan deities. And Dr. Hlckes, who attributes the

Introduction of this number to the Normans, tells us that among the inhabitants of Norway, from whom

the Normans, as well as the Dimes, were descended, a great veneration was pni<l to the number twelve:

" nfhil «anctiu«. nihil antiquius fuit; perintle ac si in ipso Aoc numero secreia qtic&lnm esset religio." Dw-

tert. Epittolar. 49. Snelni. Gloss. 329.

(m) Pro Cbtentio. 43.

(n) Ascon. in Cic. Ver. 1,6. A learned writer of our own, Dr. Pettlngal, hath shown In an elaborate

work (published A. D. 1769) so many resemblances between the imaarai of tbe Greeks, the judices selecti

of the Romans, and the juries of the English, that he is tempted to conclude that the latter are derived

from the former.

(15) In general, no writ is issued for this purpose in the United States, bnt the court, by order,

directs tho sheriff to summon from the bystanders the necessary number of talesmen to fill the

panel.

• VOL. II.—29 2.2.5
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upon that side which affirms the matter in question: in which our law agrees

with the civil; (o) " ei incumbit probatio, qui (licit, non qui negat; cum per rerun

naturam factum-negantis probatio nulla sit." The opening counsel briefly

informs them what has been transacted in the court above; the parties, the

nature of the action, the declaration, the plea, replication, and other proceed-

ings, and, lastly, upon what point the issue is joined, which is there set down to

be determined. Instead of which, (p) formerly the whole record and process

r *of7 -] °f the pleadings was read to *them in English by the court, and the

L J matter in issue clearly explained to their capacities. The nature of the

case, and the evidence intended to be produced, are next laid before them by

counsel also on the same side : and when their evidence is gone through, the

advocate on the other side opens the adverse case, and supports it by evidence;

and then the party which began is heard by way of reply.

The nature of my present design will not permit me to enter into the num-

berless niceties and distinctions of what is, or is not, legal evidence to a jury, (q)

I shall only, therefore, select a few of the general heads and leading maxims,

relative to this point, together with some observations on the manner of- giving

evidence.

And, first, evidence signifies that which demonstrates, makes clear, or ascer-

tains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on the

other; and no evidence ought to be admitted to any other point. Therefore,

upon an action of debt, when the defendant denies his bond by the plea of non
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est factum, and the issue is, whether it be the defendant's deed or no ; he cannot

give a release of this bond in evidence: for that does not destroy the bond, and

therefore does not prove the issue which he has chosen to rely upon, viz., that the

bond has no existence.

Again; evidence in the trial by jury is of two kinds, either that which is

given in proof, or that which the jury may receive by their own private knowl-

edge. The former, or proofs (to which in common speech the name of evidence

is usually confined), are either written, or parol, that is, by word of mouth.

Written proofs, or evidence, are, 1. Records; and 2. Ancient deeds of thirty

years standing, which prove themselves; (16) but 3. Modern deeds; and 4.

T *Sfi81 Ottier *writings, must be attested and verified by parol evidence of wit-

[ dbS J nesgeg And fhe one general rule that runs through all the doctrine of

trials is this, that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit of shall

always IMS required, if possible to be had; but if not possible, then the best

(o) Ff. 22. 3, 2. Cod. 4. 19. 23. (a) Fortcsc. c. 20.

(q) This is admirably well performed in Lord Chief baron Gilbert's excellent treatise of evidence,—a

work which It is Impossible to abstract or abridge, without losing some beauty and destroying the chain

of the whole, and which hath lately been engrafted into a very useful work, The Introduction to die Law

ofNisiPrius, 4to. 1787.

(16) [The same rale applies to wills thirty years old. 4 T. B. 709, note. This rule is laid

down in books of evidence without sufficient explanation of its principle, or of the extent of

its application. There seems to be danger in permitting a deed to be read merely because it

bears date above thirty years before its production, and in requiring no evidence, where a

forgery may be committed' with the least probability of detection. Chief Baron Gilbert lays

down, that where possession has gone agreeably to the limitations of a deed bearing date

thirty years ago, it may be read without any evidence of its execution, though, the subscrib-

ing witnesses be still living. Law of Ey. 94. For such possession affords so strong a pre-

sumption in favor of the authenticity of the deed, as to supersede the necessity of any other

proof of the validity of its origin, or of its due execution. The court of king's bench have deter-

mined that the mero production of a parish certificate, dated above thirty years ago, was suffi-

cient to make it evidence, without giving any account of the custody from which it was attracted.

5 T. H. 259.

Upon this subject see 1 Greenl. Ev. $§ 21, 142-145, 570; 1 Stark. Ev. 93, 523; and especially

Phillips's Ev. by Cowen, Hill and Edwards, vol. 2, 475-480. It is much safer to say in these

cases, and is much nearer strict accuracy, not that the deed proves itself, but that its authentic-

ity may be presumed from the circumstances: such as the long acquiescence of parties interested

to dispute it, and who n ust be supposed to have satisfied themselves originally that the convey-

ance was c'fl'eetual. Hut those circumstances are to be proved like other facts.
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evidence that can be had shall be allowed. (17) For if it be found that there is

any better evidence existing than is produced, the very not producing it is a

presumption that it would have detected some falsehood that at present is con-

cealed. Thus, in order to prove a lease for years, nothing else shall be admitted

but the very deed of lease itself, if in being: but if that be positively proved

to be burnt or destroyed (not relying on any Ioo3e negative, as that it cannot be

found, or the like), then an attested copy may be produced; or parol evidence

be given of its contents. So, no evidence of a discourse with another will be

admitted, but the man himself must be produced; yet in some cases, (as in

proof of any general customs, or matters of common tradition or repute), the

courts admit of hearsay evidence, or an account of what persons deceased have

declared in their lifetime: but such evidence will not be received of any par-

ticular facts. (18) So, too, books of account, or shop-books, are not allowed of

(17) [No rule of law is more frequently cited, and more generally misconceived, than this.

It is certainly true when lightly understood; but it is very limited in its extent and application.

It signifies nothing more than that, if the best legal evidence cannot possibly be produeed, the

next best legal evidence shall be admitted. Evidence may bo divided into primary and secon-

dary : and the secondary evidence is as accurately defined by the law as the primary. But

in general the want of better evidence can never justify the admission of hearsay, interested

•witnesses, or the copies of copies, <fec. Where there are exceptions to general rules, these

exceptions are as much recognized by the law as the general rule ; and where boundaries and

limits are established by the law for every case that can possibly occur, it is immaterial what we
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call the rule, and what the exception.

Some of the numerous cases which are found even in modem books may bo cited for illustra-

tion and in confirmation of the text and note.

If the subscribing witness be living and within the jurisdiction of the court, he must be

called to prove the execution; or if he cannot be found, and that fact be satisfactorily explained,

proof of his handwriting will be sufficient evidence of the execution. Barnes ». Trompowsky,

7 T. R. 266. And the witness of the execution is necessary; acknowledgment of the party

who executed the deed cannot be received. Johnson v. Mason, 1 Esp. 89. At least only as

secondary evidence. Call, Bart. v. Dunning, 4 East, 53. And acknowledgment to a subscribing

witness by an obligor of a bond that he has executed it, is sufficient. Powell «. Blackett, 1 Esp.

97; and see Grellier ». Neale, Peake, 146. But a mere bystander may not be received to supply

the absence of the subscribing witness (McCraw v. Gentry, 3 Oampb. 232), or only as secondary

evidence. See the next case. If the apparent attesting witness deny that he saw the execution,

secondary evidence is admissible ; that is t<> say, the handwriting of the obligor, <tc., may be

proved. Ley «. Ballard, 3 E.sp. 173, n. And, as a general rule, it seems that wherever a

subscribing witness appears to an instrument, note, <fcc., !«• must be called or his absence

•explained. See Higgs r. Dixon, 2 Stark.180; Breton i;. Cope. Peake. 31.]

See upon the rule requiring the best evidence, 1 Stark. Ev. 641-649 ; 1 Greenl. Ev. $ 82, et seq.

(18) [It is a general rule that the mere recital of a fact, that is, the mere oral assertion or

written entry by an individual, that a particular fact is true, cannot bo received in evidence.

But the objection does not apply to any public documents mode under lawful authority, such

as gazettes, proclamations, public surveys, records, and other memorials of a similar description,

and whenever the declaration or entry is in itself a fact, and is part of the ren gestie. Stark.

on Evid. pt. 1, 46, 47. But it is to 'be carefully observed, that neither the declarations, nor

any other acts of those who are mere strangers, or. as is usually termed, any res inter alios acta,

is admissible in evidence against any one, as affording a presumption against him in the way of

admission, or otherwise. Id. 51.

In cases of customs and prescriptive rights, hearsay or traditional evidence is not admitted

until some instances of the custom or exercise of the right claimed are first proved. The

declarations of parents respecting their marriage, and the legitimacy of their children, are

admitted, after their decease, as evidence. And hearsay is also received respecting pedigrees

and the death of relations abroad. Bull. N. P. 294 ; 2 Esp. 784. What has been said in con-

versation in the hearing of any party, if not contradicted by him, may be given in evidence;

for not being denied, it amounts to a species of confession. See 3 T. R. 707, where the sub-

ject of hearsay evidence is much discussed.

The court of king's bench has decided, that a father's declaration of the place of the birth

of his son is not evidence after the father's death. 8 East, 539. But it would not, probably,

be difficult to prove, that this is of the nature of pedigree, and ought to be admitted, as the

father's declaration of the time of his son's birth, which has always been legal evidence. In

criminal cases, the declarations of a person, who relates, in extremis, or under an appre-

hension of dying, the cause of his death, or any other material circumstance, may be admitted

in evidence; for the mind in that awful state is presumed to be under as great a religious

obligation to disclose the truth, as is created by the administration of an oath. But declare-
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themselves to be given in evidence for the owner; but a servant who made the

entry may have recourse to them to refresh his memory; and, if such sen-ant

(who was accustomed to make those entries) be dead, and his hand be proved,

the book may be read in evidence: (r) for as tradesmen are often under a neces-

sity of giving credit without any note or writing, this is therefore, when accom-

panied with such other collateral proofs of fairness and regularity, («) the best

evidence that can then be produced. However, this dangerous species of evidence

is not carried so far in England as abroad ;(t) where a man's own books of accounts,

by a distortion of the civil law (which seems to have meant the same thing as

f *369 1 's Prac^se<^ with us), (w) with the suppletory oath of *the merchant,

' '' J amount at all times to full proof. (19) But as this kind of evidence,

even thus regulated, would be much too hard upon the buyer at any long distance

of time, the statute 7 Jac. I, c. 12 (the penners of which seem to have imagined

that the books of themselves were evidence at common law), confines this

species of proof to such transactions as have happened within one year before

the action brought; unless between merchant and merchant in the usual inter-

course of trade. For accounts of so recent a date, if erroneous, may more easily

be unravelled and adjusted. (20)

With regard to parol^ evidence, or witnesses; it must first be remembered that

there is a process to bring them in by writ of subpoena ad testificandum: which

commands them, laying aside all pretences and excuses, to appear at the trial ou

pain of 1001. to be forfeited to the king; to which the statute 5 Eliz, c, 9, has
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added a penalty of 101. to the party aggrieved, and damages equivalent to the

loss sustained by want of his evidence. But no witness, unless his reasonable

expenses be tendered him, is bound to appear at all; nor, if he appears, is he

bound to give evidence till such charges are actually paid him; except he resides

within the bills of mortality, and is summoned to give evidence within the same.

This compulsory process, to bring in unwilling witnesses, and the additional

terrors of an attachment in case of disobedience, are of excellent use in the

(r) Law of Nisi Prins, 266. («) Salk. 235. «) Gail, i>l,s<rnit. 2, 20, 23.

(«i Inttrumenta domestica, sea. privata tettatio, teu adnotatio. ri non aliix quoque ndminiculi* adjurentvr

ad probationem sola non sufficient. Cod. 4, 19, 5. Nam exemplo perniciontm eyt, nt ei scriptures credatur,

qua timuquitquc libi adnotaiionc propria ddritorem ctmttititU. laid. c. 7.

tions of a deceased person ought not to be received, unless the court is satisfied, from the cir-

cumstances of the case, that they were mode under the impression of approaching dissolution.

Leach's Cases, 400. But the declarations of a felon at the place of execution cannot be received,

as he is incompetent to give evidence upon oath; and the situation of a dying man is only

thought equivalent to that of a competent witness, when he is sworn. Id. 276.]

Testimony of a witness given on a former trial, where the parties had an opportunity to

examine him, may be received if the witness is dead, or is out of the jurisdiction, or insane

and unable to testify, or it he has been summoned and is kept away by the adverse party.

1 Greenl. Bv. $ 163, and cases cited.

(19) A party's own books of account may be given in evidence in his own favor to prove

the accounts upon them, after preliminary proof that they -were regularly kept as each, and

are books of original entries; thtit the party kept no clerk, or, if he Kept any, giving sufficient

reason for not producing him; that some of the articles charged were actually delivered; and

by proving also, from other persons who have dealt with him, that he keeps fair and honest

accounts. Bnt they are not very satisfactory evidence, and wherever from the nature of the

case there mnst be witnesses who can give direct testimony concerning the account, the party

will be required to produce them before giving his books in evidence. See Vosburgh r.

Thayer, 12 Johns. 461; Cogswell v. DoUiver, 2 Mass. 217; Thomas r. Dyott, 1 Nott and McC.

186; Sickles r. Mather, 20 Wend. 72; Bumam v. Adams, 5 Vt. 313; Jackson v. Evans, 8

Mich. 476; 1 Greenl. Ev. $ 118, and notes. If anything suspicious appears in the books when

presented to the court, they will be excluded. Churchman «. Smith, 6 Whart. 146. There

are statutes on this subject m many of the states. The party's own oath is usually required to

substantiate the charges. The books can only be made evidence of those things which are

properly the subject of book account; not of charges for money loaned, Ac. See Bradley r.

Goodyear, 1 Day, 105. And upon the whole subject see 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill and

Edwards. 370-386.

(20) [The entries in the book of a person deceased, not connected with the parties, are of no

more avail than hearsay. But the books of an incumbent, respecting the tithes of the parish,

are evidence for his successor. 5 T. R. 123; 2 Yes. 43.]

228
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thorough investigation of truth: and, upon the same principle, in the Athenian

courts, the witnesses who were summoned to attend the trial had the choice of

three things; either to swear to the truth of the fact in question, to deny or

abjure it, or else pay a fine of a thousand drachmas, (v)

All witnesses, of whatever religion or country, that have the use of their

reason, (21) are to be received and examined, except such as are infamous, or

such as are interested in the event of the cause. All others are competent wit-

nesses; though the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credi-

bility. (22) "Infamous persons are such as may be challenged as jurors, r %3~0 -•

propter delictum ; and therefore never shall be admitted to give evidence *- '" '

to inform that jury, with whom they were too scandalous to associate. Interested

witnesses may be examined upon a voir dire, if suspected of being secretly con-

cerned in the event; or their interest may be proved in court. Which last is

the only method of supporting an objection to the former class: for no man is

to be examined to prove his own infamy. (23) And no counsel, attorney, or

(v) Pott. Antiq. b. i, c. 21.

(21) [A Mahometan may be sworn upon the Alcoran, a Gentoo according to the custom of

India, and their evidence may be received even in a criminal case. Leach's Cases, 52; 1 Atk.

21. But an atheist, or a person who has no belief or notion of a God, or a future state of

rewards and punishments, ought not in any instance to be admitted as a witness. 1 Atk. 45;

B. N". P. 202. See Peakc Rep. 11, where Bnller, J., held that the proper question to be asked

of a wttness is, whether he believes in God, the obligation of an oath, and in the future state of
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rewards and punishments.]

All persons may give evidence who believe in a supreme superintending Providence who

rewards and punishes, and who declare that they consider an oath binding on their conscience.

See the leading cases of Ormichnnd v. Barker, Wills, 538; and 1 Smith Lead. Cas. 535. See

also G'ubbison v. McCreary, 7 W. and S. 262; Jones ». Harris, 1 Strob. 160; Brock ». Milligan,

10 Ohio, 121; Bennett v. State, 1 Swan, 411; Central R. R. Co. v Rockafellow, 17 111. 541.

Some of the United States forbid witnesses being questioned concerning their religions belief.

See Cooley Const. Lim. 478, note.

Persons who cannot conscientiously take an oath are allowed to make affirmation, and are

under the like penalties with witnesses sworn, in case of false testimony.

(22) ["The old cases upon the competency of witnesses have gone upon very subtle grounds.

But of late years the courts have endeavored as far as possible, consistent with authorities,

to let the objection go to the credit, rather than to the competency, of a witness." Lord Mans-

field, 1 T. R. 300. '

It is now established that, if a witness does not immediately gain or lose by the event of the

cause, and il the verdict in the cause cannot be evidence either for or against him in any other

suit, In- shall be admitted as a competent witness, though the circumstances of the case may,

in some degree, lessen his credibility. 3 T. R. 27. The interest must be a present, certain, vested

interest, and not uncertain or contingent: Doug. 134; 1 T. R. 163; 1 P. Wins. 287; therefore

the heir apparent is competent in supporting the claim of the ancestor, though the remainder-

man, having a vested interest, is incompetent. Salk. 283; Ld. Raym. 724. A clerk of the com-

pany of wire-drawers is competent, in an action against a person for acting as an assistant,

although the verdict might cause the defendant to be sworn, upon which the clerk would

obtain a fee. See Stark, on Ev. pt. 4, 745.

A servant of a tradesman, from necessity, is permitted in an action by his master to prove

the delivery of goods, though he himself may have purloined them; but, in an action brought

against the master for the negligence of his servant, the servant cannot be a witness for nis

master without a release; for the master may afterwards have his action against the servant,

and the verdict recovered against him may be given in evidence in that action to prove the

damage which the master has sustained. 4 T. R. 589.

By the 46 Geo. Ill, c. 37, it is enacted, that a witness cannot refuse to answer a question

relevant to the matter in issue, the answering of which has no tendency to accuse himself,

or to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture, by reason only that the answer to such question

may establish, or tend to establish, that he owes a debt or is subject to a civil suit.

This statute was passed because, upon a point which arose at Lord Melville's impeachment,

the high living authorities of the law were nearly divided, whether a witness was compellable to

answer such a question. But surely it was agreeable to the law of England, that a man

should be compelled to be honest, and where, ii he avoided the question, injustice would be

done both between the parties before the court, and afterwards between the witness and

MM in: other party.]

(23) f^A witness may be examined with regard to his own infamy, if the confession of it does

not subject him to any future punishment; as a witness he may be asked if he has not stood

in the pillory for perjury: 4 T. R. 440; but he cannot be entirely rejected as a witness with-

,'
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other person, entrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party himself shall

be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such conversation or mat-

ters of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and confi-

dence : (w) (24) but he may be examined as to mere matters of fact, as the

execution of a deed or the like, which might have come to his knowledge with-

out being interested in the cause.

One witness (if credible) is sufficient evidence to a jury of any single fact,

though undoubtedly the concurrence of two or more corroborates the proof. Yet

our law considers that there are many transactions to which only one person is

privy; and therefore does not always demand the testimony of two, which the

civil law universally requires. " Unius responsio testes omnino non audiatur." (x)

(w) Law of Nisi I'rius, 287. (x) Cod. 4, SO, 9.

out the production of the record of conviction, by which he is rendered incompetent. 8 Bast,

77. Though it has been held, in some other cases, that a witness is not bound to answer such

questions. 4 St. Tr. 748; 1 Salk. 153; 4 Esp. 225, 242. It is quite clear that a man is not

bound to answer any questions, either in a court of law or equity, which may tend to criminate

himself, or which may render him liable to n penalty. Stra. 444; 3 Taunt. 424; 4 St. Tr. 6;

6 id. 649 ; 16 Ves. 242; 2 Ld. Kaym. 1088; Mitford's Ch. PI. 157. As to questions which merely

disgrace the witness, there is some difficulty. See Stark, on Ev., pt. 2, 139. Still a witness is

in no case legally incompetent to allege his own turpitude, or to give evidence which involves his

own infamy : 2 Stark. Rep. 116; 8 East 78: 11 id. 309; or impeaches his own solemn acts : 5 M.

and S. 244 ; 7 T. R. 604 ; unless he be rendered incompetent by a legal interest in the event of
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the cause, or in the record. It seems to be an universal rule that a particeps criminis may be

examined as a witness iu both civil and criminal cases, provided he has not been incapacitated

by a conviction of crime. As a clerk, who had laid out money which he had embezzled in

illegal insurances was held to be a competent witness for the master against the insurer.

Cowp. 197. So a man who has pretended to convey lands to another may prove that he had

no title. Ld. Raym. 1008. A co-assignee of a ship may prove that he had no interest in the

vessel. Cited in'l T. R. 301. The parents may give evidence to bastardize their issue: 6 T. R.

330, 331; ur to prove the legitimacy: id.; though it is said the sole evidence of the mother, a

married woman, shall not be sufficient to bastardize her child. 1 Wils. 340.]

[By statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 99, all legal objection to the competency of witnesses on the

ground of interest is removed, and the parties to suits, and the persons in whose behalf they

are brought or defended, are made competent and compellable to give evidence, in behalf of

either party, except that a person charged with an offence cannot give evidence against him-

self, nor is any person compellable to answer a question tending to criminate himself, nor can

husband and wife give evidence for or against each other in criminal cases. The cases of actions

for breach of promise of marriage, and of proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery,

are excepted from the statute. The subsequent statute of 16 and 17 Vic. c. 83, makes the hus-

bands and wives of parties to suits, or of persons on whose behalf the suits are brought or de-

fended, competent and compellable to (jive evidence on behalf of either party. But they are not

to be made to disclose any communication made or received during marriage, and neither

party is a competent witness in a criminal proceeding, or in any proceeding instituted in con-

sequence of adultery. The previous statute of 6 and 7 Vic. c. 85, removed the incapacities of

witnesses on account of crime.]

In the United States the tendency of recent legislation is in the direction of the removal of

all the common law disabilities of witnesses, leaving the objections from infamy, interest, A-.:,.

to have such weight as the jury may see fit to give them as objections to the credibility of the

witnesses.

(24) [But the principle and policy of this rule restrain it to that confidence, only, which is

placed in a counsel or solicitor, and which must necessarily be inviolable, where the use of

advocates and legal assistance is admitted. But the purposes of public justice supersede the

delicacy of every other species of confidential communication. In the trial of the duchess of

Kingston, it was determined that a friend might be bound to disclose, if necessary, in a court

of justice, secrets of the most sacred nature which one sex could repose in the other. And

that a surgeon was bound to communicate any information whatever, which he was possessed

of in consequence of his professional attendance. 11 St. Tr. 243, 246. And those secrets only,

communicated to a counsel or attorney, are inviolable in a court of justice, which have

been intrusted to them while acting in their respective characters to the party as their client.

4 T. R. 431, 753.]

For an excellent case on this subject, see Whiting v. Barnes, 30 N. Y. 330. See, also, People

t>. Blakelcy, 4 Park. Cr. R. 176; 1 Greeul. Ev. $ 237 to 246; 1 Stark. Ev. 40; 1 Phil. Ev. by

Cowen, Hill and Edwards, 130, et seq. In several of the United States statutes have been passed

extending similar protection to the communications made to physicians and clergymen, with

a view to obtaining their professional advice or assistance.
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To extricate itself out of which absurdity, the raodarn practice of the civil law

court * has plunged itself into another. For, as they do not allow a less number

than two witnesses to the plena probatio, they call the testimony of one, though

never so clear and positive, semi-plena probatio only, on which no sentence can

be founded. To make up, therefore, the necessary complement of witnesses, when

they have one only to a single fact, they admit the party himself (plaintiff or

defendant) to be e'xamined in his own behalf; and administer to him what is

called the suppletory oath ; and if his evidence happens to be in his own favour,

this immediately converts the half proof into a whole one. By this ingenious

device, satisfying at once the forms of the Boman law, and acknowledging the

superior *reasonableness of the law of England : which permits one wit- r *,,«, -i

•"

ness to be sufficient where no more are to be had : and, to avoid all ^

temptations of perjury, lays it down as an invariable rule, that nemo testis esse

debct inpropri causa. (25)

Positive proof is always required, where from the nature of the case it appears

it might possibly have been had. But next to positive proof, circumstantial evi-

dence, or the doctrine of presumptions, must take place ; for when the fact itself

cannot be demonstratively evinced, that which comes nearest to the proof of the

fact is the proof of such circumstances as either necessarily, or usually attend

such facts ; and these are called presumptions, which are only to be relied upon

till the contrary be actually proved. Stabitur prcssumptioni donee probetur in
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contrarium. (y) Violent presumption is many times equal to full proof; (z) for

there those circumstances appear which necessarily attend the fact. As if a

landlord sues for rent due at michaelmas, 1754, and the tenant cannot prove the

payment, but produces an acquittance for rent due at a subsequent time, in full

of all demands, this is a violent presumption of his having paid the former rent,

and is equivalent to full proof; for though the actual payment is not proved,

yet the acquittance in full of all demands is proved, which could not be without

such payment; and it therefore induces so forcible a presumption, that no

proof shall be admitted to the contrary, (a) (26) Probable presumption, arising

(y) Co. LJtt. 373. (X) 1 bid. 6. fa) Gilb. Evid. 181.

(25) In equity a rule apparently somewhat different prevails in a certain class of cases. If

Bhe complainant calls for an answer from the defendant on oath, he thereby makes the answer

evidence in the cause ; and as it is evidence called for by himself, it is allowed to have the

same weight in the ease as the testimony of any other witness, and therefore the complainant,

•who is bound to make out his case, cannot have a decree against an answer denying the equity

of the bill, unless he overcomes the answer with the testimony of two witnesses, or at least of

one witness and strong supporting circumstances. 1 Greenl. Ev. $ 260. "WTiere, however, by

statute, the parties in chancery are made competent witnesses generally, and may bo orally ex-

amined, it would seem that this rule is substantially done away with. Roberts v . Miles, 12 Mich.

297. See however Vandogrift v. Herbert, 3 Green. N". J. 466. In high treason two witnesses are

essential in England, and in the United States by the constitution. Art. 3, § 3. Two are also

necessary in cases where perjury is charged. But in other eases, if the evidence is competent, the

jury must bo the judges how much weight it is entitled to. 1 Phil. Ev. 1, 2 ; 1 Stark Ev. 583.

(*26) [Presumptions are of three kinds ; 1st. Legal presumptions, made by the law itself; 2dly.

Legal presumptions to be made by ajury, of law and fact ; 3dly. Natural presumptions, or pre-

sumptions of mere fact.

1st. Legal presumptions are in some cases absolute, as that a bond or other specialty was ex-

ecuted upon a good consideration (4 Burr. 2225), so long as the deed or bond remains unim-

peached ; but it may be impeached on the ground of fraud, and then the consideration becomes

the subject of inquiry. But in the case of bills of exchange, the presumption that it was ac-

cepted for a good consideration may be rebutted by evidence. So where a fine ha*! been levied.

it will be implied that it was levied with proclamation (3 Co. 86, b), unless rebutted (Bui. N. P.

229), and some other like instances ; but the presumption in favour of innocence is, and has

been hold, too strong to be overcome by any artificial intendment of law. 2 B. and A. 386. 2d.

Presumptions of law and fact, as that the adverse enjoyment unquestioned for twenty years, of

tin incorporeal hereditament, presumes a grant; that a 'bond has been satisfied upon which no

interest has been paid, nor other acknowledgmfent made of its existence for a like period :

2 Stra. 826 ; 2 Ld. Raym. 1370 ; that there has been a conversion of goods in the case oftrover,

•where the defendant refuses to deliver them up. 3d. Natural presumptions. It is the peculiar

province of the jury to deal with presumptions of this class ; yet where the particular facts are

inseparably connected according to the usual course of nature, the courts themselves will
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from such circumstances as usually attend the fact, hath also its due weight:

as if, in a suit for rent due in 1754, the tenant proves the payment of the rent

due in 1755; this will prevail to exonerate the tenant, (b) unless it be clearly

shown that the rent of 1754 was retained for some special reason, or that there

was some fraud or mistake; for otherwise it will be presumed to have been paid

before that in 1755, as it is most usual to receive first the rents of longest stand-

ing. Light, or rash, presumptions have no weight or validity at all. (27)

r *o~j> -, *The oath administrated to the witness is not only that what he

L -I deposes shall be true, but that he shall also depose the whole truth: so

that he is not to conceal any part of what he knows, whether interrogated par-

ticularly to that point or not. And all this evidence is to be given in open court,

in the presence of the parties, their attorneys, the counsel, and all by-standers,

and before the judge and jury; each party having liberty to except to its compe-

tency, which exceptions are publicly stated and by the judge are openly and pub-

licly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country: which must curb any

secret bias or partiality that might arise in his own breast. And if, either in

his directions or decisions, he misstates the law by ignorance, inadvertence, or

design, the counsel on either side may require him publicly to seal a bill of excep-

tions; stating the point wherein he is supposed to err: and this he is obliged to

seal by statute Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 31, or, if he refuses so to do, the party

may have a compulsory writ against him, (c) commanding him to seal it, if the

fact alleged be truly stated: and if he returns, that the fact is untruly stated
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when the case is otherwise, an action will lie against him for making a false

return. This bill of exceptions is in the nature of an appeal; examinable, not

in the court out of which the record issues for the trial at nisiprius, but in

the next immediate superior court, upon a writ of error, after judgment given in

the court below. But a demurrer to evidence shall be determined by the court,

out of which the record is sent. This happens, where a record or other matter

is produced in evidence, concerning the legal consequences of which there arises a

doubt in law: in which case the adverse party may if he please demur to the whole

evidence; which admits the truth of every fact that has been alleged, but denies

the sufficiency of them all in point of law to maintain or overthrow the issue;

id) which draws the question of law from the cognizance of the jury, to be decided

as it ought) by the court But neither these demurrers to evidence, nor the

f *3731 '' "' excepti°n8>are at present so much *in use as formerly; since

I -I the more frequent extension of the discretionary powers of the court in

granting a new trial, which is now very commonly had for the misdirection of

the judge at nisi prius. (28)

(b) Co. Utfc 37S. (a) Reg. Br. 182. 2Inst.427. (d) Co. Lltt 72. 5 Bap. 10*.

draw the inference, as when a child has been bom within a few weeks after access of the hns-

band, its bastardy will be inferred without the aid of u jury. 8 East, 193. All cases of circum-

stantial evidence may be more or less within this class. And it is obvious that the case put

in the text belongs to this division, upon which Mr. (Christian has made the following remark:

" This can scarcely be correct; I should conceive that proof may be admitted to repel all

presumptions whatever; and even if a receipt should be produced expressly for the rent of

the year 1754, still I lie landlord might show that it had been obtained by mistake or fraud, and

that no rent had been received at the time."]

A receipt, so far as it is a mere acknowledgment of payment and delivery, is always open to

explanation or contradiction by parol evidence. 1 Greenl. Ev. J 305. And now by statute in some

of the United States, a seal to a bond or other obligation, is only prima facie evidence of con-

sideration, which may be rebutted.

(27) [It is difficult to say what is light and rash presumption, if it is any presumption at all.

Any circumstance may be proved from which a fair inference can be drawn, though alone it

would betooslight to support the verdict of the jury, yet it may corroborate other testimony, and

a number of such presumptions may become of importance.

(28) To obviate the hardships which frequently occurred where parties were defeated on

trials at the circuit ou account of defects in pleadings not material to the merits of the case,

enlarged powers to permit amendments at the trial have been grouted by several recent Eng-

lish statutes, and especially bv the common law procedure act, 1852, and almost any defect

may be amended by leave of the court, where the nature of the action or ground of defence is
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This open examination of witnesses, viva voce, in the presence of all mankind,

is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth (e) than the private and

secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in the

ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from the

civil law ; where a witness may frequently depose that in private, which he will

be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal. There an artful or care-

less scribe may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing up his

depositions in his own forms and language; but he is here at liberty to correct

and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which he can never do after a writ-

ten deposition is once taken. Besides, the occasional questions of the judge,

the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out

the truth much better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned

and settled ; and the confronting of adverse witnesses is also another opportu-

nity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be had upon any other

method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge, during the examination, a

matter of small importance: for, besides the respect and awe with which his

presence will naturally inspire the witness, he is able, by use and experience, to

keep the evidence from wandering from the point in issue. In short, by this

method of examination, and this only, the persons who are to decide upon the

evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, under-

standing, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in which points all persons

must appear alike, when their depositions are reduced to writing, and read to
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the judge, in the absence of those who made them; and yet as much may be

frequently collected from the manner in which the evidence is delivered, as from

the matter of *it These are a few of the advantages attending this, r #0** -i

the English, way of giving testimony, ore tenus. Which was also indeed ^ -"

familiar among the ancient Romans, as may be collected from Quintiliau; (f)

who lays down very good instructions for examining and cross-examining wit-

nesses viva voce. And this, or somewhat like it, was continued as low as the

time of Hadrian: (g) but the civil law, as it is now modelled, rejects all public

examination of witnesses.

As to such evidence as the jury may have in their own consciences, by their

private knowledge of facts, it was an ancient doctrine, that this had as much

right to sway their judgment as the written or parol evidence which is delivered

in court. And therefore it hath been often held, (h) that though no proofs be

produced on either side, yet the jury might bring in a verdict. For the oath

of the jurors, to find according to their evidence, was construed (i) to be, to do

it according to the best of their own knowledge. This seems to have arisen

from the ancient practice in taking recognitions of assize, at the first introduc-

tion of that remedy; the sheriff being bound to return such recognitors as knew

the truth of the fact, and the recognitors, when sworn, being to retire immedi-

ately from the bar, and bring in their verdict according to their own personal

knowledge, without hearing extrinsic evidence or receiving any direction from

the judge. (j) And the same doctrine (when attaints came to be extended to

trials by jury, (29) as well as to recognitions of assize) was also applied to the

case of common jurors; that they might escape the heavy penalties of the

attaint, in case they could show, by any additional proof, that their verdict was

(ft Bale's Hist. C. 1. 254. 258, 258. (f) Instilni. Orat. I. 5, c. 7.

(g) See his epistle to Varus. the legate or judge of Cilicia . " Tu magis tcire potes, quanta flde» sit ha-

lenda ttntibut i •/«>, et cujui dignitatu, it r«/'i/.< astimationit tint; ft qui limpliciter viti tint, dicere; vtrum

ttnum etindemme metlUatum tcrmonm attalerint, an ad eagitce interrogaveras extempore nris'mU'ut re-

tponderint." fy. 22.8,3. (

(h) Year-book, 14 Hen. VII. 29. PloWd. 12. Hob. 227. 1 Lev. 87. (i) Vangh. 148, H9.

(j) Bract. 1. 4, tr. 1, c. 19, » 3. Flet. I. 4, c. 9, J 2.

not changed, and the opposite party not likely to be misled. Amendments are permitted on

such terms as the court thinks proper to impose. In the United States the statutes of amend-

ments are generally very brood and liberal, and permit amendments for the furtherance of

justice, in any state of the proceedings, and after judgment.

(29) Writs of attaint and assize are both abolished.
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agreeable to the truth, though not according to the evidence produced; with

which additional proof the law presumed they were privately acquainted, though

r *-}75 I it did not appear in *court. But this doctrine was again gradually

L J exploded, when attaints began to be disused, and new trials introduced

in their stead. For it is quite incompatible with the grounds upon which such

new trials are every day awarded, viz., that the verdict was given without, or

contrary to, evidence. And, therefore, together with new trials, the practice

seems to have been first introduced (k} which now universally obtains, that if a

juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he maybe sworn as a witness, and

give his evidence publicly in court.

When the evidence is gone through on both sides, the judge, in the presence

of the parties, the counsel, and all others, sums up the whole to the jury ; omit-

ting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the main question and

principal issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to support it, with such

remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving them his opinion

in matters of law arising upon that evidence.

The jury, after the proofs are summed up, unless the case be very clear, with-

draw from the bar to consider of their verdict: and, in order to avoid intem-

perance and causeless delay, are to be kept without meat, drink, fire, or candle,

unless by permission of the judge, till they are all unanimously agreed. A

method of accelerating unanimity not wholly unknown in other constitutions

of Europe, and in matters of greater concern. For, by the golden bull of the
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empire, (1) if, after the congress is opened, the electors delay the election of a

king of the Eomans for thirty days, they shall be fed only with bread and water

till the same is accomplished. But if our juries eat or drink at all, or have any

eatables about them, without consent of the court, and before verdict, it is fin-

able; and if they do so at his charge for whom they afterwards find, it will set

aside the verdict. Also, if thev speak with either 01 the parties or their agents,

F *3761 ?^tel tue^ are ?one *^rom tne bar; or if they receive any fresh evidence

1 -"in private ; or if to prevent disputes they cast lots for whom they shall

find; any of these circumstances will entirely vitiate the verdict. (30.) And it

has been held, that if the jurors do not agree in their verdict before the judges

are about to leave the town, though they are not to be threatened or impris-

oned, (m) the judges are not bouud to wait for them, but may carry them round

the circuit from town to town in a cart. («) This necessity of a total unanimity

seems to be peculiar to our own constitution ; (o) or, at least in the nembda or

jury of the ancient Goths, there was required (even in criminal cases) only the

consent of the major part; and in case of an equality, the defendant was held

to be acquitted. (p) (31.)

ft) Styl. 233. 1 Sid. 133. (1) C. S. Cm; Mirr. c. 4, » 24. (n)LO>. Ais.fo\.40, pi. 11.

fnj See Harrington on the Statutes, in, 30, 21. (p) Stiern. 2. 1, c. 4.

(30) That is, the court will set aside the verdict, on misconduct of this character being proven.

But the misconduct must be made out by other evidence than that of the jurors themselves;

for they will not be allowed to testify to it. Dana v. Tucker, 4 Johns. 487 ; Clum v. Smith, 5

Hill, 560. The general rule is that the evidence of jurors will not bo received to impeach their

verdict. Bridgcwater e. Plymouth, 97 Mass. ;582; Hann t'. "Wilson, 28 Ind. 296; Rutland c.

Huthorn, 36 Ga. 380. See this principle limited in "Wright t>. Telegraph Co. 20 Iowa, 195.

(31) [The learned judge has displayed much erudition in the beginning of this chapter, to

prove the antiquity of the trial by jury; but the trials referred to bv the authors there cited,

and even the jmiiemm parinm, mentioned ifl the celebrated chapter of magna cliarta, are trials

which were something similar to that by a jury, rather than instances of a trial by jury accord-

ing to its present established form. The jucliciumparium seems strictly the judgment of a sub-

ject's equals in the feudal courts of tb/e king and barons. And so little appears to be ascertained

by antiquarians respecting the introduction of the trial in criminal cases by two juries, that al-

though it is one of the most important, it is certainly one of the most obscure and inexplicable,

parts of the law of England.

The unanimity of twelve men. so repugnant to all experience of human conduct, passions,

and understandings, could hardly in any age have been introduced into practice by a deliberate

act of the legislature.

But that the life, and perhaps the liberty and property, of a subject, should not be affected

by the concurring judgment of a less number than twelve, where more were present, was a

law founded in reason and caution; and seoma to be transmitted to us by the common law,
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When they are all unanimously agreed, the jury return back to the bar; and,

before they deliver their verdict, the plaintiff is bound to appear in court, by

himself, attorney, or counsel, in order to answer the amercement to which,

by the old,law, he is liable, as has been formerly mentioned, (q) in case he fails

in his suit, as a punishment for his false claim. To be amerced, or a mercie, is

to be at the king's mercy with regard to the fine to be imposed; in misericordia

domini regis pro falso clamore suo. The amercement is disused, but the form

still continues; and if the plaintiff does not appear, no verdict can be given,

but the plaintiff is said to be nonsuit, non sequitur clamorem suum. Therefore

it is usual for a plaintiff, when he or his counsel perceives that he has not given

evidence sufficient to maintain his issue, to be voluntarily nonsuited, or with-

draw himself: whereupon the crier is ordered to call the plaintiff: and if nei-

ther he, nor any body for him, appears, he is nonsuited, the jurors are discharged,

the action is at an end, and the defendant shall recover his costs. The reason

of this practice is, that a nonsuit is more eligible for the plaintiff than a verdict

against him: for, after a nonsuit, which is only a default, he may commence the

same suit *again for the same cause of action; but after a verdict had, r *onw -i

and judgment consequent thereupon, he is forever barred from attack- ' "' ' '

ing the defendant upon the same ground of complaint. But, in case the plaintiff

appears, the jury by their foreman deliver in their verdict. (32)

A verdict vere dictum, is either privy or public. A privy verdict is when

the judge hath left or adjourned the court: and the jury, being agreed, in
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order to be delivered from their confinement, obtain leave to give their verdict

privily to the judge out of court: (r) which privy verdict is of no force, unless

afterwards affirmed by a public verdict given openly in court: wherein the jury

may, if they please, vary from the privy verdict. So that the privy verdict is

indeed a mere nullity; and yet it is a dangerous practice, allowing time for the

parties to tamper with the jury, and therefore very seldom indulged. (33) But

the only effectual and legal verdict is the public verdict: in which they openly

declare to have found the issue for the plaintiff, or for the defendant; and if for

the plaintiff, they assess the damages also sustained by the plaintiff, in conse-

quence of the injury upon which the action is brought.

Sometimes, if there arises in the case any difficult matter of law, the jury,

for the sake of better information, and to avoid the danger of having their

verdict attained, will find a special verdict; which is grounded on the statute

of "Westm. 2,13 Edw. I, c. 30, § 2. And herein they state the naked facts, as

they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the court thereon; con-

(q) Page 275. See also book IV, 379.

(r) If the jndgo hnth adjourned the conrt to his own lodgings, and there receives the verdict, It is a

public and not A privy verdict.

or from immemorial antiquity. The grand assize might have consisted of more than twelve, yet

the verdict must have been given by twelve or more; and if twelve did not agree, the assize

was afforced, that is, others were added till twelve did concur. See 1 Reeve's Hist, of Eng. Law.

341, 480. This was a majority, and not unanimity. A grand jury may consist of any number

from twelve to twenty-three inclusive, but a pifesentmeut ought not to be made by less than

twelve. 2 Hale P. C. 161. The same is true also of an inquisition before the coroner. In the

high court of parliament, and the conrt of the lord high steward, a peer may be convicted by

the greater number; yet there can be no conviction unless the greater number consists at least

of twelve. 3 lust. 30; Kclyng, 56; Moore, 622. Under a commission of lunacy the jury was

seventeen, but twelve joined in the verdict. 7 Ves. Jun. 450. A jury upon a writ of inquiry

may be more than twelve. In all these cases, if twelve only appeared, it followed, as a necessary

consequence, that, to act with effect, they must have been unanimous.

Hence, this may be suggested as a conjecture respecting the origin of the unanimity of juries,

that, as less than twelve, if twelve or more were present, could pronounce no effective verdict,

when twelve only were sworn, their unanimity became indispensable.]

(32) [When a verdict will carry all the costs, and it is doubtful from the evidence for which

party it will be given, it is a common, practice for the judge to recommend, and the parties to

consent, that a juror should be withdrawn; and thus no verdict is given, and each party pays his

own costs.]

(33) [A privy verdict cannot be given' in treason and felony. 2 H. P. C. 300.]

•
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eluding conditionally, that if upon the whole matter the court should be of

opinion that the plaintiff had cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff:

if otherwise, then for the defendant. This is entered at length on the record,

and afterwards argued and determined in the court at Westminster, from whence

the issue came to be tried.

f *378 1 *Another method of finding a species of special verdict, is when the

J jury find a verdict generally for the plaintiff, but subject nevertheless to

the opinion of the judge of the court above, on a special case (34) stated by the

counsel on both sides with regard to a matter of law: which has this advan-

tage over a special verdict, that it is attended with much less expense, and

obtains a much speedier decision: the postea (of which in the next chapter)

being stayed in the hands of the officer of nisi prius, till the question is deter-

mined, and the verdict is then entered for the plaintiff or defendant, as the

case may happen. But, as nothing appears upon the record but the general

verdict, the parties are precluded hereby from the benefit of a writ of error, if

dissatisfied with the judgment of the court or judge upon the point of law.

Which makes it a thing to be wished, that a method could be devised of either

lessening the expense of special verdicts, or else of entering the cause at length

upon the postea. But in both these instances the jury may, if they think

proper, take upon themselves to determine, at their own hazard, the complicated

question of fact and law; and. without either special verdict or special case,

may find a verdict absolutely either for the plaintiff or defendant, (s)
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When the jury have delivered in their verdict, and it is recorded in court,

they are then discharged. And so ends the trial by jury: a trial which, besides

the other vast advantages which we have occasionally observed in its progress,

is also as expeditious and cheap, as it is convenient, equitable, and certain; for

a commission out of chancery, or the civil law courts, for examining witnesses

in one cause will frequently last as long, and of course be full as expensive, as

the trial of a hundred issues at nisi prius: and yet the fact cannot be deter-

mined by such commissioners at all; no, not till the depositions are published,

and read at the hearing of the cause in court.

f *3791 *tlpon these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever

L ' J will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And if it has so great

an advantage over others m regulating civil property, how much must that advan-

tage be heightened, when it is applied to criminal cases! But this we must

refer to the ensuing book of these Commentaries: only observing for the present,

that it is the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or M'ish

for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but

by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbours and equals. A constitution,

that I may venture to affirm has, under Providence, secured the just liberties of

this nation for a long succession of ages. And therefore a celebrated French

writer, it) who concludes, that because Borne, Sparta, and Carthage have lost

their liberties, therefore those of England in time must perish, should have

recollected that Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, at the time when their liberties

were lost, were strangers to the trial by jury.

Great as this eulogium may seem, it is no more than this admirable constitu-

tion, when traced to its principles, will be found in sober reason to deserve.

The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and

our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely intrusted

to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the

prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite

of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards

those of their own rank and dignity: it is not to be expected from human

(») Lltt. {366. ft) Montesq. Sp. L. si, 8.

(34) [And since the statute 3 and 4 Win. IY, c. 42, the parties may state a special cage for the

opinion of the court, without the intervention of a jury.]
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nature, that the few should be always attentive to the interests and good of the

many. On the other hand, if the power of judicature were placed at random

in the hands of the multitude, their decisions would be wild and capricious, and

a new rule of action would be every day established in our courts. It is wisely

therefore ordered, that the principles and axioms of law, which are general

propositions, flowing from abstracted reason, and not *accommodated to r *qon -i

times or to men, should be deposited in the breasts of the judges, to be L J

occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascertained before them. For

here partiality can have little scope: the law is well known, and is the same for

all ranks and. degrees; it follows as a regular conclusion from the premises of

fact pre-established. But in settling and adjusting a question of fact, when

intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and injustice have an ample field

to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be proved which is not so, or by

more artfully suppressing some circumstances, stretching and warping others,

and distinguishing away the remainder. Here, therefore, a competent number

of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from among those of the middle-

rank, will be found the best investigators of truth, and the surest guardians of

public justice. For the most powerful individual in the state will be cautious

of committing any flagrant invasion of another's right, when he knows that

the fact of his oppression must be examined and decided by twelve indifferent

men, not appointed till the hour of trial; and that, when once the fact is ascer-

tained, the law must of course redress it This, therefore, preserves in the hands
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of the people that share which they ought to have in the administration of

public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more powerful and

wealthy citizens. Every new tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without

the intervention of a jury (whether composed of justices of the peace, com-

missioners of the revenue, judges of a court of conscience, or any other stand-

ing magistrates), is a step towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive

of absolute governments. The feudal system, which for the sake of military

subordination, pursued an aristocratical plan in all its arrangements of property,

had been intolerable in times of peace, had it not been wisely counterpoised by

that privilege so universally diffused through every part of it, the trial by the

feudal peers. And in every country on the continent, as the trial by the peers

has been gradually disused, so the nobles have increased in power, till the state

has been torn to pieces by rival factions, and oligarchy in effect has been estab-

lished, though under the shadow of regal government; *unless where r $001 -i

the miserable commons have taken shelter under absolute monarchy, as ^ J

the lighter evil of the two. And, particularly, it is a circumstance well worthy

an Englishman's observation, that m Sweden $ie trial by jury, that bulwark of

northern liberty, which continued in its full vigour so lately as the middle of

the last century, («) is now fallen into disuse: (w) and that there, though the

regal power is m no country so closely limited, yet the liberties of the commons

are extinguished, and the government is degenerated into a mere aristocracy, (x)

It is, therefore, upon the whole, a duty which every man owes to his country,

his friends, his posterity and himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power

this valuable constitution in all its rights; to restore it to its ancient dignity,

if at all impaired by the different value of property, or otherwise deviated from

its first institution; to amend it, wherever it is defective; and, above all, to

guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new

and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under a variety of plausible pretences,

may in time imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of English liberty.

Yet, after all, it must be owned, that the best and most effectual method to

preserve and extend the trial by jury in practice, would be by endeavouring to re-

move all the defects, as well as to improve the advantages, incident to this mode

of inquiry. If justice is not done to the entire satisfaction of the people, in this

method of deciding facts, in spite of all encomiums and panegyrics on trials at

the common law, they will resort in search of that justice to another tribunal •

(w) 2 Whitclock of Parl. 427. (w) Mod. Un. Hist xxxiii. 24. (x) Ibid. 17.
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though more dilatory, though more expensive, though more arbitrary in its frame

and constitution. If justice is not done to the crown by the verdict of a jury

the necessities of the public revenue will call for the erection of summary tri-

bunals. The principal defects seem to be,

1. The want of a complete discovery by the oath of the parties. This each of

F *3821 them is now entitled to have, by *going through the expense and circuity

' J of a court of equity, and therefore it is sometimes had by consent, even in

the courts of law. How fur such a mode of compulsive examination is agreeable

to the rights of mankind, and ought to be introduced in any country, may be

matter of curious discussion, but is foreign to our present inquiries. It has long

been introduced and established in our courts of equity, not to mention the civil

law courts: and it seems the height of judicial absurdity, that in the same cause

between the same parties, in the examination of the same facts, a discovery by

the oath of the parties should be permitted on one side of Westminster-hall, and

denied on the other: or that the judges of one and. the same court should be

bound by law to reject such a species of evidence, if attempted on a trial at bar,

but, when sitting the next day as a court of equity, should be obliged to hear

such examination read, and to found their decrees upon it. In short, within the

same country, governed by the same laws, such a mode of inquiry should be uni-

versally admitted, or else universally rejected. (35)

2. A second defect is of a nature somewhat similar to the first: the want of a

compulsive power for the production of books and papers belonging to the par-
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ties. In the hands of third persons they can generally be obtained by rule of

court, or by adding a clause of requisition to the writ of subpmna, which is then

called a subpcsna diices tevum. But, in mercantile transactions especially, the

sight of the party's own books is frequently decisive; as the day-book of a trader,

where the transaction was recently entered, as really understood at the time;

though subsequent events may tempt him to give it a different colour. And, as

this evidence may be finally obtained, and produced on a trial at law, by the cir-

cuitous course of filing a bill in equity, the want of an original power for the

same purposes in the courts of law is liable to the same observations as were

made on the preceding article. (36)

F *SSS ] ***' Another w^ft is that of power to examine witnesses abroad, and

L -1 to receive their depositions in writing, where the witnesses reside, and

especially when the cause of action arises, in a foreign country. To which may

be added the power of examining witnesses that are aged, or going abroad, upon

interrogatories de bene ease j to be read in evidence if the trial should be deferred

till after their death or departure, but otherwise to be totally suppressed. Both

these are now very frequently effected by mutual consent, if the parties are open

and candid; and they may also be done indirectly at any time, through the

channel of a court of equity; but such a practice nas never yet been directly

(35) [The common law procedure act, 1854, now, however, enables either party, by leave of

the court or a judge, to interrogate his opponent upon any matter as to which discovery may

he sought, and to require such party to answer the questions within ten days, by affidavit sworn

and filed in court in the ordinary way. Any person omitting, without just cause, to answer all

questions as to which a discovery is sought, is guilty of a contempt, and liable to be proceeded

against accordingly.]

(3(5) ["When one partv is in possession of papers or any species of written evidence material

to the other, if notice is given him to produce them at the trial, upon his refusal copies of

them will he admitted; or if no copy has been made, parol evidence of their contents will be

received. The court and jury presume in favor of such evidence; because, if it were not

agreeable to the strict truth, it would be corrected by the production of the originals. There

is uo difference with respect to this species of evidence between criminal and civil cases.

2 T. R. 201.]

[The statute 14 and 15 Vic. o. 99, $ 6, enacts that on any action or other legal proceeding in

the superior courts of common law. the court or any judge thereof may, on application by

either of the litigants, compel the opposite party to allow the party applying to inspect all

documents in his custody or under his control relating to such action or other legal proceeding,

in all cases in which a discovery may be obtained by filing a bill or other proceeding in a court

of equity.]
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adopted (y) as the rule of a court of law. (37) Yet where the cause of action

arises in India, and a suit is brought thereupon in any of the king's courts at

Westminster, the court may issue a commission to examine witnesses upon the

spot, and transmit the depositions to England, (z)

4. The administration of justice should not only be chaste, but should not

even be suspected. A jury coming from the neigbourhood has in some respects

a great advantage ; but is often liable to strong objections; especially in small

jurisdictions, as in cities which are counties of themselves, and such where assizes

are but seldom holden; or where the question in dispute has an extensive local

tendency; where a cry has been raised, and the passions of the multitude been

inflamed; or where one of the parties is popular, and the other a stranger or ob-

noxious. It is true that, if a whole county is interested in the question to be

tried, the trial by the rule of law (a) must be in some adjoining county; but, as

there may be a strict interest so minute as not to occasion any bias, so there may

be the strongest bias without any pecuniary interest. In all these cases, to sum-

mon a jury, laboring under local prejudices, is laying a snare for their consciences:

and, though "they should have virtue and vigour of mind sufficient to r MOA -\

keep them upright, the parties will grow suspicious, and resort under *• *" '' '

various pretences to another mode of trial. The courts of law will therefore in

transitory actions very often change the venue, or county wherein the cause is

to be tried : (V) but in local actions, though they sometimes do it indirectly and

by mutual consent, yet, to eifect it directly and absolutely, the parties are driven
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to a court of equity; where, upon making out a proper case, it is done upon the

ground of being necessary to a fair, impartial, and satisfactory trial, (c) (38)

The locality of trial required by the common law seems a consequence of the

ancient locality of jurisdiction. All over the world, actions transitory follow

the person of the defendant, territorial suits must be discussed in the territorial

tribunal. I may sue a Frenchman here for a debt contracted abroad; but lands

lying in France must be sued for there, and English lands must be sued for in

the kingdom of England. Formerly they were usually demanded only in the

court-baron of the manor, where the steward could summon no jurors but such

as were the tenants of the lord. When the cause was removed to the hundred-

court (as seems to have been the course in the Saxon times,) (d) the lord of the

hundred had a farther power, to convoke the inhabitants of different vills to

form a jury: observing probably always to intermix among them a stated num-

ber of tenants of that manor wherein the dispute arose. When afterwards it

came to the county court, the great tribunal of Saxon justice, the sheriff had

wider authority, and could impanel a jury from the men of his county at large:

but was obliged (as a mark of the original locality of the cause) to return a

competent number of hundredors ; omitting the inferior distinction, if indeed ic

ever existed. And when at length, after the conquest, the king's justiciars

drew the cognizance of the cause from the *county court, though they r ,„„. -,

could have summoned a jury from any part of the kingdom, yet they *- l> "' '

chose to take the cause as they found it, with all its local appendages; triable by

a stated number of hundredors, mixed with other freeholders of the county.

The restriction as to hundredors hath gradually worn away, and at length

entirely vanished; (e) that of counties still remains, for many beneficial pur-

(») See page 78. (e) Stat. ISGeo. m, c. 63. (a) Stra. 177. (b) See page 294.

(c) T hi.-, among a number of other instances, was the case of the Issues directed by the bonee of lords

in the cause between the duke of Devonshire and the miners of the county of Derby, A. D. 1762.

(<J) LL. Edw. Conf. c. 32. Wilk. 203. (el See page 360.

(37) But now by statute 1 "Wm. IV, c. 22, the superior courts of law are empowered, upon

the application of any party to an action therein, to order the examination of any witnesses

upon interrogatories, and, if the witnesses are out of the jurisdiction of the court, a commission

may be issued for the purpose. But the examination is not to be read at the trial, without the

consent of the opposite party, unless it shall appear that the witness is then beyond the juris-

diction of the court, or dead, or unable from permanent sickness to attend the trial.

(38] [This may now be done in a court of law. Tidd, 8th ed. 655.]
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poses: but, as the king's courts have a jurisdiction co-extensive with the king-

dom, there surely can be no impropriety in sometimes departing from the

general rule, when the great ends of justice warrant and require an exception.

I have ventured to mark these defects, that the just panegyric, which I have

given on the trial by jnry, might appear to be the result of sober reflection, and

not of enthusiasm or prejudice. But should they, after all, continue unreme-

died and unsupplied. still (with all its imperfections) I trust that this mode of

decision will be found the best criterion, for investigating the truth of facts, that

was ever established in any country. (39)

CHAPTER XXIV.

OF JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS.

IK the present chapter we are to consider the transactions in the cause next

immediately subsequent to arguing the demurrer, or trial of the issue.

If the issue be an issue of fact; and, upon trial by any of the methods men-

tioned in the two preceding chapters, it be found for either the plaintiff or

defendant, or specially; or if the plaintiff makes default, or is nonsuit; or what-

ever, in short, is done subsequent to the joining of issue and awarding the trial,

it is entered on record and is called a posted, (a) The substance of which is, that

postea, afterwards, the said plaintiff and defendant appeared by their attorneys

at the place of trial; and a jury, being sworn, found such a verdict; or, that the

plaintiff, after the jnry sworn, made default, and did not prosecute his suit; or

as the case may happen. This is added to the roll, which is now returned to the
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court from which it was sent; and the history of the cause, from the time it was

carried out, is thus continued by the posted.

Next follows, sixthly, the judgment of the court upon what has previously

passed; both the matter of law and matter of fact being now fully weighed and

r *og7 i adjusted. Judgment *may however for certain causes be suspended, or

*• "' •" finally arrested: for it cannot be entered till the next term after trial

had, and that upon notice to the other party. So that if any defect of justice

happened at the trial, by surprise, inadvertence, or misconduct, the party may

have relief in the court above, by obtaining a new trial; or if, notwithstanding

the issue of fact be regularly decided, it appears that the complaint was either

(a) Appendix No. 11, M.

(39) So important hag the right of trial by jury been regarded in the United States, that not

only the national constitution, bnt the constitution of each of the states, contains limitations,

more or less broad, upon the power of the legislature to deprive parties of it. The national

constitution provides " that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed," and that '• m suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall

exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ; and no fact tried by jury

shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of

the common law." Const. U. S. 6th' and 7th amendments. The restrictions in the state con-

stitutions vary greatly, and they generally permit parties to waive the right. Some ol them also

allow a jurv of less number than twelve. It is well settled, however, that where the constitution

preserves £be right of trial by jury in general terms, it preserves it for all those cases in which

it was demandable of right at the common law. Crandall e. James, 6 R. I. 104; Dane Co. t'.

Dunning, 20 Wis. 210; Tabor v. Cook, 15 Mich. 322; In re Kemp, 16 "Wis. 359 ; Byers». Com-

monwealth, 42 Penn. St. 89; Haines v. Levin, 51 Penn. St. 412. And the right cannot be made

to depend upon any condition. Green r. Briggs, 1 Curt. C. C. 311. And the number of the jurv

must Be twelve, and in criminal cases, at least, the party cannot waive the right, or bind himself

by consent to be tried by a less number. Work ti. State, 2 Ohio, N. S. 296; Cancemi t). People,

18 N. Y. 128; Brown v. State, 8 Blackf. 561; Hill t). People, 16 Mich. 351.

240

Chap. 24.] JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS. 387

not actionable in itself, or not made with sufficient precision and accuracy, the

party may supersede it by arresting or staying the judgment.

1. Causes of suspending the judgment, by granting a new trial, (1) are at pres-

ent wholly extrinsic, arising from the matter foreign to, or dehors the record.

Of this sort are want of notice of trial; or any flagrant misbehaviour of the party

prevailing towards the jury, which may have influenced their verdict; or any

gross misbehaviour of the jury among themselves: also if it appears by the

judge's report, certified to the court, that the jury have brought in a verdict

without or contrary to evidence, so that he is reasonably dissatisfied there-

with; (b) or if they "have given exorbitant damages; (c) or if the judge himself

has misdirected the jury, so that they found an unjustifiable verdict: for these,

and other reasons of the like kind, it is the practice of the court to award anew,

or second trial. But if two juries agree in the same or a similar verdict, a third

trial is seldom awarded: (d) for the law will not readily suppose, that the verdict

of any one subsequent jury can countervail the oaths of the two preceding ones.

The exertion of these superintendent powers of the king's courts, in setting

aside the verdict of a jury and granting a new trial, on account of misbehaviour

in the jurors, is of a date extremely ancient There are instances in the year-

(b) Law of Nisi Prim, 303, 304. (c) Comb. 357. (d) « Mod. 22. Salk. 649.

(1) [As to new trials iu general, see Tidd. 8th ed. 934 to 949. When there are two contrary

verdicts, it is not of course, but in the discretion of the court, to grant a new trial. 2 Bla. R.

963. The principle grounds for setting aside a verdict or nonsuit, and granting a new trial,
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besides those mentioned in the text, are—1st. The discovery of now and material evidence

since the trial, 2 Bla. Rep. 955. 2dly. If the witnesses on whose testimony the verdict was

obtained, have been since convicted of perjury iu giving their evidence: M. 22 Geo. Ill, K.

B; or if probable ground bo laid to induce the court to believe that the witnesses are per-

jured, they will stay the proceedings on the finding of a bill of indictment against them for

Eerjury till the indictment is tried : id.; but the circumstance of an indictment for perjury

aving been found against a witness, is no ground of motion for new trial. 4 M. and S. 140;

8 Taunt. IBS. 3dly. For excessive damages, indicating passion or partiality in the jury.

1 Stra. 692; 1 Burr. 609; 3 Wils. 18; 2 Bl. Rep. 929; Cowp. 230; 5 T. R. 257 ; 7 id. 529; il

East, 23. It is not usual to grant a new trial for sniallness of damages ; 2 Salk. 647 ; 2 Stra.

940 ; Doug. 509; Barnes, 455, 456 ; iu which latter caie it is said, if the demand is certain, as

on a promissory note, the court will set aside a verdict for too small damages, but not where

the damages are uncertain. Lastly, it is a general rule not to grant a new trial except for the

misdirection of the judge : 4 T. R. 753; 5 id. 19; 6 East, 316 (b); 1 Marsh. 555; or where a

point has been saved at the trial: 1 B. and P. 338: in a penal (2 Stra. 899; 10 East, 268; 4

II. and S. 338 ; 2 Chitty R. 273), hard or trifling action : 2 Salk. 653 ; 3 Burr. 13015; and an

action is considered trifling in this respect, when the sum to bo recovered is under 20Z. : 5 Taunt.

537 ; 1 Chitty R. 265 (a) ; unless the trial is to settle a right of a permanent nature. Id. In

all these cases, if the verdict be agreeable to equity and justice, the court will not grant a new

trial, though there may have been an error in the admission or rejection of evidence, or in the

direction of the judge, if it appear to the court on the whole matter disclosed by the report, that

the verdict ought to be confirmed. 4 T. R. 468.

A new trial cannot be granted in civil cases at the instance of one of several defendants:

12 Mod. 275; 2 Stra. 814 ; nor for Apart only of the cause of action. 2 Burr. 1224; 3 Wils.

47. Bnt there may be cases in which the new trial is restricted to a particular part of the

record, as if the judge give leave to move on one part or point only, on a stipulation that

counsel shall not move for any thing else ; or if the court think injustice may be done bv set-

ting the whole matter at large again, they may restrict the second trial to certain particular

points. 4 Taunt. 556.

In criminal cases no new trial can be granted where the defendant has been acquitted;

6 East, 315; 4 M. and S. 337 ; 1 B. and A. 64. Where several defendants are tried at the same

time for a misdemeanor, and some are acquitted, and others convicted, the court may grant a

new trial to those convicted, if they think the conviction improper. 6 East, 619. See further

on this subject, Tidd, 8th ed. 934. In civil cases a motion for a new trial cannot be made

after an unsuccessful motion in arrest of judgment. 4 Bar. and Cres. 160. The granting of

a new trial is either without or upon payment of the costs of the former trial; or such costs

nro directed to abide the event of the suit. The general rule seems to be, that if the new trial

be granted for the misbehavior of the jury, or the misdirection of the judge, the costs are

not required to be paid by the party applying for a new trial; but where the mere error of the

jury, or the discovery of fresh evidence is the ground, the costs must be paid by the party

moving to set aside the former Terdict. See Tidd, 8th ed. 945.1

As to new trials, see, in general, Graham and Waterman on New Trials, passim.
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books of the reigns of Edward III, (e) Henry IV, (/) and Henry VII, (g) of jndg-

f *3881 men''s oeing stayed (even after a trial at bar) and *new venires awarded,

"• *" -1 because the jury had eat and drank without consent of the judge, aud

because the plaintiff had privately given a paper to a juryman before he was

sworn. And upon these the chief-justice Glynn in 1655, grounded the first

precedent that is reported in our books (h) for granting a new trial upon account

of excessive damages given by the jury; apprehending, with reason, that noto-

rious partiality in the jurors was a principal species of misbehaviour. A few

years before, a practice took rise in the common pleas, (t) of granting new trials

upon the mere certificate of the judge (unfortified by any report of the evi-

dence), that the verdict hsvd passed against his opinion ; though Chief-justice

Rolle (who allowed of new trials in case of misbehaviour, surprise, or fraud, or

if the verdict was notoriously contrary to evidence) (k) refused to adopt that

practice in the court of king's bench. And at that time it was dearly held for

law, (1) that whatever matter was offeree to avoid a verdict, ought to be returned

upon thepostea, and not merely surmised by the court; lest posterity should

wonder why a new venire was awarded, without any sufficient reason appearing

upon the record. But very early in the reign of Charles the Second new trials

were granted upon affidavits; (m) and the former strictness of the courts of

law, in respect of new trials, having driven many parties into courts of equity

to be relieved from oppressive verdicts, they are now more liberal in granting

them: the maxim at present adopted being this, that (in all cases of moment)
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where justice is not done upon one trial, the injured party is entitled to

another, (n)

Formerly the principal remedy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was by

writ of attaint; of which we shall speak in the next chapter, and which is at

least as old as the institution of the grand assize by Henry II, (0) in lieu of the

F *3891 •^orman trwl by battle. Such a sanction was probably thought *neces-

L ' sary, when, instead of appealing to Providence for the decision of a

dubious right, it was referred to the oatli of fallible or perhaps corrupted men.

Our ancestors saw that a jury might give an erroneous verdict; and if they did,

that it ought not finally to conclude the question in the first instance: but the

remedy, which they provided, shows the ignorance and ferocity of the times, and

the simplicity of the points then usually litigated in the courts of justice. They

supposed that the law being told to the jury by the judge, the proof of fact

must be always so clear, that, if they found a wrong verdict, they must be wil-

fully and corruptly perjured. Whereas a juror may find a just verdict from

unrighteous motives, which can only be known to the great searcher of hearts:

and he may, on the contrary, find a verdict very manifestly wrong, without any

bad motive at all; from inexperience in business, incapacity, misapprehension,

inattention to circumstances, and a thousand other innocent causes. But such

a remedy as this laid the injured party under an insuperable hardship, by mak-

ing a conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of his redress.

The judges saw this; and therefore very early, even upon writs of assize, they

devised a great variety of distinctions; by which an attaint might be avoided,

and the verdict set to rights in a more temperate and dispassionate method, (p)

Thus, if excessive damages were given, they were moderated by the discretion

of the justices, (q) And if, either in that, or in any other instance, justice was

not completely done, through the error of either the judge or the recognitors,

it was remedied by certificate of assize, which was neither more nor less than a

second trial of the same cause by the same jury, (r) And, in mixed or personal

actions, as trespass and the like (wherein no attaint originally lay), if the jury

gave a wrong verdict, the judges did not think themselves warranted thereby

to pronounce an iniquitous judgment; but amended it, if possible, by subse-

(«1 24E<lw. III.24. Bro. Abr. tit. verdUe. 17. (/) 11 Hon. IV, 18. Bro. Abr. tit. enguat, 75.

117) 14 Hen. VII. 1. Bro. Aljr. tit. verdite, 18. (A) Styl. 46(1. (i) IMd 238.

(ft) t Slit. S3S. Styl. Pract. Ren S10, 311. o«lit. lft.17. Ill Oo. Ellz. (118. Palm. 32S. 1 Brownl. Z07.

im) 1 Ski. 285. 2 Lev. 140. In) 1 Burr. KB. (o) Ip»iregalHnatUiitionicleytintfrinttrta. Gktnv. I. 3, o. If).

(j))Bract. 1. 4, tr.S, c. 4. (gllbiit. tr. 1, 0.19, (8. (r)lbid.l.l, tr. 6, o. ti, j 2. F. X. B. 181. 2 lust. 415.
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quent inquiries of their own; and, if that *could not be they referred

it to another examination. («) When afterwards attaints, by several

statutes were more universally extended, the judges frequently, even for the

misbehaviour of jurymen, instead of prosecuting the writ of attaint, awarded a

second trial: and subsequent resolutions, for more than a century past, have so

amplified the benefit of this remedy, that the attaint is now as obsolete as the

trial by battle which it succeeded; and we shall probably see the revival of the

one as soon as the revival of the other. And here I cannot but again admire(^)

the wisdom of suffering time to bring to perfection new remedies, more easy

and beneficial to the subject; which, by degrees, from the experience and appro-

bation of the people, supersede the necessity or desire of using or continuing the

old.

If every verdict was final in the first instance, it would tend to destroy this

valuable method of trial, and would drive away all causes of consequence to be

decided according to the forms of the imperial law, upon the depositions in writing;

which might be reviewed in a course of appeal. Causes of great importance,

titles to land, and large questions of commercial property, come often to be tried

by a jury, merely upon the general issue: where the facts are complicated and

intricate, the evidence of great length and variety, and sometimes contradicting

each other; and where the nature of the dispute very frequently introduces nice

questions and subtilties of law. Either party may be surprised by a piece of

evidence which (had he known of its production) he could have explained or
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answered : or may be puzzled by a legal doubt, which a little recollection would

have solved. In the hurry of a trial the ablest judge may mistake the law, and

misdirect the jury: he may not be able so to state and range the evidence as to

lay it clearly before them, nor to take off the artful impressions which have been

made on their minds by learned and experienced advocates. The jury are to

give their *opinion instanter; that is, before they separate, eat, or drink. .- %ggi -i

And under these circumstances the most intelligent and best intentioued L -"

men may bring in a verdict, which they themselves upon cool deliberation would

wish to reverse.

Next to doing right, the great object in the administration of public justice

should be to give public satisfaction. If the verdict be liable to many objections

and doubts in the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of bystanders,

no party would go awav satisfied unless he had a prospect of reviewing it. Such

doubts would with him be decisive: he would arraign the determination as

manifestly unjust; and abhor a tribunal which he imagined had done him an

injury without a possibility of redress.

Granting a new trial, under proper regulations, cures all these inconveniences,

and at the same time preserves entire and renders perfect that most excellent

method of decision, which is the glory of the English law. A new trial is a

rehearing of the cause before another jury; but with as little prejudice to either

party, as if it had never been heard before. No advantage is taken of the

former verdict on the one side, or the rule of court for awarding such second

trial on the other: and the subsequent verdict, though contrary to the first,

imports no tittle of blame upon the former jury; who, had they possessed the

same lights and advantages, would probably have altered their own opinion.

The parties come better informed, the counsel better prepared, the law is more

fully understood, the judge is more master of the subject; and nothing is now

tried but the real merits of the case.

A sufficient ground must however be laid before the court, to satisfy them that

it is necessary to justice that the cause should be farther considered. If the

matter be such, as did not or could not appear to the judge who presided at

nisi prius, it is disclosed to the court by affidavit: if it arises from what passed

at the trial, it is taken from the judge's information; who usually makes a

(«) SI jurtitorei errarerlnt, et justlfiarii tecundum eorum dictum judtcitim pronuntiaverint. faUam faciunt

prnnuiUiattemem; et irleo itgul nan dtbent eorum dictum, led illml emendare teneiitur per diligmltm examiiia-

tiouein. Si autmt dijudicare nacuuU, recurraulitm eritad mttjui judichtm. Bract. 1. t, tr. 5, c. 4, JS.

I >, Sec pugu 26 J.

s
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special and minute report of the evidence. Counsel are heard on both sides to

f *3921 'ml)eacn *or establish the verdict, and the court give their reasons at

' '" J large why a new examination ought or ought not to be allowed. The

true import of the evidence is duly weighed, false colours are taken off, and all

points of law which arose at the trial are upon full deliberation clearly explained

and settled.

Nor do the courts lend too easy an ear to every application for a review of the

former verdict. They must be satisfied that there are strong probable grounds

to suppose that the merits have not been fairly and fully discussed, and that the

decision is not agreeable to the justice and truth of tlie case. A new trial is

not granted, where the value is too inconsiderable to merit a second examina-

tion. It is not granted upon nice and formal objections, which do not go to the

real merits. It is not granted in cases of strict right, or nuntmiim jus, where

the rigorous exaction of extreme legal justice is hardly reconcilable to con-

science. Nor is it granted where the scales of evidence hang nearly equal: that

•which leans against the former verdict ought always very strongly to prepon-

derate.

In granting such farther trial (which is matter of sound discretion) the court

has also an opportunity which it seldom fails to improve, of supplying those

defects in this mode of trial which are stated in the preceding chapter; by lay-

ing the party applying under all such equitable terms as his antagonist shall

desire and mutually oiler to comply with: such as tho discovery of some facts
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upon oatli; the admission of others not intended to be litigated ; the production

of deeds, books, and papers; the examination of witnesses, infirm, or going beyond

sea ; and the like. And the delay and expense of this proceeding are so small

and trifling, that it seldom can be moved for to gain time or to gratify humour.

Tlie motion must be made within the first four days of the next succeeding term,

within which term it is usually heard and decided. And it is worthy observa-

tion how infinitely superior to all others the trial by jury approves itself, even

in the very mode of its revision. In every other country of Europe, and in those

T *393 1 °^ our own tribunals which conform themselves to the *process of the

1 "*' -I civil law, the parties are at liberty, whenever they please, to appeal from

day to day and from court to court upon questions merely of fact; which is a

perpetual source of obstinate chicane, delay, and expensive litigation. («) With

us no new trial is allowed, unless there be a manifest mistake, and the subject-

matter be worthy of interposition. The party who thinks himself aggrieved,

may still, if he pleases, have recourse to his writ of attaint (2) after judgment:

in the course of the trial he may demur to the evidence, or tender a bill of excep-

tions. And, if the first is totally laid aside, and the other two very seldom put

in practice, it is because long experience has shown, that a motion for a second

trial is the shortest, cheapest, and most effectual cure for all imperfections in the

verdict; whether they arise from the mistakes of the parties themselves, of their

counsel or attorneys, or even of the judge or jury.

2. Arrests of judgment (3) arise from intrinsic causes, appearing upon the

face of the record. Of this kind are, first, where the declaration varies totally

(u)Snt many yearsnproiin appeal trashrnturht to the hotiso of lords from the oonrt of session in Scotland,

In a canst! between Napier anil Macfhrlane. It was inslimted in March. 174.V anil (after many interlocutory or-

ders ami sentences below, appealed from anil reheard as far as the course of proceeding would admit) was

finally determined In April, 1719—the qncr-tinn belnir only on the property in an ox. adjudged to be of the

value" of three guineas. No picjiic or spirit could have nvido mutli a emiso in tho court olkiuif'n bench or

common pleas, have lasted a tenth of that time, or hiivo cost a twentieth part ol'the expense.

(2) Since abolished.

(:5) [Tho parties cannot move in arrest of judgment for anything that is aided after verdict

at common law, or by the statute of amendments, or cured, as matter of form, by the statute

ot'jeofails. See 1 Sauiid. 22H, u. (1) It is a general rule that a verdict will aid a title imper-

fectly set out, but not an imperfect title. 2 Burr. 11">9; :5 'Wils. 275; -IT. R. -172. The de-

fendant cannot move in arrest of judgment for any thing which ho might have pleaded in

abatement. 2 Bla. R. 1120. Surplusage-will not vitiate alter verdict, as in trover stating the

possession of the goods, in plaintiff on the 3d of March, and the conversion by defendant
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from the original writ; as where the writ is in debt or detinue, and the plaintiff

declares in an action on the case for an assumpsit: for the original writ out of

chancery being the foundation and warrant of the whole proceedings in the

common pleas, if the declaration does not pursue the nature of the writ, the

court's authority totally fails. (4) Also, secondly, where the verdict materially

differs from the pleadings and issue thereon; as if, in an action for words, it is

laid in the declaration that the defendant said, " the plaintiff is a bankrupt;"

and the verdict find specially that he said, " the plaintiff will be a bankrupt."

Or, thirdly, if the case laid in the declaration is not sufficient in point of law to

found an action upon. And this is an invariable *rule with regard to r #304 ]

arrests of judgment upon matters of law, "that whatever is alleged in L *"''"' '

arrest of judgment must be such matter as would upon demurrer have been

sufficient to overturn the action or plea." As if, on an action for slander in

calling the plaintiff a Jew, the defendant denies the words, and issue is joined

thereon; now if a verdict be found for the plaintiff, that the words were actually

spoken, whereby the fact is established, still the defendant may move in arrest

of judgment, that to call a man a Jew is not actionable: and, if the court be of

that opinion, the judgment shall be arrested, and never entered for the plaintiff.

But the rule will not hold e converse, "that every thing that may be alleged as

cause of demurrer will be good in arrest of judgment, for if a declaration or

plea omits to state some particular circumstance, without proving of which, at

the trial, it is impossible to support the action or defence, this omission shall be
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aided by a verdict. As if, in an action of trespass, the declaration doth not

allege that the trespass was committed on any certain day; (10) or if the defend-

ant justifies, by prescribing for a right of common for his cattle, and does not

plead that his cattle were levant and couchant on the land; (a;) (5) though either

of these defects might be good cause to demur to the declaration or plea, yet

if the adverse party omit to take advantage of such omission in due time, but

takes issue, and has a verdict against him, these exceptions cannot, after verdict,

be moved in arrest of judgment. For the verdict ascertains those facts, which

before from the inaccuracy of the pleadings might be dubious; since the law will

not suppose that a jury, under the inspection of a judge, would find a verdict for

the plaintiff or defendant, unless he had proved those circumstances, without

which his general allegation is defective, (y) Exceptions, therefore, that are

moved in arrest of judgment, must be much more material and glaring than

such as will maintain a demurrer: or, in other words, many inaccuracies and

omissions, which would be fatal, if early observed, are cured by a subsequent

verdict; and not suffered, in the last stage of a cause, to unravel the whole pro-

ceedings. *But if the thing omitted be essential to the action or defence, r ,,00- i

as if the plaintiff does not merely state his title in a defective manner, •- J

but sets forth a title that is totally defective in itself, (z) or if to an action of debt

the defendant pleads not guilty instead of nil dcbet, (a) these cannot be cured by

a verdict for the plaintiff in the first case, or for the defendant in the second.

(w) Garth. 389. (x) Cro. Jac. 41. (y) 1 Mod. 293. (*) Sulk. 36i. (a) Cro. Eliz. 778.

" afterwards, to wit, on the 1st of March," it was held that " afterward" might stand, and the

other words be treated as surplusage. Cro. C. 428.

If the judgment be arrested in consequence of mistake in the form of action, or otherwise,

the plaintiff is at liberty to proceed do novo in a fresh action. 1 Mod. 207; Vin. Ab. tit. Judg-

ment, Q. 4; Bla. E. 831. Each party pays his own costs upon the judgment being arrested.

Cowp. 407.]

The rule as to the defects that shall be cured by verdict is thus stated in 2 Saund. Rep. 228, n. (1)

"When there is anv defect, imperfection, or omission in any pleading, whether in substance

or form, which would have been a fatal objection on demurrer, yet if the issue joined be such

as necessarily required, on the trial proof of the facts so defectively or imperfectly stated

or omitted, and without which it is not to be presumed that either the judge would direct tho

jury to give, or the jury would have given, the verdict, such defect, imperfection or omission,

is cured by the verdict at the commonlaw." See, also, Gould PI. Ch. 10, § 13: 1 Chit. PI. 673.

(4) [Now no form of action is stated in the writ. Com. Law Prac. Act, 1853, s. 3.]

(5) [See, however, 1 Saund. 228, note 1.]
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If, by the misconduct or inadvertence of the pleaders, the issue be joined on a

fact totally immaterial, or insufficient to determine the right, so that the court

upon the finding cannot know for whom judgment ought to be given; as if, in

an action on the case in assumpsit against an executor, he pleads that he him-

self (instead of the testator) made no such promise : (b) or if, in an action of debt

on bond conditioned to pay money on or before a certain day, ihe defendant

pleads payment on the day : (c) (which issue, if found for the plaintiff1, would be

inconclusive, as the money might have been paid before;) in these cases the court

will after verdict award a repleader quod parties replacitent; unless it appears

from the whole record that nothing material can possibly be pleaded in any

shape whatsoever, and then a repleader would be fruitless, (rf) And, whenever

a repleader is granted, the pleadings must begin de novo at thai stage of them,

whether it be the plea, replication, or rejoinder, &c., wherein theie appears to have

been the first defect, or deviation from the regular course, (e)

If judgment is not by some of these means arrested within the first four days

of the next term after the trial, it is then to be entered on the roll or record.

Judgments are the sentence of the law, pronounced by the court upon the mat-

ter contained in the record ; and are of four sorts. First, where the facts are

confessed by the parties, and the law determined by the court; as in case of

judgment upon demurrer : secondly, where the law is admitted, by the parties,

and the facts disputed ; as in case of judgment on a verdict : thirdly, where

T *W 1 *koth tne **ct an<^ tne *aw ar>sing thereon are admitted by the defend-
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I- -I ant; which is the case of judgments by confession or default: or, lastly,

where the plaintiff is convinced that either fact, or law, or both, are insufficient

to support his action, and therefore abandons or withdraws his prosecution :

which is the case in judgments upon a nonsuit or retraxit.

The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their de-

termination or sentence, but the determination and sentence of the luw. It is

the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law and

fact, which stand thus : against him who hath rode over my corn, I may recover

damages by law: but A hath rode over my corn; therefore I shall recover dama-

ges against A. If the major proposition be denied, this is a demurrer in law: if

the minor, it is then an issue of fact ; but if both be confessed (or determined) to

be right, the conclusion or judgment of the court cannot but follow. Which

judgment or conclusion depends not, therefore, on the arbitrary caprice of the

judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of justice. The judgment in

short, is the remedy prescribed by law for the redress of injuries ; and the suit

or action is the vehicle or means of administering it. What that remedy may be,

is, indeed, the result of deliberation and study to point out, and therefore the style

of the judgment is, not that it is decreed or resolved by the court, for then the

judgment might appear to be their own ; but " it is considered," consideration

est percuriam, that the plaintiff do recover his damages, his debt, his possession,

and the like : which implies that the judgment is none of their own ; but the act

of law, pronounced and declared by the court, after due deliberation and inquiry.

All these species of judgments are either interlocutory or final. Interlocu-

tory judgments are such as are given in the middle of a cause, upon some plea,

proceeding, or default, which is only intermediate, and does not finally determine

or complete the suit. Of this nature are all judgments for the plaintiff upon

f *197 1 Pleas in abatement of the suit or action : in *which it is considered by

L ' the court that the defendant do answer over, respondent ouster ; that is,

put in a more substantial plea. (/) It is easy to observe, that the judgment

here given is not final, but merely interlocutory; for there are afterwards farther

proceedings to be had, when the defendant hath put in a better answer.

But the interlocutory judgments most usually spoken of are those incomplete

judgments, whereby the right of the plaintiff is "indeed established, but the quan-

tum of damages sustained by him is not ascertained : which is a matter that can-

(6l 2 Ventr. 190. (c) Stra. 994. (d) 1 Bnrr. 301. 303.

(«) Uaym. 458. Salk. 579. (./) 2 Saumi. W.
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not be done without the intervention of a jury. As by the old Gothic constitu-

tion the cause was not completely finished till the nembda or jurors were called

in " ad executionem decretorum judicii, ad mstimationem pretii, damni, lucri,"

&c. (g) This can only happen where the plaintiff recovers ; For, when judgment is

given for the defendant, it is always complete as well as final. And this happens,

in the first place, where the defendant suffers judgment to go against him by

default, or nihil dicit; as if he puts in no plea at all to the plaintiff's declara-

tion: by confession or cognovit actionem, where he acknowledges the plaintiffs

demand to be just: or by non sum,informaiug, when the defendant's attorney

declares he has no instruction to say any thing in answer to the plaintiff, or in

defence of his client; which is a species of judgment by default If these, or

any of them, happen in actions where the specific thing sued for is recovered, as

in actions of debt for a sum certain, the judgment is absolutely complete. And

therefore it is very usual, in order to strengthen a creditor's security, for the

debtor to execute a warrant of attorney to some attorney named by the creditor,

empowering him to confess a judgment by either of the ways just now mentioned

(by nihil dicit, cognovit actionem, or non sum informatus) in an action of debt

to be brought by the creditor against the debtor for the specific sum due: which

judgment, when confessed, is absolutely complete and binding; provided the

same (as is also required in all other judgments) be regularly docquetted, that is,

abstracted and entered in a book, 'according to the directions of statute r^qogi

4 and 5 W. and M. c. 20. But where damages are to be recovered, a jury <- '
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must be called in to assess them; unless the defendant, to save charges, will

confess the whole damages laid in the declaration: otherwise the entry of the

judgment is, "that the plaintiff ought to recover his damages (indefinitely), but

because the court know not what damages the said plaintiff hath sustained,

therefore the sheriff is commanded, that by the oaths of twelve honest and lawful

men he inquire into the said damages, and return such inquisition into court"

This process is called a writ of inquiry; in the execution of which the sheriff

sits as judge, and tries by a jury, subject to nearly the same laws and conditions

as the trial by jury at nisi prius, what damages the plaintiff hath really sustained :

and when their verdict is given, which must assess #ome damages, the sheriff

returns the inquisition, which is entered upon the roll in manner of&postea; and

thereupon it is considered that the plaintiff do recover the exact sum of the dam-

ages so assessed. In like manner, when a demurrer is determined for the plain-

tiff upon an action wherein damages are recovered, the judgment is also incom-

plete, without the aid of a writ of inquiry. (6)

Final judgments are such as at once put an end to the action, by declaring

that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy

he sues for. In which case, if the judgment be for the plaintiff, it is also con-

sidered that the defendant be either amerced, for his wilful delay of justice in

not immediately obeying the king's writ by rendering the plaintiff his due; (A)

or be taken up, capiatur, till he pays a tine to the king for the public mis-

demeanor which is coupled with the private injury, in all cases of force, (i) of

falsehood in denying his own deed, (k) or unjustly claiming property in replevin,

or of contempt by disobeying the command of the king's writ or the express

(a) Stiernhook, dejure Gotk. I. 1. c. 4. (h) S Rep. 40. 61.

fit 8 Rop. 59. 11 Hep. 43. S Mod. 285. See Append. No. II, i 4.

ft) F. Ji. B. 111. Co. Lilt. 131. 8 Kcp. 60. 1 Kull. Abr. 21D. Lill. Entr. S79, C. B. Hil. 4 Ann. rot. 430.

(6) [It has been said, by C. J. TVilmot, that "this is an inquest of office to inform the con-

science of the court, who, if they please, may themselves assess the damages." 3 Wils. 02.

Hence a practice is now established in the courts of king's bench and common pleas, in actions

where judgment is recovered by default upon a bill of exchange or promissory note, to refer it

to the master or prothonotary to ascertain what is duo for principal, interest, and costs, whose

report supersedes the necessity of a writ ot inquiry. 4 T. R. 275; 1 H. Bl. 541. And this

practice is now adopted by the court of exchequer. 4 Price, 134 ; see further. Tidd, 6th ed.

817, 819. In cases of difficulty and importance, the court will give leave to have the writ of

injury executed before a judge at sittings OT nisi prius; and then the judge acts only as an assist-

ant to the sheriff.
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prohibition of any statute. (I) But now, in case of trespass, ejectment, assault,

and false imprisonment, it is provided by the statute 5 and 6 W. and If., c. 12,

that no writ of capias shall issue for this fine, nor any fine be paid; but the

plaintiff shall pay 6s. 8rf. to the proper officer, and be allowed it against the

defendant among his other costs. And, therefore, upon snch judgments in

the common pleas, they used to enter that the fine was remitted, and now in

F *SOO 1 koth courts they kike no notice of any fine or capias at all. (m) *But

"- J if judgment be for the defendant, then, in case of fraud and deceit to

the court, or malicious or vexatious suits, the plaintiff may also be fined; («)

but in most cases it is only considered thaf he and his pledges of prosecuting be

(nominally) amerced for his false claim, pro falso clamore xuo, and that the

defendant may go thereof without a day, eat inde sine die. that is, without any

farther continuance or adjournment; the king's writ, commanding his attend-

ance, being now fully satisfied, and his innocence publicly cleared, (o)

Thus much for judgments ; to which costs are a necessary appendage ; it being

now as well the maxim of ours as of the civil law, that " victim victori in

expensis condemnandug est:" (p) though the common law did not professedly

allow any, the amercement of the vanquished party being his only punishment.

The first statute which gave costs, eo nomine, to the demandant in a real action

was the statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1, as did the statute of Marlbridge,

52 Hen. Ill, c. 6, to the defendant in one particular case, relative to wardship in

chivalry: though in reality costs were always considered and included in the
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quantum of damages, in such actions where damages are given ; and, even now,

costs for the plaintiff are always entered on the roll as increase of damages by

the court, (q) But, because those damages were frequently inadequate to the

plaintiffs expenses, the statute of Gloucester orders costs to be also added ; and

farther directs, that the same rule shall hold place in all cases where the party

is to recover damages. And, therefore, in such actions where no damages were

then recoverable (as in quare impedit, in which damages were not given till the

statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I), no costs are now allowed; (r) unless they have

been expressly given by some subsequent statute. The statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 10,

was the first which allowed any costs on a writ of error. But no costs were

allowed the defendant in any shape, till the statutes 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, 4 Jac. I,

c. 3, 8 and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 11, 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, which very equitably gave the

defendant, if he prevailed, the same costs as the plaintiff would have had, in case

he had recovered. These costs on both sides are taxed and moderated by the pro-

thouotary, or other proper officer of the court.

r *4001 *The king (and any person suing to his use) (s) shall neither pay nor

L -* receive costs; for besides that he is not included under the general words

of these statutes, as it is his prerogative not to pay them to a subject, so it is

beneath his dignity to receive them. (7) And it seems reasonable to suppose,

that the queen-consort participates of the same privilege; for in actions brought

by her, she was not at the common law obliged to find pledges of prosecution,

nor could be amerced in case there was judgment against her. (t) In two other

cases an exemption also lies from paying costs. Executors and administrators,

when suing in the right of the deceased, shall pay none; (u) for the statute

23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, doth not give costs to defendants, unless where the action

supposeth the contract to be made with, or the wrong to be done to, the plaintiff

himself. (8) And paupers, that is, such as will swear themselves not worth five

pounds, are, by statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 12, to have original writs and mbpanas

gratis, and counsel and attorney assigned them without fee; and are excused

(I) 8 Bcp. fiO. (m) Salk. M. Cnrth. 390. (n) SRep. 59, 60. (o) Appendix, No. Ill, « 0.

Cp; Coil. 3, 1, 13. (q) Appendix, No. II, M. (r) 10 Ucp. 11«. (tj stat. 24 Hen. VIII, c. 8.

(t) K. N. 11. 101. Co. LIU. 133. (u) Cro. Jac. 229. 1 Ventr. at.

(7) In civil cases the rule is now otherwise.

(8) The statute 3 and 4 TVm. IV, c. 42, gives cost against executors suing in the right of their

testator, in all cases in which they would be liable to costs if suing in their own right, unless the

court or judge otherwise orders.
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from paying costs, when plaintiffs, by the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, but shall

suffer other punishment at the discretion of the judges. And it was formerly

usual to give such paupers, if nonsuited, their election either to be whipped or

pay the costs :(w) though that practice is now disused, (x) (9) It seems, how-

ever, agreed that a pauper may recover costs, though he pays none; (10) for the

counsel and clerks are bound to give their labour to him, but not to his antago-

nist, (y) To prevent also trifling and malicious actions, for words, for assault

and battery, and for trespass, it is enacted by statutes 43 Eliz. c. 6, 21 Jac. I,

C. 16, and 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 9, § 136, that, where the jury who try any of

these actions shall give less damages than 40s., the plaintiff stall be allowed no

more costs than damages, unless the judge before whom the cause is tried shall

certify under his hand, on the back of the record, that an actual battery (and not

an assault only) was proved, or that in trespass the freehold or title of the laud

came chiefly in question. Also, by statutes 4 and 5 W. and M. *c. 23, and r * ,Q, -i

8 and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 11, if the trespass were committed in hunting or "- J

sporting by an inferior tradesman, or if it appear to be wilfully and maliciously

committed, the plaintiff shall have full costs, (z) though his damages, as assessed

by the jury, amount to less than 40s.

After judgment is entered, execution will immediately follow, unless the party

condemned thinks himself unjustly aggrieved by any of these proceedings, and

then he has his remedy to reverse them by several writs in the nature of appeals,

which we shall consider in the succeeding chapter.
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CHAPTEE XXV.

OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE NATURE OF APPEALS.

PROCEEDINGS in the nature of appeals from the proceedings of the king's

courts of law, are of various kinds: according to the subject-matter in which

they are concerned. They are principally four.

I. A writ of attaint: (i) which lieth to inquire whether a jury of twelve men

gave a false verdict;(«) that so the judgment following thereupon may be

reversed: and this must be brought in the lifetime of him for whom the verdict

was given; and of two at least of the jurors who gave it. This lay, at the com-

mon law, only upon writs of assize ; and seems to have been coeval with that

institution by King Henry II, at the instance of his chief-justice, Glanvil: being

probably meant as a check upon the vast power then reposed in the recognitors

of assize, of finding a verdict according to their own personal knowledge, with-

out the examination of witnesses. And even here it extended no farther than

to such instances, where the issue was joined upon the very point of assize

(the heirship, disseisin, &c.), and not on any collateral matter; as villenage,

bastardy, or any other disputed fact. In these cases the assize was said to^be

turned into an inquest or jury (assisa vertitur in jura-turn), or that the assize

should be taken in modum juratce et non in modum assists; that is, that the

issue should be tried by a common jury or inquest, and not by recognitors of

ftvj ISid. Ml. 7 Mod. 114. (x) Salk. 506. (y) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 125.

(z) See pages 214, 215. (a) Pinch, L,. 484.

(9) [But, as observed in Tidd Prac. 8th ed. 94, it does not appear that so disgraceful a pro-

ceeding was ever adopted bv inflicting the punishment.]

(10) [1 Bos. and P. 39. "The pauper in such ease can only recover as costs the sums he is

actually put of pocket; not such sums as would have been so paid in an ordinary suit by any

other plaintiff.]

(1) Abolished by statute 6 Geo. IT, o. 50.
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assize: (b) and then I apprehend that no attaint lay against the inquest or jnry

that determined such collateral issue, (c) Neither do I find any mention made

by our ancient writers, of such a process obtaining after the trial by inquest or

F *403 1 J111^' 'n t'le °^ N°rman or feudal actions *prosecuted by writ of entry.

"• J Xor did any attaint lie in trespass, debt, or other action personal, by the

old common law: because those were always determined by common inquests

or juries, (d) At length the statute of Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 38, allowed

an attaint to be sued upon inquests, as well as assizes, which were taken

upon any plea of land or of freehold. But this was at the king's discretion,

and is so understood by the author of Fleta, (e) a writer contemporary with

the statute; though Sir Edward Coke(/) seems to hold a different opinion.

Other subsequent statutes (g) introduced the same remedy in all pleas of ires-

pass, and the statute 34 Edw. Ill, c. 7, extended it to all pleas whatsoever, per-

sonal as well as real; except only the writ of rigid, in such cases where the

raise or issue is joined on the mere right, and not on any collateral question.

For though the attaint seems to have been generally allowed in the reign of

Henry the Second, (A^ at the first introduction of the grand assize (which at

that time might consist of only twelve recognitors, in case they were all unan-

mous), yet subsequent authorities have holden, that no attaint lies on a false

verdict given upon the mere right, either at common law or by statute; because

that is determined by the grand assize, appealed to by the party himself, and

now consisting of sixteen jurors, (i)
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The jury who are to try this false verdict must be twenty-four, and are called

the grand jury; for the law wills not that the oath of one jury of twelve

should be attainted or set aside by an equal number, nor by less indeed than.

double the former, (k) If the matter in dispute be of forty pounds value in

personals, or of forty shillings a year in lands and tenements, then, by statute

15 Hen. VI, c. 5, each grand juror must have freehold to the annual value of

twenty pounds. And he that brings the attaint can give no other evidence to

the grand jury than what was originally given to the petit. For, as their ver-

dict is now trying, and the question is, whether or no they did right upon the

evidence that appeared to them, the law adjudged it the highest absurdity to

r *Ar\A I produce any subsequent proof upon such trial, and to *condemn the prior

' ' J jurisdiction for not believing evidence which they never knew. But

those against whom it is brought are allowed, in affirmance of the first verdict,

to produce new matter: (1) because the petit jury may have formed their verdict

upon evidence of their own knowledge, which never appeared in court, ll the

grand jury found the verdict a false one, the judgment by the common law was,

that the jurors should lose their liberam If gem and become forever in tarn ous;

should forfeit their goods and the profits of their lands ; should themselves be

imprisoned, and their wives and children thrown out of doors; should have

their houses razed, their trees extirpated, and their meadows ploughed; and

that the plaintiff should be restored to all that he lost by reason of the unjust

verdict. But as the severity of this punishment had its usual effect, in prevent-

ing the law from being executed, therefore by the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 24,

revived by 23 Hen. VIII, c. 3, and made perpetual by 13 Eliz. c. 25, an attaint

is allowed to be brought after the death of the party, and a more moderate

punishment was inflicted upon attainted jurors; viz., perpetual infamy, and, if

the cause of action were above 40Z. value, a forfeiture of '201. apiece by the jurors,

or, if under 40Z., then 51. apiece: to be divided between the ting and the party

injured. So that a man may now bring an attaint either upon the statute or at

common law, at his election; (m) and in both of them reverse the former

judgment But the practice of setting aside verdicts upon motion, and grant-

fl>) Bract. I. 4, tr. 1, c. 3i, U 2, S, 4: tr. S, c. 17 ; tr. 5, c. 4, J( 1, 2. Flet. J. S, c. K, » 8. Co. Entv. 61. b.

Booth. 213. (c) Bruct. 4, 1. M. 2. Flel. ibid.

(il) Year-book, 28 Edw. HI, 15,17. Au.jA. 18. Flot. B, 22, 16. (e) L. 5, c. 22, ») 6,16. (f) 3 Insl, 130, -.37.

(g) htat. 1 Edw. III. st. 1. c. B. 5 Edw. Ill, c. 7. 28 EMw. Ill, c. 8. (hj Sec page SS).

(tj Bract. 1. •», tr. 5, c, 4,} 2. Flct. 5.22,7. Britt. 242, b. Year-book, 12 Hen. VI. 6 Bro. Abr. tit. atttint, 42.

IKoll. Abr. 2*1.

(It) Bract. (. t, tr. 5, c. 4, j 2. Flet. I 5, 0. 22, J 7. (I) Finch, L. 486. (m) 3 lust. 1M.
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ing new trials, has so superseded the use of both sorts of attaints, that I have

observed very few instances of an attaint in our books, later than the sixteenth

century, (n) By the old Gothic constitution, indeed, no certificate of a judge

was allowed, in matters of evidence, to countervail the oath of the jury; but

their verdict, however erroneous, was absolutely final and conclusive. Yet there

was a proceeding from whence our attaint may be derived. If, upon a lawful

trial before a superior *tribunal, the jury were found to have given a false r * ,Q- -i

verdict, they were fined, and rendered infamous for the future, (o) ' '

II. The writ of deceit, or action on the case in nature of it, may be brought in

the court of common pleas, to reverse a judgment there had by fraud or collu-

sion in a real action, whereby lands and tenements have been recovered to the

prejudice of him that hath right. (2) But of this enough hath been observed in

a former chapter, (p)

III. An audita querela is where a defendant, against whom judgment is recov-

ered, and who is therefore in danger of execution, or perhaps actually in execu-

tion, may be relieved upon good matter of discharge, which has happened since

the judgment; 'as if the plaintiff hath given him a general release; or if the

defendant hath paid the debt to the plaintiff, without procuring satisfaction to

be entered on the record. In these and the like cases, wherein the defendant

hath good matter to plead, but hath had no opportunity of pleading it (either

at the beginning of the suit, or puis darrein continuance, which, as was shown

in a former chapter, (g) must always be before judgment), and audita querela lies,
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in the nature of a bill in equity, to be relieved against the oppression of the

plaintiff. It is a writ directed to the court, stating that the complaint of the

defendant hath been heard, audita querela defendentis, and then, setting out the

matter of the complaint, it at length enjoins the court to call the parties before

them and, having heard their allegations and proofs, to cause justice to be done

between them, (r) It also lies for bail, when judgment is obtained against them

by scire facias to answer the debt of their principal, and it happens afterwards

that the original judgment against their principal is reversed: for here the bail,

after judgment had against them, have no opportunity to plead this special mat-

ter, and therefore they shall have redress by audita querela; (s) which is a writ

of a most remedial nature, and seems to have been invented, lest in any case

there should *be an oppressive defect of justice, where a party who hath •- # ^Qg -i

a good defence is too late to make it in the ordinary forms of law. But *• •"/

the indulgence now shown by the courts in granting a summary relief upon

motion, in cases of such evident oppression, (t) has almost rendered useless the

writ of audita querela, and driven it quite out of practice. (3)

IV. But, fourthly, the principal method of redress for erroneous judgments in

the king's court of record, is by writ of error to some superior court of appeal.

A writ of error (M) lies for some supposed mistake in the proceedings of a

court of record; for to amend errors in a base court, not of record, a writ

(n) Cro. Eliz. 309. Cro Jnc. 90.

(o) '• Si tnmen mftfnti argvnrnto fatsum jvraste continmntur (id qnod mmHut judicium cof/nosccre

dcbet) mulctantur in famfo, de cretero perjiiri et intextabUes." Stiernh. dentre Qolh. 1. 1, c. 4.

(p) See page 165. (q) See DUKC »16. (rj Finch. L. .|8S. F. N B. 102.

(ij 1 Boll. Abr. 308. (IJ Lord Ruym. 439. (u) Appendix, No. Ill, j«.

(2) Abolished by statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 27.

(3) [Ch. J. Eyre says; " I take it to be the modern practice to interpose in a summary war,

in all cases where the party would bo entitled to relief on an audita querela." 1 Bos. and Pul.

428. In general the courts will not put the defendant to the trouble and expense of an audita

querela, but will relievo him in a summary way on motion : 4 Burr. 2287 ; but where the ground

of his relief is a release, when there is some doubt about the execution, or some matter of fact

•which cannot be clearly ascertained by affidavit, and therefore proper to be tried, the court has

driven the defendant to his andita qnercla. 1 Salk. 93, 264 ; 1 Ld. Raym. 439; 12 Mod. 240; 2

Ld. Rayn. 1295; 2 Stra. 1198 : see also, 5 Taunt. 561 ; 2 Marsh, 37. And indeed the indulgence

which of late has been shown by courts of law in granting summary relief upon motion in most

cases of evident oppression, for which the only remedy was formerly by audita querela, has

occasioned this remedy now to be very rarely resorted to"]

[Equitable defences"arising after lapse of the period during which they could be pleaded may

be set up by way of audita fLucrela. Com. Law Proc. Act, 1854, s. 84.]
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of false judgment lies, (v) The writ of error only lies upon matter of law aris-

ing upon the face of the proceedings; so that no evidence is required to sub-

stantiate or support it: there being no method of reversing an error in the deter-

mination of facts, but by an attaint, or a new trial, to correct the mistakes of the

former verdict. (4)

Formerly, the suitors were much perplexed by writs of error brought upon

very slight and trivial grounds, as mis-spellings and other mistakes of the clerks,

all which might be amended at the common law, while all the proceedings were

in paper; (w) for they were then considered as only in fieri, and therefore sub-

ject to the control of the courts. But, when once the record was made up, it

was formerly held, that by the common law no amendment could be permitted,

unless within the very term in which the judicial act so recorded was done:

for during the term the record is in the breast of the court; but afterwards it

admitted of no alteration, (z) But now the courts are become more liberal;

and, where justice requires it, will allow of amendments at any time while the

suit is depending, notwithstanding the record be made up. and the term be past.

For they at present consider the proceedings as in fieri, till judgment is given ;

F *4071 a therefore that, till then, they have power to permit amendments *by

L -• the common law: but when judgment is once given and enrolled, no

amendment is permitted in any subsequent term. (?/) Mistakes are also effectu-

ally helped by the statutes of amendment and jeofaih: so called, because when

a pleader perceives any slip in the form of his proceedings, and acknowledges
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such error (jeo fails), he is at liberty by those statutes to amend it; which

amendment is seldom actually made, but the benefit of the acts is attained by

the court's overlooking the exception, (z) These statutes are many in number,

and the provisions in them too minute to be here taken notice of otherwise than

by referring to the statutes themselves; (a) by which all trifling exceptions are

so thoroughly guarded against, that writs of error cannot now be maintained,

but for some material mistake assigned. (5)

This is at present the general doctrine of amendments; and its rise and history

are somewhat curious. In the early ages of our jurisprudence, when all plead-

ings were ore tenu.*, if a slip was perceived and objected to by the opposite party,

or the court, the pleader instantly acknowledged his error and rectilied his plea ;

which gave occasion to that length of dialogue reported in the ancient year-

books. So liberal were then the sentiments of the crown as well as the judges,

(v) Finch, L. 484. (tcj Burr. 1099. (x) Co. Lttt. 280. fyj Stnt. 11 Hen. IV, c. 3.

(z) Strn. 1011.

(a) Stat. 14 Eilw. Ill, c. 6. 9 Hen. V, c. 4. 4 Hen. VI, c. 3. 8 Hen. VI, c. 12 and 15. 32 Hen. Vin, c. 30.

IS Kliz. c. 14. 21 Jac. I, c. 13. in ami 17 Car. J I. c. 8 I.M \ l<-.| in 1 Vciitr. 10U, an omnipotent act). 4 and 6

Anne, c. 16. 9 Anne, c. 20. 6 (.<•". I. c. 13.

(4) [A writ of error lies for some error or defect in substance, that is not aided, amendable,

or cured at common law, or by some of the statutes of jeofails. And it lies to the game court

in which the judgment wan given, if it be erroneous in matter of fact only; for error in fact

is not the error of the judges, and reversing it is not reversing their ovm judgment: as where

an infant appeared by attorney instead of guardian, or the plaintiff or defendant at the time

of commencing the suit was a married woman. If a judgment in the king's bench be errone-

ous in matter of fact only, and not in point of law, it may be reversed in the same court by

writ of error coram wo&is'or qua; coram nobis resident; so called from its being founded on the

record and process, which are stated in the writ to remain in the court of the lord the king,

before the king himself. But if the error be in the judgment itself, and not in the process, a

writ of error docs not lie in the same court upon such judgment. 1 Roll. Al>. 746. In the

common pleas, the record and process being stated to remain before the king's justices, the

writ is called a writ of error coram robis, or qua; coram volia resident. On a lodgment against

several parties, the writ ol error must be brought in all their names: 6 Co. 25; 3 Mod. 134 ; 5

id. 16; 1 Ld. Harm. 244 ; 2 id. 1532; 3 Burr 1792; 2 T. R. 737; but if one or more dip, the

survivors may bnug the writ of error: Palm. 151; 1 Stra. 234 ; or if it be brought in the names

of several, and one or more refuse to appear and assign errors, they must be summoned, and

severed, and then the rest may proceed alone. Telv. 4 ; Cro. Eliz. 892; 6 Mod. 40; 1 Stra. 234;

Cas. Temp. Hardw. 135, 136.]

(5) In addition to the statutes referred to by the author in the note, see 9 Geo. IV, c. 15; 3

and 4 Win. IV, c. 42, and the common law procedure act, 1852.
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that in the statute of Wales, made at Eothelan, 12 Edw. I, the pleadings are

directed to be carried on in that principality, "sine calumpnia verborum, non

observata ilia dura consuetudine, qui cadit a ayllaba cadit a iota causa." The

judgments were entered up immediately by the clerks and officers of the court;

and if any misentry was made, it was rectified by the minutes, or by the remem-

brance of the court itself.

When the treatise by Britton was published, in the name and by authority of

the king (probably about the 13 Edw. I, because the last statutes therein re-

ferred to are those of Winchester and Westminster the second), a check seems

intended *to be given to the unwarrantable practices of some judges, , *IAQ "I

who had made false entries on the rolls to cover their owu misbehaviour, *• •*

and had taken upon them by amendments and rasures to falsify their own

records. The king therefore declares, (b) that " although we have granted to

our justices to make record of pleas pleaded before them, yet we will not that

their own record shall be a warranty for their own wrong, nor that they may

rase their rolls, nor amend them, nor record them contrary to their original en-

rolment. The whole of which, taken together, amounts to this, that a record

surreptitiously or erroneously made up, to stifle or pervert the truth, should not

be a sanction for error; and that a record, originally made up according to the

truth of the case, should not afterwards by any private rasure or amendment be

altered to any sinister purpose.

But when afterwards King Edward, on his return from his French dominions
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in the seventeenth year of his reign, after upwards of three years' absence, found

it necessary (or convenient, in order to replenish his exchequer) to prosecute his

judges for their corruption and other malpractices, the perversion of judgment and

other manifold errors, (c) occasioned by their erasing and altering records, were

among the causes assigned for the heavy punishments inflicted upon almost all

the king's justices, even the most able and upright, (d) The severity of which pro-

ceedings *seems so to have alarmed the succeeding judges, that through r „ .,,„ -,

a fear of being said to do wrong, they hesitated at doing what was right. L -I

As it was so hazardous to alter a record duly made up, even from compassionate

motives (as happened in Hengham's case, which in strictness was certainly in-

defensible), they resolved not to touch a record any more; but held that even

palpable errors, when enrolled and the term at an end, were too sacred to be

rectified or called in question: and, because Britton had forbidden all criminal

and clandestine alterations, to make a record speak a falsity, they conceived that

they might not judicially and publicly amend it, to make it agreeable to truth.

In Edward the Third's time, indeed, they once ventured (upon the certificate of

the justice in eyre) to estreat a larger fine than had been recorded by the clerk

of the court below; (e) but instead of amending the clerk's erroneous record,

they made a second enrolment of what the justice had declared ore tenus; and

(b) Brit, proem. 2, 3. (c) Judicia perverterunt, et in alii* erravenmt. Matth. West. A. D. 1239.

(tit Among the other judges, sir Kulph Honghmn, cliiofjiistiee of the king's bench, is said to have been

flneil 7,000 marks; Sir Adam Stratum, chiefbaron of the exchequer, :il,im(i marks: and Thomas \Va\lnnd,

chlefjustice of the common plead, to have been attainted of felony, and to have abjured the realm, with a

forfeiture of all his estates : the whole amonnl of the forfeitures being upwards of 100,000 marks, or 70,0<X)

pounds 13 1'rvn. Rec. 401. 402]—an Incredible sum In those days, before paper credit was In use. and when

the annual sa'larv of a chief justice was only sixty marks. Claut. 6 Edie. 1. m. G. Dngd. Chron. So-. 20. The

charge against Sir ICalph Hcngham (a very learned judge, to whom we are obliged for two excellent treatises

of practice) was oniv. according to a tradition that was current in Kichard the Third's time (Year-book, M.

'-' Kic. 111. Hi i, his aftoring, out of mere compassion, a fine, which was set upon a very poor man, from l.'in.

4*2. to fa. Xd.. for which he was fined 900 marks—a more probable sum than 7,000. It is tnio, the book culls

the judge so punished Inghnm, and not Henyhnmt but I find no Judge of the name of Ingluim in Dngdale's

Scrim; and Sir Edward Coke (4 Inst. 855) anil Sir Matthew Hale (1 1* C. 64H) understand it to have been the

chief justice. And certainly his ofl'enoe (whatever it was) was nothing vi'vy atrocious or disgraceful; for,

though removed from the king's bench at this lime (together with the rest of the judges) we Ilnd him,

about eleven years afterward*, one of the justices in eyre for the general iwrambulatlon of the forest(7?of.

fernmbvl.fortit. in turri Load. V.I Edw. I, m. SI and tlie next year made chief justice of the common pleas

fat. •£> E<lw. I, m. 7; Dudg. Chron. Ser. 32), in which offlco he continued till his death, in 2 Edw. U,

Clna. 1 Edw. II. m. 19. Pat. 2. Kdw. II, p. 1, m. 0. Dndg. 34. Selden. prof, to Hengham. There is an

appendix to this tradition, remembered by Justice Southcote in the reign of Queen Elizabeth d Inst. 72; 4

Inst. 255), that with this fine of Chief Justice Hengham a clock-house was built at Westminster, and fur-

nished with a clock, to bo heard into Westminster hall. Upon which story I shall only remark that (what-

ever early instances may be found of the private exertion of mechanical genius in constructing horologicul

machines) clocks came not into common use till a hundred years afterwards, about the end of the fburtueuUi

century. Enryclopetlie. tit. Horloge, HJltjm. Fad. KX). Durham's Artif. (Jlockmakei, 91.

(ej I Hal. P. C. W7.

253

409 PROCEEDINGS IN NATURE OF APPEALS. [Book III.

left it to be settled by posterity in which of the two rolls that absolute verity

resides, which every record is said to import in itself. (/) And, in the reign of

Richard the Second, there are instances (g) of their refusing to amend the most

palpable errors and mis-entries, unless by the authority of parliament

To this real sullenness, but affected timidity, of the judges, such a narrowness

of thinking was added, that every slip (even of a syllable or letter), (It) was now

held to be fatal to the pleader, and overturned his client's cause. (»') If they durst

F *4101 *no*;' or would not, set right mere formal mistakes or any time, upon.

L J equitable terms and conditions, they at least should have held, that

trifling objections were at all times inadmissible; and that more solid exceptions

in point of form came too late when the merits had been tried. They might,

through a decent degree of tenderness, have excused themselves from amending

in criminal, and especially in capital, cases. They needed not have granted an

amendment, where it would work an injustice to either party; or where he could

not be put in as good a condition, as if his adversary had made no mistake. And,

if it was feared that an amendment after trial might subject the jury to au

attaint, how easy was it to make waving the attaint the condition of allowing

the amendmen t! And yet these were among the absurd reasons alleged for never

Buffering amendments at all! (k)

The precedents then set were afterwards most religiously followed, (I) to the

great obstruction of justice, and ruin of the suitors: who have formerly suffered

as much by this scrupulous obstinacy and literal strictness of the courts, as they
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could have done even by their iniquity. After verdicts and judgments upon the

merits, they were frequently reversed for slips of the pen or mis-spellings; and

justice was perpetually entangled in a net of mere technical jargon. The legis-

lature hath therefore been forced to interpose, by no less than twelve statutes, to

remedy these opprobrious niceties: and its endeavours have been of late so well

seconded by judges of a more liberal cast, that this unseemly degree of strictness

is almost entirely eradicated: and will, probably in a few years, be no more

remembered than the learning of essoigns and defaults, or the counter-pleas of

voucher, are at present But to return to our writs of error.

If a writ of error be brought to reverse any judgment of an inferior court of

record, where the damages are less than ten pounds; or if it is brought to reverse

the judgment of any superior court after verdict, he that brings the writ, or that

is plaintiff in error, must (except in some peculiar cases) find substantial pledges

F *4111 °^ Prosecut*on or bail: (n) to prevent *delays by frivolous pretences to

L J appeal; and for securing payment of costs and damages, which are now-

payable by the vanquished party in all, except a few particular instances, by

virtue of the several statutes cited in the margin, (n)

A writ of error lies from the inferior courts of record in England into the

king's bench, (o) and not into the common pleas, (p) Also from the king's

bench in Ireland to the king's bench in England. It likewise may be brought

from the common pleas at Westminster to the king's bench; and then from the

king's bench the cause is removable to the house of lords. From proceedings

on the law side of the exchequer a writ of error lies into the court of exchequer

chamber before thfe lord chancellor, lord treasurer, and the judges of the court

of king's bench and common pleas; and from thence it lies to the house of

peers. From proceedings in the king^s bench, in debt, detinue, covenant,

account, case, ejectment, or trespass, originally begun therein by bill (except

where the king is party), it lies to the exchequer chamber, before the justices of

the common pleas and barons of the exchequer; and from thence also to the

house of lords; (q) but where the proceedings in the king's bench do not first

commence therein by bill, but by original writ sued out of chancery, (r) this

(f) 1 Leon. 188. Co. Litt. 117. Seepage 331. (g) 1 Hal. P. C. MS. (h} Stat. H Edw. IH, c. 6.

(il In those days It was strictly true, what Rnggle (in his Jgnoramut) has humorously applied to more

mocfern pleadings •—" tn nattra lege unum commit everttt totmn ptacitum."

(k) Styl M7 (1) 8 Hep. 15B. Ac.

(ml Stat 3 Jae. I, o. 8. IS Car. II, o. S. 18 and 17 Car. n, o. 8. 19 Geo. Ill, c. 70.

(n) 3 Hen. VII, o. 10. IS Car. II, o. S. 8 ami il Wm. III. c. 11. 4 and 6 Aline, e. IB.

(o) See ch. 4. (pj Finch, L. ISO. Dyer, 250. (qj Stat. 27 Eliz. o. 8. (r) See page 43.
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takes the case out of the general mle laid down by the statute; (s) so that the

writ of error then lies, without any intermediate state of appeal, directly to the

house of lords, the dernier resort for the ultimate decision of every civil

action. (6) Each court of appeal, in their respective stages, may, upon hearing

the matter of la*w in which the error is assigned, reverse or affirm the judgment

of the inferior courts, but none of them are final, save only the house of peers,

to whose judicial decisions all other tribunals must therefore submit and con-

form their own. And thus much for the reversal or affirmance of judgments at

law, by writs in the nature of appeals. (7)

CHAPTER XXVI.

OF EXECUTION.

IF the regular judgment of the court, after the decision of the suit, be not

suspended, superseded, or reversed, by one or other of the methods mentioned in

the two preceding chapters, the next and last step is the execution of that judg-

ment ; or putting the sentence of the law in force. This is performed in different

manners, according to the nature of the action upon which it is founded, and

of the judgment which is had or recovered.

If the plaintiff recovers in an action real or mixed, whereby the seisin or pos-

session of land is awarded to him, the writ of execution shall be an habere facias

seisinam, or writ of seisin, of a freehold ; or an habere facias posscssionem, or

writ of possession, (a) of a chattel interest. (J) These are writs directed to the

sheriff of the county, commanding him to give actual possession to the plaintiff

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:03 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of the land so recovered: in the execution of which the sheriff may take with

him the posse comitatus, or power of the county; and may justify breaking open

doors, if the possession be not quietly delivered. But, if it be peaceably yielded

up, the delivery of a twig, a turf, or the ring of the door, in the name of seisin,

is sufficient execution of the writ. Upon a presentation to a benefice recovered

l«) 1 Roll. Rep. 284. 1 Sid. 424. 1 Snund. 340. Caith. 180. Comb. 295.

(a) Appendix. No. II, i 4. (i) Fiuuh, L. 470.

(6) But now, by statute 1 Win. IV, c. 70, and the common law procedure act, 1852, error

upon any judgment of the queen's bench, common pleas or exchequer, must be brought in the

exchequer chamber before the judges, or judges and barons as the case may be, of the other

two courts, whence it again lies to the house of lords.

(7) This appeal is taken away by 23 Geo. Ill, c. 21. See book I, p. 104, n. 15. Since the

union, however, a writ of error lies from the superior courts in Ireland to the house of lords.

Before the union with Scotland, a writ of error lay not within this country upon any judgment in

Scotland ; but it is since given by statute 6 Ann. c. 26, s. 12, from the court of exchequer in

Scotland, returnable in parliament. And see the 48 Geo. Ill, c. 151, concerning appeals to the

house of lords from the court of session in Scotland.

[In this chapter Sir W. Blackstone has considered only the modes by which a judgment may

be reversed by writ of error brought in a court of appeal, and has stated that this can only be

done for error in law. There is, however, a proceeding to reverse a judgment by writ of error in,

the same court, where the error complained of is in fact and not in law, and whore of cour.se uo

fault is imputed to the court in pronouncing its judgment. This writ is called the writ coram

nobtg, or coram vobis, according as the proceedings are in the king's bench or common pleas,

because the record is stated to remain before us (the king), if in the former, and before yon

(the judges), if in the latter, and is .not removed to another court. In this proceeding it is of

course necessary to suggest a new fact upon the record from which the error in the first judg-

ment will appear; thus, supposing the defendant, being an infant, has appeared by attorney

instead of guardian, it will be necessary to suggest the fact of his infancy, of which the court

was not before informed. There is, therefore, no inconsistency in bringing this writ of error

before the same judges who pronounced the judgment in the first instance, because they are

required to pronounce upon a new state of facts, without impeachment of the former judgment

on the facto as they then stood.]
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F *413 1 *n a yuare impedit, or assize of darrein presentment, *the execution is

I J by a writ de clerico admittendo ; directed, not to the sheriff, but to the

bishop or archbishop, and requiring him to admit and institute the clerk of the

plaintiff.

In other actions, where the judgment is that something in special be done or

rendered by the defendant, then, in order to compel him so to do, and to see the

judgment executed, a special writ of execution issues to the sheriff, according

to the nature of the case. As, upon an assize of nuisance, or quod permittat

prvttterncre, where one part of the judgment is qaod nocumentum amoveatur,

a writ goes to the sheriff to abate it at the charge of the party, which likewise

issues even in case of an indictment, (c) (1) Upon a replevin, the writ of exe-

cution is the writ de retorno habendo: (d) and, if the distress be eloigned, the

defendant shall have a capias in withernam; (e) but on the plaintiff's tendering

the damages and submitting to a fine, the process in withernam shall be stayed,(/)

In detinue, after judgment, the plaintiff shall have a distriiwas, to compel the

defendant to deliver the goods, by repeated distresses of his chattels: (g) or else

a scire facias against any third person in whose hands they ma^ happen to be,

to show cause why they should not be delivered: and if the defendant still

continues obstinate, then (if the judgment hath been by default or on demurrer)

the sheriff shall summon an inquest to ascertain the value of the goods, and the

plaintiffs damages: which (being either so assessed, or by the verdict in case

of an issue), (h) shall be levied on the person or goods of the defendant So that,
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after all, in replevin and detinue (the only actions for recovering the specific

possession of personal chattels), if the wrongdoer be very perverse, he cannot

be compelled to a restitution of the identical thing taken or detained; but he

still has his election to deliver the goods or their value: (i) an imperfection in

the law, that results from the nature of personal property, which is easily con-

cealed or conveyed out of the reach of justice, and not always amenable to the

magistrate.

f *4141 *Executions in actions where money only is recovered, as a debt or

' : -I damages (and not any specific chattel), are of five sorts : either against

the body of the defendant; or against his goods and chattels; or against his

foods and the profits of his lands; or against his goods and the possession of

is lands; or against all three, his body, lands, and goods.

1. The first of these species of execution is by writ of capias ad safisfacicn-

dum; (f) which addition distinguishes it from the former capias ad respond-

endum, which lies to compel an appearance at the beginning of the suit. And,

properly speaking, this cannot be sued out against any but such as were liable

to be taken upon the former capias, (k) The intent of it is, to imprison the

body of the debtor till satisfaction be made for the debt, costs, and damages :

it therefore doth not lie against any privileged persons, peers, or members of

parliament, nor against executors or administrators, nor against such other

persons as could not be originally held to bail. And Sir Edward Coke also gives

us a singular instance, (1) where a defendant in 14 Edw. Ill was discharged from

a capias, because he was of so advanced an age, quod poenam imprisonnmeiiti

siibire non potest. If an action be brought against an husband and wife for the

debt of the wife when sole, and the plaintiff recovers judgment, the capias shall

issue to take both husband and wife in execution: (in) but if the action was

originally brought against herself when sole, and pending the suit she marries,

the capias shall be awarded against her only, and not against her husband, (n)

Yet, if judgment be recovered against an husband and wife for the contract,

(c) Comb. 10. lit) See page ISO. (e) See page 149. ' (/) 2 Leon. 174.

(at 1 Koll Abr. 737. Raat.Entr.S15. (A) Bro. Abr. tit. damage*, 29. i<i Kcilw. li*.

O) Appendix. No. Ill, ( 7. (t) 3 Hep. 12. Moor. 7(i7. (1) 1 lust. 289.

(m) Moor. 704. {») Cro. Jac. 333.

(1) [That is, if it be stated in the indictment that the nnixanee in still existing. If it does

not appear in the indictment that the nuisance was then in eiistence, it would be absurd to give

judgment to abate a nuisance which does not exist, 8 T. K. 144.]
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nay, even for the personal misbehaviour (0) of the wife during her coverture, the

capia-s shall issue against the hushand only: which is one of the many great

privileges of English wives. (2)

*The writ of capias ad satufaciendum is an execution of the highest r „,, , -•

nature, inasmuch as it deprives a man of his liberty, till he makes the *• ' ••

satisfaction awarded; and therefore, when a man is once taken in execution upon

this writ, no other process can be sued out against his lands or goods. Only

by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 24, if the defendant dies, while charged in execution

upon this writ, the plain tiff may, after his death, sue out a new execution against

his lands, goods, or chattels. The writ is directed to the sheriff, commanding

him to take the body of the defendant and have him at Westminster on a day

therein named, to make the plaintiff satisfaction for his demand. And, if he

does not then make satisfaction, he must remain in custody till he does. This

writ may be sued out, as may all other executory process, for costs, against a

plaintiff as well as a defendant, when judgment is had against him. (3)

When a defendant is once in custody upon process, he is to be kept in arcta

et salva cuslodia: and if he be afterwards seen at large, it is an escape; and the

plaintiff may have an action thereupon against the sheriff for his whole debt.

For though, upon 'arrests, and what is called mesne process, being such as inter-

venes between the commencement and end of a suit, (p) the sheriff, till the stat-

ute 8 and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 27, might have indulged the defendant as he pleased, so

as he produced him in court to answer the plaintiff at the return of the writ: yet,
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upon a taking in execution, he could never give any indulgence; for, in that case,

confinement is the whole of the debtor's punishment, and of the satisfaction made

to the creditor. Escapes are either voluntary, or negligent. Voluntary are such

as are by the express consent of the keeper; after which he never can retake his

prisoner again (q) (though the plaintiff may retake him at any time), (r) but

the sheriff must answer for the debt Negligent escapes are where the prisoner

escapes without his keeper's knowledge or consent; and then upon fresh pursuit

the defendant may *be retaken, and the sheriff shall be excused, if he has r ^.-. /> -i

him again before any action brought against himself for the escape, (s) "- J

A rescue of a prisoner in execution, either going to gaol or in gaol, or a breach

of prison, will not excuse the sheriff from being guilty of and answering for the

escape; for he ought to have sufficient force to Keep him, since he may command

the power of the county, (t) But by statute 32 Geo. II, c. 28, if a defendant,

charged in execution for any debt not exceeding 1001. will surrender all his effects

to his creditors (except his apparel, bedding, and tools of his trade, not amount-

ing in the whole to the value of 101.), and will make oath of his punctual com-

pliance with the statute, the prisoner may be discharged, unless the creditor in-

sists on detaining him; in which case he shall allow him 2s. 4rf. per week, to be

paid on the first day of every week, and on failure of regular payment the prisoner

(o) Cro. Car. 513. (p) See pagre 279. fqJS Hop. 62. 1 Sid. 330.

(r) Stat 8 and 0 Wm. HI. c. 27. (i) F. N. B. 130. ftj Cro. Jao. 418.

(2) [There arc many cases in which the defendant may be taken in execution after judgment,

though he could not be arrested at the commencement of the suit; but it is an universal rule

that, whenever a capias is allowed on mesne process before judgment, it may be had upon the

judgment itself. 3 Salk. 286 ; 3 Co. 12. ]

A great change has been effected in the law of England regarding imprisonment for debt

since these commentaries were written, and now it is not allowed in actions on contracts, except

in cases of fraud. See statutes 1 and 2 Vic. c. 110; 5 and 6 Tic. c. 116; 7 and 8 Vic. c. 9ti;

and 32 and 33 Vic c. 62.

(3) Taking the body of the defendant in execution suspends the lien of the judgment. Jack-

feon t'. Benedict, 13 Johns. 533. If the plaintiff gives the defendant, when in execution, permis-

sion to go at large, the judgment is discharged, and he will have no remedy either agaiust the

defendant or the sheriff. Blackburn ». Stunart, 2 East, 243 ; Yates ». Van Rensselaer, 5 Johns.

364 : Puncher ». Holley, 3 Wend. 184. And this irrespective of the intention of the plaintiff, or

of any violation by the defendant of any understanding on which he was discharged. Id. The

same principle is applicable if one of several defendants is discharged by the plaintiff. Ransom v.

Keyes, 9 Cow. 128.
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shall be discharged. Yet the creditor may at any future time have execution

against the lands and goods of such defendant, though never more against his

person. And, on the other hand, the creditors may, as in ease of bankruptcy,

compel (under pain of transportation for seven years) such debtor charged m

execution for any debt under 100Z. to make a discovery and surrender of all

his effects for their benefit, whereupon be is also entitled to the like discharge of

his person.

If a capias ad satisfaciendum is sued out, and a non est inventits is returned

thereon, the plaintiff may sue out a process against the bail, if any were given :

who, we may remember, stipulated in this triple alternative, that the defendant

should, if condemned in the suit, satisfy the plaintiff his debt and costs; or that

he should surrender himself a prisoner ; or, that they would pay it for him : as

therefore the two former branches of the alternative are neither of them com-

plied with, the latter must immediately take place. («) In order to which a writ

of tscire facias may be sued out against the bail, commanding them to show cause

F *417 1 w^7 ^e P^a'nt'ff should not have execution against them for bis *debt

*• * and damages ; and on such writ, if they show no sufficient cause, or the

defendant does not surrender himself on the day of the return, or of showing

cause (for afterwards is not sufficient), the plaintiff may have judgment against

the bail, and take out a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum, or other process of

execution against them.

2. The next species of execution is against the goods and chattels of the de-
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fendant; and is called a writ of fieri facias, (w) from the words in it where the

sheriff is commanded, quad fieri facial de bonis, that he cause to be made of the

goods and chattels of the defendant the sum or debt recovered. (4) This lies as

well against privileged persons, peers, &c., as other common persons ; and against

executors or administrators, with regard to the goods of the deceased. The

sheriff may not break open any outer door, (x) to execute either this, or the

former writ : but must enter peaceably ; and may then break open any inner

door, belonging to the defendant, in order to take the goods, (y) And he may

sell the goods and chattels (even an estate for years, which is a chattel real) (z)

of the defendant, till he has raised enough to satisfy the judgment and costs ;

first paying the landlord of the premises, upon which the goods are found, the

arrears of rent then due, not exceeding one year's rent in the whole: (a) If part

only of the debt be levied on a fieri facias, the plaintiff may have a capias ad

satixfaciendum for the residue, (b) (5)

3. A third species of execution is by writ of levari facia*; which affects a

man's goods and the prqfifx of his lauds, by commanding the sheriff to levy the

plaintiff's debt on the lands and goods of the defendant : whereby the sheriff

may seize all his goods, and receive the rents and profits of his lands, till satis-

f *418 1 ' 5 ma(le *° the plaintiff, (c) Little use *is now made of this

L J writ ; the remedy by elegit, which takes possession of the lands them-

selves, being much more effectual. But of this species is a writ of execution proper

only to ecclesiastics; which is given when the sheriff, upon a common writ of

execution sued, returns that the defendant is a beneficed clerk, not having any

(u) Uitif . IW9-1J73 (tt) Appeitill*, tfo. in, » 7. fx) ft Rep 91 (y) Pnlm. M. (*} 8 Rep. 171.

fa) SUt. 8 Anne, c. It. (b) I Roil. Abr. KM. Cro. Eli*. XU, Co; Finch, L. 471.

(4) [If, upon a judgment in tort, against two or more, execution be levied for the whole dam-

apes upon one only (1 Camp. 343), that one cannot recover a moiety against the other for has

contribution ; but he may maintain an action for the moioty, if the original action were founded

upon contract. 8 T. B. 156 ; nee also 2 Camp. 45'2.]

(5) A levy npon »ufncient personal property to satisfy the judgment is a temporary bar to

further execution or suit, and will amount to satisfaction unless it fail, in whole or in part, with-

out the fault of the plaintiff. Green v. Burke, 23 Wend. 490. See Ladd v. Blunt, 4 Mass. 40-2 ;

Webb ». Bumpass, 9 Port. 201 ; P. aud M. Bank t>. Kingsley, 2 Doug. Mich. 379. If the de-

fendant is allowed tx> retain the property, it is no satisfaction. Peck ». Tiffany, 2 N. Y. 451.

Or if it is taken from the sheriff by due course of law. Alexander v. Polk, 39 Miss. 737. A

levy npon real property is not a satisfaction. Ladd ». Blunt, gupra; Shcpard ». Kowo, 14 Wend.

2GO. White v. Graves, 15 Texas, 183.
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lay fee. In this case a writ goes to the bishop of the diocese, in the nature of

a levari or fieri facias,(d) to levy the debt and damages de bonis ecclesiasticis,

which are not to be touched by lay hands: and thereupon the bishop sends out

a sequestration of the profits of the clerk's benefice, directed to the church-

wardens, to collect the same and pay them to the plaintiff, till the full sum be

raised.(«)

4. The fourth species of execution is by the writ of elegit; which is a judi-

cial writ given by the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 18, either upon a judg-

ment for a debt, or damages; or upon the forfeiture of a recognizance taken in

the king's court. By the common law a man could only have satisfaction of

goods, chattels, and the present profits of lands, by the two last-mentioned writs

of fieri facias, or levari facias ; but not the possession of the lands themselves;

which was a natural consequence of the feudal principles, which prohibited the

alienation, and of course the incumbering of the fief with the debts of the

owner. And, when the restriction of alienation began to wear away, the conse-

quence still continued; and no creditor could take the possession of lands, but

only levy the growing profits: so that, if the defendant aliened his lands, the

plaintiff was ousted of his remedy. The statute therefore granted this writ

(called an elegit, because it is in the choice or election of the plaintiff whether

he will sueoutthis writ or one of the former), by which the defendant's goods

and chattels are not sold, but only appraised; and all of them (except oxen and

beasts of the plough) are delivered to the plaintiff, at such reasonable appraise-
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ment and price, in part of satisfaction of his debt. If the goods are not suffi-

cient, then the moiety or "one-half of his freehold lands, which he had r + ...„ -,

at the time of the judgment given,(/) whether held in his own name, "• '

or by any other in trust for him (ff) are also to be delivered to the plaintiff; to

hoM, till out of the rents and profits thereof the debt be levied, or till the

defendant's interest be expired; as till the death of the defendant, if he be

tenant for life or in tail. During this period the plaintiff is called tenant by

elegit, of whom we spoke in a former part of these Commentaries^/*) We there

observed that till this statute, by the ancient common law, lauds were not liable

to be charged with, or seized for, debts; because by these means the connexion

between lord and tenant might be destroyed, fraudulent alienations might be

made, and the services be transferred to be performed by a stranger; provided

the tenant incurred a large debt, sufficient to cover the land. And therefore,

even by this statute, only one-half was, and now is, subject to execution; that

out of the remainder sufficient might be left for the lord to distrain upon for his

services. And upon the same feudal principle, copyhold lauds are at this day

not liable to be taken in execution upon a judgment.(z)(6) But, in case of a

debt to the king, it appears by mayna carta, c. 8, that it was allowed by the

common law for him to take possession of the lands till the debt was paid.

For he, being the grand superior and ultimate proprietor of all landed estates,

might seize the lauds into his own hands, if any thing was owing from the vassal;

and could not be said to be defrauded of his services when the ouster of the

vassal proceeded from his own command. This execution, or seizing of lands

by elegit, is of so high a nature, that after it the body of the defendant cannot

be taken : but if execution can only be had of the goods, because there are no

lands, and such goods are not sufficient to pay the debt, a capias ad satisfacien-

dum may then be had after the eUgit; for such elegit is in this case no more in

fdj BegMr. OHg. 300, jtulie. 22. 2 Inst. 4. ft} 2 Barn. Eccl. Law, 349. (f) 2 Inst 395.

fgj Stat 2» Car. II, c. 3. (\) Book H, ch. 10. (1) 1 ItoU. Abr. 868.

(6) [By statute 1 and '2 Vic., c. 110, a great alteration has been made in the law in this respcc-t.

B\- section 11 the sheriff is empowered to deliver unto the judgment creditor all lands, tene-

ments and hereditaments, including thoae of copyhold or customary tenure, which the person

against whom execution is so sued out, or any person in trust for him, shall have been seized or

possessed of at the time of entering upon the judgment, or over which the judgment debtor at

the time has, or at any time afterward shall have, a disposing power capable of being exercised

fbrhis ovrn beuelit]
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effect than a fieri facias.(j) So that body and goods rimy be taken in execn-

1 *4201 ^on> or 'anc^ a .i?00^8» but u°t body *and land too, upon any judg-

J J ment between subject and subject in the course of the common law. But,

5. Upon some prosecutions given by statute; as in the case of recognizances for

debts acknowledged on statutes merchant, or statutes staple (pursuant to the

statutes 13 Edw. I, de mercatoribus, and 27 Edw. Ill, c. 9); upon forfeiture of

these, the body, lands and goods may all be taken at once in execution, to com-

pel the payment of the debt. The process hereon is usually called an extent, or

extendi facias, because the sheriff is to cause the lands, &c., to be appraised to

their full extended value, before he delivers them to the plaintiff, that it may be

certainly known how soon the debt will be satisfied.(*;) And by statute 33

Hen. VIII, c. 39, all obligations made to the king shall have the same force, and

of consequence the same remedy to recover them, as a statute staple; though

indeed, before this statute, the king was entitled to sue out execution against

the body, lands and goods of his accountant or debtor.(Z) And his debt shall,

in suing out execution, be preferred to that of any other creditor, who hath not

obtained judgment before the king commenced his suit.(w) The king's judg-

ment also affects all lands which the king's debtor hath at or after the time of

contracting his debt, or which any of his officers mentioned in the statute 13

Eliz. c. 4, hath at or after the time of his entering on the office: so that if,

such officer of the crown aliens for a valuable consideration, the land shall be

liable to the king's debt even in the hands of a bonafide purchaser; though the
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debt due to the king was contracted by the vendor many years after the aliena-

tion, (re) Whereas judgments between subject and subject related, even at com-

mon law, no farther back than the first day of the term in which they were re-

covered, in respect of the lauds of the debtor; and did not bind his goods and

chattels, but from the date of the writ of execution: and now, by the statute of

frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, the judgment shall not bind the land in the hands of a

F *4211 boiia *Jide purchaser, but only from the day of actually signing the

' -" same : which is directed by the statute to be punctually entered on the

record; nor shall the writ of execution bind the goods in the hands of a

stranger, or the purchaser.(o) but only from the actual delivery of the writ to the

sheriff or other officer, who is therefore ordered to endorse on the back of it the

dav of his receiving the same.

These are the methods which the law of England has pointed out for the ex-

ecution of judgments: and when the plaintiff's demand is satisfied, either by

the voluntary payment of the defendant, or by this compulsory process, or

otherwise, satisfaction ought to be entered on the record, that the defendant

may not be liable to be thereafter harassed a second time on the same account.

But all these writs of execution must be sued out within a year and a day after

the judgment is entered ; otherwise the court concludes prima facie that the

judgment is satisfied and extinct: yet, however, it will grant a writ of scire

facias in pursuance of statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 45, for the defendant to

show cause why the judgment should not be revived, and execution had against

him; to which the defendant may plead such matter as he has to allege, in

order to show why process of execution should not be issued: or the plaintiff

may still bring an action of debt, founded on this dormant judgment, which

was the only method of revival allowed by the common law.( »)(7)

In this manner are the several remedies given by the Euglisn law for all sorts

of injuries, either real or personal, administered by the several courts of justice,

(}) Hoh. 58. (kj F. N. B. 131. (1) 3 Rep. 12. (mi Stat. 32 Hen. V1IL o. 39, i I«.

(n) 10 Hep. 55, 56. (o) Skin. 257. ffj Co. Utt. 490.

(7) [Bat the •writ of scire facias for the ordinary purpose of reviving a judgment is retained.

Bnriiijt the lives of the parties to a judgment, or those of them during whose lives execution

may at present issue within a year and a day, without a scire facias, and within six rears from

the recovery of the judgment, execution may now, however, issue without revival of the judg-

ment. Com. Law ljroc. Act, \&i, $ lid.]
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and their respectrre officers. In the course, therefore, of the present book, we

have, first, seen and considered the nature of remedies, by the mere act of the

parties, or mere operation of law, without any suit in courts. We have next

taken a review of remedies, by suit or action in courts: and therein have con-

templated, first, the nature and species of courts, instituted for the redress of

injuries in general; and then have shown in what particular courts application

must be made for the redress of particular injuries, or the doctrine of jurisdic-

tions and *cognizance. We afterwards proceed to consider the nature r HAW 1

and distribution of wrongs and injuries affecting every species of per- •-

eonal and real rights, with the respective remedies by suit, which the law of the

land has afforded for every possible injury. And, lastly, we have deduced and

pointed out the method and progress of obtaining such remedies in the courts

of justice: proceeding from the first general complaint or original writ, through

all the stages of process, to compel the defendant's appearance; and of pleading,

or formal allegation on the one side, and excuse or denial on the other; with

the examination of the validity of such complaint or excuse, upon demurrer;

or the truth of the facts alleged and denied, upon issue joined, and its several

trials; to the judgment or sentence of the law, with respect to the nature and

amount of the redress to be specifically given : till after considering the suspen-

sion of that judgment by writs in the nature of appeals, we have arrived at its

final execution; which puts the party in specific possession of his right by the

intervention of ministerial officers, or else gives him an ample satisfaction,
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either by equivalent damages, or by the confinement of his body who is guilty

of the injury complained of.

This care and circumspection in the law,—in providing that no man's right

shall be affected by any legal proceeding without giving him previous notice,

and yet that the debtor shall not by receiving such notice take occasion to escape

from justice; in requiring that every complaint be accurately and precisely

ascertained in writing, and be as pointedly and exactly answered; in clearly

stating the question either of law or of fact; in deliberately resolving the former

after full argumentative discussion, and indisputably fixing the latter by a dili-

gent and impartial trial; in correcting such errors as may have arisen m either

of those modes of decision, from accident, mistake, or surprise; and in finally

enforcing the judgment, when nothing can be alleged to impeach it;—this

anxiety to maintain and restore to every individual the enjoyment of his civil

rights, without intrenching upon those of any other individual in the nation,

this parental solicitude *which pervades our whole legal constitution, is r * .^ -,

the genuine offspring of that spirit of equal liberty which is the singular >• '"'' '

felicity of Englishmen. At the same time it must be owned to have given a

handle, in some degree, to those complaints of delay in the practice of trie law,

which are not wholly without foundation, but are greatly exaggerated beyond

the truth. There may be, it is true, in this, as in all other departments of

knowledge, a few unworthy professors: who study the science of chicane and

sophistry rather than of truth and justice; and who to gratify the spleen, the

dishonesty, and wilfulness of their clients, may endeavor to screen the guilty,

by an unwarrantable use of those means which were intended to protect the in-

nocent. But the frequent disappointments and the constant discountenance,

that they meet with in the courts of justice, have confined these men (to the

honor of this age be it spoken) both in number and reputation to indeed a very

despicable compass.

Yet some delays there certainly are, and must unavoidably be, in the con-

duct of a suit, however desirous the parties and their agents may be to come to

a speedy determination. These arise from the same original causes as were-

mentioned in examining a former complaint; (q) from liberty, property, civility,

commerce, and an extent of populous territory : which, whenever we are willing

to exchange for tyranny, poverty, barbarism, idleness and a barren desert, we

may then enjoy the same dispatch of causes that is so highly extolled in some

(q) See page 327.
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foreign countries. But common sense and a little experience will convince us

that more time and circumspection are requisite in causes, where the suitors hare

valuable and permanent rights to lose, than where their property is trivial and

precarious, and what the law gives them to-day, may be seized by their prince

to-morrow. In Turkey, says Montesquieu (r) where little regard is shown to

the lives or fortunes of the subject, all causes are quickly decided: the basha,

on a summary hearing, orders which party he pleases to be bastinadoed, and

F *4241 ^en sen<^8 them about their business. But in *free states, the trouble,

' •" expense, and delays of judicial proceedings are the price that every sub-

ject pays for his liberty: and in all governments, he adds, the formalities of law

increase in proportion to the value which ia set on the honour, the fortune, the

liberty, and life of the subject.

From these principles it might reasonably follow, that the English courts

should be more subject to delays than those of other nations; as they set a

greater value on life, on liberty, and on property. But it is our peculiar felicity

to enjoy the advantage, and yet be exempted from a proportionable share of

the burthen. For the course of the civil law, to which most other nations conform

their practice, is much more tedious than ours; for proof of which I need only

appeal to the suitors of those courts in England where the practice of the

Roman law is allowed in its full extent. And particularly in France, not only

our Fortescue («) accuses (on his own knowledge) their courts of most unexam-

pled delays in administering justice; but even a writer of their own (t) has not
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scrupled to testify that there were in his time more causes there depending

than in all Europe besides, and some of them a hundred years old. But (not to

enlarge on the prodigious improvements which have been made in the celerity

of justice by the disuse of real actions, by the statutes of amendment and jeo-

fails, (u) and by other more modern regulations, which it now might be indeli-

cate to remember, but which posterity will never forget) the time and attendance

afforded by the judges in our English courts are also greater than those of many

other countries. In the Roman calendar there were in the whole year but

twenty eight-judicial or triverbial (w) days allowed to the praetor fordeciding

causes: (a;) whereas, with us, one-fourth of the year is term time in which three

courts constantly sit for the dispatch of matters of law; besides the very close

P 4.a- -i attendance of the court of chancery for determining *suits in equity,

L J and the numerous courts of assize and nisi prius that sit in vacation for

the trial of matters of fact Indeed, there is no other country in the known

world, that hath an institution so commodious and so adapted to the dispatch

of causes, as our trial by jury in those courts for the decision of facts; in no

other nation under heaven does justice make her progress twice in each year

into almost every part of the kingdom, to decide upon the spot, by the voice of

the people themselves, the disputes of the remotest provinces.

And here this part of our Commentaries, which regularly treats only of re-

dress at the common law, would naturally draw to a conclusion. But, as the

proceedings in the courts of equity are very different from those at common law,

and as those courts are of a very general and extensive jurisdiction, it is in some

measure a branch of the task I have undertaken, to give the student some

general idea of the forms of practice adopted by these courts. These will, there-

fore, be the subject of the ensuing chapter.

(r) Sp. It. b. 6, c. 2. (») Df Lmnl. LL, c. 53. (t) Bodln. de republ. I. 8, c. R. (n) See page 407.

(w> Otherwise called diet fasti in quibut licebatprectorifari tria verba, do, dim, addiao. Catn. Lex. 285.

(x) Si>elman of the Terms, f i, c. 4.
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CHAPTER XXVII.

OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS OF EQUITY.

BEFORE we enter on the proposed subject of the ensuing chapter, viz., the na-

imre and method of proceedings in the courts of equity, (1) it will be proper to

recollect the observations which were made in the beginning of this book (a) on

the principal tribunals of that kind, acknowledged by the constitution of Eng-

(a) PaKM 46, 60, 78.

(1) [That the courts of equity and courts of law are not opposed to each other, and often con-

cur in the exercise of their powers, to promote the ends of substantial justice, is not now dis-

puted. It is said that matters of fact should be left to courts of law for the decision of a jury :

1 Ridgway's Par!. Car. 3; and issues are oftentimes directed for that purpose; yet " there is no

doubt," says Lord Bldon, "that according to the constitution of this court, it may take upon

itself the decision of every fact put in issue upon the record." And again, " This court has a

right {to be exercised very tenderly and sparingly) of deciding without issues." 9 Ves. 168.

The general rule is, that a court <rf equity will never exorcise jurisdiction over criminal proceed-

ings. Yet in a ca.se where the plaintiffs indicted defendant's agent at the sessions, where the

plaintifl's themselves were judges, for a Drench of the peace, Lord Hardwicke made an order to

restrain the prosecution till after hearing of the cause and further order; and where a bill is

brought to quiet possession, if the plaintiff afterwards prefer an indictment for forcible entry, this

court will stop the proceedings upon such indictment. 2 Atk. 302. The court of chancery has

no jurisdiction to prevent a crime, except in the protection of infants. Therefore, it is said, that

the publication of a libel cannot be restrained: 2 Swanst. 413. Nor will the court compel a dU-
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coverv in aid of criminal proceedings. 2 Ves. 398. The court of chancery has a concurrent

jurisdiction with the admiralty : Gilb. Eq. Rep. SS8; and may repeal letters of reprisal, after a

peace, though there is a clause in the patent that no treaty of peace shall prejudice it. 1 Vern.

54. So equity may relieve after verdict in K. B. or C. P., and even grant a perpetual injunction

after five trials at law on the same point and verdicts the same way ; but equity is very tender

in the exercise of this power, 2 P. Wins. 425; 10 Mod. 1. And a court of equity will not review

the orders of the exchequer as a court of revenue; nor interfere where that court, as a court of

revenue, is competent to decide the subject matter. 3 Ridgw. P. C. 80.

Matters arising out of England. A question concerning the right and title to the Isle of Man

may be determined in a court of chancery. 1 Ves. 202. \Vhere the defendant is in England,

though the cause of the suit arose in the plantations, if the bill be brought here, the court agens

in personam may, by compulsion of the person, force him to do justice, tor the jurisdiction of the

chancellor is not ousted: 3 Atk. £89; see 1 Jac. and TV. 27; and this although in general all

questions respecting real estates belong to the country where they are situate. Eiliott r. Lord

Minto, 6 Mod. 16.

1. It is assistant to the common law, by removing legal impediments to a fair decision of a

question depending in those courts; as, preventing the setting up of outstanding terms, <fcc. 5

Mad. 428; 2 J. and W. 391.

2. It acts concurrently with the common law, by compelling a discovery which may enable

those courts to decide according to the real facts and justice of the case; as, where the dis-

covery is to ascertain whether the defendant did not promise to marry : Forrest, Rep. 42; or to

disprove the defendant's plea, that he had made nopromise within six years, and to compel him

to state whether he has not promised within that time ; 5 Mad. 831; but he has a right to pro-

tect himself in equity by the statute of limitations, from a discovery as to the original considera-

tion of the debt, or whether it has since been paid. 5 Mad. 331. So be may be required to dis-

close whether ho is an alien or not: 2 Ves. Sen. 287, 494; but where a discovery would subject

a party to penalty or forfeiture, it is not to be obtained : 1 Ves. 56 ; 2 Gh. Rep. tW; 2 Atk. 392;

2 Ves. 365; 1 Eq. Ab. 131, p. 10; except in cases under the stockjobbing act (7 Geo. II, c. 8, s.

1; 2 Marsh. Rep. 125), and some other particular provisions. Nor will the court compel a dis-

covery in aid of crimuial proceedings. 2 Ves. 398; vide Mitf. PI. 150. It exercises concurrent

jurisdiction, in perpetuating testimony in danger of being lost before it can be used; by preserv-

ing property during litigation; by counteracting fraudulent judgments; by setting bounds to

oppressive litigation ; and in cases of fraud, accident, mistake, account, partition and dower.

3. It claims exclusive jurisdiction in matters of trust and confidence, and whenever, upon the

principles of universal justice, the interference of a court of judicature is necessary to prevent a

wrong, and the positive law is silent. 1 Fonb. Eq. p. 9, n. (f.)

The matters over which the court of chancery maintains an equitable jurisdiction have been

arranged in the following alphabetical order; and as this analysis has the recommendation of

practical utility, we shall proceed to embody the principal rules and decisions under each head

respectively.
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land ; and to premise a few remarks upon those particular causes, wherein any

of them claims and exercises a sole jurisdiction, .distinct from and exclusive of

the other.

I have already (b) attempted to trace (though very concisely) the history, rise,

and progress, of the extraordinary court, or court of equity, in chancery. The

(b} Page 60, Ac.

I. ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE.

II. ACCOUNT.

III. FRAUD.

IV. INFANTS.

V. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENTS.

VI. TRUSTS.

I. ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE. By accident is meant, where a cose is distinguished from others

of the like nature by unusual circumstances, for the court of chancery cannot control the maxims

of the common law, because of general inconvenience; but only where the observation of a rule

is attended with some unusual and particular inconveineuce. 10 Mod. 1.

1. Jionds, tf-c. Equity will relieve against the loss of deeds (3 V. and B. 54), or bonds (5 Yes.

2J5 ; 6 id. 812), but not if the bond be voluntary. 1 Ch. Oa. 77. It will also set up a bond so

lost or destroyed, against sureties, though the principal be out of the jurisdiction. 3 Atk. 93 : 1

Ch. Ca. 77 ; 9 Ves. 464. Bonds mode joint, instead of several, may bo modified according to in-

tent in some cases. 2 Atk. 33; 9 Vcs. 118; 17 id. 514 ; 1 Meriv. 5(54.

2. JtSouitdaries, Sfc. Equity will ascertain the boundaries or fix the value, where lands have
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been intermixed by unity of possession. 2 Meriv. 507 ; 1 Swanst. 9. So to distinguish copyhold

from freehold lands within the manor. 4 Vcs. 180 ; Ncls. 14.

3. Penalties, Forfeitures, »J-c., incurred by accident, are relieved against (2 Vern. 594 ; 1 Stro.

453; 1 Bro. C. C. 4i8; 2 Sen. and Lef. 685), where the thing may be done afterwards, or a com-

pensation made for it. 1 Ch. Ca. 24; 2 Ventr. 352; 9 Mod. 22; 18 Ves. 63. But no relief is

given in the case of a voluntary composition, payable at a fixed period. Anib. 332. See 1 Vern.

210; 2 Atk. 527 ; 3 id. 585 ; 16 Ves. 372. Equity will not relieve against the payment of stipu-

lated, or, as they are sometimes called, liquidated damages : 2 Atk. 194 ; Finch, 117; 2 Ch. Ca.

198; 6 Bro. P. C. 470; 1 Cox. 27 ; 2 Bos. and P. 346 ; 3 Atk. 395; and forfeitures under acts of

parliament, or conditions in law, which do not admit of compensation, or a forfeiture which may

be considered as a limitation of an estate, which determines it when it happens, cannot be re-

lieved against. 1 Ball and Batt. 373, 478 ; 1 Stra. 447, 452; Prec. Ch. 574.

4. Mistake. A defective conveyance to charitable uses is always aided ; 1 Eden, 14 ; 2 Tern.

755; Prec. Ch. 1G ; 2 Veru. 453; Hob. 136; but neither a mistake in a tine (if after death of con

usor), or in the names in a recovery, are supplied, especially against a purchaser: 2 Vern. 3;

Ambl. 102. Nor an erroneous recovery in the manorial court." 1 Veru. 367. Mistakes in a deed

or contract, founded on good consideration, may bo rectified. 1 Ves. 317 ; 2 Atk. 203. And if

a bargain and sale be made and not enrolled within six months, equity will compel the vendor

to make a good title, by executing another bargain and sale which may be enrolled. 6 Ves. 745.

A conveyance defective in form may be rectified (1 Eq. Ab. 320; 1 P". Wins. 279), even against

assignees (2 Vcrn. 564; 1 Atk. 162; 4 Bro. C. C. 472), or against representatives. 1 Aast. 14.

So defects in surrenders of copyhold. 2 Vern. 564 ; Salk. 449; 2 Vcm. 151. But not the omis-

sion of formalities required by act of parliament in conveyances. 5 Ves. 240; 3 Bro. C. C. 571;

13 Ves. 588; 15 id. 60; 6 id. 745; 11 id. 626. Defects in the mode of con veyanco may be remedied.

4 Bro. C. C. 382. So the execution of powers. 2 P. Wins. 623.

II. ACCOUNT. Mutual dealings and demands between parties, which are too complex to be

accurately taken by trial at law, may be adjusted in equity: 1 Sch. and Lefroy, 309; 13 Ves,

276, 279; 1 Mad. Ch. 86, and note (i); but if the subject be matter of set-off at la'w, and capable

of proof, a bill will not lie: 6 Ves. 136; and the difficulty in adjusting the account constitutes

no legal objection to an action. 5 Taunt. 481; 1 Marsh. 115; 2 Camp. 238.

III. FRAUD. Equity has so great an abhorrence of fraud, that it will set aside its own

decrees if founded thereupon; and a bill lies to vacate letters patent obtained by fraud. 13

Vin. Ab. 543, pi. 9; 1 Vern. 277. All deceitful practices and artful devices, contrary to the

Elaiu rules of common honesty, are frauds at common law, and punishable there ; but for some

•auds or deceits there is no remedy at law, in which cases they ore cognizable in equity, as

one of the chief branches of its original jurisdiction. 2 Ch. Ca. 103; Finch, 161; 2 P. Wins.

270; 2 Vern. 189; 2 Atk. 324; 3 P. Wms. 130; Bridg. Ind. tit. Fraud, pi. 1. Where a person

is prevented by fraud from executing a deed, equity will regard it as already done. 1 Joe. and

W. 99.

1. Trustees are in no case permitted to purchase from themselves the trust estate (1 Tern.

465), nor their solicitor. 3 Mer. 200. Nor in bankruptcy are the commissioners (6 Ves. 617), or

assignees (6 Ves. 627), nor their solicitors. 10 Ves. 381. Nor committee or keeper of a lunatio

(13 Ves. 156), nor an executor (1 To*, and B. 170; 1 Cox. 134), nor governors of charities. 17

Ves. 500.
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same jurisdiction is exercised, and the same system of redress pursued, in the

equity court of the exchequer; with a distinction, however, as to some few

matters, peculiar to each tribunal, and in which the other cannot interfere.

And, first, of those peculiar to the chancery.

2. Attorney and Client. Fraud in transactions between attorney and client is guarded against

most watchfully. 2 Ves. J. 801; 1 Mad. Ch. 114, 115, 116.

3. Heirs, Sailors, <J-c. Equity will protect improvident heirs against agreements binding on

their future expectancies, negotiated during some temporary embarrassment, provided such

agreement manifest great inadequacy of consideration. 1 Tern. 169; 2 id. 27; IP. W. 310;

I Bro. C. C. 1; 2 Ves. 157. It will also set aside unequal contracts obtained from sailors

respecting their prize-money: Newl. Cont. 443; 1 Wils. 229; 2 Ves. 281, 516; and the fourth

section of 20 Geo. Ill, c. 24, declares all bargains, Ac., concerning any share of a prize taken

from any of his majesty's enemies, &c., void. Vid. Xewl. Cont. 444

. 4. Guardian. Fraud between guardian and ward is also the subject of strict cognizance in

the court of chancery. For the details under this head, see book 1, ch. xvii, and notes.

5. Injunctions. In a modern work the subject of injunctions is considered under the head

of fraud: see 1 Mad. Ch. 125; but it seems to deserve a distinct consideration. An injunction

is a method by which the court of chancery interferes to prevent the commission of fraud and

mischief. The exercise of this authority may be obtained, 1st. To stay proceedings in other

courts. 2d. To restrain infringements of patents. 3d. To stay waste. 4th. To preserve copy-

right. 5th. To restrain negotiation of bills, Ac., or the transfer of stock. 6th. To prevent
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nuisances, and in most cases where the rights of others are invaded, and the remedy by action

at law is too remote to prevent increasing damage. See 1 Mad. Ch. 157 to 165. An injunction

to stay proceedings at law does not extend to a distress for rent. 1 Jac. and \V. 392. Nor has

equity any jurisdiction to stop goods in transitu in any case, nor will the court restrain the

sailing of a vessel for such purpose by injunction. 2 Jac. and W. 349.

6. IKlls of Peace, which form an essential check on litigation. 1 Bro. P. C. 266; 2 id. 217;

Bunb. 158; 1 P. Vf. 671; Free. Ch. 202 ; 1 Stra, 404. For this purpose a perpetual injunction

will be granted. See 10 Mod. 1; 1 Bro. P. C. 2H8. This bill cannot hold in disputes between

two persons only. 2 Atk. 483, 391: 4 Bro. C. C. 157 ; Vin. tit. Ch. 425, pi. 35 ; 3 P. W. 156.

7. Kill of Interpleader will lie to prevent fraud or injustice, where two or more parties claim

adversely to each other, from him in possession; (otherwise it will not lie, 1 Mer. 405) for in

such ease, it is necessary the two claimants should settle their rights before the person holding

possession be required to give up to either. 2 Ves. J. 310; Mitf. PI. 39; 1 Mad. Ch. 173 ; and

on the same principle,

8. mils or Writs of Certiorari, to remove a cause from an inferior, or incompetent, j nris-

diction.

9. Sills to perpetuate testimony in danger of being lost before the right can bo ascertained.

10. Bills to discover evidence in possession of defendant, whereof plaintiff would be otherwise

wholly deprived, or of deeds, Ac., in defendant's custody.

11. SUlt of Quia Timet for the purpose of preventing a possible future injury, and thereby

quieting men's minds and estates, Ac. 1 Madd. Ch. 224 ; Xewl. on Contr. 93. 493.

12. Hills for the delivering up of Deeds. As where an instrument is void at common law, as

being against the policy of the faw, it belongs to the jurisdiction of equity to order it to be

delivered up. 11 Ves. 535. In Mavor, Ac., of Colchester r. Lowton, Lord Eldon says : " My

opinion has always been (differing trom others) that a court of equity has jurisdiction and duty

to order a void deed to bo delivered up, and placed with those wliose property may be affected

by it, if it remains in other hands." 1 Ves. and B. 244.

13. Bills for apportionment or contribution between persons standing in particular relations

one to another. 5 Ves. 792; 2 Frcein. 97.

14. For Dower and partition.

15. To establish mod\uscs.

16. Bills to marshal securities.

17. Bills to secure property in litigation in other courts. And,

18. and lastly. Bills to compel lords of manors to hold courts, or to admit copyholders and

bills to reverse erroneous judgments in copyhold courts, ride 1 Madd. Ch. 242 to 253.

IV. IKFASTS. The protection and care which the court of chancery exercises over infants

have already been incidentally noticed. Vide book 1, cc. xvi, xvii, and notes.

Wards of Court. To make a child a ward of court, it is sufficient to file a bill; and it is a

contempt to marry a ward of court, though the infant's father be living. Ambl. 301. The

court of chancery, representing the king as parens patrioo, has jurisdiction to control the

right of the father to the possession of his infant; but the court of K. B. has not any portion

of that delegated authority, The court of chancery will restrain the father from removing

his child, or doing any act towards removing it out of the jurisdiction. So will the court

refuse the possession of the child to its mother, if she has withdrawn herself from her hus-

band. 10 Vos. 52; Co. Lit. 89, (a), n. 70; 2 Fonb. Tr. Eq. 224, n. (a); 2 Bro. C. C. 499;

1 P. AV. 705; 4 Bro. C. C. 101; 2 P. "W. 102. The court retains its jurisdiction over the prop-

erty of a ward of court after twenty-one, if it remains in court; and if the ward marries, will
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1. Upon the abolition of the court of wards, the care, which the crown was

bound to take as guardian of its infant tenants, was totally extinguished in

T *427 1 eTery feudal view; but *resulted to the king in his court of chancery,

' ' together with the general protection (c) of all other infants in the king-

fcj F. N. B. 27

order a proper settlement to be made, or reform an improper one, nnlesn the ward consents to

the settlement either in court or nnder a commission. 2 Sim. and 8tn. 123, n. (a). In case the

husband assign the property of the wife, •who is a ward of eonrt, it shall not prevail, but the

court will direct even the whole of the property in question to be settled on the wife and her

children, and the assignee will not be entitled even to the arrear of interest aocmed since l ho

marriage. 3 Ves. 506.

V. SPBOrFIO PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENTS. The jurisdiction of the courts of equity, in

matters of this kind, though certainly as ancient as the reign of Edward IV, did not obtain

an unresisting and uniform acquiescence on the part of the public till many years afterwords.

See 1 Roll. Rep. 354 ; 2 id. 443 ; Latch. 172.

Ki-a-lty. Thus equity enforces agreements for the purchase of lands, or things wbieh relate

to realties, but uot (generally) those which relate to personal chattels, as the Bale of stock, corn,

hops. &e.; in such cases the remedy is at law. 3 Atk. 383 ; Newl. Cont. 87.

That which is agreed to be done ia in equity considered as already done : 2 P. ~W. 222; and

therefore when a husband covenants on his marriage to make a settlement charged upon his

lands, which he is afterwards prevented from completing by sudden death, the heir shall make

satisfaction of the settlement out of the estate. Id. 233.
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1'i-rsonalty. In agreements, with penalties for the breach of them, it is necessary to dis-

tinguish the cases of a penalty intended as a security, for a collateral object, from those where

the contract itself has anxctaed the damages which the party is tu pay, upon his doing cr omit-

ting to do the particular act. In these latter cases, equity will not interfere either to prevent

or to enforce tie act in question, or to restrain the recovery of damages after they have be-

come due. But in the former, where it plainly appears that the specific performance of that

act was the primary object of the agreement," and the penalty intended merely to operate as

a collateral security for its being done, though at law the party might moke his election,

either to do the particular act or to pay the penalty, a court of equity will not permit him to-cx-

ercise snch right, but will compel him to perform the object of the agreement. Newl. Cout. c. 17.

Thus, as the principle whereon A specific performance of agreement relating to personals is

refused, is, that there is as complete a remedy to be obtained at law, therefore, where a party

sues merely on a memorandum of agreement (a mere memorandum not being regarded as

valid at law), a court of equity will give relief, for equity suffers not a right to be without a

remedy. 3 Atk. 3H2, 386. But it is only where the legal remedy is inadequate or defective,

that courts of equity interfere. 8 Ves/163. Equity will not enforce an agreement for the

transfer of stock: l6 Tes. 161; but it has been held that a bill will lie for performance of

agreement for purchase of goverment stock, where it prays for the delivery of the certificate*

•which give the legal title to stock. 1 Siui. and Stu. 590. And it seems the court will entertain

a suit for the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of a debt. 5 Price, 325. So

to sell the good will of ft trade, and the exclusive use of a secret in dying (1 Sim. and Stu. 74)

but not without great caution. See 1 P. AVms. 181.

VI. TRUSTS. Trusts may be created of real or personal estate, and are either, 1st, Express;

or, 2d. Implied. Under the head of implied trusts may be included all resulting trusts, and

all such trusts are not express. Express trusts are created by deed or will. Implied trusts

arise, in general, bv construction of law, upon the acts or situation of parties. 1 Mad. Ch. 446.

1. Lunatics. The custody of the persons and estates of lunatics was a power not originally

in the crown, but was given to it by statute, for the benefit of the subject. 1 Ridgw. P. C. 224,

ct vid. '2 lust. 14. And now, by the statute de prcrogativa regis {17 Edw. II, c. » and 10), the

king shall have the real estates of idiots to his own use, and he shall provide for the safe keep-

ing of the real estates of lunatics, so that they shall have a competent maintenance, and the

residue is to be kept for their use. 1 Ridgw. P. C. 519, 535. A liberal application of the

property of a lunatic is made to secure evtry comfort his situation will admit (6 Ves, *?), without

regard to expectants on estate. 1 Tcs. J. 297. The power of the chancellor extends to making

grants from time to time of the lunatic's estate, and as this power is derived under the sign

manual, in virtue of the prerogative of the crown, the chancellor, who is usually invested with

it, is responsible to the crown alone for the right exercise of it. Per Ld. Hardw., 3 Atk. 635.

It is said, that since the revolution the king has always granted the surplus profits of the estate

of an idiot to some of his family. Ridgw. P. C. 519, 'App. note 1.

2. Charities. The general controlling power of the court over Charities does not extend to a

charity regulated by governors under a charter, unless they have also the management of the

revenues, and abuse their trust; which will not be presumed, but must be apparent, and made

out bv evidence. 2 Tes. Jun. 42. The internal management of a charity is the exclusive

subject of visitorial jurisdiction : but, under a trust as to the revenue, abuse by misauplicatioB

is controlled in chancery. 2 Ves. and B. 134.
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dom. When, therefore, a fatherless child has no other guardian, the court of

chancery has a right to appoint one: and from all proceedings relative thereto,

an appeal lies to the honse of lords. The court of exchequer can only appoint

A guardian ad litem, to manage the defence of the infant if a suit be commenced

against him; a power which is incident to the jurisdiction of every court of

justice: (d) but when the interest of a minor comes before the court judicially,

in the progress of a cause, or upon a bill for that purpose filed, either tribunal

indiscriminately will take care of the property of the infant.

2. As to idiots and lunatics: the king himself used formerly to commit the

custody of them to proper committees, in every particular case; but now, to

avoid solicitations and the very shadow of undue partiality, a warrant is issued

by the king, {e) under his royal sign manual, to the chancellor or keeper of his

seal, to perform this office for him: and, if he acts improperly in granting suck

custodies, the complaint must be made to the king himself in council. (/) But

the previous proceedings on the commission, to inquire whether or no the party

be an idiot or a lunatic, are on the law side of the court of chancery, and can

only be redressed (if erroneous) by writ of error in the regular course of law. (2)

3. The king, as parens patriie, has the general superintendence of all chari-

ties ; which he exercises by the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor. And,

therefore, whenever it is necessary, the attorney-general, at the relation of some

informant {who is usually called the relator), files ox offido an information in the

court of chancery to have the charity properly established. By statute also,
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43 Eliz. c. 4, authority is given to the lord chancellor, or lord keeper, and to the

(<!} Cro. Jar.. 641. 2 Lev. 168. T. Jonet, 90. («) See book I, ch. 8. (/) 3 P. Wind. 103. See Reg. Br. 267.

3. Executors. \Vhere an executor has an express legacy, the court of chancery looks upon him

us a trustee with regard to the surplus, and will make him account, though the spiritual court

has no such power. 1 P. W. 7. And where an executor, who was directed to lay out ttte

testator's personalty in the funds, unnecessarily sold out stock, kept large balances in his band,

and resisted payment of debts by false pretences of outstanding demands, he was charged

with five per cent interest and costs, but the court refused to make rests ra the account. 1

Jac. and "W. 586. And see, on this subject, ante, book 2, ch. 32.

4. MarghalKng Assets. The testator's whole personal property, whether devised or not, is assets

l»oth hi law and equity, to which creditors by simple contract, or of any higher order, may

have recourse for the satisfaction of their demands. But the testator may, by clear and ex-

plicit words, exempt his personalty from payment of debts as against the devisee of his realty,

though not a* against creditors. The rule in equity is, that, in case even of a specialty debt,

the personal assets shall be first applied, and if deficient, and there be no devise for payment

of debts, the heir shall then be charged for assets descended. 2 Atk. 426, 434. For lands are

in equity a favored fund, insomuch that the heir at law, or devisee, of a mortgagor may de-

mand to have the estate mortgaged by such devisor himself cleared out of the personalty.

Tin. Ab. tit. Heir, U. pi. 35; 1 Atk. 487. And a specific devisee of a mortgaged estate is enti-

tled to have it exonerated out of real assets descended. 3 Atk. 430, 439. But at law there is

no such distinction of favor sh'owii to lauds; a bond creditor may, if he please, proceed im-

mediately against the heir, without suing the personal representative of his deceased debtor.

As to tie order in which real assets shall be applied in equity for payment of debts (after

exhausting the personal effects, supposing them not exempted), the general rule is, first, to take

lands devised simply for that purpose, then lands descended, and, lastly, estates specifically

devised, even though they are generally charged with the payment of debts. 2 Bre. 263.

Equitable assets are such as at law cannot be reached by a creditor, as a devise in trust to

Eay debts, of an equity of redemption subject to a mortgage in fee, or where the descent is

roken by a devise to sell for the payment of debts. 1 Tern". 411; 1 Ch. Ca. 128, n; 2 Atk. 290.

But lauds so devised, subject to a mortgage for years, are legal assets.]

Upon the general subject of equity jurisdiction, a brief note like the foregoing can give but

very imperfect information. The treatises by Mr. Spence on the equitable jurisdiction, aud by

Adams and Story on equity jurisprudence, are very mil and satisfactory.

Some of the United States have no distinct equity system, and the relief formerly given in

equity in some cases cannot be had; in others, equity principles are administered, but under

the same forms and by the same courts as common-law principles are; and in others still, the

X'ty svstem is fully retained, but is administered under equitable forms by the same judges

"hold the courts of common law. This last is the case with the courts of the federal

government.

(2) This jurisdiction is now exercised under and regulated by statutes 16 and 17 Tic. e. 70,

and 30 aud 31 Tic. c. 87, and the lords justices may exercise it.
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F *4281 c'lflnceH°r °f the duchy of Lancaster, respectively, to grant *commis»

*• J sions under their several seals, to inquire into any abuses of charitable

donations, and rectify the same by decree; which may be reviewed in the

respective courts of the several chancellors, upon exceptions taken thereto. But»

though this is done in the petty bag office in the court of chaucery, because the

commission is there returned, it is not a proceeding at common law, but treated

as an original cause in the court of equity. The evidence below ia not taken

down in writing, and the respondent, in his answer to the exceptions, may allege

what new matter he pleases; upon which they go to proof, and examine wit-

nesses in writing upon all.the matters in issue: and the court may decree the

respondent to pay all the costs, though no such authority is given by the statute.

And as it is thus considered as an original cause throughout, an appeal lies of

course from the chancellor's decree to the house of peers, (g) notwithstanding

any loose opinions to the contrary, (h) (3)

4. By the several statutes relating to bankrupts, a summary jurisdiction is

given to the chancellor, in many matters consequential or previous to the commis-

sions thereby directed to be issued; from which the statutes give no appeal. (4)

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court of chancery doth not extend

to some causes, wherein relief may be had in the exchequer. No information

can be brought in chancery for such mistaken charities as are given to the

king by the statutes for suppressing superstitious uses. Nor can chancery give

any relief against the king, or direct any act to be done by him, or make any
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decree disposing of or affecting his property; not even in cases where he is a

royal trustee, (i) (5) Such causes must be determined in the court of exchequer,

F *4291 as a cour* °f revcmie: which alone has power *over the king's treasury,

*- ' •* and the officers employed in its management: unless where it properly

belongs to the duchy court of Lancaster, which hath also a similar jurisdiction

as a court of revenue; and, like the other, consists of both a court of law and

H court of equity.

In all other matters, what is said of the court of equity in chancery will be

equally applicable to the other courts of equity. Whatever difference there may

be in the forms of practice, it arises from the different constitution of their offi-

cers: or, if they differ in any thing more essential, one of them must certainly

be wrong; for truth and justice are always uniform, and ought equally to be

adopted by them all.

Let us next take a brief, but comprehensive view of the general nature of

equity, as now understood and practiced in our several courts of judicature. I

have formerly touched upon it, (k) but imperfectly: it deserves a more complete

explication. Yet as nothing is hitherto extant that can give a stranger a

tolerable idea of the courts of equity subsisting in England, as distinguished

from the courts of law, the compiler of these observations cannot but attempt

it with diffidence: those who know them best are too much employed to find

time to write; and those who have attempted but little in those courts must be

often at a loss for materials.

(g) Dukc'e Char. Uses, 62,128. Corporation of Burforc] v. Lrnthal, Cane. 9 May, 1743.

(»)'J Vcrn. US.

(»> Hugirins v. York Buildings' Company, Cane. 21 Oct. 1740. llecve ». Attorney-General, Cane. 37 Nov.

1741. Lighlbuurn ». Attorney-General. Cane. 2 May. 1743.

(/:; Book I, inn-Mil. « 2, 3, ad cole.

(3) [The most important piece of legislation on this subject ia the charitable trusts act, 1853,

of which the professed object is to secure the due administration of charitable tnt.sts, and

in certain cases a more beueficial application of charitable funds than that previously in

operation.]

See, also, the charitable trusts acts, 1S55 and 1800.

(4) This jurisdiction was transferred to the court of bankruptcy by statute 1 and 2 Wm.

IT, c. 56. '

(5) It has already been stated that a sovereignty is not suable in its own courts, except with

its own consent, and this consent is given either by general lavr, or specially for the particular

case. See note p. 257, supra.
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Equity, then, in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit of all

law: positive law is construed, and rational law is made by it. In this, equity

is synonymous to justice; in that, to the true sense and sound interpretation

of the rule. But the very terms of a court of equity, and a court of law, as

contrasted to each other, are apt to confound and mislead us: as if the one

judged without equity, and the other was not bound by any law. Whereas

every definition or illustration to be met with, which now draws a line between

the two jurisdictions, by setting law and equity *in opposition to each

other, will be found either totally erroneous, or erroneous to a certain

degree.

1. Thus in the first place it is said, (I) that it is the business of a court of

equity in England to abate the rigour of the common law. But no such power

is contended for. Hard was the case of bond-creditors whose debtor devised

away his real estate; rigorous and unjust the rule, which put the devisee in a

better condition than the heir; (m) yet a court of equity had no power to inter-

pose. Hard is the common law still subsisting, that land devised, or descending

to the heir, shall not be liable to simple contract debts of the ancestor or devi-

sor, (n) although the money was laid out in purchasing the very land, (6) and

that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the real estate of the

son: (o) but a court of equity can give no relief; though in both these instances

the artificial reason of the law, arising from feudal principles, has long ago

entirely ceased. The like may be observed of the descent of lands to a remote
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relation of the whole blood, or even their escheat to the lord, in preference to

the owner's half brother; (p) and of the total stop to all justice, by causing the

parol to demur, (q) whenever an infant is sued as heir, or is party to a real

action. (7) In all such cases of positive law, the courts of equity, as well as the

courts of law, must say with Ulpian, (r) " hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed

ita lex scripta est."

2. It is said, (s) that a court of equity determines according to the spirit of

the rule, and not according to the strictness of the letter. But so also does a

court of law. Both, for instance, are equally bound, and equally profess, to

interpret statutes according to the true intent of the legislature. In general

law all cases cannot be foreseen; or, if foreseen, cannot be expressed: some will

arise that will fall within the *meaning, though not within the words, of r „ ,01 -i

the legislator; and others which may fall within the letter,may be contrary L -"

to his meaning, though not expressly excepted. These cases, thus out of the letter,

are often said to be within the equity of an act of parliament; and so cases

within the letter are frequently out of the equity. Here by equity we mean

nothing but the sound interpretation of the law; though the words of the law

itself may be too general, too special, or otherwise inaccurate or defective.

These, then, are the cases which, as Grotius (t) says, "lex non exacte definit, sed

arbitrio boni viri permitit;" in order to find out the true sense and meaning of

the lawgiver, from every other topic of construction. But there is not a single

rule of interpreting laws, whether equitably or strictly, that is not equally used

by the judges in the courts both of law and equity: the construction must in

both be the same: or, if they differ, it is only as one court of law may also hap-

pen to differ from another. Each endeavours to fix and adopt the true sense of

the law in question; neither can enlarge, diminish, or alter that sense in a

single tittle.

3. Again, it hath been said, (u) that fraud, accident, and trust, are the proper and

peculiar objects of a court of equity. But every kind of fraud is equally cognizable,

«) l.onl Kiilms. Prlnc. of Equity, 44. (m) See bonk II, ch. 23, p. 378.

(») Ibid. ch. 13, pp. 243, 244; ch. 23, p. 377. (o) Ibid. ch. 14. p. 208. (p} JIM. p. 227.

(o) See page 300. (r) £/. 40, 9. 12. (i\ Lord Kiilms, Prlnc. of Equity, 177.

(2) /).- aqvltate, i 3. (u) 1 lioll. Abr. 374. 4 Inst. S4. 10 Mod. 1.

(6) This rule is rfnce abrogated by statute.

(7) [This delay of justice is remedied by the statute 11 Geo. IY and 1 "Win. IV, e. 47;

B.10.]
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and equally adverted to, in a court of law: and some frauds are cognizable only

there: as fraud in containing a devise of lands, which is always sent out of the

equity courts, to be there determined. Many accidents are also supplied in a

court of law; as, loss of deeds, mistakes in receipts or accounts, wrong payments,

deaths which make it impossible to perform a condition literally, and a multi-

tude of other contingencies: and many cannot be relieved even in a court of

equity; as, if by accident a recovery is ill suffered, a devise ill executed, a contin-

gent remainder destroyed, or a power of leasing omitted in a family settlement.

A technical trust, indeed, created by the limitation of a second use, was forced

r *4321 lul" "1C cour*8 °f ecluity 'n the manner formerly mentioned; (w) and

«- -I this species of trusts, extended by inference ana construction, have ever

since remained as a kind ofpeculium in those courts. But there are other trusts,

which are cognizable in a court of law: as deposits, and all manner of bailments;

and especially that implied contract, so highly beneficial and useful, of having

undertaken to account for money received to another's use, (x) which is the

ground of an action on the case almost as universally remedial as a bill in equity.

4. Once more; it has been said that a court of equity is not bound by rules

or precedents, but acts from the opinion of the judge, (y) founded on the circum-

stances of every particular case. Whereas the system of our courts of equity is a

laboured, connected system, governed by established rules, and bound down by

precedents, from which they do not depart, although the reason of some of them

may perhaps be liable to objection. Thus the refusing of a wife her dower in a

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

trust-estate, (z) (8) yet allowing the husband his curtesy: the holding the pen-

alty of a bond to be merely a security foi the debt and interest, yet considering

it sometimes as the debt itself, so that the interest shall not exceed that penalty, (a)

the distinguishing between a mortgage at five per cent, with a clause of a reduc-

tion to four, if the interest be regularly paid, and a mortgage at four per cent.

with a clause of enlargement to five, if the payment of the interest be deferred;

so that the former shall be deemed a conscientious, the latter an unrighteous bar-

gain : (b) all these, and other cases that might be instanced, are plainly rules of posi-

F *4S31 ^ve 'aw' suPP°rted only by *the reverence that is shown, and generally

L -I very properly shown, to a series of former determinations; that the rule

of property may be uniform and steady. Nay, sometimes a precedent is so strictly

followed, that a particular judgment, founded upon special circumstances, (c)

gives rise to a general rule.

In short, if a court of equity in England did really act as many ingenious

writers have supposed it (from theory) to do, it would rise above all law, either

common or statute, and be a most arbitrary legislator in every particular case.

No wonder they are so often mistaken. Grotius, or Puffendorf, or anv other of

the great masters of jurisprudence, would have been as little able to discover, by

their own light, the system of a court of equity in England, as the system of a

court of law: especially, as the notions before mentioned of the character, power,

and practice of a court of equity were formerly adopted and propagated (though

not with approbation of the thing) by our principal antiquaries and lawyers;

Spelman, (d) Coke, (e) Lambard, (/) and Selden, (g) and even the great Bacon (h)

himself. But this was in the infancy of our courts of equity, before their juris-

(»•> Book II. i'h. 20. (.f\ Seepage 163.

(y) This is stated by Mr. Selden (Table-Talk, tit. Eqnlty) with more pleasantry than truth. " For lmr> we

have a measure, and know what to trust to : equltyla according to the conscience of him that is chancellor;

and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'TIS all one as if they should make the standard fur the

measure a chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be.' One chancellor has a long foot,

another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. It Is the same thing with the chancellor's conscience "

(z) 2 P. Wms. 840. Sec hook II, ji. 'Sn. (a\ Salk. 154. (»l 2 Vorn. W9. 316. 3 Atk. 520.

(c) See the case of Foster and Muut (1 Vern. 473) with regard to the undisposed residuum of personal

estates.

(</l Owf In summit itague trUiunalibut mtilti e legum canone decermmt JwHcet, loltu iti ret exigertt) cohibtat

canceuariits ex arbitrio; nee aliter decrvti* tfiietur sua curite /; f «rt ipsius, '/'"'". ftucente nova ratione

recognotcai qua voluerit. mutet et tJtlwit prmtt swe ridebUur prudentke. Gtott. 108.

(e) See page* 54. 66. (/) Areluum. 71, 72, 72. (g) Vbi tupra.

(ft) Hi: Augm. Scient. I. 8, c. 3.

(8) [This anomaly no longer exists. See statute 3 and 4 "Wm. IV. c. 105.1
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diction was settled, and when the chancellors themselves, partly from their ig-

norance of law (being frequently bishops or statesmen), partly from ambition or

lust of power (encouraged by the arbitrary principles of the age they lived in),

but principally from the narrow and unjust decisions of the courts of law, had

arrogated to themselves such unlimited authority, as hath totally been disclaimed

by their successors for now about a century past. The decrees of a court of

equity were then rather in the nature of awards, formed on the sudden pro tie naia,

with more probity of intention than knowledge of the subject; *founded r *,,,, -i

on no settled principles, as being never designed, and therefore never *- •''"•'

used for precedents. But the systems of jurisprudence, in our courts both of law

and equity, are now equally artificial systems, founded on the same principles of

justice and positive law; but varied by different usages in the forms and mode of

their proceedings: the one being originally derived (though much reformed and

improved) from the feudal customs, as they prevailed in different ages in the

Saxon and Norman judicatures; the other (bnt with equal improvements) from

the imperial and pontifical formularies, introduced by their clerical chancellors.

The suggestion indeed of every bill, to give jurisdiction to the courts of equity

(copied from those early times), is that the complainant hath no remedy at the

common law. Bnt he who should from thence conclude, that no case is judged

of in equity where there might have been relief at law, and at the same time casts

his eye on the extent and variety of the cases in our equity reports, must think

the law a dead letter indeed. 1*he rules of property, rules of evidence, and rules
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of interpretation in both courts are, or should be, exactly the same: both ought

to adopt the best, or must cease to be courts of justice. Formerly some causes,

which now no longer exist, might occasion a different rule to be followed in one

court, from what was afterwards adopted in the other, as founded in the nature

and reason of the thing: but, the instant those causes ceased, the measure of

substantial justice ought to have been the same in both. Thus the penalty of a

bond, originally contrived to evade the absurdity of those monkish constitutions

which prohibited taking interest for money, was therefore very pardonably con-

sidered as the real debt in the courts of law, when the debtor neglected to per-

form his agreement for the return of the loan with interest: for the judges could

not, as the law then stood, give judgment that the interest should be specifically

paid. But when afterwards the taking of interest became legal, as the necessary

companion of commerce, (i) nay after the statute of 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, had de-

clared the *debt or loan itself to be " the just and true intent" for which r *, g- -i

the obligation was given, their narrow-minded successors still adhered <• "'"' *

wilfully and technically to the letter of the ancient precedents, and refused to

consider the payment of principal, interest, and costs, as a full satisfaction of the

bond. At the same time more liberal men, who sate in the courts of equity, con-

strued the instrument according to its "just and true intent," as merely a security

for the loan: in which light it was certainly understood by the parties, at least

after these determinations; and therefore this construction should have been

universally received. So in mortgages, being only a landed as the other is a per-

sonal security for the money lent, the payment of principal, interest, and costs,

ought at any time, before judgment executed, to have saved the forfeiture in a

court of law, as well as in a court of equity. And the inconvenience, as well as

injustice, of putting different constructions in different courts upon one and

the same transaction, obliged the parliament at length to interfere, and to direct,

by the statutes 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, and 7 Geo. II, c.20, that, in the cases of bonds

and mortgages, what had long been the practice of the courts of equity should

also for the future be universally followed in the courts of law; wherein it had

before these statutes in some degree obtained a footing. (/)

Again ; neither a court of equity nor of law can vary men's wills or agree-

ments, or (in other words) make wills or agreements for them. Both are to under-

stand them truly, and therefore uniformly. One court ought not to extend, nor

the other abridge, a lawful provision deliberately settled by the parties, contrary

(i) See book II, p. 430. (i) 2 Keb. 653, 555. Salk. 597. 6 Mod. 11, 80, 101.

271

435 PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY. [Book III.

to its just intent. A court of equity, no more than a court of law, can relieve

against a penalty in the nature of stated damages; as a reut of 51. an acre for

ploughing up ancient meadow : (k) nor against a lapse of time, where the time

is material to the contract; as in covenants for the renewal of leases. Both

courts will equitably construe, but neither pretends to control or change, a law-

ful stipulation or engagement.

F*436 1 *The rules of decision are in both courts equally apposite to the sub-

' -1 jects of which they take cognizance. Where the subject-matter is such

as requires to be determined secundum aquum et lonum, as generally upon

actions on the case, the judgments of the courts of law are guided by the most

liberal equity. In matters of positive right, both courts must submit to and

follow those ancient and invariable maxims "qua relicta sunt et tradita." (1)

Both follow the law of nations, and collect it from history and the most approved

authors of all countries, where the question is the object of that law: as in the

case of the privileges of ambassadors, (»i) hostages, or ransom-bills.(n) In mercan-

tile transactions they follow the marine law,(o) and argue from the usages and

authorities received in all maritime countries. Where they exercise a concurrent

jurisdiction, they both follow the law of the proper forum: (p) in matters ori-

ginally of ecclesiastical cognizance, they both equally adopt the canon or imperial

law, according to the nature of the subject; (q) and if a question came before

either, which was properly the object of a foreign municipal law, they would

both receive information what is the rule of Ute country, (r)and would both
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decide accordingly.

Such then being the parity of law and reason which governs both species

of courts, wherein (it may be asked) does their essential difference consist ? It

principally consists in the different modes of administering justice in each; in

the mode of proof, the mode of trial, and the mode of relief. Upon these, and

upon two other accidental grounds of jurisdiction, which were formerly driven

into those courts by narrow decisions of the courts of law, viz.: the true con-

F *437 ~\ 8*ruo^on °f securities for money lent, and the form and effect *of a trust

L -"or second use; upon these main pillars hath been gradually erected that

structure of jurisprudence, which prevails in our courts of equity, and is inwardly

bottomed upon the same substantial foundations as the legal system which hath

hitherto been delineated in these Commentaries; however different they may

appear in their outward form, from the different taste of their architects.

1. And first, as to the mode of proof. When facts, or their leading circum-

stances, rest only in the knowledge of the party, a court of equity applies itself

to his conscience, and purges him upon oath with regard to the truth of the

transaction ; and, that being once discovered, the judgment is the same in equity

as it would have been at law. But for want of this discovery at law, the courts

of equity have acquired a concurrent jurisdiction with every other court in all

matters of account.^) As incident to accounts, they take a concurrent cogni-

zance of the administration of personal assets,(<) consequently of debts, legacies,

the distribution of the residue, and the conduct of executors and administra-

tors. (M) As incident to accounts, they also take the concurrent jurisdiction of

tithes, and all questions relating thereto; (w) of all dealings in partnership,^) and

many other mercantile transactions; and so of bailiffs, receivers, factors, and

agents, (y) It would be endless to point out all the several avenues in human

affairs, and in this commercial age, which lead to or end in accounts.

From the same fruitful source, the compulsive discovery upon oath, the courts

of equity have acquired a jurisdiction over almost all matters of fraud ; (2) all

matters in the private knowledge of the party, which, though concealed, are

binding in conscience; and all judgments at law, obtained through such fraud or

ft) 2 Atk. 239.

(I) /)'.''"'' »"'<"•«• cogitarepcrnoiatque dicere dcbemut, dejurepapuli liomani. yuardictt atmt ft troditm.

CU1. de Leg. 1. 8, odctilc.

fmj See book I, p. 253, (n) Rieord v Iletlcnliam, Tr. 8 Geo. Ill, B. 11.

foj See book I, p. 75. Book n, m>. 4)9, 401, 487. (p) See book II. p. 513. (q) ] bid. 504.

(r)lbld. 4H3. (») 1 Chii. Cn. 57. r<J2r. WIIIK. 145. (u)* Chn. Ca. 152.

(wj i liq. Ca. Abr. 367. (xj-t Vern. 277. (yJItU.M. (zjt Chu. Ca. 46.
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concealment And this, not by *impeaehing or reversing the judgment ,- $.00 -i

itself, but by prohibiting the plaintiff from taking any advantage of a "- '" '

judgment, obtained by suppressing the truth ; (a) and which, had the same facts

appeared on the trial as now are discovered, he would never have attained at all.

2. As to the mode of (rial. This is by interrogatories administered to the

witnesses, upon which their depositions are taken in writing, wherever they

happen to reside. If therefore the cause arises in a foreign country, and the

witnesses reside upon the spot; if, in causes arising in England, the witnesses

are abroad, or shortly to leave the kingdom ; or if witnesses residing at home

are aged or infirm ; any of these cases lays a ground for a court of equity to

grant a commission to examine them, and (in consequence) ( 9) to exercise the

same jurisdiction, which might have been exercised at law, if the witnesses could

probably attend.

3. With respect to the mode of relief. The want of a more specific remedy

than can be obtained in the courts of law gives a concurrent jurisdiction to a

court of equity in a great variety of cases. To instance in executory agreements.

A court of equity will compel them to be carried into strict execution, (b) unless

where it is improper or impossible: instead of giving damages for tneir non-

performance^ 10) And hence a fiction is established, that what ought to be done

shall be considered as being actually done, (c) and shall relate back to the time

when it ought to have been done originally : and this fiction is so closely pur-

sued through all its consequences, that it necessarily branches out into manv rules
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of jurisprudence, which form a certain regular system. So of waste, and" other

similar injuries, a court of equity takes a concurrent cognizance, in order to

prevent them by injunction, (d) Over questions that mav be tried at law, in a

great multiplicity of actions, a court of equity assumes a ^jurisdiction, r »,OQ -i

<- '''' '

to prevent the expense and vexation of endless litigations and suits.(e)

In various kinds of frauds it assumes a concurrent (/) jurisdiction, not only

for the sake of a discovery, but of a more extensive and specific relief: as by

setting aside fraudulent deeds, (g) decreeing re-conveyances, (/«) or directing an

absolute conveyance merely to stand as a security, (i) And thus, lastly, for the

sake of a more beneficial and complete relief by decreeing a sale of lands, (j) a

court of equity holds plea of all debts, incumbrances, and charges, that may

affect it or issue thereout.

4. The true construction of securities for money lent is another fountain of

jurisdiction in courts of equity. When they held the penalty of a bond to be the

form, and that in substance it was only as a pledge to secure the repayment of the

sum bona fide advanced, with a proper compensation for the use, they laid the

foundation of a regular series of determinations, which have settled the doctrine

of personal pledges or securities, and are equally applicable to mortgages of reul

property. The mortgagor continues owner 01 the land, the mortgagee of the

money lent upon it ; but this ownership is mutually transferred, and the mort-

gagor is barred from redemption, if, when called upon by the mortgagee, he does

not redeem within a time limited by the court ; or he may when out of possession

be barred by length of time, by analogy to the statute of limitations. (11)

5. The form ot a trust, or second use, gives the courts of equity an exclusive

jurisdiction as to the subject-matter of all settlements and devises in that form,

and of all the long terms created in the present complicated mode of convey-

ancing. This is a very ample source of jurisdiction : but the trust is governed by

(a) 3 P. Wins. 145. Year-book, 22 Eilw. IV, 87. pi. 21. (b) 1 Bq. Ca. Abr. 18.

(c> 3 P. Wins. 215. (d) \ Cha. Hep. 14. 8 Cha. Ca. 32.

(e) 1 Vern. i»S. Free. Cha. S8I. 1 P. Wins. «72. Stra. 404. ff) 2 P. Wms. 156.

(g) 1 Vern. M. 1 P. Wm». 289. (h) I Vern. 237. (i) i Vern. 84. (j) 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 337.

(9) The courts of law now have this jurisdiction, under statutes heretofore referred to.

(10) Specific performance, however, is not a matter of right, but always rests in tho discretion

of the court, and will not be decreed unless the contract was reasonable and fair : Seymour v.

Unlancy, 6 Johns. Ch. 2ir>, and 3 Cow. 555 ; -Autcr r. Miller. 18 Iowa, 405 ; Chambers p. Liver-

more. 15 Mich. 381 ; Hawralty v. Warren, 3 Green (N\ J.) Eq. 124 ; McCnrty v. Kyle, 4 Cold.

348 ; Pendleton v. Dalton, Phi'll. (N. C.) Eq. 119. A contract which is illegal, immoral, or against

public policy, will not be enforced. Dnmont v. Duforc. 27 lnd.263 ; Platt t>. Maples, 19 La. An. 459.

(11) Now the bar is by express statute. 3 aud 4 Wm. IV. c. 27. 6 28.
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very nearly the same rules, as would govern the estate in a court of law, (k) if

F *440 1 no *;ru8'ee was interposed: and *by a regular positive system established

L -1 in the courts of equity, the doctrine of trusts is now reduced to as great

a certainty as that of legal estates in the courts of the common law.

These are the principal (for I omit the minuter) grounds of the jurisdiction

at present exercised in our courts of equity: which differ, we see, very consider-

ably from the notions entertained by strangers, and even by those courts them-

selves before they arrived to maturity; as appears from the principles laid down,

and the jealousies entertained of their abuse, by our early juridical writers cited

in a former page; (I) and which have been implicitly received and handed down

by subsequent compilers, without attending to those gradual accessions and

derelictions, by which in the course of a century this mighty river hath imper-

ceptibly shifted its channel. Lambard, in particular, in the reign of Queen

Elizabeth, lays it down, (m) that "equity should not be appealed unto, but only

in rare and extraordinary matters: and that a good chancellor will not arrogate

authority in every complaint that shall be brought before him upon whatsoever

suggestion: and thereby both overthrow the authority of the courts of common

law, and also bring upon men such a confusion and uncertainty, as hardly, any man

should know how or how long to hold his own assured to him." And certainly,

if a court of equity were still at sea, and floated upon the occasional opinion

which the judge who happened to preside might entertain of conscience in every

particular case, the inconvenience that would arise from this uncertainty would
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be a worse evil than any hardship that could follow from rules too strict and

inflexible. Its powers would have become too arbitrary to have been endured

in a country like this, (n) which boasts of being governed in all respects by law

and not by will. But since the time when Lambard wrote, a set of great and

eminent lawyers, (o) who have successively held the great seal, have by degrees

erected the system of relief administered by a court of equity into a regular

r *44il *science, which cannot be attained without study and experience, any

*• -1 more than the science of law: but from which, when understood, it may

be known what remedy a suitor is entitled to expect, and by what mode of suit,

as readily and with as much precision in a court of equity as in a court of law.

It were much to be wished, for the sake of certainty, peace, and justice, that

each court would as far as possible follow the other, in the best and most effect-

ual rules for attaining those desirable ends. It is a maxim that equity follows

the law; and in former days the law has not scrupled to follow even that equity

which was laid down by the clercical chancellors. Every one who is conversant

in our ancient books, knows that many valuable improvements in the state of

our tenures (especially in leaseholds (p) and copyholds) (g) and the forms of

administering justice, (r) have arisen from this single reason, that the same

thing was constantly effected by means of a subpana in the chancery. And

sure there cannot be a greater solecism, than that in two sovereign independent

courts established in the same country, exercising concurrent jurisdiction, and

over the same subject-matter, there should exist in a single instance two differ-

ent rules of property, clashing with or contradicting each other.

It would carry me beyond the bounds of my present purpose to go further

into this matter. I have been tempted to go so far, because strangers are apt to

be confounded by nominal distinctions, and the loose, unguarded expressions to

be met with in the best of our writers; and thence to form erroneous ideas of

the separate jurisdictions now existing in England, but which never were sepa-

rated in any other country in the universe. It hath also afforded me an oppor-

F *442 1 tunity t° vindicate, on the one hand, the justice of our *courts of law

I -I from being that harsh and illiberal rule, which many are too ready to

suppose it; and on the other, the justice of our courts of equity from being the

result of mere arbitrary opinion, or an exercise of dictatorial power, which rides

over the law of the land, and corrects amends and controls it by the loose and

(Icj 2 P. Wm». MS, fl«8, 880. (1) Sec paec 483. (m) Jrctteion. 71. 78.

(HI 2 P. Wm>. 685, 688. (o) Sec piige 54. :.'., M. fpj (Jllb. of t^cctmout, 2. 1 Bao. Abr. 160.

(q) Bro. Abr. tit. tenant per copie, pi. 10. LHt. i 77. (r) See page 200.
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fluctuating dictates of the conscience of a single judge. It is now high time

to proceed to the practice of our courts of equity, thus explained, and thus

Understood. (12)

The first commencement of a suit in chancery is by preferring a bill to the

lord chancellor, in the style of a petition; " humbly complaining, sheweth to

your lordship your orator A B that," &c. This is in the nature of a declaration

at common law, or a libel and allegation in the spiritual courts: setting forth

the circumstances of the case at length, as, some fraud, trust or hardship ; "in

tender consideration whereof" (which is the usual language of the bill), " and

for that your orator is wholly without remedy at the common law," relief is

therefore prayed at the chancellor's hands, and also process of subpoena against

the defendant, to compel him to answer upon oath to all the matter charged in

the bill. And, if it be to quiet the possession of lands, to stay waste, or to stop

proceeedings at law. an injunction is also prayed, in the nature of an interdictum

by the civil law, commanding the defendant to cease.

This bill must call all necessary parties, however remotely concerned in

interest, before the court, otherwise no decree can be made to bind them; and

must be signed by counsel, as a certificate of its decency and propriety. For it

must not contain matter either scandalous or impertinent: if it does, the de-

fendant may refuse to answer it, till such scandal or impertinence is expunged,

which is done upon an order to refer it to one of the officers of the court, called

a master in chancery; of whom there are in number twelve, including the
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master of the rolls, all of whom, so late as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, were

commonly doctors of the civil *law. (s) The master is to examine the .- * ,..•> -,

propriety of the bill: and if he reports it scandalous or impertinent, such *- '

matter must be struck out, and the defendant shall have his costs; which ought

of right to be paid by the counsel who signed the bill.

When the bill is tiled in the office of the six clerks (who originally were all

in orders; and therefore, when the constitution of the court began to alter, a

law (t) was made to permit them to marry), when, I say, the bill is thus filed, if

au injunction be prayed therein, it may be had at various stages of the cause,

according to the circumstances of the case. If the bill be to stay execution

upon an oppressive judgment, and the defendant does not put in his answer

within the stated time allowed by the rules of the court, an injunction will issue

of course: and, when the answer comes in, the injunction can only be con-

tinued upon a sufficient ground appearing from the answer itself. But if an

injunction be wanted to stay waste, or other injuries of an equally urgent na-

ture, then upon the filing of the bill, and a proper case supported by affidavits,

the court will grant an injunction immediately, to continue till the defendant

has put in his answer, and till the court shall make some farther order concerning

it: and when the answer comes in, whether it shall then be dissolved or con-

tinued till the hearing of the cause, is determined by the court upon argument,

drawn from considering the answer and affidavit together.

But, upon common bills, as soon as they are filed, process of subpoena is taken

out: which is a writ commanding the defendant to appear and answer to the bill,

on pain of 100Z. But this is not all; for if the defendant, on service of the stib-

pCBna, does not appear within the time limited by the rules of the court, and

plead, demur or answer to the bill, he is then said to be in contempt; and the

(•) Smith's Commonw. b. II, c. 12. (!) Stat. 14 and IS Hen. VIII, c. 8.

(12) In some particulars great changes were made in proceedings in chancery by the statute

15 and 16 Vic. c. 86, and the general orders of court since adopted. These changes will appear

by the recent editions of Dauiell's Chancery Practice. Among the most important arc the right

of the court, on the application of either party, to order the evidence as to any facts or issues to

bo taken visa coce at the hearing, and the abolition of the office of master, and the putting of the

business of that office under the immediate direction and control of the judges. The court may

now, in its discretion, summon a jury to try before itself any disputed question of fact See

Fernie v. Young, L. B. 1 H. L. 63.
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respective processes of contempt are in successive order awarded against him.

F *444 1 ^^e nrst °^ wn*ck is an attachment, which is a writ "in the nature of a

' ': J capias, directed to tlie sheriff, and commanding him to attach, or take

up, the defendant, and bring him into court. If the sheriff returns that the

defendant is non est inventus, then an attachment with proclamation* issues ;

which, besides the ordinary form of attachment, directs the sheriff that he

cause public proclamations to be made throughout the county, to summon the

defendant, upon his allegiance, personally to appear and answer. If this be also

returned with non est inventus, and he still stands out in contempt, a commis-

sion of rebellion is awarded against him, for not obeying the king-'s proclama-

tions according to his allegiance: and four commissioners therein named, or

any of them, are ordered to attach him wheresoever he may be found in Great

Britain, as a rebel and contemner of the king's laws and government, by refus-

ing to attend his sovereign when thereunto required: since, as was before ob-

served, (M) matters of equity were originally determined by the king in person,

assisted by his council; though that business is now devolved upon his chan-

cellor. If upon this commission of rebellion a non est inventus is returned, the

court then sends a sergeant-at-arms in quest of him ; and if he eludes the

search of the sergeant also, then a sequestration issues to seize all his personal

estate, and the profits of his real, and to detain them, subject to the order of the

court. Sequestrations were first introduced by Sir Nicholas Bacon, lord keeper

in the reign of Queen Elizabeth ; before which the court found some difficulty
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in enforcing its process and decrees, (v) After an order for a sequestration

issued, the plaintiff's bill is to be taken pro confesso, and a decree to be made

accordingly. So that the sequestration does not seem to be in the nature of

process to bring in the defendant, but only intended to enforce the performance

of the decree. Thus much if the defendant absconds.

If the defendant is taken upon any of this process, he is to be committed to

the Fleet, or other prison, till he puts in his appearance, or answer, or performs

r *44" 1 wn&tever else this *process is issued to enforce, and also clears his con-

L ° J tempts by paying the costs which the plaintiff has incurred thereby.

For the same kind of process (which was also the process of the court of star-

chamber till its dissolution) (w) is issued out in all sorts of contempt during

the progress of the cause, if the parties in any point refuse or neglect to obey

the order of the court

The process against a body corporate is by distringas, to distrain them by

their goods and chattels, rents and profits, till they shall obey the summons or

directions of the court. And, if a peer is a defendant, the lord chancellor sends

a letter missive to him to request his appearance, together with a copy of the

bill ; and, if he neglects to appear, then lie may be served with a subpcena ; and,

if he continues still in contempt, a sequestration issues out immediately against

his lands and goods, without any of the mesne process of attachments, &c.,

which are directed only against the person, and therefore cannot affect a lord of

parliament. The same process issues against a member of the house of com-

mons, except only that the lord chancellor sends him no letter missive,

The ordinary process before mentioned cannot be sued out till after service

of the subpcena, for then the contempt begins; otherwise he is not presumed to

have notice of the bill : and, therefore, by absconding to avoid the subpcena a

defendant might have eluded justice, till the statute 5 Geo. II, c. 25, which enacts

that, where the defendant cannot be found to be served with process of subpcena,

and absconds (as is believed) to avoid being served therewith, a day shall be ap-

pointed him to appear to the bill of the plaintiff; which is to be inserted in the

London gazette, read in the parish church where the defendant last lived, and

fixed up at the royal exchange ; and, if the defendant doth not appear upon that

day, the bill shall be taken pro confesno.

But if the defendant appears regularly, and takes a copy of the bill, he is

next to demur, plead, or answer.

(u) Page 30. ( vj 1 Vera. 421. fw) 18 Hym. Fad. 195.
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*A demurrer in equity is nearly of the same nature as a demurrer in ,- ^,,,, -•

law; being an appeal to the judgment of the court, whether the defend- *• '

ant shall be bound to answer the plaintiff's bill; as, for want of sufficient matter

Of equity therein contained; or where the plaintiff, upon his own showing, ap-

pears to have no right; or where the bill seeks the discovery of a thing which may

cause a forfeiture of any kind, or may convict a man of any criminal misbe-

havionr. For any of these causes a defendant may demur to the bill. And if,

on demurrer, the defendant prevails, the plaintiff's bill shall be dismissed: if

the demurrer be over-ruled, the defendant is ordered to answer.

A plea may be either to the jurisdiction; showing that the court has no cog-

nizance of the cause: or to the person; showing some disability in the plaintiff,

as by outlawry, excommunication, and the like; or it is in bar; showing some

matter wherefore the plaintiff can demand no relief, as an act of parliament, a

fine, a release, or a former decree. And the truth of this plea the defendant is

bound to prove, if put upon it by the plaintiff. But as bills are often of a com-

plicated nature, and contain various matter, a man may plead as to part, demur

as to part, and answer to the residue. But no exceptions to formal minutite in

the pleadings will be here allowed; for the parties are at liberty, on the discovery

of any errors in form, to amend them, (x)

An answer is the most usual defence that is made to a plaintiff's bill. It ia

given in upon oath, or the honour of a peer or peeress: but where there are

amicable defendants, their answer is usually taken without oath by consent of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the plaintiff. This method of proceeding is taken from the ecclesiastical courts,

like the rest of the practice in chancery: for there in almost every case the

plaintiff may demand the *oath of his adversary in supply of proof, r *.. ~ -.

Formerly this was done in those courts with compurgators in the man- L J

ner of our waging of law; but this has been long disused; and instead of it

the present kind of purgation, by the single oath of the party himself, was

introduced. This oath was made nse of in the spiritual courts, as well in

criminal cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, as in matters of civil right; and it

was then usually denominated the oath ex officio: whereof the high commission

court in particular made a most extravagant and illegal use; forming a court

of inquisition, in which all persons were obliged to answer in cases of bare

suspicion, if the commissioners thought proper to proceed against them ex officio

for any supposed ecclesiastical enormities. But when the high commission

court was abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 11, this oath ex officio was abolished

with it; and it is also enacted by statute 13 Car. II, st. 1, c. 12, "that it shall

not be lawful for any bishop or ecclesiastical judge to tender to any person the

oath ex officio, or any other oath whereby the party may be charged or com-

pelled to confess, accuse, or purge himself, of any criminal matter. But this

does not extend to oaths in a civil suit, and therefore it is still the practice, both

in the spiritual courts and in equity, to demand the personal answer of the

party himself upon oath. Yet if in the bill any question be put, that tends to

the discovery of any crime, the defendant may thereupon demur, as was before

observed and may refuse to answer.

If the defendant lives within twenty miles of London, he must be sworn before

one of the masters of the court: if farther off, there may be a dedimus potesfa-

tem or commission to take his answer in the country, where the commissioners

administer him the usual oath; and then, the answer being sealed up, either

one of the commissioners carries it up to the court: or it is sent by a messenger,

who swears he received it from one of the commissioners, and that the same has

not been opened or altered since he received it. An answer must be signed by

counsel, and must either deny or confess all the *material parts of the p *A±Q i

bill; or it may confess and avoid, that is, justify or palliate the facts. "- '

If one of these is not done, the answer may be excepted to for insufficiency,

and the defendant be compelled to put in a more sufficient answer. A defend-

(x) En cest court dr. chauncerie, home «e serra predjudiccpar arm minplc<ling on pnr tlefaut tie forme, tnea

snlnt"in< le rtryte, dfl nutter, car i7 doit ayardfr xotonrrttc consciens, et nemi tx rigorc juris. Ztyrer.s-y'e des

court ei, adit. 1431, fol. 21)0, 297. Bro. Abr. tit. Jurisdiction, 50.
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ant cannot pray anything in this hia answer, but to be dismissed the court: if

he has any relief to pray against the plaintiff, he must do it by an. original bill

of his own, which is called a cross-bill.

After answer put in, the plaintiff, upon payment of costs, may amend his

bill, either by adding new parties or new matter, or both, upon the new lights

given him by the defendant; and the defendant is obliged to answer afresh to

such amended bill. But this must be before the plaintiff has replied to the

defendant's answer, whereby the cause is at issue: for afterwards, if new matter

arises which did not exist before, he must set it forth by a supplemental-bill.

There may be also a bill of revivor when the suit is abated by the death of any

of the parties; in order to set the proceedings again in motion, without which

they remain at a stand. And there is likewise a bill of interpleader, (13) where

a person who owes a debt or rent to one of the parties in suit, but, till the deter-

mination of it, he knows not to which, desires that they may interplead, that he

may be safe in the payment. In this last case it is usual to order the money to

be paid into court for the benefit of such of the parties to whom, upon hearing,

the court shall decree it to be due. But this depends upon circumstances; and

the plaintiff must also annex an affidavit to his bill, swearing that he does not

collude with either of the parties. (14)

If the plaintiff finds sufficient matter confessed in the defendant's answer to

ground a decree upon, he may proceed to the hearing of the cause upon bill and

answer only. But in that case he must take the defendant's answer to be true
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in every point. Otherwise the course is for the plaintiff to reply generally to

the answer, averring his bill to be true, certain and sufficient, and the defend-

T*4491 ant'8 answer *° ^ "directly the reverse; which he is ready to prove as

L J the court shall award; upon which the defendant rejoins, averring the

like on his side; which is joining issue upon the facts in dispute . To prove

which facts is the next concern.

This is done by examination of witnesses, and taking their depositions in

writing, according to the manner of the civil law. And for that purpose inter-

rogatories are framed, or questions in writing; which, and which only, are to be

proposed to, and asked of, the witnesses in the cause. These interrogatories

must be short and pertinent; not leading ones; (as, " did not you see this ?" or,

" did not you hear that ?") for if they be such the depositions taken thereon

will be suppressed and not suffered to be read. For the purpose of examining

witnesses in or near London, there is an examiner's office appointed; but for

such as live in the country, a commission to examine witnesses is usually

granted to four commissioners, two named of each side, or any three or two of

them, to take the depositions there. And if the witnesses reside beyond sea, a

commission may be had to examine them there upon their own oaths, and (if

foreigners) upon the oaths of skilful interpreters. And it hath been estab-

lished (y) that the deposition of an heathen who believes in the Supreme Being,

taken by commission in the most solemn manner according to the custom of

his own country, may be read in evidence.

The commissioners are sworn to take the examinations truly and without

partiality, and not to divulge them till published in the court of chancery; and

J»/) Ormichnnd <•.. Barker', 1 Alk. 21.

(13) [Without depriving courts of equity of their jurisdiction in these esses, the statute of

1 and 2 Win. IV, c. 58, gives, to a considerable extent, a concurrent jurisdiction to courts of

law. Upon the application of a defendant sued in any action of assumpgit, debt detinue; or

trover, such application being made after the declaration and before plea, showing that the

defendant does not claim any interest in the subject-matter of the suit, but that the right is

claimed by or supposed to belong to gome third person ; the court may order such third per-

son to appear and maintain, or relinquish, his claim; and in the meantime stay such action.

If such third party should not appear, the court may bar his claim against the original defend-

ant, his executors or administrators; and make such order between such defendant and the

plaintiff, as to costs and other matters, as may appear just.]

(14) [And must bring the money (if any is due) into court, oral least offer to do so by his bill.

Prac. Reg. 39; Bunb. 303. Bargord. Cn. 250; MM. PI. 40.]
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their clerks are also sworn to secrecy. Their witnesses are compellable by pro-

cess of subpoena, as in the courts of common law, to appear and submit to

examination. And when their depositions are taken, they are transmitted to

the court with the same care that the answer of a defendant is sent

*If witnesses to a disputable fact are old and infirm, it is very usual r *AK(\ -i

to file a bill to perpetuate the testimony of those witnesses, although >• J

no suit is depending; for, it may be, a man's antagonist only waits for the death

of some of them to begin his suit This is most frequent when lands are

devised by will away from the heir at law; and the devisee, in order to per-

petuate the testimony of the witnesses to such will,, exhibits a bill in chancery

against the heir, and sets forth the will verbatim therein, suggesting that the

heir is inclined to dispute its validity; and then, the defendant having answered,

they proceed to issue as in other cases, and examine the witnesses to the will;

after which the cause is at an end, without proceeding to any decree, no relief

being prayed by the bill; but the heir is entitled to his costs, even though he

contests the will. This is what is usually meant by proving a will in chancery.

When all the witnesses are examined, then, and not before, the depositions

may be published, by a rule to pass publication; after which they are open

for the inspection of all the parties, and copies may be taken of them. The cause

is then ripe to beset down for hearing, which may be done at the procurement of

the plaintiff or defendant, before either the lord chancellor or the master of the
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rolls, according to the discretion of the clerk in court, regulated by the

nature and importance of the suit, and the arrear of causes depending before

each of them respectively. Concerning the authority of the master of the rolls,

to hear and determine causes, and his general power in the «ourt of chancery,

there were (not many years since) divers questions and disputes very warmly

agitated, to quiet which it was declared by statute 3 Geo. II, c. 30, that all orders

and decrees by him made, except such as by the course of the court were ap-

propriated to the great seal alone, should be deemed to be valid; subject never-

theless to be discharged or altered by the lord chancellor, and so as they shall

not be enrolled, till the same are signed by his lordship. Either party may

be subpoenaed to hear judgment *on the day so fixed for the hearing: r $.,, -•

and then, if the plaintiff does not attend, his bill is dismissed with >• *

costs; or, if the defendant makes default, a decree will be made against him,

which will be final, unless he pays the plaintiff's cost of attendance, and shows

good cause to the contrary on a day appointed by the court A plaintiff's bill

may also at any time be dismissed for want of prosecution, which is in the

nature of a non-suit at law, if he suffers three terms to elapse without moving

forward in the cause.

When there are cross causes, on a cross bill filed by the defendant against the

plaintiff in the original cause, they are generally contrived to be brought on

together, that the same hearing and the same decree may serve for both of them.

The method of hearing causes in court is usually this. The parties on both sides

appearing by their counsel, the plaintiff's bill is first opened, or briefly abridged,

and the defendant's answer also, by the junior counsel on each side; after which the

plaintiff's leading counsel states the case and the matters in issue, and the points

of equity arising therefrom: and then such depositions as are called for by the

plaintiff are read by one of the six clerks, and the plaintiff may also read such

part of the defendant's answer as he thinks material or convenient: (z) and after

this, the rest of the counsel for the plaintiff make their observations and argu-

ments. Then the defendant's counsel go through the same process for him,

except that they may not read any part of his answer; and the counsel for the

plaintiff are heard in reply. When all are heard, the court pronounces the

decree, adjusting every point in debate, according to equity and good conscience;

which decree being usually very long, the minutes of it are taken down and

(«) On a trial :it law, It the plaintiff reads any part of the defendant's answer, he must read the whole of

it; for, bv reading any of It, he shown a reliance on the tnith of the defendant's testimony, and makes the

whole of his answer evidence.
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read openly in conrt by the registrar. (15) The matter of costs to be given to

either party, is not here held to be a point of right, but merely discretionary

(by the statute 17 Kic. II, c. 6), according to the circumstances of the case, as

f *4"2 1 ^ne^ *aPPear more OE less favourable to the party vanquished. And yet

' -I the statute 15 Hen. VI, C. 4, seems expressly to direct, that as well

damages as costs shall be given to the defendant, if wrongfully vexed is this

court.

The chancellor's decree is either interlocutory or final It very seldom happens

that the first decree can be final, or conclude the cause; for, if any matter of

fact is strongly controverted, this court is so sensible of the deficiency of trial

by written depositions that it will not bind the parties thereby, but usually

directs the matter to be tried by jury; especially such important facts as the

validity of a will, or whether A is the heir at law to B, or the existence of a mo^-

dus decimandi, or real and immemorial composition for tithes. But, as no jury

can be summoned to attend this court, the fact is usually directed to be tried at

the bar of the court of king's bench, or at the assizes upon a feigned issue. For

{in order to bring it there, and have the point in dispute, and that only, put in

issue) an action is brought, wherein the plaintiff, by a fiction, declares that he

laid a wager of 52. with the defendant that A was heir at law to B; and then

avers that he is so; and therefore demands the 51. The defendant admits the

feigned wager, but avers that A is not the heir to B; and thereupon that issae

is joined, which is directed out of chancery to be tried; and thus the verdict of

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the juror at law determines the fact in the court of equity. These feigned

issues seem borrowed from the sponsio judidalis of the Romans: (a), and are

also frequently us%d in the courts of law, by consent ef the parties to determine

some disputed right without the formality of pleading, and thereby to s*ve

much time and expense in the decision of a cause. (16)

So, likewise, if a question of mere law arises in the course of a cause, as

F *415S 1 wnet^er> Dv t^e word* of a will, an estate for life, or *in tail is created,

t J or whether a future interest devised by a testator shall operate as a re-

mainder or an executory devise, it is the practice of this court to refer it to the

opinion of the judges of the court of king's bench or common pleas, upon a

case stated for that purpose, wherein all the material facts are admitted, and the

point of law submitted to their decision; who thereupon hear it solemnly

argued by counsel on both sides, and certify their opinion to the chancellor.

And upon such certificate the decree is usually founded. (17)

Another thing also retards the completion of decrees. Frequently long ac-

counts are to be settled, incumbrancea and debts to be inquired into, and a

hundred little facts to be cleared up, before a decree can do full and sufficient

justice. These matters are always, by the decree on the first hearing, referred

to a master in chancery to examine; which examinations frequently last for

years; and then he is to report the fact, as it appears to him, to the court This

report may be excepted to, disproved and overruled; or otherwise, is confirmed

and made absolute, by order of the court

When all issues are tried and settled, and all references to the master, ended,

the cause is again brought to hearing upon the matters of equity reserved ; and

(H) \nliiMt tpontiojudicialit; " fpondesne quingentot rf turns sitl npondto,ti tm/s lit. Et tu quoqtu

iponileme quingentoi, ni tmii tit 1 ipondeo, ni meat tit.'' FWeHeincc. Anttquttat. 1. S, t. 16, 9 3, and Sijron.

dejudiciu. I. SI, p. 466, total, ibid.

(15) [It is now the practice for the registrar to read the minutes of the decree openly in

court; but any party to the suit may procure a copy of them, and if there is any mistake, may

move to have them amended.]

(16) [The consent of the court ought also to be previously obtained, for trial of a feigned issue

•without such consent is a contempt which will authorize the court to order the proceedings to

be stayed. 4 T. R. 402.]

(17) [Under the chancery amendment acts, the court of chancery may itself determine, with

the aid of a jury, those issues which were formerly directed to bo tried by a jury in a court of

common law.
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a final decree is made: the performance of which is enforced (if necessary) by

commitment of the person, or sequestration of the person's estate. And if,

by this decree, either party thinks himself aggrieved, he may petition the chan-

cellor for a rehearing ; whether it was heard before his lordship, or any of the

judges, sitting for him, or before the master of the rolls. For whoever may

have heard the cause, it is the chancellor's decree, and must be signed by him

before it is enrolled; (b) which is done of course, unless a rehearing be desired.

Every petition for a rehearing must be signed by two counsel of character, usu-

ally such as have been concerned in the cause, certifying that they apprehend

the cause is proper to be reheard. And upon the "rehearing, all the eVi- r *.., -•

dence taken in the cause, whether read before or not, is now admitted L -I

to be read; because it is the decree of the chancellor himself, who only now sits

to hear reasons why it should not be enrolled and perfected; at which time all

omissions of either evidence or argument may be supplied, (c) But, after the

decree is once signed and enrolled, it cannot be reheard or rectified but by bill

of review, or by appeal to the house of lords.

A bill of review (18) may be had upon apparent error in judgment, appearing

on the face of the decree; or by special leave of the court upon oath made of

the discovery of new matter or evidence, which could not possibly be had or

used at the time when the decree passed. But no new evidence or matter then

in the knowledge of the parties, and which might have been used before, shall

be a sufficient ground for a bill of review.
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An appeal to parliament, that is to the house of lords, is the dernier resort

of the subject who thinks himself aggrieved by an interlocutory order or

final determination in this court: and it is effected by petition to the

house of peers, and not by writ of error, as upon judgments at common law.

This jurisdiction is said (c?) to have begun in 18 Jac. I, and it is certain, that the

first petition which appears in the records of parliament, was preferred in that

year; (e) and that the first which was heard and determined (though the name

of appeal was then a novelty) was presented in a few months after; (/) both lev-

elled against the lord chancellor. Bacon, for corruption and other misbehaviour.

It was afterwards warmly controverted by the house of commons in the reign

of Charles the Second. (g) But this dispute is now at rest: (h) it being obvious

to the reason of all mankind, that, when the courts of equity became principal

tribunals for deciding causes of property, a revisision of their *decrees r *,,-_ -i

(by way of appeal) became equally necessary, as a writ of error from the L ''''-'

judgment of a court of law. And, upon the same principle, from decrees of

the chancellor relating to the commissioners for the dissolution of chauntries,

&c., under the statute 37 Hen. VIII, c. 4, (as well as for charitable uses under

the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4), an appeal to the king in parliament was always unques-

tionably allowed, (i) But no new evidence is admitted in the house of lords

upon any account; this being a distinct jurisdiction: (k) which differs it very

considerably from those instances, wherein the same jurisdiction revises and

corrects its own acts, as in rehearings and bills of review. For it is a practice

unknown to our law (though constantly followed in the spiritual courts), when

a superior court is reviewing the sentence of an inferior, to examine the justice

of the former decree by evidence that was never produced below. And thus

much for the general method of proceeding in the courts of equity.

(*) Stat. 3 Geo. II. c. 39. See page 450. (c) Glib. Rep. 1S1, 162. <<f) Com. Jour. 13 Mar. 1704.

<e) Lords' Jour. 23 Mar. KBO. (/) IWd. 3. 11, 12 Dec,. 1821. (o) Com. Jour. 19 Nov. 1675, Ac.

(A) Show. Parl. C. 81. (i) Duke's Charitable Uses, 62. (*) Glib. Kcp. 145, 156.

(18) [A bill of review is only necessary where a decree is signed and enrolled. Mitf. PI. 71.

It cannot be brought after twenty years. Id. 69; 1 Bro. P. C. 95; 5 id. 460; 6 id. 395.]

THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.
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APPENDIX.

No.l.

PROCEEDINGS ON A WRIT OF RIGHT PATENT. , ,

No. 1.

SECT. 1. WRIT OF RIGHT PATENT IN THE COURT-BARON.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland,

king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, greet-

ing. We command you that without delay you hold full right to Wuliam Kent,

Esquire, of one messuage and twenty acres of land with the appurtenances, in

Dorchester, which he claims to hold of yon by the free service of one penny yearly

in lien of all services, of which Richard Allen deforces him. And unless you do

so, let the sheriff of Oxfordshire do it, that we no longer hoar complaint thereof

for defect of right. Witness ourself at Westminster, the twentieth day of August,

in the thirtieth year of our reign.

Pledges of prosecution,

SECT. 2. WRIT OF TOLT, TO REMOVE IT INTO THE COUNTY COURT.

CHARLES MORTON, Esquire, sheriff of Oxfordshire, to John Long, bailiff, er-

rant of our lord the king and ot myself, greeting. Because by the complaint of Wil-

liam Kent, Esquire, personally present at my county court, to wit, on Monday,

the sixth day ot September, in the thirtieth year of the reign of our lord George

the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland king, de-

fender of the faith, and so forth, at Oxford, in the shire-house there holden, I am

age
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the appurtenances, in Dorchester, within my said county, of which Richard Allen

deforces him, hath brought to the said Willoughby, earl of Abingdon ; yet for that

the said Willoughby, carl of Abingdon, fovoureth the said Richard Allen in this

part, and hath hitherto delayed to do full right according to the exigence of the

said writ, I command you on the part of our said lord the king, firmly enjoining,

that in your proper person you go to the court-baron of the said Willoughby, earl

of Abingdon, at Dorchester aforesaid, and take away the plaint, which there is

between the said William Kent and Richard Allen by the said writ, into my county

court to be next holden ; and summon by good summouers the said Richard Allen,

that he be at my county court, on Monday, the fourth day of October next coming,

at Oxford, in the storehouse there to be holden, to answer to the said William Kent

thereof. And have you there then the said plaint, the snmmoners, and this pre-

cept. Given in my county court, at Oxford, in the ehirehonse, the sixth day of

September, in the year aforesaid.

SECT. 3. WBIT OF POKE, TO REMOVE IT INTO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting.

Put at the request of William Kent, before our justices at Westminster, on the

morrow of All Souls, the plaint which is in yonr county court by our writ of right,

between the said William Kent, demandant, and Richard Allen, tenant, of one

messuage and twenty acres of land, with the appurtenances, in Dorchester; and

summon by good summoners the said Richard Allen, that he be then there, to an-

swer to the said William Kent thereof. And have you there the summoners and

this writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the tenth day of September, in the

thirtieth year of our reign.
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SECT. 4. "WRIT OP RIGHT, QUIA DOMINCT EBMISIT CURIAU.

GEORGB the Second, by the grace of Chid, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland

kiiiL'. defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, creeling.

Command Richard Allen, that he justly and without delay render unto William

Kent one messuage and twenty acres of land, with the appurtenances in Dorches-

ter, which hi< claims to be his right aud inheritance, and whereupon he complain* that

till] the aforesaid Richard unjustly deforces him. And unless he shall so do, and "if

the said William shall give yon security of prosecuting his claim, then summon by

good suuimoncrs the said Richard, that he appear before our justices at Westmin-

ster, on the morrow of All Souls, to show wherefore he hath not done it. And

have you there the summoners and this writ. Witness oursclf at Westminster, the

twentieth day of August, in the thirtieth year of our reigu. Because Willoughby,

earl of Abingdon, the chief lord of that fee, hath thereupon remised unto us his court

Sheriffs return. Pledges of ) John Doe. Suminouers of the > John Den.

prosecution. J Richard Roe. within-named Richard, ) Richard Fen.

SECT. 5. THE RECORD, WITH AWARD OF BATTEL.*

Writ.

Domfattl Rtmlri

rariam.

Court.
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Eipleci.

Defence.

Wager uf lint 11< I.

[Mr]

Replication.

Joinder of

lllltt.'I.

Gages Riven.

Awnrd of

Battle.

Pledget,

PLEAS at "Westminster before Sir John Willcs, knight, and his brethren,

justices of the bench of the lord the king at Westminster, of the term of Saint

Michael, in the thirtieth year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by

the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland king, defender of the

faith, &o.

Oxon, ) WILLIAM KENT, esquire, by James Parker, his attorney, demands against

to wit. ) Richard Allen, gentleman, one messuage and twenty acres of laud, with

the appurtenances in Dorchester, as his right and inheritance, by writ of the

Lord the king of right, because Willonghby, earl of Abiugdou, the chief lord

of that fee. hath now thereupon remised to the lord the king his court. And

whereupon he saith that he himself was seized of the tenements aforesaid, with

the appurtenances, in his demesne a« of fee and right, in the time of peace, in

the time of the lord George the First, late king of Great Britain, by taking the

esplees thereof to the yaluei [of ten shillings, and more, in rents, corn and grass].

Aud that such is his right he offers [suit and good proof]. And the said Richard

Allen, by Peter Jones, his attorney, comes and defends the right of the said

William Kent, and his seisin, when [and where it shall behoove him], and all [that

concerns it], aud whatsoever [he ought to defend] and chiefly the tenements

aforesaid, with the appurtenances, as of fee and right [namely, one messuage

and twenty acres of land, with appurtenances in Dorchester]. And this he i-

ready to defend by the body of his freeman, George Knuibold by name, who is

present here in court, ready to defend the same by his body, or in what manner

soever the court of the lord the king shall consider that* he ought to defend.

•And if any mischance should befall the said George (which God defend), he is

ready to defend the same by another man, who [is bonnden and able to defend

it]. And the said William" Kent saith, that the said Richard Allen unjustly

di-fends the right of him the said William, and his seisin, Ac., and all, <fcc., and

•whatsoever, <tc., and chiefly of the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances,

as of fee and right, <tc.; because ho saith, that he himself was seized of the

tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, in his demesne as of fee aud right,

in the time of peace, in the time of the said lord George the First, late

king of Great Bntain, by taking the esplees thereof to this value, <fec. And

that such is his right, he is prepared to prove by the body of his freeman,

Henry Broughton by name, who is present here in court ready to prove

the same by his body, or in what manner soever the court of the lord

the king shall consider that he ought to prove; and if any mischance
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Reginald Read and Simon Tayler. And thereupon day is here given as well v°-*•

to the said William Kent as to the said Richard Allen, to wit, on the morrow =====

of Saint Martin next coming, by the assent as well of the said William Kent as _ .

of the said Richard Allen. And it is commanded that each of them then have on nuano&

here his champion, sufficiently furnished with competent armour as becomes

him, and ready to make the battel aforesaid : and that the bodies of them in the

meantime be safely ke.pt, on peril that shall fall thereon. A t which day here champions

come as well the said William Kent as the said Richard Allen by their attorneys appear,

aforesaid, and the said George Kumbold and Henry Bruughtou in their proper

persons likewise come, sufficiently furnished with competent armour aa becomes

them, ready to make the battel aforesaid, as they had before waged it. And j^z-])™;™6"*

hereupon day is further given by the court here", as well to the said William Fields.

Kent as to the said Richard Alien, at Tothill, near the city of Westminster, in

the county of Middlesex, to wit, on the morrow of the Purification of the Blessed

Virgin Mary next coming, by the assent as well of the said "William as of the [*v]

aforesaid Richard. And it is commanded, that each of them have then there

his champion, armed in the form aforesaid, ready to make the battel aforesaid,

and that their bodies in the mean time, <tc. At which day here, to wit, at Tot-

hill aforesaid, comes the said Richard Allen by his attorney aforesaid, and the said

George Rumbold and Henry Broughton in their proper persons likewise come,

sufficiently furnished with competent armour as becomes them, ready to make

the battel aforesaid, as they before had waged it. And the said William Kent
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being solemnly called doth not come, nor hath prosecuted his writ aforesaid.

Therefore it is considered, that the same William and his pledges of prose- Demandant

euting, to wit, John Doe and Ricuard Roe, be iu mercy for his false complaint, and noll8Ult-

that the same Richard go thereof without a day, <te., and also that the said Richard

do hold the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances, to him and his heirs, quit p|na| ju(1

of the said William and his heirs, forever, Ac. for the. teuauc!

SECT. 6. TBIAL BT THE GRAND ASSIZE.

—And the said Richard Allen, by Peter Jones, his attorney, comes and defends _ .

the right of the said William Kent, and his seisin, when, <fcc., and all, <tc., and ence'

whatsoever, <tc., and chiefly of the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances,

as of fee and right, <fcc., and puts himself upon the grand assize of the lord the HIM.

king, and prays recognition to be made, whether he himself hath greater right

to hold the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances to him and his heirs as

tenants thereof as he now holdetb them, or the said William to have the said

tenements with the appurtenances, as he above demaudeth them. And he Tender of de-

tenders here in court six shillings and eight-pence to the use of the lord the now >*••*

king, &c., for that, to wit, it may inquired of the time [of tho seisin alleged

by the said William]. And he therefore prays, that it may be inquired by the

assize, whether the said William Kent was seized of the tenements aforesaid

with the appurtenances iu his demesne as of fee in the time ot the said lord the

king George the First, as the said William in his demand before hath alleged.

Therefore it is commanded the sheriff, that he summon by good summoners Summons of

four lawful knights of his county, girt with swords, that they be here on the the kulKhu-

octaves of Saint Hilary next coming, to make election of the assize aforesaid.

The same day is given as well to the said William Kent as to the said Richard

Allen here, <tc. At which day here come as well the said William Kent, as the BetunL

said Richard Allen; and the sheriff, to wit, Sir Adam Alstone, knight, now

returns, that he had caused to be summoned Charles Stephens, Randel Wholer,

Toby Cos, and Thomas Monday, four lawful knights of "bis county, girt with r*vi]

swords, by John Doe and Richard Roe his bailiffs, to be here at the said octaves

of Saint Hilary, to do as the said writ thereof commands and requires; and that

the said summoners, and each of them, are mainprized by John Day and James

Fleteher. Whereupon the said Charles Stephens, Raiidel Wheler, Toby Cox, and

Thomas Munday, four lawful knights of the county aforesaid, girt with swords, Election of tne

being called, hi their proper persons come, and being sworn upon their oath in recognttors.

the presence of the parties aforesaid, chose of themselves and others twenty-four,

to wit, Charles Stephens, Handel Wheler, Toby Cox, Thomas Munday, Oliver

Greenway, John Boys, Charles Price, knights; Daniel Prince, William Day,

Roger Lucas, Patrick Fleming, James Harris, John Richardson, Alexander

Moore, Peter Payne, Robert Quin, Archibald Stuart, Bartholomew Norton, and

Henry Davis, e quires; John Porter, Christopher Ball, Benjamin Robinson,

Lewis Long, William Kirby, gentlemen, good and lawful men of the county

aforesaid, who neither are of km to the said William Kent nor to the said Rich-

ard Allen, 1o make recognition of the grand assize aforesaid. Therefore it is

commanded tho sheriff, that be cause them to come here from the day of Easter rt''lrt flKuu.

in fifteen days, to make the recognition aforesaid. The same day is there given

to the parties aforesaid. At which day here come as well the said William Kent

460 APPENDIX.

Ho- n. as the said Richard Allen, by their attorneys aforesaid, and the recognitore of th«

assize, whereof mention is made above, being called, come, and certain of them,

to wit, Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler, Toby Cox, Thomas Munday, Charles

Recognitor. price, knights; Daniel Prince, Roger Lucas, William Day. James Harris, Peter

Payne, Robert Quin, Henry Davis, John Porter, Christopher Ball. Lewis Long,

v d -t f th a William Kirby, being elected, tried, and sworn upon their oath say, that the

"'""'' ""* said William Kent hath more right to have the tenements aforesaid with the

appurtenances to him and bis heirs, as he demandeth the same, than the said

Richard Allen to hold the same as he now holdeth them, according as the said

Judgment William Kent by his writ aforesaid hath supposed. Therefore it is considered,

that the said William Kent do recover his seisin against the said Richard Allen

of the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, to him and his heirs, quit

of the said Richard Allen and his heirs forever: and the said Richard Allen in

mercy, Ac.

*No. IL

- PROCEEDINGS IN AN ACTION OF TRESPASS IX EJECTMENT, BT

ORIGINAL, IN THE KING'S BENCH.

SECT. 1. THE ORIGINAL WRIT.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire-

land, king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Berkshire, greet-

ing. If Richard Smith shall give you security of prosecuting his claim, then

put by gage and safe pledges William Stiles, late of Newbnry, gentleman, so
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that he be before us on' the morrow of All-Souls, wheresoever we shall then be

in England, to show wherefore with force and arms be entered into one mes-

suage with the appurtenances, in Sutton, which John Rogers, esquire, hath

demised to the aforesaid Richard, for a term which is not yet expired, and

ejected him from his said farm, and other enormities to him did, to the great

damage of the said Richard, and against our peace. And have you there the

names of the pledges and this writ. Witness ourself at Westminster, the twelfth

day of October, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign,

return. Pledges of JJoHNDoE. The within named )j

prosecution, ) RICHARD ROB. William Stiles is at-

tached by pledges.

SECT. 2. COPT OF THE DECLARATION AGAINST THE CASUAL EJECTOR, WHO GIVES

NOTICE THEREUPON TO THE TENANT IN POSSESSION.

Michaelmas, the 29th of Sing George the Second.

Declaration. Berks \ WILLIAM STILES, late of Nowbury in the said county, gentleman, was

to wit, ) attached to answer Richard Smith, of a plea, wherefore with force and

arms he entered into one messuage, with the appurtenances, in Sutton in the

county aforesaid, which John Rogers, Esquire, demised to the said Richard Smith

for a term which is not yet expired, and ejected him from his said farm, and

other wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against

the 'peace of the lord the king, <tc. And whereupon the said Richard by

L V11IJ "Robert Martin his attorney complains, that whereas the said John Rogers, on

the first day of October, in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord the

king that now is, at Sutton aforesaid, had demised to the same Richard the

tenement aforesaid, with the appurtenances, to have and to hold the said tene-

ment, with the appurtenances, to the said Richard and his assigns, from the

Feast of Saint Michael the Archangel then last past, to the end and term of five

years from thence next following and fully to be complete and ended, by virtue

of which demise the said Richard entered into the said tenement, with the

appurtenances, and was thereof possessed; and the said Richard being so pos-

sessed thereof, the said William afterwards, that is to say, on the said first day

of October in the said twenty-ninth year, with force and arms, that is to say,

with swords, staves, and knives, entered into the said tenement, with the appur-

tenances, which the said John Rogers demised to the said Richard in form afore-

said for the term aforesaid, which is not yet expired, and ejected the said Richard

out of his said farm, and other wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the

said Richard, and against the peace of the said lord the king; whereby the

Baid Richard saith, that he is injured and damaged to the value of twenty pounds.

And thereupon he brings suit, <tc.

MARTIN, for the plaintiff, \ Pledges of ) JOHN DOB,

PETERS, for the defendant. ) prosecution, $ RICUARD ROB. •
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MR. GBOROE SAUNDERS: Hft

I am informed that you are in possession of, or claim title to, the premises men-

tii ii MM! in this declaration of ejectment, or to some part thereof; and I, being sued

in this action as a casual ejector, and having no claim or title to the same, do

advise you to appear next Hilary Term, in his majesty's court of king's bench at

Westminster, by some attorney of that court, and then and there, by a rale to be

made of the same court, to cause yourself to be made defendant in my stead ;

otherwise I shall suffer judgment to be entered against me, and you will be turned

oat of possession.

Tonr loving friend,

5th January, 1756. WILLIAM STILES.

•SECT. 3. THE RULE OP COUKT.

Hilary Term, in the twenty-ninth Tear of King George the Second.

Berks, ) IT is ORDERED by the court, by the assent of both parties, and

to wit. ) attorneys, that George Saunders, gentleman, may be made defendant, meuiiuge with

in the place of the now defendant, William Stiles, and shall immediately appear S^2SI>1ta*But-

to the plaintiff's action, and shall receive a declaration in a plea of trespass and ton, on the de-

ejectment of the tenements in question, and shall immediately plead thereto not ^M of Jolm

guilty: and, upon the trial of the issue, shall confess lease, entry, and ouster, '«"•*•

and insist upon his title only. And if upon the trial of the issue, the said George

do not confess lease, entry, and ouster, and by reason thereof the plaintiff can-

not prosecute his writ, then the taxation of costs upon such nonpros, shall cease,
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and the said G«orge shall pay such costs to the plaintiff, as by the court of our

lord the king here shall be taxed and adjudged, for such his default in non-

performance of this rule ; and judgment shall be entered against the said William

Stiles, now the casual ejector, by default. And it is further ordered, that if, upon

the trial of the said issue, a verdict shall be given for the defendant, or if the

plaintiff shall not prosecute his writ upon any other cause than for the not con-

fessing lease, entry, and ouster, as aforesaid, then the lessor of the plaintiff shall

pay costs, if the plaintiff does not pay them.

By the Court

MARTIN, for the plaintiff.

NEWMAN, for the defendant.

SECT. 4. THE RECORD.

Pleas before the lord the king at Westminster, of the Term of Saint Hilary, in the

twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by the grace of

God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland king, defender of the faith, &c.

Berks, > GEORGE SAUNDERS, late of Sntton, in the county aforesaid, gentleman,

to wit. S was attached to answer Richard Smith, of a plea, wherefor with force and

arms he entered into one messuage, with the appurtenances, in Sutton, which

John Rogers, Esq., hath demised to the said Richard, for a term which is not

yet expired, and ejected him from his said farm, and other wrongs to him

did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against the peace of the

lord the king that *now is. And whereupon the said Richard, by Robert Martin, [*x]

his attorney, complains, that whereas, the said John Rogers, on the first day of Declaration, or

October in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord the king that now is, cottnt-

at Sutton aforesaid, had demised to the said Richard the tenement aforesaid,

with the appurtenances, to have and to hold the said tenement, with the appur-

tenances, to the said Richard and his assigns, from the feast of Saint Michael

the Archangel then last past, to the end and term of five years from thence next

following, and fully to be complete and ended ; by virtue of which demise the

said Richard entered into the said tenement, with the appurtenances, and was

thereof possessed : and the said Richard being so possessed thereof, the said

George afterwards, that is to say, on the first day of October in the caid twenty-

ninth year, with force and arms, that is to say, with swords, staves, and knives,

entered into the said tenement, with the appurtenances, which the said John Rogers

demised to the said Richard, in form aforesaid, for the term aforesaid, which

is not yet expired, and ejected the said Richard out of his said farm, and other

wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against the

peace of the said lord the king ; whereby the said Richard saith that he is

injured and eudamagud to the value of twenty pounds : and thereupon he brings

suit [and good 'proof]. And the aforesaid George Saunders, by Charles New-

man, his attorney, conies and defends the force and injury, when [and where it P|es not llw

-lull behove himj; and saith that he is in no wise guilty of the trespass and "' " '"'" "''""

ejectment aforesaid, as the Richard above complains against him ; and thereof lMU<k
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Mo. n. he puts himself upon the country ; aud the said Richard doth likewise the same ; <

Therefore let a jury come thereupon before the lord the king, on the octave of the

warded, purification of the blessed Yirgiu Mary, wheresoever he shall then be in England,

who neither [are of kin Ui the said Kichard, nor to the said George], to recognize

[whether the said George, be guilty of the trespass and ejectmeut aforesaid] ;

because as well [the said George as" the said Richard, between whom the differ-

ence is, have put themselves on the said jury]. The same day is there given to

Borolt« tor de- tne pirtie* aforesaid. Afterwards the process therein, being continued be-

f.ult of jurors. tweeu the said parties of the plea aforesaid by the jury, js put between them in

respite, before the lord the king, until the day of Easter in lifteen days, where-

soever the said lord the king shall then be in England ; unless the justices of

the lord the king, assigned to take assizes in the county aforesaid, shall have come

before that time, to wit, on Monday the eighth of March, at Reading, iu the said

county, by the form of the statute [in that case provided], by reason of the default

of the jurors [summoned to appear as aforesaid]. At which day, before the lord

f*xil ° "1?' "* Westminster, come the parties aforesaid by their attorneys aforesaid ;

<• J and the aforesaid justices of "assize, before whom [the jury aforesaid came],

sent here their record before them, hod in these words, to wit : Afterwards,

Pottta. at the day and place within contained, before Heneage Ledger, Esquire, one of

the barons of the exchequer of the lord the king, and Sir John Eardly Wil-

mot, knight, one of the justices of the said lord the king, assigned to hold

pleas before the king himself, justices of the said lord the king, assigned to
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take assizes at the county of Berks by the form of the statute [iu that case pro-

vided], come as well the within-named Richard Smith, as the within-written

George Sauuders, by their attorneys within contained ; and the jurors of the

jury whereof mention is within made beiug called, certain of them, to wit,

Charles Holloway, John Hooke, Peter Graham, Ileury Cox, William Brown,

aud Frauds Oakley, come, and are sworn upon the jury ; and because the rest

of the jurors of the same jury did not appjar. therefore others of the bystanders

being chosen by the sheriff, at the request of the said Richard Smith, aud by the

~ command of the justices aforesaid, are appointed anew, whose names are affixed

to the panel within written, according to the form of the statute in such case

made and provided ; which said jurors so appointed anew, to wit, Roger Bacon,

Thomas Small, Charles Pye, Edward Hawkins, Samuel Roberts, and Uauiel

Parker, being likewise called, come ; and together with the other jurors aforesaid

before impanelled and Kworn, being elected, tried, and sworn to speak the truth

of the matter within contained, upon their oath say, that the aforesaid George

Verdict for the Saunders is guilty of the trespass and ejectment within-written, in manner and

form as the aforesaid Richard Smith within complains against him ; and assess

the damages of the said Riohard Smith, on occasion of that trespass and eject-

ment, besides his costs and charges which ho hath been put unto about bis suit

in that behalf, to twelve-pence ; and, for those costs and charges, to forty shil-

ling*. Whereupon, the said Riohard Smith, by his attornev aforesaid, prayeth

judgment against the said George Saunders, in and upon the verdict aforesaid,

by the jurors aforesaid given, in the form aforesaid ; and the said George Sauu-

ders, by his attorney aforesaid, saith that the court here ought not to proceed to

give judgment upon the said verdict, and prayoth that judgment against him,

Motion in ar- jue 8ajd George Saunders, in and upon the verdict aforesaid, by the jurors nfore-

meut!' " said, given in the form aforesaid, may be stayed, by reason that the said verdict

is insufficient and erroneous, and that the same verdict may be quashed, and that

the issue aforesaid may be tried anew by other jurors, to be afresh impanelled.

And, because the court of the lord the king here is not yet advised of giving

continuance, their Judgment of and upon the premises, therefore day thereof is given as well

to the said Richard Smith as the said George Sauuders, before the lord the

king, until the morrow of the ascension of our Lord, wheresoever the said

f*\ii] ''"''' "' il!' ki".- slu" ' '"'" '"' m ''•"';l:11!l1- to hear their judgment of aud upon

the premises, for that the court of the lord the king is not yet advised thereof.

At which day, before the lord the king, at Westminster, oome the parties afore-

said, by their attorneys aforesaid ; upon which, the record and matters aforesaid

having been SITU, and by the court of the lord the king now here fully under-

stood, and all and singular the premises having boon examined, and mature

Opinion of the deliberation being had thereupon, for th»t it seems to the court of the lord the

oouru ting now here that the verdict aforesaid is in no wise insufficient or erroneous,

and that the same ought not to be quashed, and that no new trial ought to be hod

of the issue aforesaid, — Therefore it is considered, that the said Richard do re-

jndicment for cover against the said George his term vet to come, of and in the said tenement-!,

the ]ii;iin! HI. with the appurtenances, and the said damages assessed by the said jury in form

Cost*. aforesaid, and also twenty-seven pounds six shillings and eight-pencu for his

costs and charges aforesaid, by the court of the lord the king here awarded to

APPENDIX. 463

" And let the said George be taken [until he maketh fine to the lord the king]." t y°- m-

And hereupon the said Richard, by his attorney aforesaid, prayeth a writ ot the -

lord the king to be directed to the sheriff of the county aforesaid, to cause him to writ of ponea-

have possession of his term aforesaid yet to couie, of and in the tenements afore- "ton.

said, \rith the appurtenances ; and it fs granted unto him, returnable before the

lord the king on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, -wheresoever he shall then be in

England. At which day, before the lord the king, at Westminster, cometh the

»aid Kichard, by his attorney aforesaid ; and the sheriff, that is to say, Sir Thomas »"••»•

Iteevc, knight, now sendeth, that he, by virtue of the writ aforesaid, to him

directed, on the ninth day of June last past, did cause the said Richard to have his

possession of bis term aforesaid yet to come, of and in the tenements aforesaid, with

the appurtenances, as he was commanded.

*No. III. [*xiii]

PROCEEDINGS ON AN ACTION OP DEBT TN THE COURT OF COM-

MON PLEAS ; REMOVED INTO THE KING'S BENCH BY WRIT OF

ERROR.

SECT. 1. ORIGINAL.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so forth ; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting.

Command Charles Long, late of Bnrford, gentleman, that justly and without delay

he render to William Burton two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly

detains, as he saith. And unless he shall do so, and if the said William shall make
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you secure of prosecuting his claim, then summon by good summoners the afore-

said Charles, that he be before our justices, at Westminster, on the octave of Saint

Hilary, to show wherefore he hath iiot done it. And have you there then the sum-

ffloners and this writ. Witness ourself, at Westminster, the twenty-fourth day of

December, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.

'

Chares

SECT. 2. PROCESS.

GEORUK the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting. •"' !"""tut'

Put by gage and safe pledges Charles Long, late of Buri'ord, gentleman, that he be

before our justices at Westminster, on the octave of the purification of the blessed POM.

Mary, to answer to William Burton of a plea, that he render to him two hundred

pounds, which lie owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith ; and to show where-

fore he was not before our justices at Westminster on the octave of Saint Hilary,

as he was summoned. And have there then the names of the pledges and this

•writ. Witness Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the twenty-third day of

January, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.

The within-named Charles Long ) EDWARD LBIOR, sheriff^ re-

is attached by pledges, ) ROBERT TANNER, torn.

e Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so forth : to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting. w*lj*J*™-.

We command you, that you distrein Charles Long, late of Bnrford, gentleman, by [ X1VJ

all his lands and chattels within youri bailwick, so that neither he nor any one

through him may lay hands on the same, until you shall receive from us another

command thereupon ; and that you answer to us of the issue of the same ; and that

you have his body before our justices, at Westminster, from the day of Easter, in

fifteen days, to answer to William Burton of a plea, that he render to him two

hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith, and to hear

his judgment of his many defaults. Witness Sir John Willes, knight, at West-

minster, the twelfth day of February, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.

The within named Charles Long hath nothing in my bailiwick, whereby be may sheriff* ratnrn.

be distreined. "

t Now omitted. See page 398.
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no. m.

Capiai ad re-

Nisei ill's return.

If on ft taunt*

tn.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and

: Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxford-

shire greeting. We command yon, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford,

gentleman, if he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so thai

you may have bis body before our justices at Westminster from the day of

Easter in five weeks, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that

he render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detaius,

as he saith ; and whereupon you have returned to our justices at Westminster,

that the said Charles hath nothing in your bailiwick, whereby he may be dis-

treined. And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, kuight,

at Westminster, the sixteenth day of April, in the twenty-eighth year of our

reign.

The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwiok.

_ GEORGZ the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so forth ; to the sheriff of Berkshire, greeting. We

command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if he may
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be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that yon may have his body be-

fore our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer to

William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds,

•which he owes him and unjustly detaius, as he saith ; and whereupon our sheriff

of Oxfordshire hath mode a return to our justices of Westminster, at a certain day

7] now post, that the 'aforesaid Charles is not found in his bailiwick ; and thereupon

it is testified in our said court, that the aforesaid Charles lurks, wanders, and runs

about in your county. And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir Johu

Willes, knight, at Westminster, the seventh day of May, in the twenty-eighth yeai

of our reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within named

^gff. Charles Long; which I have ready at the day and place within contained, accord-

ing as by this writ it is commanded me.

Or, upon the Return o/non est inventus upon the first capias, the plaintiff may sue

out an alias and a pluries, and thence proceed to outlawry: thus:

Alvucaptu.

SherlfT« re-

turn. .Yon at

inrentw.

Pinna capita.

Sheriff'* re-

turn. .v-';i at

*xvi]

facial.

GEORGE the Soct'id, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and

Ireland kiiig, defender of the fnith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxford-

shire greeting. We command you as formerly we commanded you, that you

take Charles Long, late of Bnrford, gentleman, if he may be found in your

bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before our jus-

tices at Westminster, on the morrow of the Hofy Trinity, to answer to William

Barton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds, which be

owes him and unjustly detaius, as he saith. And have yon then there this writ.

Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the seventh day of May, in the

twenty-eighth year of our reign.

The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and

Ireland king, defeuder of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire

greeting. We command you, as we have more than once commanded you, that

you take Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if he may be found in your

bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may hare his body before onr justices

at Westminster, from the day of the Holy Trinitv in three weeks, to answer to

William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds,

which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith. And have you there then

this writ. Witness, Sir Johu Willes, knight, at Westminster, the thirtieth day of

May, in the twenty-eighth year of our reigu.

The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.

•GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and
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he saith; and whereupon you have returned to our justices at "Westminster, 5o.ni. ^

from the day of the Holy Trinity in three weeks, that he is not found in your '

bailiwick. And have you then "there this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight,

at Westminster, the eighteenth day of June, in the twenty-eithth year of our

reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, at my county court held at Oxford, in Shertff'e re-

the county of Oxford, on Thursday, the twenty-first day of Juno, in the twenty- f^, eeaata.

ninth year of the reign of the lord the king within written, the within named

Charles Long was required the first time, and did not appear: and at my county Scmxdoemtttu.

court held at Oxford aforesaid, on Thursday, the twenty-fourth day of June, IVr"<> «**»

in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Lone" was required the second time, and

did uot appear: and at my county court held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday. Tarttoanatu.

the twenty-first day of August, in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was

required the third time, and did not appear: and at my county court held at Quarto exacttu.

Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the eighteenth day of September, in the year ;

aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required the fourth time, and did not ap-

pear : and at my county court held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the six-

teeuth day of October, in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required

the fifth time, and did not appear; therefore the said Charles Long, by the judg- I(leo

niriit. of the coroners of the snid lord the king, of the county aforesaid, according

to the law and custom of the kingdom of England, is outlawed.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Writ of proci*-
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Ireland king, defender of "the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire nation,

greeting, ll'hcreag, by our writ we have lately commanded you that you should

cause Charles Long, 'late of Burford, gentleman, to be required from county

court to county court, until, according to *the law and custom of our realm of [*xvil]

England, he should be outlawed, if he did not appear: and if he did appear,

then that you should take him and cause him to be safely kept, so that you

might have his body before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of all

Souls, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he rendered to him

two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith:

Therefore we comiuaud you, by virtue of the statute in the thirty-first year of

the lady Elisabeth, late queen of England, made and provided, that you cause

the said Charles Long to be proclaimed upon three several days according to

the form of that statute; (whereof one proclamation shall be made at or near

the most usual door of the church of the parish wherein he inhabits) that he

render himself unto you; so that you may have his body before our justices at

Westminster at the day aforesaid, to answer the said William Burton of the

plea aforesaid. And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes,

knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of June, in the twenty-eighth year

of our reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, at my county court held at Oxford, in the

county of Oxford, on Thursday tlie twenty-sixth day of June, in the twenty-ninth

year of the reign of the lord and king within written, I caused to be proclaimed

the first time; and at the general quarter sessions of the peace, held at Oxford

aforesaid, on Tuesday, the fifteenth day of July, in the year aforesaid, I caused to

bo proclaimed the second time: and at the most usual door of the church of Bur-

ford within written, on Sunday the third day of August in the year aforesaid, im-

mediately after divine service, one month at the least before the within named

Charles Long was required the fifth time, I caused to be proclaimed the third time,

that the said Charles Long should render himself uuto me, a.-* within it is com-

manded me.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, Prince and Ireland <;.,,•,„,>, ^aaga

king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire greeting. •<""•

We command you, that you omit not by reason of any liberty of your county,

but that you take Charles Long, late of Burford in the. county of Oxford, gentle-

man (being outlawed in the said county of Oxford, on Thursday the sixteenth

day of October last past, at the suit of William Burton, gentleman, of a plea of

debt, as the sheriff of Oxfordshire aforesaid returned to our justices at Westmin-

ster on the morrow of All Souls then next ensuing), if the said Charles Long

may be found in your bailiwick; and him safely keep, so that you may "have [*Jtviii]

his body before onr justice at Westminster from the day of St. Martin in fifteen

days to do and receive what our court shall consider concerning him in thig

behalf. H'itnexs, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the sixth day of Novem-

ber, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within named 5J|!:/rl!£ir<'turl1'

Charles Long; which I have ready at the day and place within contained, accord- ***»««•

ing m by this writ it is commanded me.

291

46G

APPENDIX.

SECT. 3. tHILL OF MIDDLESEX, AND LATITAT THEREUPON nr THE COURT or

KINO'S BENCH.

a«x for trvft-

]>aaa.

Ac 'taw

in .!.•„•.

S)ieri(Tsr«-

turn. ..Nonejf

! "'• ritil*.

LaUtal.

Ac rliam.

Middlesex, ) THB SHERIFF is commanded that he take Charles Long, late of

Bill at Middle- to wit. ) Burford, iu the county of Oxford, if he may be found in his bailiwick,

and him safely keep, so that he may hare his body before the lord and 1, i nir at

Westminster, on Wednesday next alter fifteen days of Easter, to answer William

Burton, gentleman, of a plea of trespass [and also to a bill of the said William

against the aforesaid Charles, for two hundred pounds of debt, according to the

custom of the court of the said lord and king, before the king himself to be exhibited] ;

and that he have there then this precept.

The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, oi Great Britain, France and Ireland
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king, defender of the faith, and so forth ; to the sheriff of Berkshire, greeting.

Whereas we lately commanded our sheriff of Middlesex that he should take

Charles Long, late of Burtord, in the county of Oxford, if he might be found in

his bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that he might be before us at Westminster,

at a certain day now past, to answer unto William Burton, gentleman, of a plea

of trespass [and <cbo to a bill of the said William against the aforesaid Charles,

for two hundred pounds of debt, according to the custom of our court, before

us to bo exhibited] ; and our said sheriff of Middlesex at that day returned to us

that the aforesaid Charles was not found in his bailiwick ; whereupon on the

behalf of the aforesaid William in our court before us it is sufficiently attested

tbut the aforesaid Charles lurks and runs about in your county : Therefore we

command you, that you take him, if he may be found in "your bailiwick, and

him safely keep, so that you may have his body before us at Westminster, on

Tuesday next after five weeks of Easter, to answer the aforesaid William of the

plea [and bill] aforesaid ; and have yon there then this writ. Witness, Sir Dud-

ley Kyder, knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of April, in the twenty-

eighth year of our reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within

named Charles Long ; which I have ready at the day and place within contained,

according as by this writ it is commanded me.

SKCT. 4. WRIT OF Quo MINUS IN THE EXCHEQUER.

GEORGE the Second, by the grace of God, of Groat Britain, France and Ireland

king, defender of the faith, and so forth ; to the sheriff of Berkshire, greeting.

We command you that you omit not by reason of any liberty of yonr county,

but that you enter the same, and take Charles Long*, late of Burford, in the

counts of Oxford, gentleman, wheresoever he shall bo found in yonr bailiwick,

and him safely keep, so that yon ma}- have his body before the" barons of our

exchequer at Westminster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer William

Burton, our debtor of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds which

he owes him and unjustly detains, whereby he is the less able to satisfy us the

debts which be owes us at our said exchequer, as he said he can reasonably show

that the same he ought to render : and have you there this writ. Witness, Sir

Thomas Parker, knight, at Westminster, the sixth day of May, in the twenty-

eighth year of our reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within

named Charles Long ; which I have ready before the barons within written, ao-

cording as within it is commanded mo.

SECT. 5. SPECIAL BAIL, ON THE ARREST OF THB DEFENDANT, PURSUANT TO THB

TESTATUM CAPIAS.

Bail bond to the KNOW ALL MRN by these presents, that we Charles Long, of Burford, in the

•heritt county of Oxford, gentleman, Peter llamond of Bix, in the said county, yeoman,

Sheriff's re-

turn.

Sheriffs re-

c»? 'cvnna.

'""'""

and Edward Thomliuson, of Woodstock, in the said county, innholder, we held
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payment welt and trnly to be mnrte, we bind ourselves and each of us by him- ""•nl-

self'for the whole and in gross, our and every of our heirs, executors, and admin- f«xxl

istrators. firmly by these presents, sealed with our seals. Bated the fifteenth day L J

of Mav, in the'twentr-eigbth year of the reign of onr sovereign lord George the

Second, by the grace'of God, king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender

of the faith, and so forth, and in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred

and fifty-five.

The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bonnden Charles Long

do appear before the justices of oar sovereign lord the king, at Westminster, on

the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer William Burton, gentleman, of a plea

of debt of two hundred pounds, then this obligation shall be void and of none

effect, or else shall be and remain in full force and virtue.

Sealed and delivered, being first CHARLES LONG. [L. s,]

duly stamped, in the presence PETER HAMOND. [L. s.]

of Kuu.utn THOMLINSON. [b. s.]

HENRY SHAW,

TIMOTHY GRIFFITH.

You Charles Long do acknowledge to owe unto the plaintiff four hundred

pounds, and you John Rose and Peter Hainond do severally acknowledge to owe

unto the same person the sum of two hundred pounds a piece, to be levied upon

yonr several goods and chattels, lands and tenements, upon condition that, if the of ball^before

defendant be condemned in tbe action, he shall pay the condemnation, or render "'
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himself a prisoner in the Fleet for the same; and, if he fail so to do, yon John

Roee and Peter Hamond do undertake to do it for him.

Trinity Term, 38 Gto. II.

Berks, \ ON a Teatatvm Capias from Oxfordshire against Charles Long, late of VM plece>

to tcit. ) Burford, in the county of Oxford, gentleman, returnable on the morrow

of the Holy Trinity, at the suit of William Burton, of a plea of debt of two

hundred pounds:

Tfie bail are John Rose, of Witney, in the county of Oxford, esquire, Peter

Eamond, of Bix, in the said county, yeoman.

RICHARD PRICE, attorney )

for the defendant s

The party himself in 4001

Each of the bail in 200J.

Taken and acknowledged the twetity-eighth

day of May, in the year of our Lord one

thousand seven hundred and fifty-five, de

bene <•««/ before me,

ROBERT GROVE,

one of the Commissioners.

•SECT. 6. THB RECORD, AS REMOVED BY WHIT OP ERROR. r*xxil

THE lord the king hath given in charge to his trusty and beloved Sir John Willea, Wrlt of erlot

knight, his writ closed in these words: —GEORGE the Second, by the grace of

God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, ktng, defender of the faith, and so forth;

to our trust}' and beloved Sir John Willes, knight, greeting. Because in the record

and process, and also in the giving of judgment of the plaint, which was in onr

court before yon and your fellows, our justices of the bench, by our writ, between

William Burton, gentleman, and Charles Long, late of Burford in the county of

Oxford, gentleman, of a certain debt of two hundred pounds, which the said

William demands of the said Charles, manifest error hath intervened, to the great

damage of him the said William, as we from his complaint are informed; we

being willing that the error, if any there be, should be corrected in due manner,

and thnt full and speedy justice should be done to the parties aforesaid in

this behalf, do command vou, that if judgment thereof be given, then under

your seul you do distinctly and openly send the record and process of the

plaint aforesaid, with all things concerning them, and this wnt; so that we

may have them from the day of Easter in fifteen days, wheresoever we shall

then be in England; that the record and process aforesaid being inspected, we

may cause to be done thereupon for correcting that error, what of right and

according to the law and custom of onr realm of England ought to be done.

Witness ourself at Westminster, the twelfth day of February, in the twenty-niath

year of our reign.
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No. m. THH record and process whereof in the said writ mention above is made, follow

chirfMtJi^T in these word8'

return.

.

The Becord.

PLEAS at Westminster before Sir John Willes, knight, and his brethren, jus-

tices of the bench of the lord the king at Westminster, of the term of the

Holy Trinity, in the twenty-eighth year of the reign of the lord GEORGE the

Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, king, de-

fender of the faith, &u.

bond.'

[*xxii]

in curio.

Defence.

Ovor proved of

bond mid coudi-

tion, rli. : to

•ward!" *"

Imparlance.

Continuance,

r(, ....
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I XXIIIJ

»ward.n0 ""''"'

Hii""folrtn'anet"

award. "

Oxon, ) CHARLES LONG, late of Bnrford, in the county aforesaid, gentleman,

to wit. ) was summoned to answer William Burton, of Yarnton, in the said

county, gentleman, of a plea that be render unto him two hnndred pounds,

w^'cn {"e °wes him and unjnstly detains [as he saith]. And whereupon the

"aid William, by Thomas Gough, his attorney, complains, that whereas, on the

first day of December, in the year of our Lord "one thousand seven hundred

fifty-four, at Banbury, in this county, the said Charles by his writing obligatory

did acknowledge himself to be bound to the said William in the said sum of

two hundred pounds of lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid to the said

William, whenever after the said Charles should be thereto required; neverthe-

less the said Charles (although often required) hath not piiid to the said William

the said sum of two hundred pounds, nor any part thereof, but hitherto alto-

gether hath, refused, and doth still refuse, to render the same; wherefore he

saith that he is injured, and hath damage to the value of ten pounds : and there-

upon he brings suit [and good proof]- -^nd be brings here into court the writ-

ing obligatory aforesaid; which testifies the debt aforesaid in form aforesaid;

the date whereof is the day and year before mentioned. Ami the aforesaid

Charles, by Richard Price, his attorney, comes and defends the force and in-

jury when [and where it shall behoove him], and craves over of the said writing

OD''8atoI7' and it is read nnto him [in the form aforesaid]: he likewise craves

°yer of the condition of the said writing, and it is read unto him in these

words : " The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bounden

Charles Long, his heirs, executors and administrators, and every of them, shall

aud do from time to time, and at all times hereafter, well and truly stand to,

obey, observe, fulfil and keep, the award, arbitrament, order, rule, judgment,

final end, and determination, of David Stiles, of Woodstock, in the said county,

clerk, and Henry Bacon, of Woodstock aforesaid, gentleman, (arbitrators in-

differently nominated and chosen by and between the said Charles Long and the

above-named William Burton, to arbitrate, award, order, rule, judge and deter-

mine, of all and all manner of actions, cause or causes of action, suits, plaints,

debts, duties, reckonings, accounts, controversies, trespasses and demands what-

soever had, moved, or depending, or which might have been had, moved or de-

pending, by and between the said parties, for any matter, cause or thing, from

the beginning of the world until the day of the date hereof), which the said

arbitrators shall make and publish, of or in the premises, in writing under their

bauds and seals, or otherwise by word of mouth, in the presence of two credi-

ble witnesses, on or before the first day of January next ensuing the date here-

of; then this obligation to be void and of none effect, or else to be and remain

in full force and virtue." Which being read and heard, the said Charles prays

leave to imparl therein here until the octave of the Holy Trinity ; and it is

granted unto him. The game day is given to the said William Burton, here, <tc.

At which day, to wit, on the octave of the Holy Trinity, here comes as well the

said William Burton as the said Charles Long, by their attorneys aforesaid :
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end and determination aforesaid, of and in the premises specified in the N"- '"•

condition aforesaid; alid then and there made and published their award by "

•word of mouth in manner and form following, that is to say, the raid arbitrators

did award, order and adjudge, that he the said Charles Long should forth-

with pay to the said William Burton the sum of seventy-five pounds, and that

thereupon all differences between them at the time of the making the said

writing obligatory should finally cease and determine. And the said William

further saith that although he afterwards, to wit, on the sixth day of January,

in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty-five, at Banbury

aforesaid, requested him the said Charles to puy to him the said William the

said seventy-five pounds, yet (by protestation that the said Charles hath not

stood to, obeyed, observed, fulfilled or kept any part of the said award,

•which by him, the said Charles, ought to have been stood to, obeyed,

observed, fulfilled and kept (for further plea therein he saith, that the said

Charles the said seventy-five pounds to the said William hath not hitherto

paid; and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment, and his

debt aforesaid, together with bis damages occasioned by the detention of the said

debt, to be adjudged unto him, etc. And the aforesaid Charles saith, that the plea Demurrer,

aforesaid, by him the said William in manner and form aforesaid above in his

replication pleaded, and the matter in the same contained, are in no wise

sufficient in "law for the said William to have or maintain his action aforesaid [*xxiv]

thereupon against him the said Charles; to which the said Charles hath no
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necessity, neither is he obliged by the law of the land, in any manner to

answer; and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore, for want of a sufficient

replication in this behalf, the said Charles, as aforesaid, prays judgment, and

that the said William may be precluded from having his action aforesaid there-

upon against him, <fcc. And the said Charles, according to the form of the (..,„„,„ ,,f

statute in that case made and provided, shows to the court here the cause of demurrer,

demurrer following: to wit, that it doth not appear, by the replication aforesaid,

that the said arbitrators made the same award in the presence of two credible

witnesses on or before the said first dav of January { as they ought to have done,

according to the form and effect of the condition aforesaid; and that the

replication aforesaid is uncertain, insufficient and wants form. And the afore- Joinder In de-

said William saith, that the plea aforesaid by him the said William in manner ""irrer.

and form aforesaid above in his replication pleaded, and the matter in the

game contained, are good and sufficient in law for the said William to have and

maintain the said action of him the said William thereupon against the said

Charles; which said plea and the matter therein contained, the said William

is ready to verify and prove as the court shall award; and because the afore-

said Charles bath not answered to that plea, nor hath he hitherto in any manner

denied the same, the said William as before prays judgment, and his debt

aforesaid, together with his damages occasioned by the detention of that debt,

to be adjudged unto him, Ac. And because the justices here will advise them- Continuance*,

selves of and upon the premises before they give judgment thereupon, a day ia

thereupon given to the parties aforesaid here, until the morrow of All Souls, to

hear their judgment thereupon, for that the said justices are not yet advised

thereof. At which day here come as well the said Charles as the said William,

by their said attorneys; and because the said justices here will farther advise

themselves of and upon the premises before they give judgment thereupon, a

day is farther given to the parties aforesaid here until the octave of St. Hilary,

to hear their judgment thereupon, for that the said justices here are not yet

advised thereof. At which day here come as well the said William Burton

as the said Charles "Long, by their said attorneys. Wherefore, the record and opinion of the

matters aforesaid having been seen, and by the justices here fully understood, court,

and all and singular the premises being examined, and mature deliberation

being had thereupon; for that it seems to the said justices here, that the said Replication

plea of the said William Burton before in his replication pleaded, and the matter insufficient,

therein contained, are not sufficient in law, to have and maintain the action

of the aforesaid William against the aforesaid Charles; therefore it is con-

sidered, that the aforesaid William *take nothing by his writ aforesaid, but [*.\.\v]

that he and his pledges of prosecuting, to wit, John Doe and Richard Koe, be judgment

in mercy for his false complaint; and that the aforesaid Charles go thereof for the .1,,-

without a day, Ac. And it is farther considered, that the aforesaid Charles fc^^Bt

dp recover against the aforesaid William eleven pounds and seven shillings, for iumpiat

his costs and charges by him about his defence in this behalf sustained, adjudged '~'' ';•'••'••

by the court here to the said Charles with his consent, according to the form of ccStT!em<1

the statute in that case made and provided: and that the aforesaid Charles may Execution,

have execution thereof, Ac.

Afterwards to wit, on Wednesday next after fifteen days of Easter in this General error
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pluiiitltr.

Costs.

Defendant

amerced.

and process aforesaid, and also in the giving or the judgment in the plaint

iil'cuv-mtl, it is manifestly i-rn-il in this: to wit, that the judgment aforesaid wan

given in form aforesaid for the said Charles Louj: against the aforesaid William

Barton, where by he law of i In- land judgment should have been given for the

said William Barton against the said Charles Long; and this he id ready to

verify. .1ml the said William prays the writ of the said lord the king, to warn

the Maid Charles Long to be before the raid lord the king, to hear the record

and process aforesaid; and it is granted nnto him; by which the sheriff afore-

said is commanded that by good [and lawful man of his bailiwick] he cause

the aforesaid Charles Long to know, that he be before the lord the king from

the day of Easter in five weeks, wheresoever [he shall then be in England]

to hear the record and process aforesaid, if [it shall have happened that in the

same any error shall have intervened]; and farther [to do and receive what the

court of the lord the king shall consider in his behalf]. The same day is given

to the aforesaid William Burton. At which day before the lord the king, at

Westminster, corned the aforesaid William Bui-ton, by his attorney aforesaid;

and the sheriff returns, that by virtue ot the writ aforesaid to him directed, he

had caused the said Charles Long to know, that he be before the lord the king at

the time aforesaid in the said writ contained, by John Den and Kit-hard Feu,

good, .'(•[-.. as by the same writ was commanded him; which said Charles Long

according to the warning given him in this behalf, here Cometh by Thomas

Wehb, his attorney. Whereupon the said William saith, that in the record and.

Rrocew aforesaid,'and also in the giving of the judgment aforesaid, it is mani-

istly erred, alleging the error aforesaid by him in the form aforesaid alleged,

and "prays that the judgment aforesaid for the error aforesaid, and others, iu

the record and process aforesaid being, may be reversed, annulled and entirely for

nothing esteemed, and that the said Charles "may rejoin to the errors aforesaid,

and that the court of the said lord the king here may proceed to the examina-

tion as well of the record and process aforesaid, as of the matter aforesaid above

for error assigned. 1ml the said Charles saith, that neither in the record and

process aforesaid, nor in the giving of the judgment aforesaid, in any thing is

there erred; and he prays in like manner that the court of the said lord the

king here may proceed to the examination as well of the record and process

aforesaid, as of the matters aforesaid above for error assigned. And because

the court of the lord the king here is not yet advised what judgment to give of

and upon the premises, a day is therefore given to the parties aforesaid until the

morrow of the Holy Trinity, before the lord the king wheresoever he shall

then be in England, to hear their judgment of and upon the premises, for that the

court of the lord the king here is not yet advised thereof. At which day before

the lord the king, at Westminster, come the parties aforesaid by the attorneys

aforesaid. Wliereupon, as well the record and process aforesaid, and the judgment

thereupon given, as the matters aforesaid by the said William above for

error assigned, being seen, and by the court of the lord the king here being

APPENDIX. . 471

By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within named "«•nl-

Charles Long; which I have ready before the lord the king at Westminster, at the rr '

day within written, as within it is'commanded me. tll"a; £??

GEOROK the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland corput.

king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, greeting. Writ of Jfcri

We command you that of the goods and chattels within yonr bailiwick of >**»••

Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, you cause to be made two hundred

pounds debt, which William Burton lately in our court before us at Westmin-

ster hath recovered against him, and also fifty pounds, which were adjudged in

our court before us to the said William, for his damages which he hatli sus-

tained, as well by occasion of the detention of his said debt, as for his costs and

charges to which he hath been put about his suit in this behalf, whereof the

said Charles Long is convicted, as it appears to us of record; and have that

money before us in three weeks from the day of the Holv Trinitv, wheresoever

we shall then be in England, to render to the said William of" his debt and

damages aforesaid; and have there then this writ. Witness, Sir Thomas Denison,

knight, at Westminster, the nineteenth day of June, in the tweuty-ninth year of

our reign.

By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have caused to be made of the goods and ?h

chattels of the within written Charles Long, two hundred and fifty pounds ; which /£

I have ready before the lord the king at Westminster, at the day within written, as

it is within commanded me.
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COMMENTARIES

OH

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.

BOOK THE FOURTH.

OF PUBLIC WRONGS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE NATURE OF CRIMES, AND THEIR PUNISHMENT.

•

WE are now arrived at the fourth and last branch of these Commentaries, which

treats of public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors. For we may remember

that, in the beginning of the preceding book, (a) wrongs were divided into two

species: the one private and the other public. Private wrongs, which are fre-

quently termed civil injuries, were the subject of that entire book: we are now

therefore, lastly, to proceed to the consideration of public wrongs, or crimes and

misdemeanors; with the means of their prevention and punishment In the

pursuit of which subject I shall consider, in the first place, the general nature

of crimes and punishments; secondly, the persons capable of committing crimes;

thirdly, their several degrees of guilt, as principals, or accessories; ^fourthly r^-,

the several species of crimes, with the punishment annexed to each by the *• '

laws of England; fifthly, the means of preventing their perpetration; and

sixthly the method of inflicting those punishments, which the law has annexed

to each several crime and misdemeanor.

First, as to the general nature of crimes and their punishment; the discussion
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and admeasurement of which forms in every country the code of criminal law ;

or, as it is more usually denominated with us in England, the doctrine of the

pleas of the crown ; so called, because the king, in whom centers the majesty

of the whole community, is supposed by the law to be the person injured by

every infraction of the public rights, belonging to that community, and is there-

fore .in all cases the proper prosecutor for every public offence, (b)

The knowledge of this branch of jurisprudence, which teaches the nature,

extent, and degrees of every crime, and adjusts to it its adequate and necessary

penalty, is of the utmost importance to every individual in the state. For (as

a very great master of the crown law (c) has observed upon a similar occasion)

no rank or elevation in life, no uprightness of heart, no prudence or circumspec-

tion of conduct, should tempt a man to conclude, that he may not at some time or

other be deeply interested in these researches. The infirmities of the best among

us, the vices, and ungovernable passions of others, the instability of all human

affairs, and the numberless unforeseen events, which the compass of a dav may

bring forth, will teach us (upon a moment's reflection) that to know with pre-

(aj Book III, ch. 1. (b) Seo book I, p. 268. (c) Mir Michael Foster, pref. to rap.
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cision what the laws of our country have forbidden, and the deplorable conse-

quences to which a willful disobedience may expose us, is a matter of universal

concern.

In proportion to the importance of the criminal law ought also to be the care

and attention of the legislature in properly forming and enforcing it. It should

r*Q-i be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform, *and universal;

L J and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of

humanity, and the indellible rights of mankind : though it sometimes (provided

there be no transgression of these external boundaries) may be modified, nar-

rowed, or enlarged, according to the local or occasional necessities of the state

which it is meant to govern. And yet, either from a want of attention to these

principles in the first concoction of the laws, and adopting in their stead the

impetuous dictates of avarice, ambition, and revenge; from retaining the dis-

cordant political regulations, which successive conquerors or factious have estab-

lished, in the various revolutions of government; from giving a lasting efficacy

to sanctions that were intended to be temporary, and made (as Lord Bacon ex-

presses it) merely upon the spur of the occasion; or from, lagtlv, too hastily

employing such means as are greatly disproportionate to their encl, in order to

check the progress of some very prevalent offence: from some, or from all, of

these causes, it hath happened, that the criminal law ig in every country of Eu-

rope more rude and imperfect than the civil. I shall not here enter into any

minute inquiries concerning the local constitutions of other nations: the inhu-
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manity and mistaken policy of which have been sufficiently pointed out by in-

genious writers of their own. (d) But even with us in England, where our crown

law is with justice supposed to be more nearly advanced to perfection ; where

crimes are more accurately defined, and penalties less uncertain and arbitrary ;

r*4i where all our accusations are public, and our *trials in the face of the

*• •• world; where torture is unknown, and every delinquent is judged by such

of his equals, against whom he can form no exception nor even & personal dis-

like;—even here we shall occasionally find room to remark some particulars that

seem to want revision and amendment These have chiefly arisen from too

scrupulous an adherence to some rules of the ancient common law, when the

reasons have ceased upon which those rules were founded; from not repealing

such of the old penal laws as are either obsolete or absurd; and from too little

care and attention in framing nnd passing new ones. The enacting of penalties,

to which a whole nation should be subject, ought not to be left as a matter of

indifference to the passions or interests of a few, who upon temporary motives

may prefer or support such a bill; but be calmly and maturely considered by

persons who know what provisions the laws have already made to remedy the

mischief complained of, who can from exjwrience foresee the probable conse-

quences of those which are now proposed, and who will judge without passion or

prejudice how adequate they are to the evil. It is never usual in the house of

peers even to read a private bill, which may affect the property of an individual,

without first referring it to some of the learned judges, and hearing their report

thereon, (e) And surely equal precaution is necessary, when laws are to be es-

tablished, which may affect the property, the liberty, and perhaps even the live*

of thousands. Had such a reference taken place, it is impossible that in the

eighteenth century it couW eTer have been made a capital crime, to break down,

(however maliciously) the mound of a fish pond, whereby any fish shall escape;

or to cut down a cherry tree in an orchard. (/) Were even a committee ap-

pointed but once in a hundred years to revise the criminal law, it could not have

continued to this hour a felony, without benefit of clergy, to be seen for one

month in the company of persons who call themselves, or are called, Egyptians.^)

It is true, that these outrageous penalties, being seldom or never inflicted, are

hardly known to be law by the public; *but that rather aggravates the mis-

chief, by laying a snare for the unwary. Yet they cannot but occur to

(d) Huron Montcsqulcn. marquis Beccarla, Ac. (e) Sec book n, p. US.

(ft Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. «*. SI Gee. II, c. 1'J. (g) Stat. 6 Eliz. c. 20.
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the observation of any one, who hath undertaken the task of examining the

great outlines of the English law, and tracing them up to their principles: and

it is the duty of such a one to hint them with decency to those, whose abilities

and stations enable them to apply the remedy.(l) Having therefore premised

this ajwlogy for some of the ensuing remarks, which might otherwise seem to

savour of arrogance, I proceed now to consider (in the first place) the general

nature of crimes.

I. A crime, or misdemeanor, is an act committed, or omitted, in violation of

a public law, either forbidding or commanding it. This general definition com-

prehends both crimes and misdemeanors; which, properly speaking, are mere

synonymous terms; though in common usage, the word "crimes" is made to

denote such offences as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller

faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the gentler name

of "misdemeanors" only. (2)

The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors

from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs or

civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong

to individuals, considered merely as individuals: public wrongs, or crimes and

misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to

the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capa-

city. As, if I detain a field from another man, to which the law has given him

a right, this is a civil injury, and not a crime: for here only the right of an indi-
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vidual is concerned, and it is immaterial to the public, which of us is in pos-

session of the land ; but treason, murder, and robbery are properly ranked among

crimes; since, besides the injury done to individuals, they strike at the very

being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where actions of this sort are

suffered to escape with iinpuiiity.(3)

(1) This hint has been taken, at last, and a thorough revision has been mode of the criminal

law of England, relieving it of its worst and most barbarous features.

(2) [In the English law. misdemeanor is generally used in contradistinction to felony, and

misdemeanors comprehend all indictable offences which do not amount to felony; as perjury,

battery, libels, conspiracies, attempts, and solicitations to commit felonies, <tc.]

For the enlarged meaning of the word felony in American law, see Carpenter ». Nixon, 5 Hill,

260 ; post, p. 94i note.

(3) [The distinction between public crimes and private injuries seems entirely to be created by

positive laws, and is referable only to civil institutions. Every violation of a moral law, or natu-

ral obligation, is an injury, for which the offender ought to make retribution to the individuals

•who immediately sutfcr from it; and it i* also a crime for which he ought to be punished to that

extent, which would deter both him and others from a repetiton of the offence. In positive

laws those acts are denominated injuries, for which the legislature has provided only retribution,

or a compensation in damages; but when, from experience, it is discovered that this is not

sufficient to restrain within moderate bounds certain classes of injuries.it then becomes neces

gary for the legislative power to raise them into crimes, and to endeavor to repress them by

the terror of punishment, or the sword of the public magistrate. The word " crime " has no

technical meaning in the law of England. It seems, when it has a reference to positive law,

to comprehend those acts which subject the offender to punishment. When the words high

crimes and mudemcanortt are used in prosecutions by impeachment, the words high crimes

have no definite signification, but are used merely to give greater solemnity to the charge.

When the word ertme is used with a reference to moral law, it implies every deviation from

moral rectitude. Hence we say, it is a crime to refuse the payment of a just debt; it is a

crime wilfully to do an injury to another's person or property without making him satisfac-

tion. To destroy another's property wilfully, without making the owner a compensation, is,

in all cases, a worse crime in reason than theft; because the individual deprived of his property

suffers precisely the same injury, and tbe public loses the benefit of that property, which con-

tributes to the support of no one; and be who does the injury has not the temptation of him who

steals to supply his wants. In the case of those actions which are only civil injuries, and to

which no legal punishment is annexed, the law has supposed that retribution will be sufficient to

deter the commission of them.]

The meaning of the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" underwent much discussion in

the case of President Johnson, who was triod on articles of impeachment in 1868, but the result

of the case was not such that auy authoritative rule can be derived from it. See, upon the gen-

eral subject, articles in the American Law Kogistor, vol. vi, N. S. pp. 857 and 641.

Wrongs done to individuals for which they may have a remedy by private action, but which

involve no offence against the state, are usually spoken of as torts.
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In all cases the crime includes an injury; every public offence is also a private

•wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the

r *g -i community. "Thus treason, in imagining the king's death, involves in it

I J conspiracy against an individual, which is also a civil injury; but, as this

species of treason in its consequences principally tends to the dissolution of

government, and the destruction thereby of the order and peace of society, this

denominates it a crime of the highest magnitude. Murder is an injury to the

life of an individual; but the law of society considers principally the loss which

the state sustains by being deprived of a member, and the pernicious example

thereby set for others to do the like. Robbery may be considered in the same

view: it is an injury to private property; but were that all, a civil satisfaction

in damages might atone for it: the public mischief is the thing, for the preven-

tion of which our laws have made it a capital offirtice. In these gross and

atrocious injuries the private wrong is swallowed up in the public : we seldom

hear any mention made of satisfaction to the individual; the satisfaction to the

community being so very great. And, indeed, as the public crime is not other-

wise avenged than by forfeiture of life and property, it is impossible afterwards

to make any reparation for the private wrong: which can only be had from the

body or goods of the aggressor.(4) But there are crimes of an inferior nature,

in which the public punishment is not so severe, but it affords room for a private

compensation also; and herein the destination of crimes from civil injuries is

very apparent. For instance: in the case of battery, or beating another, the
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aggressor may be indicted for this at the suit of the king, for disturbing the pub-

lic peace, and be punished criminally by fine and imprisonment; and the party

beaten may also have his private remedy by action of trespass for the injury

which he in particular sustains, and recover a civil satisfaction in damages. So,

also, in case of a public nuisance, as digging a ditch across a highway, this ia

punishable by indictment, as a common offence to the whole kingdom and all

r „„ -• his majesty's subjects; but if any individual sustains any special *damage

L J thereby, as laming his horse, breaking his carriage, or the like, the offen-

der may be compelled to make ample satisfaction, as well for the private injury

as for the public wrong.

Upon the whole we may observe, that in taking cognizance of all wrongs, or

unlawful acts, the law has a double view: viz., not only to redress the party in-

jured, by either restoring to him his right, if possible; or by giving him an

equivalent; the manner of doing which was the object of our inquiries in the

preceding book of these Commentaries; but also to secure to the public the bene-

fit of society, by preventing or punishing every breach and violation of those

laws, which the sovereign power has thought proper to establish for the govern-

ment and tranquility of the whole. What those breaches are, and how prevented

or punished, are to be considered in the present book.

II. The nature of crimes and misdemeanors in general being thus ascertained

and distinguished, I proceed, in the next place, to consider the general nature

of punishments: which are evils or inconveniences consequent upon crimes and

(4) [The civil right to sue for the injury the party has received for a case of felouy is not in

general merged or destroyed, but only suspended until he has performed his dnty to society, by

an endeavor to bring the offender to justice : and after the party on whom suspicion was fixed.

has been convicted or acquitted, without collusion, the prosecutor may support an action for the

same cause as that on which the criminal prosecution was founded. Stylos, 346; 12 East, 409 ;

Kep. T. Hardw. 350; 17 Ves. 3i9. No action can be brought, or bill in equity filed, in relation

to a felony, until the offender has been duly tried for the offence (id.), or that every exertion has

been made to bring him to justice.]

TUis is believed not to be law in the United States, where the management and control of

prosecutions for offences against the state are confined to officers chosen or appointed for the pur-

pose. Parties injured by a felony are not permitted to compound with the offender, and to

receive a compensation for suppressing a prosecution, or concealing the evidence of the crime;

but they may demand and recover compensation for the private injury the crime has inflicted

ic prosecutor may see fit

Co. ». Dona, 1 Gray, S3,

[Mil, I ur\ Ulny Ul m.ulll nuu 1CUU»C1 l.l'lll [n '|;-;M l"ll nil buo JH J^ tus lu|lll \

npon them, without awaiting the result of such action as the public prosecutor may see fit

to institute. See Plumer v. Smith, 5N. H. 554; Boston, <tc., B. R. C

and cases cited.
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misdemeanors; being devised, denounced, and inflicted by human laws, in con-

sequence of disobedience or misbehaviour in those, to regulate whose conduct

such laws were respectively made. And herein we will briefly consider thepower,

the end, and the measure of human punishment.

1. As to the power of human punishment, or the right of the temporal legis-

lator to inflict discretionary penalties for crimes and misdemeanors. (A) It is

clear, that the right of punishing crimes against the laws of nature, as murder

and the like, is in a state of mere nature vested in every individual. For it

must be vested in somebody; otherwise the laws of nature would be vain and

fruitless, if none were empowered to put them in execution: and if that power

is vested in any one, it must also be vested in all mankind; *since all r ^g-i

are by nature equal. Whereof the first murderer Cain was so sensible, •• ^

that we find him (i) expressing his apprehensions, that whoever should find him

would slay him. In a state of society this right is transferred from individuals

to the sovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being judges in their

own causes, which is one of the evils that civil government was intended to

remedy. Whatever power, therefore, individuals had of punishing offences against

the law of nature, that is now vested in the magistrate alone; who bears the

eword of justice by the consent of the whole community. And to this precedent

natural power of individuals must be referred that right, which some have

argued to belong to every state (though, in fact, never exercised by any), of

punishing not only their own subjects, but also foreign ambassadors, even with
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death itself; in case they have offended, not indeed against the municipal laws

of the country, but against the divine laws of nature, and become liable thereby

to forfeit their lives for their guilt, (k)

As to offences merely against the laws of society, which are only mala prdhi-

lita, and not mala in se; the temporal magistrate is also empowered to inflict

coercive penalties for such transgressions; and this by the consent of individuals;

•who, in forming societies, did either tacitly or expressly invest the sovereign

power with the right of making laws, and of enforcing obedience to them when

made, by exercising, upon their non-observance, severities adequate to the evil.

The lawfulness, therefore, of punishing such criminals is founded upon this

principle, that the law by which they suffer was made by their own consent; it is a

part of the original contract into which they entered, when first they engaged in

society; it was calculated for, and has long contributed to their own security.

This right, therefore, being thus conferred by universal consent, gives to the

state exactly the same power, and no more, over all its members, as each indi-

vidual member had naturally over himself or others. Whioh has *occa- *+„ -,

sioned some to doubt how far a human legislature ought to inflict capital I- -I

punishments for positive offences; offences against the municipal law only, and

not against the law of nature: since no individual has, naturally, a power of

inflicting death upon himself or others for actions in themselves indifferent.

With regard to offences m-ala in se, capital punishments are in some instances

inflicted by the immediate command of God himself to all mankind; as in the

case of murder, by the precept delivered to Noah, their common ancestor and

representative, " whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." (I)

In other instances they are inflicted after the example of the Creator, in his posi-

tive code of laws for the regulation of the Jewish republic: as in the case of the

crime against nature. But they are sometimes inflicted without such express

warrant or example, at the will and discretion of the human legislature; as for

forgery, for theft, and sometimes for offences of a lighter kind. Of these we are

principally to speak; as these crimes are, none of them, offences against natural,

but only against social rights; not even theft itself, unless it be accompanied with

violence to one's house or person: all others being an infringement of that right

(ID See Grntlne, •'<_;'. b. A p. 1. "-. c. 20. PuOendorf. L. of Nat. A N. I. 8, c. 3. (t) Gen. IT, 14.

(tj See book I, p. 2M. (I) Gon. Ix, 0.

303

0 CRIMES AND THEIR PUNISHMENT. [Book IV.

of property, which, as we have formerly seen, (m) owes its origin not to the law

of nature, but merely to civil society. (5)

The practice of inflicting capital punishments, for offences of human institu-

tion, is thus justified by that great and good man, Sir Matthew Hale: («) " When

offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a kingdom or state, destruc-

tive or highly pernicious to civil societies, and to the great insecurity and danger

of the kingdom or its inhabitants, severe punishment, and even death itself, is

necessary to be annexed to laws in many cases by the prudence of lawgivers."

It is therefore, the enormity, or dangerous tendency, of the crime that alone

can warrant any earthly legislature in putting him to death that commits it

f *101 *^ '8 no'; '^ fre<luency> only» or the difficulty of otherwise preventing

' J it, that will excuse our attempting to prevent it by a wanton effusion of

human blood. For, though the end of punishment is to deter men from offend-

ing, it can never follow from thence that it is lawful to deter them at any rate

and by any means; since there may be unlawful methods of enforcing obedience

even to the justest laws. Every humane legislator will be therefore extremely

cautious of establishing laws that inflict the penalty of death, especially for

slight offences, or such as are merely positive. He will expect a better reason

for his so doing than that loose one which generally is given; that it is found

by former experience that no lighter penalty will be effectual. For is it found,

upon farther experience, that capital punishments are more effectual ? Was the

vast territory of all the Russias worse regulated under the late empress Eliza-
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beth, than under her more sanguinary predecessors ? Is it now, under Cath-

erine II, less civilized, less social, less secure ? And yet we are assured that

neither of these illustrious princesses have, throughout their whole administra-

tion, inflicted the penalty of death; and the latter has, upon full persuasion of

its being useless, nay, even pernicious, given orders for abolishing it entirely

throughout her extensive dominions, (o) But, indeed, were capital punishments

proved by experience to be a sure and effectual remedy, that would not prove

the necessity (upon which the justice and propriety depend) of inflicting them

upon all occasions when other expedients fail. I fear this reasoning would

extend a great deal too far. For instance, the damage done to our public roads

by loaded wagons is universally allowed, and many laws have been made to

prevent it; none of which have hitherto proved effectual. But it does not there-

fore follow that it would be just for the legislature to inflict death upon every

obstinate carrier, who defeats or eludes the provision of former statutes. Where

the evil to be prevented is not adequate to the violence of the preventive, a

sovereign that thinks seriously can never justify such a law to the dictates of

F *111 *conscience aud humanity. To shed the blood of our fellow creature is

L J a matter that requires the greatest deliberation and the fullest conviction

of our own authority: for life is the immediate gift of God to man; which

neither he can resign, nor can it be taken from him, unless by the command or

Crmisaion of Him who gave it; either expressly revealed, or collected from the

YS of nature or society by clear and indisputable demonstration.

I would not be understood to deny the right of the legislature in any country

to enforce its own laws by the death of the transgressor, though peraons of some

abilities have doubted it; but only to suggest a few hints for the consideration

of such as are, or may hereafter become, legislators. When a question arises,

(m) Book H. c. 1. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 13.

(<>) O mini instructions for framing a now cixio of laws fur the Russian empire, f 210.

(1) [It is strange that the Ieame4 judge's conclusion, viz., that theft itself it not an offence

against natural rights, did not lead liiiu to gasped the fallacy of the position, that the right of

property otcesits origin not to the Jaw of nature, bnt merely to civil society, which he has also

advanced in a former book (book 2, p. 11), and which I have there presumed to controvert. If

thoft be not a violation of the law of nature and reason, it would follow that there is no moral

turpitude in dishonesty. " Non igitnr magis est contra natoram morbns aut egestas ant quid

hujusmodi quaui dotractio aut appetitio alien!."—Cic. Thou shall not steal, is certainly one of

the first procepts both of nature and religion. CHUISTIAN.
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whether death may be lawfully inflicted for this or that transgression, the wis-

dom of the laws must decide it; and to this public judgment or decision all

private judgments must submit; else there is an end of the first principle of all

society and government. The guilt of blood, if any, must lie at their doors,

who misinterpret the extent of their warrant; and not at the doors of the sub-

ject who is bound to receive the interpretations that are given by the sovereign

power.

2. As to to the end, or final cause of human punishments. This is not byway

of atonement or expiation for the crime committed; for that must be left to the

just determination of the Supreme Being; but as a precaution against future

offences of the same kind. This is effected three ways: either by the amend-

ment of the offender himself; for which purpose all corporal punishments, fines,

and temporary exile or imprisoment, are inflicted: or, by deterring others by

the dread of his example from offending in the like way, " ut pana (as Tally (p)

expresses it) ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat;" which gives rise to all

ignominious punishments, and to such executions of justice as are open and

public: *or, lastly, by depriving the party injuring of the power to do r*ioi

future mischief; which is effected by either putting him to death or con-I- -I

demning him to perpetual confinement, slavery, or exile. The same one end, of

preventing future crimes, is endeavoured to be answered by each of these three

species of punishment. The public gains equal security, whether the offender

himself be amended by wholesome correction, or whether he be disabled from
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doing any further harm: and if the penalty fails of botli these effects, as it may

do, still the terror of his example remains as a warning to other citizens. The

method, however, of inflicting punishment ought always to be proportioned to

the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and by no means to exceed it: there-

fore, the pains of death, and perpetual disability by exile, slavery, or imprison-

ment ought never to be inflicted, but when the offender appears incorrigible:

which may be collected either from a repetition of minuter offences ; or from

the perpetration of some one crime of deep malignity, which of itself demon-

strates a disposition without hope or probability of amendment; and in such

cases it would be cruelty to the public to defer the punishment of such a crim-

inal, till he had an opportunity of repeating perhaps the worst of villanies.

3. As to the measure of human punishments. From what has been observed

in the former articles, we mav collect, that the quantity of punishment can.

never be absolutely determined by any standing invariable rule; but it must be

left to the arbitration of the legislature to inflict such penalties as are warranted

by the laws of nature and society, and such as appear to be the best calculated

to answer the end of precaution against future offences.

Hence it will be evident, that what some have so highly extolled for its

equity, the lex talionis, or law of retaliation, can never be in all cases an ade-

quate or permanent rule of punishment. In some cases, indeed, it seems to be

dictated by natural reason; as in the case of conspiracies to do an injury, or

false accusations of the innocent; to which we may add that law of the Jews

and Egyptians, mentioned by *Josephus and Diordorus Siculus, that r*io-|

whoever without sufficient cause was found with any mortal poison in his "- ' -"

custody, should himself be obliged to take it. But, in general, the difference

of persons, place, time, provocation, or other circumstances, may enhance or

mitigate the offence; and in such cases retaliation can never be a proper measure

of justice. If a nobleman strikes a peasant, all mankind will see, that if a court

of justice awards a return of the blow, it is more than a just compensation. On

the other hand, retaliation may, sometimes, be too easy a sentence; as, if a man

maliciously should put out the remaining eye of him who had lost one before,

it is too slight a punishment for the maimer to lose only one of his: and there-

fore the law of the Locrians, which demanded an eye for an eye, was in this in-

etance judiciously altered by decreeing, in imitation of Solon's laws, (q) that,

he who struck out the eye of a one-eyed man, should lose both his own in,

(p) Pro Clumiio, 48. fa) 1'ott. Aut. b. 1. o. 28.
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return. Besides, there are very many crimes, that will in no shape admit of theso

penalties, without manifest absurdity and wickedness. Theft cannot be pun-

ished with theft, defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by

adultery, and the like. And we may add, tbat those instances, wherein retalia-

tion appeai-s to be used, even by the Divine authority, do not really proceed iipon

the rule of exact retribution, by doing to the criminal the same hurt he has done

to his neighbour and no more; but this correspondence between the crime and

punishment is barely a consequence from some other principle. Death is

ordered to be punished with death ; not because one is equivalent to the other,

for that would be expiation, and not punishment. Nor is death always au

equivalent for death : the execution of a needy, decrepit assassin is a poor satis-

faction for the murder of a nobleman in the bloom of his youth, and full enjoy-

ment of his friends, his honours, and his fortune. (6) But the reason upon

which this sentence is grounded seems to be, that this is the highest penalty

T*141 ^a'; man can inn^c';> *and tends most to the security of mankind; by re-

L J moving one murderer from the earth, and setting a'dreadful example to

deter others: so that even this grand instance proceeds upon other principles

than those of retaliation. And truly, if any measure of punishment is to be

taken from the damage sustained by the sufferer, the punishment ought rather

to exceed than equal the injury: since it seems contrary to reason and equity,

that the guilty (if convicted) should suffer no more than the innocent has done

before him; especially sis the Buffering of the innocent is past and irrevocable,
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that of the guilty is future, contingent, and liable to be escaped or evaded.

With regard indeed to crimes that are incomplete, which consist merely iu the

intention, and are not yet carried into act, as conspiracies and the like; the

innocent has a chance to frustrate or avoid the villainy, as the conspirator has

also a chance to escape his punishment: and this may be one reason why the

lex talionis is more proper to be inflicted, if at all, for crimes that consist in

intention, than for such as are carried into act. It seems indeed consonant to

natural reason, and has therefore been adopted as a maxim by several theoretical

writers, (r) that the punishment due to the crime of which one falsely accuses

another should be inflicted ou the perjured informer. Accordingly, when it

was attempted to introduce into England the law of retaliation, it was intended

as a punishment for such only as preferred malicious accusations against others;

it being enacted by statute 37 Edw. III. c. 18, that such as preferred any sug-

gestions to the king's great council should put in sureties of talmtion; that is,

to incur the same pain that the other should have had in case the suggestions

were found untrue. But, after one year's experience this punishment of talia-

tiou was rejected, and imprisonment adopted in its stead. (*•)

But though from what has been said it appears that there cannot be any regu-

r*i~-i lar or determinate method of rating the *quantity of punishments for

L J crimes, by any one uniform rule; but they must be referred to the will

and discretion of the legislative power: yet there are some general principles,

drawn from the nature and circumstances of the crime, that may be of some

assistance in alloting it an adequate punishment.

As, first, with regard to the object of it; for the greater and more exalted the

object of an injury is, the more care should be taken to prevent that injury,

and of course under this aggravation the punishment should be more severe.

Therefore treason in conspiring the king's death is by the English law, punished

with greater rigour than even actually killing any private subject. And yet,

generally, a design to transgress is not so flagrant an enormity as the actual

completion of that design. For evil, the nearer we approach it, is the more

disagreeable and shocking; so that it requires more obstinacy iu wickedness to

(rj Bcecftr. c. 15. (») Stat. S3 Eclw. Ill, c. 9.

(6) [It is possible; that the common tator meant tn flatter au audienco of tbo sons of noblemen,

bv iutinmtiujf that it was a loss crime to kill a poor old man, than to kill a nobleman even in the

bloom of youth! In the eye of every sound moralist there can be no difference.
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perpetrate an unlawful action, than barely to entertain the thought of it: and it

is an encouragement to repentance, and remorse, even to the last stage of any

crime, that it is never too late to retract; and that if a man stops even here, it

is better for him than if he proceeds: for which reason an attempt to rob, to

ravish, or to kill, is far less penal than the actual robbery, rape or murder. But

in the case of a treasonable conspiracy, the object whereof is the king's majesty,

the bare intention will deserve the highest degree of severity; not because the

intention is equivalent to the act itself: but because the greatest rigour is no

more than adequate to a treasonable purpose of the heart, and there is no greater

left to inflict upon the actual execution itself.

Again: the violence of passion, or temptation, may sometimes alleviate a

crime; as theft, in case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion than when

committed through avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses. To kill a

man upon sudden and violent resentment, is less penal than upon cool, deliber-

ate malice. The age, education, and character of the offender: the repetition

(or otherwise) *of the offence; the time, the place, the company wherein it r *,,, -•

was committed; all these, and a thousand other incidents, may aggravate L J •"

or extenuate the crime, (t)

Further: as punishments are chiefly intended for the prevention of future

crimes, it is but reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should

be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the public safety

and happiness; (u) and among crimes of an equal malignity, tho.se which a man
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has the most frequent and easy opportunities of committing, which cannot be

so easily guarded against as others, and which, therefore, the offender h.vs the

strongest inducement to commit; according to what Cicero observes, (v) "ea

sunt animadverttsnda peccata maxime, qius difficilUme prtBcaeentur" Hence it

is, that for a servant to rob his master is in more cases capital, than for a

stranger: if a servant kills his master, it is a species of treason; (?) in another

it is only murder; to steal a handkerchief or other trifle of above the value of

twelve pence, privately from one's person, is made capital; (8) but to carry off a

load of corn from an open field, though of fifty times greater value, is punished

with transportation only. And in the island of Man this rule was formerly

carried so far, that to take away a horse or ox was there no felony, but a tres-

pass, because of the difficulty in that little territory to conceal them or carry

them off: but to steal a pig or a fowl, which is easily done, was a capital mis-

demeanor, and the offender was punished with death, (w)

Lastly: aa a conclusion to the whole, we may observe that punishments of

unreasonable severity, especially when indiscriminately inflicted, have less effect

in preventing crimes, and amending the manners of a people, than such as are

more merciful in general, yet properly intermixed with due *distiuctions r*iw-i

of severity. It is the sentiment of an ingenious writer, who seems to *- '

have well studied the springs of human action, (x) Miat crimes are more

effectually prevented by the certainty, than by the severity, of punishment. For

the excessive severity of laws (says Montesquieu) (;/) hinders their execution:

when the punishment surpasses all measure, the public will frequently out of

humanity prefer impunity to it. Thus also the statute 1 Mar. st. 1, c. 1. recites in

its preamble, "that the state of every king consists more assuredly in the love of

the subject towards their prince, than in the dread of laws made with rigorous

pains; and that laws made for the preservation of the commonwealth without

(t\ Thus Demosthenes (in his oration against Mtdias, dimly works uii the aggravations of the InsulN ho

had received. " I was abused," says he, " Ijy niv encniy. in cold blood, out ot'malioe, not by heat of \vinej

in the morning:, publicly, before strangers as"well as citizens; and that in the temple, whither the duly ot

niv ofliee called me."

(«) Itourar. c. 6. (v) Pro Sexto Koscio, 40. (w) 4 Inst. 285. (z) Beccar. c. 7.

(V) S|i. L. I>. 6, e. 13.

(7) This is no longer the law. What was formerly petit treason is now murder. 9 Geo. IV,

c. :il. « 2.

(.-) The capital punishment for this ofience was abolished by statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 29.
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great penalties are more often obeyed and kept, than laws made with extreme

punishments-" Happy had it been for the nation, if the subsequent practice of

that deluded princess in matters of religion, had been correspondent to these

sentiments of herself and parliament, in matters of state and government I We

may further observe that sanguinary laws are a bad symptom of the distemper

of any state, or at least of its weak constitution, the laws of the Roman

kings, and the twelve tables of the decemviri, were full of cruel punishments:

the Porcian law, which exempted all citizens from sentence of death, silently

abrogated them all. In this period the republic flourished: under the emperors

severe punishments were revived; and then the empire fell. (9)

It is moreover absurd and impolitic to apply the same punishment to crimes

of different malignity. A multitude of sanguinary laws (besides the doubt that

may be entertained concerning the right of making them) do likewise prove a

manifest defect either in the wisdom of the legislative or the strength of the

executive power. It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues a want

of solid skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the nltimum sujiplicium, to

every case of difficulty. It is, it must l>e owned, much easier to extirpate than to

r*jo-i amend mankind: yet *that magistrate must be esteemed both a weak and

' J cruel surgeon, who cuts off every limb, which through ignorance or indo-

lence lie will not attempt to cure. It has been therefore ingeniously proposed, (z)

that in every state a scale of crimes should be formed, with a corresponding scale

of punishments, descending from the greatest to the least; but, if that be too
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romantic an idea yet a least wise legislator will mark the principal divisions,

and not assign penalties of the first degree to offences of an inferior rank. Where

men see no distinction made in the nature and gradations of punishment, the

generality will be led to conclude there is no distinction in the guilt. Thus in

i-Vance the punishment of robbery, either with or without murder, is the

same: (a) hence it is, that though perhaps they are therefore subject to fewer

robberies, yet they never rob but they also murder. In China, murderers are

cut to pieces, and robbers not: hence in that country they never murder on the

highway, though they often rob. Arid in England, besides the additional ter-

rors of a speedy execution, and a subsequent exposure or dissection, robbers

have a hope of transportation which seldom is extended to murderers. This has

the same effect here as in China; in preventing frequent assassination and

slaughter.

Yet, though in this instance we may glory in the wisdom of the English law, we

shall find it more difficult to justify the frequency of capital punishment to be found

therein; inflicted (perhaps inattentively) by a multitude of successive independent

(*) Beccar. c. 6. (a) Sp. L, V (',,<•. 18.

(9) [The most admirable and excellent statute ever passed by the English legislature is the

1 Edw. VI, c. 12. In the preamble it states, in a beautiful and simple strain of eloquence, that

" Nothing is more godly, more sure, more to be wished and desired betwixt a prince, the

supreme head and ruler, aud tho subjects whose governor and head ho is, than on the prince's

part great clemency and indnlgency, and rather too much forgiveness and remission of his

royal power and inst punishment, than exact severity and justice to bo showed; and on tho

subjects' behalf, that they should obey rather for love, aud for the necessity and love of »

king and prince, than for fear of his strait and severe laws. But as in tempest or winter oae

course and garment is convenient, in calm or warm weather a more liberal ease or lighter

garment botS may and ought to be followed and used; so we have seen divers strait aud

sore laws made in one parliament (the time so requiring), in a more calm and quiet reign of

another priuce bv the like authority and parliament taken away," <to. It therefore repeals

every statute which has created any treason siaee the 25 Edw. Ill, st. 5, c. 2. It repeals " all

and every act of parliament concerning doctrine or matters of religion." It repeals every

felony created by the legislature, during the preceding long and cruel reign oi Henry VIII.

It repeals tho statute 31 Hen. VIII, "that proclamations made by the king's highness, by

the advice of his honorable counsel, should be made and kept as though they were mado

by authority of parliament." It repeals also the extraordinary statute <le bigamis, 4 Edw. I,

hf. 3. c. 5. which enacted, that if any man married a widow, or married a second wife after

the death of tho first, he should be "deprived of the benefit of clergy, if he was convicted uf

any clergyable felony whatever.]
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statutes, upon crimes very different in their natures. It is a melancholy truth,

that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less

than a hundred and sixty have been declared by act of parliament (b) to be

felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant

death. So dreadful a list, instead of diminishing, increases the number of

offenders. (10) *The injured, through compassion, will often forbear to r*iq-i

prosecute; juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, L / -I

and either acquit the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offence; and judges,

through compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recommend them

to the royal mercy. Among so many chances of escaping, the needy and hard-

ened offender overlooks the multitude that suffer: he boldly engages in some

desperate attempt, to relieve his wants or supply his vices; and, if unexpectedly

the hand of justice overtakes him, he deems himself peculiarly unfortunate, in

falling at last a sacrifice to those laws, which long impunity has taught him to

contemn.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES.

HAVING, in the preceding chapter, considered in general the nature of crimes

and punishments, we are led next, in the order of our distribution, to inquire

what persons are, or are not, capable of committing crimes; or, which is all

one, who are exempted from the censures of the law upon the commission of

those acts, which in other persons would be severely punished. In the process
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of which inquiry, we must have recourse to particular and special exceptions:

for the general rule is, that no person shall be excused from punishment for dis-

obedience to the laws of his country, excepting such as are expressly defined and

exempted by the laws themselves.

All the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of a forbidden

act from the punishment whicli is otherwise annexed thereto, may be reduced

to this single consideration, the want or defect of will. An involuntary act, as

it has no claim to merit, so neither can it induce any guilt: the concurrence of

the will, when it has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, be-

ing the only thing *that renders human action either praiseworthy or p^, -,

culpable. Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable oy human laws, *• ^

there must be both a will and an act. For, though, inforo conscicntice, a fixed

design or will to do an unlawful act, is almost as heinous as the commission of

it, yet, as no temporal tribunal can search the heart, or fathom the intentions

of the mind, otherwise than as they are demonstrated by outward actions, it

therefore cannot punish for what it cannot know. For which reason, in all

temporal jurisdictions, an overt act, or some open evidence of an intended crime,

is necessary in order to demonstrate the depravity of the will, before the man

is liable to punishment. And, as a vicious will without a vicious act is no civil

crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no

crime at all. So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be,

first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such

vicious wilL

Now there are three cases, in which the will does not join with the act: 1. Where

there is a defect of understanding. For where there is no discernment, there is

(b) Sec Knffhcad's index to the statutes, (tit. Felony), and the acts which have since been made.

(10) The legislature has at length been brought to see thia truth, and haa greatly diminished

this fearful list.
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no choice; and where there is no choice, there can be no act of the will, which

is nothing else but a determination of one's choice to do or to abstain from a

particular action: he, therefore, that has no understanding can have no will to

guide his conduct 2. Where there is understanding and will sufficient, residing

in the party; but not called forth and exerted at the time of the action done;

which is the case of all offences committed by chance or ignorance. Here the

will sits neuter; and neither concurs with the act, nor disagrees to it. 3. Where

the action is constrained by some outward force and violence. Here the will

counteracts the deed; and is so far from concurring with, that it loathe and dis-

agrees to, what the man is obliged to perform. It will be the business of the

present chapter briefly to consider all the several species of defect in will, as they

fall under some one or other of these general heads: as infancy, idiocy, lunacy,

and intoxication, which fall under the first class; misfortune and ignorance,

r*:<J21 w'l'cn *mav be referred to the second; and compulsion or necessity, which

L J may properly rank in the third.

I. First, we will consider the case of infancy or nonage; which is a defect

of the understanding. Infants, under the age of discretion, ought not to be

punished by any criminal prosecution whatever, (a) What the age of dis-

cretion is, in various nations, is matter of some variety. The civil law distin-

guished the age of minors, or those under twenty-five years old, into three stages:

iiifantia, from the birtli till seven years of age: pueritn, from seven to fourteen ;

and pubertas, from fourteen upwards. The period of puerita, or childhood,
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was again subdivided into two equal parts: from seven to ten and an half was

(etas infantiiB proximo,; from ten and an half to fourteen, was wtas pubertati

proximo. During the first stage of infancy, and the next half stage of childhood,

inf antics proximo, they were not punishable for any crime, (b) During the other

half stage of childhood, approaching to puberty, from ten and an half to four-

teen, they were indeed punishable, if found to be doli capaces, or capable of

mischief: but with many mitigations, and not with the utmost rigour of the

law. (a) During the last stage (at the age of puberty, and afterwards), minors

were liable to be punished, as well capitally as otherwise.

The law of England does in some cases privilege an infant, under the age of

twenty-one, as to common misdemeanors, so as to escape fine, imprisonment, and

the like: and particularly in cases of omission, as not repairing a bridge, or a

highway, and other similar offences; (d) for, not having the command of his

fortune until twenty-one, he wants the capacity to do those things which the

law requires. But where there is any notorious breach of the peace, a riot, bat-

tery, or the like (which infants, when full grown, are at least as liable as others

l"*231 to commit), for these an infant, above *the age of fourteen, is equally

•- -1 liable to suffer, as a person of the full age of twenty-one.

With regard to capital crimes, the law is still more minute and circumspect;

distinguishing with greater nicety the several degrees of age and discretion. By

the ancient Saxon law, the age of twelve years was established for the age of

possible discretion, when first the understanding might open ; (e) and from thence

till the offender was fourteen, it was cetas pubertati proximo, m which he might

or might not be guilty of a crime, according to his natural capacity or incapcity.

This was the dubious stage of discretion: but, under twelve it was held that lie

could not be guilty in will, neither after fourteen could he be supposed innocent,

of any capital crime which he in fact committed. But by the law, as it now

stands, and has stood at least ever since the time of Edward the Third, the

capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by years and

days, as bv the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment. For

one lad of eleven years old may have as much cunning as another of fourteen ;

and in these cases our maxim is, that, "malilia supplet aetatem" Under seven

years of age indeed an infant cannot be guilty of felony ; (f) for then a felonious

discretion is almost an impossibility in nature: but at eight years old he may be

fa) I Hawk. P. C. 2. (b) Iiat. 3. 20.10. (c) Ff. 29. 5. H. W). 17. 111. 47. «. 23. (d) 1 Hal. P. C. 20, 21, a.

(e} LL. Mhelttan. WUk. 05. (f) Mir. c. 4,} 16. 1 Hal. P. C. 27.
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guilty of felony, (g) Also, under fourteen, though an infant shall be primti fade

adjudged to be doliinctipax; yet if it appeal* to thecourtand jury that he was doli

capux, and could discern between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer

death. (1) Thus a girl of thirteen has been burnt for killing her mistress: and

one boy of ten, and another of nine years old, who had killed their companions,

have been sentenced to death, and he of teu years actually hanged ; because it

appeared upon their trials, that the one hid himself, and the other hid the body

he hail killed, which hiding manifested a consciousness of guilt, and a discretion

*to discern between good and evil.(A) And there was an instance in the last r*2± 1

century where a boy of eight years old was tried at Abingdon for tiring two L J

barns; and it appearing that he had malice, revenge, and cunning, he was found

guilty, condemned, and hanged accordingly, (i) Thus also, in very modern

times, a boy of ten years old was convicted on his own confession of murdering

his bedfellow, there appearing in his whole behaviour plain tokens of a mis-

chievous discretion ; and, as the sparing this boy merely on account of his tender

years might be of dangerous consequence to the public by propagating a notion

that children might commit such atrocious crimes with impunity, it was unani-

mously agreed by all the judges that he was a proper subject of capital punish-

ment. (7) But, in all such cases, tfie evidence of that malice which is to supply

age, ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction.

II. The second case of a deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of

crimes, arises also from a defective or vitiated understanding, viz. in an idiot or
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a lunatic. For the rule of law as to the latter, which may easily be adapted also

to the former, is, that, " furiosus furore solum punitur." In criminal cases,

therefore, idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts, if committed

when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself, (k) (2) Also if a

man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment for

it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able

(g) Dalt. Just. c. 147. (hj 1 Hill. P. C. 26, 27. fij Emlyn on 1 Hal. P. C. 25.

(j) Foster, It. (It) 8 lost. B.

(1) See upon this subject. State v. Coin, 9 Humph. 175; People ». Randolph, 2 Park. C. R.

174 ; Commonwealth v. Green, 2 Pick. 380. A male child under the age of fourteen is supposed

incapable of committing a rapp ; but in Ohio it has been decided that this is but a presumption

which may be overcome by evidence of maturity. Williams v. State, 14 Ohio, 222. So he may

be convicted of an assault with intent to commit a rape. People ». Randolph, 2 Park. C. R. 174.

An infant is liable civilly for his torts. Humphrey ». Douglass, 10 Vt. 71; Bullock v. Babcock,

3 Wend. 391; Xeal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437. And this even though under fourteen years of age.

Huchting r. Engol, 17 Wis. 230.

(2) [It is not every frantic and idle humor of a man that will exempt him from justice, and

the punishment of the law. When a man is guilty of a great offence, it must be very plain

and clear before he is allowed such an exemption on the ground of lunacy; therefore, it is not

something unaccountable in a man's actions that points him out to bo such a madman as is to

be exempted from punishment. It must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding

and memory; one who doth not know what he is doing any more than an infant, or a wild

beast; it is only such a one who is never the object of a punishment. 1C How. St. Tr. 764. If

there be a total want of reason, it will acquit the prisoner; if there be an absolute temporary

want of it, when the offence was committed, it will acquit the prisoner; but if there be only a

partial degree of insanity, mixed with a partial degree of reason, not a full and complete use

of reason (as Lord Hale carefully and emphatically expresses himself), but a competent use of it,

sufficient to have restrained those passions which produce the crime; if there be thought and

design, a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions, to discern the difference between moral

food and evil, then upon the fact of the offence proved, the judgment of the law must take place,

'cr Torke. solicitor-general, in Lord Ferrer's Case, 19 How. St. Tr. 947, 948; et per Lawrence,

J., 3 Bum, J.. 24th ed. 312, 313.]

It has been sometimes supposed where insanity is set up as a defence in a criminal case, that

the defendant takes upon himself the burden of proof to establish the defence, and that he

must make it out beyond a reasonable doubt; but this idea is now exploded. The burden of

proof rests upon the prosecutiou throughout, and a presumption of innocence all the while

attends the prisoner, and entitles him to au acquittal if the jury are not reasonably satisfied of

his guilt. A reasonable doubt of the prisoner'!, capacity to commit the crime entitles him as

jusuv to an acquittal as a reasonable doubt upon any other branch of the case ; and this fact

IB fully rccogaued by the later authorities. People ». MeCann, 1C X. Y. 5fJ Commonwealth
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to pleud to it with that advice aud caution that he ought And if, after he has

pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for how can he make

his defence? If, after he be tried and i'uund guilty, he loses his senses before

judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced ; and if, after judgment, he

becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed : for, preadveiiture, says

the humanity of the English law, hud the prisoner been of sound memory, he

F*25 1 m'^'lt nave alleged *8omething in stay of judgment or execution. (/) In-

L'J

deed, in the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, a statute was made, (/»)

which enacted, that if a person, being cmnpos mentis, should commit high treason,

and after fall into madness, he might be tried in his absence, and should suffer

death, as if he were of perfect memory. But this savage and inhuman law was

repealed by the statute 1 and 2 P.'and M. c. 10. For, as is observed by Sir

Edward Coke. («) " the execution of an offender is. for example, ut pcenn ad

pancos, metut ad omnes pervenicrt : but so it is not when a madman is executed;

but should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhuman-

ity and cruelty, and can be no example to others." But if there be any doubt,

whether the party be compos or not, this shall be tried by jury. And if he be

so found, a total idiocy, or absolute insanity, excuses from the guilt, aud of

course from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such

deprivation of the senses: but, if a lunatic hath lucid intervals of understand-

ing, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals as if he had no defi-
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ciency. (o) Yet, in the case of absolute madmen, as they are not answerable for

their actions, they should not be permitted the liberty of acting unless under

proper control; and in particular, they ought not to be suffered to go loose, to

the terror of the king's subjects. It was the doctrine of our ancient law, that

persons deprived of their reason might be confined till they recovered their

senses, (p) without waiting for the forms of a commission or other special

authority from the crown : and now, by the vagrant acts, (q) a method is chalked

out for imprisoning, chaining, and sending them to their proper homes.

III. Thirdly: as to artificial, voluntarily contracted madness, by drunkenness

or intoxication, which, depriving men of their reason, puts them in a tempo-

rary frenzy ; our law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offence, rather

*than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour. A drunkard, says

Sir Edward Coke, (r) who is voluntarius dtemon, hath no privilege there-

by; but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it:

nam omne crimen ebrivtus, et incendit et detegit. It hath been observed, that

the real use of strong liquors, and the abuse of them by drinking to excess, de-

pend much upon the temperature of the climate in which we live. The same

indulgence, which may be necessary to make the blood move in Norway, would

make an Italian mad. A German, therefore, says the president Montesquieu, (*)

drinks through custom, founded upon constitutional necessity ; a Spaniard

drinks through choice, or out of the mere wantonness of luxury: and drunken-

ness, he adds, ought to be more severely punished, where itmakes men mischiev-

(l) 1 Hal. T. C. 34. (m) 33 H. Vin, c. 20. fnj 3 Inst. 6. foj 1 Hal. P. C. 81.

(p) Bro. Abr. t, Corone, 101. (q) 17 Goo. II, o. 5. (r) 1 Inst. 247. fij Sp. L. b. 14. c. 10.

v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373; Commonwealth v. Divna, 2 Met. 340; State v. Marlor, 2 Ala. 43;

Hupps r. People, 31 111. 385 ; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 23. In the case last cited it is said that

the prosecution " are at liberty to rest upon the presumption of sanity until proof of the con-

trary condition is given by the defence. But when any evidence is given which teuds to

overthrow that presumption, the jury are to examine, weigh and pass upon it with the under-

standing thnt, although the initiative in presenting the evidence is taken by the defence, the bur-

don of proof upon this part of the case, as well as upon the other, is upon the prosecution to es-

tablish the conditions of guilt." And see per Rolfe, B., 3 C. and K. 18d; State v. Klinger, 43

Ito. 127 ; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414.

AR to the degree of mental unsoundness which shall excuse a person from punishment for

his acts, the works on medical jurisprudence and insanity will need to be consulted, imd the

case of Freeman ». People, 4 Denio, 9, aud the Trial of Huntington, will be found instructive,

though they will probably leave npou the mind a painful sense of the difficulties surrounding

this whole subject, and the impossibility of laying down definitions and abstract rules which

can be easily aud safely applied in practice. See also McNaughton's Case, 10 Cl. and Fin. 200.
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ous find mad, as in Spain and Italy, than where it only renders them stupid and

heavy, as in Germany and more northern countries. And accordingly, in the

warm climate of Greece, a law of Pittacus enacted, " that he who committed a

crime when drunk, should receive a double punishment;" one for the crime

itself, and the other for the ebriety which prompted him to commit it.(/) The

Roman law, indeed, made great allowances for this vice: "per vinum delapsis

capitaUsp<Bna rcmitiitur.(u) But the law of England, considering how easy

it is to counterfeit this excuse, and how weak an excuse it is (though real), will

not suffer any man thus to privilege one crime by another.(w)(3)

IV. A fourth deficiency of will is where a man commits an unlawful act by

misfortune or chance, and not by design. Here the will observes a total neu-

trality, and does not co-operate with the deed ; which therefore wants one main

ingredient of a crime. Of this, when it affects the life of another, we shall

find more occasion to speak hereafter; at present only observing, that if any

accidental mischief ""happens to follow from the performance of a lawful r *o?i

act, the party stands excused from all guilt; but if a man be doing any >- -"

tiling unlawful, and a consequence ensues which he did not foresee or intend,

as the death of a man or the like, his want of foresight shall be no excuse; for,

being guilty of one offence, in doing antecedently what is in itself unlawful,

he is criminally guilty of whatever consequence may follow the first misbeha-

viour.^)^)

V. Fifthly: ignorance or mistake is another defect of will; when a man, in-
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tending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. For here, the deed and

the will acting separately, there is not that conjunction between them which is

necessary to form a criminal act. But this must be an ignorance or mistake of

fact and not an error in point of law. As if a man, intending to kill a, thief or

house breaker in his own house, by mistake kills one of his own family, this is

BO criminal action: (y) but if a man thinks he has a right to kill a person ex-

communicated or outlawed, wherever he meets him, and does so; this is wilful

murder. For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion not

only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal cases no sort of

defence. Iftnorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, neminem excusat, is as

well the maxim of our own law,(2) as it was of the Romaii.(a)(5)

(tj Puff. L. of V., b.8, c. S. (uj Ff. 49. 16. 0. (v>) Plowd. 19. (x) 1 Hal. P. C. 39.

fyj Cro. Car. 53S. (*) Plowil. S43. (a) Ff. 22. 6. 9.

(3) A man who, by means of intoxication, voluuttirily puts himself in condition to have no

soutrol of his actions, uiuat be held to intend the consequences. The safety of community re-

quires this rule. Intoxication is so easily counterfeited, and when real it is so often resorted to

as a means of nerving the person up to the commission of some desperate act, that the law cannot

recognize it as an excuse for the commission of crime. U. S. v. Drew, 5 Minon, 28; Pirtle v.

State, !l Humph. 6*>3; Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; People«. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9;

Choice v. Slate, 31 Geo. 424 ; State ». A very, 44 N. II. 392. Nevertheless, the drunkenness of

die party is often an important consideration in criminal cases, where the guilty knowledge or

tntent constitute the principal ingredient of the crime, so as to make the peculiar state and con-

dition of the criminal's mind at the time, with reference to the act done, the important subject

Df inquiry. See Swan v. State, 4 Humph. 141; U. S. v. Roudenbush, 1 Bald. 517; Kelley v.

State, 3 S. and M. 518. As in the case ot passing counterfeit money : Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio,

655 ; or the appropriation of another's property which might be larcericy or a trespass merely,

iccordiug as the specific intent to steal was present or absent. Rex r. I'itmim, 2 C. and P. 423.

See further, O'Herrin v. State, 14 Ind. 420; State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332; Golden v. State, 25 Geo.

527 ; Mooney v. State, 33 Ala. 419 ; Kegiua v. Cruse, S C. and P. 541; State v. Garey, 11 Minn.

154; People r. Harris, 29 Cal. 678; Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 42; State v. Schiugen, 20 Wis. 74.

Where insanity results from long continued intoxication, the insane person is no more to be pun-

ished for his aits than if the delirium had proceeded from causes not under his control. U. S. t>.

Drew. 5 Mason, 28; State v. McCants, 1 Spears, 384; Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 423; State e.

Hundley, 46 Mo. 414.

(4) [By "unlawful" is intended here, anv act morally wrong; that which is maJnm in se; for

if it was barely maluntprohibition, as shooting at game by a person not qualified by statute law

to use a gun for that purpose, the party will not be answerable for the unforeseen consequence.

Foster, 259.]

(5) Ignorance of the law, which every; man is bound to know, excuses no man. See the maxim

and illustrations in Broom's Legal Maxims, p. 190.

And this maxim in criminal cases cannot often work a wrong, for there are few acts punish
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VI. A. sixth species of defect of will is that arising from compulsion and inev-

itable •necessity. These are constraint npoii the will, whereby a man is urged to

do that which his judgment disapproves ; and which, it is to be presumed, his will

(if left to itself) would reject. As punishments are therefore only inflicted for

the abuse of that free will which God has given to man. it is highly just and

equitable that a man should be excused for those acts which are done through

unavoidable force and compulsion.

F*2S1 ' ls nature, in the first place, is the obligation of civil subjec-

L J (ion, whereby the inferior is constrained by the superior to act contrary

to what his own reason and inclination would suggest: as when a legislator

establishes iniquity by a law, and commands the subject to do an act contrary to

religion or sound morality. How far this excuse will be admitted in foro con-

sci-entice, or whether the inferior in this case is not bound to obey the divine

rather than the human law, it is not mv business to decide ; though the question,

I believe, among the causists, will hardly bear a doubt. But, however that may

be, obedience to the laws in being is undoubtedly a sufficient extenuation of civil

guilt before the municipal tribunal. The sheriff who burnt Latimer and Kid-

ley, in the bigoted days of Queen Mary, was not liable to punishment from Eliza-

beth, for executing so horrid an office ; being justified by the commands of that

magistracy which endeavoured to restore superstition under the holy auspices of

its merciless sister, persecution.

As to persons in private relations; the principal case, where constraint of a
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superior is allowed as an excuse for criminal misconduct, is with regard to the

matrimonial subjection of the wife to her husband; for neither a son nor a ser-

vant are excused for the commission of any crime, whether capital or otherwise,

by the command or coercion of the parent or master ; ( b) though in some cases the

command or authority of the husband, either expressed or implied, will privi-

lege the wife from punishment, even for capital offences. And therefore if a

woman commit theft, burglary or other civil offences against the laws of society,

by the coercion of her husband ; or even in his company, which the law con-

strues a coercion ; she is not. guilty of any crime ; being considered as acting

by compulsion and not of her own will.(c)(6) Which doctrine is at least a

(b) 1 Hawk. P. C. 8. fcj I Hal. P. C. 45.

able crimiually which a party can be excusable for committing, whether he is aware of the pen-

alty or not. Xevertheless, the ignorance of the party ma;- sometimes be ground for inflicting a

nominal punishment, or recommending him to pardon. Rex <;. Lynn, 2 T. R. 73:? ; Rex c. Bai-

ley, R. and Ry. 1 ; Regina !'. Esop. 7 C. and P. 456. And in some cases where the intent is the

essence of the crime, it may constitute a defence. As where a person is prosecuted for larcency

for the conversion to his own use of money which ho had found, and which he erroneously be-

lieved became his own by the finding. The Queen v. Reed, Car. and M. 306. Or where parties

riotously destroy a house, in the mistaken belief that in law it belongs to one of them. The

Queen «•. Langford, Car. and M. 602. Or where a bankrupt, in honestly following the advice of

counsel, withholds property from his schedule which ought to ba included, and makes to the

same an affidavit which in law is false. U. S. t; Conner, 3 McLean, 573.

((i) The husband must, however, be present when the offence is committed, or the presumption

of coercion by him does not arise. Rex ». Morris. Russ. and Ry. -270. As to what is sufficient

presence, see R. v. Connolly, 2 Lew. C. C. 229. And even then the presumption is not a conclu-

sive one, but only prima facie, and it may be shown by evidence that in fact the wife was the

real criminal. R. v. Hammond, 1 Leach, ',147 ; 1 Bish, Or. L. $ 2dO ; Wharf. Cr. L. § 2475. The

wife may therefore be indicted and tried jointly with the husband, and must rely on the coercion

for an acquittal when the proofs are adduced at the trial. State v. Parkersou, 1 Strob. 169 ; Com-

monwealth r. Murphy, 2 Gray, 510.

Coercion is not admitted as an excuse in the case of treason or murder. Reg. ». Manning, 2

C. nud K. 903 ; and perhaps robbery should be added to this list. Arch. Cr. L. 6 ; 1 Bish. Cr.

L. $ 270 ; Rex v. Cruse, rf C. and P." 545. It is allowed in other felonies, and in misdemeanors

generally. R. t>. Ingram, 1 Salk. 3S4 ; Commonwealth v. Ncal, 10 Mass. 152. But the case ot

Keeping 11 brothel and gamiug-housi; are exceptions. R. v. Dixon. 10 Mod. 336 ; State v. Beutz,

11 Mo. 27 ; Commonwealth r. Lewis, 1 Met. 151. Andlmsband and wife may be jointly indicted

and convicted of an assault : Regina r. Cruse, 8 C. and P. 541 ; or of keeping a liquor nuisance.

Commonwealth v. Tryon, 99 Mass. 442.
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n

thousand years old in this kingdom, being to be found among the laws of King

*Ina, the West Saxon, (d) And it appears that among the northern r*->oi

nations on the continent, this privilege extended to am" woman trans- L *" J

greasing in concert with a man, and to any servant that committed a joint

offence with a freeman; the male or freeman only was punished, the female or

slave dismissed : "procul dubio quod atterum libertas, alter urn necessita,? impel-

leret." (e) But (besides that in our law, which is a stranger to slavery, no

impunity is given to servants, who are as much free agents as their masters)

even with regard to wives this rule admits of an exception in crimes that are

mala in se, and prohibited by the law of nature, as murder and the like: not

only because these are of a deeper dye, but also, since in a state of nature no

one is in subjection to another, it would be unreasonable to screen an offender

from the punishment due to natural crimes, by the refinements and subordina-

tions of civil society. In treason, also (the highest crime which a member of

society can, as such, be guilty of), no plea of coverture shall excuse the wife:

no presumption of the husband's coercion shall extenuate her guilt: (/") as well

because of the odiousness and dangerous consequences of the crime itself, as

because the husband, having broken through the most sacred tie of social com-

munity by rebellion against the state, has no right to that obedience from a

wife which he himself as a subject has forgotten to pay. In inferior misde-

meanors, also, we may remark another exception ; that a wife may be indicted
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and set in the pillory with her husband for keeping a brothel; for this is an

otfence touching the domestic economy or government of the house, in which

the wife has a principal share; and is also such an offence as the law presumes

to be generally conducted by the intrigues of the female sex. (g) And in all

cases, where the wife offends alone, without the company or coercion of her hus-

band, she is responsible for her offence, as much as any feme-sole.

*2. Another species of compulsion or necessity is what our law calls I-*OQ-|

duress per minus; (h) or threats and menaces, which induce a fear of ' J

death or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the guilt of

many crimes and misdemeanors ; at least before the human tribunal. But then

that fear which compels a man to do an unwarrantable action ought to be just

and well-grounded; snch"qui caderepossit in virum constant-em, non tiinidum

et meticulosuiii" as Bracton expresses it, (i) in the words of the civil law.(k)

Therefore, in time of war or rebellion, a man may be justified in doing many

treasonable acts by compulsion of the enemy or rebels, which would admit of

no excuse in the time of peace. (I) (7) This however seems, only, or at least

principally, to hold as to positive crimes, so created by the laws of society : and

which therefore society may excuse ; but not as to natural offences so declared

by the law of God, wherein human magistrates are only the executioners of

divine punishment. And therefore though a man be violently assaulted, and

fa> Cap 57. (e) Sticrnh. de jure Sueon. I. 2, e. 4. (f) 1 Hal. P. C. 47. (g) 1 Hawk. V. C. 2, 3.

(h) o«j book, I, ]>. 131. (ij 1. 2,/. 1«. (t) Ff. 4, 2, 5 auU B. (I) 1 Hul. P. C. SO.

The presumption of coercion will apply to admissions made by the wife in the husband's pres-

ence, calculated to exonerate him and inculpate herself. Reg. t>. Laugher, 2 C. and K. *£>. I*

is not necessary for the woman to prove an actual marriage in these eases; the jury may pre-

sume it from evidence of cohabitation and reputation. Rex v. "Woodward, 8 C. and P. 561; Keg.

v. Good, 1 C. and K. 185.

Page. 5 Havw. 97. See, also, po.it, p. 37, n.

(7) [The fear of having houses burnt, or goods spoiled, is no excuse in the eye of the law,

for joining and marching with rebels. The only force that doth excuse, is a force upon the

person, and present, fear of death ; and this force and fear must continue all the time the party

remains with the rebels. It is incumbent npon men, who make force their dei'euce, to show

an actual force, and that they joined pro timore mortis, et reccsserunt quam cito jiotuerunt.

Fost. 14. 216.1

See also lies v. McGrowther, 1 Bast, P. C. 71; Respublica v. McCarty, 2 Dall. 86.
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hath no other possible means of escaping death, but by killing an innocent

person ; this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather

to die himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent, (in) But in such a

case lie is permitted to kill the assailant; for there the law of nature and self-

defence, its primary canon, have made him his own protector.

3. There is a third species of necessity, which may be distinguished from the

actual compulsion of external force or fear; being the result of reason and

reflection, which act upon and constrain a man's will, and oblige him to do an

. action which, without such obligation, would be criminal. And that is, when

a man has his choice of two evils set before him, and, being under a necessity

f*3l 1 °' eh008'11?? one> '10 chooses the *least pernicious of the two. Here the

' '' J will cannot be said freely to exert itself, being rather passive than active

or, if active, it is rather in rejecting the greater evil than in choosing the less.

Of this sort is that necessity, where a man by the commandment of the law is

bound to arrest another for any capital offence, or to disperse a riot, and resist-

ance is made to his authority: it is here justifiable and even necessary to beat,

to wound or perhaps to kill the offenders, rather than permit the murderer to

escape, or the riot to continue. For the preservation of the peace of the king-

dom, and the apprehending of notorious malefactors, are of the utmost conse-

quence to the public; and therefore excuse the felony, which the killing would

otherwise amount to. (n) (8)

4. There is yet another case of necessity, which has occasioned great specula-
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tion among the writers upon general law ; viz. whether a man in extreme want

of food or clothing may justify stealing either to relieve his present necessities.

And this both Grotinsfo) and Puffendorf, (p) together with many other of the

foreign jurists, hold in the affimative; maintaining by many ingenious, humane,

and plausible reasons, that in such cases the community of goods, by a kind of

tacit confession of society, is revived. And some even of our own lawyers have

held the same, (q) though it seems to be an unwarranted doctrine, borrowed from

the notions of some civilians: at least it is now antiquated, the law of England

admitting no such excuse at present, (r) And this its doctrine is agreeable not

only to the sentiments of many of the wisest ancients, particularly Cicero, (*)

who holds that" suum cuiqne iiicoinmoduin fere/ulitm ext, potius quam de ftlte-

rius commodis defrahendum;" but also to the Jewish law, as certified by King

Solomon himself: (/) " if a thief steals to satisfy his soul when he is hungry, he

sna^ restore *seven-fold, he shall give all the substance of his house:"

which was the ordinary punishment for theft in that kingdom. And this

is founded upon the highest reason: for men's properties would be under a strange

insecurity, if liable to be invaded according to the wants of others, of which wants

no man can possibly be an adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads

them. In this country, especially, there would be a peculiar impropriety in ad-

mitting so dubious an excuse: for by our laws such sufficient provision is made

for the poor by the power of the civil magistrate, that it is impossible that the

most needy stranger should ever lie reduced to the necessity of thieving to sup-

port nature. The case of a stranger is, by the way, the strongest instance put

by Baron Puffendorf, and whereon he builds his principal arguments: which,

however they may hold upon the continent, where the parsimonious industry of

the natives orders every one to work or starve, yet must lose all their weight and

efficacy in England, where charity is reduced to a system, and interwoven in our

very constitution. Therefore, our laws ought by no means to be taxed with being

unmerciful for denying this privilege to the necessitous; especially when we

consider, that the king, on the representation of his ministers of justice, hath a

power to soften the law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar hardship. An

(m) 1 Hal. P. C. 51. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 52. foj DC iitre b. and p. I. 2, c. 2.

(p) L. ol'Nnt. nnd X. 1, 2, c. B. (q) Brttton, c. 10. Mirr. c. 4,} 10. (r) 1 Hal.P. C. 54.

•sj De off. 1. 3, c. 6. ftj Prov. vl. 30.

(S) See State r. Roane, 2 Dev. 58; Tata ». State, 5 Bloekf. 73.
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advantage which is wanting in many states, particularly those which are derno-

cnttical; and these have in its stead introduced and adopted, in the body of the

law itself, a multitude of circumstances tending to alleviate its rigour. But the

founders of our constitution thought it better to vest in the crown the power of

pardoning particular objects of compassion, than to countenance and establish

theft by one general undistinguishing law.

VII. To these several cases, in which the incapacity of committing crimes

arises from a deficiency of the will, we may add one more, in which the law sup-

poses an incapacity of doing wrong, from the excellence and perfection of the

*person; which extend as well to the will as to the other qualities of his r #oo -i

mind. I mean the case of the king; who, by virtue of his royal preroga- *- -*

tive, is not under the coercive power of the law; (u) which will not suppose him

capable of committing a folly, much less a crime. We are therefore, out of rever-

ence and decency, to forbear any idle inquiries, of what would be the consequence

if the king was to act thus and thus: since the law deems so highly of his wis-

dom and virtue as not even to presume it possible for him to do any thing incon-

sistent with his station and dignity: and therefore has made no provisions to

remedy such a greviance. But of this sufficient was said inaformer volume,(v)

to which I must refer the reader.

CHAPTER III.

OF PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES.

IT having been shown in the preceding chapter what persons are, or are not,
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upon account of their situation and circumstances, capable of committing

crimes, we are next to make a few remarks on the different degrees of guilt

among persons that are capable of offending, viz.: as principal, and as accessory.

1. A man may be principal in an offence in two degrees. A principal, in the

first degree, is he that is the actor, or absolute perpetrator, of the crime; and,

in the second degree, he who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to be

done. («) Which pretence need not always be an actual immediate standing by,

within sight or hearing of the fact; but there may be also a constructive pres-

ence, as when one commits a robberv or murder, and another keeps watch or

guard at some convenient distance, (i) (1) And this rule hath also other excep-

(«) 1 Hal. P. C. 44. (r) Book I, cli. 7, page 244. (a) 1 Hal. P. C. 015. (6) Tester, 350.

(1) [Wh6™ a person stood outside a house to receive goods which a confederate was steal-

ing within it, he was held a principal: 1 Ky. and M. C. C. 96; and in the case of privately

stealing in a shop, if several are acting together, some in the shop and some out of it, and the

property is stolen by the hands of one of those who are in the shop, those who are outside

are equally guilty as principals: Russ. and R. C. C. 343; and if several combine to forge an

instrument, and each executes by himself a distinct part of the forgery, and they are uot to-

gether when the instrument is completed, they are nevertheless all guilty as priucipals. RUSS.

and K. C. C. 440. But where a man incites a guilty agent to commit murder, and ho is neither

actually nor constructive!v present, the perpetrator is the principal felon, and the former only

an accessory before the fact. 1 Hale, 435; 3 lust. 49. Persons not present, nor sufficiently

near to give assistance, are not principals. Russ. and R. C. C. 363, 421.

Mere presence is not sufficient to constitute the party a principal, without he aids, assists, and

abets. Thus if two aru fighting and a third comes by and looks on, but assists neither, he is

not guilty if homicide ensue: 1 Hale, 439; 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 10; but if several come with

intent to do mischief, though only one does it, all the rest are principals in the second degree.

1 Hale, 440; 2 llawk. c. 29, s. d. So, if one present command another to kill a third, both the

agent and contriver are guilty. Id.; and see 1 Hale, 442, 444; 2 Hawk. c. 29, s. 8. In a late

singular case it was held, that if a man encourage a woman to murder herself, and is present

abetting her while she does so, such person is guilty of murder as a principal; and that if twf

encourage each other to murder themselves together, and one does NO, but if the other fails in

the attempt upon himself, he is a principal in the murder ol the other; but if it be uncertaia
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tions: for, in case of murder by poisoning, a man may be a principal felon by

preparing and laying the poison, or persuading anotfier to drink it (c) who is

ignorant of its poisonous quality, (d) or giving it to him for that purpose; and

yet not administer it himself, nor be present when the very deed of poisoning

is committed, (e) And the same reasoning will hold, with regard to other inur-

r*q- -I ders committed in the absence *of the murderer, by means which he had

L J prepared beforehand, and which probably could not fail of their mis-

chievous effect. As by laying a trap or pitfall for another, whereby he is killed:

letting out a wild beast, with an intent to do mischief, or inciting a madman to

commit murder, so that death thereupon ensues; in every of these cases the

party offending is guilty of murder as a principal in the first degree. For he

cannot be called an accessory, that necessarily pre-supposing a principal; and

the poison, the pitfall, the beast, or the madman, cannot be held principals, being

only the instruments of death. As therefore he must be certainly guilty either as

principal or accessory, and cannot be so as accessory, it follows that he must be

guilty as principal, and, if principal, then in the first degree; for there is no other

criminal, much less a superior in the guilt, whom he could aid. abet, or assist. (/)

II. An accessory is he who is not the chief actor in the offence, nor present

at its performance, but in some way concerned therein, either before or after the

fact committed. In considering the nature of which degree of guilt, we will,

first, examine what offences admit of accessories, and what not: secondly, who

may be an accessory, before the fact: thirdly, who may be an accessory after it:
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and, lastly, how accessories, considered merely -as such, and distinct from princi-

pals, are to be treated.

1. And, first, as to what offences admit of accessories, and what not. In high,

treason there are no accessories, but all are principals: the same acts, that make

a man accessory in felony, making him a principal in high treason, upon ac-

count of the heinousness of the crime, (g) Besides it is to be considered, that

the bare intent to commit treason is many times actual treason: as imagining

the death of the king, or conspiring to take away his crown. And, as no one

can advise and abet such a crime without an intention to have it done, there

r *op -| can be no accessories before the fact; since the *very advice and abet-

I- J ment amount to principal treason. But this will not hold in the inferior

species of high treason, which do not amount to the legal idea of compassing

the death of the king, queen, or prince. For in those no advice to commit

them, unless the thing be actually performed, will make a man a principal

traitor, (h) In petit treason, murder and felonies, with or without benefit of

clergy, (2) there may be accessories: except only in those offences which by

(c) Kf 1. 52. (rf) Foster. 3t9. («) 3 Inst. 138. (/) 1 Hal. P. C. 617. 2 Haw. P. C, SIS.

(g) 8 Inst. 138. 1 Hal. P. 0. 613. (A) Foster, 342.

whether the deceased really killed herself, or whether she came to her death by accident be-

fore the moment when she meant to destroy herself, it will not be murder in either. Kuss.

and H. C. 0. iW3.

Besides presence and aiding and abetting the principal, there must be a participation in the

felonious dcs'ujn. or at least the offence must bo within the compass of the original iuteation,

to constitute a principal in the second degree. Thus, if a master assaults another with malice

prepense, and the servant, being ignorant of his master's malignant design, takes part with

him, the servant in not an abettor of murder but manslaughter only. See 1 Hale, 44(j; Kius.

and K. C. C. 99. And in order to render persons liable as principals in the second degree, th«

killing or other act must be in pursuance of some original unlawful purpose, and not col-

lateral to it. 1 East. P. C. 358.

The puntKli incut of principals in tbe second degree is in general the same as principals in

the first degree. 1 Leach, t>4; 4 Burr. 2076. But where the act is necessarily personal, as in

stealing privately from the p'jrsou, he whose hand took the property can alone be guilty,

under the statute, and aiders and abetters are only principals m a simple larceny. 1 Hafe,

52!). So on an indictment on the statute against stubbing, only the party who actually stabs

is ousted of clergy. 1 Jae. I, o. 8; 1 East, P. C. 3*3, 850:1 Hale, 488.]

(i) [This seems to apply merely to felonies whore, by the law, judgment of death ought

regularly to ensue. 1 Hale, 016; 1 Burn, 5. The crime ot petit treason is now abolished.]
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judgment of law are sudden and unpremeditated, as manslaughter and the

like; which therefore cannot have any accessories before the fact, (i) So, too, in

petit larceny, and in all crimes under the degree of felony, there are no acces-

sories either before or after the fact; but all persons concerned therein, if guilty

at all, are principals; Ch) the same rule holding with regard to the highest and

lowest offences, though upon different reasons. In treason all are principals,

propter odium delidi; in trespass all are principals, because the law, quce de

minimis non CUT at, does not descend to distinguish the different shades of

guilt in petty misdemeanors. It is a maxim, that ao^essorius sequitur luituram

suiprincipalis; (I) and therefore an accessory cannot be guilty of a higher

crime than his principal; being only punished as a partaker of his guilt. So

that if a servant instigates a stranger to kill his master, this being murder in

the stranger as principal, of course the servant is accessory only to the crime

of murder; though, had he been present and assisting, he would have been

guilty as principal of petit treason, and the stranger of murder, (rn)

2. As to the second point, who may be an accessory before the fact; Sir Mat-

thew Hale (») defines him to be one who being absent at the time of the crime

committed, doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a crime.

Herein absence is necessary to make him an accessory: for if such procurer, or

the like, be present, he is guilty of the crime as principal. If A then advises B

to kill another, and *B does it in the absence, of A. now B is principal r*ow-i

and A is accessory in the murder. And this holds, even though the <- -"

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

party killed be not in rerum natura at the time of the advice given. As if A,

the reputed father, advises B, the mother of a bastard child, unborn, to strangle

it when born, and she does so; A is accessory to this murder, (o) And it is also

settled, (p) that whoever procureth a felony to be committed, though it be by the

intervention of a third person, is an accessory before the fact. It is likewise a

rule, that he who in any wise commands or counsels another to commit an

unlawful act, is accessory to all that ensues upon that unlawful act; but is not

accessory to any act distinct from the other. As if A commands B to be;it C,

and B beats him so that he dies: B is guilty of murder as principal, and A as

accessory. (3) But if A commands B to burn C's house; and he, in so doing,

commit a robbery; now A, though accessory to the burning, is not accessory to

the robbery, for that is a thing of & distinct and inconsequential nature, (q) (4)

But if the felony committed be the same in substance with that which is com-

manded, and only varying in some circumstantial matters; as if, upon a com-

mand to poison Titius, he is stabbed or shot, and dies: the commander is still

(i) 1 Hal. P. C. 615. (i)/Wrf. 613. (I) 3 lust. 139. (m) 2 Hawk. P. C. 315.

(n) 1 Hal. 1'. C. 610. (o) Dyer, 183. IP) Foster, 125. (?) 1 Hal. P. C. «17.

(3) [This must be understood to hare reference to a case where the command is to bent

Violently. 1 Hale, 442-44-1; 1 East, P. C. U57-259; Kel. 109, 117.]

It in uo excuse for the party* beating in such a case, that the command was by a master to his

servant, by a parent to his child, or by iviy other person occupying a position of authority; if the

beating was unwarranted by law both are criminally responsible. See Commonwealth v. Drew,

3 Gush. 279; Hays r. State, 13 Mo. 246; State v. Bell, 5 Port. 36.1; Harmonr v. Mitchell, 13

How. 115; State v. Bugbee, 22 Tt. 32 ; Curtis v. Knox, 2 Deuio, 341.

(4) [The crime must be of the same complexion, and not on a different object than that to

which the agent was instigated. Thus, if A commands B U> burn a certain house with which

he is well acquainted, and he burns another, or to steal a certain horse, and he steals a different

one, A will not bo liable to be indicted as accessory to the crime committed, because B. acting

in contradiction to the commands of A, and that knowingly, it is on his part a mere ineffectual

temptation, and the specific crime he planned was never completed. Plowd. 475; Hawk. b. 2,

c. 2!», j 18 ; 1 Hale, 017; 1 Fost. 3150.]

See, also, Kcpina v. Taunton. 9 C. and P. 309. Where the offence committed is not the per-

cise one plauncd and advised, Mr. Justice Foster says the proper criterion to determine

whether the adviser is involved in the legal guilt or not, is, "bid the principal commit thu

offence he stands charged with under the influence of the flagitious advice; and was the event,

in the ordinary course of things, a probable consequence of that felony* or did he, following

the suggestions of his own wicked heart, wilfully and knowinglv commit a felony of another

kind'," Vast. 372.

As to accessories hi general, see 1 Bish. Cr. L. ch. 30; 1 Arch. Cr. L. ch. 1; 1 Hugs on Cr. ch. 2.
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accessory to the murder; for the substance of the thing commanded was the

death of Titius, and the manner of its execution is a mere collateral circum-

stance, (r)

3. An accessory after the fact may be, where a person, knowing a felony to

have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon. (.?) There-

fore, to make an accessory ex post facto, it is in the first place requisite that he

knows of the felony committed, (t) (5) In the next place he must receive,

relieve, comfort, or assist him. And generally, any assistance whatever, given

to a felon, to hinder his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punishment,

makes the assistor an accessory. As furnishing him with a horse to escape his

r*.-vo-i *pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other shelter to

' ' J conceal him, or open force and violence to rescue or protect him. (M) So

likewise to convey instruments to a felon to enable him to break gaol, or to

bribe the gaoler to let him escape, makes a man an accessory to the felony,

lint to relieve u felon in gaol with clothes or other necessaries, is no offence ;

for the crime impu table to this species of accessory is the hinderance of public

justice, by assisting the felon to escape the vengeance of the law. (v) To buy

or receive stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, falls under none of these

descriptions; it was therefore at common law a mere misdemeanor, and made

not the receiver accessory to the theft, because he received the goods only, and

not the felon: (to) but now by the statutes 5 Ann. c. 31, and 4 Geo. I, c. 11,

all such receivers are made accessories (where the principal felony admits of
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accessories), (a:) and may be transported for fourteen years; and, in the case of

receiving linen goods stolen from the bleaehing-grounds, are by statute 18 Geo.

II, c. 27. declared felons without benefit of clergy. (0) In France such receivers

are punished with deatli: and the Gothic constitutions distinguished also three

sorts of thieves, " itnum qui consilium daret, alfenim, qui contradaret, tertium

qui rcrt'ptaret et occuleret; pari ptence singulos obnnxio.i." (y)

The felony must be complete at the time of the assistance given; else it

makes not the assistant an accessory. As if one wounds another mortally, and

after the wound given, but before death ensues, a person assists or receives the

delinquent: this does not make him accessory to t lie homicide; for, till death

ensues, there is no felony committed, (z) But so strict is the law where a felony

is actually complete, in order to do effectual justice, that the nearest relations

are not suffered to aid or receive one another. (7) If the parent assists his child,

or the child his parent, if the brother receives the brother, the master his

servant, or the servant his master, or even if the husband relieves his wife, who

r*qqi llttve any« °f them committed a *felony, the receivers become accessories

L °' -I ex post fnrto. (a) But a feme-covert cannot become an accessory by the

receipt and concealment of her husband ; for she is presumed to act under his

coercion, and therefore she is not bound, neither ought she, to discover her

lord, (b)

4. The last point of inquiry is, how accessories are to be treated, considered

distinct from principals. And the general rule of the ancient law (borrowed

from the Gothic constitutions), (c) is this, that accessories shall suffer the same

punishment as their principals : if one be liable to death, the other isalso liable :(rf)

as, by the laws of Athens, delinquents and their abettors were to receive the

eame punishment, (c) Why, then, it may be asked, are such elaborate distinc-

tions made between accessories and principals, if both are to suffer the same

fr) 2 Hnwk. P. C. 318. (») 1 Hill. P. C. 818. (() 2 Hawk. P. C. 318.

(«) Ibid. 317,318. (r) 1 Hill. P. C. 620, |B1. (WJ/Wrf, <WO.

(«} Stieruhook, de jure. doth. 1. \ c. 6. (z; 2 Hawk. P. C. 320.

(Si Slnsl. 108. t Hun-k. I'. C. 320. (6) 1 Hal. P. C. 621. (o)

jd) 3 lust. 183. (e) Poll. Anliq. b. 1, c. 2fi.

(x) Foster, 73.

(o) See Stlornhook, ibid.

(5) Soe 1 Hale, P. C. 323, fi22; "Wharf. O. L. $ 146; 1 «ish. Cr. L. J 488.

(6) These statutory provisions are repealed, and the death penalty abolished. The offene*

is now punished under statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.

(7) [That is (as stated in the last section), if done in order to prevent an arrest, etc.]
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punishment? For these reasons: 1. To distinguish the nature and denomina-

tion of crimes that the accused may know how to defend himself, when indicted ;

the commission of an actual robbery being quite a different accusation from that

of harboring the robber. 2. Because, though by the ancient common law the

rule is as before laid down, that both shall be punished alike, yet now by the

statutes relating to the benefit of clergy a distinction is made between them:

accessories after the fact being still allowed the benefit of clergy in all cases,

except horse-stealing (/) and stealing of linen from bleaching-grounds: (g)

which is denied to the principals and accessories before the fact, in many cases :

as, among others, in petit treason, murder, robbery, and willful burning. (A) And

perhaps if a distinction were constantly to be made between the punishment of

principals and accessories, even before the fact, the latter to be treated with a

little less severity than the former, it might prevent the perpetration of many

crimes, by increasing the difficulty of finding a person to execute the deed itself;

as his danger would be greater *than that of his accomplices, by reason r* IQ-I

of the difference of his punishment, (i) 3. Because formerly no man could L J

be tried as accessory till after the principal was convicted, or at least he must

have been tried at the same time with him: though that law is now much

altered, as will be shown more fully in its proper place. 4. Because, though a

man be indicted as accessory and acquitted, he may afterwards be indicted as

principal: for an acquittal of receiving or counselling a felon is no acquittal of the

felony itself: but it is matter of some doubt, whether, if a man be acquitted as
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principal, he can be afterwards indicted as accessory before the fact; since those

offences are frequently very nearly allied, and therefore an acquittal of the guilt

of one may be an acquittal of the other also, (k) (8) But it is clearly held, that

one acquitted as a principal may be indicted as an accessory after the fact; since

that is always an offence of a different species of guilt, principally tending to

evade the public justice, and is subsequent in its commencement to the other.

Upon these reasons, the distinction of principal and accessory will appear to be

highly necessary; though the punishment is still much the same with regard

to principals, and such accessories as offend before the fact is committed. (9)

(f) Stat. 31 Eliz. o. W. (a) Stat. 18 Geo. II, c. 87. fh) 1 Hal. P. C. 815.

(ij Bcccar. c. 87. (k) 1 Hal. I'. C. CiS, 636. 3 Han-k. P. C. S73. Foster, 361.

(3) [The authorities of Hawkins and Foster are both against this reasoning and the princi-

ple of the law is certainly with them, because the offence* are specifically different, aud require

different evidence to prove them.]

(9) By statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94, an accessory before the fact to a felony may be in-

dicted, tried, and punished as if he were a principal felon; and, by section 2, whoever shall

counsel, procure or command any other person to commit a felony, shall be guilty of felony,

and m<iy be punished either as accessory before the fact, or for a substantive felony, and

whether the principal felon is previously convicted, or is amenable to justice or not. And, by

section 3, accessories after the fact to a felony may be indicted and convicted, of a substantive

felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not be previously convicted, or amenable to

justice, or not.

In a number of the United States there are similar modifications of the common law relat-

ing to this subject. For the rule, in the absence of such statutes, see Stoops v. Commonwealth,

7 S. and R. 491; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 477 ; State v. Duncan, 6 Ired. 98; Holmes

v. Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St. 221.

As to charging accessories with a substantive felony, under statutes permitting that course,

see State o. Weston, 9 Conn. 527; Noland v. State, 19 Ohio, 131; Shannon t>. People, 5

Mich. 71.
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CHAPTER IV.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST GOD AND KELIGION.

IN the present chapter we are to enter upon the detail of the several species

of crimes and misdemeanors, with the punishments annexed to each by the laws

of England. It was observed in the beginning of this book, (a) that crimes and

misdemeanors area breach and violation of the public rights and duties owing

to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate

capacity. And in the very entrance of these Commentaries (b) it was shown that

human laws can have no concern with any but social and relative dudes, being

intended only to regulate the conduct of man, considered under various rela-

tions, as a member of civil society. All crimes ought therefore to be estimated

merely according to the mischiefs which they produce in civil society ; (c) and

of consequence private vices or breach of mere absolute duties, which man is

bound to perform considered only as an individual, are not, cannot be, the ob-

ject of any municipal law, any farther than as by their evil example, or other

pernicious effects, they may prejudice the community, and thereby become a

species of public crimes. Thus the vice of drunkenness, if committed pri-

vately and alone, is beyond the knowledge, and of course beyond the reach of

human tribunals: but If committed publicly, in the lace of the world, its evil

example makes it liable to temporal censures. The vice of lying, which con-

sists (abstractedly taken) in a criminal violation of truth, and therefore in any

F*421 *s'laPe *s derogatory from sound morality, is not however taken notice of
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"• -'by our law. unless it carries with it some public inconvenience, as spread-

ing false news; or some social injury, as slander and malicious prosecution,

for which a private recompense is given. And yet drunkenness and malevolent

lying are, in foro conscientice, as thoroughly criminal when they are not, as

when they are, attended with public inconvenience. The only difference is,

that both public and private vices are subject to the vengeance of eternal jus-

tice ; and public vices are besides liable to the temporal punishments of human

tribunals.

On the other hand; there are some misdeameanors which are punished by the

municipal law, that have in themselves nothing criminal, but are made unlawful

by the positive constitutions of the state for public convenience; such as

poaching, exportation of wool, and the like. These are naturally no offences at

all; but their whole criminality consists in their disobedience to the supreme

power, which has an undoubted right, for the well-being and peace of the com-

munity, to make some things unlawful which were in themselves indifferent.

Upon the whole, therefore, though part of the offences to be enumerated in the

following sheets are offences against the revealed law of God, others against the

law of nature, and some are offences against neither; yet, in a treatise of muni-

cipal law, we must consider them all as deriving their particular guilt, here

punishable, from the law of man.

Having premised this caution, I shall next proceed to distribute the several

offences, which are either directly or by consequence injurious to civil society,

and therefore punishable by the laws of England under the following general

heads: first, those which are more immediately injurious to God and his holy

religion; secondly, such as violate and transgress the law of nations; thirdly,

those rights and duties which are owing to particular individuals, and in the

preservation and vindication of which the community is deeply interested.

(a) See page 9. (&) See book I, pages 123,124. (c) Beccar. o. 8.
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First, then, of such crimes and misdemeanors as more immediately offend

Almighty God, by openly transgressing the precepts of religion, either natural

or revealed; and mediately, by their bad example and consequence, the law of

society also: which constitutes that guilt in the action which human tribunals

are to censure.

I. Of this species the first is that of apostasy, or a total renunciation of

Christianity, by embracing either a false religion, or no religion at all. This

offence can only take place in such as have once professed the true religion.

The perversion of a Christian to Judaism, paganism, or other false religion, was

punished by the emperors Coustantius and Julian with confiscation of goods; (d)

to which the emperors Theodosius and Valentinian added capital punishment,

in case the apostate endeavoured to pervert others to the same iniquity: (e) a

punishment too severe for any temporal laws to inflict upon any spiritual

offence; and yet the zeal of our ancestors imported it into this country; for we

find by Bracton (/) that in his time apostates were to be burnt to dentil.

Doubtless the preservation of Christianity, as a national religion, is, abstracted

from its own intrinsic truth, of the utmost"consequence to the civil state: which

a single instance will sufficiently demonstrate. The belief of a future state of

rewards and punishments, the entertaining just ideas of the moral attributes

of the Supreme Being, and a firm persuasion that he superintends and will

finally compensate every action in human life (all which are clearly revealed in

the doctrines, and forcibly inculcated by the precepts, of our Saviour Christ),
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these are the grand foundation of all judicial oaths; which call God to witness

the truth of those facts, which perhaps may be only known to him and the

party attesting: all moral evidence, *therefore, all confidence in human ,-g.. •.

veracity, must be weakened by apostasy, and overthrown by total *• ' '

infidelity. (</) Wherefore all affronts to Christianity, or endeavours to depreciate

its efficacy, in those who have once professed it, are highly deserving of censure.

But yet the loss of life is a heavier penalty than the offence, taken in a civil

light, deserves: and, taken in a spiritual light, our laws have no jurisdiction

over it. This punishment therefore has long ago become obsolete; and the

offence of apostasy was for a long time the object only of the ecclesiastical

courts, which corrected the offender pro salute animce. But about the close of

the last century, the civil liberties to which we were then restored being used

as a cloak of maliciousness, and the most horrid doctrines subversive of all

religion being publicly avowed both in discourse and writings, it was thought

necessary again for the civil power to interpose, by not admitting those mis-

creants (li) to the privileges of society, who maintained such principles as

destroved all moral obligation. To this end it was enacted by statute 9 and 10

Wm. fll, c. 32, that if any person educated in, or having made profession of,

the Christian religion, shall, by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking,

deny the Christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine

authority, he shall, upon the first offence, be rendered incapable to hold any

office or place of trust; and, for the second, be rendered incapable of bringing

any action, being guardian, executor, legatee, or purchaser of lands, and shall

suffer three years' imprisonment without bail. To give room, however, for

repentance, if, within four months after the first conviction, the delinquent will

in open court publicly renounce his error, he is discharged for that once from

all disabilities.

II. A second offence is that of heresy, which consists not in a total denial of

Christianity, but of some of its essential 'doctrines, publicly and obstinately r*, _ -•

avowed; being defined by Sir Matthew Hale, " sententia rerun divinarum *• •-•

humano sensu excogitata, palam docta et pertinaciter defensa." (i) And here it

must also be acknowledged that particular modes of belief or unbelief, not tend-

(d) Cod. I, 7, 1. (e) I1M. (I. (f) I. 3. c. 9.

(ff) Utilef cs»e apiniones has. quis ncgat, cum iilteUiffat. tptfim multti firmentHT jurejurandQ : quanta naZu-

,'<"•. tint fvederum rfliffionet: t/uuin multos iiiri»i Bitpplicii mftits a scelerc rtmcnrit: qitamque sancta tit

eocirtui cirium inter ipsoi, Mis immortnlUms intfrpontii tumjutUdlHU. turn tettibu* 7 Cic. rf« L. L. it. 7.

lit> Metcroyavtz in oar ancient l;nv books is the name uf unbelievers. (i} 1 Hal. 1*. C. ;;-<.
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ing to overturn Christianity itself, or to sap the foundations of morality, are by

no means the object of coercion by the civil magistrate. What doctrines shall

therefore be adjudged heresy was left by our old constitution to the determina-

tion of the ecclesiastical judge ; who had herein a most arbitrary latitude allowed

him. For the general definition of an heretic given by Lyndewode, (k) extends

to the smallest deviation from the doctrines of noly church: "hasreticus esl qui

(lubitat de fide catholica, et qui negligit servare ea, qua Romana ecclesia statuit,

seu servare decreverat." Or, as the statute 2 Hen. IV, c. 15, expresses it iu

English, " teachers of erroneous opinions, contrary to the faith and blessed

determinations of the holy church. Very contrary this to the usage of the

first general councils, which defined all heretical doctrines with the utmost pre-

cision and exactness. And what ought to have alleviated the punishment, the

uncertainty of the crime, seems to have en chanced it in those days of blind zeal

and pious cruelty. It is true that the sanctimonious hypocrisy of the canonists

went at first no farther than enjoining penance, excommunication, and ecclesi-

astical deprivation for heresy; though afterwards they proceeded boldly to

imprisonment by the ordinary, and confiscation of goods in pios usus. But in

the mean time they had prevailed upon the weakness of bigoted princes to make

the civil power subservient to their purposes, by making heresy not only a tem-

poral, but even a capital offence : the Romish ecclesiastics determining, without

appeal, whatever they pleased to be heresy, and shifting off to the secular arm

the odium and drudgery of executions; with which they themselves were too
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tender and delicate to intermeddle. Nay, they pretended to intercede and pray,

on behalf of the convicted heretic, ut r.itra mortis periculum sententia circa cum

r*-lf 1 m°deratur: (I) well *knowing at the same time that they were delivering

•• •• the unhappy victim to certain death. Hence the capital punishments

inflicted on the ancient Donatists and Manichseans by the emperors Theodosins

and Justinian:(/«) hence also the constitution of the emperor Frederic men-

tioned by Lyndewode, (n) adjudging all persons without distinction to be burnt

with fire, who were convicted of heresy by the ecclesiastical judge. The same

emperor, in another constitution, (o) ordained that if any temporal lord, when

admonished by the church, should neglect to clear his territories of heretics

within a year, it should be lawful for good catholics to seize and occupy the

lands, and utterly to exterminate the heretical possessors. And upon this foun-

dation was built that arbitrary power, so long claimed and so fatally exerted by

the pope, of disposing even of the kingdoms of refractory princes to more dutiful

sons of the church. The immediate event of this constitution was something

singular, and may serve to illustrate at once the gratitude of the holy see, and

the just punishment of the royal bigot: for upon the authority of this very con-

stitution, the pope afterwards expel led this very emperor Frederic from his king-

dom of Sicily, and gave it to Charles of Anjou. (p)

Christianity being thus deformed by the. dsemon of persecution npon the con-

tinent, we cannot expect that our own island should be entirely free from the

same scourge. And therefore we find among our ancient precedents (q) a writ

de hwetico cumburendo, which is thought by some to be as ancient as the com-

mon law itself. However, it appears from thence, that the conviction of heresy

by the common law was not in any petty ecclesiastical court, but before the

archbishop himself, in a provincial synod; and that the delinquent was delivered

over to the king, to do as he should please with him: so that the crown had a

control over the spiritual power, and might pardon the convict by issuing

no process against him; the writ de liwretico comburendo being not a writ

F*471 *°^ course» D"t issuing only by the special direction of the king in

I- -I council, (r) But in the reign of Henry the Fourth, when the eyes of the

Christian worm began to open, and the seeds of the protestant religion (though

under the opprobrious name of lollardy) (,v) took root in the kingdom; the clergy

(t| Cup. lie hcereUcii. (J) Decreed. I. 5, t. VI, c. 27. Im) Cod. 1.1, tit. ',. (n) c. ,1,- ImrtNdt.

(ot Cod. 1, a, 4. (o) Biildus in Cod. 1, a, t. (?) F. X. B. 4(*. (r] 1 Hal. P. C. Sic..

(s> So cattail not I'rom loliitm or Inre.*. (an etymology which was nftonranU devised in order to justify

II"- buriung ot'tlicm, Mntth. xiii. !JO) but from one Walter Lollutrd. u (.rniuiu reformer. A. It. 1315. JUodU

L 11 lli.-i. \-.\i, 13. Spi'lm. Gttot. S71.
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taking advantage from the king's dubious title to demand an increase of their

own power, obtained an act of parliament, (i) which sharpened the edge of

persecution to its utmost keenness. For, by that statute, the diocesan

alone, without the intervention of a synod, might convict of heretical tenets:

and unless the convict abjured his opinions, or if afte.i abjuration he relapsed,

the sheriff was bound, ex offimo, if required by the bishop, to commit the un-

happy victim to the flumes, without waiting for the consent of the crown. By

the statute 2 H«n. V, c. 7, lollardy was also made a temporal offence, and indict-

able in the king's courts; which'did not thereby gain an exclusive, but only a

concurrent, jurisdiction with the bishop's consistory.

Afterwards, when the final reformation of religion began to advance, the

power of the ecclesiastics was somewhat moderated: for though what heresy is,

•was not then precisely defined, yet we were told in some points what it is not:

the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 14, declaring that offences against the see of Rome

are not heresy; and the ordinary being thereby restrained from proceeding in

any case upon mere suspicion; that is, unless the party be accused by two credi-

ble witnesses, or an indictment of heresy be first previously found in the king's

courts of common law. And yet the spirit of persecution was not then abated,

but only diverted into a lay channel. For in six years afterwards, by statute 31

Hen. VllI, c. 14, the bloody law of the six articles was made, which established

the six most contested points of *popery, transubstantiation, communion r*,o -i

in one kind, the celibacy of the clergy, monastic vows, the sacrifice of the *• *
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mass, and auricular confession; which points were " determined and resolved by

the most godly study, pain, and travail of his majesty: for which his most hum-

ble and obedient subjects, the lords spiritual and temporal, and the commons in

parliament assembled, did not only render and give unto his highness their most

nigh and hearty thanks," but dirf also enact and declare all oppugners of the

first to be heretics, and to be burnt with fire; and of the five last to be felons,

and to suffer death. The same statute established a new and mixed jurisdiction

of clergy and laity for the trial and conviction of heretics^ the reigning prince

being then equally intent on destroying the supremacy of the bishops of Rome,

and establishing all other their corruptions of the Christian religion.

I shall not perplex this detail with the various repeals and revivals of these

sanguinary laws in the two succeeding reigns; but shall proceed directly to the

reign of Queen Elizabeth; when the reformation was finally established with

temper and decency, unsullied with party rancour, or personal caprice and

resentment. By statute 1 Eliz. c. 1, all former statutes relating to heresy are

repealed, which leaves the jurisdiction of heresy as it stood at common law;

viz., as to the infliction of common censures, in the ecclesiastical courts; and in

case of burning the heretic, in the provincial senate only, (u) Sir Matthew Hale

is indeed of a different opinion, and holds that such power resided in the diocesan

also, though he agrees that, in either case, the writ de hoeretico comburendo was

not demandable of common right, butgrantable or otherwise merely at the king's

discretion, (v) But the principal point now gained was, that by this statute a

boundary is for the first time set to what shall be accounted heresy; nothing

for the future being to be so determined, but only such tenets, which have been

heretofore so declared: 1. By the words of the canonical scriptures ; 2. By the first

four general councils, or such *others as have only used the words of the r*4gi

holy scriptures; or, 3. Which shall hereafter be so declared by the parlia- L J _

ment, with the assent of the clergy in convocation. Thus was heresy reduced '

to a greater certainty than before; though it might not have been the worst to

have defined it in terms still more precise and particular: as a man continued

still liable to be burnt for what perhaps he did not understand to be heresy till

the ecclesiastical judge so interpreted the words of the canonical scriptures.

For the writ de hasretico comburendo remained still in force; and we have in-

stances of its being put in execution upon two anabaptists in the seventeenth of

Elizabeth, and two arians in the ninth of James the First But it was totally

(t) 2 Hon. IV, c. IS (u) 5 Rep. 23. 12 Rep. K. 92. (v) 1 Hal. P. C. 405.

325

49 OFFENCES AGAINST GOD AND RELIGION. [Book IV.

abolished, and heresy again subjected only to ecclesiastical correction, pro salute

unima, by virtue of the statute 29 Car. II, c. 9. For in one and the same reign,

our hinds were delivered from the slavery of military tenures, our bodies from

arbitrary imprisonment by the habeas corpus act, and our minds from the tyr-

anny of superstitious bigotry, by demolishing this lust badge of persecution in

the English law.

In what I have now said, I would not be understood to derogate from the just

rights of the national church, or to favor a loose latitude of propagating any

crude, undigested sentiments, in religious matters. Of propagating, I say; for

the bare entertaining them, without an endeavour to diffuse them, seems hardly

cognizable by any human authority. I only mean to illustrate the excellence of

our present establishment, by looking back to former times. Every thing is now as

it should be, with respect to the spiritual cognizance, and spiritual punishment,

of heresy: unless perhaps that the crime ought to be more strictly delined, and no

prosecution permitted, even in the ecclesiastical courts, till the tenets in question

are by proper authority previously declared to be heretical. Under these restric-

tions it seems necessary, for the support of the national religion, that the officers

of the church slum hi have power to censure heretics; yet not to harass them

.-„_„ -, with temporal penalties, much less to exterminate or *destroy them. The

"- -" legislature hath indeed thought it proper, that the civil magistrate should

again interpose, with regard to one species of heresy very prevalent in modern

times ; for by statute 9 and 10 \fm III, c. 32, if auy person educated in the
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Christian religion, or professing the same, shall by writing, printing, teaching,

or advised speaking, deny any one of the persons in the holy trinity to be God,

or maintain that there are more gods than one, he shall undergo the same penal-

ties and incapacities, which were just now mentioned to be inflicted on apostacy

by the same statute. (I) And thua much for the crime of heresy.

III. Another species of offences against religion are those which affect the

established church. And these are either positive or negative : positive, by revil-

ing its ordinances; 91 negative, by non-conformity to its worship. Of both of

these in their order.

1. And, first, of the offence of reviling the ordinances of the church. (2) This

is a crime of a much grosser nature than the other of mere nonconformity:

since it carries with it the utmost indecency, arrogance, and ingratitude; ind"e-

cency, by setting up private judgment in virulent and factious opposition to pub-

lic authority; arrogance, by treating with contempt and rudeness what has at

least a better chance to be right than the singular notions of auy particular mau:

and ingratitude, by denying that indulgence and undisturbed liberty of conscience

to the members of the national church, which the retainers to every petty con-

venticle enjoy. However, it is provided by statutes 1 Edw. VI, c. 1, and 1 Eliz.

c. 1, that whoever reviles the sacrament of the Lord's supper shall be punished

by fine and imprisonment; and by the statute 1 Eliz. c. 2, if any minister shall

speak any thing in derogation of the book of common prayer, he shall, if not

beneficed, be imprisoned one year for the first offence, and for life for the second;

nud if he be beneficed, he shall for the first offence be imprisoned six months,

and forfeit one year's value of his benefice: for the second offence he shall be

deprived, and suffer one year's imprisonment: and, for the third, he shall in like

r*5j i manner be deprived, and suffer imprisonment for life. *Aud if any person

i- -1 whatsoever shall, in plays, songs, or other open words, speak any thing

in derogation, depraving, or despising of the said book, or shall forcibly prevent

the reading of it, or cause any other service to be used in its stead, he shall forfeit

for the first offence an hundred marks; for the second, four hundred ; and for

the third, shall forfeit all his goods and chattels, and suffer imprisonment

(1) [This enactment, go far as it affected persons denrinjz the holy trinitv. was repealed by

the 53 Oeo. Ill, c. 160, $ 2. See K. ». Waddmgton, I B.'and C. 26; R. v. CarUle, 3 B. and Ali

161.]

(2) See the cases cited in the previous note.
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for life. (3) These penalties were framed in the infancy of our present establish-

ment, when the disciples o" Rome and Geneva united in inveighing with the ut-

most bitterness against the English liturgy; and the terror of these laws (for they

seldom, if ever, were fully executed) proved a principal means, under Providence,

of preserving the purity as well as decency of our national worship. Nor can

their continuance to this time (of the milder penalties at least) be thought too

severe and intolerant so far as they are levelled at the offence, not of thinking

diiferently from the national church, but of railing at that church and obstructing

its ordinances, for not submitting its public judgment to the private opinion of

others. For, though it is clear that no restraint should be laid upon rational and

dispassionate discussions of the rectitude and propriety of the established mode

of worship; yet contumely and contempt are what no establishment can tole-

rate, (w) A rigid attachment to trifles, and an intemperate zeal for reforming

them, are equally ridiculous and absurd : but the latter is at present the less excus-

able, because from political reasons, sufficiently hinted at in a former volume, (a;)

it would now be extremely unadvisable to make any alterations in the service of

the church; unless by its own consent, or unless it can be shown that some

manifest impiety or shocking absurdity will follow from continuing the present

forms.

2. Non-conformity to the worship of the church is the other, or negative

branch of this offence. And for this there is much more to be pleaded than for

the former; being a *matter of private conscience, to the scruples of r*go -i
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which our present laws have shown a very inst and Christian indul- *• -I

gence. For undoubtedly all persecution and oppression of weak consciences,

on the score of religious persuasions, are highly unjustifiable upon every prin-

ciple of natural reason, civil liberty, or sound religion. But care must be taken

not to carry this indulgence into such extremes, as may endanger the national

church: there is always a difference to be made between toleration and estab-

lishment.

Non-conformists are of two sorts: first, such as absent themselves from divine

worship in the established church, through total irreligion, and attend the

service of no other persuasion. These, by the statutes of 1 Eliz. c. 2, 23 Eliz. c.

1, and 3 Jac. 1, c. 4, forfeit one shilling to the poor every Lord's day they so

absent themselves, and 20J. to the king if they continue such default for a

month together. And if they keep any inmate, thus irreligiously disposed, in

their houses, they forfeit 101. per month.

The second species of non-conformists are those who offend through a mis-

taken or perverse zeal. Such were esteemed by our laws, enacted since the time

of the reformation, to be papists and protestant dissenters; both of which were

supposed to be equally schismatics in not communicating with the national

church; with this difference, that the papists divided from it upon material,

though erroneous reasons; but many of the dissenters upon matters of indiffer-

ence, or, in other words, upon no reason at all. Yet certainly our ancestors

were mistaken in their plans of compulsion and intolerance. The sin of schism,

as such, is by no means the object of temporal coercion and punishment. If

through weakness of intellect, through misdirected piety, through perverseness

and acerbity of temper, or (which is often the case), through a prospect of secular

advantage in herding with a party, men quarrel with the ecclesiastical establish-

ment, the civil magistrate has nothing to do with it, unless their tenets and

practice are such as to threaten ruin or disturbance to the state. He is bound,

•indeed, to protect the established church; *and, if this can be better .-„-„ -,

effected, by admitting none but its genuine members to offices of trust I- -I

fu>) By an ordinance 28 An*. IMS, which continued till the restoration, to preach, writs, or print any

thing in derogation or depraving nf the directory, for the then established presbyterian worship, subjected

the offender upon indictment to a discretionary fine, not exceeding Ml. (Scobell OS.)

(x) Book I, p. 93.

(3) [This statute of 1 Eli». o. 2, was repealed as far as relates to protestant dissenters, by the

31 Geo. Ill, c. 32, B. 3.]
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ami emolument, he is certainly at liberty so to do: the disposal of offices being

matter of favour and discretion. But, this point being once secured from perse-

cution for diversity of opinions, however ridiculous and absurd they may be, is

contrary to every principle of sound policy and civil freedom. The names and

subordination of the clergy, the posture of devotion, the materials and colour

of the minister's garment, the joining in a known or an unknown form of prayer,

and other matters of the same kind, must be left to the option of every man's

private judgment.

With regard, therefore, to protestant dissenters, although the experience of their

turbulent disposition in former times occasioned several disabilities and restric-

tions (which I shall not undertake to justify) to be laid upon them by abundance

of statutes (y) yet at length the legislature, with a spirit of true magnanimity,

extended that indulgence to these sectaries, which they themselves, when in

power, had held to be countenancing schism, and denied to the church of

England. (2) The penalties are conditionally suspended by the statute 1 W. &

M. st. 1, c. 18, " for exempting their majesties' protestant subjects, dissenting

from the church of England, from the penalties of certain laws," commonly

called the toleration act; which is confirmed by the statute 10 Ann. c. 2, and

declares that neither the laws above mentioned, nor the statutes 1 Eliz. c. 2, § 14,

3 Jac. I, c. 4 and 5, nor any other penal laws made against popish recusants

(except the test acts), shall extend to any dissenters, other than papists and such

as deny the trinity provided, first, that they take the oaths of allegiance and
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supremacy (or make a similar affirmation, being quakers) (a) and subscribe the

declaration against popery; second, that they repair to some congregation certi-

fied to and registered in the court of the bishop or archdeacon, or at the county

sessions; third, that the doors of such meeting-house shall be unlocked, unbar-

r*-i-i red, and unbolted; in default of which *the persons meeting there are

L ° -I still liable to all the penalties of the former acts. Dissenting teachers

in order to be exempted from the penalties of the statutes 13 and 14 Car. II, c.

4, 15 Car. II, c. 6, 17 Car. II, c. 2, and 22 Car. II. c. 1, are also to subscribe the

articles of religion mentioned in the statute 13 Eliz. c. 12 (which only concern

the confession of the true Christian faith, and the doctrine of the sacraments),

with an express exception of those relating to the government and powers of

the church, and to infant baptism; or if they scruple subscribing the same,

shall make and subscribe the declaration prescribed by statute 19 Geo. Ill, c.

44, professing themselves to be Christians and protestants, and that they believe

the scriptures to contain the revealed will of God, and to be the rule of doctrine

and practice. Thus, though the crime of non-conformity is by no means uni-

versally abrogated, it is suspended and ceases to exist with regard to these

protestant dissenters, during their compliance with the conditions imposed by

these acts; and, under these conditions, all persons who will approve them-

selves no papists or oppngners of the trinity, are left at full liberty to act as

their consciences shall direct them, in the matter of religious worship. And

if any person shall wilfully, maliciously, or contemptuously disturb any con-

gregation, assembled in any church or permitted meeting-house, or shall misuse

any preacher or teacher there, he shall (by virtue of the same statute, 1 W. and

M.) be bound over to the sessions of the peace, and forfeit twenty pounds. But

by statute 5 Geo. I, c. 4, no mayor or principal magistrate must appear at any

dissenting meeting with the ensigns of his office, (b) on pain of disability to hold

that or any other office: the legislature judging it a matter of propriety, that«a

mode of worship set up in opposition to the national, when allowed to be exercised

in peace, should be exercised also with decency, gratitude and humility. Dis-

senters, also, who subscribe the declaration of the act 19 Geo. Ill, are exempted

(y) it Eliz. c.l. 29 Eliz. c. 6. SS Eliz. <-,. I. 22 Car. II, c. I.

(z) The ordinance of 1645 (before citc'l) inflicted imprisonment for a year on the third offence, nnd pern-

niary penalties on the former two, in case of using tlie book of common prayer, not only In a place of pub-

lic worship but also in any private liimily.

f a) See stnt. 8 Geo. I. c. 6.

(b) Sir Humphrey Edwin, a lord mayor of I/ondon, had the imprudence soon after the tolernl'.on acttojro

to 11 prcsbytcrian meeting-house in his formalities ; which is alluded to by Dean Swift, in his (ale of a tub,

under the allegory of Jack getting on a great horse, and eating custard.
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(unless iu the case of endowed schools, and colleges), from the penalties of the

statutes 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 4, and 17 Car. II, c. 2, which prohibit (upon pain

of fine and imprisonment) all persons from teaching school, unless they he

licensed by the ordinary, and *subscribe a declaration of conformity to r *., -,

the liturgy of the church, and reverently frequent divine service, estab- L °° J

lished by the laws of this kingdom. (4)

As to papists, what has been said of the protestant dissenters would hold

equally strong for a general toleration of them; provided their separation was

founded only upon difference of opinion in religion, and their principles did

not also exte'nd to a subversion of the civil government. If once they could be

brought to renounce the supremacy of the pope, they might quietly enjoy their

seven sacraments, their purgatory, and auricular confession; their worship of

reliques and images; nay, even their transubstautiation. But while they ac-

knowledge a foreign power, superior to the sovereignty of the kingdom, they

cannot complain if the laws of that kingdom will not treat them upon the foot-

ing of good subjects.

Let us therefore now take a view of the laws in force against the papists; who

may be divided into three classes, persons professing popery, popish recusants

convict, and popish priests. 1. Persons professing the popish religion, besides

the former penalties for not frequenting their parish church, are disabled from

taking their lands either by descent or purchase, after eighteen years of age, un-

til they renounce their errors; they must at the age of twenty-one register their
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estates before acquired, and all future conveyances and wills relating to them;

they are incapable of presenting to any advowson, or granting to any other per-

son any avoidance of the same; they may not teach or keep any school under

pain of perpetual imprisonment; and if they willingly, say or hear mass, they

forfeit, the one two hundred, the other one hundred marks,"and each shall suffer

a year's imprisonment. Thus much for persons who, from the misfortune of

family prejudices or otherwise, have, conceived an unhappy attachment to the

Romish church from their infancy, and publicly profess its errors. But if any

evil industry is used to rivet these errors upon them, if any person sends an-

other abroad to be educated in the popish religion, or to reside iu any religious

house abroad for that purpose, or contributes to their maintenance when there;

*both the sender, the sent, and the contributor, are disabled to sue in r,,, „ -,

law or equity, to be executor or administrator to any person, to take any L J

legacy or deed of gift, and to bear any office iu the realm, and shall forfeit all

their goods and chattels, and likewise all their real estate for life. And where

these errors are also aggravated by apostasy, or perversion, where a person is rec-

onciled to the see of Rome, or procures others to be reconciled, the offence

amounts to high treason. 2. Popish recusants, convicted in a court of law of

not attending the service of the church of England, are subject to the follow-

ing disabilities, penalties and forfeitures, over and above those before mentioned.

They are considered as persons excommunicated; they can hold no office or

employment; they must not keep arms in their nouses, but the same may be

seized by the justices of the peace; they may not come within ten miles of

London, on pain of 1001.; they can bring no action at law, or suit in equity;

they are not permitted to travel above five miles from home, unless by license,

upon pain of forfeiting all their goods; and they may not come to court under

pain of 100Z. No marriage or burial of such recusant, or baptism of his child,

shall be had otherwise than by the ministers of the church of England, under

other severe penalties. A married woman, when recusant, shall forfeit two-

thirds of her dower or jointure, may not be executrix or administratrix to'her

husband, nor have any part of his goods; and during the coverture may be kept

^4) The statutes here mentioned, and others operating as restraints and impediments to the

religious worship and education of persons not in communion with the established church,

are nearly all repealed. See statutes 9 Geo. IV, c. 17; 8 and 9 Vic. c. 102; 9 and 10 Vic. c.

59; 29 and 30 Vic. c. 5'2; 30 and 31 Vic. c. 62. For an account of the modern advance

of religious liberty in England, see May, Const. Hist. cc. 12-14.
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in prison, unlesa her husband redeems her at the rale of 107. a month, or the

third part of all his lauds. And, lastly, as a feme-covert recusant may be im-

prisoned, so all others must, within three months after conviction, either submit

and renounce their errors, or, if required so to do by four justices, must abjure

and renounce the realm; and if they do not depart, or if they return without

the king's license, they shall be guilty of felony, and suffer death as felons with-

out the benefit of clergy. There is also an inferior species of recusancy

} refusing to make the declaration against popery, enjoined by statute 30 Cur.

I, st. 2, when tendered by the proper magistrate), which, if the party resides

within ten miles of London, makes him an absolute recusant convict; or if at

r*-iy-i a greater distance, suspends him from having any seat in *parliament,

L J keeping arms in his house, or any horse above the value of five pounds.

This is the state, by the laws now in being, (c) of a lay papist. But, 3. The re-

maining species or degree, viz., popish priests, an in a still more .dangerous

condition. For by statute 11 and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 4, popish priests or bishops,

celebrating mass, or exercising any part of their-functions in England, except in

the houses of ambassadors, are liable to perpetual imprisonment. And by the

statute 27 Eliz. c. 2, any popish priests, born in the dominions of the crown of

England, who shall come over hither from beyond sea (unless driven by stress

of weather, and tarrying only a reasonable time, (d) or shall be in England

three days without conforming and taking the oaths, is guilty of high treason:

and all persons harbouring him are guilty of felony without the benefit of clergy.
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This is a short summary of the laws against the papists, under their three

several classes, of persons professing the popish religion, popish recusants con-

vict, and popish priests. Of which the president Montesquieu observes, (e) that

they are so rigorous, though not professedly of the sanguinary kind, that they

do all the hurt that can possibly be done in cold blood. But, in answer to this,

it may be observed (what foreigners who only judge from our statute-book are

not fully apprized of), that these laws are seldom exerted to their utmost rigour:

and, indeed, if they were, it would be very ditlicult to excuse them. For they

are rather to be accounted for from their history, and the urgency of the times

which produced them, than to be approved (upon a cool review) as a standing

system of law. The restless machinations of the Jesuits during the reign of

Elizabeth, the turbulence and uneasiness of the papists under the new religious

establishment, and the boldness of their hopes and wishes for the succession of

the queen of Scots, obliged the parliament to counteract so dangerous a spirit

by laws of a great, and then perhaps necessary, severity. The powder-treason,

r,.Q..m the succeeding reign, struck a panic into *James I, which operated

L Jin different ways: it occasioned the enacting of new laws against the

papists; but deterred him from putting them into execution. The intrigues

of Queen Henrietta in the reign of Charles I, the prospect of a popish successor

in that of Charles II, the assassination-plot in the reign of King William, and

the avowed claim of a popish pretender to the crown in. that and subsequent

reigns, will account for the extension of these penalties at those several periods

of our history. But if a time should ever arrive, and perhaps it is not very

distant, when all fears of a pretender shall have vanished, and the power and

influence of the pope shall become feeble, ridiculous, and despicable, not only in

England, but in every kingdom of Europe; it probably would not then be

amiss to review and soften these rigorous edicts: at least till the civil principles

of the Roman catholics called again upon the legislature to renew them: for it

ought not to be left in the breast of every merciless bigot to drag down the

vengeance of these occasional laws upon inoffensive, though mistaken, subjects;

in opposition to the lenient inclinations of the civil magistrate, and to the

destruction of every principle of toleration and religious liberty.

(r, si:it. 23 Mi/., c. 1. 27 Eliz. c. 2. 29 Kliz. c. ft. W Eliz. c. 2. 1 Jao I, c. 4. 3 Jac. I, c. 4 anrt 6. 7 Jac. I, o.

6. » Cur. I, c. 3. -J5 Car. II. c. 2. 30 Car. II. st. *. 1 W. and M. c. 9, 16 aud 26. 11 anil 12 Wm. Ill, c. 4. 1*

Ann. st. 2, c. 14. 1 tico. I, it. 2, c. 65. 3 Geo. I. c. 18. 11 Ueo. II, o. 17.

(d) Hayiii. 377. Latcli. 1. (e) Sp. L. b. 19, c. 87.
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This hath partly been done by statute 18 Geo. Ill, c. 60, with regard to such

papists as duly take the oath therein prescribed, of allegiance to his majesty,

abjuration of the pretender, renunciation of the pope's civil power, and abhor-

rence of the doctrines of destroying and not keeping faith with heretics, and

deposing or murdering princes excommunicated by authority of the see of Rome:

in respect of whom only the statute of 11 and 12 Wm. Ill is repealed, so far us

it disables them from purchasing or inheriting, or authorizes the apprehending

or prosecuting the popish clergy, or subjects to perpetual imprisonment either

•them or any teachers of youth. (5)

In order the better to secure the established church against perils from non-

comformists of all denominations, infidels, Turks, Jews, heretics, papists, and

sectaries, there are however two bulwarks erected; called the corporation and

test acts: (6) by the former of which (/) no person can be legally elected to any

office relating to the government of any city or corporation, unless, within a

twelvemonth before he has received the sacrament of the Lord's supper,

according to the rites of the church of England; and he is also enjoined to

take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy at the *same time that he [-„,.„ -i

takes the oath of office: or, in default of either of these requisites, such *- ••

election shall be void. The other, called the test act, (g) directs all officers,

civil and military, to take the oaths and make the declaration against tmnsub-

stantiation, in any of the king's courts at Westminster, or at the quarter ses-

sions, within six calendar months after their admission; and also within the
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same time to receive the sacrament of the Lord's supper, according to the usage

of the church of England, in some public church, immediately after divine

service and sermon, and to deliver into court a certificate thereof signed by the

minister and church warden, and also to prove the same by two credible wit-

nesses : upon forfeiture of 5001. and disability to hold the said office. And of

much the same nature with these, is the statute 7 Jac. I, c. 2, which permits no

persons to be naturalized or restored in blood, but such as undergo a like test:

which test having been removed in 1753, in favor of the Jews, was the next ses-

sion of parliament restored again with some precipitation.

Thus much for offences, which strike at our national religion, or the doctrine

and discipline of the church of England in particular. I proceed now to con-

sider some gross impieties and general immoralities, which are taken notice of

and punished by our municipal law ; frequently in concurrence with the ecclesi-

astical, to which the censure of many of them does also of right appertain;

though with a view somewhat different: the spiritual court punishing all sinful

enormities for the sake of reforming the private sinner, pro salute animce; while

the temporal courts resent the public affront to religion and morality on which

all government must depend for support, and correct more for the sake of exam-

ple than private amendment.

IV. The fourth species of offences, therefore, more immediately against God

and religion, is that of bla»phemy against the Almighty, by denying his being or

providence; or by contumelious reproaches of our Saviour Christ (7) Whither

(/) Stut. 13 Car. II, at. S, c. 1. (g) Stat. 25 Cor. II, c. 2, explained by 9 Geo. II, c. 86.

(5) The restrictions, penalties and disabilities, imposed by statute apon persons professing

the Koruan Catholic religion, are now nearly all removed. See statutes 10 Geo. IV, c. 7 ; 7 and

8 Vic. c. 102; 9 and 10 Vic. c. 59; 29 and 30 Vic. c. 22; 30 and 31 Vic. c. 62; May's Const.

Hist. c. 12-14.

(6) But these " bulwarks" of the church, having become generally odious, were in 1828 re-

pealed, with the consent even of the prelates and to the general satisfaction of the nation.

(7) The law on the subject of blasphemy is so fully considered in the cases of People v.

Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290; State v. Chandler, 2 Llarr. 555; Updegraph p. Commonwealth. 11 S. and

B. 394; and Commonwealth i>. Kueelaud, 20 Pick. 213, as to leave little to be added by other

authorities.

The doctrine of our commentator, that " Christianity is part of the law of England," U

true in the qualified sense that the law takes notice of the fact that Christianity is tlie prevail-

ing religion among the people, and that evil speech concerning the Being who'is tbe «\>juct of
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also may be referred all profane scoffing at the holy scripture, or exposing it to

contempt and ridicule. These are offences punishable at common law by tine

and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment; (A) for Christianity

is part of the laws of England, (i)

V. Somewhat allied to this, though in an inferior degree, is the offence of

F*60 1 Pr°fane and common swearing and *cursing. By the last statute against

*• J which, 19 Geo. II, c. 21, which repeals all former ones, every labourer,

sailor, or soldier profanely cursing or swearing shall forfeit 1*.; every other

person under the degree of a gentleman 2.*.; and every gentleman or person of

superior rank 5s. to the poor of the parish ; and, on the second conviction,

double ; and, for every subsequent offence, treble the sum first forfeited ; with

all charges of conviction : and in default of payment shall be sent to the house

of correction for ten days. Any justice of the peace may convict upon his own

hearing, or the testimony of one witness ; and any constable or peace officer,

upon his own hearing, may secure any offender and carry him before a justice,

and there convict him. If the justice omits his duty, he forfeits 51. and the con-

stable 40*. And the act is to be read in all parish churches and public chapels,

the Sunday after every quarter-day, on pain of 5/. to be levied bv Avarrant from

any justice. (8) Besides this punishment for taking God's name in vain in com-

mon discourse, it is enacted by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 21, that if in any stage-play,

interlude, or show, the name of the holy trinity or any of the persons therein, be

jestingly or profanely used, the offender shall forfeit 10?., one moiety to the king,
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and the other to the informer.

VI. A sixth species of offence against God and religion, of which our ancient

books are full, is a crime of which one knows not well what account to give.

I mean the offence of witchcraft, conjuration, inchantment, or sorcery. To

deny the possibility, nay, actual existence, of witchcraft and sorcery, is at once

flatly to contradict the revealed word of God, in various passages both of the

Old and New Testament : and the thing itself is a truth to which every nation

in the world hath in its turn borne testimony, either by examples seemingly

well attested, or by prohibitory laws; which at least suppose the possibility of

commerce with evil spirits. The civil law punishes with death not only the

sorcerers themselves, but also those who consult them, ( /) imitating in the for-

mer the express law of God, (k) "thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." And

pg, -i our own laws, both before and since the conquest, have been *eqnally

*• -1 penal ; ranking this crime in the same class with heresy, and con-

demning both to the flames. (I) The president Montesquieu (m) ranks them

also both together, but with a very different view; laying it down as an

important maxim, that we ought to be very circumspect in the prosecution

of magic and heresy ; because the most unexceptionable conduct, the purest

morals, and the constant practice of every duty in life, are not a sufficient

security against the suspicion of crimes like these. And indeed the ridicu-

lous stories that are generally told, and the many impostures and delusions

that have been discovered in all ages, are enough to demolish all faith in

such a dubious crime; if the contrary evidence were not also extremely

strong. Wherefore it seems to be the most eligible way to conclude, with

an ingenious writer of our own, («) that in general there has been such a

thing as witchcraft; though one cannot give credit to any particular modern

instance of it.

(h) 1 Hnwk. P. C. 7. «) 1 Ventr. 203. 2 Strange, 831. (j; Cod. 1. 9, c. IS.

I/.-) Exorl. s-.\ii, I*. (2) 3 Inst. II (m) Sp. L. b. 12, c. 6. on Mr. Addlson, &pcct. No. 117.

adoration by the Christian, and malicious reproach or profane ridicule of Christ or the books

of the Bible, have an evil effect in sapping the foundations of society and of public order,

and are therefore properly punished as crimes. And the punishment of the lower species of

profanity may be referred to the same principle. See upon this subject Cooley's Const. Liiu.

472. et scq.

(8) [By the 4 Gco. IT, c. 31, this latter provision is repealed.]
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Our forefathers were stronger believers, when they enacted by statute 33 Hen.

VIII, c. 8, all witchcraft and sorcery to be felony without benefit of clergy; and

again by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 12, that all persons invoking any evil spirit, or consult-

ing, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding, or rewarding any evil

spirit; or taking up dead bodies from their graves to be used in any witchcraft,

sorcery, charm, or hichantinent; or killing or otherwise hurting any person by

such infernal arts, should be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy, and suffer

death. And, if any person should attempt by sorcery to discover hidden treas-

ure, or to restore stolen goods, or to provoke unlawful love, or to hurt any man

or beast, though the same were not effected, he or she should suffer imprison-

ment and pillory for the first offence, and death for the second. These acts con-

tinued in force till lately, to the terror of all ancient females in the kingdom :

and many poor wretches were sacrificed thereby to the prejudice of their

neighbours, and their own illusions; not a few having, by some means or other,

confessed the fact at the gallows. But all executions for this dubious crime are

now at an end; our legislature having at length followed the wise example of

*Lonis XIV, in France, who thought proper by an edict to restrain the r*6ol

tribunals of justice from receiving informations of witchcraft, (o) And >- •"

accordingly it is with us enacted by statute 9 Oeo. II, c. 5, that no prosecution

shall for the future be carried on against any persons for conjuration, witchcraft,

sorcery, or incliantment But the misdemeanor of persons pretending to use

witchcraft, tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods by skill in the occult sciences,
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is still deservedly punished with a year's imprisonment, and standing four times

in the pillory. (!•))

VII. A seventh species of offenders in this class are all religious importers;

such as falsely pretend an extraordinary commission from heaven; or terrify

and abuse the people with false denunciations of judgments. These, as tending

to subvert all religion, by bringing it into ridicule and contempt, are punishable

by the temporal courts with fine, imprisonment, and infamous corporal punish-

ment, (p)

VIII. Simony, or the corrupt presentation of any one to an ecclesiastical

benefice for gift or reward, is also to be considered as an offence against religion;

as well by reason of the sacrednessof the charge which is thus profanely bought

and sold, as because it is always attended with perjury in the person present-

ed, (q) (10) The statute 31 filiz. c. 6 (which, so far as it relates to the forfeit-

ure of the right of presentation, was considered in a former book), (r) enacts,

that if any patron, for money or any other corrupt consideration or promise,

directly or indirectly given, shall present, admit, institute, induct, install, or

collate any person to an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity, both the giver and

tuker shall forfeit two years value of the benefice or dignity; one moiety to the

king, and the other to any one who will sue for the same. If persons also cor-

ruptly resign or exchange their benefices, both the giver and taker shall in like

manner forfeit double the value of the money or other corrupt consideration.

And persons who shall *corruptly ordain or license any minister, or pro- r*f.o -,

cure him to be ordained or licensed (which is the true idea of simony), >- -"

shall incur a like forfeiture of forty pounds; and the minister himself of ten

pounds, besides an incapacity to hold any ecclesiastical preferment for seven

years afterwards. Corrupt elections and resignations in colleges, hospitals, and

other eleemosynary corporations, are also punished by the same statute with for-

feiture of the double value, vacating the place or office, and a devolution of the

right of election for that turn to the crown:

(o) Voltalrr siecl. Laifa XIV. ch. 28. Mod. Un. Hist. xxv. 215. Yet Voughlnns(de droU criminal, 353,

4Sfl), still !•.•.•!..»,.- up sorcery anil witchr.rnft among the crimes punishable In France.

lp) 1 Iluwii. r. C. 7. (?) 3 Inst. 158. (r) See book II. p. 379.

(9) The vagrant act treats these as rogues and vagabonds, and restrains and punishes them

•ccordmply.

(10) [But according to 2 Bla. Kcp. 1052; 1 Ld. Ravin. 449; Moore Hep. 564, simony is not

an offence ortminally punishable at common law.")

ooo

63 OFFENCES AGAINST GOD AND RELIGION. [Book IV.

IX. Profanation of the Lord's day, vulgarly (but improperly) called Sabbath-

breaking, is a ninth offence against God and religion, punished by the munici-

pal law of England. (11) For, besides the notorious indecency and scandal of

permitting any secular business to be publicly transacted on that dav, in a

country professing Christianity, and the corruption of morals which usually fol-

lows its profanation, the keeping one day in the seven holy, as a time of relax-

ation and refreshment as well as for public worship, is of admirable service to a

state, considered merely as a civil institution. It humanizes, by the help of

conversation and society, the manners of the lower classes; which would

otherwise degenerate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfishness of spirit: it

enables the industrious workman to pursue his occupation in the ensuing week

with health and cheerfulness: it imprints on the minds of the peopl that sense

of their duty to God, so necessary to make them good citizens; but which yet

would be worn out and defaced by an unremitted continuance of labour, with-

out any stated times of recalling them to the worship of their Maker. And

therefore the laws of King Athelstan (s) forbade all merchandizing on the Lord's

day, under very severe penalties. And by the statute 27 Hen. VI, c. 5, no fair

or market shall be held on the principal festivals, Good Friday, or any Sunday

(except the four Sundays in harvest), on pain of forfeiting the goods exposed

to sale. And since, by the statute 1 Car. I, c. 1, no person shall assemble out

of their own parishes, for any sport whatsoever upon this day; nor, in their

r*641 parishes, shall use any bull or "bear-baiting, interludes, plays, or other
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"• J unlawful exercise, or pastimes; on pain that every offender shall pay

3s. 4d. to the poor. This statute dose not prohibit, but rather impliedly

allows, any innocent recreation or amusement, within their respective parishes,

even on the Lord's day, after divine service is over. But by statute 29 Car. II,

c. 7, no person is allowed to work on the Lord's day or use any boat or barge,

or expose any goods to sale; except meat in public houses, milk at certain hours,

and works of necessity or charity, on forfeiture of 5s. Nor shall any drover,

carrier, or the like, travel upon that day, under pain of twenty shillings.

X. Drunkenness is also punished by statute 4 Jac. I, c. 5, with the forfeiture

of 5s.; or the sitting six hours in the stocks: by which time the statute pre-

sumes the offender will have regained his senses, and not be liable to do mischief

to his neighbours. And there are many wholesome statutes, by way of preven-

tion, chiefly passed in the same reign of King James I, which regulate the

licensing of alehouses, and punish persons found tippling therein; or the master

of such houses permitting them.

XI. The last offence which I shall mention, more immediately against

religion and morality, and cognizable by the temporal courts, is that of open

and notorious lewdness ; either by frequenting houses of ill-fame, which is au

indictable offence; (t) (12) or by some grossly scandalous and public indecency for

(«) C. 24, (/) Poph. «W.

(11) In the United States, generally by statute persons are prohibited by law from follow-

ing their ordinary calling on Sunday, and contracts entered into on that day are made void.

These statutes nave sometimes been assailed as unconstitutional, because encroaching upon

religions liberty; but the courts have sustained them. Commonwealth r. Wolf. :i S. and R.

50; Commonwealth v. Lisher, 17 S and K. 160; Shover *, State, 5 Ping. 529; Vogolsong

t'.State, 9 Ind. 112; State ». Ambs, 20 Mo. 214; Cincinnati «. Rice, 15 Ohio, 225; Specht T.

Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St. 312.

As to exceptions in such statutes of works of necessity or charity, see Commonwealth r. Knoi,

16 Mass. 76 ; Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502; Murray u. Commonwealth, 24 Penn. St. 270.

(12) The keeping of a bawdy-house is a nuisance at the common law, and indictable as

such. Smith ». State, 6 Gill, 425 ; Smith t. Commonwealth, 6 B Monr. 21; State c. Evans, 5

Ired. 603 ; Commonwealth ». Harrington, 3 Pick. 26 ; People v. Erwin, 4 Denio, 129. And any

form of open and notorious lewduess and indecency, as shown by Mr. Chitty in the following

note. And probably frequenting houses of ill-fame may be so open and scandalous as to con

Btitute a public oflense, also, but single acts of private lewdness certainly are not such at lh«

ctminion law.
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which the punishment is by fine and imprisonment. («) (13) In the year 1650,

when the ruling power found it for their interest to put on the semblance of a

very extraordinary strictness and purity of morals, not only incest and wilful

adultery were made capital crimes; but also the repeated act of keeping a

brothel, or committing fornification, were (upon a second conviction) made

felony without benefit of clergy, (w) But at the restoration, when men, from

an abhorrence of the hypocrisy of the late times, fell into a contrary extreme of

licentiousness, it was not thought proper to renew alaw of *snch unfash- r *6-i

ionable rigour. And these offences have been ever since left to the feeble •- -1

coercion of the spiritual court, according to the rules of the canon law; a law

which has treated the offence of incontinence, nay, even adultery itself, with a

great degree of tenderness and lenity; owing perhaps to the constrained celibacy

of its first compilers. The temporal courts therefore take no cognizance of the

crime of adultery, otherwise than as a private injury, (x) (14)

But, before we quit this subject, we must take notice of the temporal punish-

ment for having bastard children, considered in a criminal light; for with re-

gard to the maintenance of such illegitimate offspring, which is a civil con-

cern, we have formerly spoken at large, (y) By the statute 18 Eliz. c. 3, two

justices may take order for the punishment of the mother and reputed father;

but what that punishment shall be is not therein ascertained; though the con-

temporary exposition was that a corporal punishment was intended, (z) By

statute 7 Jac. I. c. 4, a specific punishment (viz. commitment to the house 01
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correction) is inflicted on the woman only. But in both cases it seems that the

penaltv can only be inflicted if the bastard becomes chargeable to the parish ;

for otherwise the very maintenance of the child is considered as a degree of

punishment By the last-mentioned statute the justices may commit the

mother to the house of correction, there to be punished and set on work for one

year; and, in case of a second offence, till she find sureties never to offend

again. (15)

fitj 1 Sid. 168. fuJScobell, 181. (x) See book III, p. 139. ft/jSce book I, p. 438. fgj Dull. Ju*t. ch. 11.

(13) [Exposing a party's person to the public view, is an offence contra more*, and indicta-

ble. See 1 Sid. 168; 2Canip, 89; 1 Keb. 620. And by the vagrant act. 5 Geo. IV, c. 83, J 4,

exposing a man's person with intent to insult a female, is an offence for which the offender may

be treated as a rojpe and vagabond ; and so is the willfully exposing an obscene print or inde-

cent exhibition; indeed this would be an indictable offence at common law. 2 Stra. 789; 1

Barn. Rep. 29; 4 Burr. 2527, 2574. And by the same act of 5 Geo. IV, c. P3, $ 3, every com-

mon prostitute wandering in public and behaving in a riotous and indecent manner, may be

treated as an idle and disorderly person within the meaning of that act.

Publicly selling and buying a wife is clearly an indictable offence: 3 Burr. 1438; and many

prosecutions against husbands for selling, and others for buying, have been sustained, and im-

prisonment for six months inflicted.

Procuring or endeavoring to procure the seduction of a girl seems indictable. 3 St. Tr. 519.

So is endeavoring to lead a girl into prostitution. 3 Burr. 1438. And see post 209,212, a» to the

offence of seduction.

It is an indictable offence to dig up and carry away a dead 6ody out of a church-yard. 2 T.

E. 733; Leach, C. L. 4th ed. 497, 8. C.; 2 East, P. (J. 652. And the mere disposing of a dead

body for gain and profit is an indictable offence. Kuss. and It. 0. C. 366, note ; 1 Dowl. and If.

N . P. C. 13. And it is a misdemeanor to arrest a dead body, and thereby prevent a burial in

due time. 4 East, 465. The punishment for such an offence is fine .uul imprisonment. 2 T. U.

733.]

(14) Adultery and seduction are punished criminallv in some of the United States. In others

the only redress is by civil action for the recovery of damage*.

(15) The statute 7 James I, e. 4, was repealed by 50 Geo. Ill, c. 51, which made new provis-

ions fur these cases.

In the United States the statutes upon the subject of bastard children do not usually go much

beyond the protection of the public against the bastard becoming a public charge. With this

object in view proceedings may be taken against the putative father, and he may be compelled

to support the child, either alone or with the assistance of the mother.
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CHAPTEE V.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS.

ACCORDING to the method marked out in the preceding chapter, we are next

to consider the offences more immediately repugnant to that universal law of

society which regulates the mutual intercourse between one state and another;

those, I mean, which arc particularly animadverted on, as such, by the English

law. (1)

The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and

established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the

world ; (a) in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civili-

ties, and to insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that inter-

course which must frequently occur between two or more independent states,

and the individuals belonging to each, (b) This general law is founded upon

this principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another

all the good they can; and in time of war as little harm as possible, without

prejudice to their own real interests, (c) And, as none of these states will allow

a superiority in the other, therefore neither can dictate or prescribe the rules

of tnis law to the rest; but such rules must necessarily result from those

r tg~-i *principles of natural justice, in which all the learned of every nation

L J agree; or they depend upon mutual compacts or treaties between the

respective communities ; in the construction of which there is also no judge to

resort to, but the law of nature and reason, being the only one in which all the
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contracting parties are equally conversant, and to which they are equally sub-

ject.

In arbitrary states, this law, wherever it contradicts, or is not provided for by,

the municipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal power: but since in

England no royal power can introduce a new law, or suspend the execution of

the old, therefore the law of nations ([wherever any question arises which is

properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the

common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land. And those acts of

parliament which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal

law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are not to be considered as

introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental

constitutions of the kingdom: without which it must cease to be a part of the

civilized world. Thus, in mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange, and

the like: in all marine causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insur-

ances, bottomry, and others of a similar nature; the law merchant, (d) which is a

branch of the law of nations, is regularly and constantly adhered to. So, too, in

all disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there

is no other rule of decision but this great unversal law, collected from history

and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as are generally ap-

proved and allowed of. (2)

But though in civil transactions and questions of property between the

subjects of different states, the law of nations has much scope and extent, as

adopted by the law of England; yet the present branch of our inquiries will fall

F *681 *wl>th'n a narrow compass, as offences against the law of nations can

*• -• rarely be the object of the criminal law of any particular state. For

(a) F/,1,1,9. fb) See book I, p. 43. fej Sp. L. b. 1, c. 7. (d) See book I, p. J7S.

(1) The offences enumerated in this chapter are in the United States cognizable by the federal

courts. They will be found treated of by Mr. Wheaton in his International Law, as well as in

other treatises on that subject, and those on criminal law.

(•-') The ransom of ships is forbidden by statute :j:i Guu. Ill, c. 6C, and contracts and securities

for that purpose are made void.
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offences against this law are principally incident to whole states or nations;

in which case recourse can only be had to war; which is an appeal to the God

of hosts, to punish such infractions of public faith as are committed by one

independent people against another: neither state having any superior jurisdic-

tion to resort to upon earth for justice. But where the individuals of any state

violate this general law, it is then the interest as well as duty of the govern-

ment, under which they live, to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity,

that the peace of the world may be maintained. For in vain would nations in

their collective capacity observe these universal rules, if private subjects were

at liberty to break them at their own discretion, and involve the two states in a

war. It is therefore incumbent upon the nation injured, first to demand sutis-

furiion and justice to be done en the offender, by the state to which he belongs,

and, if that be refused or neglected, the sovereign then avows himself an accom-

plice or abettor of his subject's crime, and draws upon his community the

calamities of foreign war.

The principal offences against the law of nations, animadverted on as such

by the municipal laws of England, are of three kinds; 1. Violation of safe-con-

ducts; 2. Infringements of the rights of ambassadors; and 3. Piracy.

I. As to the first, violation of safe-conduct.g or pasaports, expressly granted by

the kiag or his ambassadors (e) to the subjects of a foreign power in time of

mutual war; or committing acts of hostilities against Midi as are in amity,

league, or truce with us, who are here under a general implied safe-conduct:
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these are breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which there

can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation and another: and such

offences may, according to the writers on the law of nations, be a just ground of

a national war; since it is not in the power of *the foreign prince r»gg i

to cause justice to be done to his subjects by the very individual delin- •• J

quent, but he must require it of the whole community. And as during the

continuance of any safe-conduct, either express or implied, the foreigner is

under the protectioa of the king and the law: and, more especially, as it is one

of the articles of ntagna carlo, (/) that foreign merchants should be entitled to

safe-conduct and security throughout the kingdom; there is no question but

that any violation of either the person or property of such foreigner may be

punished by indictment in the name of the king, whose honour is more particu-

larly engaged in supporting his own safe-conduct. And, when this malicious

rapacity was not confined to private individuals, but broke out into general

hostilities, by the statute 2 lieu. V, at 1, c. 6, breaking of truce and safe-con-

ducts, or abetting and receiving the truce-breakers, was (in affirmance and

support of the law of nations) declared to be high treason against the crown and

dignity of the king; and conservators of truce and safe-conducts were appointed

in every port, and empowered to hear and determine such treasons (when com-

mitted at sea) according to the ancient marine law then practiced in the

admiral's court; and, together with two men learned in the law of the land, to

hear and determine according to that law the same treasons when committed

within the body of any county. Which statute, so far as it made these offences

amount to treason, was suspended by 14 Hen. VI, c. 8, and repealed by 20 Hen.

VI, c. 11, but revived by 29 Hen. VI, c. 2, which gave the same powers to the

lord chancellor, associated with either of the chief justices, as belonged to the

conservators of truce and their assessors; and enacted that, notwithstanding

the party be convicted of treason, the injured stranger should have restitution

out of his effects, prior to any claim of the crown. And it is farther enacted by

the statute 31 Hen. VI, c. 4, that if any of the king's subjects attempt or offend

u (iiin the sea, or in any port within the king's obeysance, against any stranger in

amity, league, or truce, or under safe-conduct; and especially by attaching

*his person, or spoiling him or robbing him of his goods the lord r*™-]

chancellor, with any of the justices of either the kinge's bench or common *• '

pleas, may cause full restitution and amends to be made to the party injured.

(e) See book I, page WO. (f) 9 Hm. Ill, c. 30. See book I. page HB, Ao.
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It is to be observed, that the suspending and repealing acts of 14 and 20

Hon. VI, and also the reviving act of 29 Hen. VI, were only temporary, so that

it should seem that, after the expiration of them all, the statute 2 Hen. V con-

tinued in full force; but yet it is considered as extinct by the statute 14 Edw.

IV, c. 4, which revives and confirms all statutes and ordinances, made before

the accession of the house of York, against breakers of amities, traces, leagues,

and safe-conducts, with an express exception to the statute of 2 Hen. V. But

(however that may be) I apprehend it was finally repealed by the general statutes

of Edw. VI, and 'Queen Mary, for abolishing new-created treasons; though Sir

Matthew Hale seems to question it as to treasons committed on the sea.(<7) But

certainly the statute of 31 Hen. VI remains in full force to this day.

II. As to the rights of ambassadors, which are also established by the law of

nations, and are therefore matter of universal concern, they have formerly been

treated of at large, (h) It may here be sufficient to remark, that the common

law of England recognizes them in their full extent, by immediately stopping

all legal process sued out through the ignorance or rashness of individuals,

•which may intrench upon the immunities of a foreign minister or any of his

train. And, the more effectually to enforce the law of nations in this respet-t*

when violated through wantonness or insolence, it is declared, by the statute

7 Ann. c. 12, that all process whereby the person of any ambassador, or of his

domestic or domestic servant, may be arrested, or his goods distrained or seised,

shall be utterly null and void ; and that all persons prosecuting, soliciting, or
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executing such process being convicted by confession or the oath of one wit-

,-„„, T ness, before the * lord chancellor and the chief justices, or any two of

•• -" them, shall be deemed violators of the laws of nations, and disturbers

of the public repose; and shall suffer such penalties and corporal punishment

as the said judges, or any two of them, shall think fit. (i) (3) Thus, in cases of

extraordinary outrage, for which the law hath provided no special penalty, the

legislature hath intrusted to the three principal judges of the kingdom an un-

limited power of proportioning the punishment to the crime.

III. Lastly, the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high

seas, is an offence against the universal law of society; a pirate being, according^

to Sir Edward Coke, (h) hotstis humnni generis. As, therefore, he has renounced

all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself afresh to

the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind

must declare war against him: so that every community hath a right, by the

rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him which every individual

would in a state of nature have been otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion

of his pei-son or personal property.

By the ancient common law, piracy, if committed by a subject, was held to

be a species of treason, being contrary to his natural allegiance; and by an

alien, to be felony only; but now, since the statute of treason, 25 Edw. Ill, c. 2,

it is held to be only felony in a subject. (I) Formerly it was only cognizable by

fa) 1 Hnl. P. C. -'17. (h) Soo book I, p. 253. (!) See the occasion of making this statute, book, I, p. 255.

fftjlluit. US. (I) IMd.

(3) [A consul is not a public minister, within the act. The party, to entitle him to the

protection of the act, must be a servant, or employed in the ambassador's house: 3 D. and

K. 25; and a servant within the meaning of the act, must be actually and bona fide such

Hcrvant. Tidcl Prao. 8th ed. 193; 4 Burr. 2016, 2017. It does not matter whether the

servant is a native of the country where the ambassador re-fid"8, or a foreigner; and real

servants, though not residing with the ambassador, are within the act. 2 Stra. 7'Ji ; 3 Wils.

35; 1 B. and C. 563; 2 D. and R. 840, S. C. But if the servant do not reside in the timKusa-

dor's house, and have poods in his own house, more than are necessary for his convenience as

such sen-ant, they are not within the protection of the act. 1 B. and C. 554 : 2 D. and II. <?£$,

S. C. The servant's name must be registered in the secretary of states's office, and transmitted

.to the sheriff's office, to support a proceeding against the sheriff for such arrest. 1 Wihs. 20;

Tidd Prac. 8th ed. 194.]

For similar statutory provisions in the United States, see act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. at

Large, 117; Brightly's" Dig. 40.
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the admiralty courts, which proceed bv the rules of the civil law. (m) But it

being inconsistent with the liberties of the nation thut any man's life should be

taken away unless by the judgment of his peers, or of the common law of the

land, the statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15, established a new jurisdiction for this

purpose, which proceeds according to the course of the common law, and of

which we shall say more hereafter.

*The offence of piracy, by common law, consists in committing those r*n% i

acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed "• J

upon laud, would have amounted to felony there. (M) But, by statute some

other offences are made piracy also; as, by statute 11 and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 7, if

any nut. HIM! born subject commits any act of hostility upon the high seas against

others of his majesty's subjects, under colour of a commission from any foreign

power; this, though it would only be an act of war in an alien, shall be construed

piracy in a subject And, farther, any commander, or other seafaring person,

betraying his trust, and running away with any ship, boat, ordnance, ammuni-

tion, or goods; or yielding them up voluntarily to a pirate; or conspiring to do

these acts ; or any person assaulting the commander of a vessel to hinder him

from fighting in defence of his ship, or confining him, or making, or endeavor-

ing to make a revolt on board; shall, for each of these offences, be adjudged a

pirate, felon and robber, and shall suffer death, whether he be principal, or

merely accessory, by setting forth such pirates, or abetting them before the fact,

or receiving or concealing them or their goods after it. And the statute 4 Geo.
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I, c. 11, expressly excludes the principals from the benefit of clergy. By the

statute 8 Geo. I, c. 24, the trading with known pirates, or furnishing them with

stores or ammunition, or fitting out any vessel for that purpose, or in any wise

consulting, combining,confederating, or corresponding with them: or the forci-

ble boarding any merchant vessel, though without seizing or carrying her off,

and destroying or throwing any of the goods overboard, shall be deemed piracy :

and such accessories to piracy as are described by the statute of King William

are declared to be principal pirates, and all parties convicted by virtue of this

act are made felons without the benefit of clergy. (4) By the same statutes also

(to encourage the defence of merchant vessels against pirates], the commanders

or seamen wounded, and _ the widows of such seamen as are slain, in any pirat-

ical engagement, shall be entitled to a bounty, to *be divided among them r*~o -i

not exceeding one fiftieth part of the value of the cargo on board: and L J

such wounded seamen shall be entitled to the pension of Greenwich hospital:

which no other seamen are, except only such as have served in a ship of war.

And if the commander shall behave cowardly, by not defending the ship, if she

carries guns or arms, or shall discharge the mariners from fighting, so that the

ship falls into the hands of pirates, such commander shall forfeit all his wages,

and suffer six months' imprisonment. (5) Lastly, by statute 18 Geo. II, c. 30,

any natural born subject, or denizen, who in time of war shall commit hostili-

fmj 1 Hawk. P. C. as. (n) 1 Hnwk. P. C. 100.

(4) [The ordinary punishment of piracy, under the etovtute law, is now penal servitude for

life or any terra not less than five years, or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more

than two years.]

(5) [In the construction of the common law, as enlarged by the statutes mentioned in the

text, it appears, for mariners to seize the captain, put him "on shore against his will, and

nftcrwards employ the ship to their use, is piracy. 2 East, P. C. 796. And embezzling a nhip's

anchor and cable is piracy, though the master of the vessel concur in it, and though the object

is to defraud the underwriters, not the insurers. Russ. and R. C. C. 123. Where the master

of a vessel insured the ship and cargo, lauded the goods, and, on the destruction of the for-

mer, protested both as lost, with intent to defraud the owners and insurers, this was holden to

be a mere breach of trust and no felony, because there was no determination of the special

authority with which the defenaut was intrusted. 2 East, P. C. 776. The rules as to larceny

wiU here apply.]
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ties at sea against any of his fellow-subjects, or shall assist an enemy on that

element, is liable to be tried and convicted as a pirate. (6)

These are the principal cases, in which tlte statute law of England interposes

to aid and enforce the law of nations, as a part of the common taw: by inflict-

ing an adequate punishment apon offences against that universal l»w, commit-

ted by private persons. We shall proceed in the next chapter to consider

offences which more immediately aflect the sovereign executive power of our

own particular state, or the king and government; which species of crime

branches itself into a much larger extent than either of those which we have

already treated.

CHAPTER VI.

OF HIGH TREASON.

THE third general division of crimes consists of such as more especially affect

the supreme executive power,or the king and his government; which amount

either to a total renunciation of that allegiance, or at least to a criminal neglect

of that duty, which is due from every subject to his sovereign. In a former part

of these Commentaries (a) we had occasion to mention the nature of allegiance,

as the tie or ligamen which binds every subject to be trne and faithful to his

sovereign liege lord the king, in return for that protection which is afforded

him ; and truth and faith to bear of life and limb, and earthly honour; and not

to know or hear of any ill intended him, without defending him therefrom.

And this allegiance, we may remember, was distinguished into two species: the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

one natural and perpetual, which is inherent only iu natives of the king's domin-

ions ; the other local and temporary, which is incident to aliens also. Every

oifeuce therefore, more immediately affecting the royal person, his crown, or

dignity, is in some degree a breach of this duty of allegiance, whether natnral

or innate, or local and acquired bv residence: and these may be distinguished

into four kinds; L Treason. 2. Felonies injurious to the king's prerogative.

3. Prwmunire. 4. Other misprisions and contempts. Of which crimes, the

first and principal is that of treason.

.-*_. , "Treason, proditio, in its very name (which is borrowed from the

L ' J French) imports a betraying, treachery, or breach of faith. It therefore

happens only between allies, saith the Mirror: (b) for treason is indeed a general

appellation made use of by the law, to denote not only offences against the

king and government, but also that accumulation of gmlt which arises when-

ever a superior reposes a confidence in a subject or inferior, between whom and

himself there subsists a natural, a civil, or even a spiritual relation: and the

inferior so abuses that confidence, so forgets the obligations of duty, subjection

(o) Book I. cb. 10. (ft) C. 1, J 7.

(6) [See 2 Haw. P. C. pp. 305, 461—-4S5, 4-»0, $ 1. See also 5 Geo. IV, o. 113, i 9. wn! Forbes

v. C'ochrene, 3 D. and R. 679; 2 B. and C. 448.

The statute 9 G«o, IV c. 31, repeals so much of the 22 and 2.1 Car. II, c. 11, " as relates to

anv mariner laying violent hands on his commander, as therein mentioned." See also 9

Geo. IV, c. 84.]"

Piracy is punished in the United States iu the federal courts. The laws of congress prescribe

•what acts shall be punishable! as piracy ; and the act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. at Large, 113;

that of May 15, 1820,3 id. 300 ; that of August 8, 184fi, 9 id. 73; mid that of March 3, 1347,

id. 175; are referred to for particular*. The act of 18'iO makes the slave trade piracy. Tho

aet of March 3, 18li», which wan only temporay, provided for the punishment of offences

•which were piracy by the laws of nations : as to which sc« 17. S. ». Smith, 5 Wheat. 153 ; anil

I' S. r. Furlong, id. 184 ; Tho Mariano Flora, 11 id. 1. Anil as to pirarr nnfcr the act of 1790,

sen U. S. r. Palmor, 3 Wheat. 610; U. S. p. Klintock, 5 id. 144; U. S. v. Furlong, id. 164,

The slave trade is made piracy by English statutes. See statute G and 7 Vie. c. 9d.
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and allegiance; as to destroy the life of any such superior or lord, (c) This is

looked upon as proceeding from the same principle of treachery, in private life,

as would have nrged him who harbours it to have conspired in public against

his liege lord and sovereign, and therefore for a wife to kill her lord or husband,

a servant his lord or Blaster, and an ecclesiastic his lord or ordinary: these being

breaches of the lower allegiance, of private and domestic faith, are denominated

petU treasons. (1) But when disloyalty so rears its crest as to attack even

majesty itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction high treason alia pru-

dilw; being equivalent to the em'men Icesas majestatis of the Romans, aa

Glanvil (>/) denominates it also in our English law.

As this is the highest civil crime which (considered as a member of the com-

munity) any matt can possibly commit, it ought therefore to be the more pre-

cisely ascertained. For if the crime of high treason be indeterminate, this

alone (says the president Montesquieu) is sufficient to make any government

degenerate into arbitrary power. («) And yet, by the ancient common law, there

was a great latitude left in the breast of the judges to determine what was

treason or not so: whereby the creatures of tyrannical princes had opportunity

to create abundance of constructive treasons; that ia, to raise, by force and

arbitrary constructions, offences into the *crime and punishment of r^,, -,

treason which never were suspected to be such. Thus the accroaching L •" J

er attempting to exercise, royal power (a very uncertain charge) was in the 21

Edw. Ill held to be treason in a knight of Hertfordshire, who forcibly assaulted
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and detained one of th« king's subjects till he paid him 90&: (/) a crime, it

must be owned, well deserving of punishment; bet which seems to be of a com-

plexion very different from that of treason. Killing the king's father, or

brother, or even his messenger, has also fallen under the same denomination, (g)

The latter of which is almost as tyrannical a doctrine as that of the imperial

constitution of Arcadius and Honoring, which determines that any attempts or

designs against the ministers of the prince shall be treason. (/*) But, however,

to prevent the inconveniences which began to arise in England from this multi-

tude of constructive treasons, the statute 25 Edw. Ill, c. 2, was made; which

defines what offences only for the future should be held to be treason : in like

manner as the lex Julia majestntin among the Romans promudged by Augustus

Cwsar, comprehended all the ancient laws, that had before been enacted to punish

transgressors against the state (t) (2) This statute must therefore be our text

and guide, in order to examine into the several species of high treason. And we

shall find that it comprehends all kinds of high treason under seven distinct

branches.

1. " When a man doth compass or imagine the death our lord the king, of

our lady his queen, or of their eldest son, and heir." Under this description it is

(«) LL. Aelfr&H. e. 4. AMdsl. c. 4. Canuti, c. H, 8t. (<f) L. 1, c. t. («) Sp. L, b. 12, c. 7.

(/) I Hal. 1'. U. SO. (jf) Britt. c. 22. 1 Hawk. P. C. M.

(A) ^uiefc NectivivonuB illtuatrittm, qui coturilii* et cotututoria nostro i'n/ar««n/, sewitoruun ctiam (nam • t

ipsi pan ciirpori* nnttri mull rtl cvjuii libet fwtrrmo, gui mtlitat.nMixum. cogitaverit i u'/u/em enim seivi-i-

trttf i-niir/ituii in gctlerit, </"••• -v/- •/"«*. pttntrt jwa voluerint) ip«e gulden, uipote maj&fitUit retu, giwiio

feriutur. bonii yus owmitnajtuco nottro addictu. (Cod. B, S. S.)

(ii <iraiin. Orig. 1, t :U.

(1) This offence is not recognized in the United States, and is now abolished in England.

(2) [The provisions of this act are confirmed by the 'M Gco. Ill, c. 7, which is made perpet-

ual by the 57 Geo. Ill, c. 6. This latter statute renders the law of high treason more clear

and definite. It provides, that if any one within the realm, or without, shall compass or in-

tend death, destruction, or any bodily harm tending thereto, maiming, or wounding, imprison-

ment or restraint of his majesty, or depose him from the stylo, honour, or kingly namo of

the imperial trowu of these realnis, or to levy war against him within this realm, in order by

force or constraint to compel him to change his measures or counselor in order to put any

constraint upon, or intimidate both, or either house of parliament, or to move or stir any

foreigner witn force to invade this realm, or <«i£ of his majesty's dominions; and such com-

passing or intentions shall express by publishing any printing, or writing, or by any other

overt act, being convicted thereof on the oaths of two witnesses upon trial, or otherwise, by

dne course of law, such person shall bo adjudged a traitor, and suffer death ax in oases of high

treason.]

.-
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held that a queen regnant (such as Queen Elizabeth and Queen Anne) is within-

the words of the act, being invested with royal power, and entitled to the

allegiance of her subjects: (/) but the husband of snch a queen is not com-

f*77 1 P™86'! within these words, *and therefore no treason can be committed

*• J against him. (&) The king here intended is the king in possession, with-

out any respect to his title; for it is held, that a king de facto and not de jure,

or, in other words, an usurper that hath got possession of the throne, is a king

within the meaning of the statute: as there is a temporary allegiance due to

him, for his administration of the government and temporary protection of the

public: and, therefore, treasons committed against Henry VI were punished

under Edward IV, though all the line of Lancaster had been previously de-

clared usurpers by act of parliament. But the most rightful heir of the crown,

or king de jure and not de facto, who hath never had plenary possession of the

throne, as was the case of the house of York during the three reigns of the line

of Lancaster, is not a king within this statute against whom treasons may be

committed. (I) And a very sensible writer on the crown-law carries the point of

possession so far, that he holds, (m) that a king out of possession is so far from

having any right to our allegiance, by any other title which he may set up

against the king in being, that we are bound by the duty of our allegiance to

resist him. A doctrine which he grounds upon the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 1,

which is declaratory of the common law, and pronounces all subjects excused

from any penalty or forfeiture, which do assist and obey a king de facto. But,
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in truth, this seems to be confounding all notions of right and wrong; and the

consequence would be, that when Cromwell had murdered the elder Charles,

and usurped the power (though not the name) of king, the people were bound

in duty to hinder the son's restoration : and were the king of Poland or Morocco

to invade this kingdom, and by any means to get possession of the crown (a

term, by the way, of very loose and indistinct signification), the subject would be

bound by his allegiance "to fight for his natural prince to-day, and by the same

duty of allegiance to fight against him to-morrow. The true distinction seems

r*78 i to be, that the statute of Henry *the Seventh does by no means com-

L J mand any opposition to a king dejure; but excuses the obedience paid

to a king de facto. When, therefore, an usurper is in possession, the subiect is

excused and justified in obeying and giving him assistance: otherwise, under an

usurpation, no man could be safe: if the lawful prince had a right to hang him

for obedience to the powers in being, as the usurper would certainly do for dis-

obedience. Nay, farther, as the mass of people are imperfect judges of title, of

which in all cases possession is prima facie evidence, the law compels no man

to yield obedience to that prince whose right is by want of possession rendered

uncertain and disputable, till Providence shall think fit to interpose in his

favour, and decide the ambiguous claim: and, therefore, till he is entitled to

such allegiance by possession, no treason can be committed against him. Lastly,

a king who has resigned his crown, such resignation being admitted and ratified

in parliament, is, according to Sir Matthew Hale, no longer the object of trea-

son, (n) And the same reason holds, in case a king abdicates the government;

or, by actions subversive of the constitution, virtually renounces the authority

which he claims by that very constitution: since, as was formerly observed, (o)

when the fact of abdication is once established, and determined by the proper

judges, the consequence necessarily follows, that the throne is thereby vacant,

and he is no longer king.

Let us next see, what is a compassing or imagining the death of the king, &c.

These are synonymous terms; the word compass signifying the purpose or

design of the mind or will, (p) and not, as in common speech, the carrying such

design to effect, (q) And therefore an accidental stroke, which may mortally

(j) 1 Hal. P. C. 101. (i) 8 Inst. 7. 1 Hal. P. C. 106. (1) 3 lust. 7. 1 Hal. P. C. 104.

(m) 1 Hawk. P. C. 80. (n) 1 Hal. P. C. 104. (o) Book I, page 212.

I p} By i in- ancient law compatting or intending the death of any man, demonstrated by some evident

fact, was equally penal ae homicide itself. (3 Inst. ,">,)

(9) 1 Hal. P. C. 107.
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wound the sovereign,per inforlunium, without any traitorous intent, is no trea-

son : as was the case of Sir Walter Tyrrel, who, by the command of King Wil-

liam Rufus, *shooting at a hart, the arrow glanced against a tree, and killed r**n -i

the king upon the spot, (r) But, as this compassing or imagining is an act L J

of the mind, it cannot possibly fall under any judicial cognizance, unless it be

demonstrated by some open, or overt act (3) And yet the tyrant Dionysius is

recorded (.«) to have executed a subject, barely for dreaming that he had killed

Lim; which was held of sufficient proof, that he had thought thereof in his

waking hours. But such is not the temper of the English law ; and therefore.

in this, and the three next species of treason, it is necessary that there appear

an open or overt act of a more full and explicit nature, to convict the traitor

upon. The statute expressly requires that the accused "be thereof, upon suffi-

cient proof, attainted of some open act by men of his own condition." Thus,

to provide weapons or ammunition for the purpose of killing the king is held

to be a palpable overt act of treason in imagining his death. \t) To conspire to

imprison the king by force, and move towards it by assembling company, is an

overt act of compassing the king's death ; (u) for all force, used to the person

of the king, in its consequence may tend to his death, and is a strong presump-

tion of something worse intended than the present force, by such as have so far

thrown off their bounden duty to their sovereign ; it being an old observation,

that there is generally but a short interval between the prisons and the graves

of princes. There is no question, also, but that taking any measures to render
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such treasonable purposes effectual, as assembling and consulting on the means

to kill the king, is a sufficient overt act of high treason, (w) (4)

How far mere words, spoken by an individual, and not relative to any treasou-

frj 3 InsU «. (i) Plutarch in ett. ftj 3 lost 12. fu) 1 Hal. P. C. 109.

(w) 1 Hawk P. C. 3d. 1 Hal. P. C. 119.

(3) [In the case of the regicides, the indictment charged is, that they did traitorously compass

and imagine the death of the king. And the taking off his head was laid, among others, as an

overt act of compassing. And the person who was supposed to have given the stroke was con-

victed un the same indictment. For the compassing is considered as the treason, the overt act

as the means made use of to effectuate the intentions of the heart. And in every indictment for

this species of treason, and, indeed, for levying war, or adhering to the king's enemies, an overt

act must be alleged and proved. For the overt act is the charge to which the prisoner must ap-

ply his defence. But it is not necessary that the whole of the evidence intended to bo given

should be set forth ; the common law never required this exactness, nor doth the statute of King

Williuui require it. It is sufficient that the charge be reduced to a reasonable certainty so that

the defendant may be apprized of the nature of it, and prepared to give an answer to it. Fost.

194.]

(4) [This subject is so ably explained by Mr. Justice Foster in his first discourse 0,11 high trea-

son, that it may be useful to annex here two of his sections. " In the case of the king the

statute of treasons hath, with great propriety, retained the rule voluntas pro facto. The princi-

ple upon which this is founded is too obvious to need much enlargement. The king is considered

as the head of the body politic, and the members of that body are considered as united and kept

together by a political union with him and with each other. His life cannot, in the ordinary

course of things, be taken away by treasonable practices without involving a whole nation in

blood and contusion ; consequently, every stroke levelled at his person is, in the ordinary course

of thing*, levelled at the public tranquility. The law therefore, tendereth the safety of the king

with an anxious concern; and if 1 may use the expression, with a concern bordering upon jeal-

ousy. It considereth the wicked imaginations of the heart, in the same degree of guilt as if

carried into actual execution, from the moment measures appear to have been taken to render

them effectual. And, therefore, if conspirators meet and consult how to kill the king, though

they do not then fall upon any scheme lor that purpose, this is an overt act of compassing his

death ; and so are all means made use of, be it advice, persuasion, or command, to incite or en-

courage others to commit the fact, or join in the attempt; and every person who but asseuteth

to any overtures for that purpose will be involved in the same jniilt.

" The care the law hath taken for the personal safety of the king is not confined to actions or

attempts of the more flagitious kind, to assassination or poison, or other attempts directly and

immediately aiming at nig life. It is extended to everything wilfully and deliberately done

or attempted, whereby his life may be endangered. And, therefore, the entering into mea-

sures for deposing or imprisoning him, or to get his person into the power of the conspirators,

these offences are overt acts of treason within this branch ol the statute. For ex-
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able act or design then in agitation, shall amount to treason, has been formerly

matter of doubt. "We have two instances in the reign of Edward the Fourth,

F*80 1 *°^ Persons executed for treasonable words: the one a citiaen of London

L J who said he would make his son heir of the crown, being the sign of the

house in which he lived; the other a gentleman whose favorite buck the king kill-

ed in hunting, whereupon he wished it, horns and all, in the king's bell v.(5) These

were esteemed hard cases: and the chief justice, Markham, rather chose to leave

his place than assent to the latter judgment, (a;) But now it seems clearly to be

agreed, that by the common law and the statute of Edward III, words spoken

amount to only a high misdemeanor, and no treason. For they may be spoken

in heat, without any intention, or be mistaken, perverted, or mis-remembered bj

the hearers; their meaning depends always on their connection with other words

and things; they may signify differently evea according to the tone of voice with

which they are delivered ; and soEaetimes silence itself is more expressive tban

any discourse. As, therefore, there can be nothing more equivocal and ambiguous

than words, it would indeed be unreasonable to make tliem amount to high

treason. And accordingly in 4 Car. I, on a reference to all the judges, concern-

ing some very atrocious words spoken by one Pyne, they certified to the kingj

" that though the words were as wicked as might be, yet they were no treason :

for unless it be by some particular statute, no words will be treason."(y) (6) If

the words be set down in writing, it argues more deliberate intention : and it

has been held that writing is an overt act of treason : for soribere est agere. But
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even in this case the bare words are not the treason, bin the deliberate act of

writing them. And such wriHng, though nn published, has in some arbitrary

reigns convicted its author of treason : particularly in the cases of one Peaehum,

a clergyman, for treasonable passages in a sermon never preached; (2) and of

Algernon Sydney, for some papers found in his closet; which, had they been

plainly relative to any previous formed design of dethroning or murdering the

F*81 1 king> might doubtless have been properly read in evidence as overt *acts

L J of that treason, which was specially laid in the indictment, (a) But

being merely speculative, without any intention (so fur as appeared) of making

any public use of them, the convicting the authors of treason upon such an in-

sufficient foundation has been universally disapproved. Peachum was therefore

pardoned: and though Sydney indeed was executed, yet it was to the general

discontent of the nation ; and his attainder was afterwards reversed by parlia-

ment. There was then HO manner of doubt, but that the publication of such a

treasonable writing was a sufficient overt act of treason at the common law; (b)

though of late even that has been questioned.

2. The second species of treason is, " if a man do violate the king's companion,

or the king's eldest daughter unmarried, or the wife of the king's eldest son and

(x) 1 Hal. P. C. 118. (y) Cro. Gar. 186. (aJ Ibid, fa} Foster, 198. (b) 1 Hal. P. C. 118. 1 Hawk. P. C. 88.

perience has shown that between the prisons and the graves of princes the distance is very small."

Tost. 194.

This was the species of treason with which the state prisoners were charged, who were tried

in 1794. And the question a* stated by the court for the jury to try, was, whether their meas-

ures had been entered into with an intent to subvert the monarchy and to depose the king I

See Hardy's trial.]

And any one who would understand thoroughly the law of treason in England should not fail

to read this case, very fully reported in the State Trials, and in which w.aa made oue of the

finest displays of Mr. Krskine's matchless abilities as an advocate.

(5) [There was even a refinement and degree of subtlety in the cruelty of that case, for he

wished it, horns and all, in the belly of him who counselled the kine to kill it; and as the king

killed it of his own accord, or was his own counsellor, it was held to be a treasonable wish

aeainst the king himself. 1 Hal. P. C. 115.]

(6) [Tlus subject is fully and ably discussed by Mr. J. Foster, who maintains that words alone

cannot amount to an overt act of treason; but if they are attended or followed by a. consultation,

meeting or any act, then they will be evidence, or a confession, of the intent of such consulta-

tion meeting, or act, and he concludes, that " loose words, not relative to facto are at thu worst

no more than bare indications of the malignity of the heart." Fost. 202, e< geq.]
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heir." By the king's companion is meant his wife; and by violation is under-

stood carnal knowledge, as well without force, as with it: and this is high trea-

son in both parties, if both be consenting; as some of the wives of Henry the

Eighth by fatal experience evinced. The plain intention of this law is to guard

the blood royal from any suspicion ef bastardy, whereby the succession to the

crown might be rendered dubious: and therefore, when this reason ceases, the law

ceases with it; for to violate a queen or princess-dowager is held to be no trea-

son : (c) (7) in like manner as, by the feudal law, it was a felony and attended with

a forfeiture of the fief, if the vassal vitiated the wife or daughter of his lord; (d)

but not so, if he only vitiated his widow, (e) '

3. The third species of treason is "• if a man do levy war against our lord the

king in his realm." And this may be done by taking arms, not only to dethrone

the king, but under pretence to reform religion, or the laws, or to remove evil

counsellors, or other grievances, whether real or pretended. (/) (8) For the law

does not, neither can it, permit *any private man, of set of men, to inter-

fere forcibly in matters of snch high importance; especially as it has es-

tablished a sufficient power, for these purposes, in the high court of parliament:'

neither does the constitution justify any private or particular resistance for pri-

vate or particular grievances; though in cases-of national oppression the nation

has very justifiably risen as one man, to vindicate the original contract subsisting

between the king and his people. To resist the king's forces by defending a

castle against them, is a levying of war: and so is an insurrection with an avowed
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design to pull down aU inclosnres, all brothels, and the like; the universality

of the design making it a rebellion against the state, an usurpation of the powers

of government, and an insolent invasion of the king's authority, (g) But, a

tumult, with a view to pull down a particular house, or lay open a particular

inclosnre, amounts at most to a riot; this being no general defiance of public

government. So, if two subjects quarrel and levy war against each other (in

that spirit of private war, which prevailed all over Europe (h) in the early feudal

times), it is only a great riot and contempt, and no treason. Thus it happened

between the earlsof Hereford and Gloucester, in 20 Edw. !„ who raised each a little

army, and committed outrages on each others'lands, burning houses, attended

with the loss of many lives: yet this was held to be no high treason, but only a

great misdemeanor, (i) A bare conspiracy to levy war does not amount to tliis

species of treason; but (if particularly pointed at the person of the king or his gov-

ernment) it falls within the first, of compassing or imagining the king's death.(/e)

4. " If a man be adherent to the king's enemies in his realm, giving to them

aid and comfort in the realm,, or elsewhere/* he is also declared guilty of high

treason. This must likewise be proved by some overt act,, as by giving them

intelligence, (9>) by sending them provisions, bv selling them arms, by treacher-

ously surrendering a fortress, or the *like. (1) By enemies are here under-

stood the subjects of foreign powers with whom we are at open war. As

(c)SInst. 9. (d) Fmd. 1. 1, t. 3. (e) Ibtd. t. SI. (/) 1 Hawk. P. C. 87. (ff) 1 Hal. P. C. 133.

<*) Robertson Ch. V, i, 45, 286. (<) 1 Hal. 1*. C. 138: (/•: .1 Iii.-r. 9. Foster, 211, l.!l:!. (1} 3 last. 10.

(7) [Bnt the instances specified in the statute do not prove much consistency in the applica-

tion of this reason ; for there is no protection given to the wives of the younger sous of the

king, though their issue must inherit the crown before the issue of the king's eldest (laughter,

and her chastity is only inviolable before marriage, whilst her children would be clearly ille-

gitimate.

Before the 25 Edw. Ill it was held to be high treason not only t«> violate tho wife and daugh-

ters of the king, but also the nurses of his children, les norices de lour enfantz. Britt. c. 8.]

(8) [Lord Mansfield declared, upon the trial of Lord George Gordon, that it was the unani-

mous opinion of the court, that an attempt, by intimidation and violence, to force the repeal

of a law, was a levying war against the king, and high treason. Doug. 570.] See Kegina r.

Frost, 9. C. and P. 129.

(9) [Sending intelligence to the enemy of the destinations and designs of this kingdom, in

order to assist thorn in their operations against us, or in defence of themselves, is high treason,

although such correspondence should be intercepted. Dr. Hensoy's Cose, 1 Burr. 650. The

name docirine wa« held by Lord Kenyon and the court in the case of William Stone, who
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to foreign pirates or robbers, who may happen to invade our coasts, without any

open hostilities between their nation and our own, and without any commission

from any prince or state at enmity with the crown of Great Britain, the giving

them any assistance is also clearly treason; either in the light of adhering to

the public enemies of the king and kingdom, (in) or else in that of levying war

against his majesty. And, most indisputably, the same acts of adherence or aid,

which (when applied to foreign enemies) will constitute treason under this

branch of the statute, will (when afforded to our own fellow subjects in actual

rebellion at home) amount to high treason under the description of levying war

against the king, (n) But to relieve a rebel, flod out of the kingdom, is no

treason : for the statute is taken strictly, and a rebel is not an enemy: an enemy

being always the subject of some foreign prince, and one who owes no allegiance

to the crown of England, (o) And if a person be under circumstances of actual

force and constraint, through a well grounded apprehension of injury to his life

or person, this fear or compulsion will excuse his even joining with either rebels

or enemies in the kingdom, provided he leaves them whenever he hath a safe

opportunity- (p)

5. " If a man counterfeit the king's great or privy seal," this is also high

treason. But if a man takes wax bearing the impression of the great seal off

from one patent, and fixes it to another, this is held to be only an abuse of the

seal, and not a counterfeiting of it: as was the case of a certain chaplain, who

in such manner framed a dispensation for non-residence. But the knavish arti-
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fice of a lawyer much exceeded this of the divine. One of the clerks in chan-

cery glued together two pieces of parchment, on the uppermost of which he

wrote a patent, to which he regularly obtained the great seal, the label going

r*g4l through both the skins. He *then dissolved the cement; and taking oft

<• -I the written patent, on the blank skin wrote a fresh patent, of a different

import from the former, and published it as true. This was held no counter-

feiting of the great seal, but only a great misprision; and Sir Edward Coke (q)

mentions it with some indignation, that the party was living at that day.

(m) Foster, 419. (n) IMd. S16. (o) 1 Hawk. P. C. 38. (p) Foster, S1J. (ft 8 fnst. 16.

was tried at the bar of the court of king's bench, in Hilary term. 1796. In the same case it was

held, that sending a paper to the enemy, though it was afterwards intercepted, containing advice

not to invade this country, if sent with the intention of assisting their councils in their conduct

and in the prosecution oi the war, was high treason. 6 T. H. 5SJ7.]

Treason against the United States is very cart-fully defined and limited by the constitntion,

and it can consist " only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving

them aid and comfort.'' Const, of United States, art. 3, $ 3. And by the same section, " Xf.

person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt

act, or on confession in open court." See, alao, act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. at Large 112),

prescribing the penalty of death for this offence.

The question, what is treason under the constitution, was considered in Ex parte Bollmon,

4 C'ranch, 75, aud it was there held that a conspiracy to subvert the government by force is not

treason, but that war must be actually levied. See also U. S. v. Hauway, 1 Wai. Jr. 139; Res-

publiea v. Carlisle. 1 Dall. 35. In Fries' Case ("WTiart. State Trials, 634). Judge Chase, of the

United States supreme court, charged the jury, among other things, as follows:

" It is the opinion of the court that any insurrection or rising of any body of people, within

the United States, to attain or effect by force or violence any object of a great public nature, or

of public and general (or national) concern, is a levying of war against the United States within

the contemplation aud construction of the constitution.

" On tins general position the court are of opinion that any such insurrection or rising to

resist, or to prevent by force or violence, the execution of any statute of the United States,

for levying or collecting taxes, duties, imposts or excises; or for calling forth the militia to

execute the laws of the Union, or for any other object of a general nature or national concern,

under any protence, as that the statute was unjust, burtheusome, oppressive or unconstitutional,

tendency 1

society, to destroy all order and all laws, and also all security for the hven, liberties and property of

the citizens of the United States.

"Thecourt are of opinion that, military weapons (as guns and swords, mentioned in the

indictment) are not necessary to make such insurrection or rising amount to a levvimr war.
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6. The sixth species of treason under this statute, is "if a man counterfeit

the king's money: and if a man bring false money into the realm counterfeit

to the money of England, knowing the money to be false, to merchandise and

make payment withal." As to the first branch, counterfeiting the king's

money ; this is treason, whether the false money be uttered in payment or not

Also, if the king's own minters alter the standard or alloy established by law,

it is treason. But gold and silver money only are held to be within the stat-

ute, (r) (10) With regard likewise to the second branch, importing foreign

•counterfeit money, in order to utter it here; it is held that uttering it, without

importing it, is not within the statute, (s) But of this we shall presently say

more.

7. The last species of treason ascertained by the statute, is, " if a man slay

the chancellor, treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other,

justices in eyre, or justices of assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and

determine, being in their places doing their offices." These high magistrates,

as they represent the king's majesty during the execution of their offices, are

therefore for the time equally regarded by the law. But this statute extends

only to the actual killing of them, and not wounding, or a bare attempt to kill

them. It extends also only to the officers therein specified ; and therefore the

barons of exchequer, as such, are not within the protection of this act: (fj but

the lord keeper or commissioners of the great seal now seem to be within it, by

virtue of the statutes 5 Eliz. c. 18, and 1 W. and M. c. 21.
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*Thus careful was the legislature, in the reign of Edward the Third,

to specify and reduce to a certainty the vague notions of treason that

(rj 1 Hawk. P. C. 42. (») Ibid. 43. ftj I Hal. P. C. 231.

because members may supply the want of weapons, and other instruments may effect the in-

tended mischief. The legal guilt of levying war may be incurred without the use of military

weapons or military array.

" The court are of the opinion that the assembling of bodies of men, armed and arrayed in a

•warlike manner, for purposes only of a private nature, is not treason, although the judges or

other peaco officers should be insulted or resisted, or even great outrages committed to the per-

sons or property of our citizens.

" The true criterion whether acts committed are treason or a less offence (as a riot) is the

quo animo, or the intention, with which the people did assemble. When the intention is uni-

versal or general, as to effect some object of a general public nature, it will be treason, and can-

not be considered, construed, or reduced to a riot. The commission of any number of felonies,

riots, or other misdemeanors, cannot alter their nature, so as to make them amount to treason;

and on the other hand, if the intention and acts combined amount to a treason, they cannot be

sunk down to a felony or riot. The intention with which any acts (as felonies, the destruction

of property or the like) are done, will show to what class of crimes the case belongs." See also

TJ. S. v. Hanway, 2 Wai. Jr. 144; TJ. S. v. Mitchell, 2 Ball. 348; U. S. «. Vigols, id. 246; U. S.

v. Hovic. 1 Paine, 265. And as to what is adhering to the enemies of the United States, see

TJ. S. t-. Hodges, -2 Doll. 87; U. S. v. Pyron, 3 Wash. C. C. 234, And see 2 Bish. Cr. L. $$ 1032

to 1038 (where the doctrine of Judge Chase, above stated, is somewhat questioned), Whart. Cr.

li. j 2718, et seq.

Attainder of treason against the United States works corruption of blood, or forfeiture only

during the life of the person attainted. Const., art. 3, $ 3.

Treason may also be committed against the several states. The crime is generally defined

and limited in'the state constitutions in the same manner as in the constitution of the United

States, and the punishment prescribed is the same.

(10) [The moneys charged to be counterfeited must resemble the true and lawful coin, but

this resemblance is a mere matter of fact, of which the jnry are to judge upon the evidence be-

fore them; the rule being that the resemblance need not be perfect, but such as may in circula-

tion ordinarily impose upon the world. Thus a counterfeiting with some little variation in the

inscription, effigies, or arms, done probably with intent to evade the law, is yet within it; and so

is the counterfeiting a different metal, if in appearance it be made to resemble the true coin.

Hawk. b. 1, c. 17, s. 81; 1 Kuss. 80 ; 1 Hale, 17ci, 184,211, 215 ; 1 East, P. C. 163. Bound blanks,

•without any impression, are sufficient if they resemble the coin in circulation. 1 Leach, 28o ;

and see 1 East, P. C, 164. But where the impression of money was stamped on an irregular

piece of metal not rounded, without finishing it, so as not to be in a state to pass current, the

offence was holden to be incomplete, although the prisoner had actually attempted Ui pass it in

that condition. 2 Bla. Rep. 632; and see 1 Leach, 135.] This offence is now a felony only.

Statute 24 and 25 Tic. c. 99.
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had formerly prevailed in our courts. Bnt the act does not stop here, but goes

on. " Because other like cases of treason may happen in time to come, which

cannot be thought of nor declared at present, it IB accorded, that if any other

case supposed to be treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before

any judge; the judge shall tarry without going to judgment of the treason,

till tlie cause be showed and declared before th« kLug and his parliament,

whether it o-agbt to be judged treason, or other fdony." Sir Matthew Hale («)

is very high in his encomiums on the great wisdom and care of the parliament,

in thus keeping judges within the proper bounds and limits of this act, by not

suffering them to run out (upon their own opinions) into constructive treasons,

though in cases that seem to them to have a like parity of reason, but reserving

them to the decision of parliament. This is a great security to the public, the

judges, and even tkia sacred act itself; and leaves a weighty memento to judges

to be careful and not over-hasty in letting in treasons by construction or inter-

pretation, especially in new cases that have not been resolved and settled. 2. He

observes, that as the authoritative decision of these casus omissi is reserved to

the king and parliament, the most regular way to do it is by a new declarative

act; and therefore the opinion of any one or of both houses, though of very re-

spectable weight, is not that solemn declaration referred to by this act, as the

only criterion for judging of future treasons.

In consequence of this power, not, indeed, originally granted by the statute

of Edward III, but constitutionally inherent in every subsequent parliament
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(which cannot be abridged of any rights by the acts of a precedent one), the

legislature was extremely liberal in declaring new treasons in the unfortunate

reign of King Kichard the Second; as, particularly, the killing of an ambassa-

r *£„ 1 dor was made so ; *which seems to be founded upon better reason than

L •* the multitude of other points, that were then strained up to this high

offence; the most arbitrary and absurd of all which was by the statute 21 Kid

II, c. 3, which made the bare purpose nnd intent of killing or deposing the

king, without any overt act to demonstrate it, high treason. And yet so little

effect have over-violent laws to prevent any crime, that within two years after-

wards this very prince was both deposed and murdered. And in ttie first year

of his successor's reign, an act was passed, (v) reciting " that no man knew how

he ought to behave himself, to do, speak, or say, for doubt of such pains of trea*

son; and therefore it was accorded, that in no time to come any treason be

judged otherwise than was ordained by the statute of King Edward the Third."

This at once swept away the whole load of extravagant treasons introduced in

the time of Richard the Second.

But afterward, between the reign of Henry the Fourth and Queen Mary, and

particularly in the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, the spirit of inventing

new and strange treasons was revived: among which we may reckon the offences

of clipping money; breaking prison or rescue, when the prisoner is committed

for treason; burning houses to extort money; stealing cattle by Welshmen;

counterfeiting foreign coin; wilful poisoning; execrations against the king,

calling him opprobrious names by public writing; counterfeiting the siga

manual or signet; refusing to abjure the pope ; deflowering or marrying, with-

out the royal license, any of the king's children, sisters, aunts, nephews, or

nieces; bare solicitation of the chastity of the queen or princess, or advances

made by themselves ; marrying with the king by a woman not a virgin, without

previously discovering to him such her unchaste life; judging or believing

(manifested by any overt act) the king to have been lawfully married to Ann of

Cleves; derogating from the king's royal style and title; impugning his su-

r*q>v i premacy; and assembling riotously to the ""number of twelve, and not

L ' J dispersing upon proclamation: all which new-fangled treasons were

totally abrogated by the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, which once more reduced all trea-

sons to the standard of the statute 25 Edw. III. Since which time, though the

legislature has been more cautious in creating new offences of this kind,

(*) 1 Hal. P. C. 2S8. (v) Stat. 1 Hen. IT, c. 10.
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yet the number is very considerably increased, as we shall find upon a short re-

view. (11)

These new treasons, created since the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, and not compre-

hended under the description of statute 25 Edw, III, I shall comprise under three

he«ds. 1. Such as relate to papists. 2. Such as relate to falsifying the coin or

other royal signatures. 3. Such as are created for the security oi the protestaut

succession in the house of Hanover.

1. The first species, relating to papists, was considered in a preceding chapter,

among the penalties incurred by that branch of non-conformists to the national

church; wherein w« have only "to remember, that by statute 5 Eliz. c. 1, to de

fend the pope's jurisdiction in this realm, is, for the first time, a heavy misde-

meanor : and, if the offence be repeated, it is high treason. Also by -statute 27

Eliz. c. 2, if any popish priest, boru in the dominions of the crown of England,

shall come over hither from beyond the seas, unless driven by stress of weather,

(w) and departing in a reasonable time; (x) or shall tarry hwe three days with-

out conforming to the church, and taking the oaths; he is guilty of high trea-

son. And by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 4, if any natural-born subject be withdrawn

from his allegiance, and reconciled to the pope or see of Kome, or any other

prince or stale, both he and all such as procure such recoBciliation shall incur

the guilt of high treason. These were mentioned under the division before re-

ferred to, as spiritual offences, and I now repeat them as temporal oaes also; the

reason of distinguishing these overt acts of popery from all others, by setting
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the mark of high treason on them, being certainly on a civil, and not on a re-

ligions account. For every popish priest of course renounces his allegiance to

his *temporal sovereign upon taking orders ; that being inconsistent with ,- $gg -•

his new engagements of canonical obedience to the pope; aad tn« same"- -"

may be said of an obstinate defence of his authority here, or a formal recon-

ciliation to the see of Rome, which the statute construes to be a withdrawing from

one's natural allegiance; and therefore, besides being reconciled " to the pope,"

it also adds, "or any other prince or state."

2. With regard to treasons relative to the coin or other royal signatures, we

may recollect that the only two offences respecting th« coinage, which are made

treason by the statute 26 Edw, Ill, are the actual counterfeiting the gold and

silver coin of this kingdom ; or the importing of such counterfeit mouev with

intent to utter it, knowing it to be false. But, these not being found sufficient

to restrain the evil practices of coiners and false moneyers, other statutes have

been since made for that purpose. The crime itself is made a species of high

treason ; as being a breach of allegiance by infringing the king s prerogative,

and assuming one of the attributes of the sovereign, to whom alone it belongs,

to set the. value and denomination of coin made at home, or to fix the currency

of foreign money : and besides, as all money which bears the stamp of the king-

dom is sent into the world upon the public'faith. as containing metal of a parti-

cular weight and standard, whoever falsifies this is an offender against the state,

by contributing to render that public faith suspected. And upon the same rea-

sons, by a law of the emperor Constantine, (y) false coiners were declared

guilty of high treason, and were condemned to be burnt alive: as, by the laws

of Athens, (z) all counterfeiters, debasers, and diminishers of the current coin were

subjected to capital punishment However it must be owned, that this method

of reasoning is a little overstrained: counterfeiting or debasing the coin being

usually practiced rather for the sake of private and unlawful lucre, than out of any

disaffection to the sovereign. And "therefore, both this and its kindred r *gg-j

species of treason, that of counterfeiting the seals of the crown or other L -1

(in sirT. IJnyni. 377. (*) Latch. L (y) C. 9. 24. 8 Cod. Theod. deJMta moneta, I. 9.

(z) Pott. Ant. b. J, 0. 86.

(11) [The statute 1 Mar. c. 1, was only a confirmation, so far, of a much more important stat-

*ite, viz.: 1 Edw. VI, c. 18. See the statute 36 Geo. Ill, c. 7, rendered perpetual by 57 Goo. Ill,

c. 6. confirming the statute of 555 Edw. III.]
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royal signatures, seem better denominated by the later civilians a branch of the

crimenfalsi or forgery (in which they are followed by Glanvil, (a) Bracton, (b)

and Fleta), (c) than by Constastine aud our Edward the Third, a species of the

crinien Icesm majestatis or high treason. For this confounds the distinction and

proportion of offences ; and, by affixing the same ideas of guilt upon the man

who coins a leaden groat and him who assassinates his sovereign, takes off from

that horror which ought to attend the very mention of the crime of high trea-

son, and makes it more familiar to the subject. Before the statute 25 Edw. Ill,

the offence of counterfeiting the coin was held to be only a species of petit trea-

son ; (d) but subsequent acts in their new extensions of the offence have fol-

lowed the example of that statute, and have made it equally high treason with

an endeavor to subvert the government, though not quite equal in its punish-

ment.

In consequence of the principle thus adopted, the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, having

at one stroke (12) repealed all intermediate treasons created since the 25 Edw.

Ill, it was thought expedient by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 6, to revive two species,

viz.: 1. That if any person falsely forge or counterfeit any such kind of

coin of gold or silver, as is not the proper coin of this realm, but shall be

current within this realm by consent of the crown ; or. 2, shall falsely forge or

counterfeit the sign manual, privy signet, or privy seal; such offences shall be

deemed high treason. And by statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 11, if any persons

do bring into this realm such false or counterfeit foreign money, being current
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here, knowing the same to be false, with intent to utter the same in payment,

they shall be deemed offenders in high treason. The money referred to in these

statutes must be such as is absolutely current here, in all payments, by the

king's proclamation ; of which there is none at present, Portugal money being

only talcen by consent, as approaching the nearest to our standard: aud falling

in well enough with our divisions of money into pounds and shillings: therefore

F *90 1 '° ^uuterfeit it i8 no* h'gh treason, but another inferior offence. *Clip-

L J ping or defacing the genuine coin was not hitherto included in these

statutes; though an offence equally pernicious to trade, and an equal insult

upon the prerogative, as well as personal affront to the sovereign ; whose very

image ought to be had in reverence by all loyal subjects. And therefore among

the Komans, (e) defacing or even melting down the emperor's statues was made

treason by the Julian law; together with other offences of the like sort, accord-

ing to that vague conclusion, " aliudvc quid simile si admiserint." And now,

in England, by statutes 5 Eliz. c. 11, clipping,^washing, rounding, or filing, for

wicked gain's sake, any of the money of this realm, or other money suffered to

be current here, shall he adjudged to' he high treason ; and by statute 18 Eliz. c.

1 (because " the same law, being penal, ought to be taken and expounded strict-

ly according to the words thereof, and the like offences, not by any equity to

receive the like punishment or pains"), the same species of offences is therefore

described in other more general words, viz.: impairing, diminishing, falsifying,

scaling, and lightening; and made liable to the same penalties. By statute 8

and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 26, made perpetual by 7 Ann. c. 25, whoever without proper

authority, shall knowingly make or mend, or assist in so doing, or shall buy,

sell, conceal, hide, or knowingly have in his possession, any implements of coin-

age specified in the act, or other tools or instruments proper only for the coin-

age of money; (13) or shall convey the same out of the king's mint; he, to-

gether with his counsellors, procurers, aiders, and abettors, shall be guilty of

fa) L. 14. e. 7. (b) L. 8. «. 3..'! 1 and 2. (c) L. 1, c. 22.

(d) 1 Hal. P. C. 224. (e) Ff. 48, 4, 6.

(12) [This was done far more effectually six .rears before by 1 Edw. VI, e. 12. The object of

the above statute, by this needless repetition, seems only an* endeavor to continue to Mary the

popularity which had BO justly been gained by her brother.]

(13) The law on this subject is now to be found in statute 24 and 25 Vio. c. 99. which makes

the offence felony only. ,
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high treason, which is by much the severest branch of the coinage law. The

statute goes on farther, and enacts that to mark any coin on the edges with

letters, or otherwise in imitation of those used in the mint ; or to colour, guild,

or case over any coin resembling the current coin, or even round blanks of

base metal ; shall be construed high treason. But all prosecutions on this act

are to be commenced within three *months after the commission of the r*9i -.

offence, except those for making or mending any coining tool or instru- L -"

ment, or for marking money round the edges ; which are directed to be com-

menced within six months after the offence committed. (/) (14) And, lastly,

by statute 15 and 16 Geo. II, c. 28, if any person colours or alters any shilling

or sixpence, either lawful or counterfeit, to make them respectively resemble a

guinea or half guinea; or any halfpenny or farthing to make them respec-

tively resemble a shilling or sixpence ; this is also high treason : but the offender

shall be pardoned, in case (being out of prison) he discovers and convicts two

other offenders of the same kind. (15)

3. The other new species of high treason is such as is created for the security

of the protestant succession over and above such treasons against the king and

government as were comprised under the statute 25 Edw. III. For this pur-

pose, after the act of settlement was made, for transferring the crown to the

illustrious house of Hanover, it was enacted by statute 13 and 14 Wm. Ill, c. 3,

that the pretended Prince of Wales, who was then thirteen years of age, and

had assumed the title of King James III, should be attainted of high treason;
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and it was made high treason for any of the king's subjects, by letters, messages,

or otherwise, to hold correspondence with him, or any person employed by him,

or to remit any money for his use, knowing the same to be for his service. And

by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39, it is enacted, that if any of the sons of the pretender

shall land or attempt to land in this kingdom, or be found in Great Britain, or

Ireland, or any of the dominions belonging to the same, he shall be judged at-

tainted of high treason, and suffer the pains thereof. And to correspond with them,

or to remit money for their use, is made high treason in the same manner as it

was to correspond with the father. By the statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 17, if any per-

son shall endeavour to deprive or hinder any person, being the next in succession

to the crown according to the limitations of the act of settlement, from succeed-

ing to the crown, and shall maliciously and directly attempt the same by any

*overt act, such offence shall be high treason. And by statute 6 Ann. r*nc\ -i

c. 7, if any person shall maliciously, advisedly, and directly, by writing *• -I

or printing, maintain and affirm, that any other person hath any right or title

to the crown of this realm, otherwise than according to the act of settlement;

or that the kings of this realm with the authority of parliament are not able to

(f) Stat. 1 Ann. c. 25

(14) [If a person is apprehended in the act of coining, or is proved to have made consider-

able progress in making counterfoil pieces resembling the gold or silver coin of this realm,

yet il ther are so imperfect as that no one would take them, he cannot bo convicted upon

the charge of coining under this statute. Leach, 71, 126. But he may be convicted, if he

has made blank pieces without any impression to the similitude of silver coin worn smooth

by time. Welch's Case, ibid. 293. Or if any one shall put pieces of mixed metal into aqua-

fortis, which attracts the baser metal and leaves the silver upon the surface, or, as the vulgar

av. draws out the silver, this is held to be coloring under this statute. Lavcy's case,

sari4u.]

(10) Th

he counterfeiting, Ac., of copper coin, the making, mending, Ac., of tools or imple-

ments for the purpose, and having the same in custody without lawful excuse, Ac., were mode

punishable as felonies under statute 2 Wm. IV, c. 34. The uttering or putting in circula-

tion of counterfeit copper coin was not before indictable at all ; Hex «. Curwan, 1 East, P. C.

162; and the making, &v., of tools, Ac., for counterfeiting the copper coin was a commun-Iaw

misdemeanor only. The present statute on the subject is 24 and 2f> Vic. c. 99. Offenses against

the currency are'punishable in the federal courts of the United States, under various acts of

congress, as statutory offences. But they may also be punished by the states ; the same act

constituting an offence against each sovereignty. Fox ». Ohio, 5 How. 410; U. S. f. Marri-

golil, t» How. 560 ; Moore t. People, 14 How. 13.

351

92 HIGH TREASON. [Book IV.

(b
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make laws and statutes, to bind the crown and the descent thereof; such per-

son shall be guilty of high treason. This offence (or indeed maintaining this

doctrine in any wise, that the king and parliament cannot limit the crown) was

once before made high treason by statute 13 Eliz. c. 1, during the life of that

princess. And after her decease it continued a high misdemeanor, punishable

with forfeiture of goods and chattels, even in the most flourishing sera of indefeasi-

ble hereditary right and jure divino succession. But it was again raised into

high treason, by the statute of Anne before mentioned, at the time of a projected

invasion in favour of the then pretender ; and upon this statute one Matthews,

a printer, was convicted and executed in 1719, for printing a treasonable pam-

phlet, entitled " Vox populi vox Del." (g)

Thus much for the crime of treason, or Icesa majestatis, in all its branches ;

which consists, we may observe, originally, in grossly counteracting that allegi-

ance which is due from the subject by either birth or residence ; though, in some

instances, the zeal of our legislators to stop the progress of some highly perni-

cious practices has occasioned them a little to depart from this its primitive idea.

But oi this enough has been hinted already : it is now time to pass on from

defining the crime to describing its punishment

The punishment of high treason in general is very solemn and terrible. 1. That

the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk ; though usually
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by connivance, (h) at length ripened by humanity into law) a sledge or hur-

le is allowed, to preserve the offender from the extreme torment of being dragged

r*93 1 on ^ ground or pavement. (*') 2. That he *be hanged by the neck, and

L -1 then cut down alive, 3. That his entrails be taken out and burned, whil&

he is yet alive. 4. That his head be cut off. 5. That his body be divided into

four parts. 6. That his head and quarters be at the king's disposal, (k) (16)

The king may, and often doth, discharge all the punishment, except behead-

ing, especially where any of noble blood are attainted. For beheading, being part

of the judgment, that may be executed, though all the rest be omitted by the

king's command. (/) But where beheading is no part of the judgment, as in

murder or other felonies, it hath been said that the king cannot change the judg-

ment, although at the request of the party, from one species of death to another.

(rn) But of this we shall say more hereafter. (•»)

In the case of coining, which is a treason of a different complexion from the

rest, the punishment is milder for male offenders ; being only to be drawn and

hanged by the neck till dead, (o) But in treasons of every kind the punishment

of women is the same, and different from that of men. For as the decency due

to the sex forbids the exposing and publicly mangling their bodies, their sentence

(which is to the full as terrible to sensation as the other) is to be drawn to the

gallows, and there to be burned alive, (p)

The consequence of this judgment (attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of

blood) must be referred to the latter end of this book, when we shall treat of

them all together, as well in trejkson as in other offences.

(o) State Tr. ix. 880. (ft) S3 Ass. pi. 7. «) 1 Hal. P. G. 33-2.

it', Thin punishment for treason. Sir EJivanl Cote tells us, is win-ran tod by divers examples in Soriptnre;

for Joab was drawn, Bltban was hanged, Judas WAS emhowelVeil, and so or tin- rest. :: last. 811.)

(1)1 H»l. P. C. SSI. (m) 3 In«t. 53. (MI See eh. SJ. (ol I Hal. f. C. 851.

Ud-1 Hid. l\ c;. :;.i!>.

(16) [But now by the statute 30 Geo. Ill, o. 43, women convicted, in all oases of treason, shall

receive inclement to be drawn to the pUtoe of execution, and there to be banged by the neck

till dead. Before this humane statute, women from the remotest timt*s were sentenced to b»

burned alive for every species of treason.

And now, by 54 Q«o. Ill, o. 146, the judgment against a man for high treason is, in effect,

that he shall be drawn on a hnrdle to the plaoe of execution, aud be there banged by the neck

until he be dead, and that afterwards his head shall bo severed from his body, and his body

divided into four quarters, shall be disposed of as the king shall think fit ; with power to the

king, by tipecial warrant, in part to alter the punishment. A mouth'* time has been allowed

between sentence aud execution. 1 Burr. 650.]
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CHAPTER VII.

OF FELONIES INJURIOUS TO THE KING'S PREROGATIVE.

As, according to the method I have adopted, we are next to consider such

felonies as are more immediately injurious to the kiug's prerogative, it will not

be amiss here, at our first entrance upon this crime, to inquire briefly into the

nature and meaning of felony : before we proceed upon any of the particular

branches into which it is divided.

Felony, in the general acceptation of our English law, comprises every species

of crime, which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or goods. (1)

This most frequently happens in those crimes, for which a capital punishment

either is or was liable to be inflicted: for those felonies which are called clergy-

able, or to which the benefit of clergy extends, were anciently punished with

death, in all lay, or unlearned offenders; though now by the statute-law that

punishment is for the first ofl'ence universally remitted. Treason itself, says Sir

Edward Coke, (a) was anciently comprised under the name felony: and in con-

firmation of this we may observe that the statute of treasons, 25 Ed\v. Ill, c. 2,

speaking of some dubious crimes, directs a reference to parliament; *that r-^gg -•

it may there be adjudged, " whether they be treason, or other felony." All >- J

treasons, therefore, strictly speaking, are felonies; though all felonies are not

treason. And to this also we may add, that not only all offences, now capital,

are in some degree or other felony ; but that this is likewise the case with some

other offences, which are not punished with death; as suicide, where the party is
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already dead; homicide by chance medley, or in self-defence; and petit larceny or

pilfering: all which are (strictly speaking) felonies, as they subject the committers

of them to forfeitures. So that upon the whole the only adequate definition of fel-

ony seems to be that which is before laid down ; viz., an offence which occasions a

total forfeiture of either lands, or goods, or both, at the common law; and to which

capital or other punishment may be superadded, according to the degree of guilt.

To explain this matter a little farther: the word felony or felonia is of

undoubted feudal origin, being frequently to be met with in the books of feuds,

&c.; but the derivation of it has much puzzled the juridical lexicographers,

Praeteus, Calvinus and the rest: some deriving it from the Greek ^Aor, an

imposter or deceiver; others from the Latin folio, fefelli, to countenance which

they would have it called fallonia. Sir Edward Coke, as his manner is, has

given us a still stranger etymology; (b) that it is crimen anima felleo perpe-

tratnm, with a bitter or gallish inclination. But all of them agree in the

description, that it is such a crime as occasions a forfeiture of all the offender's

lands or goods. And this gives great probability to Sir Henry Spelmau's

Teutonic or German derivation of it: (c) in which language indeed,as the word

is of clearly feudal original, we ought rather to look for its signification, than

among the Greeks and Romans, le-lon then, according to him, is derived from

two northern words: fefc. which signifies (we well know) the fief, feud, or

beneficiary estate; and 10u, which signifies price or value. Felony is therefore

(a) 3 lust. 15. (i>) 1 In.-i. 391. (c) Glossar. til. felon.

(1) In some of the United States \>y statute the term '• felony " is made to embrace all offences

for which a specified punishment may be imposed ; c. tj., imprisonment in the state penitentiary.

Feople v. Van Stecnbnrgh, 1 Park. C. K. 39. In the absence of such statutory definition, those

offences are felonies which were so at the common law : Ward v. People, 3 Hill, 395; Dreii-

nan «. People. 10 Mich. 169; though in Ohio, where all offences are statutory, it lias been said

that " the term felony has no distinct and well defined meaning applicable to our system of

criminal jurisprudence. In England it has a well-known and extensive signification,'and com-

prises every species of crime which, at common law, worked a forfeiture of goods and lands.

But under our criminal code the word felonious, though occasionally used, expresses a signi-

fication no less vague and indefinite than the word criminal." Mathowa v. State, 4 Ohio.

K. S. 542.
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F*96 1 tne same ^ Pre^1 'um feu(li' t'le Consideration for which a man gives up

L -1 his lief; as we say in common speech, such an act is as much as your lite

or estate is worth. In this sense it will clearly signify the feudal forfeiture, or

act by which an estate is forfeited, or escheats to the lord. (2)

To confirm this we may observe, that it is, in this sense, of forfeiture to the

lord, that the feudal writers constantly use it For all those acts, whether of a

criminal nature or not, which at this day are generally forfeitures of copyhold

estates, (d) are styled felonia in the feudal law: "scilicet per quas feudum

amitfifnr." (e) As" si domino deservire noluerit ;(f) si per annum et diem ccs-

faverit in patenda investitura : ( g) si dominum ejuraverit i. e., negaverit se a dom-

ino fcudnm habere; (h) si a domino, in jus eum vocante, ter citatus non compa-

ruerii;" (i) all these, with many others,' are still causes of forfeiture in our

copyhold estates, and were denominated felonies by the feudal constitutions.

So likewise injuries of a more substantial or criminal nature were denominated

felonies, that is, forfeitures: as assaulting or beating the lord ;(/fc) vitiating liis

wife or daughter, " si dominum cucurbjfaverit, i. e., cum uxore ejus concubiie-

rit;" (I) all these are esteemed felonies, and the latter is expressly so denomi-

nated, " si feccrit felonium, dominum forte cucurbitando." (m) And as these

contempts, or smaller offences, were felonies or acts of forfeiture, of course

greater crimes, as murder and robbery, fell under the same denomination. On.

the other hand, the lord might be guilty of felony, or forfeit his seigniory to the

vassal, by the same acts as the vassal would have forfeited his feud to the lord.
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"Si dominus commiserit felonium, per quam vasallus amitterit feudum si earn

commiserit in dominum, feudi proprietatem etiam dominus perdere debet." (•«•)

One instance given of this sort of felony in the lord is beating the servant of

his vassal, so that he loses his service ; which seems merely in the nature of

r*g~ -I a civil "injury, so far as it respects the vassal. And all these felonies

•- J were to be determined "per laudamentum sine judicum parium suo-

rum" in the lords court; as with us forfeiture of copyhold lands are presenta-

ble by the homage in the court-baron.

Felony and the act of forfeiture to the lord, being thus synonymous terms in

the feudal law, we may easily trace the reason why, upon the introduction of

that law into England, those crimes which induced such forfeiture or escheat

of lands (and, by small deflection from the original sense, such as induced the

forfeiture of goods also) were denominated felonies. Thus it was said, that

suicide, robbery and rape, were felonies ; that is, the consequence of such crimes

was forfeiture ; till by long use we began to signify by the term of felony the

actual crime committed, and not the penal consequence. And upon this system

only can we account for the cause, why treason in ancient times was held to be

a species of felony : viz. because it induced a forfeiture.

Hence it follows, that capital punishment does by no means enter into the true

idea and definition of felony. Felony may be without inflicting capital pun-

ishment, as in the cases instanced of self-murder, excusable homicide and petit lar-

ceny : and it is possible that capital punishments may be inflicted, and yet the

offence be no felony; as in case of heresy by the common law, which, though capital,

never worked any forfeiture of lands or goods, (o) an inseparable incident to felony.

And of the same nature was the punishment of standing mute, without pleading to

an indictment, which at common law was capital, but without any forfeiture, and

therefore such standing mute was no felony. In short, the true criterion of felony

is forfeiture ; for, as Sir Edward Coke justly observes ( p) in all felonies which are

punishable with death, the offender loses all his lands in fee-simple, and also his

'^•oocls and chattels ; in such as are not so punishable, his goods and chattels only.

/ (d) Son hook II. papc 284. (e) Fetid. 1. 2, t. 16, in cole. (f) IbU. I. 1, t 21. (g) Ibid. I. ». t, 24.

..,.,.,.. .

fin) Iliul.l.l.t.St. Jirtiton. I. 1, c. 22. (n) 1 bid. I. 2, t. 96 antl 47. (o) 3 lust. «.

(p) 1 lust. S91. _ _

(2) [Jiut a forfeiture of land is not a necessary consequence of felony ; for petit larceny is

felony, which does not produce a forfeiture of lands ; but every species of ielony is followed" by

forfeiture of goods and personal chattels.]
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*The idea of felony is indeed so generally connected with that of capi-

tal punishment, that we find it hard to separate them ; and to this usage

the interpretations of the law do now conform. And, therefore, if a statute

makes any new offence felony, the law (q) implies that it shall be punished with

death, viz., by hanging as well as with forfeiture: unless the offender prays the

benefit of clergy (3) which all felons are entitled once to have, provided the

same is not expressly taken away by statute. And in compliance herewith, I

shall for the future consider it also in the same light, as a generical term, includ-

ing all capital crimes below treason; having premised thus much concerning

the true nature and original meaning of felony, in order to account for the rea-

son of those instances I have mentioned, of felonies that are not capital, and capi-

tal offences that are not felonies: which seem at first view repugnant to the gen-

eral idea which we now entertain of felony, as a crime to be punished by death :

whereas properly it is a crime to be punished by forfeiture, and to which death

may, or may not be, though it generally is, superadded.

I proceed now to consider such felonies as are more immediately injurious to

the king's prerogative. These are, 1. Offences relating to the coin, not amount-

ing to treason. 2. Offences against the king's council. 3. The offence of serv-

ing a foreign prince. 4. The offence of embezzling or destroying the king's

armour or stores of war. To which may be added a fifth, 5. Desertion from the

king's armies in time of war.

1. Offences relating to the coin, under which may be ranked some inferior mis-
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demeanors not amounting to felony, are thus declared by a series of statutes which

I shall recite in the order of time. And first, by statute 27 Edw. I, c. 3, none

shall bring pollards and crockards, which were foreign coins of base metal, into

the realm on pain of forfeiture of life and goods. By statute 9 Edw. Ill, st. 2, no

sterling money shall be melted down, upon pain of forfeiture thereof. *By p™ -•

statute 17 Edw. Ill, none shall be so hardy to bring false and ill money *• *

into the realm, on pain or forfeiture of life and member by the persons import-

ing, and the searchers permitting such importation. By statute 3 Hen. V, st. 1,

to make, coin, buy, or bring into the realm any gally-halfpeuce, suskins, or dot-

kins, in order to utter them, is felony; and knowingly to receive or pay either

them or blanks (r) is forfeiture of an "hundred shillings. By statute 14 Eliz. c. 3,

such as forge any foreign coin, although it be not made current here by procla-

mation, shall (with their aiders and abettors) be guilty of misprision of treason :

a crime which we shall hereafter consider. By statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 31,

the offence of melting down any current silver money shall be punished with

forfeiture of the same, and also the double value: and the offender, if a freeman

of any town, shall be disfranchised; if not, shall suffer six months' imprison-

ment. By statute 6 and 7 Wm. Ill, c. 17, if any person buys or sells, or know-

ingly has in his custody, any clippings, or filings, of the coin, he shall forfeit

the same and 500/.; one moiety to the king, and the other to the informer; and

be branded in the cheek with the letter R. By statute 8 and 9 AVm. Ill, c. 26,

if any person shall blanch or whiten copper for sale (which makes it resemble

silver); or buy or sell, or offer to sell any malleable composition, which shall be

heavier than silver, and look, touch, and wear like gold, but be beneath the stand-

ard : or if any person shall receive or pay at a less rate than it imports to be of

(which demonstrates a consciousness of its baseness, and a fraudulent design,)

any counterfeit or diminished milled money of this kingdom, not being cut in

(?) 1 Hawk. P. C. 107. 2 Hawk. P. C. 444. (r) S Stat. Hen. VI. o. 9.

(3) [The criminal law was considerably ameliorated, however, in this respect by the statute

8 Geo. IV, c. 28, $ 8, which enacted that any person convicted of felony not punishable with

death should be punished in the same manner prescribed by the statute or statutes especially re-

lating to such felony ; and that every person convicted of a felony for which no punishment had

been or might be specially provided, should be deemed to be punishable under that statute, and

be liable to transportation for seven years, or imprisonment (with whipping if the court think fit)

for any term not exceeding two years.]
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pieces (an operation which is expressly directed to be performed when any such

money shall be produced in evidence, and which any person, to whom any gold

or silver money is tendered, is empowered by statutes 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, c. 21,

13 Geo. Ill, c. 71, and 14 Geo. Ill, c. 70, to perform at his own hazard, and the

officers of the exchequer and receivers general of the taxes are particularly

required to perform): all such persons shall be guilty of felony; and may be

prosecuted for the same at any time within three months after the offence com-

F *100 1 ^tted. *Kut these precautions not being found sufficient to prevent

L -I the uttering of false or diminished money, which was only a misdemeanor

at common law, it is enacted by statute 15 and 1C Geo. II, c. 28, that if any

person shall utter or tender in payment any counterfeit coin, knowing it so to

be. he shall for the first offence be imprisoned six months, and find sureties for

his good behaviour for six months more; for the second offence, shall be im-

prisoned two years, and find sureties for two years longer; and for the third

oft'ence, shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. Also, if a person

knowingly tenders in payment any counterfeit money, and at the same time has

more in Iiis custody; or shall, within ten days after, knowingly tender other

false money ; he shall be deemed a common utterer of counterfeit money, and

shall for the first offence be imprisoned one year, and find sureties for his good

behaviour for two years longer; and for the second, be guilty of felony without

benefit of clergy. By the same statute it is also enacted, that if any person

counterfeits the copper coin, he shall suffer two vears' imprisonment, and find
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sureties for two years more. By statute 11 Geo. Ill, c. 40, persons counterfeit-

ing copper half-pence or farthings, with their abettors; or buying, selling,

receiving, or putting off any counterfeit copper money (not being cut in pieces

or melted down) at a less value than it imports to be of; shall be guilty of single

felony. And by a temporary statute (14 Geo. Ill, c. 42), if any quantity of

money, exceeding the sum of five pounds, being or purporting to be the silver

coin of this realm, but below the standard of the mint in weight or fineness,

shall be imported into Great Britain or Ireland, the same shall be forfeited in

equal moieties to the crown and prosecutor. Thus much for offences relating to

the coin, as well misdemeanors as felonies, which I thought it most convenient

to consider in one and the same view. (4)

2. Felonies, against the king's council, (s) are these. First, by statute 3 Hen.

VII, c. 14, if any sworn servant of the king's household conspires or confederates

F *1011 kill anv l°rcl °f this *realm, or other person sworn of the king's

• 1 council, he shall be guilty of felony. Secondly, by statute 9 Ann. c. 16,

to assault, strike, wound or attempt to kill, any privy councillor in the execution

of his office, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (5)

3. Felonies in serving foreign states, which service is generally inconsistent

with allegiance to one's natural prince, are restrained and punished by statute

3 Jac. I, c. 4, which makes it felony for any persons whatever to go out of the

realm, to serve any foreign prince, without having first taken the oath of alle-

giance before his departure. And it is felony also for any gentleman, or person

of higher degree, or who hath borne any office in the army, to go out of the

realm to serve such foreign prince or state, without previously entering into a

bond, with two sureties, not to be reconciled to the see of Rome, or enter into

any conspiracy against his natural sovereign. And further, by statute 9 Geo. II,

c. 30, enforced by statute 29 Geo. II, c. 17, if any subject of Great Britain shall

enlist himself, or if any person shall procure him to be enlisted, in any foreign

service, or detain or embark him for that purpose, without license under the

king's sign manual, he shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy; but

(•) See book I, page 334.

(4) This subject is now covered by statute 24 and 25 Tic. c. 99, and the statutes mentioned in

tlio text are repealed.

(5) All attempts to commit murder are now punishable without any distinction respecting the

rank of tho party, except in the case of the king and the. royal family. Seo statute 24 and 25

Yic. c. 100.
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if the person so enlisted or enticed shall discover his seducer within fifteen

days, so as he may be apprehended and convicted of the same, he shall be

indemnified. By the statute 29 Geo. II, c. 17, it is moreover enacted, that to

serve under the French king, as a military officer, shall be felony without bene-

fit of clergy; and to enter into the Scotch brigade in the Dutch service, without

previously taking the oaths of allegiance and abjuration, shall be a forfeiture

of500/.(6)

4. Felony by embezzling or destroying the king's armour or warlike stores is,

in the first place, so declared to be by statute 31 Eliz. c. 4, which enacts, that if

any person having the charge or custody of the king's armour, ordinance, am-

munition, or habiliments of war, or of any victual provided for victualling the

king's soldiers or mariners, shall either for gain, or to impede his majesty's

service, embezzle the same *to the value of twenty shillings, such offence r *i QO -,

shall be felony. And the statute 22 Car. II, c. 5, takes away the benefit >- ~ '

of clergy for this offence, (7) and from stealing the king's naval stores to the

value of twenty shillings; with a power for the judge, after sentence, to trans-

port the offender for seven years. Other inferior embezzlements and misde-

meanors, that fall under this denomination, are punished by statutes 9 and 10

Wm. Ill, c. 41,1 Geo. I, c. 25, 9 Geo. I, c. 8V and 17 Geo. II, c. 40, with fine,

corporal punishment, and imprisonment. And by statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 24,

to set on fire, burn, or destroy any of his majesty's ships of war, whether built,

building, or repairing; or any of the king's arsenals, magazines, dock-yards,
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rope-yards, or victualling offices, or materials thereunto belonging; or military,

naval, or victualling stores, or ammunition ; or causing, aiding, procuring, abet-

ting, or assisting in, such offence; shall be felony without benefit of clergy.

5. Desertion from the king's armies in time of war, whether by land or sea,

in England or in parts beyond the sea, is, by the standing laws of the land (exclu-

sive of the annual acts of parliament, to punish mutiny and desertion), and

particularly by statute 18 Hen. VI, c. 19, and 5 Eliz. c. 5, made felony, but not

without benefit of clergy. But by the statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 2, clergy is

taken away from such deserters, and the offence is made triable by the justices

of every shire. The same statutes punish other inferior military offences with

fines, imprisonment, and other penalties. (8)

(f>) [These statutes of 9 Geo. IT, and 29 Geo. II, are repealed by the 59 Geo. Ill, o. 69, which

re-enacta and adds to their provisions, and by it the entering into, or agreeing to enter into,

the aid of a foreign prince or people, <fcc., in any warlike capacity whatever, or going abroad

with that intent, or attempting to get others to do so, is a misdemeanor, and punishable by fine

or imprisonment, or both ; and a penalty of 5GV. is imposed on masters of ships and owners for

assisting in the offence : there are further provisions for preventing the offence.]

(7) This provision was repealed by statute 5 Geo. IV, c. 53.

(8) [To this class of felonies injurious to the king's prerogative, may be added two felonies

lately created by the Igislature, who thought it expedient to repress the attempts of mis-

chievous and disaffected persons, by transportation or capital punishment. The 37 Geo. Ill,

c. 70 (revived and made perpetual by the 57 Geo. Ill, c. 7), enacts, that if any person shall

maliciously and advisedly endeavor to seduce any person serving in her majesty's service by

sea or land from his duty and allegiance, or to incite any person to commit any act of mutiny

or mutinous practice, he shall be guilty of felony, and shall suffer death without benefit of

clergy. The crime, wherever committed, may bo tried in any county. A sailor in a sick

hospital, where he had been for thirty days, and therefore not entitled to pay, nor liable fur

what he then does to a court-martial, is a person serving in the king's forces by sea. within

the 37 Geo. Ill, so as to make the seducing him an offence within that act. Kuss. and R.

C. C. 76.]
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CHAPTER VIII.

OF PR^MUNIRE.

A THIED species of offence more immediately affecting the king and his gov-

ernment, though not subject to capital punishment, is that of prcemunire; so

called from the words of the writ preparatory to the prosecution thereof: "proe-

rnunire (a) facias A B" cause A B to be forewarned that he appear before us

to answer the contempt wherewith he stands charged: which contempt is par-

ticularly recited in the preamble to the writ, (b) It took its original from the

exorbitant power claimed and exercised in England by the pope, which even in

the days of blind zeal was too heavy for our ancestors to bear.

It may justly be observed, that religious principles, which (when genuine and

pure) have an evident tendency to make their professors better citizens as well

as better men, have (when perverted and erroneous) been usually subversive of

civil government, and been made both the cloak and the instrument of every

pernicious design that can be harbored in the heart of man. The unbounded

authority that was exercised by the Druids in the west, under the influence of

pagan superstition, and the terrible ravages committed by the Saracens in the

east, to propagate the religion of Mahomet, both witness to the truth of that

ancient universal observation, that in all ages and in all countries, civil and

ecclesiastical tyranny are mutually productive of each other. It is therefore

the glory of the church of England, that she inculcates due obedience to lawful

F *104 1 au^lority, and hath heen (as her prelates on *a trying occasion once
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' J expressed it) (c) in her principles and practice ever most unquestiona-

bly loyal. The clergy of her persuasion, holy in their doctrines and unblemished

in their lives and conversation, are also moderate in their ambition, and enter-

tain just notions of the ties of society and the rights of civil government. As

in matters of faith and morality they acknowledge no guide but the Scriptures,

so, in matters of external polity and of private right, they derive all their title

from the civil magistrate; they look up to the king as their head, to the parlia-

ment as their lawgiver, and pride themselves in nothing more justly, than in

being true members of the church, emphatically ly law established. Whereas

the notions of ecclesiastical liberty, in those who differ from them, as well in

one extreme as the other (for I here only speak of extremes), are equally and

totally destructive of those ties and obligations by which all society is kept

together; equally encroaching on those rights which reason and the original

contract of every free state in the universe have vested in the sovereign power;

and equally aiming at a distinct independent supremacy of their own, where

spiritual men and spiritual causes are concerned. The dreadful effects of such

a religious bigotry, when actuated by erroneous principles, even of the protes-

tant kind1, are sufficiently evident from the history of the anabaptists in Germany,

the covenanters in Scotland, and that deluge of sectaries in England, wh'o

murdered their sovereign, overturned the church and monarchy, shook every

pillar of law, justice, and private property, and most devoutly established a

kingdom of the saints in their stead. But these horrid devastations, the effects

of mere madness, or of zeal that was nearly allied to it, though violent and

tumultuous, were but of a short duration. Whereas, the progress of the papal

policy, long actuated by the steady counsels of successive pontiffs, took deeper

root, and was at length in some places with difficulty, m others never yet,

extirpated. For this we might call to witness the black intrigues of the Jesuits,

fa} A barbarous word for prasmonerl. (1) (bj Old. JVirf. Brett. 101, edit. 1534.

(c) Address to James II, 1687.

(1) \_Praimunio, in law-latin, is used, in all its tenses and participles, for prtemonio or ci?o.

Ducango Gloss.]

This chapter is wholly inapplicable in the United States.
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eo lately triumphant over Christendom, but now universally abandoned by even

the Eoman Catholic powers: but the subject of our present *chapter r*iQ5-i

rather leads us to consider the vast strides-which were formerly made in ^ •!

this kingdom by the popish clergy; how nearly they arrived to effecting their

grand design; some few of the means they mifte use of for establishing their plan;

and how almost all of them have been defeated or converted to better purposes, by

the vigour of our free constitution, and the wisdom of successive parliaments.

The ancient British church, by whomsoever planted, was a stranger to the

bishop of Rome, and all his pretended authority. But the pagan Saxon in-

vaders, having driven the professors of Christianity to the remotest corners of

our island, their own conversion was afterwards effected by Augustin the monk,

and other missionaries from the Court of Borne. This naturally introduced

some few of the papal corruptions in point of faith and doctrine; but we read

of no civil authority claimed by the pope in these kingdoms, till the fera of the

Norman conquest; when the then reigning pontiff, having favoured Dnke Wil-

liam in his projected invasion, by blessing his host and consecrating his ban-

ners, took that opportunity also of establishing his spiritual encroachments:

and was even permitted so to do by the policy ot the conqueror, in order more •

effectually to humble the Saxon clergy and. aggrandize his Norman prelates;

prelates, who, being bred abroad in the doctrine and practice of slavery, had con-

tracted a reverence and regard for it, and took a pleasure in riveting the chains

of a free-born people.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:04 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

The most stable foundation of legal and rational government is a due sub-

ordination of rank, and a gradual scale of authority; and tyranny, also, itself

is most surely supported by a regular increase of despotism, rising from the

slave to the sultan : with this difference, however, that the measure of obedience

in the one is grounded on the principles of society, and is extended no farther

than reason and necessity will warrant: in the other it is limited only by abso-

lute will and pleasure, without permitting the inferior to examine the title upon

•which it is founded. More effectually, therefore, to enslave the consciences and

minds of the people, the Romish *clergy themselves paid the most im- p *IQ« i

plicit obedience to their own superiors or prelates; and they, in their L J

turn, were as blindly devoted to the will of the sovereign pontiff, whose decis-

ions they held to be infallible, and his authority co-extensive with the Christian

•world. "Hence his legates a Mere were introduced into every kingdom of Europe,

his bulls and decretal epistles became the rule both of faith and discipline, his

judgment was the final resort in all cases of doubt or difficulty, his decrees were

enforced by anathemas and spiritual censures, he dethroned even kings that were

refractory, and denied to whole kingdoms (when undutiful) the exercise of Chris-

tian ordinances, and the benefits of the gospel of God.

But, though the being spiritual head of the church was a thing of great

sound, and of greater authority, among men of conscience and piety, yet the

court of Rome was fully apprised that (among the bulk of mankind) power

cannot be maintained without property; and therefore its attention began very

early to be riveted upon every method that promised pecuniary advantage. The

doctrine of purgatory was introduced, and with it the purchase of masses to re-

deem the souls of the deceased. New-fangled offences were created, and indul-

gences were sold to the wealthy, for liberty to sin without danger. The canon

law took cognizance of crimes, enjoined penance pro salute aninm, and com-

muted that penance for money. Non-residence and pluralities among the clergy,

and marriages among the laity, related within the seventh degree, were stric,tly

prohibited by canon; but dispensations were seldom denied to those who could

afford to buy them. In short, all the wealth of Christendom was gradually

drained by a thousand channels into the coffers of the holy see.

The establishment also of the feudal system in most of the governments of

Europe, whereby the lands of all private proprietors were declared to be holden

of the prince, gave a hint to the court of Rome for usurping a similar au-

thority over all the preferments of the church; which began first in Italy, and
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r ,^07 -• gradually spread itself to England. The pope became a *feudal lord;

' -1 and all ordinary patrons were to hold their right of patronage under

this universal superior. Estates held by feudal tenure, being originally gratu-

itous donations, were at that time denominated beneficia; their very mime as

•well as constitution was borrowed, and the care of the souls of a parish thence

came to he denominated a benefice. Lay fees were conferred by investiture or de-

livery of corporal possession; and spiritual benefices, which at first were uni-

versally donative, now received in like manner a spiritual investiture, by

institution from the bishop, and induction under his authority. As lands

f cheated to the lord, in defect of a legal tenant, so benefices lapsed to the bishop

upon non-presentation by the patron, in the nature of a spiritual escheat. The

annual tenths collected from the clergy were equivalent to the feudal render, or

rent, reserved upon a grant; the oath of canonical obedience was copied from

the oath of fealty required from the vassal by his superior; and theprimer sei-

sins of our military tenures, whereby the first profits of an heir's estate were

cruelly extorted by his lord, gave birth to as cruel an exaction of first fruits from

the beneh'ced clergy. And the occasional aids and talliages, levied by the prince

on his vassals, gave a handle to the pope to levy, by the means of his legates a

latere, peter-pence and other taxations.

At length the holy father went a step beyond any example of either emperor

or feudal lord. He reserved to himself, by his own apostolical authority, (d) the

presentation to all benefices which became vacant while the incumbent was at-
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tending the court of Home upon any occasion, or on his journey thither, or

back again; and moreover such also as became vacant by his promotion to a

bishopric or abbey: " etinmsi ad ilia persona conmcverint ct de buerint per

electionem aut quemvis alium modum asswmi." And this last, the canonists de-

clared, was no detriment at all to the patron, being only like the change of a

life in a feudal estate by the lord. Dispensations to avoid these vacancies bogat

the doctrine of commendams: and papal provisions were the previous nomina-

F *1081 ^otl *° suc^ Dene^ccs' by a kind °f anticipation, before they *became

L J actually void: though afterwards indiscriminately applied to any right of

natronage exerted or usurped by the pope. In consequence of which the best

livings were filled by Italian and other foreign clergy, equally unskilled in and

averse to the laws and constitution of England. The very nomination to

bishoprics, that ancient prerogative of the crown, was wrested from King

Henry the First, and afterwards from his successor King John; and seemingly,

indeed, conferred on the chapters belonging to each see: but by means of the

frequent appeals to Rome, through the intricacy of the laws which regulated

canonical elections, was eventually vested in the pope. And, to sum up this

head with a transaction most unparalleled and astonishing in its kind. Pope

Innocent III had at length the effrontery to demand, and King John had the

meanness to consent to, a resignation of his crown to the Pope, whereby England

was to become forever St. Peter's patrimony ; and the dastardly monarch reac-

cepted his sceptre from the hands of the papal legate, to hold as the vassal of the

holy see, at the annual rent of a thousand marks.

Another engine set on foot, or at least greatly improved, by the court of

Rome, was a master-piece of papal policy. Not content with the ample pro-

vision of tithes, which the law of the land hud given to the parochial clergy,

they endeavoured to grasp at the lands and inheritances of the kingdom, and

(had not the legislature withstood them) would by this time have probably

•been masters of every foot of ground in the kingdom. To this end they intro-

duced the monks of the Benedictine and other rules, men of sour and'austere

religion, separated from the world and its concerns by a vow of perpetual

celibacy, yet fascinating the minds of the people by pretences to extraordinary

sanctity, while all their aim was to aggrandize the power and extend the influ-

ence of their grand superior, the pope. And as, in those times of civil tumult,

great rapines and violence were daily committed by overgrown lords and their

(d} Extrav. I. 3, t. 2, c. 13.
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adherents, they were taught to believe, that founding a monastery a little before

their death would atone for a life of incontinence, disorder and bloodshed.

Hence innumerable abbeys and religious houses were built within a *cen- r *i nq i

tury after the conquest, and endowed, not only with the tithes of parishes <- -"

which were ravished from the secular clergy, but also with lands, manors, lord-

ships, and extensive baronies. And the doctrine inculcated was, that whatever

was so given to, or purchased by, the monks and friars, was consecrated to God

himself; and that to alienate or take it away was no less than the sin of

sacrilege.

I might here have enlarged upon other contrivances, which will occur to the

recollection of the reader, set on foot by the court of Rome, for effecting an en-

tire exemption of its clergv from any intercourse with the civil magistrate:

such as the separation of the ecclesiastical court from the temporal; the ap-

pointment of its judges by merely spiritual authoritv without anv interposition

from the crown; the exclusive jurisdiction it claimed over all ecclesiastical per-

sons and causes; and the privilegium clericale, or benefit of clergy, which de-

livered all clerks from any trial or punishment except before their own tribunal.

But the history and progress of ecclesiastical courts, (e) as well as of purchases

in mortmain, (/) have already been fully discussed in the preceding book: and we

shall have an opportunity of examining at large the nature of the privilegium

clericale in the progress of the present one. And therefore I shall only observe

at present, that notwithstanding this plan of pontifical power was so deeply laid,
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and so indefatigably pursued by the unwearied politics of the court of Rome

through a long succession of ages; notwithstanding it was polished and im-

proved by the united endeavours of a body of men, who engrossed all the learn-

ing of Europe for centuries together; notwithstanding it was firmly and reso-

lutely executed by persons the best calculated for establishing tyranny and

despotism, being fired with a bigoted enthusiasm (which prevailed not only

among the weak and simple, but even among those of the best natural and

acquired endowments), unconnected with their fellow subjects, and totally in-

different what might befal that posterity to which they bore no endearing

relation : — yet it vanished into *nothing, when the eyes of the people r *IIQ -i

were a little enlightened, and they set themselves with vigour to oppose <- -I

it. So vain and ridiculous is the attempt to live in society, without acknowl-

edging the obligations which it lays us under; and to affect an entire inde-

pendence of that civil state which protects us in all our rights, and gives us

every other liberty, that only exccpted of despising the laws of the community.

Having thus, in some degree, endeavoured to trace out the original and sub-

sequent progress of the papal usurpations in England, let us now return to the

statutes of prcemunire, which were framed to encounter this overgrown, yet

increasing evil. King Edward I, a wise and magnanimous prince, set himself

in earnest to shake off this servile yoke. (</) He would not suffer his bishops to

attend a general council, till they had sworn not to receive the papal benedic-

tion. He made light of all papal bulles and processes: attacking Scotland in

defiance of one: and seizing the temporalties of his clergy, who, under pretence

of another, refused to pay a tax imposed by parliament. He strengthened the

statutes of mortmain; thereby closing the great gulph in which all the lands

of the kingdom were in danger of being swallowed. And, one of his subjects

Having obtained a bulle of excommunication against another, he ordered him

to be executed as a traitor, according to the ancient law. (h) And in the thirty-

Gfth year of his reign was made the first statute against papal provisions, being,

according to Sir Edward Coke, (i) the foundation of all the subsequent statutes

of prmnunire, which we rank as an offence immediately against the king, be-

cause every encouragement of the papal power is a diminution of the authority

of the crown.

In the weak reign of Edward the Second the pope again endeavoured to

(<0 Sec book III, p. fil. (/; Sec book II, 11. 2fiS. (.7) Dnv. 81, Ac.

IA) Bro. Air. tit. Corone. 115. Treason, 14. 5 Hop. p. 1, fol. 12. 3 Ass. ill. (<) 2 Inst. B83.
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encroach, but the parliament manfully withstood him; and it was one of the

principal articles charged against that unhappy prince, that he had given allow-

ance to the bulles of the see of Rome. But Ldward the Third was of a temper

F *111 1 extremely different: and to remedy these *iu conveniences first by gentle

"- -" means, he and his nobility wrote an expostulation to the pope: but

receiving a menacing and contemptuous answer, withal acquainting him, that

the emperor (who a few years before, at the diet of Nuremburg, A. D. 1323, had

established a law against provisions), (k) and also the king of France, had lately

submitted to the holy see; the king replied, that if both the emperor and the

French king should take the pope's part, he was ready to give battle to them

both, in defence of the liberties of the crown. Hereupon more sharp and penal

laws were devised against provisors, (/) which enact severally, that the court of

Home shall not presenter collate to any bishopric or living in England; and

that whoever disturbs any patron in the presentation to a living by virtue of a

papal provision, such provisor shall pay fine and ransom to the king at his will,

and be imprisoned till he renounces such provision: and the same punishment

is inflicted on such as cite the king, or any of his subjects, to answer in the

court of Rome. And when the holy see resented these proceedings, and Pope

Urban V attempted to revive the vassalage and annual rent to which King John

had subjected his kingdom, it was unanimously agreed by all the estates of the

realm in parliament assembled (40 Edw. Ill), that King John's donation was

null and void, being without the concurrence of parliament, and contrary to his
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coronation oath: and all the temporal nobility aud commons engaged, that if

the pope should endeavour, by process or otherwise, to maintain these usurpa-

tions, they would reist and withstand him with all their power, (m)

In the reigii of Richard the Second it was found necessary to sharpen and

strengthen these laws, and therefore it was enacted by statutes 3 Ric. II, c. 3,

aud 7 Ric. II, c. 12, first, that no alien should be capable of lettiug his benefice

to farm; in order to compel such as had crept in, at least to reside on their

f *112 1 Prefermen^s: and, afterwards, that no alien *should be capable to be

I -' presented to any ecclesiastical preferment, under the penalty of the stat-

utes of provisors. By the statute 12 Ric. II, c. 15, all liegemen of the king,

accepting of a living by any foreign provision, are put out of the king's pro-

tection, and the benefices made void. To which the statute 13 Ric. II, st. 2, c. .2,

adds banishment and forfeiture of lauds and goods: and, by chapter 3 of the

same statute, any person bringing over any citation or excommunication from

beyond sea, on account of the execution of the foregoing statutes of provisors,

shall be imprisoned, forfeit his goods and lands, aud moreover suffer pain of

life and member.

In the writ for the execution of all these statutes, the words prcemunm

facias, being (as we said) used to command a citation of the party, have de-

nominated, in common speech, not only the writ, but the offence itself of main-

taining the papal power, by the name of prcemunire. And accordingly the

next statute I shall mention, which is generally referred to by all subsequent

statutes, is usually called the statute of prcemunire. It is the statute 16 Ric. II,

c. 5, which enacts, that whoever procures at Rome, or elsewhere, any transla-

tions, processes, excommunications, bulles, instruments, or other things which

touch the king, against him, his crown, and realm, and all persons aiding and

assisting therein, shall be put out of the king's protection, their lands and goods

forfeited to the king's use, and they shall be attached by their bodies to answer

to the king and his council: or process of prcemunire facias shall be made out

against them as in other cases of provisors.

By the statute 2 Hen. IV, c. 3, all persons who accept any provision from the

pope, to be exempt from canonical obedience to their proper ordinary, are also

subjected to the penalties of prcemunire. And this is the last of our ancient

statutes touching this offence; the usurped civil power of the bishop of Rome

<i) Mod. Un. Hist, xxbc, 38. (1) Slat. 25 Edw. Ill, St. C. 27 Edw. Ill, et. 1, c. 1. 38 Edw. Ill, st. I,

c. 4, and st. 2. c. 1, 4, 3, 4. (m) Sold, in flet. 10. 4.
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being pretty well broken down by these statutes, as his usurped religious power

was in about a century afterwards; the spirit of the nation being so much

raised *against foreigners, that about this time, in the reign of Henry , *,, „ -,

the Fifth, the alien priories, or abbeys for foreign monks, were suppressed, •- J

and their lands given to the crown. And no farther attempts were afterwards

made in support of these foreign jurisdictions.

A learned writer, before referred to, is therefore greatly mistaken, when he

says, (n) that in Henry the Sixth's time the Archbishop of Canterbury and other

bishops offered to the king a large supply, if he would consent that all laws

against provisors, and especially the statute 16 Ric. II, might be repealed; but

that this motion was rejected. This account is incorrect in all its brandies.

For, first, the application, which he probably means, was not made by the bish-

ops only, but b^ the unanimous consent of a provincial synod, assembled in

1439 (18 Hen. \ I), that very synod which at the same time refused to confirm

and allow a papal bulle, which then was laid before them. Next, the purport

of it was not to procure a repeal of the statutes against provisors, or that of

Eichard II in particular; but to request that the penalties thereof, which by

forced construction were applied, to all that sued in the spiritual, and even in

many temporal, courts of this realm, might be turned against the proper objects

only; those who appealed to Eome, or to any foreign jurisdiction; the tenor

of the petition being, " that those penalties should be taken to extend only to

those that commenced any suits or procured any writs or public instruments at
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Eome or elsewhere out of England; and that no one should be prosecuted upon

that statute for any suit in the spiritual courts or lay jurisdictions of this

kingdom." Lastly, the motion was so far from being rejected, that the king

promised to recommend it to the next parliament, and in the meantime that no

one should be molested upon this account. And the clergy were so satisfied

with their success, that they granted to the king a whole tenth upon this

occasion, (o)

*Aud, indeed, so far was the archbishop, who presided in this synod, r ICIIAI

from countenancing the usurped power of the pope in this realm, <• -I

that he was ever a firm opposer of it. And, particulary in the reign of Henry

the Fifth, he prevented the king's uncle from being then made a cardinal, and

legate a lalere from the pope; upon the mere principle of its being within the

mischief of papal provisions, and derogatory from the liberties of the English

church and nation. For, as he expressed himself to the king in his letter upon

that subject, " he was bound to oppose it by his ligeance, and also to quit him-

self to God and the church of this land, of which God and the king had made

him governor." This was not the language of a prelate addicted to the slavery

of the see of Eome; but of one who was indeed of principles so very opposite

to the papal usurpations, that in the year preceding this synod (17 Hen VI), he

refused to consecrate a bishop of Ely, that was nominated by Pope Eugenius

IV. A conduct quite consonant to his former behaviour, in 6 Hen. VI, when

he refused to obey the commands of Pope Martin V, who had required him to

exert his endeavours to repeal the statute of prcemunire (" execrabile illud statu-

tum," as the holy father phrases it); whicli refusal so far exasperated the court

of Eome against him, that at length the pope issued a bulle to suspend him

from his office and authority, whicli the archbishop disregarded, and appealed

to a general council. And so sensible were the nation of their primate's merits,

that the lords spiritual and temporal, and also the university of Oxford, wrote

letters to the pope in his defence; and the house of commons addressed the

king, to send an ambassador forthwith to his holiness, on behalf of the arch-

bishop, who had incurred the displeasure of the pope for opposing the excessive

power of the court of Eome. (p)

(n) Dav. 96. (o) Wilk. Conctf. Mag. Brtt. III. 633.

(p) See Wilk. Condi. Mag. Dr. vol. iii. pattim, and Dr. Dnck's life of Archbishop Chichele, who was the

prolate here spoken of, anil the munificent founder of All Souls college In Oxford; in vindication of whoso

memory the author hopes to be excused this digression ; if indeed it be 1 digression to show- how contrary

to the sentiments of do learned and pious a prelate, even in the days of popery those usurpations were,

which the statutes of prcemunire and provisory wuro made to restrain.
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r *jjg -i *Tliis then is the original meaning of the offence, which we call

J pramumre, viz: introducing a foreign power into this land, and cre-

ating imperium in imperio, by paying that obedience to papal process, which

constitutionally belonged to the king alone, long before the reformation in the

reign of Henry the Eighth: at which time the penalties of prcemunire were

indeed extended to more papal abuses than before; as the kingdom then entirely

renounced the authority of the see of Rome, though not at all the corrupted doc-

trines of the Roman church. And therefore by the several statutes of 24 Hen.

VIII, c. 12, and 25 Hen. VIII, cc. 19 and 21, to appeal to Rome from any of the

king's courts, which (though illegal before) had at times been connived at; to

sue to Rome for any license or dispensation ; or to obey any process from thence;

are made liable to the pains of prcemunire. And, in order to restore to the

king in effect the nomination of vacant bishoprics, and yet keep up the estab-

lished forms, it is enacted by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 20, that if the dean and

chapter refuse to elect the person named by the king, or any archbishop or

bishop to confirm or consecrate him, they shall fall within the penalties of the

statutes of prcemunire. Also by statute 5 Eliz. c. 1, to refuse the oath of suprem-

acy will incur the pains of prcemunire; and to defend the pope's jurisdiction in

this realm, is a prcemunire for the first oifence, and high treason for the second.

So, too, by statute 13 Eliz. c. 2, if any one import any agnus Dei, crosses, beads,

or other superstitious things pretended to be hallowed by the bishop of Rome,

and tender the same to be used; or receive the same with such intent, and
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not discover the offender; or if a justice of the peace, knowing thereof, shall

not within fourteen days declare it to a privy counsellor; they all incur prce-

munire. (2) But importing or selling mass-books, or other popish books, is by

statute 3 Jac. I, c. 5, § 25, only liable to a penalty of forty shillings. Lastly,

to contribute to the maintenance of a Jesuit's college, or any popish seminary

whatever beyond sea; or any person in the same; or to contribute to the main-

tenance of any Jesuit or popish priest in England, is, by statute 27 Eliz. c. 2,

made liable to the penalties oT prcemunire.

F *1161 *Thus far the penalties of prcemunire seem to have kept within the

<- * proper bounds of their original institution, the depressing the power of

the pope; but, they being pains of no inconsiderable consequence, it has been

thought fit to apply the same to other heinous offences; some of which bear

more, and some less, relation to this original offence, and some no relation

at all.

Thus, 1. By the statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 8, to molest the possessors of

abbey lands granted by parliament to Henry the Eighth and Edward the Sixth,

is & prcemunire. 2. So likewise is the offence of acting as a broker or agent in

any usurious contract, when above ten per cent, interest is taken, by statute 13

Eliz. c. 8. (3) 3. To obtain any stay of proceedings, other than by arrest of

judgment or writ of error, in any suit for a monopoly, is likewise a pramuniTt,

by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 3. 4. To obtain an exclusive patent for the sole making

or importation of gunpowder or arms, or to hinder others from importing them,

is also & prcemunire by two statutes: the one 16 Car. I, c. 21, the other 1 Jac.

II, c. 8. (4) 5. On the abolition by statute 12 Car. II, c. 24, of purveyance, (?)

.and the prerogative of pre-emption, or taking any victual, beasts, or goods for

the king's use, at a stated price, without consent of the proprietor, the exertion

of any such power for the future was declared to incur the penalties of prmmu-

nire. 6. To assert maliciously and advisedly, by speaking or writing, that both

or either house of parliament have a legislative authority without the king,

is declared a prcemunire by statute 13 Car. II, c. 1. 7. By the habeas corpu*

(q) See book I, page 287.

(2) [R«pealed by statute 8 and 9 Vic. o. 59.1

(3) [This act was made perpetual by the 39 Bliz. c. 18, ss. 30 and 32; but though not express ly

repealed, yet it seems to have virtually expired since the 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 16, s. 1.]

(4) [Repealed by 6 Geo. IV, c. 105.
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act also, 31 Car. II, c. 2, it is a prcemunire, and incapable of the king's pardon,

besides other heavy penalties, (r) to send any subject of this realm a prisoner

into parts beyond the seas. 8. By the statute 1 W. and II. st. 1, c. 8, persons of

eighteen years of age, refusing to take the new oaths of allegiance, as well as

supremacy, upon tender by the proper magistrate, are subject to the penalties of

a prcenmnire ; (5) and by statute 7 and *8 Wm. Ill, c. 24, Serjeants, coun- p „,.. ~ -•

sellers, proctors, attorneys, and all officers of courts, practising without L J

having taken the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and subscribed the decla-

ration against popery, are guilty of & prcemunire, whether the oaths be tendered

or no. 9. By the statute 6 Ann. c. 7, to assert maliciously and directly, by

preaching, teaching, or advised speaking, that the then pretended prince of

Wales, or any person other than according to the acts of settlement and union,

hath any right to the throne of these kingdoms; or that the king and parlia-

ment cannot make laws to limit the descent of the crown; such preaching,

teaching, or advised speaking is & prcemunire; as writing, printing, or publish-

ing the same doctrines amounted, we may remember, to high treason. 10. By

statute G Ann. c. 23, if the assembly of peers in Scotland, convened to elect their

sixteen representatives in the British parliament, shall presume to treat of any

other matter save only the election, they incur the penalties of a prcemunire.

11. The statute 6 Geo. I, c. 18 (enacted in the vear after the infamous south-sea

project had beggared half the nation), makes all unwarrantable undertakings by

unlawful subscriptions, then commonly known by the names of bubbles, subject
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to the penalties of aprcemunire. (6) 12. The statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 11, subjects

to the penalties of the statute of prcenmnire all such as knowingly and wilfully

solem iiize, assest or are present at any forbidden marriage of such of the descendants

of the body of King George II, as are by that act prohibited to contract

matrimony without the consent of the crown, (s)

Having thus inquired into the nature and several species of prcemunire, its

punishment may be gathered from the foregoing statutes, which are thus

shortly summed up by Sir Edward Coke: (t) " that from the conviction, the

defendant shall be out of the king's protection, and his lands and tenements,

goods and chattels, forfeited to the king: and that his body shall remain in

prison at the king's pleasure: *or (as other authorities have it) during , *IIQ 1

life:" (u) both which amount to the same thing; as the king, by his pre- L -"

rogative, may any time remit the whole, or any part, of the punishment, except

in the case of transgressing the statute of habeas corpus. These forfeitures

here inflicted do not (by the way) bring this offence within our former defini-

tion of felony; being inflicted by particular statutes, and not by the common

law. But so odious. Sir Edward Coke adds, was this offence of prcemunire, that

a man that was attainted of the same might have been slain by any other man

without danger of law; because it was provided by law, (w) that anv man might

do to him as to the king's enemy; and any man may lawfully kill an enemy.

However, the position itself, that it is at any time lawful to kill an enemy, is by

no means tenable: it is only lawful, by the law of nature and nations, to kill

him in the heat of battle, or for necessary self-defence. And to obviate such

savage and mistaken notions, (x) the statute 5 Eliz. c. 1, provides, that it shall

not be lawful to kill any person attainted in aprcemunire, any law, statute, opinion,

or exposition of law to the contrary notwitlistanding. (7) But still such delin-

quent, though protected as a part of the public from public wrongs, can bring

(r) Sec book I, pajrc 138. Book III, pnue 137. (») See book I, ch. 4. (t) 1 Inst. 129. (u) 1 Bulst. 139.

(w) Stat. 25 Eihv. Ill, 8t. 5, c. ffl. (x) Uro. Abr. t. Corone, 196.

(5) [By the 3 Goo. Ill, c. 32, } IS, it is enacted, that no person shall be summoned to take the

oath of supremacy, or make the declaration against transubstantiation, or be prosecuted for not

obeving the summons for that purpose.]

(IS) [By the 6 Geo. IV the greater part of the provisions of this statute are repealed, and

illegal companies are left to be dealt with according to the common law.]

(7) [And although this statute has been repealed by the act 9 and 10 Vic. c. 59, it can scarcely

be suggested that a man convicted upon &pratmunire is wholly out of the pale of the law.]
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no action for any private injury, how atrocious soever, being so far out of the

protection of the law, that it will not guard his civil rights, nor remedy any

grievance which he as an individual may suffer. And no man, knowing nim to

be guilty, can with safety give him comfort, aid, or relief, (y) (8)

CHAPTER IX.

I!

OF MISPRISIONS AND CONTEMPTS AFFECTING THE KING

AND GOVERNMENT.

THE fourth species of offences more immediately against the king and govern-

ment are entitled misprisions and contempts.

Misprisions (a term derived from the old French, mespris, a neglect or con-

tempt) are, in the acceptation of our law, generally understood to be all such

high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon:

and it is said, that a misprisioii is contained in every treason and felony what-

soever: and that if the king so please, the offender may be proceeded against for

the misprision only, (a) And upon the same principle, while the jurisdiction of

the star-chamber subsisted, it was held that the king might remit a prosecution

for treason, and cause the delinquent to be censured in that court, merely for

a high misdemeanor: as happened in the case of Roger, earl of Ruthland, in 43

Eliz., who was concerned in the earl of Essex's rebellion, (b) Misprisions are

generally divided into two sorts: negative, which consist in the concealment of

something which ought to be revealed; and positive, which consist in the com-
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mission of something which ought not to be done.

T *1201 **' ^ tne ^r8*'' or ne&at*ve kind, is what is called misprision of

I j.,«u j freagon-^ consisting in the bare knowledge and concealment of treason,

without any degree of assent thereto: for any assent makes the party a prin-

cipal traitor; as indeed the concealment, which was construed aiding and abet-

ting, did at the common law: in like manner as the knowledge of a plot against

the state, and not revealing it, was a capital crime at Florence and in other

states of Italy, (c) But it is now enacted by the statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10,

that a bare concealment of treason shall be only held a misprision. This con-

cealment becomes criminal, if the party apprized of the treason does not, as

soon as conveniently may be, reveal it to some judge of assize or justice of the

peace, (d) But if there be any probable circumstances of assent, as if one goes

to a treasonable meeting, knowing before-hand that a conspiracy is intended

against the king; or, being in such company once by accident, and having heard

"such treasonable conspiracy, meets the same company again, and hears more of

it, but conceals it; this is an implied assent in law, and makes the concealer

guilty of actual high treason, (e)

There is also one positive misprision of treason, created so by act of parlia-

ment. The statute 13 Eliz. c. 2, enacts, that those who forge foreign coin, not

(urrent in this kingdom, their aiders, abettors, and procurers, shall all be guilty

(«) 1 Hawk. P. C. 65.

(«• Year-book, 2 Sie. III. 10. Staumlf. P. C. 37. Kcl. 71. 1 Hal. P. C. 37*. 1 Hawk. P. C. K. 56.

(6) Hudson of the court of star-chamber. MS. in Mia. Brit. (c) Guicclanl. llist. b. 3 and 13.

(d] 1 Hal. P. C. 372. (e) 1 Hawk. P. C. «t.

(8) [The terrible penalties of a prcemunire are denounced by a great variety of statutes, ret

prosecutions upon a prcemunire are unheard of in our courts. There is only only one instance" of

such a prosecution in the State Trials, in which cose the penalties of a prannunire were in-

flicted upon some persons for refusing to take the oath of allegiance in the reign of Charles the

Second. Harg. St. Tr. vol. 2, 463.]

(I) Misprision of treason against the United States is defined by the act of congress of April

30, 1790 (1 Stat. at Large, 112), and made punishable by imprisonment not exceeding seven

years, and by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
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of misprision of treason. (2) For, though the law would not put foreign coin

upon quite the same footing as our own ; yet if the circumstances of trade con-

cur, the falsifying it may be attended with consequences almost equally perni-

cious to the public ; as the counterfeiting of Portugal money would be at present ;

and therefore the law has made it an offence just below capital, and that is all.

For the punishment of misprision of treason is loss of the profits of land during

life, forfeiture of goods, and imprisonment during life. (/) (3) Which total for-

feiture of the goods was originally inflicted while *the offence amounted r $, ^i i

to principal treason, and of course included in it a felony, by the com- L J

mon law ; and therefore is no exception to the general rule laid down in a former

chapter, (g) that wherever an offence is punished by such total forfeiture, it is •

felony at the common law.

Misprision of felony is also the concealment of a felony which a man knows,

bnt never assented to ; for if he assented, this makes him either principal or

accessory. And the punishment of this, in a public officer, by the statute Westm.

1, 3 Edw. I, c. 9, is imprisonment for a year and a day ; in a common person,

imprisonment for a less discretionary time ; and, in both, fine and ransom at the

king's pleasure : which pleasure of the king must be observed, once for all not

to signify any extra-judicial will of the sovereign, but guch as is declared by his

representatives, the judges in his courts of justice ; " voluntas regis in curia, non

in camera." (U)

There is also another species of negative misprisions : namely, the concealing
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of treasure-trove, which belongs to the king or his grantees by prerogative royal :

the concealment of which was formerly punishable by death ; (i) bnt now only

by fine and imprisonment. ( / )

II. Misprisions, which are merely positive, are generally denominated contempts

or high misdemeanors; of which

1. The first and principal is the mal-administration of such high officers, as

are in public trust and employment. This is usually punished by the method

of parliamentary impeachment: (4) wherein such penalties, short of death, are

inflicted, as to the wisdom of the house of peers shall seem proper; consisting

usually of banishment, imprisonment, fines, or perpetual disability. Hitherto

also may be referred the *otfence of embezzling the public money, called r*io9 1

~'

among the ~Rom&T\speculatits, which the Julian law punished with death

in a magistrate, and with deportation, or banishment, in a private person, (k)

With us it is not a capital crime, but subjects the committer of it to a discretion-

ary fine and imprisonment. (5) Other misprisions are, in general, such contempts

of the executive magistrate as demonstrate themselves by some arrogant and un-

dntiful behaviour towards the king and government. These are,

2. Contempts against the king's prerogative. As, by refusing to assist him

for the good of the public ; either in his c.ouncils, by advice, if called upon ; or

in his wars by personal service for defence of the realm, against a rebellion or

(f) 1 Hal. P. C. 374. C0,l See page 94. (k) 1 Hal. P. C. <ns. (i) Glan. J. 1, c. 2. ()) 3 Inst. 133.

(k) ln»t. 4, 18, 9.

(•2) By subsequent statutes the offence is made felony, or, in case of copper coin, misdemeanor.

See 37 Oco. Ill, c. 126 ; 43 Geo. Ill, c. 139, and 24 and 25 Vic. c. 99.

(3) [But this is only iii case of high treason. Misprision of a lower degree is punishable only

by fine ami imprsonment. 1 llale, 375.]

(4) In the United States " The president, vice-president, and oil civil officers of the United

States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or

other high crimes and misdemeanors." Const, of U. S. art. 2, § 4. The senate is the tribunal

to try impeachment* ; the chief justice presiding when the president is on trial. Judgment in

case of conviction shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to

hold anil enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States ; but the party con-

victed shall nevertheless bo liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment,

according to law. Const, art. 1, s. 3.

In the several states a similar tribunal is empowered to try state officers on impeachments.

For very full discussion of the law of impeachment, see The Trial of Andrew Johnson, 1868, 3

vole. Also, articles in 6 Arn. Law Keg. N. S. 257 and 641.

(5) See statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 70.
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invasion. (1) Under which class may be ranked the neglecting to join the posse

comitatus, or power of the county, being thereunto required by the sheriff or

justices, according to the statute 2 Hen. V, c. 8, which is a duty incumbent

upon sill that are fifteen years of age, under the degree of nobility, and able to

travel. (m) Contempts against the prerogative may also be, by preferring the

interests of a foreign potentate to those of our own, or doing or receiving any

thing that may create an undue influence in favour of such extrinsic power;

as, by taking a pension from any foreign prince without the consent of the

king" (/<) Or, by disobeying the king's lawful demands ; whether by writ, issu-

ing out of his courts of justice, or by a summons to attend his privy councils, or

by letters from the king to a subject commanding him to return from beyond seas

(for disobedience to which his lands shall be seized till he does return, and him-

self afterwards punished), or by his writ of tie exeat reynum, or proclamation,

commanding the subject to stay at home, (o) Disobedience to any of these com-

mands is a high misprisiou and contempt; and so, lastly, is disobedience to any

act of parliament, where no particular penalty is assigned: for then it is pnnish-

f *12'} 1 a'}'e> like *ne Te8^ °f *tnese contempts, by line and imprisonment, at the

[ IA6 J Discretion of the king's courts of justice, (p)

3. Contempts and misprisions against the king's person and government may

be by speaking or writing against them, cursing or wishing him ill, giving out

scandalous stories concerning him, or doing any thing that may tend to lessen

him in the esteem of his subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise
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jealousies between him and his people. (0) It has been also held an offence of

this species to drink to the pious memory of a traitor; or for a clergy mail to ab-

solve persons at the gallows, who there persist in the treasons for which they die:

these being acts which impliedly encourage rebellion. And for this species of

contempt a man may not only be fined and imprisoned, but suffer the pillory (?)

or other infamous corporal punishment: (q) in like manner, as in the ancient

German empire, such persons as endeavored to sow sedition, and disturb the pub-

lic tranquility, were condemned to become the objects of public notoriety and

derision, by carrying a dog upon their shoulders from one great town to another.

The emperors Otho I and Frederic Barbarossa inflicted this punishment ou

noblemen of the highest rank, (r)

4. Contempts against the king's title, not amounting to treason or prwmunire,

are the denial of his right to the crown in common and unadvised discourse; for,

if it be by advisedly speaking, we have seen (,v) that it amounts to a pra/initn're.

This heedless species of contempt is however punished by our law with fine and

imprisonment. Likewise if any person shall in any wise hold, affirm, or main-

tain, that the common law of this realm, not altered by parliament, ought not

to direct the right of the crown of England; this is a misdemeanor, by statute

13 Eliz. c. 1, and punishable with forfeiture of goods and chattels. A contempt

may also arise from refusing or neglecting to take the oaths, appointed by statute

F *1241 ^or ^e ^e^cr securing the government; and yet *acting in a public office,

L J place of trust, or other capacity, for which the said oaths are required to

be taken; viz. those of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration; which must be

taken within six calendar months after admission. The penalties for this con-

tempt, inflicted by statute 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 13, are very little, if any thing short of

(I) 1 Hawk. P. C. 69. (m) Lamb. Elr. 315. (n) 3 Inst. 144. (o) See book I. ]>RKC 266.

(p) 1 Hawk. P. C. 60. (q) Ibid. (rj Mod. Uu. Hiat. xxix, 26, 119. ('J Sec page M.

(C) [To assert falsely that the king labors under the affliction of mental derangement is

criminal, and an indictable offence : 3 D. and It. 464 : 3 B. and C. 257, S. C. In Rex v. Cobbett,

E. T. lf)05; (Holt on Libel, 114, 115; 29 St. Tr. 1), where the defendant was convicted of pub-

lishing a libel upon the administration of the Irish government, and upon the public conduct and

character of the lord lieutenant and the lord chancellor of Ireland, Lord Ellenborough, C. J.,

observed, " It is no new doctrine, that if a publication be calculated to alienate the aflections of

the people, by bringing the government into disestcem, whether the expedient be by ridicule or

obloquy, the person go conducting himself is exposed to the inflictions of the law." See also

Holt Rep. 424; 14 How. St. Tr. 1095, S. C.

(7) The punishment of the pillory was finally altogether abolished by statute 1 Tic. o. 23.
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those of proemunire: beiug an incapacity to hold the said offices, or any other;

to prosecute any suit: to be guardian or executor: to take any legacy or deed

of gift; and to vote at any election for members of parliament: and after con-

viction the offender shall also forfeit 5001. to him or them that will sue for the

same. Members on the foundation of any college in the two universities, who by

this statute arc bound to take the oaths, must also register a certificate thereof

in the college-register, within one month after; otherwise, if the electors do not

remove him, and elect another within twelve mouths, or after, the king may

nominate a person to succeed him by his great seal or sign manual. Besides

thus taking the oaths for offices, aud two justices of the peace may by the same

statute summons, and tender the oaths to, any person whom they shall suspect

to be disaffected: and every person refusing the same, who is properly called a

non-juror, shall be adjudged a popish recusant convict, and subjected to the same

penalties that were mentioned in a former chapter: (I) which in the end may

amount to the alternative of abjuring the realm, or suffering death as a felon. (8)

5. Contempts against the king's palaces or courts of justice, have been always

looked upon as high misprisions: and by the ancient law, before the conquest,

fighting in the king's palace, or before the king's judges, was punished with

death. («) So, too, in the old Gothic constitutions, there were many places

privileged by law, quibus major revereutia et securitas debetur, ut templa et

judicia, qua sancta habebaiitur,—arces et aula regis,—denique locus quilibet

prcBxente aut aduentante reye. (v) Aud at present, with us, by the statute
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*33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, malicious striking in the king's palace, wherein his r *i 2K -i

royal person resides, whereby blood is drawn, is punishable by perpet- "• •"

ual imprisonment, and fine at the king's pleasure; and also with loss of the

offenders right hand, the solemn execution of which sentence is prescribed in

the statute at length. (9)

But striking in the king's superior courts of justice, in Westminster-hall, or

at the assizes, is made still more penal than even in the king's palace. The

reason seems to be, that those courts, being anciently held in tlie king's palace,

and before the king himself, striking there included the former contempt against

the king's palace, and something more; viz., the disturbance of public justice.

•For this reason, by the ancient common law before the conquest, (w) striking in

the king's courts of justice, or drawing a sword therein, was a capital felony:

and our modern law retains so much of the ancient severity as only to exchange

the loss of life for the loss of the offending limb. Therefore a stroke or blow

in such a court of justice, whether blood be drawn or not, or even assaulting a

(I) Sec page M. (v) 3 Insl. 140. ',/, Alured. cap. 7 and 34. (rj Stlernb. dejure Gotlt. 1. 3, t. t.

(te) LL. I rue e. 6. LL. Cauut. 86. LL. Alured. c. 7.

(8) [By statute 10 Geo. IV, c. 7, assuming any ecclesiastical title established in England was

made punishable by a fine of 100J. In 1854) the pope issued a brief which, while evading this

Bttitute appointed catholic bishops with territorial designations different from those of the estab-

lished church, and they were enthroned with great pomp. This lead to statute 14 and 15 Vic.

c. 60, which forbade all such titles, and declared this and all similar briefs illegal and void. The

Btatute however, has been substantially a dead letter, and is important only as a protest of the

English nation against any assumption of authority by the pope within the realm.

(9) (.Mr. Hargrave has given in the llth volume of the State Trials, p. 16, an extract from

Stowe's Annals, containing a very curious account of the circumstances of the trial of Sir

Edmund Knevet, who was prosecuted upon this statute, goon after it was enacted: " for which

offence he was not only judged to lose his hand, but also his body to remain in prison, and

•his lands and goods at the king's pleasure. Then the said Sir Edmund JCnevet desired that the

king, of his beuigue grace, would pardon him of his right hand, and take the left: for (quoth he)

if my right be spared, I may hereafter do such good service to his grace as shall please him to

appoint. Of this submission and request, the justices forthwith informed the king, who of his

goodness, considering the gentle heart of the said Edmund, and the good report of lords and

ladies, granted him pardon, that he should lose neither hand, land nor goods, but should go free

at liberty."

So much of the 33 Hen. VIII, c, 12 (part of J 6 to $ 18), as relates to the punishment of man-

slaughter, and malicious striking, by reason whereof blood shall bo shed, ia repealed by 9 Geo.

IV, c.31. As to manslaughter generally, vide post, 191.]
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judge sitting in the court, by drawing a weapon, without any blow struck, is

punishable with the loss of the right hand, imprisonment for life, and forfeiture

of goods and chattels, and of the profits of his lands during life, (x) A rescue

also of a prisoner from any of the said courts, without striking a blow, is pun-

ished with perpetual imprisonment, and forfeiture of goods, and of thie profits

of lands during life; (y) being looked upon as an offence of the same nature

with the last; but only, as no blow is actually given, the amputation of the

hand is excused. For the like reason, an affray, or riot, near the said courts,

but out of their actual view, is punished only with fine and imprisonment, (z) (10)

F *1261 *^°fc only 8uch as are gui^y °f an actual violence, but of threatening

L '* -" or reproachful words to any judge sitting in the courts, are guilty of a

high misprisiou, and have been punished with large fines, imprisonment, and

corporal punishment, (a) And, even in the inferior courts of the king, an affray

or contemptuous behaviour is punishable with a fine by the judges there sitting;

as by the steward in a court-leet, or the like, (b)

Likewise all such as are guilty of any injurious treatment to those who are

immediately under the protection of a court of justice, are punishable by fine

and imprisonment: as if a man assaults or threatens his adversary for suing

him, a counsellor or attorney for being employed against him, a juror for his

verdict, or a gaoler or other ministerial officer for keeping him in custody, and

properly executing his duty: (c) which offences, when they proceeded farther

than bare threats, were punished in the Gothic constitutions with exile and for-
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feiture of goods, (d)

Lastly, to endeavour to dissuade a witness from giving evidence; to disclose

an examination before the privy council; or, to advise a prisoner to stand mute

(all of which are impediments of justice); are high misprisions, and contempts

of the king's courts, and punishable by fine and imprisonment. (11) And an-

ciently it was held, that if one of the grand jury disclosed, to any person indicted,

the evidence that appeared against him, he was thereby made" accessoiy to the

offence, if felony: and in treason a principal. And at this day it is agreedthat

he is guilty of a high misprision, (e) and liable to be fined and imprisoned. (/) (12)

(x) Stannd. P. C. 38. S Ingt. 140, 141. fgj 1 Hawk. P. C. 57. (x) Cro. Car, 373. (a) Ibid. 508.

(b) 1 Hawk. P. C. 58. fcj 3 Inut HI, 142. (A) Stiemh. <fe jure Goth. 1. 8, e. S.

fej See Bar. MS. 87 Aas. pi «4, » 4, ft.1.138. (f) 1 Hawk.P. 0. 60.

(10) [Lord Thanet and others were prosecuted by an information filed by the attorney-gen-

eral for a riot at the trial of Arthur O'Connor and others for high treason under a special

commission at Maidstone. Two of the defendants were found guilty generally. The first

three counts charged (inter alia) that the defendants did riotously make an assault on one

J. K., and did then and there beat, bruine, immni. trad ill-treat the said J, H. in the. presence

of the commissioners. When the defendants were brought up for judgment. Lord Kenyon

expressed doubts, whether upon this information the court was not bound to pronounce the judg-

ment of amputation of the right hand, <fec., as required in a prosecution expressly for striking

in a court ol justice. In consequence of these doubts the attorney general entered a nolle pro-

gcqui upon the first three counts, and the court pronounced judgment of fine and imprisonment

as for a common riot. 1 East. P. C. 438; 27 St. Tr. 821.]

(11) [The mere attempt to stifle evidence is also criminal, though the persuasion should not

succeed on the principle now fully established, that an incitement to commit any crime is itself

criminal. 6 Kast, 464 ; 2 id. B, 21, 22 ; 2 Stra. 904 ; 2 Leach, 925, As to conspiring to prevent

a witness from giving evidence, see 2 East, 3G& Knowingly making use of a false affidavit is

indictable. 8 East, »54 ; 2 Stra. 1144.]

(12) There is an exception to this rule in the caso of a witness before the grand jury who is

indicted for perjury. The jurors in this case are not only competent but oompellable to give evi-

dence of what was sworn to before them. State v. O'ft'utt, 4 Blackf. 355; State e. Fasset, 16

Conn. 457; State v. Broughton, 7 Ired. 96; Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts, 56.
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CHAPTEK X.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.

THE order of our distribution will .next lead us to take into consideration

such crimes and misdemeanors as more especially affect the commonwealth, or

public polity of the kingdom: which, however, as well as those which are pecu-

liarly pointed against the lives and security of private subjects, are also offences

against the king, as the pater-familias of the nation: to whom it appertains by

his regal office to protect the community, and each individual therein, from every

degree of injurious violence, by executing those laws which the people them-

selves in conjunction with him have enacted; or at least have consented to, by

an agreement either expressly made in the persons of the representatives, or

by a tacit and implied consent presumed from and proved by immemorial usage.

The species of crimes which we have now before us is subdivided into such a

number of inferior and subordinate classes, that it would much exceed the

bounds of an elementary treatise, and be insupportably tedious to the reader,

were I to examine them all minutely, or with any degree of critical accuracy.

I shall therefore confine myself principally to general definitions, or descriptions

of this great variety of offences, and to the punishments inflicted by law for

each particular offence; with now and then a few incidental observations:

referring the student for more particulars to other voluminous authors; who

have treated of these subjects with greater precision and more in detail than is

consistent with the plan of these Commentaries.
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The crimes and misdemeanors that more especially affect the commonwealth,

may be divided into five species, viz.: *offences against public justice, r*ioQi

against the public peace, against public trade, against the public "- ••

health, and against the public police or economy: of each of which we will take

a cursory view in their order.

First, then, of offences against public justice: some of which are felonies,

whose punishment may extend to death; others only misdemeanors. I shall

begin with those that are most penal, and descend gradually to such as are of

less malignity.

1. Embezzling or vacating records, or falsifying certain other proceedings in a

court of judicature, is a felonious offence against public juetice. It is enacted

by statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 12, that if any clerk, or other person, shall wilfully take

away, withdraw, or avoid any record or process in the superior courts of justice

in Westminster-hall, by reason whereof the judgment shall be reversed or not

take effect; it shall be felony not only in the principal actors, but also in their

procurers and abettors. And this may be tried either in the king's bench or

common pleas, by a jury de medietate: half officers of any of the superior

courts, and the other half common jurors. (1) Likewise by statute 21 Jac. I,

c. 26, to acknowledge any fine, recovery, deed enrolled, statute, recognizance,

bail, or judgment, in the name of another person not privy to the same, ia

felony without benefit of clergy. Which law extends only to proceedings in the

courts themselves: but by statute 4 W. and M. c. 4, to personate any other person

(as bail) before any judge of assize or other commissioner authorized to take

bail in the country, is also felony. (2) For BO man's property would be safe, if

(1) This statute is now repealed. For statutes for the punishment of offences of the

character mentioned in the text, and others of a somewhat similar nature, sec statutes 7 and S

Geo. IV, c. 29; 1 Vic. c. 90; 1 and 2 Vic. c. 94; 7 and 8 Vic. c. 19; 14 and 15 Vic. c. 99 and

16 and 17 Vic. c. 99; 24 and 25 Vic. c. 9fi, s. 30; 24 and 25 Vic. c. 98.

(2) The statute now in C>rce for the punishment of this offence, is 24 and 25 Vic. c. 98, s. 34.

For decisions under previous statutes, see 1 Sim. 304: 1 Vent. 501; 3 Kcb. 694; 1 Ld. Raym.

445; 2 Sid. 90.

The false personation of voters at elections was made a misdemeanor by statute 6 and 7

Tic. c. IS, b. 33.
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records might be suppressed or falsified, or persons' names be falsely usurped in

courts, or before their public officers.

2. To prevent abuses by the extensive power which the law is obliged to re-

pose in gaolers, it is enacted by statute 14 Edw. Ill, c. 10, that if any gaoler by

too great duress of imprisonment makes any prisoner, that he hath in ward,

f *129 1 *Decome an approver or an appellor against his will; that is, as we shall

1 J see hereafter, to accuse and turn evidence against some other person; it is

felony in the gaoler. (3) For, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (a) it is not lawful

to induce or excite any man even to a just accusation of another; much less to

do it by duress of imprisonment; and least of all by a gaoler, to whom the

prisoner is committed for safe custody.

3. A third offence against public justice is obstructing the execution of lawful

process. This is at all times an offence of a very high and presumptuous na-

ture; but more particularly so, when it is an obstruction of an arrest upon

criminal process. And it hath been holden, that the party opposing such arrest

becomes thereby particeps criminis ; that is, an accessory in felony, and a prin-

cipal in high treason, (b) Formerly one of the greatest obstructions to pub-

lic justice, both of the civil and criminal kind, was the multitude of pretended

privileged places, where indigent persons assembled together to shelter them-

selves from justice (especially in London and Southwark), under the pretext of

their having been ancient palaces of the crown, or the like: (c) all of which

sanctuaries for iniquity are now demolished, and the opposing of any process
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therein is made highly penal, by the statutes 8 and 9 Win. Ill, c. 27, 9 Geo. I,

c. 28, and 11 Geo. I, c. 22, which enact, that persons opposing the execution of

any process in such pretended privileged places within the hills of mortality,

or abusing any officer in his endeavours to execute his duty therein, so that

he receives bodily hurt, shall be guilty of felony, and transported for seven

years: and persons in disguise, joining in or abetting any riot or tumult on

such account, or opposing any process, or assaulting and abusing any officer

executing or for having executed the same, shall be felons without benefit of

clergy. (4)

4. An escape of a person arrested upon criminal process by eluding tb.p vigilance

of his keepers before he is put in hold, is also an offence against public justice, and

F *130l t'lel)ar';y himself *is punishable by fine or imprisonment, (d) (5). But the

L -I officer permitting such escape, either by negligence or connivance, is

much more culpable than the prisoner; the natural desire of liberty pleading

strongly in his behalf, though he ought in strictness of law to submit himselt

quietly to custody, till clewed by the due course of justice. Officers therefore

who, after arrest, negligently permit a felon to escape, are also punishable by

fine: (e) but voluntary escapes, by consent and connivance of the officer, are a

much more serious offence: for it is generally agreed that such escapes amount

to the same kind of offence, and are punishable in the same degree, as the offence

of which the prisoner is guilty, and for which he is in custody, whether treason,

felony, or trespass. And this whether he were actually committed to gaol, or

only under a bare arrest. (/) But the officer cannot be thus punished, till

the original delinquent hath actually received judgment or been attainted

upon verdict, confession, or outlawry, of the crime for which he was so com-

mitted or arrested: otherwise it might happen, that the officer might be pun-

ished for treason or felony, and the person arrested and escaping might turn

out to be an innocent man. But, before the conviction of the principal party,

(a) 3 Inst. 91. (6) t Hawk. P. C. 1Z1.

(O Snnli i>8 White-Friars, ami its environs; the Savoy! anil the Mint in Sonthwurt.

id) 'I Hawk. P. C. 13. . («) 1 Hal. P. C. BOO. (/) 1 Hal. P. C. 590. 2 Hawk. P. C. 1S4.

(3) ThiR statute is now repealed.

(4) For provisions punishing similar offences, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. The wilfttl

refusal to aid a peace officer "in the performance of his duty, when requested, is a misdemea-

nor at common law. Ro«rinn v. Brown, 1 C. & M. 314.

(5) Sec statutu 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100, s. 29.
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the officer thus neglecting his duty may be fined and imprisoned for a misde-

meanor, (y) (6)

5. Breach of prison by the offender himself, when committed for any cause,

was felony at the common law: (h) or even conspiring to break it. («') But this

severity is mitigated by the statute defrangentibuspri>;onam, 1 Edw. II, st 2, which

enacts that no person shall have judgment of life or member for breaking

prison, unless committed for some capital offence. So that to break prison and

escape, when lawfully committed for any treason or felony, remains still felony

as at the common law; and to break prison (whether it be the county-gaol, the

stocks, or other usual place of security), when lawfully confined upon"any other

inferior charge, is still 'punishable as a high misdemeanor by fine and r ** „« ->

imprisonment. For the statute which ordains that such offence shall •• ^

be no longer capital, never meant to exempt it entirely from every degree of

punishment. (/) (7)

6. Kescne is the forcibly and knowingly freeing another from an arrest or

imprisonment; and it is generally the same offence in the stranger so rescuing,

as it would have been in a gaoler to have voluntarily permitted an escape. A

rescue, therefore, of one apprehended for felonv, is felony; for treason, treason ;

and for a misdemeanor, a misdemeanor also. l3ut here, likewise, as upon volun-

tary escapes, the principal must first be attainted or receive judgment before

the rescuer can be punished: and for the same reason: because, perhaps, in fact

it may turn out there has been no offence committed, (k) By statutes 11 Geo.
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II, c. 26, and 24 Geo. II, c. 40, if five or more persons assemble to rescue any

retailers of spirituous liquors, or to assault trie informers against them, it is

felony, and subject to transportation for seven years. By the statute 16 Geo.

II, c. 81, to convey to any prisoner in custody for treason or felony any arms,

instruments of escape, or disguise, without the knowledge of the gaoler, though

no escape be attempted, or any way to assist such prisoner to attempt an escape,

though no escape be actually made, is felony, and subjects the offender to trans-

portation for seven years: or, if the prisoner be in custody for petit larceny or

(a) 1 Hal. P. C. $88, 589. 2 Hawk. P. C. 134, 135. (h) 1 Hal. P. C. 607. fij Bract I. 3, c. 9.

fjj 4 Hawk. P. U. W8. (k) 1 Hal. P. C. 607. Fost 3«.

(6) [There must be an actual arrest, as well as a lawful arrest, to make an escape criminal

in an officer. 2 Hawk. c. 19. ss. 1, 2. It must also be for a criminal matter. Id. M. 3. And

the imprisonment must be continuing at the time of the offence. Id. s. 4; 1 Kuss. 531; 1 Hale,

f>94. In si.me cases it is an escape to suffer a prisoner to have greater liberty than can by law-

be allowed him ; as, to admit him to bail against law, or to suffer him to go beyond the limits

of the prison, though he return. 2 Hawk. c. 19, 8. 5. A retaking will not excuse an escape.

Id. s. 13.

1'rirate individual*, who have persons lawfully in their custody, are guilty of an escape if

they suffer them illegally to depart: 1 Hale, 595; but they may protect themselves from lia-

bility by delivering over their prisoner fo some legal and proper officer. 1 Hale, 594. 595. A

private'person, thus guilty of an escape, the puishment is fine, or imprisonment, or both. 2

Hawk. c. 20, s. 6.

(7) [An actual breaking is the gist of this offence, and must be stated in the indictment. It

mu-it also appear thrvt the party was lawfully in prison, and for a crime involving judgment

of life or member ; it is not enough to allege that he " feloniously broke prison." 2 lust. 591 ;

1 Russell, 3ril. If lawfully committed, a party breaking prison is within the statute, although

he may be innocent: as, if committed by a magistrate upon strong suspicion. 2 Inst. 59U;

1 Hale, P. C. 610 ; 1 Russell, 378. To constitute a felonious prison breach, the party must be

committed for a crime which is capital at the time of the breaking. 1 Russell, 379; Colo's

Case, Plowd. Comm. 401. A constructive breaking is not sufficient; therefore, if a person .

goes out of prison without obstruction, as by a door being left open, it is only a misdemeanor.

\ Hale P. C. 611. An actual intent to break is not necessary. The statute extends to a prison

in law, as well as to a prison in fact. 2 Inst. 589. " Prison breach or rescue is a common-

law felony, if the prisoner breaking prison, or rescued, is a convicted felon, and it is punishable

at common law by imprisonment, and under 19 Geo. Ill, c. 74, s. 4, by three times whipping.

Throwing down loose bricks at the top of a prison wall, placed there to'impede escape and give

alarm, is prison breach, though they were thrown down by accident." Rex v. Haswell, R. and

K. C. C. 458.]

See a very full discussion of this offence in 2 Bish. Cr. L. { 893, et seq.

For recent acts to punish those aiding escapes, see 5 Geo. IV, c. 84, s. 22; 28 and 29 Tic. o

126, s. 37.
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other inferior offence, or charged with a debt of 100Z., it is then a misdemeanor

punishable with fine and imprisonment. (8) And by several special statutes,^)

to rescue, or attempt to rescue, any person committed for the offences enumer-

ated in those acts, is felony without benefit of clergy; and to rescue, or attempt

to rescue, the body of a felon executed for murder, a single felony, and subject

to transportation for seven years. Nay, even if any person be charged with any

of the offences against the black-act, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, and being required by order

F *1321 *°^ kne Privy council to surrender himself, neglects so to do for forty

L J days, both he and all that knowingly conceal, aid, abet, or succour him,

are felons, without benefit of clergy. (9)

7. Another capital offence against public justice is the returning from trans-

portation, or being seen at large in Great Britain, before the expiration of the

term for which the offender was ordered to be transported, or had agreed to

transport himself. This is made felony without benefit of clergy in all cases,

by statutes 4 Geo. I, c. 11, 6 Geo. I, c, 23,16 Geo. II, a 15, and 8 Geo. Ill, c. 15,

as is also the assisting them to escape from such as are conveying thorn to the

port of transportation. (10)

8. An eighth is that of taking a reward, under pretence of helping the owner

to his stolen goods. This was a contrivance carried to a great length of villainy

in the beginning of the reign of George the First; the confederates of the

felons thus disposing of stolen goods, at a cheap rate, to the owners them-

selves, and thereby stifling all farther inquiry. The famous Jonathan Wild
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had under him a well disciplined corps of thieves, who brought in all their

spoils to him; and he kept a sort of public office for restoring them to the

owners at half price. To prevent which audacious practice, to the ruin and in

defiance of public justice, it was enacted by statute 4 Geo. I. c. 11, that who-

ever shall take a reward under the pretence of helping any one to stolen goods,

shall suffer as the felon who stole them; unless he causes such principal felon

to be apprehended and brought to trial, and also gives evidence against them.

Wild, still continuing in his old practice, was upon this statute at last convicted

and executed, (m) (11)

9. Receiving of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, is also a high misde-

meanor and affront to public justice. We have seen in a former chapter, (»)

(i) n Geo. 1, c. 93. (Transportation.) 9 Geo. I. c. 42. (Blank-act.) 8 Geo. II. c. 40. (Destroyin.e turn-

pikes, An.) 19 Goo. n, c. 34. (Smuggling. See the (« Goo. HI, c. MS, >. 11.) 23 Geo. H, c. 37. (ilunier.)

27 Geo. II. c. IS. (Black-act.)

im) See stat. 6 Geo. I, c. 43, { 9. (n) See page 38.

(8) [On an indictment under this act, the offence of delivering instruments of escape to a

prisoner has been held to be complete, though the prisoner had been pardoned of the offence of

which he was convicted, on condition of transportation; and a party may be convicted thongh

there is no evidence that he knew of what offence the prisoner had been coiirioted. Rex. r.

Shaw, R. and R. C. C. 536. This act applies only to case:) of attempt (Tilley's Case, 2 Leach,

(iiw). and a case where the commitment is on suspicion only, is not within it. Greenifs Case, 1

Leach, 36it. This act was virtually repealed by 4 Geo. IV, c. 64, s. 43.

(it) [By statute 1 Tic. c. 91, ss. 1 and 2, any person rescuing or attempting ta rescue any other

person who shall be committed or found guilty of murder, shall be liable to be transported for

life, or for any time not exceeding fifteen years, or to be imprisoned for three; and now penal

servitude may be substituted.]

See also statute 5 Geo. IV, c. 84, s. 22.

The statutes mentioned in the text are since repealed or essentially changed, so that the pun-

ishments there mentioned are not now imposed.

(10) These offences are no longer capital. See statutes 5 Geo. IV, o. 84, s. 22; 20 and 21 Vic.

c. 3, s. 2; 27 and 28 Vic. c. 47.

(11) By statutes 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 151, persons corruptly taking monevor reward on pre-

tence of helping any person to property which has been stolen, embezzled, Ac., unless they

shall use all duo diligence to bring the offenders to trial, are made guilty of felony. See Reg. >'.

King, 1 Cox, C. C. 3ti; Reg. ». Pascoe, 1 Den. C. C. 456. And by section 50, any person adver-

tising a reward for the return of property stolen or lost, and using words purporting that no ques-

tions will be asked, or that a reward will be given for the property stolen or lost, without seizing

or making any inquiry after the person producing it, or promising to return to any pawnbroker

or other person money advanced or paid by him on snob, property, or any oilier snm or

reward for the return of such property, and any person publishing such advertisement, is made

subject to a fine of !>()l.
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that this offence, which is only a misdemeanor at common law, by the statute

3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, and 5 Ann. c. 31, makes the offender accessory to the

theft and felony. But because the accessory cannot in *general be r ^,00 -i

tried, unless with the principal, or after the principal is convicted, the L '" I

receivers by that means frequently eluded justice. To remedy which, it is

enacted by statute 1 Ann. c. 9, and 5 Ann. c. 31, that such receivers may still

be prosecuted for a misdemeanor, and punished by line and imprisonment,

though the principal felon be not before taken so as to be prosecuted and

convicted. And, in case of receiving stolen lead, iron, and certain other metals,

such offence is by statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30, punishable by transportation for

fourteen years, (o) So that now the prosecutor has two methods in his choice:

either to punish the receivers for the misdemeanor immediately, before the

thief is taken; (/>) or to wait till the felon is convicted, and then punish them

as accessories to the felony. But it is provided by the same statutes, that he

shall only make use of one, and not both of these methods of punishment.

By the same statute, also 29 Geo. II, c. 30, persons having lead, iron, and

other metals in their custody, and not giving a satisfactory account how

they came by the same, are guilty of a misdemeanor, and punishable by fine

or imprisonment And by statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 48, all knowing receivers

of stolen plate or jewels, taken by robbery on the highway, or when a bur-

glary accompanies the stealing, may be tried as well before as after the con-

viction of the principal, and whether he be in or out of custody; and, if
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convicted, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and transported for fourteen

years. (12)

10. Of a nature somewhat similar to the two last is the offence of theft

bate, which is where the party robbed not only knows the felon, but also takes

his goods again, or other amends upon agreement not to prosecute. This is

frequently called, compounding of felony; and formerly was held to make a

man an accessory; but it is now punished only with fine and imprisonment, (q)

This perversion of justice, in the old Gothic constitutions, was liable to the

most severe and infamous punishment And the Salic law, " latroni eum

*similem habuit, yui ferlum celare vettet, et occulie sine judice compo- r *-\QA i

gitionem ejus admittere." (r) By statute 25 Geo. II, c. 36, even to adver- "- -"

tise a reward for the return of things stolen, with no questions asked, or words

to the same purport, subjects the advertiser and the printer to a forfeiture of

50/. each. (13)

11. Common barratry is the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up suits

and quarrels between his majesty's subjects, either at law or otherwise. (*) (14)

The punishment for this offence, in a common person, is by fine and imprisou-

(o) See also statute 1 Oeo. Ill, c. '-"*. i 12, for the punishment of recelrera of goods stolen by bumboats,

&<•., in the Thames.

(11) Foster, 373. (q) 1 Hawk. P. C. 135. (rj Stiernb. <to jure Oath. I. 3, o. 5.

(>} 1 Hawk. P. C. MS.

(12) These offences are covered by statutes 24 and 25 Vio. c. 96. The punishment is penal

servitude or imprisonment, and in case of males under sixteen years of age, with or without

whipping.

(13) See also statute 94 and 25 Vie. o. 96, s. 102.

(11) [Disturbing the peace, making false inventions, propagating evil reports and calumnies,

and spreading false and groundless rumors, whereby discord and dicquiet may ensue amongst

neighbors, may properly oe ranked under the bead barretry. Must. 368; 1 Haw. P. C. 243.

See 1 Hale, P. G. c. 27; Boo. Abr. Barretry, 1 Rnssell, 165, on this subject. See also the Case

of Barretry, 8 Co. Rep. 36, b. So one can be convicted for a single act of barretry, for every

indictment for that offence must charge the defendant with being a common barretor. In a case

in the king's bench, where an attorney, without any corrupt or unworthy motives, prepared a

special case, in order to take the opinion of the court upon the will of a testator, and suggested

several facts wbich had no foundation, he was held to be guilty of a contempt, and fined ".',(>!.

In re Elsam 5 D. and R. 389; 3 B. and C. 697.]

The statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, was made perpetual 30 and 31 Tic. c. 59.

As to indictments for common barretry, see Commonwealth <•. itcOulloch, 15 Mass. 227;

State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey, 379; Commonwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 432.
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merit; but if the offender (as is too frequently the case) belongs to the profes-

sion of the law, a barretor who is thus able as well as willing to do mischief,

ought also to be disabled from practising for the future, (t) And, indeed, it is

enacted by statute 1% Geo. I, c. 29, that if any one who hath been convicted of

forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, or common barretry, shall practise

as an attorney, solicitor, or agent, in any suit ; the court, upon complaint, shall

examine it in a summary way; and, if proved, shall direct the offender to be

transported for seven years. Hereunto may also be referred another offence, of

equal malignity and audaciousness; that of suing another in the name of a

fictitious plaintiff; either one not in being at all, or one who is ignorant of the

suit. This offence, if committed in any of the king's superior courts, is left, as

a high contempt, to be punished at their discretion. But in courts of a lower

degree, where the crime is equally pernicious, but the authority of the judges

not equally extensive, it is directed by statute 8 Eliz. c. 2, to be punished by six

mouth's imprisonment, and treble damages to the party injured.

12. Maintenance is an offence that bears a near relation to the former ; being

an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining

or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it : (?«)

a practice that was greatly encouraged by the first introduction of uses, (w)

r *i OK i This is an offence against public justice, as it *keeps alive strife and

J contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine

of oppression. And, therefore, by the Roman law, it was a species of the
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crimen falsi to enter into any confederacy, or do any act to support another's

lawsuit, by money, witnesses, or patronage, (x) A man may, however, maintain

the suit of his near kinsman, servant, or poor neighbour, out of charity and

compassion, with impunity. Otherwise, the punishment by common law is fine

and imprisonment ; (y) and by the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, a forfeiture of

ten pounds. .

13. Champerty, CMmpi-partitio, is a species of maintenance, and punished in

the same manner: (z) being a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant campum

partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if they pre-

vail at law ; whereupon the champerter is to carry on the party's suit at his

own expense, (a) Thus, champart, in the French law, signifies a similar division

of profits, being a part of the crop annually due to the landlord by bargain or

custom. In our sense of the word it signifies the purchasing of a suit, or right

of suing: (15) a practice so much abhorred by our law, that it is one main reason

why a chose in action, or thing of which one hath the right but not the posses-

sion, is not assignable at common law ; because no man shall purchase any pre-

tence to sue in another's right. These pests of civil society, that are perpetually

endeavoring to disturb the repose of their neighbours, and officiously interfering

in other men's quarrels, even at the hazard of their own fortunes, were severely

animadverted, on by the Roman law, "qui improbe caunt in alienam litcm, ut

quiuquid ex condemnations in rein ipsius redactum fuerit inter eos communi-

caretur, lege Julia de vi privata tenentur;" (b) and they were punished by the

forfeiture of a third part of their goods, and perpetual infamy. Hitherto, also,

must be referred the provision of the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, that no one

shall sell or purchase any pretended right or title to land, unless the vendor

(t) Ibid. 244. («) Ibid. 249. («) Dr. uml St. 203. te) Ff. 48. 10, 90.

(tf) 1 Hawk. P. C. 255. (z\ Ibid. 257. (a) Stat. of conspirut. 33 Ed. I. (b) Ff. 48, 7, 6.

(15) [See 1 Haw. P. C. c. 3, Co. Litt. 368; 1 Kussell, 176. on this subject. The distinction

between maintenance and champerty seems to be this : where there is no agreement to divide

the thing in snit, the party intermeddling is guilty of maintenance only ; but, where he stipu-

lates to receive part of the thing in suit, he is guilty of champerty. It seems thnt resorting

to machinerv and contrivances in order to make a party interested in a suit a witness on the

trial, amounts to maintenance. Bell e. Smith, 7 D. and R. 846; 5 B. and C. 188.]

Upon the subject of champerty and maintenance, the reader is referred to 2 Bish. Cr. L.

f § 104-116. The. tendency of late has been to confine these offences within bounds somewhat

narrower than those indicated by the older authorities.
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*hath received the profits thereof for one whole year before such grant, r *-I»D -i

or hath been in actual possession of the land, or of the reversion or L J

remainder; on pain that both purchaser and vender shall each forfeit the value

of such land to the king and the prosecutor. These offences relate chiefly to

the commencement of civil suits: but,

14. Compounding of informations upon penal statutes is an offence of an

equivalent nature in criminal causes ; and is, besides an additional misdemeanor

against public justice, by contributing to make the laws odious to the people.

At once, therefore, to discourage malicious informers, and to provide that

offences, when once discovered, shall be duly prosecuted, it is enacted by statute

18 Eliz. c. 5, that if any person, informing under pretence of any penal law,

makes any composition without leave of the court, or takes any money or

promise from the defendant to excuse him (which demonstrates his intent in

commencing the prosecution to be merely to serve his own ends, and not for

the public good), he shall forfeit 10/., shall stand two hours on the pillory, and

shall be forever disabled to sue on any popular or penal statute. (16)

15. A conspiracy, also, to indict an innocent man of felony falsely and mali-

ciously, who is accordingly indicted and acquitted, is a farther abuse and per-

version of public justice; (17) for which the party injured may either have a

civil action by writ of conspiracy (of which we spoke in the preceding bodk), (c)

or the conspirators, for there must be at least two to form a conspiracy, may be

indicted at the suit of the king, and were by the ancient common law (d) to
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receive what is called the villenoux judgment; viz., to lose their liberam legem,

whereby they are discredited and disabled as jurors or witnesses; to forfeit their

goods and chattels, and lands for life; to have those lands wasted, their houses

(cj See book III, pajte 126. (d) Bro. Abr. tit. Conspiracy, 28.

(16) [This statute does not apply to offences cognizable only before magistrates, 1 B. and A.

srts2; it applies only to common informers, and not to cases where the penalty is given to the

party grieved. 1 Salk. 30; 2 ilawk. 279. The taking the penalty is an offence within the act

though there is no action or proceeding for it. Buss, and K. C. C. 84; 3 Burn, J. 24th ed. 85.

A notice of action required by a penal "statute is no commencement of the suit, so as to subject

the plaintiff, or his agent, to an attachment for attempting to compound an offence previous to

the suiug out of the writ. 2 Bla. Rep. 781. As to the mode of obtaining leave to compound, see

Tidd's Prac. 8th ed. 604.1

This subject was considered and the previous cases examined by Ch. J. Tiudal, in Keir e.

Leeman, 9 Q. B. 392, where the conclusion was that " in all offences which involve damages to

an injured partv. for which he may maintain an action, it is competent for him, notwithstanding

they are also of a public nature, to compromise and settle his private damage in a.ny way he may

think fit;" but that an agreement to pay money in consideration of a prosecution for riot and

assault being abandoned, was illegal and void. On the same subject, see Jones v. Rice,

18 Pick. 440.

(17) LThe instance pointed out by the learned commentator is not the only one in which

parties may be indicted for a conspiracy; and it may be stated, as a general rule, that all con-

federacies wrongfully to prejudice another, are misdemeanors at common law, and indictable

accordingly, whether the intention is to injure his property, his person or his character. See

1 Hawk, c! 72, s. 2. But no indictment lies for conspiring to commit a civil trespass on a pro-

or to do any act in itself illegal.

There arc many cases in which the act itself would not bo cognizable by law if done by a

single person, which become the subject of indictment when effected by several with a joint

design. 6 T. R. 636. Thus, each person attending a theater has a right to express his disap-

probation of the piece acted, or a performer on the stage; but if several previously agree to

condemn a play, or hiss an actor, they will be guilty of conspiring. 2 Camp. 358. In the

case of workmen refusing to proceed unless they receive an advance of wages, it is clear that

any one ot them might singly act on this determination, but it is criminal when it follows

from a plan preconcerted by "many. 6 T. R. 636. See the statute as to combinations among

•workmen, infra. There are other cases in which, though the act may be morally criminal, it

is not illegal, except on the ground of conspiracy; thus the verbal slander of a private indi-

vidual is not indictable, but it is so where several unite in a scheme to blast his character.

1 Lev. 62; 1 Tent. 304. And in every case that can be adduced of conspiracy, the offence de-
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razed, their trees rooted up, and their own bodies committed to prison, (e) But

F *137 1 '^ now *8 ^e Better opinJ°n! that the villeuous judgment is hy long *dis-

<- ' use become obsolete; it not having been pronounced for some ages: but

instead thereof the delinquents are usually sentenced to imprisonment, tine, and

pillory. To this head may be referred the offence of sending letters, threatening

to accuse any person of a crime punishable with death, transportation, pillory,

or other infamous punishment, with a view to extort from him any money or

other valuable chattels. This is punishable by statute 30 Geo. II, c. 24, at the

discretion of the court, with fine, imprisonment, pillory, whipping, or transpor-

tation for seven years. (18)

16. The next offence against public justice is when the suit is past its conv

mencement, and come to trial. And that is, the crime of wilful and corrupt

perjury: which is defined by Sir Edward Coke, (/) to be a crime committed

when a lawful oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person

who swears wilfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or

point in question. The law takes no notice of any perjury but such as is com-

mitted in some court of justice, having power to administer an oath; or before

some magistrate or proper officer, invested with a similar authority, in some pro-

ceedings relative to a civil suit or a criminal prosecution: for it esteems all

other oaths unnecessary at least, and therefore will not punish the breach of

them. (19) For which reason it is much to be questioned, how far any magis-

trate is )ustifiable in taking a vountary affidavit in any extra-judicial matter,
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as is now too frequent upon every petty occasion: since it is more than possible,

that by such idle oaths a man may frequently in foro conscientiae incur the

guilt, and at the same time evade the temporal penalties, of perjury. The per-

(<•) 1 Hawk. P. C. 199. (f) S Ins!. Hil

pendg on the unlawful agreement, and not on the set which follows it; the latter is but evi-

dence of the former. 2 Burr. 993; 3 id. 1321.

To constitute a conspiracy, as observed in the text, there must be at leant two persons im-

plicated in it; and a husband and a wife cannot be guilty of it. 1 Hawk. c. 72, s. 8. If all

the persons in the indictment be acquitted except one, aud the indictment do not lay the

offence as committed jointly with other persons unknown, no judgment can be passed on

such one. Poph. 202; 3 Burr. 1262; 12 Mod. 262. But one conspirator may be tried singly;

as, if the others had escaped, or died, before the trial, or the finding of the bill, he may oe

convicted alone. 1 Stra. 193; 2 id. 1227. It is no offence to conspire to prosecute a guilty

person. 1 Salk. 174.

It is not necessary to constitute the offence, that any act should be done in pursuance of the

conspiracy : 2 Lord Rayin. 1167 ; 8 Mod. 321; 1 Salk. 174 ; 1 Bla. Kcp. 392; or that any party

was actually injured. 1 Leach, 39.]

As to what shall constitute conspiracy, see further O'Connell v. Queen, 11 Cl. and Fin. 155;

Commonwealth t>. Hunt, 4 Met. Ill; Collins v. Commonwealth, 3 S. and R. 220; State ». Row-

ley, 12 Conn. 101; Aldermanc People, 4 Mich. 414; State ». Younger, 1 Dev. 357; State v.

Murphy, 6 Ala. 765; People «. Mather, 4 Wend. 229; State v. Rickey, 4 Halst. 293; State t>.

Straw, 42 N. H. 393; Smith ». People, 25 III 17.

(18) This subject is covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.

(19) [.And no breach of an oath made in a mere private concern, as in entering into a con-

tract, however malicious, is an indictable offence, but can only bo redressed in an action for

the individual injury; nor can any criminal proceeding be maintained for the violation of an

oath, taken, however solemnly, to perform any duties in future, though the offence will be

highly aggravated by the breach of an obligation so Bacred. 3 Inst. 166; II Co. Rep. 9S.

And ovcu when an oath is required by an act of parliament in an extra-judicial proceeding,

the breach of that obligation docs not sceui to amount to perjnry, unless the statute contain

an express provision to that effect. And it seems mi indictment for perjury is not sustainable

on an oath taken before the house of commons, a* they have not any power to administer an

oath, unless indeed in those particular oases in which an express power is granted to them by

statute. But it is indictable to swear falsely in any court of equity (1 Leach, 50; 1 Sid. 418);

any ecclesiastical court (Cro. Eli. 609), and any other lawful court, whether it be of record

or'otherwise. Hawk. b. 1, c. 69, s. 3. So a false oath subjects the offender to all the penalties

of perjnry, though it be taken in a stage of the proceedings when it does not influence the

final judgment, I nit only affects some intermediate step to be taken; thus, if a man offering

to bail another swears his property to be greater than it is, in order to be received as a surety :

Cro. Car. 146; or if he swears falsely before a magistrate to induce him to compel another to

find sureties for the peace. Hawk. b. 1, c. 69, ». 3.

The party must be lawfully sworn, and, as above observed, the person by whom the oath is
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jury must also be corrupt (that is, committed malo ammo), wilful, positive, and

absolute: (20) not upon surprise, or the like: it alao must be in some point ma-

terial to the question in dispute; (21) for if it only be in some trifling collateral

circumstance, to which no regard is paid, it is no more penal than in the voluntary

extra-judicial oaths before mentioned. Subornation of perjury is the ofieuce of

procuring another to *take such a false oath, as constitutes perjury in the r*ioo-i

principal. (22) The punishment of perjury and subornation, at common >- -I

law, has been various. It was anciently death; afterwards banishment, or cutting

•out the tongue; then forfeiture of goods; and now it is fine and imprisonment, and

never more to be capable of bearing testimony.^) But the statute of 5 Eliz.

c. 9 (if the offender be prosecuted thereon), inflicts the penalty of perpetual in-

famy, and a fine of iOl. on the suborner: and, in default of payment, imprison-

ed 3 lost. 163.

administered must have competent authority to receive it. And, therefore, no false swearing

before individuals acting merely in a private capacity, or before officers who have no legal

jurisdiction to administer the particular oath in question, will amount to the offence of per-

jury. 3 Inst. 166. And though the officer stands colorably in the situation which confers a

power of receiving an oath on such an occasion, if in fact he in not duly appointed, the pro-

ceeding* will be of no avail: id.; 3 Campb. 432 ; Wood's lust. 435; for though it is sufficient

prima facie to show the ostensible capacity in which he acted when the oath was taken the pre-

sumption may be rebutted by other evidence, and the defendant, if he succeed, will be entitled

to an acquittal. [3 C'ampb. 432; see id. 96. ]
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And mere negligence or carelessness In swearing to the witness's belief, when proper pains

would have enabled him to ascertain the troth to ne otherwise, seems not to be perjury, inas-

much as the specific wilful intent is wanting. U. S. v. Shelluiire, 1 Bald. 378; 0. S. c. Bab-

cock, 4 McLean, 113 ; State v. Cockran, 1 Bailey, 50. See State v. Lea, 3 Ala. 602; Common-

wealth t'. Brady, 5 Gray, 78.

(20) [If a man swears that he lj,-lirrrn that to be true which he knows to be false, he swears as

absolutely, and is as criminal, in point of law, as if he hod made a positive assertion that the

fact was as he swore he believed it to be. 3 Wils. 427 ; 2 Bla. Eep. 881; 1 Leach, 242; Hawk,

b. 1, c. <>9, s. 7, n. a. The false swearing, however, as to the legal operation of a deed is not

indictable. 1 Esp. Rep. 280.]

Oil) [If the subject matter is entirely foreign to the purpose, not tending either to extenuate

or increase the damages or the guilt, nor likely to induce the jury to give a more easy credit to

the substantial part of the evidence, the party will not be liable to an indictment. Hawk. b.

1, c. 69, s. 8. To swear falsely as to the character of a witness is sufficiently material. Com.

Rep. 43; 1 Ld. Rayin. 258. And in general it is sufficient if the matter be circumstantially

material to the issue, or affect the ultimate decision. 1 Ld. liny in. 258 ; 2 id. 889; 2 Roll R.

369. Thus perjury may be permitted by falsely swearing that another witness is entitled to

credit, if such assertion conduce to the p'roof of the point in issue. 1 Ld. Raym. 858. And it is

certain, that tbere is no necessity that the false evidence should be sufficient to render the party

on whose behalf it is given successful, but it will suffice if that is its evident tendency : 2 Lxi.

Rayrn. 889 ; or if in a civil action it has the effect of increasing or extenuating the damages,

riHHiiti' K> mlili: Wood's Inst. 435. In a late case, in an indictment for perjury, in an answer

in chancery to a bill filed against the defendant for the specific performance of tin agreement

relating to the purchase of land, the defendant had relied on the statute of frauds (the agree-

ment not being in writing), and had also denied having ever entered into such an agreement,

and upon this denial be was indicted; but it was held that the denial of an agreement, which

by the statute of frauds was not binding on the parties, was immaterial and irrelevant, and not

indictable. 1 Ry. and M. 109.

To constitute perjury at common law, it is not necessary that the false oath should obtain

any credit, or occasion any actual injury to the party agaiust whom the evidence is given;

for the prosecution is not grounded on the inconvenience which an individual may sustain, but

on the abuse and insult to public justice. 2 Leon. 211; 3 id. 230 ; 7 T. R. 315.

In some cases, where a false oath has been taken, the party may be prosecuted by indictment

at common law, though the offence may not amount to perjury. Thus it appears to have been

holdeu that any person making or knowingly using, any false affidavit taken abroad (though a

perjury could not be assigned on it here), in order to mislead our courts of justice, is punishable

as a misdemeanor; and Lord Ellonborough, 0. J., said •' that he had not the least doubt that

any person making use of a false instrument, in order to prevent the due course of justice, was

guilty of an offence punishable by indictment." 8 East, 364; 2 Russ. 1759.]

(22) To render the offence of subornation of perjury complete, cither at common law or on

the statute, the false oath must be actually taken, and no abortive attempt to solicit will bring

the offender within its penalties. 3 Mod. 122; 1 Leach. 455, notes. But the criminal solicita-

tion to commit pcrjurv, though nnsuccossful, is a misdemeanor at common law, punishable not

onlv by fine and imprisonment, but by corporal and infamous punishment. 2 East Rep. 17 ; 1

HaWk. c. 19. s. 10; 6 East, 464.]
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ment for six months, and to stand with both ears nailed to the pillory. Perjury

itself is thereby punished with six months' imprisonment, perpetual infamy, and

a tine of 20£., or to have both ears nailed to the pillory. But the prosecution is

usually carried on for the offence at common law; especially as to the penalties

before inflicted, the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, snperadds a power for the court to

order the offender to be sent to the house of correction for a term not exceeding

seven years, or to be transported for the same period; and makes it felony with-

out benefit of clergy to return or escape within the time.(23) It has sometimes

been wished that perjury, at least upon capital accusations, whereby another's

life has been or might have been destroyed, was also rendered capital, upon a

principle of retaliation: as it is in all cases by the laws of France.(/<) And cer-

tainly the odiousness of the crime pleads strongly in behalf of the French law.

But it is to be considered, that there they admit witnesses to be heasd only on the

side of the prosecution, and use the rack to extort a confession from the accused.

In such a consitution, therefore, it is necessary to throw the dread of capital

punishment into the other scale, in order to keep in awe the witnesses for the

crown, on whom alone the prisoner's fate depends; so naturally does one cruel

law beget another. But corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile and per-

petual infamy, are more suited to the genius of the English law: where the fact

is openly discussed between witnesses on both sides, and the evidence for the

crown may be contradicted and disproved by those of the prisoner. Where

•-3, on-i *indced, the death of an innocent person has actually been the conse-
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•• J quence of such wilful perjury, it falls within the guilt of deliberate

murder, and deserves an equal punishment: which our ancient law in fact in-

flicted.^') But the mere attempt to destroy life by other means not being

capital, there is no reason that an attempt by perjury should; much less that

this crime should in all judicial cases be punished with death. For to multiply

capital punishments lessens their effect, when applied to crimes of the deepest

dye; and detestable as perjury is, it is not by any means to be compared with

some other offences, for which only death can be inflicted; and therefore it

seems already (except perhaps in the instance of deliberate murder by perjury)

very properly punished by our present law, which has adopted the opinion of

Cicero, (k) derived from the law of the twelve tables, " perjurii pana divina,

exitium ; humana, dcdecun."

17. Bribery is the next species of offence against public justice; which is

when a judge, or other person concerned in the administration of justice, takes

any undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office.(/) (24) In the East it

is the custom never to petition any superior for justice, not excepting their

kings, without a present. This is calculated for the genius of despotic coun-

tries; where the true principles of government are never understood, and it is

imagined that there is no obligation from the superior to the inferior, no rela-

tive duty owing from the governor to the governed. The Koman law, though

(fcJMontesq. Sp. L. b. -29 c. H. (<) Brllton, c. S. (t) De Leg, 2. 9. (1} 1 Haw. P C., 168.

(23.) [There is another circumstance which attends all convictions for perjury, though it

forms no part of the judgment at common law, the incapacity of the offender to bear testimony

as a witness. But when the indictment is (rained at common law, a p»rdim under the great senl

restores the competency, which the conviction destroyed . 1 Vent. 1149; 4 Harg. St. Tr. ti*J;

1 Esp. Rep. 94; but where the proceedings are grounded on the 5 Eliz. c. 9, this cannot be done

without a reversal of the judgment, because it is here made a partoi the punishment prescribed.

1 Salk. 289; 5 Esp. Rep. 94. J For the punishment of the ofl'euces here mentioned, sec also

statutes 'JO and 21 vie. c. 3; 27 and 28 Vic. c. 47.

(24) [It is equally a crime to give as to receive, and in many eases the attempt itself is an

offence complete on the side of him who offers it. 4 Burr. 2500 ; 2 East, 5; Runs, and R. C. C.

107. Thus an attempt to bribe a privy counsellor to procure a reversionary pnteut of an office,

grantable by the king under the great seal, is indictable, though it did not succeed. 4 Burr.

§495; 2 Cainp. 231. An attempt to bribe at elections to parliament is criminal for the same

renson. 4. Burr. 2500,; and see ante, book 1, 179. So a promise of money to a corporator to

•vote for a member of a corporation is criminal: 2 Lord Kaym. 1377 ; 4 Burr. 2i>01; and the

offence is not. as the learned commentator supposes, confined to bribing judicial officers. Sec 1

East, 183 ; 4 Burr. 2494.1 See also Whart. C'r. L. « 2815.
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it contained many severe injunctions against bribery, as well for selling a

man's vote in the senate or other public assembly, as for the bartering of com-

mon justice, yet, by a strange indulgence in one instance, it tacitly encouraged

this practice: allowing the magistrate to receive small presents, provided they

did not in the whole exceed a hundred crowns in the year: (m) not considering

the insinuating nature and gigantic progress of this vice, when once admitted.

Plato therefore more wisely, in his ideal republic, (?z) ""orders those who r *i IQ -j

take presents for doing their duty to be punished in the severest man- >- ' '

ner: and by the laws of Athens he that offered was also prosecuted, as well as

he that received a bribe, (o) In England this offence of taking bribes is pun-

ished, in inferior officers, with line and imprisonment; and in those who otter a

bribe, though not taken, the same, (p) But in judges, especially the superior

ones, it ha'h been always looked upon as so heinous an offence, that the chief jus-

tice Thorpe was hanged for it in the reign of Edward III. By a statute (q) 11

Hen. IV, all judges and officers of the king, convicted of bribery, shall forfeit

treble the bribe, be punished at the king's will, and be discharged from the

king's service forever. (25) And some notable examples have been made in par-

liament, of persons in the highest stations, and otherwise very eminent and

able, contaminated with this sordid vice. (20)

18. Embracery is an attempt to influence a jury corruptly' to one side by

promises, persuasions, entreaties, money, entertainments, and the like, (r) The

punishment for the person embracing is by fine and imprisonment; and for the
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juror so embraced, if it be by taking money, the punishment is (by divers stat-

utes of the reign of Edward III) perpetual infamy, imprisonment for a year,

and forfeiture of the tenfold value. (27)

19. The false verdict of jurors, whether occasioned by embracery or not, was

anciently considered as criminal, and therefore exemplarily punished by attaint

in the manner formerly mentioned, (s)

20. Another offence of the same species is the negligence of public officers, in-

trusted with the administration of justice, as sheriffs, coroners, constables and

the like, which makes the offender liable to be fined; and in very notorious

cases will amount to a forfeiture of his office, if it be a beneficial one. (/) Also

the omitting to apprehend persons offering stolen *iron, lead and other r „,... -,

metals to sale, is a misdemeanor, dud punishable by a stated fine, or iui- >• -I

prisonmeut, in pursuance of the statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30.

21. There is yet another offence against public justice, which is a crime of

deep malignity; and so much the deeper, as there are many opportunities of

putting it in practice, and the power and wealth of the offenders may often deter

the injured from a legal prosecution. This is the oppression and tyrannical

partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the administration and

under the colour of their office. However, when prosecuted, either by impeach-

ment in parliament, or by in formation in the court of the king's bench (according

to the rank of the offenders), it is sure to be severely punished with forfeiture

of their offices (either consequential or immediate), fines, imprisonment, or other

discretionary censure, regulated by the nature and aggravations of the offence

committed. (28)

(m) Ff. 48, 11, 6. (n) Df Leg. 1. It. (ert Pott. Antin b. 1, o. 23. (p) 3 Inst. 147.

(.7) Ibid. 140. (r) 1 Hawk. F. C. 239. («) See book III, pp. 402, 403. «) 1 Hawk. P. C. 168.

(25) This statute is repealed by 26 and 27 Vic. o. 125.

(•M) [See the proceedings against Lord Bacon, 2 St. Tr. 1087, and against Lord Haoclesfield,

16 id. 767.]

(27) [By the 6 Geo. IT, c. 50. s. 61, the offence of embracery of jurors, and jurors wilfully

and corruptly consenting thereto, is punishable by fine and imprisonment.]

(28) [On motions for informations against magistrates, the question is, not whether the act

don« might on full investigation be found to bo strictly right, but whether it proceeded from

oppressive, dishonest, or corrupt motives (under which fear and favor may generally be in-

cluded), or from mistake or error; in either of the latter cases, the court will not grant a rule.

Bex ». Ban-on, 3 B. and A. 432. That case seems to lay down the general rule upon this sub-

ject clearly and definitively.]
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22. Lastly, extortion is an abuse of public justice, which consists in any

officer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money

or thing of value, that is not due to him, or more than is due. or before it is

due. («) The punishment is fine and imprisonment, and sometimes a forfeiture

of the office. (29)

CHAPTER XI.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE.

WE are next to consider offences against the public peace; the conservation

of which is intrusted to the king and his officers, in the manner and for the

reasons which were formerly mentioned at large, (a) These offences are either

such as are an actual breach of the peace: or constructively so, by tending to

make others break it. Both of these species are also either felonious, or not

felonious. The felonious breaches of the peace are strained up to that degree of

malignity by virtue of several modern statutes: and, particularly,

1. The riotous assembling of twelve (1) persons, or more, and not dispersing

upon proclamation. This was first made high treason by statute 3 and 4 Edw.

VI, c. 5. when the king was a minor, and a change in religion to be effected;

but that statute was repealed by the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, among the other treasons

created since the 25 Edw. Ill: though the prohibition was in substance re-

enacted, with an inferior degree of punishment, by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 12,

which made the same offence a single felony. These statutes specified and par-

ticularized the nature of the riots they were meant to suppress; as, for example,
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such as were set on foot with intention to offer violence to the privy council, or

to change the laws of the kingdom, or for certain other specific purposes: in

which cases, if the persons were commanded, by proclamation, to disperse, and

they did not, it was, by the statute of Mary, made felony, but within the benefit

F*143l °^ c^er&v' an<^ *also *-he act indemnified the peace officers and their

L J assistants, if they killed any of the mob in endeavoring to suppress such

riot This was thought a necessary security in that sanguinary reign, when

popery was intended to be re-established, which was likely to produce great

discontents: but at first it was made only for a year, and was afterwards con-

tinued for the queen's life. And, by statute 1 Eliz. c. 16, when a reformation

in religion was to be once more attempted, it was revived and continued during

her life also; and then expired. From the accession of James the First to the

death of Queen Anne, it was never once thought expedient to revive it: but, in

the first year of George the First, it was judged necessary, in order to support

the execution of the act of settlement, to renew it, and at one stroke to make it

perpetual, with large additions. For, whereas, the former acts expressly defined

and specified what should be accounted a riot, the statute 1 Geo. I, c. 5, enacts,

generally, that if any twelve persons are unlawfully assembled to the disturbance

of the peace, and any one justice of the peace, sheriff, under-sheriff, or mayor

of a town, shall think proper to command them, by proclamation, to disperse,

(u) 1 Hawk. P. C. 170. (n) Book I, pp. 118, 368, 390.

(89) Extorting an agreement to pay money or deliver something of value seems not suffi-

cient to make out the offence. Commonwealth r. Couy, 2 Haas. 523; Commonwealth >•.

Pease, 16 Mam. 91. Nor does the receiving of a reward voluntarily giren. State r. Stotts, 5

Blaekf. 460: Evans r. Trenton, 4 Zab. 764. A custom to take larger fees than the law per-

mits is no defence to the officer who has demanded and received them. Lincoln v. Shaw, 17

Mans. 410; Commonwealth v. Bagley, 7 Pick. 279. The taking must be wilful and corrupt.

State r. Gardner, 2 Mo. 22; People r. Coon, 15 Wend. 277.

(1) [It does not seem necessary that twelve perrons should have been guilty, to constitute a

riotous assembly within the acts. 6ee Doug. 1st ed. tiTH; id. 2d ed. 699; 5 T. R. 14; 2 Sannd.

377, b. n. 12.]
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if they contemn his orders and continue together for one hour afterwards, such

contempt shall be felony, without benefit of clergy. (2) And, farther, if the

reading of the proclamation be by force opposed, or the reader be in any man-

ner wilfully hindered from the reading of it, such opposers and hinderers are

felons, without benefit of clergy: and all persons to whom such proclamation

ought to have been made, and knowing of such hinderance, and not dispersing,

are felons, without benefit of clergy. There is the like indemnifying clause, in

case any of the mob be unfortunately killed in the endeavour to disperse them:

being copied from the act of Queen Mary. And, by a subsequent clause of the

new act, if any person, so riotously assembled, begin, even before proclamation,

to pull down any church, chapel, meeting-house, dwelling-house, or out-houses,

they shall be felons, without benefit of clergy. (3)

2. By statute 1 Hen. VII, c. 7, unlawful hunting in any legal forest, park, or

warren, not being the king's property, *by night, or with painted faces, r „.... -,

was declared to be single felony. But now, by the statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, "• '

to appear armed in any inclosed forest or place, where deer are usually kept, or

in any warren for hares or conies, or in any high road, open heath, common, or

down, by day or night, with faces blacked, or otherwise disguised, or (being so

disguised) to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, to rob a warren, or to steal

fish, or to procure, by gift or promise of reward, any person to^oin them in such

unlawful act, is felony, without benefit of clergy. (4) I mention these offences

in this place, not on account of the damage thereby done to private property,
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but of the manner in which that damage is committed: namely, with the face

blacked or with other disguise, and being armed with offensive weapons, to the

breach of the public peace and the terror of his majesty's subjects.

3. Also by the same statute, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, amended by statute 27 Geo, II, c.

15, knowingly to send any letter without a name, or with a fictitious name, demand-

ing money, venison, or any other valuable thing, or threatening (without any

demand) to kill any of the king's subjects, or to fire their houses, out-houses,

barns, or ricks, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (5) This offence was

formerly high treason by the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 6.

4. To pufl down or destroy any lock, sluice or floodgate, erected by authority of

parliament on a navigable river, is, by statute 1 Geo. II, st 2, c. 19, made

felony, punishable with transportation for seven years. By the statute 8 Geo.

II, c. 20, the offence of destroying such works, or rescuing any person in custody

for the same, is made felony without benefit of clergy; and it may be inquired

of and tried in any adjacent county, as if the fact had been therein committed.

By the statute 4 Geo. Ill, c, 12, maliciously to damage or destroy any

banks, sluices, or other works on such navigable river, to open the flood-gates

or otherwise obstruct the navigation, is again made felony, punishable with

transportation for seven years. And by statute 7 Geo. Ill, c. 40 *(which r „,,.. T

repeals all former acts relating to turnpikes), maliciously to pull down >- -I

or otherwise destroy any turnpike-gate or fence, toll-house or weighing engine

thereunto belonging, erected by authority of parliament, or to rescue any person

in custody for the same, is made felony without benefit of clergy; and the

indictment may be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county. (6) The

remaining offences against the public peace are merely misdemeanors and no

felonies; as,

5. Affrays (from affraier, to terrify) are the fighting of two or more persons

in some public place, to the terror of his majesty s subjects; for, if the fighting

(2) The punishment is now reduced to transportation or imprisonment (statute 1 Tic. c. 91, or

penal servitude may be substituted. Statute 16 and 17 Tic. c. 99.

(3) Subsequent statutes embrace other cases than these here mentioned, and the punishment

is mm- reduced to penal servitude.

(4) The statutes relating to these offences were repealedaiid consolidated by 7 and 8 Geo. IV,

ff 27 and 29, and the punishment greatly mitigated.

(5) This subject is covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. co. 9G, 97, 100.

(6) Upon the subject of this paragraph, gee statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 97.
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be in private, it is no affray, but an assault, (b) Affrays may be suppressed by

any private person present, who is justifiable ill endeavouring to part the com-

batants, whatever consequence may ensue, (c) But more especially the constable,

or other similar officer, however denominated, is bound to keep the peace; and

to that purpose may break open doors to suppress an affray, or apprehend the

affrayers; and may either carry them before a justice, or imprison them by his

own authority for a convenient space till the heat is over; and may then perhaps

also make them find sureties for the peace, (d) The punishment of common

affrays is by fine and imprisonment; the measure of which must be regulated

by the circumstances of the case; for, where there is any material aggravation,

the punishment proportionately increases. As where two persons coolly

and deliberately engage in a duel; this being attended with an apparent inten-

tion and danger of murder, and being a high contempt of the justice of the

nation, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief has actually

ensued, (e) Another aggravation is when thereby the officers of justice are

disturbed in the due execution of their office : or where a respect to the partic-

ular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in com-

mon ones; as in the king's court and the like. And upon the same account

r „, .g -1 also all affrays in a church or church-yard are esteemed very *heiuous

L J offences, as being indignities to him to whose service those places are

consecrated. Therefore mere quarrelsome words, which are neither an affray

nor an offence in any other place, are penal here. For it is enacted by statute
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5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 4, that if any person shall, by words only, quarrel, chide, or

brawl, in a church or church-yard, the ordinary shall suspend him, if a layman,

ab inyressn ecclesiw; and, if a clerk in orders, from the ministration of his office

during pleasure. And if any person in such church or church-yard proceeds to

emite or lay violent hands upon another, he shall be excommunicated ipso facto;

or if he strikes him with a weapon, or draws any weapon, with intent to strike,

he shall, besides excommunication (being convicted by a jury), have one of his

ears cut off: or, having no ears, be branded with the letter P in his cheek. (?)

Two persons may be guilty of an affray: but,

6. Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, must have three persons at least to

constitute them. An unlawful assembly is when three or more do assemble

themselves together to do an unlawful act, as to pull down enclosures, to destroy

a warren or the game therein; and part without doing it, or making any motion

towards it. (/) (8) A rout is where three or more meet to do an unlawful act

upon a common quarrel, as forcibly breaking down fences upon a right claimed of

common or of way; and make some advances towards it. (jj) A riot is where three

or more actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with or without a common

(b) 1 ITawk. P. C. 134. (c) Ibid. 138. (d) Ibid. 137. fej Ibid. 138. (f) 3 Inst. 176.

(gj lira. Abr. t. Riot, 4, 5.

(7) A clergyman may be guilty of brawling who addresses a public reproof to a parisher

during his sermon, without any just cause or provocation, and with great warmth of passion, and

a loud voice. Cox v. Goodday, 2 Hagg. Cons. 13d. On this subject, see statute 23 and 24 Vic.

c. 32.

The statute 5 Edw. TI, c. 4, so far as relates to the punishment of persons convicted of striking

with any weapon, or drawing any weapon with intent to strike, as therein mentioned, was re-

pealed by 9 Geo. IT, c. 31, s. 1. And so far as relates to persons not in holy orders, it was re-

pealed by statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 32, s. 5.

(8) [An assembly of a man's friends for the defence of his person against those who threaten

to beat him if he go to such a market, <fcc., is unlawful, for he who is in fear of such insults

must provide for his safety by demanding the surety of the peace against the persons by

whom he is threatened, and not make use of such violent methods which cannot but be

attended with the danger of raising tumults and disorders, to the disturbance of the public peace.

But an assembly of a man's friends at his own house for the defence of the possession of it

against suoh as threaten to make an unlawful entry, or for the defence of his person against snch

as threaten to beat him in his house, is permitted by law. for a man's house is looked upon as his

iastle. Ho is not, however, to arm himself and assemble hia friends in defence of his close. 1

Kuss. 362.]
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cause or quarrel: (h) as if they beat a man ; or hunt and kill giime in another's

park, chase, warren, or liberty; or do any other unlawful act with force and

violence; or even do a lawful act, as removing a nuisance, in a violent and

tumultuous manner. (9) The punishment of unlawful assemblies, if to the

number of twelve, we have just now seen, may be capital, according to the cir-

cumstances that attend it; but, from the number of three to eleven, is by fine

and imprisonment only. The same is the case in riots and routs by the com-

mon law; to *which the pillory (10) in very enormous cases has been r *-. ,„ -,

sometimes superadded. (i) And by the statute 13 Hen. IV, c. 7, any L J

two justices, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the county, may come

with the posse comitatus, if need be, and suppress any such riot, assembly, or

rout, arrest the rioters, and record upon the spot the nature and circumstances

of the whole transaction ; which record alone shall be a sufficient conviction of

the offenders. In the interpretation of which statute it hath been holden, that

all persons, noblemen and others, except women, clergymen, persons decrepit,

and infants under fifteen, are bound to attend the justices in suppressing a riot,

upon pain of fine and imprisonment; and that any battery, wounding, or kill-

ing the rioters, that may happen in suppressing the riot, is justifiable. (/) So

that our ancient law, previous to the modern riot act, seems pretty well to have

guarded against any violent breach of the public peace; especially as any riot-

ous assembly on a public or general account, as to redress grievances or pull down

all enclosures, and also resisting the king's forces if sent to keep the peace, may
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amount to overt acts of high treason, by levying war against the king.

7. Xearly related to this head of riots is the offence of tumultuous petition-

ing; which was carried to an enormous height in the times preceding the grand

rebellion. Wherefore by statute 13 Car. II, st. 1, c. 5, it is enacted, that not

more than twenty names shall be signed to any petition to the king or either

house of parliament, for any alteration of matters established by law in church

or state; unless the contents thereof be previously approved, in the country, by

three justices, or the majority of the grand jury at the assizes or quarter

sessions; and, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen and common council, (k)

and that no petition shall be delivered by a company of more than ten persons;

on pain *in either case of incurring a penalty not exceeding 100Z. and r »j^g -,

three months' imprisonment (11) *• " '

(A) 3 Inst. 176. (0 1 Hawk. P. C. 1!». (j) 1 Hal. 1'. C. 495. 1 Hawk. P. C. 161.

(i) This may be one reason (among others why tho corporation of London has, since the Restoration,

usually taken the lead in petitions to parliament for Clio alteration of any established lair.

(9) [To constitute a riot, the parties must act without any authority to give color to their

proceedings, for a sheriff, constable, or even a private individual, are not only permitted, but

enjoined, to raise a number of people to suppress riots, <fcc. 2 Hawk. c. 65, 8. 2. The inten-

tion also with which the parties assemble, or at least act, must be unlawful, for if a sudden

disturbance arise among persons met together for an innocent purpose, they will be guilty of

a mere affrar, though if they form parties, and engage in any violent proceedings, with promises

of mutual assistance ; or if they are impelled with a sudden disposition to demolish a house or

other building, there can be no doubt they are rioters, and will not be excused by the propriety

ill' their original design. 2 Hawk. c. 65. s. 3. But though there must be an evil intention,

whether premeditated or otherwise, the object of the riot itself maybe perfectly lawful; as

to obtain entry into lands to which one of the parties has a rightful claim, tor the law will not,

a* we have before seen, (ante, book 3, 5 n. 4), suffer private individuals to disturb the peace,

br obtaining that redress by force which the law would regularly award them. 2 Hawk. c. 65,

s."7; HT. K. 357, 364.

Women are punishable as rioters, but infants under the age of discretion are not. 1 Hawk.

c. 65. s. 44. In a riot all are principals, and therefore if any person encourages or promotes,

or takes part in a riot, whether by words, signs, or gestures, or by wearing the badge or ensign

of the rioters, he is himself to be considered a rioter. 2 Camp. 370.]

For a discussion of the general nature of this offence, see 2 Bish. Or. L. $ 954, et seq.; 1 Russ.

on Crimes, 266.

(10) Since abolished. And for the statutes for the punishment of riots, routs, <fco., see 24 and

25 Vic. cc. 96, 97 and 100.

(11) See lies. v. Lord George Gordon, Doug. 592.
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8. An eighth offence against the public peace is that of a forcible entry or

detainer; which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of lands

and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without the authority of law.

This was formerly allowable to every person disseised, or turned out of posses-

sion, unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own neglect, or other cir-

cumstances ; which were explained more at large in a former book. (7) But this

being found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought necessary by sev-

eral statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such violent methods," eveu

of doing themselves justice; and much more if they have no justice in their

claim, (in) So that the entry now allowed by law is a peaceable one ; that for-

bidden is such as is carried on and maintained with force, with violence, and

unusual weapons. By the statute 5 Eic. II, st. 1, c. 8, all forcible entries are

punished with imprisonment and ransom at the king's will. And by the sev-

eral statutes of 15 Eic. II, c. 2, 8 Hen. VI, c. 9, 31 Eliz, c. 11, and 21 Jac. I, c. 15,

upon any forcible entry, or forcible detainer after peaceable entry, into any lauds,

or benefices of the church, one or more justices of the peace, taking sufficient

power of the county, may go to the place, and there record the force upon his

own view, as in case of riots ; and upon such conviction may commit theoflender

to gaol, till he makes fine and ransom to the king. And moreover the justice

or justices have power to summon a jury to try the forcible entry or detainer

complained of: and if the same be found by that jury, then, besides the fine on

the offender, the justices shall make restitution by the sheriff of the possession,
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without inquiring into the merits of the title : for the force is the only thing to

be tried, punished, and remedied by them : and the same may be done by in-

dictment at the general sessions. But this provision does not extend to such as

r*14Q 1 enc*eavour t° maintain possession by force, where they *themselves, or

' -" their ancestors, have been in the peaceable enjoyment of the lauds and

tenements for three years immediately preceding, (n) (12)

9. The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons,

is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land ;

and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. Ill, c. 3,

upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the king's pleas-

ure in like manner, as by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was finable who

walked about the city in armour, (o)

10. Spreading false news, to make discord between the king and nobility, or

concerning any great man of the realm, is punishable by common law (p) "with

fine and imprisonment; which is confirmed by statutes Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c.

34, 2 Eic. II, st. 1, c. 5, and 12 Eic. II, c. 11.

11. False and pretended prophecies, with intent to disturb the peace, are equally

unlawful, and more penal; as they raise enthusiastic jealousies in the people, and

terrify them with imaginary fears. They are therefore punished by our law,

upon the same principle that spreading of public news of any kind, without com-

municating it first to the magistrate, was prohibited by the ancient Gauls, (q)

Such false and pretended prophecies were punished capitally by statute 1 Edw.

IV, c. 12, which was repealed in the reign of Queen Mary. And now by the

statute 5 Eliz. c. 15, the penalty for the first offence is a fine often pounds and

one year's imprisonment; for the second, forfeiture of all goods and chattels,

and imprisonment during life.

F*1"01 *^° Besides actii!il breaches of the peace, any thing that tends to

L ° J provoke or excite others to break it, is an offence of the same denomina-

flj See book III, page 174, Ac. (m) 1 Hawk. P. C. 141.

(n; HoMing over hv force, where the tonant'n title mu tmilcra le«5o, now expired, is said to be a forci-

ble iluinlner. f<Jro. Jnc. 19!).;

(o) I'otl. Antiq. 1>. 1. c. 88. (p) 2 Inst. KM. 3 Inst. 1!)8.

(<j) • ' ftubent leylbtis x<in<-.tumt si quit qtti'i de repttblicu ti flnitimis rwmore ant frtmri accepfrit. vti orf

.

trntumrltferat, nerc cum alia communiceti i/itnd atepe Itomiitet temernrlot itique imperitol/altit mnorilnii (er-

itri,vtadfuci*utimpelll. et dt *ummlji rebus consUiitm caperKcot/iiittim c*t." (.]:*•-. r!r I, :•!!. CkUl. Kb. 6, cup. 19.

(1'2) [A forcible entry and detainer is indictable at common la\v. R. v. "Wilson, 8 T. R. SoT.

per Piirke, U.: Harvey c. Brydgos, 14 M. and W. 442 ; R. c. Sinrth. 5C. and P. 201.] Stv,

also. State c. Wilson, 3 Mo. 125 ; Com. v. Shattuck. 4 Cash. 141 ; Henderson's Case, 8 GraU 7ri9
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tion. Therefore, challenges to fight, either by word or letter, or to be the bearer

of such a challenge, are punishable by fine and imprisonment, according to the

circumstances of the offence, (r) (13) If this challenge arises on account of any

money won at gaming, or if any assault or affray happens upon such account,

the offender, by statute 9 Ann. c. 14, shall forfeit all his goods to the crown, and

suffer two years' imprisonment.

13. Of a nature very similar to challenges are libels, libelli famosi, which, taken

in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures, or the

like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the sense under which we are

now to consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and especially

a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order

to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridi-

cule, (s) (14) The direct tendency of these libels is the breach of the public

peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps to bloodshed.

The communication of a libel to any one person is a publication in the eye of the

law: (t) and therefore the sending an abusive private letter to a man is as much a

libel as if it were openly printed, for it equally tends to a breach of the peace.(«<)

For the same reason it is immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether

the matter of it be true or false; (v) since the provocation, and not the falsity, is

the thing to be punished criminally: though doubtless, the falsehood of it may

aggravate its guilt and enhance its punishment. In a civil action, we may re-

member, a libel must appear to be false, as well as scandalous; («?) for, if the
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charge be true, the plaintiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to

demand a compensation for himself, whatever *offenceit may be against r#,... -i

the public peace; and therefore, upon a civil action, the truth of the ac- L J

cusation may be pleaded in bar of the suit, But, in a criminal prosecution, the

tendency which all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public

peace, is the whole that the law considers. And, therefore, in such prosecutions,

the only points to be inquired into are. first, the making or publishing of the

book or writing: and, secondlv, whether the matter be criminal: and, if both

these points are against the defendant, the offence against the public is complete.

The punishment of such libellers, for either making, repeating, printing, or pub-

lishing the libel, is fine, and such corporal punishment as the court in its discre-

tion shall inflict: regarding the quantity of the offence, and the quality of the

offender, (x) By the law of the twelve fables at Rome, libels, which affected the

reputation of another, were made a capital offence: but, before the reign of

Augustus, the punishment became corporal only, (y) Under the emperor Valen-

tinian (z) it was again made capital, not only to write, but to publish, or even to

omit destroying them. Our law, in this and many other respects, corresponds

rather with the middle age of Roman jurisprudence, when liberty, learning and

humanity were in their full vigour, than with the cruel edicts that were estab-

lished in the dark and tyrannical ages of the ancient decemviri, or the later

emperors.

(r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 135, 138. (i) \ Hawk P. C. 193. (t) Moor. 818.

(u) 2 Krownl. 115. 12 itcp. 35. Hob. 251. I'd)ill. 139. 1 Hawk. P. C. 195. (vi Moor, 627. 6 Rep. 125.

11 Mod. «l.

(vi) Sec book HI, page 125. (x) 1 Hawk. P.C. 196.

(yj QtAnetiam lex

Pofnaqite lata, mrtJn quit mtlht carmine iptenqutim

Describi < rcrttre moiltim formaline I'usus.—Hor. ad Aug. 152.

(zj Cull. U 36.

'\'X) fThe offences of fighting duels, an

bv'

It is ail offence, though the provocation to light do not succeed . 6 East, 464 ; 2 Smith, 550: and

it is a misdemeanor merely to endeavor to provoke another to send a challenge. 6 East, 4(>4.

Hut mere words which, though they may produce a challenge, do not directly tend to that issue,

as calling a man a liar, or knave, are not necessarily criminal: 2 Lord Raym. 1031; 6 East,

471; though it is probable they would be so if it could be shown that they were meant to pro-

voke a challenge.]

(14) [Though it has been held, at least for these two centuries, that the truth of a libel is no

justification in a criminal prosecution, yet in many instances it is considered an extenuation of
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In this and the other instances which we have lately considered, where blas-

phemous, immoral, treasonable, scliismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are

punished by the English law, some with a greater, others with a less, degree of

severity; the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed

or violated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free

state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and

r*1~2l *n°t in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Ev-

L J ery freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases

before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if

he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the conse-

the offence; and the court of king's bench has. laid down this general rule, viz. that it will not

grunt an information for a libel, unless tho prosecutor, who applies for it, makes an affidavit,

averting directly and pointedly that he is innocent of the charge imputed to him. But this

rule may be dispensed with, if the person libelled resides abroad, or if the imputation* of the

libel are general and indefinite, or il it is a charge against the prosecutor for language which

lie has held in parliament. Doug. 271. 372.

It had frequently been determined by the conrt of king's bench, that the only questions for

the consideration of the jury, in criminal prosecutions for libels, were the fact of publication

and the truth of the innnendos, that is, the truth of the meaning and sense of the passages of

th" libel, as stated and averred in the record, and that the judge or court alone were competent

to determine whether the subject of the publication was or was uot» libel. Seethecaseof

the dean ol St. Asaph, 3 T. K. 423. lint the legality of this doctrine having been much con-
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troverted, the 32 Geo. Ill, c. 60, was passed, entitled, "An act to remove doubts respecting the

function* of juries in cases of libels." And it declares and enacts that, on every trial of an in-

dictment or information for a libel, the jury may give a general verdict of guilty, or not guilty,

upon the whole matter in issue, and shall not lie required or directed by the judge to find the

defendant guilty, merely on the proof of the publication of the paper charged to be a libel,

niid of the seu.se ascribed to it in the record. But the statute provides, that the judge may give

his opinion to the jury respecting the matter in issue, and the jury may at their discretion, as

in other cases, find a special verdict, and the defendant, if convicted, may move tue court, as

before the statute, in arrest of judgment.

A person may bo punished for a libel reflecting on the memory and character of the dead,

but it must bo alleged, and proved to the satisfaction of the jury," that the author intended by

the publication to bring dishonor and contempt on the relations and descendants of the de-

ceased. 4 T. R. 126.

It is not a libel to publish a correct copy of the reports or resolutions of the two houses of

parliament, or a true account of tho proceedings of a court of justice. ''For though," as Mr.

Justice Lawrence has well observed, " the publication of such proceedings may bo to tho disad-

vantage of the particular individual concerned, yet it is of vast importance to the public that

the proceedings of courts of justice should be universally known. The general advantage to

tho country in haying these proceedings made public more than counterbalances the incon-

venience to the private persona whose conduct may be the subject of such proceedings." Res v.

Wright, 3 T. R. 293.

But this will not apply to the publication of part of a trial, before it is finally concluded ; for

that might enable the friends of the parties to pervert tho justice of the court by the fabrication

of evidence, and other impure practices.

Xor ought it to extend to the publication of trials, where indecent evidence must from ne-

cessity be introduced ; for it would be in vain to turn wonion and children out of court, if they

arc afterwards permitted to read what has passed in their absence.]

The act above mentioned in this note is what is known as Mr. Fox's Libel Act, and was passed

to put an end to a violent controversy in which the judges wore charged with perverting the

common law. A still more recent statute (6 and 7 Vic. c. 96, s. 6) provides that on the trial

of any indictment or information for libel, the defendant having properly pleaded, the truth

of the matter charged may be inquired into, but shall not amount to a defence unless it was

lor the public benefit that the matter charged should be published; and to enable the defendant

to give the truth in evidence as a defunce, he nmst in pleading allege the truth of such matters,

:ind that it was for the public benefit that tho matters charged should be published; and if after

such plea the defendant is convicted, the court may, in pronouncing sentence, consider whether

The guilt of tho defendant is aggravated or mitigated by the plea. The defendant in addition

may'plead not guilty.

In tne United States generally the truth of the alleged libellous matter is made a defence

where the publication is made with good motives and for justifiable ends. See Townsend on

Slander and Libel; 2 Bish. Cr. L. ? $ 783. 815; WTiart. Or. L. $ 2525, et. itcq.; Cooley Const. Urn.

<!^4, 436, 464. And as to what shall establish good motives and justifiable ends, see King v.

Knot, 4 Wcud. 121; Commonwealth v. Bonuer, 9 Met. 410; Regina v. Newman, 1 El. and "BI.

2!5rf and 558; Bartheleuiy v. People, 2 Hill, 248; State v. White, 7 Ired. 180; Commonwealth ».

Suelliiig, 15 Pick. 337.
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quenoe of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a

licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the revolution, (a) is to sub-

ject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the

arbitrary and iufalliuble judge of all controverted points in learning, religion,

and government But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or

offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be

adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace

and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil

liberty. Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that

free-will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby liiid

npou freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still left;

the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends

of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a *fine r*i-Qi

writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but L J

not publicly to vend them as cordials. And to this we may add, that the only

plausible argument heretofore used for the restraining the just freedom of the

press, "that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of it," will entirely lose

its force, when it is shown (by a seasonable exertion of the laws) that the press

cannot be abused to any bad purpose without incurring a suitable punishment:

whereas it never can be used to any good one, when under the control of an

inspector. So true it will be found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to

maintain the liberty, of the press. (15)
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CHAPTER XIL

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRADE.

OFFENCES against public trade, like those of the preceding classes, are either

felonious, or not felonious. Of the first sort are,

1. Owling, so called from its being carried on in the night, which is the offence

of transporting wool or sheep out of this kingdom, to the detriment of its staple

manufacture. This was forbidden at common law, (a) and more particularly by

statute 11 Edw. Ill, c. 1, when the importance of our woolen manufacture "was

first attended to ; and there are now many later statutes relating to this offence,

the most useful and principal of which are those enacted in the reign of Queen

Elizabeth and since. The statute 8 Eliz. c. 3, makes the transportation of live

sheep, or embarking them on board any ship, for the first offence forfeiture of

(oi The art or printing, soon ;i HIM- its introduction, was looked upon (as well in England as in other coun-

tries) as merely a matter of state, and subject to thecocrcion ofthe crown. It was therefore regulated with

as by the king's proclamations, prohibitions, charters of privileges and of licence, and, finally, by the

decrees of the court of star-chamber ; which limited the number of printers, and presses which each should

employ, and prohibited new publications, unless previously approved by proper licensers. On the demoli-

tion of this odious jurisdiction in 1641, the long parliament of Charles I, after their rupture with th:it prince,

assumed the same powers as the star-chamber exercised with respect to the licensing of books ; and i n 11; i:;,

if.17. 1X49. ami 1652 (Scobell, i, 44, l:;i ; ii, 88,130], issued their ordinances tor that purpose, founded princi-

pally on the star-chamber decree of 1637. In 1GB2 waspnssed the statute 13 and H Car. U, c. 33, which I with

some few alterations) was copied from the parliamentary ordinances. This act expired in 1671), but was

revived bv statute 1 Jac. II, c. 17, and continued till IDiiS. It was then continued for two years longer by

.Btatute 4 W. and AI. c. 24 ; but though frequent attempts were made by the government to revive it, in the

subsequent part of the reign : Com. Jonrn. 11 Feb. 16U4 ; 26 Nov. 1895 ; « Oct. 1698 ; a Feb. 1087 : 81 Jan.

IfiSW ; yet the parliament resisted it so strongly that it fiually expired, and the press became properly

free, in 1B»4; and has ever since so continued.

(a) Mir. c. 1. i 3.

(15) It may well be doubted, however, if attempts to restrain the licentiousness of the press

through criminal prosecutions ever served a beneficial purpose. The attempt by the govern-

ment «f the United States, by means of the " Sedition Act," during the administration of

the fust Adams, was so conspicuous and mortifying a failure, that it is not likely to be soon re-

peated. The excesses of the press seem to be best restrained by public sentiment, and by the

infliction of damages at the hands of a jury where private character is unjustly assailed,
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goods, and imprisonment for a year, and that at the end of the year the left hand

shall be cut off in some public market, and shall be there nailed up in the openest

place; and the second offence is felony. The statutes 12 Car. II, c. 32, and 7 and

8 Win. Ill, c. 28, make the exportation of wool, sheep, or fuller's earth, liable to

pecuniary penalties, and the forfeiture of the interest of the ship and cargo by

the owners, if privy, and confiscation of goods, and three year's imprisonment

to the master and all the mariners. And the statute 4 Geo. I, c. 11 (amended

I *155 1 ?n(* ^artner ent'orced by 12 Geo. *II, c. 21, and 19 Geo. Ill, c. 34), makes

' ' -I it transportation for seven years if the penalties be not paid. (1)

2. Smuggling, or the offence of importing goods without paying the duties

imposed thereon by the laws of the custom and excise, is an offence generally

connected and carried on hand in hand with the former. This is restrained by

a great variety of statutes, which inflict pecuniary penalties and seizure of the

goods for clandestine smuggling; and affix the guilt of felony, with transpor-

tation for seven years, upon more open, daring, and avowed practices: but the

last of them, 19 Geo. II, c. 34, is for this purpose instar omnium; for it makes

all forcible acts of smuggling, carried on iu defiance of the laws, or even in

disguise to evade them, felony without benefit of clergy : enacting, that if three

or more persons shall assemble, with fire-arms or other offensive weapons, to

assist in the illegal exportation or importation of goods, or in rescuing the same

after seizure, or in rescuing offenders in custody for such offences; or shall pass

with such goods in disguise; or shall wound, shoot at, or assault any officers of
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the revenue when in the execution of their duty; such persons shall be felons

without the benefit of clergy. As to that branch of the statute which required

any person, charged upon oath as a smuggler, under pain of death to surrender

himself upon proclamation, it seems to be expired; as the subsequent statutes, (b)

which continue the original act to the present time, do in terms continue only

so much of the said act as relates to the punishment of the offenders, and not to

the extraordinay method of apprehending or causing them to surrender: and

for offences of this positive species, where punishment (though necessary) is

rendered so by the laws themselves, which by imposing high duties on commodi-

ties increase the temptation to evade them, we cannot surely be too cautious in

inflicting the penalty of death, (c) (2)

r+i-fl-i *3. Another offence against public trade is fraudulent baiikrupfcy,

L ° J which was sufficiently spoken of in a former volume; (d) I shall there-

fore now barely mention the several species of fraud taken notice of by the

statute law, viz: the bankrupt's neglect of surrendering himself to his credit-

ors; his non-conformity to the directions of the several statutes; his concealing

or embezzling his effects to the value of 201.; and his withholding any books or

writings with intent to defraud his creditors: all of which the policy of our com-

mercial country has made felony without benefit of clergy, (c) (3) And indeed

it is allowed by such as are the most averse to the infliction of capital punish-

ment, that the offence of fraudulent bankruptcy, being an atrocious species of

the crimenfalsi, ought to be put upon a level with those of forgery and falsify-

ing the coin. (/) And, even without actual fraud, if the bankrupt cannot make

it appear that he is disabled from paying his debts by some casual loss, he shall

by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 19, be set on the pillory for two hours, with one of

Ins ears nailed to the same, and cut off. To this head we may also subjoin,

that by statute 32 Geo. II, c. 28, it is felony, punishable by transportation for

seven years, if a prisoner, charged in execution for any debt under 100?., neg-

(i) Stnt 28 Geo. I. c. 32. 32 Geo. II, c. 18. 4 Geo. VI, o. IS. (c) Soe book I, p. 317. Beccar. c. 33.

(d) Hec book II, pag« 4S1, 483. (e) Stat. 6 Geo. II, c. 30. (fi Beccar. c. 34.

(1) These statutes are since repealed.

(2) The present law on this subject is in 16 and 17 Tic. c. 107. The punishments are greatly

mitigated.

(3) The previous statutes on the subject of bankruptcy were superseded by the new bank-

rupt law which took effect Jan. 1, 1870. The penalties are now much less severe than those

specified in the text.
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lects or refuses on demand to discover and deliver up his effects for the benefit

of his creditors. And these are the only felonious offences against public trade;

the residue being mere misdemeanors: as,

4. Usury, which is an unlawful contract upon the loan of money, to receive

the same again with exorbitant increase. Of this also we had occasion to dis-

course at large in a former volume, (g) We there observed that by statute 37

Hen. VIII, c. 9, the rate of interest was fixed at IQl.per cent.per annum, which

the statute 13 Eliz. c. 8, confirms: and ordains that all brokers shall be guilty

of a prcemunire that transact any contracts for more, and the securities them

selves shall be void. The statute 21 Jac. I, c. 17, reduced interest to eight per

cent.; and, it having been lowered in 1650, during the usurpation, to six per

cent., the same reduction was re-enacted after the restoration by statute 12 Car.

II. c. 13; and, lastly, the statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 16, has reduced it to live per cent.

Wherefore, not only all contracts for taking more are in themselves totally void,

but also the lender shall forfeit treble the *money borrowed. (4) Also, r *.. .„ ->

if any scrivener or broker hikes more than five shillings per cent, pro- L J

cu ration money, or more than twelvepence for making a bond, he shall forfeit

201., with costs, and shall suffer imprisonment for half a year. And by statute

17 Geo. Ill, c. 26, to take more than t«n shillings per cent, for procuring any

money to be advanced on any life-annuity, is made an indictable misdemeanor,

and punishable with fine and imprisonment: as is also the offence of procuring

or soliciting any infant to grant any life-annuity; or to promise, or otherwise
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engage, to ratify it when he comes of age.

5. Cheating is another offence, more immediately against public trade; as

that cannot be carried on without a punctilious regard to common honesty,

and faith between man and man. Hither, therefore, may be referred that pro-

digious multitude of statutes, which are made to restrain and punish deceits in

particular trades, and which are enumerated by Hawkins and Burn, but are

chiefly of use among the traders themselves. The offence also of breaking the

assize of bread, or the rules laid down by the law, and particularly by the stat-

utes 31 Geo. II, c. 29, 3 Geo. Ill, c. 11, and 13 Geo. Ill, c. 62, for ascertaining its

price in every given quantity, is reducible to the head of cheating; as is like-

wise in a peculiar manner the offence of selling by false weight* and measures ;

the standard of which fell under our consideration in a former volume, (h) The

punishment of bakers breaking the assize was anciently to stand in the pillory,

by statute 51 Hen. Ill, st. 6, and for brewers (by the same act) to stand in the

tumbrel or dungcart: (t) which, as we learn from domesday book, was the pun-

ishment for knavish brewers in the city of Chester, so early as the reign of

Edward the Confessor. " Malam cerevisiam faciens, in cathedra ponebatur

stercoris." (;) But now the general punishment for all frauds *of this r *i 50 n

kind, if indicted (as they may be) at common law, is by fine and im- *- •"

prisoument: though the easier and more usual way is by levying on a sum-

mary conviction, by distress and sale, the forfeitures imposed by the several acts

of parliament. Lastly, any deceitful practice, in cozening another by artful

means, whether in matters of trade or otherwise, as by playing with false dice,

or the like, is punishable with fine, imprisonment, and pillory.( k) (5) And by

the statutes 33 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 30 Geo. II, c. 24, if any man defrauds

(a) Sec book II, paere l.vi. &c. (A) Sec book I. page 274. (<) 3 lost. 219.

(jl Sold. tit. of Hori. b. 2, c. 8, { 2. ft) 1 Hawk. P. C. 188.

(4) Securities are no longer void for usury Stat. 17&18 Vic. c. 90.

As to usury in general, see book 2, 455, et seq.

(5) [Pillory is now abolished hy the 56 Geo. Ill, c. 138. See in general, 3 Chit. Cnra. Law,

994, 995. The cases in which fraud is indictable at common law seem confined to the use of

false weights and measures, the selling of goods with counterfeit marks, playing with false

dice, and frauds affecting the course of justice, and immediately injuring the interests pf^the

{ep. ft

public or crown: and it is settled that no mere fraud, not amounting to felony, is an indict-

able ofl'cnce at common law, unless it affects the public. 2 Burn. 1125; 1 Bla. Kep. 273, S. C.]
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another of any valuable chattels by colour of any false token, counterfeit letter,

or false pretence, or pawns or disposes of another's goods without the consent

of the owner, he shall suffer such punishment by imprisonment, fine, pillory,

transportation, whipping, or other corporal pain, as the court shall direct. (6)

6. The offence of forestalling the market is also an offence against public trade.

This, which (as well as the two following) is also an offence at common law, (I)

was described by statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, to be the buying or contract-

ing for any merchandise or victual coming in the way to market ; or dissuading

persons from bringing their goods or provisions there; or persuading them to

enhance the price, when there: any of which practices make the market dearer

to the fair trader. (7)

7. Regrating was described by the same statute to be the buying of corn, or

other dead victual, in any market, and selling it again in the same market, or

within four miles of the place. For this also enhances the price of the pro-

visions, as every successive seller must have a successive profit.

8. Engrossing was also described to be the getting into one's possession, or

buying up, large quantities of corn, or other dead victual, with intent to sell

them again. Ihis must of course be injurious to the public, by putting it in the

power of one or two rich men to raise the price of provision? at their own dis-

cretion. And so the total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent

F *159l ^° 8e^ ^ a^ an tlnreasoria':)le *pi'ice> is i"i offence indictable and finable

*• ' -• at the common law. (m) And the general penalty for these three offences
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by the common law (for all the statutes concerning them were repealed by 12

Geo. Ill, c. 71, is, as in other minute misdemeanors, discretionary fine and

imprisonment. (•«) Among the Romans these offences, and other mal-practices

to raise the price of provisions, were punished by a pecuniary mulct. " Ptena

viyinti aureorum statuitur adver&its eum, qui contra annonam facerit, societa-

temve coierit quo annona carior fiat." (o)

9. Monopolies are much the same offence in other branches of trade, that

engrossing is in provisions : being a license or privilege allowed by the king for

the sole buying and selling, making, working or using anything whatsoever;

whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manufacturing

or trading which he had before, (p) These had been carried to an enormous

height during the reign of Queen Elizabeth ; and were heavily complained of by

Sir Edward Coke, (q) in the beginning of the reign of King James the First:

but were in great measure remedied bv statute 21 Jac. I, c. 3, (8) which declares

such monopolies to be contrary to law and void (except as to patents, not

exceeding the grant of fourteen years, to the authors of new inventions ; and

except also patents concerning printing, saltpetre, gunpowder, great ordnance

and shot) ; and monopolists are punished with the forfeiture of treble damages

and double costs, to those whom they attempt to disturb; and if they procure

any action, brought against them for these damages, to be stayed by any extra-

judicial order, other than of the court wherein it is brought, they incur the

penalties of prcemunire. Combinations, also, among victuallers or artificers, to

raise the price of provisions, or any commodities, or the rate of labour, (9) are

(I) \ Hiwk. P. C. 234. (m) Cro. Car. 232. (») 1 Hawk P. C. 235. (o) FT. 18. 12. 2.

k. P. C.rfM. (?) 3 Inst. 131.

(6) By statute 24 and 25 Tic. c. 96, s. 88, "Whosoever shall, by any false pretence, obtain

from any other person any chattel, money or valuable security with intent to defraud, shall

be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, being convicted thereof, shall' be liable, at the discretion of

the court, to be kept in penal servitude for the term of three years, or be imprisoned for any

term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary con-

finement."

See, as to this offence, 2 Bish. Cr. L. ch. 32; 2 Russ. on Crimes, 286, et seq.

(7) This and the two following offences are now done away with by statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 24.

(H) Amended by statute 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 83. See also statute 7 and 8 Vic. c. 24.

(9) [By the 6 Geo. IV, c. 129, $ 1, all acts relative to combinations of workmen, or masters,

as to wages, time of work, quantity of work, Ac., are repealed. By section 2 persons com-
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in many cases severely punished by particular statutes; and in general by

statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI., c. 15, with the forfeiture of 10?., or twenty-one days,

imprisonment with an allowance of only bread and water, for the first offence;

20?. or the pillory, for the second; and *40?. for the third, or else the r *ir-r\-i

pillory, loss of one ear and perpetual infamy. In the same manner by a L •"

constitution of the Emperor Zeno,(r) all monopolies and combinations to keep

up the price of merchandise, provisions or workmanship, were prohibited upon

pain of forfeiture of goods and perpetual banishment

10. To exercise a trade in any town, without having previously served

as an apprentice for seven years, (*) is looked upon to be detrimental to public

trade, upon the supposed want of sufficient skill in the trader: and therefore is

punished by statute 5 Eliz. c. 4, with the forfeiture of forty shillings by the

month.(10)

11. Lastly, to prevent the destruction of our home manufactures by transport-

ing and seducing our artists to settle abroad, it is provided by statute 5 Geo. I,

c. 27, that such as so entice or seduce them shall be fined 100J., and be imprisoned

three months: and for the second offence shall be fined at discretion, and be

imprisoned a year: and the artificers, so going into foreign countries, and not

returning within six months after warning given them by the British ambassa-

dor where they reside, shall be deemed aliens, and forfeit all their land and goods,

and shall be incapable of any legacy or gift. By statute 23 Geo. II, c. 13, the

seducers incur, for the first offence, a forfeiture of 500/. for each artificer con-
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tracted with to be sent abroad, and imprisonment for twelve months: and for

the second 1,000?., and are liable to two years' imprisonment: and by the same

statute, connected with 14 Geo. Ill, c. 71, if any person exports any tools or

utensils used in the silk, linen, cotton, or woollen manufactures (except wool-

cards to North America), (£)he forfeits the same and 200?., and the captain of

the ship (having knowledge thereof) 100?.; and if any captain of a king's ship,

or officer of the customs, Knowingly suffers such exportation, he forfeits IOOL

and his employment; and is for ever made incapable of bearing any public office:

and every person collecting such tools or utensils, in order to export the same,

shall, on conviction at the assizes, forfeit such tools, and also 200?.(11)

(rj Cod. 4, 59, 1. (sj See liook I, page 427. (tj Stat. 15 Geo. Ill, c. 5.

pelling journeymen to leave their employment, or to return work unfinished, preventing them

from hiring themselves, compelling them to belong to clubs, <fcc., or to pay fines, or forcing

manufacturers to alter their mode of carrying on their business, are punishable with imprison-

ment, with or without hard labor, for three months. The remaining clauses provide for tho

mode of conviction of offenders before justices of the peace. For the form and requisites of

convictions for these offences under former acts of parliament, see Rex v. Nield, 6 East, 417;

Rex c. Ridgway, 1 D. and R. 123 ; 5 B. and A. 527 ; Paley on Convictions, 3d ed., by Dowling,

99 ct seq. By 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, s. 25, assaults in pursunuce of any conspiracy to raise tho rate

of wages, and section 26, assaults upon certain workmen to prevent them from working at their

trades, are punishable with imprisonment and hard labor.}

See amendatory statutes, 22 Vic. c. 34, and 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.

(10) The part of this statute here referred to was repealed by statute 54 Geo. Til, c. 96, R. 1.

(11) All statutes prohibiting artificers from going abroad are repealed by statute 5 Geo. IV,

c 97 and 6 and 7 Vic. c. 84.
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CHAPTER XIII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE

PUBLIC POLICE OH ECONOMY".

THE fourth species of offences more especially affecting the commonwealth,

are such as are against the public health of the nation ; a concern of the highest

importance, and for the preservation of which there are in many countries

special magistrates or curators appointed.

1. The first of these offences is a felony; but, by the blessing of Providence,

for more than a century past, incapable of being committed in this nation. For

by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 31, it is enacted, that if any person infected with the plague,

or dwelling in any infected house, be commanded by the mayor or constable, or

other head officer of his town or vill, to keep his house, and shall venture to

disobey it, he may be enforced, by the watchman appointed on such melancholy

occasions, to obey such necessary command: and if any hurt ensue by sucfi

enforcement, the watchmen are thereby indemnified. And farther, if such per-

son so commanded to confine himself goes abroad, and converses in company,

if lie has no plague sore upon him, he shall be punished as a vagabond by whip-

ping, and be bound to his good behaviour; but, if he has any infectious sore

upon him, uncnred, he then shall be guilty of felony. By the statute 26 Geo.

r*lG9 1 ^' c< 6 (explained and amended by 29 Geo. II, c." 8), the *method of

L -1 performing quarantine, or forty days' probation, by ships coming from

infected countries, is put in a much more regular and effectual order than form-
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erly, and masters of ships coming from infected places, and disobeying the

directions there given, or having the plague on board and concealing it, are

guilty of felon_y, without benefit of clergy. The same penalty also attends per-

sons escaping from the lazarets, or places wherein quarantine is to be performed;

and officers and watchmen neglecting their duty; and persons conveying goods

or letters from ships performing quarantine.(l)

2. A second, but much inferior species of offence against public health is the

selling of unwholesome provisions.^) To prevent which the statute 51 Hen.

Ill, st. 6, and the ordinance for bakers, c. 7, prohibit the sale of corrupted wine,

contagious or unwholesome flesh, or flesh that is bought of a Jew; under pain

of amercement for the first offence, pillory for the second, fine and imprison-

ment for the third, and abjuration of the town for the fourth. And by the

statute 12 Cai. II, c. 25, s. 11, any brewing or adulteration of wine is punished

with the forfeiture of 1001. if done by the wholesale merchant; and 40Z. if done

by the vintner or retail trader. These are all the offences which may properly

be said to respect the public health.(3)

V. The last species of offences which especially affect the commonwealth, are

those against the public police or economy. By the public police and economy

(1) Other statutes imposing lighter punishments now take the place of those mentioned in the

text,

Vaccination of children is made compulsory by statute 16 and 17 Vie. o. 100, j 9, under a

penalty of iiO*.

(2) [It is a misdemeanor at common law to give any person injurious food to eat, whether

the offender be excited by malice, or a desire of gain ; nor is it necessary he should be a public

contractor, or the injury done to the public service, to render him criminally liable. 2 East,

P. C. Srii ', 0 Ea^t, 133 to 141. If a baker direct his servant to make bread containing a specific

quantity of alum, which when mixed with the other ingredients is innoxious, but in the execu-

cution of these orders, the agent mixes up the clnii: in so unskilful a way that the bread be-

comes unwholesome, the master will be liable to be indicted. 3 M. and S. 10; 4 Camp. 10. But

an indictment will not lie against a miller for receiving good barley to grind at his mill, and

delivering a mixture of oat ami barley which is musty and unwholesome. 4 M. and S. 214.]

(3) See also the statutes 1 W. aud M., st. 1, c. 34, s. 20; 3 Geo. IV, c. 106; 6 and 7 Wm. IV,

c. 37; and 7 and 8 Vic. c. 24.
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I mean the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom ; whereby the

individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to

conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbourhood, and

good manners; and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective

stations. This head of offences must therefore be very miscellaneous, as it com-

prises all such crimes as especially affect public society, and are not compre-

hended under any of the four preceding species. These amount, some of them

to felony, and others to misdemeanors only. Among the former are,

*1. The offence of clandestine marriages: for by the statute 26 Geo. r*ipq i

II, c. 23, 1. To solemnize marriage in any other place besides a church, *- ) *

or public chapel wherein banns have been usually published, except by license

from the archbishop of Canterbury; and, 2. To solemnize marriage in such

church or chapel without due publication of banns, or license obtained from a

proper authority ; do both of them not only render the marriage void, but sub-

ject the person solemnizing it to felony, punished by transportation for four-

teen years: as, by three former statutes, (a) he and his assistants were subject to

a pecuniary forfeiture of 1001. 3. To make a false entry in a marriage register;

to alter it when made; to forge, or counterfeit such entry, or a marriage license;

to cause or procure, or act or assist in such forgery ; to utter the same as true,

knowing it to be counterfeit; or to destroy or procure the destruction of any

register, in order to vacate any marriage, or subject any person to the penalties

of this act; all these offences, knowingly and wilfully committed, subject the
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party to the guilt of felony without benefit of clergy. (4)

2. Another felonious offence, with regard to this holy estate of matrimony, is

what some have corruptly called bigamy, which properly signifies being twice

married; but is more justly denominated polygamy, or having a plurality of

wives at once. (It) Such second marriage, living the former husband or wife, is

simply void, aud a mere nullity, by the *ecclesiastical law of England: r*iQ4i

and yet the legislature has thought it just to make it felony, by reason *• ' '

of its being so great a violation of the public economy and decency of a well-

ordered state. For polygamv can never be endured under any rational civil

establishment, whatever specious reasons may be urged for it by the eastern

nations, the fallaciousness of which has been fully proved by many sensible

writers: but in northern countries the very nature of the climate seems to

reclaim against it; it never having obtained in this part of the world, even from

the time of our German ancestors, who. as Tacitus informs us, (c) "prope soli

barbarorum singulis uxoribus contend sunt." It is therefore punished by the

laws both of ancient and modern Sweden with death, (d) And with us in

England it is enacted by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 11, that if any person, being married,

do afterwards marry again, the former husband or wife being alive, it is felony;

but within the benefit of clergy. The first wife in this case shall not be

admitted as a witness against her husband, because she is the true wife, but the

second may, for she is indeed no wife at all; (<?) and so vice versa, of a second

husband. This act makes an exception to five cases, in which such second mar-

(n) 6 anil 7 \V"m. III. c. 6. 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 35. 10 Ann. c. 19, f!76.

(b) 3 In -I 88. Bigamy, according to the canonists, consisted In marrying two virgins successively, one

after the death of the other, or once marrying a widow. Such were esteemed Incapable of orders, Ac.;

and by a canon of the council of Lyons. A. />. 1274. held under Pope Gregory X. were omni pririleaio cleri-

cali nudati, et coercionifori secularii adtlicti(K Decretal, 1, 12). This canon was adopted and explained In

England, by blattite 4 K<!u . I, st. '•> c. ft. and bigamy thereupon became no uncommon counter-men to the

claim of the benefit of clergy. M. 40 Kdw. Ill, 42 ; it. II Hen. IV, II. 48. M. 1:1 Hen. IV, «; Staundf. 1*. C.

liM. The cognizance of the pica at bigamy was declared by statute 18 Kdw. Ill, st. 3. c. 2, to belong to the

court Christian, like that of bastardy. But by statute 1 Edw. VI, r.. 12, $ in. bigamy was declared to be uo

longer an Impediment to the claim of clergy. Sue Dal. 21; Dyer. 401.

(c) Du mar. Germ. 18. (d) Stiernh.' de jure Sueon. 1. 3, c.2. (e) 1 Hal. P. C. 693.

(4) The law on this subject is much modified by subsequent statutes. See statutes 4 Geo. IV,

c. 76 ; 6 aud 7 Wm. IV, c. AT ; 7 Wm. IV and 1 Vic. c. 22; 3 and 4 Vic. c. 72; and 24 and 25

A'ic. c. 96. Marriages solemnized knowingly except in the manner provided are void, and the

persons officiating are guilty of felony.
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riage, though in the three first it is void, is yet no felony. (/) 1. Where either

party hath been continually abroad for seven years, whether the party in England

hath notice of the other's being living or no. 2. Where either of the parties

hath been absent from the other seven years within this kingdom, and the

remaining party hath had no knowledge of the other's being alive within that

time. 3. Where there is a divorce (or separation a me.nsa et thoro) by sentence in

the ecclesiastical court. 4. Where the first marriage is declared absolutely void

hy any such sentence, and the party loosed a vinculo. Or, 5. Where either of

the parties was under the age of consent at the time of the first marriage, for in

such case the first marriage was voidable by the disagreement of either party,

T *165 1 wh'ch ^ie second marriage very clearly amounts to. But *if at the age

' ' -• of consent the parties had agreed to tlie marriage, which completes the

contract, and is indeed the real marriage; and afterwards one of them should

marry again ; I should apprehend that such second marriage would be within

the reason and penalties of the act. (5)

3. A third species of felony against the good order and economy of the king-

dom, is by idle soldiers and mariners wandering about the realm, or persons

pretending so to be, and abusing the name of that honorable profession, (y)

Such a one not having a testimonial or pass from a justice of the peace, limit-

ing the time of his passage; or exceeding the time limited for fourteen days,

unless he fulls sick; or forging such testimonial; is by statute 39 Eliz. c, 17,

made guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. This sanguinary law, though
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in practice deservedly antiquated, still remains a disgrace to our statute-book;

yet attended with this mitigation, that the offender may be delivered, if any

honest freeholder or other person of substance will take him into his service

(f) 3 Inst. 89. 1 Hal. P. C. 691. (g) S Inst. 85.

(5) [The statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100, s. 57, enacts that whosoever, being married, shall

marry anv other person during the life of the former husband or wife, whether the second mar-

riage shall have taken place in England or elsewhere, shall be guilty of felony ; and any such

offender may be tried in any place in England where he shall be apprehended or be in custody,

in the same manner in all respects as if the offence had been actually committed there, and may

be punished by penal servitude for not more than seven years, uor less than five years, or by

imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or"without hard labor. B\it this en-

actment does not extend (1) to any second marriage contracted elsewhere than in England or

Ireland by any other than a subject of her majesty ; or (2) to any person marrying a second time

whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven

years then last post, and shall not have been known by such person to be living within that time:

see Keg «. Cullen, 9 C. and P. 681; Reg. e. C'urgerweu, 1 L. R. C. C. 1; or (3) to any person

who, at the time of such second marriage, shall have been divorced from the bond of such first

marriage; or (4) to any person whose former marriage shall have been declared void by the sen-

tence of any court of competent jurisdiction. ]

Of the previous statute, 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, which was superseded by this, Mr. Chitty savs

that three important improvements were introduced \>y it. " First, the offence is now punish-

able wherever committed; formerly it was not punishable at all, if committed out of the

jurisdiction of England. Secondly, the absence of one party for seven years abroad will not

now excuse the second marriage, if such party be known by the other party to have been

alive within that period; formerly the mere absence was a protection, though the absent

party was well known by the other to be living. Thirdly, a divorce a rinculo alone will now

justify the second marriage; formerly a divorce a mcnsa et thoro was held sufficient. 1 East,

P. C. 460'. In a prosecution for bigamy it has been said, that a marriage in fact must be

proved : Morris r. Miller, 4 Burr. 2059 ; but see Truman's Case, 1 East, P. C. 470; but if proved

by a person who was present, it does not seein necessary to prove the registry or license : Hex

v. Allison, R. and R. C. C, 109; and it matters not that the first marriage is voidable, by

reason of affinity, <fcc. 3 Inst. 88. Parties who are within age at the time of the first mar-

riage (subsequently affirming the union by their consent) will be liable to be punished for

bigamy if they break that contract and marry again. 1 East. P. C. 468. On an indictment

for bigamy, where the first marriage is in England, it is not a valid defence to prove a divorce a

rinculo out of England before the second marriage, founded on grounds on which a divorce

a rinculo could not be obtained in England. Rex v. Lolley, R. and R. C. C. "237, cited in

Tovey v. Lindsay, 1 Dow, 117. The burthen of proving the first marriage to have beeu legal

lies upon the prosecutor. Rex e. James. R. and R. C. C. 17; Rex v. Morton, id. 19: Kex «.

Butler, id. 61."
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and he abides in the same for one year; unless licensed to depart by his em-

ployer, who in such case shall forfeit ten pounds. (6)

4. Outlandish persons calling themselves Egyptians or gypsies, are another

object of the severity of some of our unrepealed statutes. These are a strange

kind of commonwealth among themselves of wandering impostors and jugglers,

who were first taken notice of in Germany about the beginning of the h'fteenth

century, and have since spread themselves all over Europe. Munster, (h) who

is followed and relied upon by Spelman (i) and other writers, fixes the time of

their first appearance to the year 1417; under passports, real or pretended, from

the emperor Sigismund, king of Hungary. And Pope Pius II (who died A. D.

1464) mentions them in his history as thieves and vagabonds, then wandering

with their families over Europe under the name of Zigari; and whom he sup-

poses to have migrated from the country of *Zigi, which nearly answers r *i go n

to the modern Circassia. In the compass of a few years they gained <- J

such a number of idle proselytes (who imitated their language and complexion,

and betook themselves to the same arts of chiromancy, begging, and pilfering),

that they became troublesome, and even formidable to most of the states of

Europe. Hence they were expelled from France in the year 1560, and from

Spain in 1591. (is) And the government in England took the alarm much

earlier: for in 1530 they are described by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 10, as "out-

landish people, calling themselves Egyptians, using no craft nor feat of mer-

chandise, who have come into this realm and gone from shire to shire and
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place to place in great company, and used great, subtil, and crafty means to

deceive the people; bearing them in hand, that they by palmestry could tell

men's and women's fortunes; and so many times by craft and subtility have

deceived the people of their money, and also have committed many heinous

felonies and robberies." Wherefore they are directed to avoid the realm, and

not to return under pain of imprisonment, and forfeiture of their goods and

chattels: and upon their trials for any felony which they may have committed,

they shall not be entitled to a jnry de medietnte linquce. And afterwards it is

enacted by statutes 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 4, and 5 Eliz. c. 20, that if any such

persons shall be imported into this kingdom, the importer shall forfeit 40Z.

And if the Egyptians themselves remain one month in this kingdom, or if any

person being fourteen years old (whether natural-born, subject or stranger),

which hath been seen or found in the fellowship of such Egyptians, or which

hath disguised him or herself like them, shall remain in the same one mouth,

at one or several times, it is felony without benefit of clergy : and Sir Matthew

Hale informs us, (1) that at one Suffolk assizes no less than thirteen gypsies

were executed upon these statutes a few years before the restoration. But, to

the honour of our *national humanity, there are no instances more

modern than this, of carrying these laws into practice. (7)

5. To descend next to offences whose punishment is short of death. Common

nuisances are a species of offences against the public order and economical

regimen of the state ; being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all

the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good

required. (HI) The nature of common nuisances, and their distinction from

private nuisances, were explained in the preceding book: (n) when we con-

sidered more particularly the nature of the private sort, as a civil injury to

individuals. I shall here only remind the student, that common nuisances are

such inconvenient and troublesome offences, as annoy the whole community in

general, and not merely some particular person; and therefore are indictable

only, and not actionable; as it would be unreasonable to multiply suits, by

(A) Coimogr. I. 3. (I) Qloii. lift. (t) Dufresne, Gloai. 1. 200.

(/) 1 Hal. P. C. 671. (m) 1 Hawk, P. C. 197. (») Book III, page 216.

(6) This act is repealed.

(7) Statute 5 Eliz. o. 20, is repealed, and gypsies are now only punishable under the vagrant

•cts.
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giving every man a separate right of action, for what damnifies him in com-

mon only with the rest of his fellow-subjects. Of this nature are, 1. Annoy-

ances in highways, bridges, and public rivers, (8) by rendering the same inconve-

nient or dangerous to pass, either positively, by actual obstructions; or negatively,

by want of reparations. For both of these,"the person so obstructing, or such,

individuals as are bound to repair and cleanse them, or (in default of these last)

the parish at large, may be indicted, distrained to repair and amend them, and

in some cases fined. And a presentment thereof by a judge of assize, &c., or a

justice of the peace, shall be in all respects equivalent to an indictment, (o) (9)

Where there is a house erected, or an iuclosure made, upon any part of the

king's demesnes, or of an highway, or common street, or public water, or such

like public things, it is properly called a purpresture, (p) (10) 2. All those

kind of nuisances (such as offensive trades and manufactures), which when

injurious to a private man are actionable, are, when detrimental to the public,

F *16S 1 *I)un'snable by public prosecution, and subject to fine according to the

*• * quantity of the misdemeanor: and particularly the keeping of hogs in,

(o) Stut. 7 Gco. Ill, c. 48. (p) Co. Litt 277, from the French pourprii, an enclosure.

(8) [See Mayor of Colchester ». Brooke, 7 Q. B. 377; Reg.r. Belts, 16 Q. B. 102 ; Reg. v.

Charles worth, id. 1012.]

(9) By the highway act. 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 50, the proceeding by presentment for the non-

repair of highways is abolished, and a summary mode of proceeding before magistrates sub-

stituted. See also statutes 25 and 26 Vic. c. 61.
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(10) [With respect to nuisances in general to highways, <fcc., uy actual obstruction, it is to be

observed, that every unauthorized obstruction of the highway, to the annoyance of the king's

subjects, is an indictable offence. 3 Camp. 227. Thus if a wagoner, carrying on a very exten-

sive concern, constantly suffers wagons to remain on the side of the highway on which his

premises are situated, an unreasonable time, he is guilty of a nuisance. 6 East, 427; 2 Smith,

424. And if stage coaches regularly stand in a public street in London, though for the purpose

of accommodating passengers, so as to obstruct the regular track of carriages, the proprietor

may be indicted. 3 Camp. 224. So a timber merchant occasionally cutting logs of wood in the

street, which he could not otherwise convey into his premises, will not be excused by the ne-

cessity which, in choosing the situation, ho himself created. 3 Camp. 230. It is even said that

" if coaches on the occasion of a ront wait an unreasonable length of time in a public street,

and obstruct the transit of his majesty's subjects who wish to pass through it in carriages or on

foot, the personswho cause and permit such conches so to wait are guilty of a nuisance." 3 Camp.

226 ; and see 1 Rnssel, 4G3. Nor is it necessary, in order to fix the responsibility on the defend-

ant, to show that he immediately obstructed the public way, or even intended to do so : it seems

to be sufficient if the inconvenience result, as immediate consequence of any public exhibition

or act; for the erection of a booth to display rope-dancing, and other attractive spectacles, near

a public street iu London, which draws together a concourse of people, is a nuisauce liable to be

punished and abated. 1 Veutr. 169; 1 Mod. 76'; 2 Keb. 846; Bae. ji.br. t. Nuisance. And it

may be collected that a mere transitory abstraction, which must necessarily occur, is excusable,

if all reasonable promptness bo exerted. So that the erection of a scaffolding to repair a house,

the unloading a cart or wagon, and the delivery of any large articles, as casks of liquor, if done

with as little delay as possible, are lawful, though, if an unreasonable time were employed in

the operation, they would become nuisances. 3 Camp. 231. No length of time will legalize

the nuisance. 7 East, 199 ; 3 Camp. 227 ; 6 East, 195. If the party who has been indicted for

a nuisance continue the same, he is again indictable for such coutinuauce. 8 T. K. 142. Inde-

pendently of any legal proceedings, it appears that any person may lawfullv abate a public

nuisance) at least if it be placed in the middle of a highway, and obstruct the passage of his

majesty's subjects: Hawk. b. 1, c. 75. s. 12; but though a party may remove the nuisance, yet

he cannot remove the materials or convert them to his own use : Dalt. c. 50; and so much of

the thing only as causes the nuisance ought to be removed, as if a house be built too high, oulj

as much of it as is too high should be pulled down. 9 Rep. 53 ; God. 221; 2 Stra. 686.

With respect to nuisances to water conraea by actiml obstruction, any diversion of a public

river, whereby the current is weakened and rendered incapable of carrying vessels of the same

burden as it could before is a common nuisance. Hawk. b. 1. c. 75, s. 11. But if a ship or other

vessel sink by accident in a river, although it obstruct the navigation, if the owner removes it

in a reasonable time, it is not indictable as a nuisance. 2 Esp. 675. No length of time will

legalize the nuisance: 6 East, 195, supra; and even the rightful existence of a weir of brush-

wood will not authorize the building one of stone in its room. 7 East, 199.]

That a nuisance is not legalized by length of time, setf Mills «. Hall, 9 Wend. 315; Common-

wealth y. Upton. 6 Gray, 476; People v. Cunningham, 1 Denio, 524; Douglass, v. State. 4

Wis. 392.
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any city or market town is indictable as a public nuisance, (q) (11) All disorderly

inns or ale-houses, bawdy-houses, gaming-houses, stage-plays, unlicensed booths

and stages for rope-dancers, mountebanks, and the like, are public nuisances, and

may upon indictment be suppressed and fined, (r) Inns, in particular, being

intended for the lodging and receipt of travellers, may be indicted, suppressed,

and the inn-keepers fined, if they refuse to entertain a traveller without a very

sufficient cause: for thus to frustrate the end of their institution is held to be

disorderly behaviour, (s) Thus, too, the hospitable laws of Norway punish in

the severest degree such inn-keepers as refuse to furnish accommodations at a

just and reasonable price, (t) 4. By statute 10 and 11 Wm. Ill, c. 17, all lot-

terries are declared to be public nuisances, and all grants, patents, or licenses

for the same to be contrary to law. But, as state-lotteries have, for many years

fast, been found a ready mode for raising the supply, an act was made, 19 Geo.

II. c. 21, to license and regulate the keepers of such lottery-offices. (12) 5. The

making and selling of fire-works, and squibs, or throwing them about in any

street, is, on account of the danger that may ensue to any thatched or timber

buildings, declared to be a common nuisance, by statute 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, c.7,

and therefore is punishable by fine. (13) And to this head we may refer (though

not declared a common nuisance) the making, keeping, or carriage of too large

a quantity of gunpowder at one time, or in one place or vehicle; which is pro-

hibited by statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 61, under heavy penalties and forfeiture. (14)

6. Eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls or windows or the eaves of a
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house to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mis-

chievous tales, are a common nuisance and presentable at the conrt-leet: (u) or

are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by tine and finding sureties for

their good behaviour, (v) 7. Lastly, a common scold, communis rixatrix (for

our law-latin confines it to the feminine gender), is a public nuisance to her

neighbourhood. For which offence she may be indicted: (w) (15) *and if r *, „„ -,

convicted, shall (x) be sentenced to be placed in a certain engine of cor- L -I

rection called the trebucket, castigatory, or clicking stool, which in the Saxon

language is said to signify the scolding stool; though now it is frequently

corrupted into ducking stool, because the residue of the judgment is, that,

when she is so placed therein, she shall be plunged in the water for her

punishment, (y)

6. Idleness in any person whatsoever is also a high offence against the public

economy. In China it is a maxim, that if there be a man who does not work, or

a woman that is idle, in the empire, somebody must suffer cold or hunger: the

produce of the lands not being more than sufficient, with culture, to maintain

(?) Salt. 400. (r) 1 Hank. P. C. 19S, 425. (») Ibid. 22R.

((] Slier-nil, (injure Sueon.l. 2, c. 9. l») Kltch. of courts, 20. (e) Ibid. 1 Hawk. P. C. 132.

(w) 6 Mod. 21. (x} 1 Hawk. P. C. 1%, 200. (y) 3 lust. 219.

(11) [It is not essential in order to constitute this a nuisance, that the smell or other incon-

venience complained of, should be unwholesome ; it is sufficient if it impairs the enjoyment of

life or property. 1 Burr.333. The material increase in a neighborhood of noisome smells is

indictable. Peake Rep. 91.

To this class of public nuisances may be added that of making groat noises in the streets

in the night, by trumpet* or otherwise (2 Stra. 704), exhibiting monsters (2 Ch. Ca. 110),

Buffering mischievous animals, having notice of their propensity, to go loose, <tc.: Dyer, 25;

2 Salk. 662; 1 Tent, 295; carrying about persons infected with contagious diseases. 4 M. and

8. 73, 272, ante, 162. But neither an old nor a new dovecote is a common nuisance. Hawk. b.

1, c. 7, s. 8.]

Nuisances by offensive trades and manufactures are now punished under " The Sanitary

Act, 1S66." 29 and 30 Vic. c. 90; St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Gas. 642.

And on the same subject reference may also be had to Commonwealth v. Brown, 13 Met. 365;

Smith v. Commonwealth, 6 B. Monr. '2'2; People ». Cunningham, 1 Deuio, 524.

(12) Since repealed. And statute 6 Geo. IV, c 60, entirely abolishes state lotteries.

(13) [Thn offender may be indicted on the statute or at common law. 4 T. R 202 ; 1 Saund.

136. n. 4 ; Cowp. 650; 2 Burr. 803.]

(14) See statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 139, and the acts amendatory thereof. See also "Williams v.

East India Co., 3 East, 192, 201.

(15) James r. Commonwealth, 12 B. and R. 220; U. S. v. Royall, 3 Cranch C. C. 620.
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the inhabitants: and therefore, though the idle person may shift off the want

from himself, yet it must in the end fall somewhere. The court also of Areopa-

gus at Athens punished idleness, and exerted a right of examining every citizen

in what manner he spent his time; the intention of which was, (z) that the

Athenians, knowing that they were to give an account of their occupations,

should follow only such as were laudable, and that there might be no room left"

for such as lived by unlawful arts. The civil law expelled all sturdy vagrants

from the city: (a) and, in our own law, all idle persons or vagabonds, whom our

ancient statutes describe to be "such as wake on the night and sleep on the day,

and haunt customable taverns, and ale-houses, and routs about; and no rna'n

wot from whence they come ne whither they go," or such as are more particu-

larly described by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 5, and divided into three classes, idle

and disorderly perons, rogues and vagabonds and incorrigible rogues;—all these

are offenders against the good order, and blemishes in the government, of any

kingdom. They are therefore all punished by the statute last mentioned ; that

is to say, idle and disorderly persons with one month's imprisonment in the

house of correction; rogues and vagabonds with whipping and imprisonment

f *1701 no'; exceec^'ng s'x *months; and incorrigible rogues with the like disci-

'- J pline and confinement, not exceeding two years ; the breach and escape

from which confinement in one of an inferior class, ranks him among incorri-

gible rogues; and in a rogue (before incorrigible) makes him a felon and liable

to be transported for seven years. Persons harboring vagrants are liable to
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a fine of forty shillings, and to pay all expenses brought upon the parish

thereby; in the same manner as, by our ancient laws, whoever harboured any

stranger for more than two nights, was answerable to the public for any offence

that such his inmate might commit, (b) (16)

7. Under the head of public economy may also be properly ranked all sump-

tuary laws against luxury, and extravagant expense in dress,diet and the like;

concerning the general utility of which to a s^te, there is much controversy

among the political writers. Baron Montesquieu lays it down, (c) that luxury

is necessary in monarchies, as in France; but ruinous to democracies, as in

Holland. With regard therefore to England, whose government is compounded

of both species, it may still be a dubious question how far private luxury is a

public evil; and as such cognizable by public laws. And indeed our legislators

have several times changed their sentiments as to this point; for formerly there

were a multitude of penal laws existing, to restrain excess in apparel; (d) chiefly

made in the reigns of Edward the Third, Edward the Fourth and Henry the

Eighth, against piked shoes, short doublets, and long coats; all of which were

repealed by statute 1 Jac. I, c. 25. But, as to excess in diet there still remains

one ancient statute unrepealed, 10 Edward III, st. 3, which ordains, that no

man shall be served at dinner or supper, with more than two courses; except

upon some great holidays there specified, in which he may be served with three.

8. Next to that of luxury naturally follows the offence of yarning, which is

r *,„, -1 generally introduced to supply or retrieve*the expenses occasioned by the

*• •" former: it being a kind of tacit confession, that the company engaged

therein do, in general, exceed the bounds of their respective fortunes: and there-

fore they cast lots to determine upon whom the ruin shall at present fall, that the

rest may be saved a little longer. But, taken in any light, it is an oifeuce of

the most alarming nature; tending by necessary consequence to promote public

idleness, theft and debauchery among those of a lower class; and, among per-

sons of a superior rank, it hath frequently been attended with the sudden ruin

and desolation of ancient and opulent families, an abandoned prostitution of

(z) Valer. Maxim. 1. 8, c. 8. (a) Von. 80. o. 5. (b) LL. Edte. o. 27. Sraetan, 1. S, tr. 8, e. 10, JS.

(c) Sp. L. b. 7, cc. 2 and 4. (d) ilnst. 199.

(16) These offences are now punishable under statute 5 Oeo. IV, o. 83, amended by 1 and 3

Vic. c. 38.
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every principle of honour and virtue, and too often hath ended in self-mur-

der. (17) To restrain this pernicious vice among the inferior sort of people, the

statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 9, was made; which prohibits to all but gentlemen

the games of tennis, tables, cards, dice, bowls and other unlawful diversions there

specified, (e) unless in the time of Christmas, under pecuniary pains and impris-

onment. And the same law, and also the statute 30 Geo. II, c. 24, inflict pecu-

niary penalties, as well upon the master of any public house wherein servants

are permitted to game, as upon the servants themselves, who are found to be

gaming there. But this is not the principal ground of modern complaint; it is

the gaming in high life that demands the attention of the-magistrate ; a passion

to which every valuable consideration is made a sacrifice, and which we seem to

have inherited from our ancestors the ancient Germans; whom Tacitus (/)

describes to have been bewitched with a spirit ol play to a most exorbitant

degree." They addict themselves," says he," to dice (which is wonderful) when

sober, and as a serious employment: with such a mad desire of winning or los-

ing, that when stript of every thing else, they will stake at last their liberty and

their very selves. The loser goes into a voluntary slavery, and though younger

and stronger than his antagonist, suffers himself to be bound and sold. And

this perseverance in so bad a.cause they call the point of honour: *ea r t^.^ 1

eat in re parva pervicacia, ipsi fidem vovant." One would almost be <• ' " •"

tempted to think Tacitus was describing a modern Englishman. When men

are thus intoxicated with so frantic a spirit, laws will be of little avail; because
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the same false sense of honour that prompts a man to sacrifice himself, will

deter him from appealing to the magistrate. Yet it is proper that laws should

be, and be known publicly, that gentlemen may consider what penalties they

wilfully incur, and what a confidence they repose in sharpers; who, if successful

in pla}', are certain to be paid with honour, or, if unsuccessful, have it in their

power to be still greater gainers by informing. For by statute 16 Car. II, c. 7,

if any person by playing or betting shall lose more than 100/. at one time, he

shall not be compellable to pay the same; and the winner shall forfeit treble

the value, one moiety to the king, the other to the informer. The statute 9

Ann. c. 14, enacts, that all bonds and other securities, given for money won at

play, or money lent at the time to play withal, shall be utterly void; that all

mortgages and incumbrances of lands, made upon the same consideration, shall

be and enure to the use of the heir of the mortgagor; that, if any person at any

time or sitting lose 10/. at play, he must sue the winner, and recover it back by

action of debt at law; and in case the loser does not, any other person may sue the

winner for treble the sum so lost; (18) and the plaintiff may by bill in equity

examine the defendant himself upon oath; and that in any of these suits no

privilege of parliament shall be allowed. The statute further enacts, that if any

person by cheating at play shall win any money or valuable thing, or shall at

any one time or sitting win more than 101., he may be indicted thereupon, and

shall forfeit five times the value to any person who will sue for it; and (in case

of cheating) shall be deemed infamous, and suffer such corporal punishment

as in case of wilful perjury. By several statutes of the reign of King George

(e) Labelling in the Holds, slide thrift or shovo groat, cloylsh cayles, half-bowl and costing.

(f) De Hor. Germ. e. 24.

(17) [At common law, the playing at cards, dice and other games of chance, merely for the

purposes of recreation, and without any view to inordinate gain, is regarded as innocent.

Bnc. Ab. Gaining, A.; Com. Dig. Justices of the peace, B. 42; and see the preamble to 16 Car.

II, c. 7. But a common player at hazard, using false dice, is liable to be indicted at common

law: 2 Rol. Ab. 78; Bac. Ab. Gaming, A.; and any person cheating by means of cards or dice

Anight be fined or imprisoned in proportion to the nature of the offence. Bao. Ab. Gaming, A. ;

and see the 9 Ann. c. 15, s. 6.1

(18) The penalties for winning or losing to a certain amount are repealed by 8 and 9 Vic. c.

109, which makes new provisions. See also 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100; 16 and 17 Vic. c. 119; 17

and 16 Vic. c. 38; and 28 and 23 Vic. c. 17.
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II, (</) all private lotteries by tickets, cards or dice (and particularly the games

of faro, basset, ace of hearts, hazard, passage, roily polly, and all other games

with dice except backgammon) are prohibited under a penalty of 2001. for him

r *i «o -i that shall erect such lotteries, and 501. a time for the players. Public *lot-

•- ' J teries, unless by authority of parliament, and all manner of ingenious

devices,'under the denomination of sales or otherwise, which in the end are

equivalent to lotteries, were before prohibited by a great variety of statutes (//)

under heavy pecuniary penalties. But particular descriptions will ever be lame

and deficient, unless all games of mere chance are at once prohibited: the

inventions of sharpers being swifter than the punishment of the law, which

only hunts them from one device to another. The statute 13 Geo. II, c. 19, to

prevent the multiplicity of horse races, another fund of gaming, directs that

no plates or matches under 501. value shall be run, upon penalty of 200A to be

paid by the owner of each horse running, and 1001. by such as advertise the

plate. By statute 18 Geo. II, c. 34, the statute 9 Ann. is farther enforced, and

some deficiencies supplied; the forfeitures of that act may now be recovered in

a court of equity; and, moreover, if any man be convicted upon information or

indictment of winning or losing at play, or by betting at one time 101, or 20?.

within twenty-four hours, he shall be fined five times the sum for the benefit of

the poor of the parish. Thus careful has the legislature been to prevent this

destructive vice; which may show that our laws against gaming are not so

deficient, as ourselves and our magistrates in putting those laws in execu-
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tion. (19)

1». Lastly, there is another offence, constituted by a variety of acts of parlia-

ment; which are so numerous and so confused, and the crime itself of so ques-

tionablea nature, that I shall not detain the reader with many observations there-

upon. And yet it is an offence which the sportsmen of England seem to think

of the highest importance; and a matter, perhaps the only one, of general and

national concern : associations having been formed all over the kingdom to pre-

vent its destructive progress. I mean the offence of destroying such beasts and

fowls as are ranked under the denominations of game; which, we may remem-

ber, was formerly observed (i) (upon the old principles of the forest law),

I" *1741 *^° ^e a trespass and offence in all persons alike, who have not author-

<• •" ity from the crown to kill game (which is royal property), by the grant

either of a free warren, or at least a manor of their own. But the laws, called

the game laws, have also inflicted additional punishments (chiefly pecuniary) on

persons guilty of this general offence, unless they be people of such rank or

fortune as is therein particularly specified. All persons, therefore, of what

property or distinction soever, that kill game out of their own territories, or

even upon their own estates, without the king's license, expressed by the grant of

a franchise, are guilty of the first original offence, of encroaching on the royal

prerogative. And those indigent persons who do so, without having such rank

or fortune as is generally called a qualification, are guilty not only of the

fa) 12 Goo. II, c. 28. 13 Geo. II, c. 19. If Geo. II, o. 34.

(h) 10 anil 11 Wm. Ill, c. 17. !l Ann. c. 6, » 36. 10 Ann. o. 2«, f 109. 8 Geo. I, 0. 2, j} 38, 37. 9 Geo. I,

c IS). (» 4. !>. tt Geo. II. c.85. . • 29, 30.

(i) S«e book II, page 417, Ac.

(19) The enactment of 13 Gen. II, c. 19, referred to in the text, was repealed bv 3 and 4 Vic.

c. 5, and the penalties under statute 9 Ann. wore repealed by 8 and 9 Vic. c. 109, s. 15. Sec-

tion 18 of the same statute made all wagers and wagering contracts null and void, and pro.

hibited suit to recover the stakes. That wagers in general wore legal at the common law, sea

Good ». Elliot, 3 T. R. 69»; Bland t>. Collott. 4 Campb. 37 ; Man-vat v. Broderick, 2 M. and AN".

369. But if the subject-matter of the wager is such as to make it inconsistent with public

policy, either party may demand his stakei and recover from the stakeholder if be reinse to*

pav back, even though the wager is determined (Cotton f. Thurland, 5 T. R. 405 ; Laeaus.sado

i;. White, 7 T. R. 535), unless the stakeholder has actually paid it over to the winner before

notice not to do so. Howson v. Hancock, 8 T. R. 575; Perkins v. Eaton, 3 N. H. l~?i; Liv-

ingston c. Wootan, 1 X. and MoC. 178. In the United Statea wagers are generally made illegal

by statute.
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original offence, but of the aggravations also, created by the statutes for preserv-

ing the game: which aggravations are so severely punished, and those punish-

ments so implacably inflicted, that the offence against the king is seldom

thought of, provided the miserable delinquent can make his peace with the

lord of the manor. The offence, thus aggravated, I have ranked under the

present head, because the only rational footing upon which we can consider

it as a crime, is that in low and indigent persons it promotes idleness, and

takes them away from their proper employments and callings; which is an

offence against the public police and economy of the commonwealth.

The statutes for preserving the. game are many and various, and not a little

obscure and intricate; it being remarked,^') that in one statute only, 5 Ann.

c. 14, there is false grammar in no fewer than six places, besides other mistakes;

the occasion of which, or what denomination of persons were probably the

penners of these statutes, I shall not at present inquire. It is in general suffi-

cient to observe, that the qualifications for killing game, as they are usually

called, or more properly the exempt ions from the penalties inflicted by the statute

law, are, 1. The having a freehold estate of 1001. *per annum: there be- r*i «r -i

ing fifty times the property required to enable a man to kill a partridge, <- '"' '

as to vote for a knight of the shire : 2. A leasehold for ninety-nine years of 150/.

per annum: 3. Being the son and heir apparent of an esquire (a very loose

and vague description), or person of superior degree: 4. Being the owner or

keeper of a forest, park, chase, or warren. For unqualified persons transgress-
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ing these laws, by killing game, keeping engines for that purpose, or even hav-

ing game in their custody, or for persons (however qualified) that kill game or

have it in possession, at unseasonable times of the year, or unseasonable hours

of the day or night, on Sundays or on Christmas day, there are various penal-

ties assigned, corporal and pecuniary, by different statutes ;(&) on any of which,

but only on one at a time, the justice may convict in a summary way, or (in

most of them) prosecutions may be carried on at the assizes. And, lastly, by

statute 28 Geo. II, c. 12, no person, however qualified to kill, may make mer-

chandise of his valuable privilege, by selling or exposing to sale any game, on

pain of like forfeiture as if he had no qualification.(20)

CHAPTER XIV.

OF HOMICIDE.

IN the ten preceding chapters we have considered, first, such crimes and mis-

demeanors as are more immediately injurious to God, and his holy religion;

secondly, such as violate or transgress the law of nations; thirdly, such as

more especially effect the king, the father and representative of his people;

fourthly, such as more directly infringe the rights of the public or common-

wealth, taken in its collective capacity; and are now, lastly, to take into con-

sideration those which in a more peculiar manner affect and injure individuals

or private subjects.

Were these injuries indeed confined to individuals only, and did they affect

none but their immediate objects, they would fall absolutely under the notion

d) Bnrn'8 Justice. Game, (3. (k) Barn's Justice, tit. Game.

(20) The changes made in the game laws by which the property qualifications are dispensed

with, and the buying and selling of game are legalized under certain restrictions, are elsewhere

referred to. See statute 1 and 2 Win. IV, e. 32, and 2 and 3 Vic. c. 35. And as to taking

game by night, statute 9 Geo. IV, c. 69; 7 and 8 Vic. c. 29, and 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, s. 17.

In this connection, the offence of buying and selling offices may properly be mentioned. The

statutes concerning it are 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 16, and 49 Geo. Ill, c. 106, which make it a mis-

demeanor.
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of, private wrongs; for which a satisfaction would be due only to the party in-

jured; the manner of obtaining which was the subject of our inquiries in the

preceding book. But the wrongs, which we are now to treat of, are of a much

more extensive consequence: 1. Because it is impossible they can be committed

without a violation of the laws of nature ; of the moral as well as political rules

of right: 2. Because they include in them almost always a breach of the public

peace: 3. Because by their example and evil tendency they threaten and en-

danger the subversion >of all civil society. Upon these accounts it is,

f*l"71 ^hat, besides the private satisfaction due and given in many cases to the

"- ' -" individual, by action for the private wrong, the government also calls

upon the offender to submit to public punishment for the public crime. And

the prosecution of these offences is always at the suit and in the Dame of the

king, in whom, by the texture of our constitution, the jus gladii, or executory

power of the law, entirely resides. Thus, too, in the old Gothic constitution,

there was a three-fold punishment inflicted on all delinquents; first, for the

private wrong to the party injured; secondly, for the offence against the king

by disobedience to the laws; and. thirdly, for the crime against the public by

their evil example.(a) Of which we may trace the groundwork, in what

Tacitus tells us of his Germans: (b) that whenever offenders were fined, "pars

mulctcB regi, vel civitati, purs ipsi, gui vindicatur vel propinquis ejus, ex-

solvitur."

These crimes and misdemeanors against private subjects are principally of
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three kinds; against their persons, their habitations, and their property.

Of crimes injurious to the persons of private subjects the most principal and

important is the offence of taking away that life which is the immediate gift of

the great Creator; and of which therefore no man can be entitled to deprive

himself or another, but in some manner either expressly commanded in, or

evidently cleducible from those laws which the Creator has given us; the

divine laws, I mean, of either nature or revelation. The subject therefore of

the present chapter, will be the offence of homicide, or destroying the life of

man, in its several stages of guilt, arising from the particular circumstances

of mitigation or aggravation which attend it.

Now homicide, or the killing of any human creature, is of three kinds ; justi-

fiable, excusable, and felonious. The first has no share of guilt at all; the second

r*l"8 "1 Tfery 1'ttle ; but the *third is the highest crime against the law of nature

*• ' -" that man is capable of committing.

I. Justifiable homicide is of divers kinds.

1. Such as is owing to some unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention,

or desire, and without any inadvertence or negligence in the party killing, and

therefore without any shadow of blame. As, for instance, by virtue of such an

office as obliges one, in the execution of public justice, to put a malefactor to

death, who hath forfeited hislife by the laws and verdict of his country. Thia

is an act of necessity, and even of civil duty; and therefore not only justifiable,

but, commendable, where the law requires it But the law must require it,

otherwise it is not justifiable: therefore, wantonly to kill the greatest of male-

factors, a felon or a traitor, attainted or outlawed, deliberately, uncompelled,

and extra-judicially, is murder.(c) For, as Bructon (d) very justly observes,

'• istud homicidmm, si fit ex livore, vel delectatione effvndendi numanvm san-

yuinem, licet juste occirlatur iste, tamen occisor peccai mortaliter, propter inten-

'tionem eorruptam." And farther, if judgment of death be given by a judge not

authorized by lawful commission, and execution is done accordingly, the judge

is guilty of murder.(e) And upon this account, Sir Matthew Hale himself,

though he accepted the place of a judge of the common pleas under Cromwell's

government (since it is necessary to decide the disputes of civil property in th»

worst of times), yet declined to sit on the crown side at the assizes, and try

prisoners; having very strong objections to the legality of the usurper's com-

(a) Stlcrnhook, M. c. 5. (b) dr. nor. Germ. c. M. foj 1 Hal, P. C. 497, OOJW. UBk.

(c) 1 Hawk. P. C. 70. 1 Hal. P. C. 497.

404

Chap. 14.] HOMICIDE. 178

mission; (/) a distinction perhaps rather too refined; since the punishment of

crimes is at least as necessary to society, as maintaining the boundaries of prop-

erty. Also, such judgment, when legal, must be executed by the proper officer,

or his appointed deputy; for no one else is required by law to do it, which

requisition it is that justifies the homicide. If another *person doth r*i«qi

it of his own head, it is held to be murder: (g) even though it be the •- ' -"

judge himself, (h) It must farther be executed servato juris ordine ; it must

pursue the sentence of the court. If an officer beheads one who is adjudged to

be banged, or vice versa, it is murder: (?') for he is merely ministerial, and

therefore only justified when he acts under the authority and compulsion of the

law: but if a sheriff changes one kind of death for another, he then acts by his

own authority, which extends not to the commission of homicide, and besides,

this license might occasion a very gross abuse of his power. The king, indeed,

may remit part of a sentence; as in the case of treason, all but the beheading,

but this is no change, no introduction of a new punishment; and in the case of

felony, (Fhere the judgment is to be hanged, the King (it hath bc«n said) cannot

legally order even a peer to be beheaded. (It) But this doctrine will be more

fully considered in a subsequent chapter.

Again, in some cases homicide is justifiable, rather by the permission, than

by the absolute command, of the law, either for the advancement, of public justice,

which without such indemnification would never be carried on with proper

vigour; or, in such instances where it is committed for the prevention of some
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atrocious crime, which cannot otherwise be avoided.

2. Homicides committed for the advancement of public justice, are; 1. Where

an officer, in the execution of his office, either in a civil or criminal case, kills

a person that assaults and resists him. (I) 'I. If an officer, or any private person,

attempts to take a man charged with felony, and is resisted; and, in the endeav-

our to take him, kills him. (TO) This is similar to the old Gothic constitutions,

which (Stiernhook informs its) (n) "furem, si aliter capi non posset, occidere

*permittunt." 3. In case of a riot, or rebellious assembly, the officers r ^^ -,

endeavouring to disperse the mob are justifiable in killing them, both at ^ ' -'

common law, (o) and by the riot act, 1 Geo. I, c. 5. 4. Where the prisoners in a

gaol, or going to a gaol, assault the gaoler or officer, and he in his defence kills

any of them, it is justifiable for the sake of preventing an escape, (p) 5. If tres-

passers in forests, parks, chases, or warrens, will not surrender themselves to the

keepers, they may be slain; by virtue of the statute 21 Edw. I, st. 2, de malefac-

toribus in p~arcis, and 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 10. (1) But in all these cases, there

must be an apparent necessity on the officer's side, viz.: that the party could not

be arrested or apprehended, the riot could not be suppressed, the prisoners could

not be kept in hold, the deer-stealers could not but escape, Unless such homicide

•were committed: otherwise, without such absolute necessity, it is not justifi-

able. (2) 6. If the champions in a trial by battle killed either of them the other,

(/) Unmet in his life. (a) 1 Hal. P. C. 801. 1 Hawk. P. C. 70. (») Dalt Jnst c. ISO.

(I) Kinch. L. 31. 3 Inst. 52. 1 Hal. P. C. 601. (i) 8 Inst. 62, 212.

(() 1 Hal. P. (:. 494. 1 Hawk P. C. 71. (ml 1 H»l. P. C. 491. (») dejure Oath. I 3, c. 5.

<o) 1 Hal. P. C. 495. 1 Hawk. P. C. 161. (p) 1 Hal. P. C. 496.

(1) These statntes are since repealed.

(•2) [If a person commits felony, and flies, or resists those who attempt to apprehend him,

or is indicted of felony, and flies," or is arrested by warrant or process of law, and escapes, or

is being conveyed to prison, and escapes; in any of these cases, if he cannot be taken alive,

and is killed in the aet of resistance, the homicide is justifiable. 1 Hale, P. C. 489; 1 East,

F. C. S98. So, if an officer has a warrant against A, by name, for felony, or if A is indicted of

felony, or if the hue and cry is levied ngninst him. l>y name; in any of these cases, if A, though

innocent, flies or resists, and is killed by the officer or nny other person aiding him. during

flight or resistance, the person so killing him is indemnified. Post. 318; 1 Eimt. P. C. 300.

Aiid the officer, it seems, would be equally indemnified, though he had no warrant, if he acted

on a charge of felony, and on reasonable suspicion, even though it should appear in the result

that no felony had" been committed. Samuel ». Payne, I)oug. 359; Gupny ». Brittlebank,

5 Price, 525.]

^
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such homicide was justifiable, and was imputed to the just judgment of God,

who was thereby presumed to have decided in favour of the truth, (q) (3)

In the next place, such homicide as is committed for the prevention of any

forcible and atrocious crime, is justifiable by the law of nature; (r) and also by

the law of England, as it stood so early as the time of Bracton, (*) and as it is

since declared in statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 5. (4) If any person attempts a rob-

bery or murder of another, or attempts to break open a house in the 'night-time

(which extends also to an attempt to burn it), (t) and shall be killed in such

attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged. This reaches not to any

crime unaccompanied with force, as picking of pockets; or to the breaking

open of any house in the day-time, unless it carries with it an attempt of robbery

also. So the Jewish law, which punished no theft with death, makes homicide

only justifiable in case of nocturnal house-breaking; if a thief be found

r *, gj -i breaking up, and he be " smitten that he *die, there shall no blood be shed

' J for him: but if the sun be risen upon him, there shall blood be shed for

him; for he should make full restitution." («) At Athens, if any theft

was committed by night, it was lawful to kill the criminal, if taken in the

fact: (w) and by the Roman law of the twelve tables, a thief might be slain by

night with impunity: or even by day, if he armed himself with any dangerous

weapon: (x) which amounts very nearly to the same as is permitted by our own

constitutions.

The Roman law also justifies homicide, when committed >n defence of the

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:05 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

chastity either of one's self or relations: (y) and so also, according to Selden, (z)

stood the law in the Jewish republic. The English law likewise justifies a

woman killing one who attempts to ravish her: (a) and so, too, the husband or

father may justify killing a man who attempts a rape upon his wife or daugh-

ter: but not if he takes them in adultery by consent, for the one is forcible and

felonious, but not the other, (b) And I make no doubt but the forcibly attempt-

ing a crime of a still more detestable nature may be equally resisted by the death

of the unnatural aggressor. For the one uniform principle that runs through

our own, and all other laws, seems to be this: that where a crime, in itself capi-

tal, is endeavoured to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by

the death of the party attempting. But we must not carry this doctrine to the

same visionary length that Mr. Locke does: who holds, (c) " that all manner of

force without right upon a man's person, puts him in a state of war with the

aggressor; and, of consequence, that being in such a state of war, he may law-

fully kill him that puts him under this unnatural restraint." However just this

conclusion may be in a state of uncivilized nature, yet the law of England, like

f *182 1 khatof every other *well-regulated community, is too tender of the public

L J peace, too careful of the lives of the subjects, to adopt so contentious a

system; nor will suffer with impunity any crime to be prevented by death,

unless the same, if committed, would also be punished by death.

In these instances of justifiable homicide, it may be observed, that the slayer

is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is there-

fore to be totally acquitted and discharged, with commendation rather than

blame. But that is not quite the case in excusable homicide, the very name

whereof imports some fault, some error, or omission; so trivial, however, that

the law excuses it from the guilt of felony, though, in strictness, it judges it

deserving of some little degree of punishment.

(qt 1 Hawk. I> C. 71. (r) Puff. L. of N. I. 2, e. 5. (t]fol. 15S. (*) 1 Hal. P. C. 188.

<«) Exort. xxil. 2. (to) Potter, Antiq. b. 1, n. 26. (x) Cic.. pro lOtlone. 3. Ff. 9. 2, 4.

(MI " nirus Hadriama reacripsit eum yui stuprum Mi vet sttii infercnlem occidit dimittmdum." Iff. 48.8.1.)

U) De leyib. Hebrctor. 1. 4, c. 8. (a) Bnc. Elern. 34. 1 Hawk. P. C. 71. (J>) 1 Hal. P. C. 485. 4j>0.

(c) Ess. on Gov. p. S, o. 5.

(3) [The trial by battle is abolished by 59 Geo. Ill, c. 46; seo further upon that subject,

pout, 34B.]

(4) [Repealed by 9 Geo. IV, c. 31, section 10 of which enacts, that no punishment or for-

feiture shall be incurred by any person who shall kill another by misfortune, or in his own

defence, or in any other manner without felony.]
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II. Excusable homicide is of two sorts; either per infortunium, by mis-

adventure; or se defendendo, upon a principle of self preservation. We will first

see wherein these two species of homicide are distinct, and then whereiu they

agree.

1. Homicide per infortunium or misadventure is where a man, doing a law-

ful act, without any'intention of hurt, unfortunately kills another: as where a

man is at work with a hatchet, and the head thereof flies off, and kills a stander-

by; or where a person, qualified to keep a gun, is shooting at a mark,and unde-

signedly kills a man :(d) for the act is lawful, and the effect is merely accidental.(5)

So where a parent is moderately correcting his child, a master his apprentice or

scholar, or an officer punishing a criminal, and happens to occasion his death,

it is only misadventure; for the act of correction is lawful: but if he exceeds

the bounds of moderation, either in the manner, the instrument, or the quan-

tity of punishment, and death ensues, it is manslaughter at least, and in some

cases (according to the circumstances) murder ;(e) for the act of immoderate

correction is unlawful. "Thus, by an edict of the Emperor Constan- r*igo i

tine,(/) when the rigor of the Koman law with regard to slaves began to L ^

relax and soften, a master was allowed to chastise his slave with rods and

imprisonment, and, if death accidentally ensued, he was guilty of no crime:

but if he struck him with a club or a stone, and thereby occasioned his death ;

or if, in any other, yet grosser manner, " immoderate suo jure utatur, tune reus

homicidii sit."
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But to proceed. A tilt or tournament, the martial diversion of our ancestors,

was, however, an unlawful act: and so are boxing and sword-playing, the suc-

ceeding amusement of their posterity: and, therefore, if a knight in the former

case, or a gladiator in the latter, be killed, such killing is felony or manslaughter.

But if the king command or permit such diversion, it is said to be only mis-

adventure ; for then the act is lawful.(#) In the like manner, as by the laws

both of Athens and Eome, he who killed another in the pancratium, or public

games authorized or permitted by the state, was not held to be guilty of homi-

cide.(A) Likewise, to whip another's horse, whereby he runs over a child and

kills him, is held to be accidental in the rider, for he had done nothing unlaw-

ful: but manslaughter in the person who whipped him, for the act was a tres-

pass, and at best a piece of idleness, of inevitably dangerous consequences.(i)(6)

(d) \ Hawk, P. C. 73, 74. (t) 1 Hal. P. C. 473. 474. ff) Cod. I. 9. t. 14.

(g) 1 HaUJ. C. 47S. 1 Hawk. P. C. 74. (h) Plato, de LL. lib. 7. If. 9. 2. 7. (i) 1 Hawk. P. C. 78.

(r>) [II a person driving a carriage happen to kill another, if he saw or had timely notice of

the mischief likely to ensue, and yet wilfully drove on, it will be murder : if he might have

seen the danger, but did not look before him, it will be manslaughter; but if the accident

happened in such a manner that no want of due care could be imputed to the driver, it will

lie accidental death, and excusable homicide. 1 East, P. C. 263. Where on a false alarm of

thieves, the master of the house killed one of the family by mistake, who had concealed himself

in a closet, this was holden homicide by misfortune. Cro. Car. 538. "Where an unqualified per-

son bv accident shoots another in sporting, it Is no greater offence than in a qualified person.

1 East, P. C. 260.]

Homicide by practical joke is manslaughter. As, where a fire was kindled around a drunken

man only to frighten him, but into which he rolled and was killed. Errington's Case, 2 Lewin

C. C. 217. And see Fentou's Case, 1 id. 179; Martin's Case, 3 C. and P. 211.

(6) [Whenever death is the consequence of idle, dangerous and unlawful sports, or of heed-

less, wanton and indiscreet acts, without a felonious intent, the party causing the death is guilty

of manslaughter. As, if a man rides an unruly horse amongst a crowd of people; 1 East, P.

C. 231; or throws a stone, or shoots an arrow, over a wall, into a frequented public street;

1 Hale, P.C. 475; or discharges his pistols in a public street upon alighting from his carriage :

1 Stra. 481; or throws a stone at a horse, which strikes a man: i Hale, P. C. 39; in any

of these case?, though the party may be perfectly innocent of any mischievous intent, still,

if death ensues, he is guilty of manslaughter. So, if the owner suffers to be at large any

animal which he knows to be vicious and mischievous, and it kills a man, it has been thought

bv some that he may bo indicted for manslaughter : but it is well agreed that he is gnilty of a

high misdemeanor: 2 Haw. P. C. c. 13, $ 8 ; aud. in a very recent case of that kind, Best, C. J.,

laid it down as law, " that, if a person thinks proper to keep au animal of this description (a

bull), knowing its vicious nature, and another person is killed by it, it will be manslaughter in
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And in general, if death ensues in consequence of an idle, dangerous, and un-

lawful sport, as shooting or casting stones in a town, or the barbarous diversion

of cock-throwing, in these and similar cases the slayer is guilty of manslaughter,

and not misadventure only, for these are unlawful acts.(/fc)

x!. Homicide in self-defence, or #e defendendo, upon a sudden affray, is also

excusable, rather than justifiable, by the English law. This species of self-

defence must be distinguished from that just now mentioned, as calculated to

r*184-l *n'n^er t'ie perpetration of a capital crime; which is not only a matter

<- -"of excuse, but of justification. But the self-defence which we are now

speaking of is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the

like, in the course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assaults

him. And this is what the law expresses by the word chance-medley, or (as

some rather choose to write it) chaud-medley, the former of which in its

etymology signifies a casual affray, the latter an affray in the heat of blood or

passion ; both of them of pretty much the same import: but the former

is in common speech too often erroneously applied to any manner of homicide

or misadventure; whereas it appears by the statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 5, and our

ancient books.(/) that it is properly applied to such killing as happens in self-

defence upon a sudden reiJOonnter.fw) This right of natural defence does not

imply a right of attacking: for, instead of attacking one another for injuries

past or impending, men need only have recourse to the proper tribunals of

lustice. They cannot, therefore, legally exercise this right of preventive defence,
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but in sudden and violent cases when certain and immediate suffering would be

the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law. Wherefore, to excuse

homicide by the plea of self-defence, it must appear that the slayer had no

other possible (or, at least, probable) means of escaping from his assailant.(7)

It is frequently difficult to distinguish these species of homicide (upon chance-

medley in self-defence) from that of manslaughter, in the proper legal sense of

the word.(») But the true criterion between them seems to be this: when both

parties are actually combating at the time when the mortal stroke is given, the

slayer is then guilty of manslaughter: but if the slayer has not begun the fight,

or (having begun) endeavours to decline any farther struggle, and afterwards,

being closely pressed by his antagonist, kills him to avoid his own destruction,

this is homicide excusable by self-defence.(o) For which reason the law requires

r*i Q- -i that the person who kills another, in his own defence, *should have

L ° J retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the violence of

the assault, before he turns upon his assailant; and that not factitiously, or

in order to watch his opportunity, but from a real tenderness of shedding his

brother's blood. And though it may be cowardice in time of war between two

independent nations, to flee from an enemy; yet between two fellow-subjects

the law countenances no such point of honour: because the king and his

courts are the vindices injuriarum, and will give to the party wronged all the

(k) 7Md 7*. 1 Hal. P. C. 472. Fost 261. (1) Stoundf. P. C. 10. fm) S lost. 56, 57. Fost. 275, 278.

(n,l 3 last. 55. (o) Fost. 277.

the owner, if nothing more; at all events, it will be an aggravated species of manslaughter.

Blackmail ». Simmons, 3 C. and P. 140. If workmen in the ordinary course of their business,

throw rubbish from a house in a direction in which persona are likely"to pass, and any one •pass-

in? is killed, this is manslaughter. 1 East, P. C. 262. Killing a person in a prize-fight is man-

slaughter. Ward's Case. 1 East, P. C. 270.]

(7) [The general principle seems to be this. If a man is attacked in snch a manner that there

is no possibility of his escaping without killing his assailant, he is justified in doing so, after hav-

ing done his best to retreat. Fost. 278; Kel. 128. But no assault, however violent, will justify

killing the assailant, under the plea of necessity, unless them is a clear manifestation of "a

felonious intent. 1 East, P. C. 277 ; 1 Russel, 551. And an officer who kills one wbo resists

him in the execution of his office, and even a private person that kills one who feloniously as-

saults him in the highway, may justify the fact without retreating at all. 1 Haw. P. C. c. 29,

$ 16; 1 Hale P. C. 41; 3 Inst. 56.]

On this subject of homicide in self-defence and of the necessity of endeavor to avoid so serious

a consequence, see note 1, book 3, page 3.

408

Chap. 14.] HOMFCDB. 185

satisfaction he deserves, (p) In this the civil law also agrees with ours, or per-

haps goes rather farther: " qui cum aliter tueri se non possunt, damni culpam

dederint, innoxii sunt." (q) The party assaulted must therefore flee as far as he

conveniently can, either by reason of some wall, ditch, or other impediment; or

as far as the fierceness of the assault will permit him : (r) for it may be so fierce

as not to allow him to yield a step, withoiit manifest danger of his life, or

enormous bodily harm: and then in his defence he may kill his assailant

instantly. And this is the doctrine of universal justice, (s) as well as of the

municipal law.

And as the manner of the defence, so is also the time to be considered: for

if the person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor till the affray is over, or

when he is running away, this is revenge, and not defence. Neither, under the

colour of self-defence, will the law permit a man to screen himself from the

guilt of deliberate murder: for if two persons, A and B, agree to fight a duel,

and A gives the first onset, and B retreats as fur as he safely can, and then kills

A. this is murder; because of the previous malice and concerted design, (t) But

if A upon a sndden quarrel assaults B first, and upon B's returning the assault

A really and bona fide flees; and, being driven to the wall, turns again itpon B

and kills him; this may be se defenaendo according to some of our writers; («)

*though others (iv) have thought this opinion too favourable: inasmuch r *i g(> i

as the necessity, to which he is at last reduced, originally arose from his •- •"

own fault. Under this excuse of self-defence, the principal civil and natural

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:05 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

relations are comprehended; therefore master and servant, parent and child,

husband and wife, killing an assailant in the necessary defence of each other

respectively, are excused; the act of the relation assisting being construed the

same as the act of the party himself, (x)

There is one, species of homicide se defendendo, where the party slain is equally

innocent as he who occasions his death: and yet this homicide is also excusable

from the great universal principle of self-preservation, which prompts every man

to save his own life preferablv to that of another, where one of them must

inevitablv perish. As, among others, in that case mentioned by Lord Bacon, (?/)

where two persons, being shipwrecked, and getting on the same plank, but find-

ing it not able to save them both, one of them thrusts the other from it, whereby

he is drowned. He who thus preserves his own life at the expense of another

man's is excusable through unavoidable necessity, and the principle of self-de-

fence : since their both remaining on the same weak plank is a mutual, though

innocent, attempt upon, and an endangering of each other's life.

Let us next take a view of those circumstanees wherein these two species of

homicide, by misadventure and self-defence, agree; and those are in their blame

and punishment. For the law sets so high a value upon the life of a man, that

it always intends some misbehaviour in the person who takes it away, unless by

the command or express permission of the law. In the case of misadventure,

it presumes negligence, or at least a want of sufficient caution in him who was

so unfortunate as to commit it; who therefore is not altogether faultless.(z)

And as to the necessity which excuses a man who *kills another se defen- r *i or- -i

deiido, Lord Bacon (a) entitles it necessitas culpabilis, and thereby dis- "- -I

tinguishes it from the former necessity of killing a thief or a malefactor. For

the law intends that the quarrel or assault arose from some unknown wrong, or

some provocation, either in word or deed: and since in quarrels both parties may

be, and usually are, in some fault; and it scarce can be tried who was originally

in the wrong; the law will not hold the survivor entirely guiltless. But it is

clear, in the other case, that where I kill a thief that brealcs into my house, the

original default can never be upon my side. The law besides may have a farther

view, to make the crime of homicide more odious, and to caution men how they

venture to kill another upon their own private judgment; by ordaining, that

(p) 1 Hal. P. C. 481, 483. (?) Ff. 9, 2, 45. (r) 1 Hal. P. C. 483. («) ruff. 1, 2, c. 5, } 18.

(t) I Hal. P. C. 479. («) 1 bid. 4*>. (w) 1 Hawk. P. C. 76. (*) 1 Hal. P. C. 84.

(y) Elem. c. 6. See also 1 Hawk. P. C. 73. (*) 1 Hawk. P. C. 72. (a) Elcm. c. 6.
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he who slays his neighbour, without an express warrant from the law so to do,

shall in no case be aosolutely free from guilt.

Nor is the law of England singular in this respect Even the slaughter of

enemies required a solemn purgation among the Jews; which implies that the

death of a man, however it happens, will leave some stain behind it. And the

Mosaical law (b) appointed certain cities of refuge for him " who killed his

neighbour unawares: as when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to

hew wood, and his hand fetcheth a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and

the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he die,

he shall flee unto one of those cities and live." But it seems he was not held

wholly blameless, any more than in the English law; since the avenger of blood

might slay him before he reached his asylum, or if he afterwards stirred out of

it till the death of the high priest. In the imperial law likewise (c) casual

homicide was excused, by the indulgence of theemperorsigued with his own sign-

manual, "annotatione principis:" otherwise the death of a man, however com-

mitted, was in some degree punishable. Among the Greeks (d) homicide by

F *188 1 misf°r*iune was expiated by voluntary *banishment for a year, (e) In,

L -I Saxony a fine is paid to the kindred of the slain ; which also, among the

Western Goths, was little inferior to that of voluntary homicide: (/) and in

France (g) no person is ever absolved in cases of this nature, without a largesa

to the poor, and the charge of certain masses for the soul of the party killed.

The penalty inflicted by our laws is said by Sir Edward Coke to have been
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anciently no less than death ; (A) which, however, is with reason denied by later

and more accurate writers. (•»') It seems rather to have consisted in a forfeiture,

some say of all the goods and chattels, others of only part of them, by way of

fine or wereyild: (k) which was probably disposed of, as in France, in piosusv.s,

according to the humane superstition of the times, for the benefit of his soul

who was thus suddenly sent to his account, with all his imperfections on his

head. But that reason having long ceased, and the penalty (especially if a total

forfeiture) growing more severe than was intended, in proportion as personal

property has become more considerable, the delinquent has now, and has had as

early as our records will reach, (/) a pardon and writ of restitution of his goods

as a matter of course and right only paying for suing out the same, (m) (8) And,

indeed, to prevent this expense, in cases where the death has notoriously hap-

pened by misadventure or in self-defence, the judges will usually permit (if not

direct) a general verdict of acquittal, (n)

III. Felonious homicide is an act of very different nature from the former,

being the killing of a human creature, of any age or sex, without justification

or excuse. This may be done either by killing one's self, or another man.

F *189 1 *Self-murder, the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic

*• -" philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they

had not the fortitude to endure, though the attempting it seems to be counte-

nanced by the civil law, (o) yet was punished by the Athenian law with cutting

off the hand, which committed the desperate deed, (p) And also the law of

England wisely and religously considers, that no man hath a power to destroy

life, but by commission from (rod, the author of it: and, as the suicide is guilty

of a double offence: one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty,

and rushing into his immediate preience uncalled for; the ottier temporal",

(6) Numb. c. 35. and Dent, c. 18. (c) Cod. 9, 16, 5. (dl Plato At Lea. Kb. 9.

(a) To this expiation by banishment the spirit of Patroclus In Homer may be thought to allude, \rhen he

reminds Achilles, in the twenty-third Iliad, that when a child he was obliged to flee his conntry for casually

killing his playfellow ; " vrj-iof ova efle/U, ."

( /") titiernli. 'de jure (loth. 1. 3. e. 4. (g) De Morney, on the digest. (*) 2 Inst. 148, J15.

(I) I Hnl. P. C. 425. 1 Hawk. P. C. 78. Post. 282, &c. It) Fost. 287. </) Ibid. 283.

(m) 2 Hawk. P. C. 381. (n) Kost. 288.

to) "Si 7 •"' - impatitntia dolorit, out tatdio vita, out morbo, out furore, avt pudormon maluit, nun animad-

vertatnrineum'' Ff. 4B, 16, 6.

(p) Pot. Anliq. b. 1, c. 26.

(8) [But now all forfeiture and punishment ia removed in such cases. See 9 Geo. IY. c. 31, a. 10.]

410

Chap. 14.] HOMICIDE. 189

against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation-of all his subjects; the

law has therefore ranked this among the highest crimes, making it a peculiar

species of felony, a felony committed on one s self. And this admits of acces-

sories before the fact, as well as other felonies; for if one persuades another to

kill himself, and he does so, the adviser is guilty of murder, (q) A felo de se

therefore is he that deliberately puts an end to his own existence, or commits

any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death: as if

attempting to kill another, he runs upon his antagonist's sword: or, shooting

at another, the gun bursts and kills himself, (r) (9) The party must be of years

of discretion, and in his senses, else it is no crime. But this excuse ought not

to oe strained to that length to which our coroner's juries are apt to carry it,

viz.: that the very act of suicide is an evidence of insanity; as if every man,

who acts contrary to reason had no reason at all: for the same argument would

prove every other criminal non compos, as well as the self-murderer. The law

very rationally judges that every melancholy or hypochondriac fit does not de-

prive a man of the capacity of discerning right from wrong; which is neces-

sary, as was observed in a former chapter, (.?) to *form a legal excuse.

And therefore if a real lunatic kills himself in a lucid interval, he is a

felo de se as much as another man. (/)

But now the question follows, what punishment can human laws inflict on

one who has withdrawn himself from their reach ? They can only act upon

what he has left behind him, his reputation and fortune: on the former, by an
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ignominious burial in the highway, with a stake driven through his body; (10)

on the latter, by a forfeiture of all his goods and chattels to the king: hoping

that his care for either his own reputation, or the welfare of his family, would

be some motive to restrain him from so desperate and wicked an act. And it is

observable, that this forfeiture has relation to the time of the act done in the

felon's lifetime, which was the cause of his death. As if husband and wife

be possessed jointly of a term of years in land, and the husband drowns him-

self; the land shall be forfeited to the king, and the wife shall not have it by

survivorship. For by the act of casting himself into the water he forfeits the

term which gives a title to the king, prior to the wife's title by survivorship,

which could not accrue till the instant of her husband's death. («) And though

it must be owned that the letter of the law herein borders a little upon severity,

yet it is some alleviation that the power of mitigation is left in the breast of the

sovereign, who upon this, as on all other occasions, is reminded by the oath

of his office to execute judgment in mercy. (11)

(q) Keilw. 138. (r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 68. 1 Hal. P. C. 413. (*) See page 24. (t) IHal. P. C. «2.

(u) Kiiich, L. 216.

(9) [He who kills another upon his desire or command, ib in the judgment of the taw as

much a murderer, as if he had done it merely of his own head; and the person killed is not

looked upon as a felo de sc, inasmuch as his assent was merely void, being against the law of

God and man. 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 27, s. 6; Keilw. 136; Moor. 754. And see Rex v. Sawyer,

1 Russell, 424; Rex «. Evans, id. 426.]

(10; Interment in the highway, with a stake driven through the body, is done away, with by

statute 4 Gco. IV, c. 52, but it must be private, and without the rites of Christian burial.

(11) [As to what a, felo de se shall forfeit, it seems clear that he shall forfeit all chattels real

or personal which he has in his own right; and also all chattels real whereot he is possessed,

either jointly with his wife, or in her right; and also all bonds and other personal things in

action, belonging solely to himself; and also all personal things in action, and, as some say,

entire chattels in possession to which he was entitled jointly with another, or any account,

except that of merchandise. But it is said that he shall forfeit a moiety only of such joint

chattels as may be severed, and nothing at all of what he was possessed ol as executor or

administrator. 1 Haw. P. C., c. 27, $ 7. The blood of a felo de se is not corrupted, uor his

lands of inheritance forfeited, nor his wife barred of her dower. 1 Haw. P. C., c. 27, §8;

Plowd. 261, b., 2fi2, a.; 1 Hale, P. C. 413. The will of a felo dc se, therefore, becomes void as

to his personal property, but not as to his real estate. Plowd. 261. No part of the personal

estate of a felo de se vests in the king, before the self-murder is found by some inquisition;

and, consequently, the forfeiture thereof is saved by a pardon of the offence before such find-

ing. 5 Co. Rep. 110. b.; 3 Inst. 54. 1 Saund. 362; 1 Sid. 150, 1C2. But if there be no such
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The other species of criminal homicide is that of killing another man. But

in this there are also degrees of guilt, which divide the otfeuce into mannlaughter

aud murder. The difference between which may be partly collected from what

has been incidentally mentioned in the preceding articles, and principally con-

sists in this, that manslaughter, when voluntary, arises from the sudden heat of

the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart.

F *191 1 **' Manslaughter is therefore thus defined, (v) the unlawful killing of

L •" another without malice either express or implied; which may be either

voluntarily, upon a sudden heat; or involuntarily, but in the commission of

some unlawful act. These were called in the Gothic constitutions " homicidia

vnlrjaria; qua aut casu, aut etiam sponte committuntur, sed in subitaneo quo-

dam iracundioe calore et impelu." (w) And hence it follows, that in man-

slaughter there can be no accessories before the fact; because it must be done

without premeditation.

As to the first, or voluntary branch: if upon a sudden quarrel two persons

fight, and one of them kills the other, this is manslaughter: and so it is, if they

upon such an occasion go out and fight in a field; for this is one continued act

of passion: (x) and the law pays that regard to human frailty, as not to put a

hasty and a deliberate act upon the same footing with regard to guilt. So also

if a man be greatly provoked, as by pulling his nose, or other great indignity,

and immediately kills the aggressor, though this is not excusable se defendendo,

since there is no absolute necessity for doing it to preserve himself; yet neither
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is it murder, for there is no previous malice; but it is manslaughter, (y) But

in this and in every other case of homicide upon provocation, if there be a suffi-

cient cooling-time for passion to subside and reason to interpose, and the person

so provoked afterwards kills the other, this is deliberate revenge and not heat of

blood, and accordingly amounts to murder, (z) (12) So if a man takes another in

th-3 act of adultery with his wife, and kills him directly upon the spot: though

this was allowed by the laws of Solon, (a) as likewise by the Roman civil law (if

the adulterer was found in the husband's own house), (b) and also among the

ancient Goths; (c) yet in England it is not absolutely ranked in the class of

I"*1921 Juatifiab'e homicide, as in case of a forcible rape, *but it is man-

L -" slaughter, (d) (13) It is however the lowest degree of it; and therefore

in such a case the court directed the burning in the hand to be gently inflicted,

because there could not be a greater provocation, (e) Manslaughter, therefore, on

a sudden provocation differs from excusable homicide se defendendo in this:

that in one case there is an apparent necessity, for self-preservation, to kill the

aggressor; in the other, no necessity at all, being only a sudden act of revenge.

The second branch, or involuntary manslaughter, differs also from homicide

excusable by misadventure in this; that misadventure always happens in conse-

quence of a lawful act, but, this species of manslaughter in consequence of an

unlawful one. As, if two persons play at sword and buckler, unless by the king's

command, and one of them kills the other: this is manslaughter, because the

original act was unlawful; but it is not murder, for the one had no intent to do

(T) 1 Hal. P. C. 46(1. (w) SUernh. dt >ure QatK. I. 3, c. 4 (x) 1 Hawk. P C. 82 (y) Kelynjr. 135.

fij Post. 29«. fa} Plutarch, in vita Solon. (bj ff. 48, 8, 24. (c) Stlernh. dejwe Goth. 1. 3, c. 2.

(d) \ Hal. P. C. 486. (e) Sir. T. Kaytn. tli.

pardon, the whole is forfeited immediately after snch inquisition, from the time of the act done

by which the death was caused, and all intermediate alienations and titles are avoided. Plowd.

200; 1 Hale, P. C. 29; 5 Co. Rep. 110; Pinch, L. 216. See, also upon this subject, Lambert *.

Tavlor. 0 D. and R. 188; 4 B. aud C. 138.]

the offence of self-murder is not punishable in the United States,

(12) The question what is sufficient cooling time under all the circumstances of the case is

one of fact for the jury, in which the nature of the aggravation is an important consideration.

See Rux ». Lynch, 5 C. and P. 324; Rex c. Hiiyward, liC. and P. 157 ; Maher r. People, 10

Mich. 212. This doctrine though disputed (2 Bish. Or. L. J 648; Whart. Cr. L. $ 984), is never-

theless practically acted upon, and is believed to be sound.

(13) See State B. Samuel, 3 Jones, N. C. 74 ; State v. John, 8 Ired. 330; Vhart. Cr. L. } 983
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the other any personal mischief. (f) So where a person does an act, lawful in it-

Bfltj but iu an nnluwful manner, and without due caution and circumspection :

as when a workman flings down a stone or piece of timber into the street, and kills

u man; this may be either misadventure, manslaughter, or murder, according

to the circumstances under which the original act was done: if it were iu a

country village, where few passengers are, and he calls out to all people to have

a cure, it is misadventure only; but if it were in London, or other populous town,

where people are continually passing, it is manslaughter, though he gives loud

warning; (g) and murder, if he knows of their passing, and gives no warning at

all, for then it is malice against all mankind, (h) And, iu general, when an in-

voluntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it will be either

murder or manslaughter, (i) according to the nature of the act which occasioned

it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious *intent, or in its consequences r *igq -i

naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but, if no more was *• ' -•

intended than a mere civil trespass, it will ouly amount to manslaughter. (/ )

Next, as to the punishment of this degree of homicide: the crime of man-

slaughter amounts to felony, but within the benefit of clergy; and the offender

shall be burnt in the hand, and forfeit all his goods and chattels.

But there is one species of manslaughter which is punished as murder, the

benefit of clergy being taken away from it by statute; namely, the offence of

mortally stabbing another, though done upon, sudden provocation. For by

statute J Jac. I, c. 8, when one thrusts or stabs another, not then having a weapon
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drawn, or who hath not then first stricken the party stabbing, so that he dies

thereof within six mouths after, the offender shall, not have the benefit of clergy,

though he did it not of malice aforethought. This statute was made on account

of the frequent quarrels and stabbings with short daggers, between the Scotch

and the English at the accession of James the First, (K) and being therefore of

a temporary nature, ought to have expired with the mischief which it meant to

remedy. For in point of solid and substantial justice, it cannot be said that the

mode of killing, whether by stabbing, strangling, or shooting, can either extenu-

ate or enhance the guilt; unless where, as in case of poisoning it carries

with it an internal evidence of cool and deliberate malice. But the benignity

of the law hath construed the statute so favourably in behalf of the subject, and

so strictly when against him, that the offence of stabbing now stands almost

upon the same footing as it did at the common law. (/) Thus, (not to repeat the

cases before mentioned, of stabbing an adulteress. &c. which are barely man-

slaughter, as at common law), in the construction of this statute it hath been

doubted whether, if the deceased had_ struck at all before the mortal blow given,

this does not take it out of the statute, though in the preceding quarrel the

stabber had given the first blow; and *it seems to be the better opinion r *,„. -i

that this is not within the statute. (MI) Also it hath been resolved, that I -I

the killing a man by throwing a hammer or other blunt weapon is not within

the statute; and whether a shot with a pistol be so or not, is doubted. (H) But

if the party slain had a cudgel in his hand, or had thrown a pot or bottle, or dis-

charged a pistol at the party stabbing, this is a sufficient having a weapon drawn

on his side within the words of the statute, (o) (14)

2. We are next to consider the crime of deliberate and wilful murder; a

crime at which human nature starts, and which is, I believe, punished almost

universally throughout the world with death. The words of the Mosaical law

(over and above the general precept to Noah, (p) that "whoso sheddeth man's

blood, by man shall his blood be shed"), are very emphatical in prohibiting the

(f) 3 lUBt. M. (g) Kel. 40. (h) 3 lost. 57.

(i'l Our statute law has severely animadverted on one specie* of criminal negligence, whereby the death

of» man is occasioned, for by statute 10 Qoo. II, c. .11. ii'any waterman between UraveMnd and Windsor re-

ceives into his boat or barge a greater number of persons than the act allows, and any passenger ahull thou be

drowned, sueh waterman Ugniltv (not of manslaughter, but) of fch>ny, and shall be transported aft a lelou.

(}) Ko-4. -X». I Hawk. P. C. 84. ft) Loid Ravm. 140. fll Post. 29tt, JOO.

(m) *'o»t. 301. 1 Hawk. P. q 77. (*) \ Hal. P. C. 470. (o) \ Hawk. P. C. 77. Q>.) Gen. I*. 9

(14) The statute 1 James I, c. 8. is repealed. The crime of attempt to murderiS-jHwiSfiable

under -JI and 8& Vie. o. 100. Murder and manslaughter aw punishable under the same statute,
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pardon of murderers, (q) "Moreover ye shall take no satisfaction for the life

of a murderer, who is guilty of death, but he shall surely be put to death; for

the laud cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein but by the blood

of him that shed it." And therefore our law has provided one course of prose-

cution (that by appeal, of which hereafter), wherein the king himself is excluded

the power of pardoning murder; so that, were the king of England so inclined,

he could not imitate the Polish monarch mentioned by Pufiendorf: (r) who

thought proper to remit the penalties of murder to all the nobility, in an edict,

with this arrogant preamble, " nos, divini juris rigorem modcrantes" &c. But

let us now consider the definition of this great offence.

The name of murder (as a crime) was anciently applied only to the secret

killing of another; (s) (which the word moerda signifies in the Teutonic lan-

guage) ; (t) and it was defined, " homicidium quod nullo vidente, nullo sciente,

clam perpetrattir:" (u) for which the vill wherein it was committed or (if that

F *19" 1 were k°° Poor) *ne whole hundred was liable to a heavy 'amercement;

L ° J which amercement itself was also denominated murdrum. (to) This was

an ancient usage among the Goths in Sweden and Denmark; who supposed the

neighbourhood, unless they produced the murderer, to have perpetrated, or at

least connived at the murder; (x) and, according to Bracton. (y) was introduced

into this kingdom by King Canute, to prevent nis countrymen the Danes from

being privily murdered by the English; and was afterwards continued by Wil-

liam the Conqueror, for the like security to his own Normans, (z) And there-
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fore if upon inquisition had, it appeared that the person found slain was an

Englishman (the presentment whereof was denominated englescherie), (a) the

country seems to have been excused from this burthen. But, this difference

being totally abolished by statute 14 Edw. Ill, c. 4, we must now (as is observed

by Staundford) (b) define murder in quite another manner, without regarding

whether the party slain was killed openly or secretly,or whether he was of Eng-

lish or foreign extraction.

Murder is therefore now thus denned, or rather described, by Sir Edward

Coke: (c) "when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth

any reasonable creature in being, and under the king's peace, with malice afore-

thought, either express or implied." The best way of examining the nature of

this crime will be by considering the several branches of this definition.

First, it must be committed by a person of sound memory and discretion; for

lunatics or infants, as was formerly observed, are incapable of committing any

crime: unless in such cases where they show a consciousness of doing wrong,

and of course a discretion, or discernment, between good and evil.

Next it happens when a person of such sound discretion unlawfully killeth.

F*196l "^ne unkwf"11!11688 arises from the killing without *warrant or excuse:

L J and there must also be an actual killing to constitute murder; for a

bare assault, with intent to kill, is only a great misdemeanor, though formerly

it was held to be murder, (d) The killing may be by poisoning, striking, starv-

ing, drowning, and a thousand other forms of death, by which human nature may

be overcome. And if a person be indicted for one species of killing, as by

poisoning, he cannot be convicted by evidence of a tolally different species of

death, as by shooting with a pistol, or starving. But where they only differ in

circumstances, as if a wound be alleged to be given with a sword, and it proves to

have arisen from a staff, an ax, or a hatchet, this difference is immaterial, (e) (15)

(<t) NwubTiSSfrSE' (r) L. of N. 1. 8, c. 3. (s) Dial, de Scacch. J. I, c. 10. .

ft) Stiernh. dejurc Sueon. I. 3, c. 3. The wwd murdre in our old statutes also signified any kind of con-

cealment or stilling. So in the statute of Exeter, li Kdw. I, " je rieiu ne celerat, ne tutferai ettre cele ne

munlre;" which is thus translated in Fleta. I 1, e. IS. f 4. JfuUam veritatem cclabo, nee i-eiari aermittam

nee murdrari." And the words • • pur murdre le ilroit," in the articles of that statute, are rendered in Kleta,

ibid. 5 8. " pro jure allcujui murdrando."

fu) (ilanv. I. 14, c 3. (K) Uract. I. 3, tr. 1, c. 15, ( 7. Stat. Marl. c. 26. Fost, 281.

(x) Stiernh. I. 3. c. 4. (uj I. 3, tr. 2, c. 15. (z) 1 Hal. P. C. 447. (a) Bract, uptmpr.

(b) P. C. I. 1, a. 10. (c)tnst.n. (d) 1 Hal. P. C. 425. (e) 3 last. 319. « Hal. P. C. 18.1.

(15) [Soe 1 Eaat, P. C. 341, and Sharwin's Case, there cited, in which it was held that an

Bvorment of an assault with a woodett staff, was satisfied by proof of an assault with a stone;
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Of all species of deaths, the most detestable is that of poison; because it can

of all others be the least prevented either by manhood or forethought. (/) And

therefore by the statute 22 H. VIII, c. 2, it was made treason, and a more griev-

ous and lingering kind of death was inflicted on it than the common law

allowed, namely, boiling to death: (16) but this act did not live long, being

repealed by 1 £dw. VI, c. 12. There was also by the ancient common law,

one species of killing held to be murder, which may be dubious at this day; as

there hath not been an instance wherein it has been held to be murder for many

ages past: (g) I mean by bearing false witness against another, with an express

premeditated design to take away his life, so as the innocent person be con-

demned and executed. (A) The Gothic laws punished, in this case, both the

judge, the witnesses, and the prosecutor: "peculiari pcena judicem puniunt;

peculiari testes quorum fides judicem seduxit: peculiari denique et maxima

auctorem, ut homicidum. (i) And, among the Romans, the lex Cornelia

de sicariis, punished the false witness with death, as being guilty of a

species of assassination, (k) And there is no doubt but this is equally murder

in foro conscienticB as killing with a *sword ; though the modern law r*igg-|

(to avoid the danger of deterring witnesses from giving evidence upon *- -"

capital prosecutions, if it must be at the peril of their own lives) has not yet

punished it as such. If a man however does such an act of which the probable con-

sequence may be, and eventually is death ; such killing may be murder, although

no stroke be struck by himself, and no killing be primarily intended: as was
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the case of the unnatural son who exposed his sick father to the air, against

f/} 3 Inst. 48.

(ff] fast. 132. In the case of Macdaniel and Berry, reported by sir Michael Foster, though the then attor-

ney -general declined to argue tills point of law, I have tfood grounds to believe it was not from any appre-

hension of his that the point was not maintainable, but from other prudential reasons. Nothing therefore

should be concluded from the waiving of that prosecution.

(ft) Mirror, c. 1, { 9. Brit c. 02. Bract I. 8. c. 4.

li) Stiernh. dejure Goth. I. 3, c. 3. (/•) f/. 48. 8. 1.

the effect being the same. See Rex ». Dale, 13 Price, 172 ; 9 J. B. Moore, 19. A stroke must

be expressly averred, and an indictment stating that the prisoner murdered, or gave a mortal

•wound, without saying that he struck, is bad. Rex v. Long, 5 Co. Rep. 122, a; 1 East, P. C.

342. It must also be stated upon what part of the body the deceased was struck: 2 Hale,

P. C. 185 ; and the length and depth of the wound must be shown. Id. 186; Haydon's Case, 4

Co. Rep. 42, u. Where there are several wounds, the length and breadth of each need not be

stated. Rex v. Mosley, R. <fc M. C. C. 97. And see Young's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 40; "Walker's

Cose, id. 41; Rex v. Lorkin, 1 Bulstr. 124 ; 2 Hale, P. C., 184 ; Rex «. Dale. R. and M. C. C. 5,

as to the wound, cause of death, <fce. ^iVTiere the death proceeded from suffocation from the

swelling up of the passage of the throat, and such swellings proceeded from wounds occa-

sioned by forcing something into the throat, it was held sufficient to state in the indictment,

that the things were forced into the throat, and the person thereby suffocated: and that the

process immediately causing the suffocation, namely the swelling, need not be stated. Rex

». Tye, R. and R. C. C. 345. The death, by the means stated, must be positively averred, and

cannot be inferred : 1 East, P. C. 343 ; and where the death is occasioned by a stroke, it must

bo further alleged that the prisoner gave the deceased a mortal wound, <tc., whereof he died.

2 Hale, P. C. 186; Kel. 125; Lad's Case, Leach, 96. The time and place both of the wound

and of the death must be stated, in order to show that the deceased died within a year

and a day from the cause of the death; in computing which the day of the act done is

reckoned the first; though a precise statement of the day is immaterial,. if the party is proved

to have died within the limited period. 2 Inst. 318; 2 East, P. C. 344. The word murdered

is absolutely necessary in the indictment. 2 Hale, P. C. 187.]

The common-law rule in setting forth the instrument of death is, that where the instrument

laid and that proved are of the same nature and character, there is no variance, but where

they are of an opposite nature and character, the contrary. Whan. Cr. L. § 1059. Thus, evi-

dence of a dagger will support the averment of a knife, but evidence of a knife will not sup-

port the averment of a pistol. If the indictment allege a death by one kind of poison, proof

of a death by another kind of poison will support the indictment. Id.

(16) [This extraordinary punishment seems to have been adopted by the legislature, from

the peculiar circumstances of the crime which gave rise to it; for the preamble of the statute

informs us, that John Roose, a cook, had been lately convicted of throwing poison into a

large pot of broth, prepared for the bishop of Rochester's family, and for the poor of the

pan*h ; and the said John Roose, was, by a retrospective clause of the same statute, ordered

to be boiled to death. Lord Coke mentions several instances of persons suffering this horrid

punishment. 3 Inst. 48.

415

197 HOMICIDE. [Book IV.

his will, by reason whereof he died; (Z) of the harlot who laid her child un-

der leaves* in an orchard, where a kite struck it and killed it; (/«) and of the

parish officers, who shifted a child from parish to parish, till it died from want

of care and sustenance, (n) (17) So, too, if a man hath a beast that is used to do

mischief; and he knowing it, suffers it to go abroad, and it kills a man;

even this is manslaughter in the owner: but if he hud purposely turned it

loose, though barely to frighten people, and make what is called sport, it is with us

(as in the Jewish law) as much murder as if he had incited a bear or dog to

worry them, (o) If a physician or surgeon gives his patient a potion or plaster

to cure him, which contrary to expectation, kills him, this is neither murder

nor manslaughter, but misadventure; and he shall not be punished crimin-

ally, however liable he might formerly have been to a civil action for neglect

or ignorance : (p) (18) but it hath been holden, that if it be not a regular physi-

cian or surgeon, who administers the medicine or performs the operation, it

is manslaughter at the least. (q\ Yet Sir Matthew Hale very justly questions

the law of this determination, (r) (19) In order also to make the killing mur-

der, it is requisite that the party die within a year and a day after the

stroke received, or cause of death administered; in the computation of

which, the whole day upon which the hurt was done shall be reckoned the

first, (s)

Farther; the person killed must be "a reasonable creature in being, and

r *TQQ -j under the kiny's peace," at the time of the *killing. Therefore to kill
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' -I an alien, a Jew, or an outlaw, who were all under the king's peace and

protection, is as much murder as to kill the most regular-born Englishman;

except he be an alien enemy in time of war. (/) To kill a child in its mother's

womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the child be bom alive,

and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems,

by the better opinion, to be murder in such as administered or gave them. («)

B'ut, as there is one case where it is difficult to prove the child's being born

alive, namely, in the case of the mnrder of bastard children by the unnatural

mother, it is enacted by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 27, that if any woman be delivered

of a child which if born alive should by law be a bastard; and endeavours pri-

vately to conceal its death, by burying the child or the like; the mother so

offending shall suffer death as in the case of murder, unless she can prove, by

one witness a.t least, that the child was actually born dead. This law, which

savours pretty strongly of severity in making the concealment of the death

almost conclusive evidence of the child's being murdered by the mother, is

nevertheless to be also met with in the criminal codes of many other nations of

Europe; as the Danes, the Swedes, and the French, (v) But 1 apprehend it has

(I) 1 H»wk, P. C. 78. (m> I Hal. P. C. «S. (n) Palm MS. (o)IMd. 431.

<f) Mirr. c. 4, j 14 Sea book III, pace 121 (ai Britt. n. 5. 4 Hi at. 2.11. frj 1 Hal. P. C. 430.

fs) 1 Uawk. P. C. 79. ftj a Insl. 30. 1 Hal. P. C. 433.

(v) 3 lust. 90. 1 Hawk. P. C. 80, but see, 1 Hal. P. C. 4X1. (r) See Harrington on the statutes, 1-5.

(17) [Or if a master refuse his apprentice necessary lood or sustenance, or treat him with

such continued harshness and seventv as bis death is occasioned thereby, the law will imply

malice, and the offence will be murder. Leach, 127; ii Camp. 650; and see 1 Rnss. 681. If

a prisoner die by the cruelty or neglect of the gaoler, or, in legal language, by duress of im-

prisonment, the" party actually offending is criminal in this degree, Fost. 321; and see 2 Stra.

8T>t); 2 Lord Raym. 1578; Fost. 322. Laying noisome and poisonons filth at a man's door,

which kills him by corrupting the air which he breathes, will be murder. 1 Hale, 432.]

On this subject see 2 Bish. Cr. L. $$ 599—610; Roscoe Cr. Er. 4$ 665—670; Ann v. SUte, 11

Humph. 159.

(IB) [Such persons are clearly still liable to a civil action, where gross negligence or igno-

rance can be proved : Slater e. Baker, 2 TVils. 359; Seare v. Prentice, 8 Bast, 348; and it wcmld

also be a good defence to an action by an apothecary on his bill, that he had treated his patieut

ignorantly or improperly. Kannea P. M'MuIlen, Peake, 59.]

"To the same effect, see Piper p. Menifee, 12 B. Monr. 465; Leighton ». Sargent, 11 Fost.

119; Simonds v. Henry, 39 Me. 155 (case of a dentist).

(19) See also Commonwealth e. Thompson, 6 Mass. 134; Rice v. State, 8 Mo. 561; Bex r.

Itamson, 3 C. and P. 635; Bex ?. Long, 4 id. 35W; Bex v. Spiller, 5 id. 333.
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of late years been usual with us in England, upon trials for this offence, to

require some sort of presumptive evidence that the child was born alive, before

the other constrained presumption (that the child whose death is concealed

was therefore killed by its parent) is admitted to convict the prisoner.(20)

Lastly, the killing must be committed with malice aforethought, to make it the

crime of murder. This is the grand criterion which now distinguishes murder

from other killing: and this malice prepense malitia prcecogitata, is not so

properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil design

in general: the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; (w) nn dis-

position a faire un male chose ; (x) and it may be either express or implied in

law. Express "malice is when one, with a sedate deliberate mind and r*i QQI

formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is evidenced by <- J

external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as lying in wait,

antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do him some

bodily harm.(y) This takes in the case of deliberate duelling, where both parties

meet avowedly with an intent to murder: thinking it their duty as gentlemen,

and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own lives and those of their

fellow creatures; without any warrant or authority from any power either

divine or human, but in direct contradiction to the laws both of God and man;

and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of murder on

them, and on their seconds also.(z)(21) Yet it requires such a degree of passive

valour to combat the dread of even undeserved contempt, arising from the false
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notions of honour too generally received in Europe, that the strongest prohibi-

tions and penalties of the law will never be entirely effectual to eradicate this

unhappy custom; till a method be found out of compelling the original aggres-

sor to make some other satisfaction to the affronted party, which the world

shall esteem equally reputable, as that which is now given at the hazard of the

life and fortune, as well of the person insulted, as of him who hath given the

insult.(22) Also, if even upon a sudden provocation one beats another in a

cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, though he did not intend his death,

yet he is guilty of murder by express malice: that is, by an express evil design,

the genuine sense of malitia. As, when a park-keeper tied a boy that was steal-

ing wood, to a horse's tail, and dragged him along the park; when a master

(w) Foster, 256. (x) 2 Roll. Bep. 461. (y) 1 Hal. P. C. 451. (z) I Hawk. P. C. 82.

(20) Statute 21 James I, c. 27, is repealed. The present law on the subject of this para-

graph is 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.

(21) [Wherever two persona in cold blood meet and fight on a precedent quarrel, and one

of them is killed, the other is guilty of murder, and cannot excuse himself by alleging that

he was first struck by the deceased ; or that he had often declined to meet him, and was pre-

vailed upon to do it by his importunity; or that his only intent was to vindicate his reputa-

tion ; or that he meant not to kill, but only to disarm his adversary : for as he deliberately

eugaged in un act in defiance of the law, he must at his peril abide the consequences. 1 Haw.

P. C. c. 31, $ 21; 1 Bulstr. 86, 87; 2 id. 147; Croni. 22, 26; 1 Rol. Rep. 360; 3 Bulstr. 171;

1 Hale, 1*. C. 48. Therefore, if two persona quarrel over night, and appoint to fight the next

day, or quarrel in the morning, and agree to fight in the afternoon, or such a considerable

time after, by which, in common intendment. it must bo presumed that the blood was cooled,

and then they meet and fight, and one kill the other, he is guilty of murder. 1 Haw. P. C. c.

31, $ 22 ; 3 fnst. 51; 1 Hale, P. C. 48; Kel. 56; 1 Lev. 180.]

(28) [See the law of duelling fully stated 3 Kast Rep. 531; 6 East, 464; 2 Bar. and Aid.

462; Keg. v. Young, 8 C. and P.'644 ;" Reg. ». Cuddy, 1 0. and K. 210.]

See the case of Commonwealth v. Webster 5 Cush. 295, for the meaning of " malice afore-

thought." Also State r. Martin, 2 Ired. 101; Whiteford v. Commonwealth, 6 Rand. 721; Bale

r. State. 10 Yerg. 551; Shoemaker «. State, 12 Ohio, 43; U. S. r. Ross, 1 Gratt. 624. The

words "premeditated design," it has been held, mean in legal effect the same as "malice

aforethought." McDaniel v. State, 8 S. and M. 401. Whether it is legally with malice afore-

thought when one is killed upon the sudden impulse of passion without previous design, com-

pare Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295, and People r. Austin, 1 Park C. R. 154, with

Clark v. State, 8 Humph. 671, and Bevins v. State, 6 Eng. 455, and the ca^es referred to

in each.
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corrected his servant with an iron bar; arid a schoolmaster stamped on his

scholar's belly; so that each of the sufferers died: these were justly held to be

murders, because the correction being excessive, and such as could not proceed

but from a bad heart, it was equivalent to a deliberate act of slaughter.(rt)('»!3)

F*2001 ^e'*;'K'r shall be be guilty of a less crime, who kills another *in conse-

-" quence of snch a wilful act as shows him to be an enemy to nil man-

kind in general; as going deliberately, and with intent to do mischief,(£) upun

a horse used to strike, or coolly discharging a gun among a multitude of

people.(c) So, if a man resolves to kill the next man he meets, and does kill

him, it is murder, although he knew him not; for this is universal malice. And,

if two or more come together to do an unlawful act against the king's peace, ot

which the probable consequences might be bloodshed, as to beat a man, to com-

mit a riot, or to rob a park: and one of them kills a man ; it is murder in them

all, because of the unlawful act, the malitia prcecoyilata, or evil in tended before-

hand.(d)(24)

Also, in many cases where no malice is expressed, the law will imply it, as,

where a man wilfully poisons another; in such a deliberate act the law presumes

(a) 1 Hal. P. C. 454, 473, 474. (fc) Lord Raym. 148. (c) 1 Hawk. P. C. 74. (d) Ibid. 84.

(23) Homicide may be and is often extenuated by the circumstances of a mutual contest

;iri in:- from the spur of the occasion, where no undue advantage is either sought or taken

by either of the parties. See 5 Burr. 2793, and cases cited; 1 East, P. C. 241 to 246. And in

this caxe, it is of no consequence from whom the first provocation arises. 1 Hale, 45G. But
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if one with his sword drawn makes a pass at another whose sword is undrawn, and a combat

ensues, if the fanner be killed, it will only be manslaughter in the latter; but if the latter

fall, it will be murder in the former, for by making the pass before his adversary's sword was

drawn, he evinced an intention not to right with but to destroy him. Hel. 61; Hawk. c. 31, s.

33, 34 (a). And where a man upon occasion of some angry words, threw a bottle at the head

of his opponent and immediately drew, and when his adversary returned the bottle, stabbed

him; this was balden to be murder in him, because he drew previous to the first aggression.

Kel. 119; 2 Ld. Raym. 1489. So if two bailiffs arrest a man, and he abuse and threaten aud

strike them, and bring pistols, declaring that lie will not be forced from his house, and on

high words arising between them, and on the bailiff's being struck and provoked, they fall on

him and kill him, they will be guilty of manslaughter only. 6 Hargr. St. Tr. 195; Fast. 292,

294. And where, on an affray in a street, a soldier run to the combatants, and in his way a

woman struck him in the face with an iron patten and drew a great deal of blood, on which

he struck her on the breast with the pommel of his sword; and on her rnnniug away, imme-

diately followed and stabbed her in the back; he was holden to be guilty simply of felonious

homicide: Fust. 292; see 5 Burr. 2794 : and where after mutual blows between the prisoner

and the deceased, the prisoner knocked down the deceased, and after he was upon the ground

stamped upon his stomach and belly with great force, it was held manslaughter only. Russ.

and Ky. C. C. 166. On a quarrel between a partv of keel-men and soldiers, one of the latter

drew his sword to protect himself and his comrades from the assaults of the mob, and killed

a person dressed like one of the former, whom he mistook for one of the keel-men, and this

•was held to be no more than manslaughter. Brown's case, 1 Leach, 148. If A stands with

an offensive weapon in the door-way of a room, wrongfully to prevent T. S. from leaving

it, and others from entering, and C, who has a right to the room, struggles with him to get

his weapon from him, upon which 1), a comrade of A, stabs C, it will be murder in D if 0

dies. Russ. and Ky. C. C. 228. See a late case, where the judges, entertaining doubts as to

whether the prisoner who killed another in an affray was guilty of murder, recommended

him to a pardon. Rnss and Ry. C. C. 43. "Where, after mutual provocation, the deceased

and his opponent struggled, and in the course of the contest the former received his mortal

wounds from a knife which the latter had previously in his hand in nse, though the jury

found the prisoner guilty of murder, the judges held the conviction wrong, and recommended

him for a pardon. 1 Leach, 151. But m no case will previous provocation avail, if it was

239, 240.]

(24) Where in an act which is not malum in se, but malnm prohibitum (it being prohibited,

except to persons of a certain description), as shooting at game, an unqualified person will

not lie more guilty, if in shooting no accidentally kills a human being, than one who u

qualified. 1 Hale, 475; Fost. 259.]*"
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malice, though no particular enmity can be proved.(e) And if a man kills

another suddenly, without any, or without a considerable, provocation, the law

implies malice; for no person, unless of an abandoned heart, would be guilty

of such an act, upon a slight or no apparent cause. No affront, by words or

gestures only, is a sufficient provocation, so as to excuse or extenuate such acts

of violence as manifestly endanger the life of auother.(/) But if the person

so provoked had unfortunately killed the other, by beating him in such a manner

as showed only an intent to chastise and not to kill him, the law so far con-

siders the provocation of contumelious behaviour as to adjudge it only man-

slaughter, and not murder.(</) In like manner, if one kills an officer of justice,

either civil or criminal, in the execution of his duty, or any of his assistants,

endeavouring to conserve the peace, or any private person endeavouring to sup-

press an affray or apprehend a felon, knowing his authority or the intention

with which he interposes, the law will imply malice, and the killer shall be

guilty of murder,(A) And if one intends to do another felony, *and r*nAi ]

undcsignedly kills a man, this is also murder.(i') Thus if one shootsat A*- *" '

and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because of the previous felonious

intent, which the law transfers from one to the other. The same is the case

where one lays poison for A; and B, against whom the prisoner had no malicious

intent, takes it, and it kills him; this is likewise murder.(;) So also if one

gives a woman with child a medicine to procure abortion and it operates so vio-

lently as to kill the woman, this is murder in the person who gave it.(&) It
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were endless to go through all the cases of homicide which have been adjudged,

either expressly or impliedly, malicious: these, therefore, may suffice as a speci-

men ; and we may take it for a general rule, that all homicide is malicious, and,

of course, amounts to murder, unless where justified by the command or per-

mission of the law; excuxedou the account of accident or self-preservation ; or

alleviated into manslaughter, by being either the involuntary consequence of

some act, not strictly lawful, or (if voluntary), occasioned by some sudden and

sufficiently violent provocation. And all these circumstances of justification, ex-

cuse, or alleviation, it is incumbent upon the prisoner to make out, to the satis-

faction of the court and jury: the latter of whom are to decide whether the

circumstances alleged are proved to have actually existed; the former, how far

they extend to take away or mitigate guilt. For all homicide is presumed to

be malicious, until the contrary appeareth upouevidence.(/)(25)

The punishment of murder and that of manslaughter, was formerly one and

the same; both having the benefit of clergy; so that none but unlearned per-

sons, who least knew the guilt of it, Avere put to death for this enormous

crime.(w) But now by several statutes, (n) the benefit of clergy is taken

away from murderers through malice prepense, their abettors, procurers, ami

counsellors. In atrocious cases it was frequently usual for the court to direct

the murderer, after execution, to be hung upon a gibbet in chains near the

place *where the fact was committed: but this was no part of the legal r*o()2 1

judgment; and the like is still sometimes practised in the case of L '

notorious thieves. This, being quite contrary to the express command of the

Mosaical law,(o) seems to have been borrowed from the civil law: which, besides

the terror of the example, gives also another reason for this practice, viz.:

that it is a comfortable sight to the relations and friends of the deceased.(^)

(c) 1 Hal. P. C. 4.V,. (f) I Hawk. P. C. 82. 1 Hal. P. C. 46r>. 45fl. (g) Kost. 291.

fhj I Hiil. P. C. 457. Fost. *W, Ac. (ijlfM.V.V.WA. (i)Ibid.lM. (k) /6W.4M.

fmj 1 Hal. H. (J. 430. (n) 13 lion VIII, <:. 1. 1. Eilw. VI. c. ]2. 4 ami 5 I'll, iiiul SI. c. 4.

(oj -'The Imily of a malefactor shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shall In any wise

bury him (hat (lay, that the html he not dollliMl." Dent, xxi, 23.

(p) '• Famosos liitroncs. in hist locift. ubi grnnnttti stint, fitrctt jiyeitdos placuit i ut, ct conspfcht deterreantttr

aliii. et foltitio sit coniuitli interemlttorum ewlcm toco paena reddita, in quo latrones honiicittiu fecisvent.''

t'f. 48. 19. 2rt. i 15. __

(SJ5) As the majority of homicides lire not, i« fact, tntilicious, but occur through misadventure,

or under circumstances which would reduce the offence to manslaughter, a legal presumption

of malice seems inconsistent with the general doctrines of the criminal law, as well as with hu

rnanity. On this subject the reader is referred to the Review of the Trial of Prof. Webster, by

Hon. Joel Parker. North American Review, ~$o. 72, p. 176.
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But now in England, it is enacted by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 37, that the judge,

before whom any person is found guilty of wilful murder, shall pronounce sen-

te"nce immediately after conviction, unless he sees cause to postpone it; and

shall, in passing sentence, direct him to be executed on the next day but one

(unless the same shall be Sunday, and then on the Monday following), and that

his body be delivered to the surgeons to be dissected and anatomized :(q) and

that the judge may direct his body to be afterwards hung in chains, but in no-

wise to be buried without dissection. And, during the short but awful interval

between sentence and execution, the prisoner shall be kept alone, and sustained

with only bread and water. But a power is allowed to the judge, upon good

and sufficient cause, to respite the execution, and relax the other restraints of

this act.(26)

By the Roman law, parricide, or the murder of one's parents or children,

was "punished in a much severer manner than any other kind of homicide.

After being scourged, the delinquents were sewed up in a leathern sack, with a

live dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape, and so cast into the sea.(r) Solon, it is

true, m his laws, made none against parricide ; apprehending it impossible that

any one should be guilty of so unnatural a barbarity.(s) And the Persians,

according to Herodotus, entertained the same notion, when they adjudged all

persons who killed their reputed parents to be bastards. And, upon some such

r*°03 1 reason as this* we must account for *the omission of an exemplary pun-

L " J ishment for this crime in our English laws ; which treat it no otherwise
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than as simple murder, unless the child was also the servant of his parent.(<)

For, though the breach of natural relation is unobserved, yet the breach of

civil or ecclesiastical connexions, when coupled with murder, denominates it a

new offence, no less than a species of treason, called parvo proditio, or petit

treason : which however is nothing else but an aggravated degree of murder ;(«)

although, on account of the violation of private allegiance, it is stigmatized as

an inferior species of treason. (») And thus, in the ancient Gothic constitution,

we find the breach both of natural and civil relations ranked in the same class

with crimes against the state and the sovereign. (ro)

Petit treason, (27) according to the statute 25 Edw. Ill, c. 2, may happen

three ways, by a servant killing his master, a wife her husband, or an ecclesias-

tical person (either secular or regular) his superior, to whom he owes faith and

obedience. A servant who kills his master, whom he has left, upon a grudge

conceived against him during his service, is guilty of petit treason : for the

traitorous intention was hatched while the relation subsisted between them;

and this is only an execution of that intention.(a;) So, if a wife be divorced

a mensa et thoro, still the vinculum matrimonii subsists ; and if she kills such

divorced kusband, she is a traitress. (y) And a clergyman is understood to owe

canonical obedience to the bishop who ordained him, to him in whose diocese

he is beneficed, and also to the metropolitan of such suffragan or diocesan

bishop : and therefore to kill any of these is petit treason.(z) As to the rest,

whatever has been said, or remains to be observed hereafter, with respect to wil-

ful murder, is also applicable to the crime of petit treason, which is no other

F*204l ^lan mur<^er 'n *its most odious degree: except that the trial shall be

' J as in cases of high treason, before the improvements therein made by

the statutes of William III.(a) But a person indicted of petit treason may be

acquitted thereof, and found guilty of manslaughter or murder :(b) and in such

(?) Fost. 107. (r) ly. 41, 9, 9. («) Cic. pro. S. Soscto, I 95. (t) 1 Hal. P. C. 380.

(«! Foster. 107, 324, 336. (»> See page 75.

(«') " Omnium gravissima ccnsetur rts facto ab incolls in patriam. subdittsin regem, liberis in parent'*,

mantis in uxores (et vice veraa\, aervte in dominos, aut etiam ab homine in semet ipsam. Stiorn. <ie jure Co/A.

I. 3 c. ».

(z\ 1 Hawk. P. C. 89. 1 Hal. P. C. 880. (y) 1 Hal. P. C. 381. (z) I lid. (a) Fost. 337.

(&) Foster, 106. I Hal P. C. 378. 8 Hal. P. C. 184.

(2G) The act 25 Geo. II, c. 37, is repealed, and by 6 and 7 "Wm. IV, c. 30, sentence of death

in cases of murder was made the same as in other capital cases.

(27) Petit treason is unknown to the law of the United States, and was abolished in England

by statute 9 Geo. IT, o. 31, B. 2.
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case it should seem that two witnesses are not necessary, as in case of petit

treason they are. Which crime is also distinguished from murder in its punish-

ment.

The punishment of petit treason, in a man, is to be drawn and hanged, and

in a woman to be drawn and burnt: (c) the idea of which latter punishment

seems to have been handed down to us by the laws of the ancient Druids, which

condemned a woman to be burnt for murdering her husband; (d) and it is now the

usual punishment for all sorts of treason committed by those of the female

sex. (e) (28) Persons guilty of petit treason were first debarred the benefit of clergy,

by statute 12 Hen. VII, c. 7, which has been since extended to their aiders, abet-

tors and councellors, by statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 4.

CHAPTER XV.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS.

HAVING in the preceding chapter considered the principal crime, or public

wrong, that can be committed against a private subject, namely, by destroying

his life; I proceed now to inquire into such other crimes and misdemeanors, as

more peculiarly affect the security of his person, while living.

Of these some are felonies, and in their nature capital; others are simple mis-

demeanors, and punishable with a lighter animadversion. Of the felonies, the

first is that of mayhem.

1. Mayhem, mayhem.ium, was in part considered in the preceding book, (a) as

a civil injury; but it is also looked upon in a criminal light by the law,being an
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atrocious breach of the king's peace, and an offence tending to deprive him of

the aid and assistance of his subjects. For mayhem is properly defined to be,

as we may remember, the violently depriving another of the use of such of his

members as may render him the less able in fighting, either to defend himself, or to

annoy his adversary, (b) And therefore the cutting off, or disabling, or weakening

a man's hand or finger, or striking out his eye or foretooth, or depriving him of

those parts the loss of which in all animals abates their courage, are held to

*be mayhems. But the catting off his ear, or nose, or the like, are not r „„„„ -,

held to be mayhems at common law; because they do not weaken but I- -"

only disfigure him.

By the ancient law of England he that maimed any man, whereby he lost any

part of his body, was sentenced to lose the like part; membrum pro membro; (c)

which is still the law in Sweden, (d) But this went afterwards out of use: partly

because the law of retaliation, as was formerly shown, (e) is at best an inadequate

rule of punishment; and partly because upon a repetition of the offence the

punishment could not be repeated. So that, by the common law, as it for a

long time stood, mayhem was only punishable with fine and imprisonment; (/)

unless perhaps the offence of mayhem by castration, which all our old writers

held to be felony: "et sequitur aliqwando pcena, capitalis, aliquando perpetuum

exilium, cum omnium bonorum ademptione." (g) And this, although the may-

hem was committed upon the highest provocation. (h)

fcj 1 Hal. P. C. 382. 3 Inst. 811. (d) Ciesar de beU. Gall. I. fl, c. 18. (e) See page 93.

(a) Sec book III. page 121. (b) Britt. 1. 1, c. 25. 1 Hawk. P. C. HI.

(c) A last. 118.—Met, »> lapteynte soitfaite de/emme qit'avera tolle a home see membres, en tiel caxeperdra

leftme lii tine meyn par jugement. come lemembre dontit de avera treipatae. (Brit. c. 25.)

(d) ~ lii'vuliiMtk dejttrt Sutoit. I. 8. t, 8. (e) See page 12.

ff) 1 Hawk. P. C. 112. (a) Brac./oJ. 144.

(h) Sir Ed ward Coke (3 Inst. 62| has transcribed a record of Henry the Third's time (Clout. 13 Hen. Ill, m.

B;, by which a gentleman of Somersetshire and his wife appear to have been apprehended and committed

to prison, being indicted for dealing thus with John, the monk, who was caught in adultery with the wife.

(26) It vroa abolished by 30 Geo. Ill, o. 48. The punishment is now death by hanging.

206 OFFENCES AGAINST PERSONS OF INDIVIDUALS. [Book IV.

But subsequent statutes have put the crime and punishment of mayhem

more out of doubt. For first, by statute 5 Henry IV, c. 5, to remedy a mis-

chief that then prevailed of beating, wounding, or robbing a man, and then

cutting out his tongue, or putting out his eyes, to prevent him from being an

evidence against them, this offence is declared to be felony, if done of malice

prepense; that is, as Sir Edward Coke (i) explains it, voluntarily, and of set

purpose, though done upon a sudden occasion. Next, in order of time, is the

statute of 37 Hen. VIII, c. 6, which directs, that if a man shall maliciously and

T *2071 unlawfully cu^ °ff the ear of any of the *king's subjects, he shall not

"• J only forfeit treble damages to the party grieved, to be recovered by action

of trespass at common law, as a civil satisfaction; but also 101. by way of fine

to the king, which was his criminal amercement. The last statute, but by far

the most severe and effectual of all, is that of 22 and 23 Car. II, c, 1, culled the

Coventry Act; being occasioned by an assault on Sir John Coventry in the

street, and slitting his nose, in revenge (as was supposed) for some obnoxious

words uttered by him in parliament. By this statute it is enacted, that if any

person shall, of malice aforethought and by lying in wait, unlawfully cut out or

disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, cut off a nose or lip, or cut off

or disable any limb or member of any other person, with intent to maim or dis-

fiyurehim; such person, his counsellors, aiders, and abettors, shall be guilty of

felony without benefit of clergy, (k)

Thus much for the felony of mayhem; to which may be added the offence of
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wilfully and maliciously shooting at any person in any dwelling-house or other

place; an offence, of which the probable consequence may be either killing or

f *208 1 ma'm'ng hi™- This, though no such evil consequence *ensues, is made

I- J felony without benefit of clergy by statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, and thereupon

one Arnold was convicted in 1723 for shooting at Lord Onslow; but, being half

a madman, was never executed, but confined in prison, where he died about

thirty years after. (1)

II. The second offence, more immediately affecting the personal security of

individuals, relates to the female part of his majesty's subjects; being that of

I\\K\\-forcible abduction and marriage; which is vulgarly called stealing an heiress.

For by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 2, it is enacted, that if any person shall for lucre

take any woman, being maid, widow or wife, and having substance either in

goods or lands, or being heir apparent to her ancestors, contrary to her will; and

afterwards she be married to such misdoer, or by his consent to another, or de-

filed ; such person, his procurers and abettors, and such as knowingly receive

such woman, shall be deemed principal felons; and by statute 39 Eliz. c. 9, the

benefit of clergy is taken away from all such felons, who shall be principals, pro-

curers, or accessories before the fact. (.2)

(tl 3 Inst. 62.

It) On this statute Mr. Coke, a gentleman of Suffolk, and one Woodbnrn, a laborer, were indicted in 1722 ;

Coke lor hiring and abetting Woortburn. and Woodbnrn for the actmil fact of slitting the nose of Mr. Crispe,

Coke's brother-in-law. Thu case was.spmewhat singular. The murder of Crispe was intended, and he WHS

left for dead, being terribly hacked and disfigured with a hedge-bill; but he recovered. Now the bare in-

tent to murder is no felony; but to disfigure with an intent to disfigure, is made so by the statute ; on which

they were therefore indicted. And Coke, who was a disgrace to i he profession of the law. had the eOron-

terv to rest his ilcfenrr upon this point, that the assault was not committed with an intent to disfigure, but

with an intent to murder; and therefore not within the statute. But the court held, that if a man attacks

another to murder him with such an instrument as a hedge-bill, which cannot but endanger the died/Turing

him; and in such attack happens not to kill, but only to disfigure him; he may be indicted on this statute;

and it shall be left to the jury to determine whether it were not a design to murder by disfiguring, and con-

sequently a mulieious intent to disfigure as well as to murder. Accordingly the jury found them guiltv of

such previous intent to disfigure, in order to effect the principal intent to murder, and they were both con-

demned and executed. (State Trials, VI, -212.)

(1) All the previous statutes, so far as they relate to offeuoes against the person, were

repealed by 7 "Wm. IT, and 1 Vie. c. 85. For the most recent revision of the law on this

subject, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. Penal servitude for life is now the extreme penalty.

As to the proper mode of charging mayhem, see Chick v. State, 7 Humph. 161; State v. Briley,

8 Port. Ala. 472.

(2) This offence is now punishable under stntnte 24 and 26 Vic. c. 100. The extreme penalty

is fourteen years' pcnnl servitude. Tho irnllty pnvty is made incapable, by the statute, of taking

r.n\ .if..' or inturi'^t iu t-ie pniji rty cif ;•'•.!• VOHUM iu.irrii'd. but the property, oil his ci.iivR'tiim.

U to Us :<c:,th'l as the court of (;lia!icorv HMV
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In the construction of this statute it hath been determined: 1. That the indict-

ment must allege that the taking was for lucre, for such are the words of the

statute. (/) 2. In order to show this, it must appear that the woman has substance,

cither real or personal, or is an heir apparent, (m) 3. It must appear that she

was taken away against her will. 4. It must also appear that she was afterwards

married or defiled. And though possibly the marriage or defilement might be

by her subsequent consent, being won thereunto by flatteries after the taking,

yet this is felony, if the first taking were against her will: (») and so vine versa,

if the woman be originally taken away with her own consent, yet if she afterwards

refuse to continue with the offender, and be forced against her will, she may

from that time as properly *be said to be taken against her will, as if she r ^no i

never have given any consent at all; for till the force was put upon her •• J

she was in her own power, (o) It is held that a woman thus taken away and

married may be sworn and give evidence against the ott'ender, though lie is her

husband de'fncto; contrary to the general rule of law; because he is no husband

de jure, in case the actual marriage was also against her will, (p) In cases,

indeed, where the actual marriage is good, by the consent of the inveigled wo-

man obtained after her forcible abduction, Sir Matthew Hale seems to question

how far her evidence shonld be allowed: but other authorities (q) seem to agree,

that it should even then be admitted; esteeming it absurd, that the offender

should thus take advantage of his own wrong, and that the very act of marriage,

which is a principal ingredient of his crime, should (by a forced construction

him.
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of law) be made use of to stop the mouth of the most material witness against

An inferior degree of the same kind of offence, but not attended with force,,is

punished by the statutes 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 8, which enacts, that if any person,

above the age of fourteen, unlawfully shall convey or take away any woman

child unmarried (which is held (r) to extend to bastards as well as to legitimate

children), within the age of sixteen years, from the possession and against the-

will of the father, mother, guardians, or governors, he shall be imprisoned for

two years, or fined at the discretion of the justices; and if he deflowers suck

maid or woman child, or without the consent of parents contracts matrimony

with her, he shall be imprisoned five years, or fined at the discretion of the-

justices, and she shall forfeit all her lands to her next of kin, during the life of

her said husband. So that as these stolen marriages, under the age of sixteen-;,

were usually upon mercenary views, this act, besides punishing the seducer,

wisely removed the temptation. But this latter part of the act is now rendered'

*almost useless, by provisions of a very different kind, which make the r *oi A n

marriage totally void, (s) in the statute 26 Geo. II. c. 33. (3) ' '"' '

III. A third offence, against the female part also of all his majesty's subjects, but

attended with greater aggravation than that of forcible marriage, is the crime of

rape, ruptus mulierum, or the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against

her will. This, by the Jewish law, (t) was punished with death, in case the

damsel was betrothed to another man; and in case she was not betrothed, then

a heavy fine of fifty shekels was to be paid to the damsel's father, and she was to.

be the wife of the ravisher all the days of his life; without that power of divorce)

which was in general permitted by the Mosaic law.

The civil law (M) punishes the crime of ravishment with death and confisca-

tion of goods: under which it includes both the offence of forcible abduction, or

taking away a woman from her friends, of which we last spoke: and also the

present offence of forcibly dishonouring them; either of which, without the other,

is in that law sufficient to constitute a capital crime.. AJso, the stealing away a

(1} 1 Hawk. P. C. 110. (m) I Hal. P. C. SfiO. 1 Hawk. P. O. ll»; (n) 1 Hal. P. C. MO,

(01 1 Hawk. P. C. 110. (p) 1 Hal. P. C. Wl. (?) Cro. Car. 4«i. S Kfeb. 193. State Trials. V, US.

(r) Stra. IIB. (si See book I, page 437. 4o. (I) Deut. xxii, 25. (it) Coil. 9, tit. 13.

f ) T')c n-t J nn-1 f> P. anil M. c. *. i< rpyvatwl. «-vl tb" m''jt'ft of tlii* para.srnph is covured

bv -4 u.nl -6 Vk1. K. 10U. Suu jiiuiMu, C:'. iiv. u^l uil. ili.
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woman from her parents or guardians, and debauching her, is equally penal by

the emperors edict, whether she consent or is forced: "sive volentibus, xive

nolentibus mulieribus, tale facinus fuerit perpetratum." And this, in order to

take away from women every opportunity of offending in this way: whom the

Roman law supposes never to go astray, without the seduction and arts of the

other sex: and therefore, by restraining and making so highly penal the solicita-

tions of the men, they meant to secure effectually the honour of the women.

" Si enim ipsi raptores metu, vel atrocitate pcence, ab hujusmodi facinore se

temperaverint, nulli mulicri, sive volenti, sive nolenti,peccandi locus relinquetur ;

quia hoc ipsum velle mulierum, ab itmdiis neqnissimi hominis, qui mcdiutatur

F *2111 raP"u'm> inducitiir. *Ni$i etenim earn solicitaverit, nisi odiosis arti-

L -I bus circumvenerit, nonfaciet earn velle in tantum dedecus seae prodere."

But our English law does not entertain quite such sublime ideas of the honour

of either sex, as to lay the blame of a mutual fault upon one of the transgressors

only: and therefore makes it a necessary ingredient in the crime of rape, that it

must be against the woman's will.

Kape was punished by the Saxon laws, particularly those of King Athelstan, (TO)

with death: which was also agreeable to the old Gothic or Scandinavian consti-

tution, (x) But this was afterwards thought too hard: and in its stead another

severe but not capital punishment was inflicted by William the Conqueror;

viz., castration and loss of eyes;(y) which was continued until after Bracton

wrote, in the. reign of Henry the Third. But, in order to prevent malicious
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accusations, it was then the law (and, it seems, still continues to be so in appeals

of rape), (z) that the woman should immediately after, " dum recens fuerit inale-

ficium, go to the next town, and there make discovery to some credible persons

of the injury she has suffered; and afterwards should acquaint the high constable

of the hundred, the coroners, and the sheriff with the outrage, (a) This seems to

correspond in some degree with the laws of Scotland and Arragou, (b) which re-

quire that complaint must be made within twenty-four hours: though afterwards,

by statute Westm. 1, c. 13, the time of limitation in England was extended to forty

days. At present there is no time of limitation fixed: for as it is usually now pun-

ished by indictment at the suit of the king, the maxim of law takes place, that n-ul-

lum tcnipus occurit regi; but the jury will rarely give credit to a stale complaint

During the former period also it was held for law, (c) that the woman (by con-

sent of:the judge and her parents) might redeem the offender from the execution

of his sentence, by accepting him for her husband; if he also was willing to

agree to the exchange, but not otherwise.

F *-'121 *^u tne ^ . ."" ^' kv "ie statute Westm. 1, c. 13, the punishment of rape

' " Tvas much mitigated; the offence itself of ravishing a damsel within age

(that [Sj'twelce years old), either with her consent or without, or of any other

woman against her will, being reduced to a trespass, if not prosecuted by appeal

within forty days, and subjecting the offender only to two years' imprisonment,

and a fine at the king's wil'l. But this lenity being productive of the most terri-

ble consequences, it was in ten years afterwards. 13 Edw. I, found necessary to

make the offence of forcible rape felony by statute Westm. 2, c. 34. And by

statute 18 Eliz. c. 7, it is made felony without benefit of clergy ; as is also the

abominable wickedness of carnally knowing and abusing any woman child under

the age often years; in which case the consent or non-consent is immaterial, as

by reason of her tender years she is incapable of judgment and discretion. Sir

Matthew Ilule is indeed of opinion that such profligate actions committed on

an infant under the age of twelve years, the age of female discretion by the com-

mon law, either with or without consent, amount to rape and felony: as well

since as before the statute of Queen Elizabeth ; (d) but that law has in general

been held only to extend to infants under ten: though it should seem that

(w) Brncton, 1.3 c. 28. (x) Stlcrnh. tie jure Sueon, 1. 8. c. S. (y) LL. Gttl. Cong. c. 19.

(*) 1 Hal. P. C. 631. (a) Ul«n. 1. H, c. «. Brnc.t. /. 3, c. 2*. (6) Barrington, 142.

(o) Glanv. 1. 11, c. 6. Bract. I. 3, c. 28. (d} 1 Hal. P. C. (Bl.
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damsels between (en and twelve are still under the protection of the statute

Westm. 1, the law with respect to their seduction not having been altered by

either of the subsequent statutes. (4)

A male infant, under the age of fourteen years, is presumed by law incapa-

ble to commit a rape, and therefore it seems cannot be found guilty of it. For

though in other felonies malitia suppht cetatem, as has in some cases been shown;

yet, as to this particular species of felony, the law supposes an imbecility of body

as well as mind, (e) (5)

The civil law seems to suppose a prostitute or common harlot incapable of any

injuries of this kind : (/) not allowing *any punishment for violating r *om

the chastity of her who hath indeed no chastity at all, or at least hath "- -1

no regard to it. But the law of England does not judge so hardly of offenders,

as to cut off all opportunity of retreat even from common strumpets, and to

treat them as never capable of amendment. It therefore holds it to be felony

to force even a concubine or harlot; because the woman may have forsaken that

unlawful course of life: (y) for, as Bracton well observes, (A) " licet meretrix

fuerit antea, eerie tune temporis non fuit, cum reclamando nequitice ejus con-

sentire noluit. (6)

As to the material facts requisite to be given in evidence and proved upon

an indictment of rape, they are of such a nature, that though necessary to be

known and settled, for the conviction of the guilty and preservation of the

innocent, and therefore to be found in such criminal treatises as discourse
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of these matters in detail, yet they are highly improper to be publicly discussed,

except only in a court of justice. I shall, therefore, merely add upon this head

a few remarks from Sir Matthew Hale: with regard to the compentency and

credibility of witnesses ; which may, salvo pndore, be considered.

And, first, the party ravished may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a

competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she

is to be believed, must be left to the jury upon the circumstances of fact that

concur in that testimony. For instance: if the witness be of good fame; if she

presently discovered the offence, and made search for the offender; if the party

accused fled for it; these and the like are concurring circumstances which give

greater probability to her evidence. But on the other side, if she be of evil

fame, and stand unsupported by others; if she concealed the injury for any

considerable time after she had opportunity to complain; if the place where the

fact was alleged to be committed was where it was possible she might have been

beared, and she made no outcry; these and the *like circumstances carry r *oi 41

a strong but not conclusive presumption that her testimony is false or •• ••

feigned. (7)

(e) Ibid. (/) Cod. 9. 9, 22. f/. 47, 2, 39. (g) 1 Hal. P. C. 629. 1 Hawk. P. C. 108. (A) fol. 147.

(4) The punishment for rape, and also for carnal knowledge of a female child tinder ten

years of age, was reduced to transportation for life, by statute 4 and 5 Vic. c. 5(5, and now to

penal servitude or Imprisonment Statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100.

(5) But a boy under the age of puberty, or a woman, or a husband in respect to his own

•wife, may become guilty as principal in the second degree of this offence of rape. 2 Bish.

Cr. Law,' $ 948. In Commonwealth t>. Green, 2 Pick. 380, it was held that a boy under fourteen

might be guilty of an assault with intent to commit rape. And see Williams t'. State, 14

Ohio, 222.

(6) And whether she has forsaken it or not, she is entitled to the protection of the law.

See Wright «. State, 4 Humph. 194 ; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624. But her character may

have an important bearing on the credibility of her accusation. t

(7) [Bnt the rule respecting the time that elapses before the prosecutrix complains will not

applv where there is a good reason for the delay, as that she was under the control, or influ-

enced by fear, of her ravisher. 1 East, P. C. 445. And so all other general rules, as they are

deduced from circumstances, must yield, when they appear to be unsafe guides to the dis-

covery of truth. The state and appearance of the prosecutrix, marks of violence upon her

person, and the torn and disordered state of her dress, recently after the transaction, at the

time of complaint, are material circumstances, which are always admissible in evidence. See

2 Stark. 241. If the prosecutrix be an infant of louder years, the whole of her account recently
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Moreover, if the rape be charged to be committed on an infant under twelve

years of age, she may still be a competent witness, if she hath sense and under-

standing to know the nature and obligations of an oath ; or even to be sensible

of the wickedness of telling a deliberate lie. Nay, though she hath not, it is

thought by Sir Mathew Hale (i) that she ought to be heard without path, to give

the court information; and others have held, that what the child told her

mother, or other relations, may be given in evidence, since the nature of the case

admits frequently of no better proof. But it is now settled [Brazier's case,

before the twelve judges, P. 19 Geo. Ill], that no hearsay evidence can be given

of (he declaration of a child who hath not capacity to be sworn, nor can such

child be examined in court without oath: and that there is no determinate age

at which the oath of a child ought either to be admitted or rejected. Yet, where

the evidence of children is admitted, it is much to be wished, in order to render

their evidence credible, that there should be some concurrent testimony of time,

place, and circumstances, in order to make out the fact; and that the convic-

tion should not be grounded singly on the unsupported accusation of an infant

under years of discretion. There may be therefore, in many cases of this nature,

witnesses who are competent, that is, who may be admitted to be heard; and

yet, after being heard, may prove not to be credible, or such as the jury is bound

to believe. For one excellence of the trial by jury is, that the jury are triers

of the credit of the witnesses, as well as of the truth of the fact.

f *21 "1 * " It is true," says this learned judge, (_/) " that rape is a most detest-
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L -I able crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punished

with death; but it must be remembered that it is an accusation easy to make,

hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though inno-

cent." He then relates two very extraordinary cases of malicious prosecution

for this crime, that had happened within his own observation : and concludes

thus: "I mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious upon trials

of offences of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease

be imposed upon, without great care aud vigilance; the heiuousness of the

offence many times transporting the judge and jury with so much indignation

that they are overhastily carried to the conviction of the person accused thereof,

by the confident testimony sometimes of false and malicious witnesses."

IV. What has been here observed, especially with regard to the manner of

proof, which ought to be more clear in proportion as the crime is the more

detestable, may be applied to another offence, of a still deeper malignity; the

infamous crime against nature, committed either with man or beast. A crime

which ought to be strictly and impartially proved, and then as strictly and

impartially punished. But it is an offence of so dark a nature, so easily charged,

and the negative so difficult to be proved, that the accusation should be clearly

made out: for, if false, it deserves a punishment inferior only to that of the

crime itself.

I will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to

(i, 1 Hal.P.O. 834. (j) IHal. P. C. 6,15.

given seems to be admissible, for it is of the highest importance to ascertain the accuracy of her

recollection. 1 East, P. C. 443; Stark, on Evidence, part iv, 1268.]

The complaint made by the person alleged to have been ravished, immediately after the occur-

rence, cannot be put in in independent evidence, to show who were the persons who committed

the offence, even though she be since deceased. Rex v. Megson, 9 C. and P. 420; aud see People

v. McGc.0. 1 Dcnio, 19. .

It lias been held that rape is not committed where the woman's consent is obtained by fraud,

she at the time supposing the nmu to be her husband. Rex v. Jackson, Russ. and Hy. 487;

Reg. v. Siuuiders, ri 0. and P. 265: Reg. v. Williams, id. 286; State f. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765;

Wyattr. State, 2 Swan, 394. But this has been doubted. People v. Metcalf, 1 Wheel. C. C.

378 and note, 331; State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54. Carnal knowledge of the person of a

•vromnii. unaccompanied with a'iv circum'tnneo of force or t'mnd, is not rape, though tho

wninii': :u:iv hiive been atthetiiuo mc.utallv iucuLnpeteut to givo consent. (Jroiwuilf. i'runic.-.

1?, M'"\ |07.

•iiilj
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dwell any longer upon a subject, the very mention of which is a disgrace to

human nature. It will be more eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy

of our English law, which treats it, in its very indictments, as a crime not fit to

be named: "peccatum illud horribHe, inter christianos non nomiiiandum." (k)

A taciturnity observed ""likewise by the edict of Constantius and Con- *roi pi

stans:(/) "ubi scelits est id, quod nonproficii scire, jubemiis insurgere >- *

leges armari jura gladio uUore, ut ezquisitis peenis subdantur in fames qui sunt,

vel qui,futuri sunt rei." Which leads me to add a word concerning its punish-

ment.

This the voice of nature and of reason, and the express law of God,(w) deter-

mined to be capital. Of which we have a signal instance long before the Jew-

ish dispensation, by the destruction of two cities by fire from heaven; so that

this is an universal, not merely a provincial precept. And our ancient law in

some degree imitated this punishment, by commanding such miscreants to be

burnt to death; (n) though Fleta (o) says they should be buried alive; either

of which punishments was indifferently used for this crime among the ancient

Goths.(p) But now the general punishment of all felonies is the same, namely,

by hanging; and this offence (being in the times of popery only subject to ec-

clesiastical censures) was made felony without benefit of clergy by statute 25

Hen. VIII, c. 6, revived and confirmed by 5 Eliz. c. 17. And the rule of law

herein is that if both are arrived at years of discretion, agentes et consentientes

pari pcena plcdantur.(q) (8)
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These are all the felonious offences more immediately against the personal

security of the subject. The inferior offences or misdemeanors, that fall

under this head, are assaults, batteries, wounding, false imprisonment, and kid-

napping.^)

V. VI. VII. With regard to the nature of the three first of these offences in

general, I have nothing further to add to what has already been observed in the

preceding book of these Commentaries; (r) when we considered them as private

wrongs, or civil injuries, for which a satisfaction or remedy is given to the party

aggrieved. But, taken in a public' light as a ""breach of tTie king's r^oi"!

peace, an affront to his government, and a damage done to his subjects, *- ••

they are also indictable and punishable with fines and imprisonment; or with

other ignominious corporal penalties, where they are committed with any very

atrocious design.(s) As in case of an assault with intent to murder, or with an.

intent to commit either of the crimes last spoken of; for which intentional as-

saults, in the two last cases, indictments are much more usual than for the abso-

lute perpetration of the facts themselves, on account of the difficulty of proof;

or, when both parties are consenting to an unnatural attempt, it is usual not to

charge any assault; but that one of them laid hands on the other with intent to

commit, and that the other permitted the same with intent to suffer the com-

mission of, the abominable crime before mentioned. And, in all these cases,

besides heavy fine and imprisonment, it is usual to award judgment of the

pillory.(lO)

There is also one species of battery, more atrocious and penal than the rest,

which is the beating of a clerk in orders, or clergyman; on account of the

respect and reverence due to his sacred character, as the minister and ambassa-

dor of peace. Accordingly it is enacted by the statute called articuli deri, 9

Edw. II, c. 3, that if any person lay violent hands upon a clerk, the amends for

I /•) See In Rot. Pnrl. 50 Edw. Ill, n. 88, a complaint, that a Lombard did commit tho sin, " that was not

to be named." 12 Hep. 37.

(I) Cad. 9. 9. 81. (m) Levit. xx, 13, 15. (n) Bntt. c. 9. (o) I. 1. c. 37.

(p\ Sliernh.de jure Goth. 1. 3, c. 8. (g)3Inst. 59. (r) See book III, page 120.

(«} 1 Hawk. P. C. 65.

(8) As to this offence see statute 24 and 25 Y;c. c. 100, s. 61, which makes it punishable by

penal servitude fur lite, or for any term not less than ten years. And see 2 Biah. Cr. L.

•> Hh>7; Uos. Cr. Ev. <-71; 1 Rum. on Cr. G'J.3.

('.>) ?<!<•. ii* to tin-*'.- nflVnri's, sUtnte 24 uuJ 25 Tic. c. 1C3.

(li.) Tliis pnuUliiui'ut i.< u'julished.
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the peace broken shall he before the king ; that is, by indictment in the king^s

courts; and the assailant may also be sued before the bishop, that excommuni-

cation or bodily penance may be imposed: which if the offender will redeem by

money, to be given to the bishop, or the party aggrieved, it may be sued for be"-

fore the bishop ; whereas otherwise to sue in any spiritual court for civil dam-

ages for the battery, falls within the danger of prwmunire.(f) But suits are,

and always were, allowable in the spiritual court, for money agreed to be given

as a commutation for penance.(w) So that upon the whole it appears, that a

person guilty of such brutal behaviour to a clergyman is subject to three kinds

of prosecution, all of which may be pursued for one and the same offence: an

indictment, for the breach of the king's peace by such assault and battery; a

civil action, for the special damage sustained by the party injured ; and a suit

in the ecclesiastical court, first, pro corrections et salute animce, by enjoining

penance, and then again for such sum of money as shall be agreed on for taking

f*218l °$ the penance enjoined ; *it being usual in those courts to exchange

L J their spiritual censures for a round compensation in money; (v) per-

haps because poverty is generally esteemed by the moralists the best medicine

pro salute a?timce.(ll)

VIII. The two remaining crimes and offences, against the persons of his

majesty's subjects, are infringements of their natural liberty: concerning the

first of which, false imprisonment, its nature and incidents, I must content my-

self with referring the student to what was observed in the preceding book, (w)
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when we considered it as a mere civil injury. But besides the private satisfac-

tion given to the individual by action, the law also demands public vengeance

for the breach of the king's peace, for the loss which the state sustains by the

confinement of one of its members, and for the infringement of the good order

of society. We have seen before, (x) that the most atrocious degree of this of-

fence, that of sending any subject of this realm a prisoner into parts beyond

the seas, whereby he is deprived of the friendly assistance of the laws to redeem

him from such his captivity, is punished with the pains of prcemunire, and in-

capacity to hold any office, without any possibility of pardon. (y) And we may

also add. that by statute 43 Eliz. c. 13, to carry any one by force out of the four

northern counties, or imprison him within the same, in order to ransom him or

make spoil of his person or goods, is felony without benefit of clergy, in the

principals and all accessories before the fact. Inferior degrees of the same of-

fence. of false imprisonment, are also punishable by indictment, (like assaults

and batteries) and the delinquent may be fined and imprisoned. (2) And, in-

deed, («) there can be no doubt but that all kinds of crimes of a public nature,

all disturbances of the peace, all oppressions, and other misdemeanors whatso-

ever of a notoriously evil example, may be indicted at the suit of the king.

r*21c)l ' '^ne °^er remaining offence, that of kidnapping, being the

•- J forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child, from

their own country, and sending them into another, was capital by the Jewish

law. " He that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand,

he shall surely be put to death."(J) So likewise in the civil law, the offence of

spiriting away and stealing men and children ; which was called plagium, and

,the offenders plagiarii, was punished with death. (c) This is unquestionably a

very heinous crime, as it robs the king of his subjects, banishes a man from his

country, and may in its consequences be productive of the most cruel and dis-

agreeable hardships ; and therefore the common law of England has punished

it with fine, imprisonment, and pillory.(rf) And also the statute 11 and 12 Win.

Ill, c. 7, though principally intended against pirates, has a clause that extends

(«) ZInst. 492, 640. (u) ArcHo. Cler. Edvi. II, e. 4. F. N. B. S3. (t>) RoU. Kep. 384.

(w) See book III. page 127. (*) See page 116. (v) Stat. 31 Car. II, c. 2.

(z) West. Svmboi, part 2, page 92. (a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 210. (6) Exod. xrl, 18.

(C) Ff. 48. Ifc. 1. (d) Tteym. 474. 2 Show. 221. Skin. 47. Comb. 10.

(11) The punishment is now imprisonment not exceeding two years. Statute 24 and 25 Tic-

c. 100, $ 36.
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to prevent the leaving of such persons abroad, as are thus kidnapped or spirited

away; by enacting, that if any captain of a merchant vessel shall (during his

being abroad) force any person on shore, or wilfully leave him behind, or refuse

to bring home all such men as he carried out, if able and desirous to return, he

shall suffer three mouth's imprisonment. (12) And thus much for offences that

more immediately affect the persons of individuals.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE HABITATIONS OF

INDIVIDUALS.

THE only two offences that more immediately affect the Jiabitations of indi-

viduals or private subjects, are those of arson and burglary.

1. Arson, ab ardendo, is the malicious and wilful burning the house or out-

house of another man. This is an offence of very great malignity, and much

more pernicious to the public than simple theft: because first, it "is an offence

against the right of habitation, which is acquired by the law of nature as well

as by the laws of society ; next, because of the terror"and confusion that neces-

sarily attend it; and, lastly, because in simple theft the thing stolen only

changes its master but still remains in esse for the benefit of the public, where-

as by burning the very substance is absolutely destroyed. It is also frequently

more destructive than murder itself, of which, too, it is often the cause: since

murder, atrocious as it is, seldom extends beyond the felonious act designed ;

whereas fire too frequently involves in the common calamity persons unknown
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to the incendiary, and not intended to be hurt by him, and friends as well as

enemies. For which reason the civil law (a) punishes with death such as malic-

iously set fire to houses in towns, and contiguous to other; but is more merci-

ful to such as only fire a cottage, or house, standing by itself. (1)

(a) Ff. 48, 19, 28, <, 19.

(12) See statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100, for the punishment of abduction and kidnapping. Also,

statute 17 and 18 Vic. c. 104, for the punishment of wilfully and wrongfully leaving persons

abroad.

(1) The English statutes on this subject were revised and consolidated in 24 and 25 Vio.

c yi.

Section 1 makes it felony, punishable with penal servitude for life, or for any term not less

than three years, or with imprisonment not more than two years, with or without whipping, if

the offender be a male over sixteen years of age. to set fire, unlawfully and maliciously, to any

church, chapel, meeting-house or other place of divine worship.

Section 2 imposes the like punishment for setting fire to a dwelling-house, any person being

therein.

Section 3 imposes the like punishment for setting fire to any house, stable, coach-house,

outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, malt-house, hop-oast, barn, storehouse, granary, hovel,

shed or fold, or to any farm building, or to any building or erection used in farming land, or in

carrying on any trade or manufacture, whether iu possession of the offender or not, with intent

to injure or defraud any person.

And by subsequent sections the unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to buildings belong-

ing or appertaining to railways, ports, docks, harbors, or canals, or to public buildings, or " to

any buildings other than such as are in this act before mentioned," or to any thing in, against

or under a building, under such circumstances that, if the building were thereby set tire to,

the offence would bo felony, or to crops of hay, grass, corn, grain or pulse, or of any cultivated

vegetable produce, standing or cut, or to any wood, coppice or plantation of trees, or to any

heath, gorse, furze, or fern, or to stacks of hay, grain, straw, coal, peat, wood, Jfcc., or to coal

mince, or to ships or vessels, is also made felony. Attempts to burn the like buildings or

property arc also provided for by the same act; and, by section 58, it is not essential to any

of these offences that they should be committed from the malice conceived against the owner of

the property.
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r *2'>l 1 *0ur English law also distinguishes with much accuracy upon this

"• J crime. Ana therefore we will inquire, first, what is such a house as

may be the subject of this oifence; next, wherein the offence itself consists, or

what amounts to a burning of such house; and, lastly how the offence is pun-

ished.

1. Xot only the bare dwelling-house, but all outhouses that are parcel there-

of, though not contiguous thereto, nor under the same roof, as barns and stables,

maybe the subject of arson, (b) And this by the common law: which also

accounted it felony to burn a single barn in the field, if filled with hay or corn,

?though not parcel of the dwelling-house, (c) The burning of a stack of corn

'was anciently likewise accounted arson, (d) And indeed all the niceties and

distinctions which we meet with in our books, concerning what shall, or shall

not, amount to arson, seem now to be taken away by a variety of statutes;

which will be mentioned in the next chapter, and have made the punishment

of wilful burning equally extensive as the mischief. The offence of arson

(strictly so called) may be committed by wilfully setting fire to one's own house,

provided one's neighbour's house is thereby also burnt; but if no mischief is

done but to one's own, it does not amount to felony, though the fire was kindled

with intent to burn another's, (e) For by the common law no intention to com-

mit a felony amounts to the samo crime; though it does, in some cases, by par-

ticular statutes. However, such wilful firing one's own house, in a town, is a

high misdemeanor, and punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, and perpetual
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sureties for the good behaviour. (f) (2) And if a landlord or reversioner sets

fire to his own house, of which another is in possession under a lease from him-

self, or from those whose estate he hath, it shall be accounted arson ; for during

the lease the house is the property of the tenant, (g) (3)

r *.»•> ] *2- As to what shall be said to be a burning, so as to amount to arson,

*- "~ J a bare intent, or attempt to do it, by actually setting fire to a house,

unless it absolutely burns, does not fall within the description of incendit et

conibitfitit,; which were words necessary, in the days of law-latin, to all indict-

ments of this sort. But the burning and consuming of any part is sufficient;

though the fire be afterwards extinguished. (A) Also, it must be a malicious

burning: otherwise it is only a trespass: and, therefore, no negligence or mis-

chance amounts to it. (4) For which reason, though an unqualified person, by

(b) 1 Hal. P. C 507. (c) 3 Inst. 69. (d) 1 Hawk. P. C. 105.

(e) Cm. Car. 377. 1 Jon. »!. (f) 1 Hal. P. C. 5<>8. 1 Hawk. P. C. 108.

(g) Fost. 15. (h) 1 Hawk. P. C. 10B.

(.2) [It has been decided that an attempt, or preparation, by a man to set fire to his own

house in a town, though the fire be never kindled, is a misdemeanor. And that every attempt to

commit a felony is a misdemeanor; and, in general, an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is an

offence of the same nature. Cald. 397; 6 East, 464; 1 Wils. 13tt. So also an incitement or

solicitation to commit a crime is a misdemeanor. R. v. Higgius, 2 East, 5.

Foluiitax reputatur pro facto is still true, both in treason and misdemeanor; but the inten-

tion in both must be manifested by an open act. Men cannot be punished by the law for the

thoughts of the mind, however wicked they may be: even a resolution to commit high treason,

evidenced only by a confession, without any attempt to carry it into effect, is not punishable

by the lir,v of England. The principle of these cases is well illustrated by Lord Coke, who,

ai'tcr treating of single combats and affrays, says, " if any subject challenge another to fight,

this is also an offence, before any combat be performed and punishable by law, for qtttindo

illiquid jiroliibctur, prohibetitr et oinne, per quod (leccnitur ad illud." 3 Inst. 158. And, there-

lore, he who carries the challenge, knowing that it is a challenge, is also guilty of a misdemeanor:

aud he who designedly attempts to provoke another to fight or to send a challenge, is guilty

of the same offence.]

(:i) See 2 Bi*h. Cr. L. § 24. It is nsual to provide by statute that the burning one's own house

witii intent to defraud shall be felony.

(4) [The term malice, in this case as in many others, does not merely imply a desijjn to

injure the party who is eventually the Bufferer, but an evil and mischievous intention, however

general, producing damage to individuals. For if a man has a design to burn one house, and

by accident the names destroy another, instead of that against which his contrivance was

directed, he will be guilty of maliciously burning the latter. 1 Hale, 569 ; Hawk. b. 1, c. 39,

s. 5. The maxim malitia supptet cctaiem applies to this as well as to other cases: for Lord
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shooting with a gun, happens to set nre to the thatch of a house, this Sir Mat-

thew Hale determines not to be i'elouy, contrary to the opinion of former

writers. ((') But by statute 6 Ann. c. 31, any servant negligently setting fire to

a house or outhouses shall forfeit 1001. or be sent to the house of correction

for eighteen months ; in the same manner as the Roman law directed, " eos,qui

negligsnter igncs apud se Jtabuerint, fuatibus vel jlayellis ccedi."(k)

3. The punishment of arson was death by our ancient Saxon laws. (I) And

in the reign of Edward the First this sentence was executed by a kind of lex

tnliunis ; for the incendiaries were burnt to death : (m) as they were also by the

Gothic constitutions. («) The statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 6, made the wilful burning

of houses, under some special circumstances therein mentioned, amount to the

crime of high treason. But it was again reduced to felony by the general acts

of Edward VI, and Queen Mary; and now the punishment of all capital felo-

nies is uniform, namely, by hanging. The offence of arson was denied the ben-

efit of clergy by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 1, but that statute was repealed by 1

Edward VI, c. 12, and arson was afterwards held to be ousted of clergy, with

respect to the principal offender, only by inference and deduction from the

statute 4 and 5 P. and M. c. 4, *which expressly denied it to the acces- r ^ooa i

series before the fact; (o) though now it is expressly denied to the prin- *• A''"' '

cipal in all cases within the statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22. (5)

II. Burglary, or noctural housebreaking, burgi latrocinium, which by our

ancient law was called Jia-mesecken, as it is in Scotland to this day, has always
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been looked upon as a very heinous offence: not only because of the abundant

terror that it naturally carries with it, but also as it is a forcible invasion and

disturbance of that right of habitation which every individual might acquire

even in a state of nature; an invasion, which in such a state would be sure to

be punished with death, unless the assailant were the stronger. But in civil

society the laws also come in to the assistance of the weaker party; and, besides

that they leave him this natural right of killing the aggressor, if he can (as was

shown in a former chapter), (p) they also protect and avenge him, in case the

might of the assailant is too powerful. And the law of England has so par-

ticular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it

his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity; agreeing herein

witli the sentiments of ancient Home, as expressed in the words of Tully; (q)

"quid enim sanctius, quid o/nni religions munitius, quam domus uniuanujusque

civium ?" For this reason no outward doors can in general be broken open to

execute any civil process; though, in criminal cases, the public safety super-

sedes the private. Hence also, in part, arises the animadversion of the law upon

eaves-droppers, nuisaneers and incendiaries: and to this principle it must be

assigned, that a man may assemble people together lawfully (at least if they do

not exceed eleven) without danger of raising a riot, rout or unlawful assembly,

in order to protect and defend his house; which he is not permitted to do in

in any other case, (r) (C)

*The definition of a burglar, as given us by Sir Edward Coke,(s) is " he

that by night breaketh and entereth into a mansion-house, with intent to

(i) 1 Hal. P. C. Wi!l. (k) Ff. 1, 15, 4. (I) LL. Inae. e. 7. (m) Britt. c. 9.

(•n) aliemli.de/Kre Goth. I. 3. c. i>. (o} 11 Rep. 3A. S Hal. P. C. S46, 347. Fost. 336.

(p) See page lab. (q) pro domo, 41. frj 1 Hal. P. C. M7. (a) 3 lust. 03.

Hale gives an instance of a youth of tender age being coiirieted before himself, and executed

for this offence, on circumstances affording strong evidence of a mischievous discretion.

1 Hale, 569, 570. And the intent to injure may bo always inferred from the wrongful act of

getting fire, for a man must he supposed to intend the ne'cessary consequence of his own act.

Runs, and Ry. C. C. 207.] As to intent, see further, Reg. ». Paice, I C. and K. 73; Reg. e.

"tt'alluce. Car. and M. 200; Jesse r. State, 28 Miss. 100; State v. O'Counell, 26 Ind. 266.

(5) The punishment of arson is no longer capital in England.

(ti) The English statute for the punishment of this offense is 24 and 25 Tic. c. 96. The

penalty in the discretion of the court is penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than

three years, or imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor,

and with or without solitary confinement.
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commit a felony." In this definition there are four things to be considered; the

time, tho place, the manner, and the intent.

1. The time must be by night, and not by day: for in the day time there is

no burglary. We have seen, (t) in the case of justifiable homicide, how much

more heinous all laws made an attack by night, rather than by day; allowing

the party attacked by night to kill the assailant with impunity. As to what is

reckoned night, and what day, for this purpose: anciently the day was accounted

to begin only at sun-rising, and to end immediately upon sun-set; but the bet-

ter opinion seems to be, that if there be daylight or crepusculum enough, begun

or left to discern a man's face withal, it is no burglary. («) But this does not

extend to moonlight; for then many midnight burglars would go unpunished:

and besides, the malignity of the offence does not so properly arise from its

being done in the dark, as at the dead of night; when all the creation except

beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep has disarmed the owner, and rendered his

castle defenceless.

2. As to the place. It must be, according to Sir Edward Coke's definition, in a

mansion-lionee: and, therefore, to account for the reason why breaking open a

church is burglary, as it undoubtedly is, he quaintly observes that it is dmnus

mannionalis Dei. (v) But it does not seem absolutely necessary that it should

in all cases be a mansion-house; (7) for it may be also committed by breaking

(«) Sec pages 180,181. (u) 3 Inst. 03. 1 Hal. P. C. 350. 1 Hawk. P. C. 101. (v) 3 Inst. tl.

(7) [Where the owner has never by himself, or by any of his family, slept in the house, it is
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not his dwelling-house, so as to be the subject of burglary. Rex v. Martin, R. and R. C. 0. 108.

And sec Lynn's Case, Leach, 169; Thompson's Case, id. 893. Where a servant has part of a

house for his occupation, and the rest is reserved by the proprietor for other puq>oses, the

part reserved cannot be deemed part of the sen-ant's dwelling-house; and it will be the same

if any other personhas part of the house, and the rest is reserved. Rex v. Wilson, R. and R.

C. C. 115. Whore a servant stipulates upon hire for the use of certain rooms in his master's

premises for himself and family, the premises may be described as tho master's dwelling-house,

although the servant is the only person who inhabits them ; for he shall be considered as living

there as servant, not as holding as tenant. Rex v. Stor;k, id. 185. Where a shop was rented

with some of the apartments of a house, it was held that the shop was still part of the dwelling-

house, and that burglary might bp committed in it, as the house of the landlord. Gibson's Case,

Leach, 387. Where it must bo laid in the indictment to be the dwelling-house of the landlord,

if he break open the apartments of his lodgers, and steal their goods, it ig not burglary, for a man

cannot be guilty of burglary in his own house. Kel. 84.

As to the residence, from all the cases, it appears that it must be a place of actual residence.

Thus, a house under repair, in which no one lives, though the owner's property is deposited

there, is not a place in which burglary can be committed ; for it cannot be deemed his dwell-

ing-house until he has taken possession and begun to inhabit it. 1 Leach, 185. Nor will it

make any difference, if one of the workmen engaged in the repairs sleep there, in order to

protect it. 1 Leach, 186, in notis. Nor, though the house is ready for the reception of the

owner, and ho has sent his property into it preparatory to his own removal, will it become for

this purpose his mansion. 'I Leach, 771. And where the owner has never, by himself or by

any of his family, slept in the house, it is not his dwelling-house, so as to make the breaking

thereof burglarv, though he has used it for his meals, and all the purposes of his business.

Russ. and Ry. C. C. 138. So, if the landlord of a house purchases the furniture of his out-

going tenant, and procure a servant to sleep there, in order to guard it but without any inten-

tion of making it his own residence, a breaking into the house will not amount to burglary.

2 Leach, 876. But, if tho agent of a public company reside at a warehouse belonging to his

emplo3rers, this crime may be committed by breaking it, and he may be considered as the

owner. 2 Leach, 931. And it seems, that if a man die in his house, and his executors put

servants in it, and keep them there at board wages, burglary may be committed in breaking it,

and it may be laid to be the executors' property. 2 East, P. C. 499.

It seems quite settled, as above observed, that the proprietor of the house need not be actu-

ally within it at the time the offence is committed, provided it is one of his regular places of

abode. For if he leaves it animo revertendi, though no person reside there in his absence, it

will still be his mansion. As, if a man has a house in town, and another in the country, and

goes to the latter in the summer, the nocturnal breaking into either, with a felonious design,

will he burglarious. Fost. 77. And, though a man leaves his house, and never means to live

in it again, yet if he uses part of it as a shop and lets a servant and his family live and sleep

in another part of it, for fear the place should be robbed, and lets the rest to lodgers, the

habitation by his servant and family will be a habitation by him, and the shop may still be

considered as part of his dwelling-house. 1 Burn, 3., 24th ed. 503; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 442,
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the gates or walls of a town in the night; (w) though that perhaps Sir Edward

Coke would have called the mansion-house of the garrison or corporation.

Spelman defines burglary to be, " nocturna diruptio alien jus*habitaculi, r ^o- i

vel ecclesicB, etiam murorum portarumve buryi, cut feloniain perpetran- *• -"

dam." And therefore we may safely conclude, that the requisite of its being

domus mansionalis is only in the burglary of a private house: which is the most

frequent, and in which it is indispensably necessary to form its guilt, that it

must be in a mansion or dwelling-house, For no distant barn, warehouse, or

the like are tinder the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man's castle of

defence: nor is a breaking open of houses wherein no man resides, and which,

therefore, for the time being, are not mansion-houses, attended with the same

circumstances of midnight terror. A house, however, wherein a man some-

times resides, and which the owner hath only left for a short season, aniino rcver-

tcndi, is the object of burglary, though no one be in it at the time of the fact

committed, (x) And if the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-

house, and within the same common fence, (y) though not under the same roof

or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein ; for the capital house pro-

tects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage

or homestall. (z) A chamber in a college or an inn of court, where each inhab-

itant hath a distinct property, is, to all other purposes as well as this, the man-

sion-house of the owner. («) So also is a room or lodging, in any private house,

the mansion for the time being of the lodger; if the owner doth not himself
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dwell in the house, or if he and the lodger enter by different outward doors.

But if the owner himself lies in the house, and hath but one outward door at

which he and his lodgers enter, such lodgers seem only to be inmates, and all

their apartments to be parcel of the one dwelling house of the owner. (l>) Thus,

too, the house of a corporation, inhabited in separate apartments by the officers

of the body corporate, is the mansion-house of the corporation, and not of the

respective officers.(c) But if I hire a shop, parcel of another man's house, and

work or trade in it, but never lie there ; it is no dwelling house, nor can burglary

be committed therein; for by the lease *it is severed from the rest r *oog i

of the house, and therefore is not the dwelling-house of him who occu- •• J

pies the other part: neither can I be said to dwell therein, when I never lie

there, (d) Neither can burglary be committed in a tent or booth erected in a

market or fair; though the owner may lodge therein; (e) for the law regards

thus highly nothing but permanent edifices; a house or church, the wall or

gute of a town; and though it may be the choice of the owner to lodge in so

fragile a tenement, yet his lodging there no more makes it burglary to break it

open, than it would be to uncover a tilted wagon in the same circumstances.

3. As to the manner of committing burglary: there must be both a breaking

and an entry to complete it. But they need not be both done at once; for if a

hole be broken one night, and the same breakers enter the next night through

the same they are burglars. (/) There must in general be an actual breaking:

fir; Spelm. Glaus, t. Burglary. I Hawk. P. C. 103. (x) 1 Hal. P. C. 666. Kost. 77.

(!!) K v. Orirltimi. P. 16 Geo. Ill, by all the judges. (z) 1 Hal. P. C. 5.18. 1 Hawk. P. C. 101.

WHlnl. P. C. 566. (t>jKe\. 84. 1 Hal. P. C. 556. (cj Foster, 3s, 3». (dj 1 Hal. P. C. 558.

'e; 1 Huwk. P. C. 104. (f) 1 Hal. P. C. 553.

8. C. Bnt in an indictment for larceny from a dwelling-house, where the prosecutor left his

hwise without any intention of living in it again, and intending to use it as a warehouse only,

though be had persons (not of his own family) to sleep in it to guard the property, it was

Wd it cimld not be considered the prosecutor's dwelling-house, to support the charge. Rnss.

andRy. C. C. 187. And if the occupier of a house removes from it with his whole family,

and takes away so mnch of his goods ax to leave nothing fit for the accommodation of inmates,

and has no settled idea of returning to it, but rather intends to let it, the offence will be merely

larceny. Fust. 76. And the mere casual use of a tenement will not suffice; and therefore,

fte circumstance of a servant sleeping in a barn, or porter in a warehouse, for particular and

temporary purposes, will not so operate as to make a violent entry in the night, in order to steal,

» Hilary. 1 Hale, 557, 558.]

Tho! caves regarding a dwelling-house, and what shall be considered as within the curtilage,

are numerous, and are collected and classified in the works on criminal law.
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not a mere legal clausmn freijit (by leaping over invisible ideal boundaries,

which may constitute a civil trespass), but a substantial and forcible irruption-

As at least by breaking, or taking out the glass of, or otherwise opening, a win-

dow; picking a lock, or opening it with a key; nay, by lifting up the latch of a

door, or unloosing any other fastening which the owner has provided. (8) But

if a person leaves his doors or windows open, it is his own folly and negligence,

and if a man enters therein, it is no burglary: yet, if he afterwards unlocks an

inner or chamber door, it is so. ( y) (0) But to come down a chimney is held a

burglarious entry ; for that is as much closed as the nature of things will per-

mit. (A) So also to knock at the door, and upon opening it to rush in. with a

felonious intent: or under pretence of taking lodgings, to fall upon the laud-

lord and rob him ; or to procure a constable to gain admittance, in order to

search for traitors, and then to bind the constable and rob the house ; all these

r*22'"l en';1'ies nave been adjudged burglarious, though there was *no actual

L **' J breaking; for the law will not suffer itself to be trifled with by such

evasions, especially under the cloak of legal process, (i) And so. if a servant

opens and enters Iris master's chamber-door with a felonious design ; or if any

other person lodging in the same house, or in a public inn opens and enters

another's door, with such evil intent, it is burglary. Nay, if the servant con-

spires with a robber and lets him into the house by night, this is burglary in

both ; (&) or the servant is doing an unlawful act, and the opportunity afforded

him of doing it with greater ease rather aggravates than extenuates the guilt.
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As for the entry, any the least degree of it, with any part of the body, or with

an instrument held m the hand, is sufficient ; as to step over the threshold, to

put a hand or a hook in at a window to draw out goods, or a pistol to demand

one's money, are all of them burglarious entries. (?) (10) The entry may bebe-

(g) Ibid. (h) 1 Hawk. P. C. 103. 1 Hal. P. C. 652. (\) 1 Hawk. P. C. 102.

rejStra. 881. 1 Hal. P. C. 553. 1 Hawk. P. C. 103. (1) 1 Hal. P. C. 555. 1 Hawk. P. C. 103. Fost. 108.

(8) [So to push open massive doors which shut by their own weight, is burglarious, though

there is no actual fastening. 2 East. P. C. 487. Pulling down the sash of a window is a break-

ing, though it has no fastening, ami is only kept in its place by the pulley weight ; it is equally

a breaking, although there is an outer shutter which is not put to. RUBS, and Ry. C. (J. 451.

And where a window opens upon hinges, and is lastened by a wedge, so that pushing against

it will open it, forcing it open by pushing against it is sufficient to constitute a breaking.

Kuss. and Ry. C. C. 355. But where the prisoner broke out of a cellar bv lilting up a heavy

flap, by which the cellar was closed on the oul.jide next the street (the flap was not bolted,

but it had holts), six of the learned judges were of opinion that there was a sufficient break-

ing to constitute burglary ; the remaining six were of a contrary opinion. Russ. and Ry. C.

0. 157. And it is to be observed, that even when the first entry is a mere trespass, being as

per janva nptirttt, if the thief afterwards breaks open any inner room, he will be guilty of bur-

clary : 1 lialo, 553 ; and this may be done by a servant who sleeps in an adjacent room, uu-

liitchiug his master's door, and entering his apartment, with intent to kill him. 1 Hale, 544.

But Lord Hale doubts whether a guest at an inn is guilty of burglary by rising in the night,

opening his own door, and stealing goods from other rooms. 1 Hale, 554. And it seems cer-

tain that breaking open a chest or trunk is not in itself burglarious : Post. 108, 109 ; and accord-

ing to the better opinion, the same principle applies to cupboards, presses, and other fixtures,

•which though attached to the freehold, are intended only the better to supply the place of

movable despositories. Fost. 109.]

(9) [It will he burglary to unlatch an inner door with a felonious intent, and whatever

would he a breaking of an outer door will also be a breaking of an inner door to constitute

burglary. See 2 East, P. C. 488.

But it does not seem to be a burglary to break the doors of cupboards, presses and closets.

Ibid.]

Erskiue, J., in one case said that if a thief who is lawfully within even lifts the lateh to get

out of the house with the stolen property, that is a burglarious breaking out of the house.

Reg. v. Whceldon, H C. and P. 747. See Rex v. Lawrence, 4 id. 2:11 ; Curtis v. Hubbard, 1

Hill, 336; 4 id. 437; Commonwealth v, Stepheuson, 8 Pick. 354; Ducher v. State, 18 Ohio,

308.

(10) [So if the prisoner breaks open a shop window, and with his hand takes out goods, the

offence is complete. Fost. 107 ; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 499, S. P. Introducing the hand between

the glass of an outer window and an inner shutter is sufficient entry to constitute burglary.

Russ. and Ry. C. C. Ml. And whore several having broken open a house, and attempting to
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fore the breaking as well as after: by the statute 12 Ann, c. 7, if a person enters

into the dwelling-house of another", without breaking in, either by day or by

night, with intent to commit felony, or being in such a house, shall commit any

felony; and shall in the night break out of the same, this is declared to be

burglary: there having been before different opinions concerning it: Lord Ba-

con (/«)" holding the affirmative, and Sir Matthew Hale (w) the negative. But

it is universally agreed, that there must be both a breaking, either in fact or by

implication, and also an entry, in order to complete the burglary.

4. As to the intent; it is clear, that such breaking and entry must be with a

felonious intent, otherwise it is only a trespass. And it is the same, whether

such intention be actually carried into execution, or only demonstrated by some

attempt or overt act, of which the jury is to judge. And therefore such a breach

or entry of a house as has been before described, by night, with intent to commit

a robbery, *a murder, a rape or any other felony, is burglary; whether

the thing be actually perpetrated or not. Nor does it make any differ-

ence whether the offence were felony at common law, or only created so by stat-

ute ; since that statute which makes an offence felony, gives it incidentally all

the properties of a felony at common law.(o)^ll)

Thus much for the nature of burglary ; which is a felony at common law, but

•within the benefit of clergy. The statute, however, of 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, and 18

Eliz. c. 7, take away clergy from the principals, and that of 3, and 4 \V. and M.

c. 9, from all abettors and accessories before the fact.(p) And in like manner,
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the laws of Athens, which punished no simple theft with death, made burglary

a capital crime, (q)

(m) Elm. 66. <n» 1 Hal. P. C. 554. (o, I Hawk. P. C. 105.

(»l Bui-ginry in any house belonging to the plate glass company, with Intent to steal the stock or utensils,

is liy statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. US, declared to be single felony, and puuisned with transportation for seven years.

(qi Pott. Autiq. b. 1, c. 20.

enter are opposed by the owner, and in making a pass at him tho hand of one of the party is

within the threshold, he will be guilty of burglary. 1 Hale, 5T>3. If, however, an instrument

has been thrust into the window, not for the purpose of taking out property, but only calcu-

lated to form the aperture, this will not lie regarded as an entry : 1 Leach, 400; or if a house be

broken open, and the owner, through the fear occasioned by the circumstance, throw out his

money, the burglary will not be completed. 1 Hale, 555. It seems doubtful whether shooting

through a window is sufficient, by the entry of the shot discharged; but it seems the better

opinion that it is; as in this case, a felony by killing is as much attempted, as in the introduc-

tion of an instrument, a felony by stealing is attempted. 1 Hale, 555; Ilawk. b. 1, c. 38, s. 7.

See 4 Gamp. 220 ; 1 Stark, 58.]

As to what is a sufficient entry, see State v. McCall, 4 Ala. 643 ; State v. Reid, 20 Iowa, 413 ;

Frank v. State, 39 Miss. 705. Where a building is leased to different persons in distinct apart-

ments, each apartment is the dwelling-house of the lessee; Mason v. People, 26 X. Y. 200;

Stcdman v. Crane, 11 Met. 295; and see Dale ;;. State, 27 Ala. 31. As to what is within the

term " dwelling-house," see State v. Ginns, 1 If. and MeC. 583 ; State v. Langford, 1 Dev. 253 ;

Armour v. State, 3 Humph. 379; People v. Parker, 4 Johns. 424 ; People v. Suyder, 2 Parker, 23 ;

People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250; Commonwealth ». Estabrook, 10 Pick. 293; State v. Shaw, 31

Me. 523.

(11) But if a servant, intrusted by his master to sell goods, receives money to his use, con-

ceals it in the house instead of paying it over, and after his dismissal, breaks the house and

steals it, the entry is not burglarious, because there was no felony in the original taking. 1

Show, 53. And even where prisoners were proved to have broken open a house in the night

time, to recover teas seized for want of a legal permit, for tho use of the person from whom

they were taken, an indictment for burglary with intent to steal was holdeu not to be supported.

2 East, P. 0. 510.]
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CHAPTER XVII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PEIVATE PROPERTY.

THE next and last species of offences against private subjects, are such aa more

immediately affect their property. Of which there are two, which are attended

with a In-each of the peace ; larceny and malicious mischief: and one, that is

equally injurious to the rights of property, but attended with no act of violence;

which is the crime of forgery. Of these three in their order.

I. Larceny, or theft, by contraction for latrociny, lactrocinium, is distinguished

by the law into two sorts: the one called simple larceny, or plain theft, unaccom-

panied with any other atrocious circumstances; and mixed or compound larceny.

And, first, of simple larceny ; which, when it is the stealing of goods above the

value of twelve-pence, is called grand larceny; when of goods to that value, or

under, is petit larceny; offences which are considerably distinguished in their

punishment, but not otherwise. I shall, therefore, first consider the nature of

simple larceny in general; and then shall observe the different degrees of pun-

ishment inflicted on its two several branches.

Simple larceny, then," is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal

T*2SO 1 g°oc^s °* another." This *offence certainly commenced then, whenever

L -1 it was, that the bounds of property, or laws of meum and tuum, wei^

established. How far such an offence can exist in a state of nature, where all

things are held to be common, is a question that may be solved with very little

difficulty. The disturbance of any individual, in the occupation of what he has
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seized to his present use seems to be the only offence of this kind incident to such

a state. But unquestionably, in social communities, when property is estab-

lished, the necessity whereof we have formerly seen, (a) any violation of that

property is subject to be punished by the laws of-society: though how far that

punishment should extend, is matter of considerable doubt. At present we will

examine the nature of theft, or larceny, as laid down in the foregoing definition.

1. It must be a taking. (2) This implies the consent of the owner to be wanting.

Therefore no delivery of the goods from the owner to the offender, upon trust,

(a) See book II, p. 8, Ac.

(1) The punishment for this offence is now provided for by statute 24 and 25 Tic. c.96. That

statute abolishes the distinction between grand and petit larceny, and limits the punishment for

the first offence of simple larceny to three years' penal servitude, or two years' imprisonment,

wilh or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement.

(2) [The oases upon this important requisite of the offence of larceny are so numerous, and

the distinctions so subtle, that it will be necessary to go into considerable detail to give a com-

plete view of the law upon the subject. See in general, 3 Chit. Grim. L., 2d. ed. 917 to 924.

\.Whentheofendfr Jau;full>jiic(]uiredthe ]>ti><seiisit>ni>f goody, but under a bare charge, the oicner

still retaining his property in tlient, the offender will be guilty of larceny in common law in

embezzling them. Thus, in addition to the instances put by the learned author, of the butler,

the shepherd, and puest at an inn, if a master deliver property into the hands of a servant for

a special purpose, as to leave it at the house of a friend, or to get change, or deposit with a

banker, the sen-ant will be guilty of felony in applying it to his own use, for it still remains in

the constructive possession of its owner. 2 Leach, 870, 942; and see 2 East. P. C. 563, tied ritle

2 East. P. f. 502; R. and R. 0. C. 215; 4 Taunt. 258, S. C. If a banker's clerk is sent to

the money-room to bring cash for a particular purpose, and he takes the opportunity of secreting

Rome for his own use, (1 Leach, 344) he is guilty of larceny; and see 1 Leach, 251; Kel. 3:?;

Cowp. 294. And if several persons pluy together at cards, ana deposit money for that purpose,

not parting with their property therein, and one sweep it all away, and take it to himselt. ho

will be guilty of theft, if the jury find that he acted with a felonious design. 1 Leach, 270 ;

Cal. 395. So if there be a plan to cheat a man of his property, under color of a bet, and he

parts with the posscsaion only, to deposit as a stake with one of the confederates; the taking

by such confederate is felonious. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 413. And if a bag of wheat bedolivyred

to a warehouseman for safe custody, and he take the wheat out of the bag, and dispose of it. it

is larceny. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 337. And where a bankers clerk took notes from the tilL

under color of a check from a third person, which check he obtained by having entered &

436

Chap. 17.] LARCENY. 230

can ground a larceny. As if A lends B a horse, and he rides away with him:

or, if I send goods by a carrier, and he carries them away; these are no larcenies, (b)

But if the carrier opens a bale or pock of goods, or pierces a vessel of wine, and

takes away part thereof, or if he carries it to the place appointed, and afterwards

takes away tne whole, these are larcenies; (c) for here the animus furandi is mani-

fest; since in the first case he had otherwise no inducement to open the goods,

and in the second the trust was determined, the delivery having taken its effect.

But bare non-delivery shall not of course be intended to arise from a felonious

(In 1 Hal. F. C. 504. (c) 3 lust. 107.

fictitious balance in the books in favor of that person, it was held ho was guilty of felony; tho

fraudulent obtaining the check being nothing more than mere machinery to effect his purpose.

4 Taunt. 304: R. and R. C. C. 221, S. C.; 2 Leach, C. C. 1033. And where one employed as a

clerk, in the day-time, but not residing in the house, embezzles a bill of exchange, which he

received from his master in the usual course of business, with directions to transmit it by the

post to a correspondent, it was held to be larceny. 2 East, P. C. 565 ; and see 2 Chit. C. L. 2d.

ed. 917, b. And where goods have not been actually reduced into the owner's possession, yet if

ne has entrusted another to deliver them to his servant, and thev are delivered accordingly, and

the servant embezzles them, he will be guilty of larceny; as where a corn factor having pur-

chased a cargo of oats on board a ship, sent his servant with his barge to receive part of the oats

in loose bulk, and the servant ordered some of them to be put into sacks, which he afterwards

embezzled, this was holden larceny. 2 East, P. C. 1798; 2 Leach, 825.

2. Where tJie offender unlawfully (required the possession of goods, as by fraud or force. <(r.,
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with intent to steal tliem, the oicner still retaining At« property in them, such an offender will be

guilty of larceny in embezzling them. Therefore, in addition to the instances mentioned in the

text, hiring a horse on pretence of taking a journey, and immediately selling it, is larceny, because

the jury found the defendant noted animo furandi, in making the contract, and the parting

with the possession had not changed tho nature of tie property. 2 East, P. C. 685; 1 Leach,

212 ; acd see 2 Leach. 420; 2 East, P. C. 691. So obtaining a horse by pretending another per-

son wanted to hire it to go to B, but in truth with intent to steal it, and not going to B. but

taking the horse elsewhere and selling it, is larceny. 1 Leach, 409 ; 2 East, P. C. 689. So where

the prisoner, intending to steal the mail bags from a post-office, procured them to be lot down

to him by a string from the window of the post-office, under pretence that he was the mail

guard, he was held guilty of larceny. 2 East, P. C. 603. It is larceny for a person hired for the

special purpose of driving sheep to a fair to convert them to his own use, he having the in-

tention so to do at the time of receiving them from the owner. 1 Ry. and M. C. C. 87. And

where a man ordered a pair of Candlesticks from a silversmith, to be paid for on delivery, to

be sent to his lodgings, whither they were sent accordingly, with a bilf of parcels, by a" ser-

vant, and the prisoner contriving to send the servant back under some pretence, kept the

goods, it was holden larceny. Cited in 2 Leach, 420. And if a sale of goods is not completed,

and the pretended purchaser absconds with them, and from the first his intention was to de-

fraud, he is guilty of stealing: 1 Leach, 92; and to obtain money from another by ring-

dropping, is a similar offence, if there was an original design to steal: 1 Leach, 238; 2 id.

572 : and where the owner of goods sends them by a servant, to be delivered to A, and B, pre

tending to be A, obtains them from him, B is guilty of larceny. 2 East, P. C. 673. So where

the prisoner pretending to be the servant of a person who had bought a chest of tea, deposited

at the E. I. company's warehouse, got a request paper and permit for the chest, and took it

away with the assent of a person in the company's service who had the charge of it; this

was held felony. R. and Ry. C. C. 163. So. to obtain a bill of exchange from an endorsee,

under a pretence of getting it discounted, is felony, if the jury find that the party did not in-

tend to leave the bill in the possession of the defendant, previous to receiving the money to be

obtained on his credit, and that he undertook to discount with the intent to convert it" to his

own use : 1 Leach, 294 ; and it seems that if a person procure possession of a house with an in-

tent to steal the lead affixed to it, he may be indicted on the 4 Geo. II, c. 32, for the statutable

larceny. 2 Leach, 850.

In all these cases the defendant's original design in obtaining the goods was felonious, and

the owner never parted with his property therein, for where either is not the case there can be

no larceny, as will appear from the following instances: Thus, where a house was burning,

and a neighbor took some of the goods, apparently to save them from the flames, and after-

wards converted them to his own use, it was holden no felony, because the jury thought the

original design honest. 1 Leach, 411, notes. And it is certain, that if the property in effects

be given voluntarily, whatever false pretence has been used to obtain it, no felony can bo com-

mitted. 1 Hale, P'. C. 506; R. and R. C. C. 225, S. P. Thus, obtaining silver on pretence of

sending a half guinea presently in exchange, is no felony. 2 East, P. C. 672. So, writing a

letter in the name of a third person to borrow money, which he obtains by that fraud, is only

a misdemeanor: 2 East, P. C. 673; and it makes no difference in these cases that the credit

was obtained bv fraudulently using the name of another, to whom it was intended to be given :

1 Leach, 303, notes; 2 East, P. C. "673; R. and R. C. C. 225; and if a horse dealer delivers a
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design; since that may happen from a variety of other accidents. Neither

by the common law was it larceny in any servant to run away with the goods com-

mitted to him to keep, but only a breach of civil trust. But by statute 33 Hen.

VI, c. 1, the servants of a person deceased, accused of embezzling their masters'

r ^QJ -i goods, mav by writ out of chancery (issued by *the advice of the chief jus-

' " J tices and chief baron, or any two of them), and proclamation made there-

upon, be summoned to appear personally in the court of king's bench, to answer

horse to another on his promise to return immediately and pay for it, the party's riding off and

not returning in no felony. 1 Leach, 4ti7 ; 2 East, P. C. 669. So, if a tradesman sells goods to

a stranger as for ready money, and sends them to him by a servant, who delivers them, and

takes in payment for "them bills which prove to be mere fabrications, this will be no larceny,

though the party took his lodgings for the express purpose of obtaining the goods by fraud,

because the owner parted with his property. 2 Leach, 614. So, fraudulently winning money

at gaming, whore the injured party really intended to play, is no larceny, though a conspiracy

to defraud appear in evidence. 2 Leach, 610. So, brokers, bankers, or" agents, embezzling se-

curities deposited with them for security or any special purpose, are not guilty of larceny: 4

Taunt. 258; 2 Leach, 10f>4 ; K. and R. C. C. 215; S. C.; but this decision occasioned the 52 Geo.

Ill, c. 63, to be passed, making it a misdemeanor in brokers, bankers and others, to embezzle

securities deposited with them for safe custody or for any special purpose, in violation of good

faith, and contrary to the special purpose for which they were deposited. Thus, in all cases

where voluntary delivering by the prosecutor is the defence to be relied on, two questions arise:

first, whether the property was parted with by the owner; secondly, whether, supposing it was
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not, the prisoner at the time he obtained it conceived a felonious design. In the first case, no

fraud or breach of trust can make a conversion larceny; in the second, the complexion of the

offence must depend on the felonious design.

3. Wktre the offenderlawfully acquired possession and qualified property in goods, under color of

bailment, but with intention of stealing them, and privity of the bailment has been determined

either by wrongful act of offender or by intention of parties, if he afterwards embezzle such goods,

he will be guilty of larceny. For, in the first case, after the determination of the special con-

tract bv any plain and unequivocal wrongful act of the bailee, inconsistent with that con-

tract, the property, as against the bailee, reverts, to the owner, although the actual possession

remain in the bailee. 2 East, P. C. 691, 627. The most remarkable case of this description is

that of a carrier pointed out by the learned commentator. So, the conversion of money with

a felonious intent, which was found in a bureau delivered to a carpenter to be repaired, bv

breaking it open, when there was no necessity for so doing for the purpose of repairs, will

amount to a larceny: 8 Vcs. 405 ; 2 Leach, 952; 2 Russ. 1045; and in the same case it was

said, that if a pocket-book containing bank notes were left in the pocket of a coat sent to be

mended, and the tailor took the pocket-book out of the socket, and the notes out of the

pocket-book with a felonious intent, it would amount to a (elony. If the master and owner

of a ship steal some of the goods delivered to him to carry, it is not larceny in him, unless he

took the goods out of their package : nor if larceny, would it be an offence within 24 Geo. II,

c. 45. K. and R. C. C. 92. And if corn be sent to a miller to grind, and ho take part of it, he

will be guilt}7 of felony : 1 Roll. Abr. 73; but where forty bags of wheat were sent to prisoner,

a warehouseman, for safe custody, until sold by prosecutor, and prisoner's servant, by direc-

tion of prisoner, emptied four of the bags and mixed their contents with other inferior wheat,

and part of mixture was disposed of by prisoner, and remainder was placed in prosecutor's

bags, which had thus been emptied, and there was no severing of any part of wheat in any

one bag with intent to embezzle that part only which was so severed, the prisoner was held

guilty of larceny in taking the wheat out of the bag. R. and R. C. C. 337. And where property

which prosecutors had bought was weighed out in the presence of their clerk, and delivered to

their carter's servant to cart, who let other persons take away the cart and dispose of the pro-

perty for his benefit, jointly with that of the other persons,'it was held that the carters servant

was not guilty of a mere breach of trust, but that he as well as the other persons were guilty of

larceny at common-law. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 125; and see 2 East, P. C. 568 to 574, 695 to 698.

But iu all these cases the defendant must have hod an intention of stealing the property at fits

time it was delivered to him. R. and R. C. C. 441, overruling 2 East, P. C. 690, 694; 2 Rnss.

1U89, 1090; 1 R. and M. C. C. 87.

4. Where the offender lias the qualified property and actual possession of goods at the time of

the embezzlement, he will not be guilty of larceny at common-law. Thus, where a servant or

clerk had received property for the use of his master, and the master never had any other

possession than such possession by his servant or clerk, it was doubted whether the latter was

guilty of felony in stealing such property, or was guilty merely of a breach of trust. 2 Leach,

835 ;' Hale, 668 ; 2 East, P. C. 570, 571; and see 4 Taunt. 258 ; Russ. and Ry. C. 0. 215, S. C.; 2

Leach, C. C. 1054. So, a cashier of the bank could not be guilty of a felony in embezzling an India

bond which he had received from the court of chancery, and which was iu his actual as well as

constructive possession. 1 Leach, 28, So, if a clerk received money of a customer, and, without

at all putting it in the till, converted it to his own use, he was guilty only of a breach of trust,
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their .masters' executors in any civil suit for such goods; and shall, on default of

appearance, be attainted of felony. And by statute 21 Hen. VIII, c. 7, if any servant

embezzles his masters' goods to the value of forty shillings, it is made felony;

except in apprentices, and servants under eighteen years old.(3) But if he had

not the possession, but only the care and oversight of the goods, as the butler

of the plate, the shepherd of the sheep, and the like, the embezzling of them is

felony at common law.(d) So, if a guest robs his inn or tavern of a piece of plate, it

is larceny: for he hath not the possession delivered to him, but merely the use,(e)

and so it is declared to be by statute 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, if a lodger runs away

with the goods from his ready furnished lodgings. Under some circumstances,

also, a man may be guilty of felony in taking his own goods: as if he steals them

from a pawnbroker, or any one to whom he hath delivered and entrusted them,

with intent to charge such bailee with the value; or if he robs his own messen-

ger on the road, with an intent to charge the hundred with the loss according

to the statute of Winchester.(/)

2. There must not only be a taking, but a carrying away ; (4) cepit et asportavit

fdj I Hal. P. C. 506. (e) I Hawk. P. C. 90. (f) Fost. 123, 124.

though, had he mice deposited it, and then taken it again, he would have been guilty of felony.

2 Leach, 8:35. The dangers resulting from this doctrine occasioned the enactment of 39 Geo.

Ill, c. 85, against such embezzlements by servants, or clerks, rendering the ofl'enco punishable

with transportation for fourteen years.

5. Party stealing liis own goods, $'c. Besides the cases already mentioned in the text, if a
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man steals his own goods from his own bailee, though he has no intent to charge the bailee, but

his intent is to defraud the king, yet, if the bailee had an interest in the possession, and could

have withheld it from the owner, the taking is a larceny. B. and R. C. C. 470 : 3 Burn, J , 24th

ed. 240 S. C. And a man may bo accessory after the fact to a larceny committed on himself,

by receiving and harboring the thief, instead of bringing him to justice. Fost. 123 ; but a joint

tenant or tenant in common of effects cannot be guilty of larceny in appropriating the whole to

his own purpose: 1 Hale, 513, but if a part owner of property steal it from the person in

whose custody it is, and who is responsible for its safety, he is guilty of larceny. 11. and E. C.

C. 478. Nor can a wile commit larceny of her husband's goods, because his custody is, in law.

her's, and they are considered as one person. 1 Hale, 514. On the same ground no third person

can be guilty "of larceny by receiving the husband's goods from the wife, and if she keep the

key of the place where" the property is kept, her privity will be presumed, and the defendant

must be acquitted. 1 Leach, 47. See 1 Hale, 45, 510; Kel. 37.

6. The taking must always be against the will of the owner : 1 Leach. 47; but if the owner, in

irder to detect a number of men in the act of stealing, directs a servant to appear to encourage

the design, and lead them on till the offence is complete, so long as he did not induce the origi-

nal intent, but only provided for its discovery after it was formed, the criminality of the thieves

will not be destroyed. 2 Leach, 913. So, if a man be suspected of an intent to steal, and

another, to try him, leaves property in his way, which he takes, he is guilty of larceny. 2 Leach,

921. And if, on thieves breaking in to plunder a house, a servant, by desire of his master, show

them where the plate is kept, which they remove, this circumstance will not affect the crime.

2 Leach, 922.1

(3) This subject is also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 9C, which imposes the punish-

ment of penal servitude for not more than iourteen and not less than three years, or imprison-

ment not more than two years.

(4) [If a thief cut a belt on which a purse is hung, and it drops to the ground where he

leaves it, or if he compel a man to lay down goods, which he is carrying, and is apprehended

before he raises them from the ground", the crime is incomplete. 1 Leach, 322, n. b.; 1 Hale,

533. And if goods are tied to a string, which is fastened at one end to a counter, and a per-

Bon, intending to steal them, takes hold of the other, and removes them towards the door, as

far as the string will permit him, this will be no felony. So, where the prosecutor had his

keys tied to the strings of his purse in his pocket, which the prisoner endeavored to take from

him, and was detected with the purse in his hand, but the strings still hung to the pocket by

the keys, this was holden to be no asportation, and therefore no larceny was committed.

1 Leach. 321, n. a.; 1 Hale, 508. But a very slight asporation will suffice. Thus, to snatch a

diamond from a lady's ear, which is instantly dropped among the curls of her hair: 1 Leach,

320 ; 2 East, P. C. 557 ; to remove sheets from a bed, and carry them into an adjoining room.

(1 Leach, 222, in notes), to take plate from a trunk, and lay it on the floor, with intent to carry

it away (id.), and to remove a package from one part of a wagon to another, with a view to

steal it, (1 Leach, 236), have respectively been holden to be felonies : and where a prisoner had

lifted up a bag from the bottom of a boot of a coach, but was detected before he had got it

out, and it did not appear that it was entirely removed from the space it at first occupied in the

boot, but the raising it from the bottom had completely removed each part of it from the space

that specific part occupied, this was held a complete asportation^ 1 Ry. and Moody, C. C. 14.
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was the old law-latin. A bare removal from the place in which he found the

goods, though the thief does not quite make oft' with them, is a sufficient asporhv-

tion, or carrying away- As, if a man be leading another's horse out of a close, and

be apprehended in the fact; or if a guest, stealing goods out of an inn, has

removed them from his chamber down stairs: these have been adjudged suffi-

cient carryings away to constitute a larceuy.(^) Or, if a thief, intending to

steal plate, takes i't out of a chest in which it was, and lays it down upon the

floor, but is surprised before he can make his escape with it; this is larceny.(A)

T*2S2l *^' I'h'8 taking, and carrying away, must also be felonious ; that is,

L -I done ammo furandi: or, as the civil law expresses it, lucri causa.(i) (5)

(</; 3 Inst. 108, 109. (ft) 1 Hawk. P. C. 93. (<) 1 liisl. 4,1,1.

But if the defendant merely change the position of a package from lying endways to length-

ways, for the greater convenience of taking out its contents, and cuts the ontskle of it for that

purpose, but is detected before he has taken any thing, there will be no larceny committed.

Id. in notes. Where it is one continuing transaction, though there be several distinct asporta-

tious in law by several persons, yet all may be indicted as principals who concur in the felony

before the final carrying away of the goods from the virtual custody of the owner : 2 East, P. C.

557; but two cannot be convicted upon an indictment charging ajoiut larceny, unless there

be evidence to satisfy a jury that they were concerned in a joint taking. 2 Stark, on Evidence,

840. If one steal another mau's goods, and afterwards another stealcth from him, the owner

may prosecute the first or second felon at his choice. Dalt. c. 162. There is no occasion that

the carrying away be by the hand of the party accused ; for, if he procured an innocent agent,
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as a child or a lunatic, to take the property, or if he obtained it from the sheriff by a replevin,

without the slightest color of title, and with a felonious design, he will himself be a principal

offender. Hawk. b. 1, c. 3.J, s. 12.]

(5) The felonious quality consists in the intention of the prisoner to defraud the owner, and

to apply the thing stolen to bis own use; and it is not necessary that the taking should be

done lucri causa ; taking with an intent to destroy will be sufficient to constitute the offence,

if done to serve the prisoner or another person, though not in a pecuniary way. R. aud R,

C. C. 292. In a late singular case it was determined that, where a servant clandestinely took

his master's corn, though to give it to his master's horses, he was guilty of larceny—tho

servant in some degree being likely to diminish his labor thereb3r. R. aud R. C C. 307; 3

Bam, J., 24th ed. 209. (See a late case, Rus. and Ry. C. C. llrt, under very particular circum-

stances.) It is sufficient if the prisoner intend to appropriate the value of the chattel, and

not the chattel itself, to his own use, as where the owner of goods steals them from his own

servant or bailee, in order to charge him with the amount. 7 Hen. VI, f. 43. The intention

nmst exist at the time of the taking, and no subsequent felonious intention will render the pre-

vious taking felonious.

We have seen that a taking by finding, and a snbseqneut conversion, will not amount to a

felony. 3 lust. 108; 1 Hawk. e. 33, R. 2; 2 Russ. 1041. But if the goods are found in the

place where they are usually suffered to lie, as a horse on a common, cattle in the owner's

fields, or money in a place where it clearly appears the thief knew the owner to have concealed

it: 1 Hale, 507, 508 : 2 East, P. C. f>(>4 ; or if the finder in any way know the owner, or if there

be any mark on the goods by which the owner can be ascertained, the takiug will be felonious.

So, if a parcel be left in a hackney coach, and the driver open it, not merely from curiosity, but

with a view to appropriate part of its contents to his own use. or if the prosecutor order him to

deliver the package to the servant, and he omits so to do, he will be guilty of felony. 2 East,

P. 0. l>64; 1 Leach, 413-415. and in notes.

Where the taking exists, but without fraud, it may amount only to a trespass. This is also

a point frequently depending on circumstantial evidence, aud to be left for the jury's decision.

Thus, where the prisoners entered another's stable at night, and took out his horses, and rode

them thirty-two miles, and left them at an inn, aud were afterwards found pursuing their

journey on foot, they were held to have committed only a trespass, and not a felony. 2 Enst,

P. C. 01)2. It depends also on circumstances what offence it is to force a man, in 'the posses-

sion of goods, to sell them; if the defendant takes them, and throws down more than their

value, it will be evidence that it was only trespass ; if less were offered, it would probably be

regarded as felony. 1 East, Rep. 615, 636. And it seems that the taking may be only a tres-

pass, where the original assault was felonious. Thus, if a man searches the pockets ot another

for money, and finds none, and afterwards throws the saddle from his horse on the ground, and

scatters bread from his packages, he will not be guilty of robbery (2 East, P. C. 662), though

he might certainly have been indicted for feloniously assaulting"with intent to steal, for that

offence was complete.

The openness and notoriety of the taking, where possession has not been obtained by force

or stratagem, is a strong circumstance to rebut the inference of a felonious intention: 1 Hale,

507; 2 East. P. C. 661, 6G2; but this alone will not make it the less a felony. Kel. 82 ; 2 Raym.

266: 2 Vent. 94. A taking by mere accident, or in joke, or mistaking another's property for

one's own, is neither legally nor morally a crime. 2 Hale, 507, 509.]
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This requisite, besides excusing those who labor under incapacities of mind or

will (of whom we spoke sufficiently at the entrance of this book) (k) indemni-

fies also mere trespassers, and other petty offenders. As if a servant takes his

master's horse without his knowledge, and brings him home again; if a neigh-

bor takes another's plough that is left in the field, and uses it upon his own

land, and then returns it: if under cover of arrear of rent where none is due,

I distrain another's cattle, or seize them; all these are misdemeanors and tres-

pass, but no felonies. (I) The ordinary discovery of a felonious intent is where

the party doth it clandestinely ; or, being charged with the fact, denies it. But

this is by no means the only criterion of criminality: for, in cases that may

amount to larceny, the variety of circumstances is so great, and the complica-

tions thereof so mingled, that it is impossible to recount all those which may evi-

dence a felonious intent, or animum furandi: wherefore they must be left to the

due and attentive consideration of the court and jury.

4. This felonious taking and carrying away must be of the personal goods of

another: for, if they are things real, or savour of the realty, larceny at the

common law cannot be committed of them. Lands, tenements, and heredita-

ments (either corporeal or incorporeal) cannot in their nature be taken and

carried away. And oi things, likewise, that adhere to the freehold, as corn,

grass, trees, and the like, or lead upon a house, no larceny could be committed

by the rules of the common law: but the severance of them was, and in many

things is still, merely a trespass which depended on the subtility in the legal
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notions of our ancestors. These things were parcel of the real estate; and,

therefore, while they continued so, could not by any possibility, be the sub-

ject of theft, being absolutely fixed and immovable. (•/») And if they were

*severed by violence, so as to be changed into movables; and, at the r*oQ9 n

same time, by one and the same continued act, carried off by the person *• J

who severed them: they never could be said to be taken from the proprietor,

in this their newly acquired state of mobility (which is essential to the nature

of larceny), being never, as such, in the actual or constructive possession of

any one, but of him who committed the trespass. He could, not, in strictness

be said to have taken what at that time were the personal goods of another,

since the very act of taking was what turned them into personal goods. But

if the thieves sever them at one time, whereby the trespass is completed, and

they are converted into personal chattels, in the constructive possession of him

on whose soil they are left or laid; and come again at (mother time, when they

are so turned into personalty, and take them away; it is larcenv: and so it is,

if the owner, or any one else, has severed them, (n) And, now, l>y the statute

4 Gco. II, c. 32, to steal, or rip, cut, or break, with intent to steal any lead, or

iron bar, rail, gate, orpalisudo, fixed to a dwelling-house or out-house, or in any

court or garden thereunto belonging, or to any other building, is made felony,

liable to transportation for seven years; and to steal,damage, or destroy under-

wood or hedges, and the like, to rob orchards or gardens of fruit, growing

therein, to steal or otherwise destroy any turnips, potatoes, cabbages, parsnips,

peas, or carrots, or the roots of madder, when growing, are (o) punishable, crimi-

nally, by whipping, small fines, imprisonment, and satisfact on to the party

wronged, according to the nature of the offence. Moreover, the stealing by

night of any trees, or of any roots, shrubs, or plants, of the value of 5s., is, by

statute 6 Geo. Ill, c. 36, made felony in the principals, aiders and abettors, and

in the purchasers thereof, knowing the same to be stolen: and by statutes 0 Geo.

Ill, c. 48, and 13 Geo. Ill, c. 33, the stealing of any timber trees therein speci-

fied, (p) and of any root, *shrub or plant, by day or night, is liable to r*oo41

pecuniary penalties for the two first offences, and for the third is con- *- -I

stituted a felony, liable to transportation for seven years. Stealing ore out of

(t) Sec pajre 20. (1) 1 Hal. P. C. SOS. (m) See hook II. p. 10. (n) S lust. 109. 1 Hnl. P. C. MO.

(o) SUit. 43~Eliz. o. 7. 15 Oar. II, c. S. 81 Geo. II, c. 35. 8 Geo. Ill, c. 48. W Goo. Ill, c. 41. IS Geo. Ill.c. 32

(p) Oak, beech, clieatnut, walnut, ash, elm, cedar, llr, asp, lime sycamore, birch, poplar, larch

maple, and hornbeam.
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mines is also no larceny, upon the same principle of adherence to the freehold:

with an exception only to mines of black lead, the stealing of ore out of which,

or entering the same with intent to steal, is felony, punishable with imprison-

ment and whipping, or transportation not exceeding seven years; and to escape

from such imprisonment, or return from such transportation, is felony, without

benefit of clergy, by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 10. Upon nearly the same principle

the stealing of writings relating to a real estate is no felony; but a trespass: (g)

because they concern the land, or (according to our technical language) savour

of the realty, and are considered as part of it by the law : so that they descend

to the heir, together with the land which they concern. (;•) (6)

Bonds, bills, and notes, which concern mere chows in action, were also, at tho

common law, held not to be such goods whereof larceny might be committed;

being of no intrinsic value; (s) and not importing any property in possession of

the person from whom they are taken. But by the statute 2 Geo. II, c. '25, they

are now put upon the same footing, with respect to larcenies, as the money they

were meant to secure. By statute 15, Geo. II, c. 13, officers or servants of the

bank of England, secreting or embezzling any note, bill, warrant, bond, deed,

security, money, or effects intrusted with them or with the company, are guilty

of felony without benefit of clergy. The same is enacted by statute 24 Geo. II,

c. 11, with respect to officers and servants of the south-sea company. And by

statute 7 Geo. Ill, c. 50, if any officer or servant of the post office shall secrete,

embezzle, or destroy any letter or pacquet, containing any bank note or other
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valuable paper particularly specified in the act, or shall steal the same out of

l~*23" 1 any ^ter or *pacquet, lie shall be guilty of felony without benefit of

'- J clergy. Or, if he shall destroy any letter or pacquet with which he has

received money for the postage, or shall advance the rate of postage on any let-

ter or pacquet sent by the post, and shall secrete the money received by such

advancement, he shall be guilty of single felony. Larceny also could not, at

common law, be committed of treasure-trove or wreck, till seized by the king or

him who hath the franchise, for till such seizure no one hath a determinate

property therein. But by statute 26 Geo. II, c. 19, plundering or stealing from

any ship in distress (whether wreck or no wreck) is felony, without benefit of

clergy : in like manner as, by the civil law, (t) this inhumanity is punished in

the same degree as the most atrocious theft. (7)

Larceny also cannot be committed of such animals in which there is no prop-

erty either absolute or qualified: as of beasts that are ferce natures and unre-

claimed, such as deer, hares, and conies in a forest, chase, or warren; Fish in

an open river or pond: or wild fowls at their natural liberty. («) But if they are

reclaimed or confined, and may serve for food, it is otherwise, even at common

law: for of deer so inclosed in a park that they may be taken at pleasure, fish in

a trunk, and pheasants or patridge in a mew, larceny may be committed, (v) (8)

And now, by statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer; to

rob a warren ; or to steal fish from a river or pond (being in these cases armed

and disguised; also to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, in the king's forests

or chases inclosed, or in any other inclosed place where deer have been usually

kept; or by gift or promise of reward to procure any person to join them in

such unlawful act; all these are felonies without benefit of clergy. And the

statute 16 Geo. Ill, c. 30, enacts that every unauthorized person, his aiders and

abettors, who shall course, hunt, shoot at, or otherwise attempt to kill, wound,

or destroy any red or fallow deer, in any forest, chase, purlieu, or ancient walk,

(q) 1 Hal. P. C. 810. Stra. 11S7. (r) See book, II. p. 128. (») 8 Rep. 33. (*) Cod. 6, 2 18.

(u) 1 Hal. P. C. 511. Tost. 306. (r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 94. 1 Hal. P. C. 511.

(6) Tho subject of this paragraph is now covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96, which

provides for the criminal punishment of the various wrongs here enumerated.

(?) The subject of this paragraph is also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vie. c. 96.

(8) Sec Reg. v. Cheafor, 2 Den. C. C. 361. The statutes mentioned in this paragraph are now

repealed.

442

Chap. 17.] LARCENY. 236

or in any inclosea park, paddock, wood, or other ground, *where deer r *0pg i

are usually kept, shall forfeit the sum of 201., or for every deer actually L " ' '

killed, wounded, destroyed, taken in any toil or snare, or carried away, the sura

of 30?., or double those sums in case the offender be a keeper: and upon a sec-

ond offence (whether of the same or a different species), shall be guilty of felony,

and transportable for seven years. Which latter punishment is likewise inflicted

on all persons armed with offensive weapons, who shall come into such places

with an intent to commit any of the said offences, and shall there unlawfully

beat or wonnd any of the keepers in the execution of their offices, or shall

attempt to rescue any person troni their custody. Also, by statute 5 Geo. Ill,

c. 14, the penalty of transportation for seven years is inflicted on persons steal-

ing or taking fish in any water within a park, paddock, garden, orchard, or

yard: and on the receivers, aiders, and abettors: and the like punishment,

or whipping, fine, or imprisonment, is provided for the taking or killing of

conies (in) by night in open warrens: and a forfeiture of five pounds to the

owner of the fishery, is made payable by persons taking or destroying (or attempt-

ing so to do) any fish in any river or other water within any inclosed ground,

being private property. Stealing hawks, in disobedience to the rules prescribed

by the statute 37 Edw. Ill, c. 19, is also a felony, (x) It is also said, (y) that, if

swans be lawfully marked, it is felony to steal them, though at large in a public

river; and that it is likewise felony to steal them, though unmarked, if in any

private river or pond; otherwise it is only a trespass. But of all valuable domes-
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tic animals, as horses and other beasts of draught, and of all animals doinita

natures, which serve for food, as neat or other cattle, swine, poultry, and the

like, and of their fruit or produce, taken from them while living, as milk or

wool, (z) larceny may be committed; and also of the flesh of such as are either

domitce or ferce naturw, wiien killed, (a) As to those animals which do not

serve for food, and which, therefore, the law holds to have no intrinsic value, as

dogs of all sorts, and other creatures kept for whim and pleasure, though a man

may have a base property therein, and maintain a civil action for the loss of them,

(b) yet they are not of such estimation as that the crime of stealing them amounts

to larceny, (c) But by statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 18, very high pecuniary penalties,

or a long imprisonment, and whipping in their stead, may be inflicted by two

justices of the peace (with a very extraordinary mode of appeal to the quarter

sessions), on such as steal, or knowingly harbour, a stolen dog, or have in their

custody the skin of a dog that has been stolen, (d) (9)

Notwithstanding however that no larceny can be committed, unless there be

some property in the thing taken, and an owner; yet, if the owner be unknown,

provided there be a property, it is larceny to steal it; and an indictment will

lie, for the goods of a person unknown, (e) In like manner as among the Ro-

mans, the lex Host-ilia defurtis provided that a prosecution for theft might be

carried on without the intervention of the owner. (/) This is the case of steal-

ing a shroud out of a grave; which is the property of those, whoever they

were, that buried the deceased: but stealing the corpse itself, which has no

owner, (though a matter of great indecency) is no felony, unless some of the

grave-clothes be stolen with it. (g) (10) Very different from the law of the

Franks, which seems to have respected both as equal offences : when it directed

fwj See stat. 22 and 23 Car. II. c. 25. (x) 3 Inst. 98. (y) Dalt. Jnst. c. 150.

(z) Oal. 1\. Cromut. 36. 1 Hawk. P. C. 93. 1 Hal. P. CJ. 607. The King ». Martin, by all the judges.

P. 17 Gco. III.

(nj 1 Hal. P. C. 511. (b) See book H, p. 393. (c) 1 Hal. P. C. 512.

f d) see the remarks In page 4. The statute hath now continued eighteen sessions of parliament unrepealed.

(ej 1 Hal. P. C. 512. (f) Gravin. 1. 3, i 106. (g) See book II, page 429.

(9) Dog stealing, under statute 24 and 25 Tic. c. 96, may bo visited with the maximum pun-

ishment of six mouths' imprisonment, or a forfeiture of twenty pounds over aud above the value

of the dog.

(10) Violation of the sepulture is made highly penal by statutes in the United States. It was

an indictable offence at the common law, even" where the body was taken up for the purpose of

dissection. See 2 East, P. C. 652; 1 Bish. Cr. L. j 332; Koacoe Or. Ev. 392.
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that a person who had dug a corpse out of the ground in order to strip it,

should be banished from society, and no one suffered to relieve his wants, till

the relations of the deceased consented to his re-admission. (A)

Having thus considered the general nature of simple larceny, I come next to

treat of its punishment. Theft, by the Jewish law, was only punished with a pe-

cuniary fine, and satisfaction to the party injured, (t) And in the civil law, till

some very late constitutions, we never find the punishment capital. The lawrf

of Draco at Athens punished it with death : but his laws were said to be writ-

ten in blood; and Solon afterwards changed the penalty to a pecuniary mulct.

And so the Attic laws in general continued; (/) except that once, in a time ol

dearth, it was made capital to break into a garden and steal tigs: but this law

and the informers against the offense, grew so odious, thfct from them all mali-

cious informers were styled sycophants; a name which we have much perverteQ

from its original meaning. From these examples, as well as the reason of the.

thing, many learned and scrupulous men have questioned the propriety, if no'

lawfulness of inflicting capital punishment for simple theft, (k) And certainly

the natural punishment for injuries to property seems to be the loss of the of-

fender's own property; which ought to be universally the case, were all meu'f.

fortunes equal. But as those who have no property themselves are generally

the most ready to attack the property of others, it has been found necessary in-

stead of a pecuniary to substitute a corporal punishment; yet how far this cor-

poral punishment ought to extend, is what hits occasioned the doubt. Sir
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Thomas Moore, (I) and the Marquis Beccaria, (m) at the distance of more thau

two centuries from each other, have very sensibly proposed that kind of corpo-

ral punishment which approaches the nearest to a pecuniary satisfaction; viz., a

temporary imprisonment, with an obligation to labour, first for the party

robbed, and afterwards for the public, in works of the most slavish kind: in

I" *237 1 *or(^er to oblige the offender to repair, by his industry and diligeuoe,

•• """ J the depredations he has committed upon private property and public

order. But notwithstanding all the remonstrances of speculative politicians

and moralists, the punishment of theft still continues, throughout the greatest

part of Europe, to be capital; and Puffendorf, («) together with Sir Matthew

Hale, (o) are of opinion that this must always be referred to the prudence of

the legislature; who are to Judge, say they, when crimes are become so enor-

mous as to require such sanguinary restrictions, (p) Yet both these writers agree,

that such punishment should be cautiously inflicted, and never without the

utmost necessity.

Our ancient Saxon laws nominally punished theft with death, if above the

value of twelvepence; but the criminal was permitted to redeem his life by a

pecuniary ransom; as, among their ancestors the Germans, by a stated number

of cattle, (q) But in the ninth year of Henry the First, this power of redemption

was taken away, and all persons guilty of larceny above the value of twelve-

pence were directed to be hanged; which law continues in force to this day. (r)

For though the inferior species of theft or larceny is only punished by impris-

onment or whipping at common law, (s) or by statute 4 Geo. I, c. 11, may be

extended to transportation for seven years, as is also expressly directed in the

,case of the plate-glass company, (f) yet the punishment of grand larceny, or the

stealing above the value of twelvepence, (which sum was the standard in the

(A) Montesq. Sp. L. b. 30. ch. 19. (fl Exod. c. zxll.

(ji 1'ctit. LL. Attic. I. 7, tit. 5.

(it) Eitenimad rindicamla/iirtn niaiit atrox, ntc lumen ad refrirnnnda mfficitm; quippe neque fnrtum

simplex ttitn ingens fticinus cut. ut ctipitt debefit plecii: rtffittc ulla ptrna f*t tarttn ut db latrocitiiU cakio&jt tot.

qui nullam aliam ar'tem qurrrendi victus habent. (Mori L'tupin. edit. Glmy. 1750. pap. 21.f— Drniytit, cwm lex

Mosaics, quanquam inclemeiu et ftpera. tamen pecuia .furttim, hautl inorte. mulclavit; n« putemiu Deum,

in nova leye demetttite qua pater imperat flliis majnrem indulsissv nobis invicfm a<cviendi licentiam. Hate

tunt cur non licere putem; qttam vero sit abmrdum, atque etiam perniciosum reipublica, Jltrem atqtte

Jtomicitlam ex aqua pvniri nemo est (opinor) qui neiciat. (Ibid. 39.)

(I) Utop.page 42. (ml Ch. SS. (n) L. of N. b. 8, c. 3. (o> 1 Hal. P. C. IS.

(p) See page 9. (?j-Tac. ./•• mar-. Germ. o. 13. (r) 1 Hal. 1'. C. 12, 3 lust. S3.

is) 3 lost. U8. (() Stat. 13 tteo. Ill, c. 38.
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time of King Athelstan, eight hundred years ago,) is at common law regularly

death. Which, considering the great intermediate alteration (u) in the price or

denomination of "money, is undoubtedly a very rigorous constitution; r #9og -i

and made Sir Henry Spelman (above a century since, when money was "- -"

at twice its present rate), complain, that while every thing else was risen in its

nominal value, and become dearer, the life of man had continually grown

cheaper, (v) It is true, that the mercv of juries will often make them strain a

point, and bring in larceny to be under the value of twelvepence, when it is

really of much greater value: but this, though evidently justifiable and proper,

when it only reduces the present nominal value of money to the ancient stand-

ard, (w) is otherwise a kind of pious perjury, and does not at at all excuse our

common law in this respect from the imputation of severity, but rather strongly

confesses the charge. It is likewise true, that by the merciful extensions of

the benefit of clergy by our modern statute law, a person who commits a simple

larceny to the value of thirteen pence or thirteen hundred pounds, though

guilty of a capital offence, shall be excused the pains of death: but this is only

for the first offence. And in many cases of simple larceny the benefit of clergy

is taken away by statute; as for horse-stealing in the principals, and accesso-

ries both before and after the fact; (a;) theft by great and notorious thieves in

Northumberland and Cumberland; (y) taking woollen cloth from off the tent-

ers, (z) or linens, fustians, calicoes, or cotton goods from the place of manufac-

ture (a) (which extends, in the last case, to aiders, assisters, procurers, buyers,
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and receivers); feloniously driving away, or otherwise stealing one or more

sheep or other cattle specified in the *acts, or killing them with intent r *o3g n

to steal the whole or any part of the carcase, (b) or aiding or assisting <•

therein; thefts on navigable rivers above the value of forty shillings, (c) or

being present, aiding and assisting thereat: plundering vessels in distress, or that

have suffered shipwreck ;(d) stealing letters sent by the post,(e) (11) and also steal-

ing deer, fish, hares, and conies under the peculiar circumstances mentioned in

the Waltham black act.(f) Which additional severity is owing to the great

malice and mischief of the theft in some of these instances; and, in others,

to the difficulties men would otherwise lie under to preserve these goods, which

are so easily carried otf. Upon which last principle the Roman law punished

more severely than other thieves the abiegi, or stealers of cattle ;(g) and the

lalnearii, or such as stole the clothes of persons who were washing in the public

baths; (h) both which constitutions seem to be borrowed from the laws of

Athens, (i) And so, too, the ancient Goths punished with unrelenting severity

thefts of cattle or corn that was reaped and left in the field: such kind 01

property (which no human industry can sufficiently guard) being esteemed

under the peculiar custody of heaven. (_/) And thus much for the offence of

simple larcency.

Mixed or compound larceny is such as has all the properties of the former,

(u) In the reign of King Henry I, the stated value, at the exchequer, of a pasture-fed ox. was one shilling

(Dial, tie Sauce, 1. 1, > 71, which, if we should .even suppose to mean the solidui iKgalfs mentioned by

lAndcwodu fj'rtit'. I. 3. c. lit. See book II, pajre 509), or the 72d port of a pound of gold, is only equal to

lit. M. of the present standard.

(r) filuss. 330. (W) 2 Inst. 169.

(*) .Stut. 1 Kdw. VI. c. 12. 2 and :l Kdw. VI. e. 33. SI Eliz. c. 12. (y) Stat. 18 Car. H, c. 3.

(z) Suit. 22 Car. II. c. ft. But, as it sometimes is difficult to prove the identity of the goods so stolen,

the onus probaiuli with respect to innocence is now by statute 15 Geo. II, c. 27, thrown oil the persons in

whose custody such proods nre found; the failure whereof is, for the first time, a misdemeanor punishable

by the forfeiture <>f the treble value ; for the second, by imprisonment, also; and the third time it becomes

a felony, punished with transportation for seven years.

(a) Suit. 18 Gen. n, c. '27. Koto, in the three liist cases an option la given to the judge to transport the offen-

der : for life in the drat case, lor seven years in the second, and for fourteen yean in the third; in the first

and third cases instead of sentence of death, in the second after sentence is given.

(b) Stut U Gco. II, c. B. 15 Cieo. II, e. 34. See book I, pajre 88. (c) Stat. 24 Gco. II. c. 45.

(<l) St. 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18. 2fi Geo. II, c. It), (e) .Stat. 7 Geo. ni, c. 50. 'f/j Stat. 9 Geo. I, c. 22.

(yj fjT- •*?, t. 14. (ItJ Ibid. 1.17. fij Pott. Antiq, b. 1, c. 26.

(j) Sticrnh. dejure Goth. I. 3, c. 6.

(11) Offences relating to the post-office were provided for by statute 7 "Wm. IV, and 1 Vic.

C. 36. As to the other offences mentioned in this paragraph, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
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but is accompanied with either one or both of the aggravations of a taking from

one's house or person. First, therefore, of larceny from the house, and then of

larceny from the person.

1. Larceny from the house, though it seems (from the considerations men-

tioned in the preceding chapter) (k) to have a higher degree of guilt than simple

l~*240l larceny> Yet it is not at all *distingnished from the other at common

L -" law; (I) unless where it isaccompanied with the circumstance of break-

ing the house by night; and then we have seen that it falls under another

description, viz., that of burglary. But now by several acts of parliament (the

.history of which is very ingeniously deduced by a learned modern writer, (m)

,who hath shown them to have gradually arisen from our improvements in trade

and opulence), the benefit of clergy is taken from larcenies committed in a house

in almost every instance; except that larceny of the stock or utensils of the

plate-glass company from any of their houses, &c., is made only a single felony,

and liable to transportation for seven years. («) The multiplicity of the general

acts is apt to create some confusion ; but upon comparing them diligently we

may collect, that the benefit of clergy is acnicd upon the following domestic

aggravations of larceny; viz.: First, in larcenies above the value of twelvepence,

committed, 1. In a church or chapel, with or without violence, or breaking the

same: (o) 2. In a booth or tent, in a markts or fair, in the day-time or in the

night, by violence or breaking the same; the owner or some of his family being

therein:(») 3. By robbing a dwelling-house in the day-time (which robbing
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implies a breaking), any person being therein : (q) 4. In a dwelling-house by

day or by night, without breaking the same, any person being therein put in

fear; (r) which amounts in law to a robbery; and in both these last cases the

accessory before the fact is also excluded from his clergy. Secondly, in larcenies

to the value of five shillings, committed. 1. By breaking any dwelling-house or

any outhouse, shop, or warehouse thereunto belonging in the day-time, although

no person be therein; (s) which also now extends to aiders, abettors, and acces-

T *2411 sor*es Def°re tne fact: (0 2- By privately stealing goods, *wares, or mer-

L -I chandise in any shop, warehouse, («) coachhouse, or stable, by day or

by night; though the same be not broken open, and though no person be there-

in: (r) which likewise extends to such as assist, hire, or command the offence

to be committed. Lastly, in larcenies to the value of forty shillings in a dwelling-

house, or its outhouses, although the same be not broken, and whether any per-

son be therein or no; unless committed against their masters by apprentices

under the age of fifteen, (iv) This also extends to those who aid or assist in the

commission of any such offence. (12)

2. Larceny from the person is either by privately stealing; or by open and

violent assault, which is usually called robbery.

The offence of privately stealing from a man's person, as by picking his

pocket or the like, privily without his knowledge, was debarred of the benefit

of clergy, so early as by the statute 8 Eliz. c. 4. But then it must be such

a larceny as stands in need of the benefit of clergy, viz., of above the value of

twelvepence; else the offender shall uot have judgment of death. For the

statute creates no new offence; but only prevents the prisoner from praying the

benefit of clergy, and leaves him to the regular judgment of the ancient law.(ar)

This severity (for a most severe law it certainly is) seems to be owing to the

(k) See pasre 223. (I) 1 Hawk. P. 0. 98. (m) Barr. 875, Ac. fn) Stat. 13 Geo. ID, c. 38.

fa I Stal! 23 Hen. VIII, c. 1. 1. Edw. VI, c. 12. 1 Hal. P. C. 618.

fpl Stilt. 5 anil 6 Eilw. VI, c. 9. 1 Hal. P. C. 522. (q) Stat. 3 and 4 \V. and M. c. 9. (r) Ibid.

(s) Stat :)9 KHz. c. IS. ft) Stat. S and 4 W. and M. c. 9. ftij See Foster, 78. Ban-. 379.

(r) SUt. 10 and 11 Wm III, c 23. fwj Stat. 12 Ann. st. 1, o. 7.

(x) 1 Hawk. P. C. 98. The like observation will certainly liokl in the cases of horse-stealing (1 Hal. P C.

Ml), thefts in Northumberland and Cumberland, anil stealing woolen cloths from the tenders"; and possibly

in such other cases where it is provided by any statute that simple larceny under certain, circumstances

shall be felony without benefit of clergy.

(12) See, as to this offence, statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
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ease with which such offences are committed, the difficulty of guarding against

them, and the. boldness with which they were practiced (even in the queen's

court and presence) at the time when this statute was made: besides that this

is an infringement of property, in the manual occupation or corporal possession

of the *owner, which was an offence even in a state of nature. And r,..,.., -,

therefore the saccnlarii, or cut-purses, were more severely punished than L ^ -"

common thieves by the Roman and Athenian laws, (y) (13)

Open and violent larceny from the person, or robbery, the rapina of the

civilians, is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of

goods or money to any value, by violence or putting him in fear, (z)

1. There must be a taking, otherwise it is no robbery. A mere attempt to rob

was indeed held to be felony, so late as Henry the Fourth's time: (a) but after-

wards it was taken to be only a misdemeanor, and punishable with fine and

imprisonment; till the statute 7 Geo. II, c. 21, which makes it a felony (trans-

portable for seven years) unlawfully and maliciously to assault another with any

offensive weapon or instrument; or by menaces, or by other forcible or violent

manner, to demand any money or goods; with a felonious attempt to rob. If

the thief, having once taken a purse, returns it, still it is a robbery; and so it ia

whether the taking be strictly from the person of another, or in his presence

only; as, where a robber by menaces and violence puts a man in fear, and drives

away his sheep or his cattle before his face, (b) But if the taking be not either

directly from his person, or in his presence, it is no robbery, (c) 2. It is imma-
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terial of what value the thing taken is: a penny as well as a pound, thus forci-

bly extorted, makes a robbery, (d) 3. Lastly, the taking must be by force, or a pre-

vious pu tting in fear; which makes the violation of the person more atrocious than

privately stealing. For, according to the maxim of the civil law (e) " qui vi

rapuit, fur improbior esse videtur." This previous violence, or putting in

fear, is the criterion that distinguishes robbery from other larcenies. For if one

*privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards r *24T 1

keeps it by putting him in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is sub- "• "" '" '

sequent: (/) neither is it capital, as privately stealing, being under the value of

twelvepence. Not that it is indeed necessary, though usual, to lav in the indict-

ment that the robbery was committed \>y putting in fear; it is sufficient, if

laid to be done by violence. (</) And when it is laid to be done by putting in

fear, this does not imply any great degree of terror or affright in the party rob-

bed : it is enough that so much force, or threatening by word or gesture, be

used, as might create an apprehension of danger, or induce a man to part with

his property without or against his consent. (It) Thus, if a man be knocked

down without previous warning, and stripped of his property while senseless,

though strictly he cannot be said to be put in fear, yet this is undoubtedly a

robbery. Or, if a person with a sword drawn begs an alms, and I give it him

through mistrust and apprehension of violence, this is a felonious robbery, (i) So

if, under a pretence of sale, a man forcibly extorts money from another, neither

shall this subterfuge avail him. But it is doubted, (j) whether the forcing a

higlcr, or other chapman, to sell his wares, and giving him the full value of

them, amounts to so heinous a crime as robbery. (14)

(») Ft. 47, 11. 7. Pott. Antiq. 1. 1. c. 26. (z\ 1 Hawk. P. C. 95. (o) 1 Hal. P. C. 532.

(4) 1 Hal. P. C. 633. (c) 1 Comeyns. 478. Strn. 1015. (d) 1 Hawk. P. U. 97.

(e} t'f. 4. 2, 14, 5 12. I/) 1 Hal. 1'. C. 534. (g) Trin. 3 Ann. by all the Judges.

(A) Fost. Its. (i) 1 Hawk. P. C. 96. (j) Hid. 97.

(13) Thin subject is also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96. If a robbery is com-

mitted, being armed, or by more than one person, and with personal violence, the punishment

may be penal servitude for life; in other cases it is limited to peiial servitude for not more

than fourteen nor less than three v earn, or to imprisonment not more than two years.

(14) [And see E. aud R. C. C". 146; 1 Leach, 139, 193, 278; 3 Chit. Cr. L.'803. Mr. Justice

Ashurst says: "The true definition of robbery is the stealing or taking from the person of

another, or in the presence of another, property of any amount with such a degree of force

or terror, as to induce the party unwillingly to part with his property; and whether terror
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This species of larceny is debarred of the benefit of clergy by statute 23 Hen.

VIII, c. 1, and other subsequent statutes, not indeed in general, but only when

committed in a dwelling-house, or in or near the king's highway. A robbery,

therefore, in a distant field or foot-path, was not punished with death; (k) but

was open to the benefit of clergy, till the statute 3 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, which

takes away clergy from both principals and accessories before the fact, in rob-

bery, wheresoever committed.

II. Malicious mischief, or damage, is the next species of injury to private

property, which the law considers as a public crime. This is such as is done,

not animo furandi, or with an intent of gaming by another's loss; which is

some though a weak excuse: but either out of a spirit of wanton cruelty, or

black and diabolical revenge. In which it bears a near relation to the crime of

arson ; for as that affects the habitation, so this does the other property of indi-

viduals. And therefore any damage arising from this mischievous disposition,

though only a trespass at common law, is now by a multitude of statutes made

penal in the highest degree. Of these I shall extract the contents in order of

time,

(t) 1 Hal. P. C. 5S5.

arises from real or expected violence to the person, or from a sense of injury to the character,

makes no kind of difference; for to most men the idea of losing their fame and reputation

is equally, if not more terrific, than the dread of personal injury. The principal ingredient

in robbery is a man's being forced to part with his property; and the judges are unanimously
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of opinion, that, upon the principles of law, as well as the authority ot former decisions, a

threat to accuse a man of the greatest of all crimes, is a sufficient force to constitute the crime

of robbery by putting in fear." 1 Leach, 280. And fear of loss of character and service upon

a charge of sodomitical practices, .is sufficient to constitute robbery, though the narty has no

fear of being taken into custody or of punishment. R. and R. C. C. 375. But if no actual

force was used, and, at the time of parting with the money, the party were under no appre-

hension, but gave it merely for the purpose of bringing the offenders to justice, they cannot

be capitally convicted, though we have seen it is otherwise where personal violence is

employed. I East, P. C. 734; R. and R. C. C. 408. And the influence exercised over the

mind, where the force is merely constructive, must be of such kind as to disenable the prose-

cutor to make resistance. 2 Leach, 721; 6 East, 120. So that a threat to take an innocent

person before a magistrate, and thence to prison, without charging him with any specific

crime, is not sufficient to make the party a robber, if he obtain money to induce him to for-

bear. 2 I/each, 721. Indeed it has been said that the only instance in which a threat will

supply the place of force is an accusation of unnatural practices, 2 Leach, 730. 731; id. 139;

2 Russ. 1009. And it has recently been held, contrary, it seems, to the principle of some

former decisions, that, even in this case, the money must be taken immediately on the threat,

and not after time has been allowed to the prosecutor to deliberate and advise with friends as

to the best course to be pursued: 1 East, P. C. Append, xxi; though as some of the judges

dissented, it docs not seem to be decisive. Where, on the other hand, there is an immediate

threat of injury to the property, as by pulling down a house with a mob in a time of riot*, which

produces great alarm, and induces a man to part with his money, this has been holden to be

a sufficient putting in fear to constitute a robbery. 2 East, P. C. 729, 731. And if a man

assaults a woman with intent to commit a rape, and she, in order to prevail on him to desist,

offers him money, which he takes, but continues his endeavors till prevented by the approach

of a third person, he will be guilty of robbery, though his original intent was to ravish.

1 East, P. C. 711. If thieves meet a person and, by menaces of death, make him swear to

bring them money, and he, under the continuing influence of fear for his life, complies, this

is robbery in them, though it would not be so if ho had no personal fear, and acted merely

irom a superstitious regard to an oath so extorted. 1 East, P. 0. 714. In the absence of force,

to constitute robbery the fear must arise before and at the time of the property being taken;

it is not enough that it arises afterwards; and where the prisoner by stealth took some money

out of the prosecutor's pocket, who turned round, saw the prisoner, and demanded the money,

but the prisoner threatening him, he desisted through fear from making any farther demand,

it was held no robbery. Roll. Rep. 154; 1 Hale, 534.

To constitute a robbery, where an actual violence is relied on, and no putting in fear can

lv expressly shown, there must be a struggle, or at least a personal outrage. So that to snatch

p. lyrty suddenly from the hand, to seize a parcel carried on the head, to carry away a hat

iml wig without force, and to take an umbrella of a sudden, have been respectively holden

to be mere larcenies. 1 Leach, 200, 291, and in notes. Dut where a man snatched at the

sword of a gentleman hanging at his side, and the latter, perceiving the design, laid hold on

the scabbard, on which a contest ensued, and the thief succeeded in wresting the weapon from

the owner, his offence was holdeii to be robbery. Id. Snatching an article from a mau will
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*And, first, by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. II, perversely and maliciously

to cut down or destroy the powdike, in the feus of Norfolk and Ely, is

felony. And in like manner it is, by many special statutes enacted upon the

occasions, made felony to destroy the several sea-banks, river-banks, public

navigations, and bridges, erected by virtue of those acts of parliament, (15) By

statute 43 Eliz. c. 13 (for preventing rapine on the northern borders), to burn

any barn or stack of corn or grain; or to imprison or carry away any subject*

in order to ransom him, or to make prey or spoil of his person or goods upon

deadly feud or otherwise, in the four northern counties of Northumberland,

AVVstmoreland, Cumberland, and Durham, or being accessory before the fact to

such carrying away or imprisonment; or to give or take any money or contri-

bution, there called blackmail, to secure such goods from rapine ; is felony with-

out benefit of clergy. By statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 7, maliciously, unlawfully,

and willingly, in the night time, to burn, or cause to be burnt or destroyed, any

ricks or stacks of corn, hay, or grain, barns, houses, buildings, or kilns; or to

kill any horses, sheep, or other cattle, is felony; but the offender may make

his election to be transported for seven years; and to maim or hurt such

""horses, sheep, or other cattle, is a trespass for which treble damages r *.-,,? -<

shall be recovered. By statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 23, to burn on any L * ''' '

waste, between Candlemas and Midsummer, any grig, ling, heath, furze, goss, or

fern, is punishable with whipping and confinement in the house of correction.

By statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 9, captains and mariners belonging to ships, and des-
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troying the same, to the prejudice of the owners (and bv 4 Geo. I, c. 12, to the

prejudice of insurers also), are guilty of felony without benefit of clergy. And

by statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18, making any hole in a ship, in distress, or stealing

her pumps, or aiding or abetting such offences, or wilfully doing anything tend-

ing to the immediate loss of such ship, is felony without benefit of clergy. By

statute 1 Geo. I, c. 48, maliciously to set on fire any underwood, wood, or coppice,

is made single felony. By statute 6 Geo. I, c. 23. the wilful and malicious tear-

ing, cutting, spoiling, burning, or defacing of the garments or clothes of any

persons passing in the streets or highways, with intent so to do, is felony. This

was occasioned by the insolence of certain weavers and others; who, upon the

introduction of some Indian fashions prejudicial to their own manufactures,

made it their practice to deface them; either by open outrage, or by privily

cutting, or casting aqua fords in the streets upon such as wore them. By

statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, commonly called the Waltham black act, occasioned by

the devastations committed near Waltham in Hampshire, by persons in disguise

constitute robbery if it is attached to his person or clothes BO as to afford resistance; and

therefore, where the prosecutor's watch was fastened to a steel chain which went round his

neck, and the seal and chain hung from his fob, and the prisoner laid hold of the seal and

chain and pulled the watch from the fob, but the steel chain still secured it, and by two jerks

the prisoner broke the steel chain, and made off with the watch, it was hold a robber}-, for

the prisoner did not get the watch at once, but had to overcome the resistance the steel chain

made, and actual force was used for that purpose. R. and R. C. C. 419. And where a heavy

diamond pin, with a corkscrew stalk, which was twisted and strongly fastened in a lady's

hair, was snatched out, and part of the hair torn away, the judges came to a similar decision

1 Leach, 335. The ease of the man who tore an ear-ring from the ear, and in so doing lace-

rated the flesh, serves also to confirm this position. 1 Leach, 320. Nor will it excuse the

violence that it was done under pretence of law; for where a bailiff handcuffed a prisoner

and used her with great cruelty, for the purpose of extorting money from her, he was holden

to be guilty; as were also a number of men for seizing a wagon under pretence that there was

no penult, when none was in reality necessary. 1 Leach, 280; 1 East, P. C. 709.]

Tliat extorting money or other thing of value by means of a charge of sodomy may be robbery,

see People r. McDauicls, 1 Parker, 198. Hut this is an exceptional case, and it is held not rob-

bery to extort money by means of the charge of any other offence, as for instance, forgery.

Long v. State, 12 Geo. '293; Britt v. State, 7 Humph. 45. Obtaining money from a woman

under a threat to accuse her husband of an indecent assault, was held not to be robbery in Res

'}. Edwards, 5 C. and P. 518; 1 Moo. and R. 257.

(15) Sec as to this offence stat ute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 97. The same statute provides generally for

other offences mentioned in this paragraph.
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or with their faces blacked (who seem to have resembled the Roberdsmen, or

followers of Robert Hood, that in the reign of Richard the First committed

great outrages on the borders of England and Scotland); (/) by this black act. I

say. which has in part been mentioned under the several heads of riots, menaces,

mayhem, and larceny, (»*) it is farther enacted, that to set fire to any house,

barn, or outhouse (which ia extended by statute 9 Geo. Ill, c. 29, to the

f *24P 1 *mal'ci°ns au<i wilful burning or setting fire to all kinds of mills), or

L -"to any hovel, cock, mow, or stack of corn, straw, hay, or wood; or un-

lawfully and maliciously to break down the head of any fish pond, whereby the

fish shall be lost or destroyed; or in like manner to kill, maim, or wound any

cattle; or cut down or destroy any trees planted in an avenue, or growing in a

garden, orchard, or plantation, for ornament, shelter, or profit; all these mali-

cious acts, or procuring by gift or promise of reward any person to join them

therein, are felonies without benefit of clergy ; and the hundred shall be charge-

able for the damages, unless the offender be convicted. In like manner by the

Roman law to cut down trees, and especially vines, was punished in the same

degree as robbery. («) By statutes 6 Geo. II, c. 37, and 10 Geo. II, c. 32, it is

also made felony, without the benefit of clergy, maliciously to cut down any

river or sea-bank, whereby lands may be overflowed or damaged; or to cut any

hop-binds growing in a plantation of hops, or wilfully and maliciously to set on

fire, or cause to be set on fire, any mine, pit, or depth of coal. By statute 11

Geo. II c. '22, to use any violence in order to deter any person from buying corn
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or grain; to seize any carriage or horse carrying grain or meal to or from any

market or sea port; or to use any outrage with such intent; or to scatter, take

away, spoil, or damage such grain or meal; is punished for the first offence with

imprisonment and public whipping: and the second offence, or destroying any

granary where corn is kept for exportation, or taking away or spoiling any grain

or meal in such granary, or in any ship, boat, or vessel intended for exporta-

tion, is felony, subject to transportation for seven years. By statute 23 Geo. II,

c. 10, to set fire to any gos, furze, or fern, growing in any forest or chase, is

subject to a fine of five pounds. By statutes 6 Geo. Ill, cc. 3C and 48, and

13 Geo. Ill, c. 33, wilfully to spoil or destroy any timber or other trees, roots

F *'>47 1 *sal'UDS> or plants, is for the two first offences liable to pecuniary penal-

L J ties; and for the third, if in the day time, and even for the first, if at

night, the offender shall be guilty of felony, and liable to transportation for

seven years. By statute 9 Geo. Ill, c. 29, wilfully and maliciously to burn or

destroy any engine or other machines, therein specified, belonging to any mine;

or any fences for inclosures pursuant to any act of parliament, is made single

felony, and punishable with transportation for seven years, in the offender, his

advisers, and procurers. And by statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 38, the like punishment

is inflicted on such as break into any house, &c.. belonging to the plate-glass

company, with intent to steal, cut, or destroy, any of their stock or utensils, or

wilfully and maliciously cut or destroy the same. And these are the principal

punishments of malicious mischief.

III. Forgery, (16) or the crimen falni, is an offence, which was punished by

the civil law with deportation or banishment, and sometimes with death, (o) It

(I) 3 Inst. 197. (m) Soo pages 144, 208, 235. 240. in) Ff. 47, 7, 2. (o) Inst. 4, 18, 7.

(16) [FORGERY. We will endeavor to elucidate the nature of, and what constitutes, this

ofl'ence, by considering, 1. "What false making is sufficient: 2. With what intent the forgery

must be committed; and, 3. How fur the instrument forged mast appear to be genuine. The

[t moderation of what instruments may be the subjects of forgery will follow.

} I. WHAT FALSE MAKING is SUFFICIENT. It in not necessary that the whole instrument

should 1)0 fictitious. Making a fradulent insertion, alteration, or erasure, in any material

part of a true document, by which another may be defrauded; the fraudulent application of

a false signature to a trno instrument, or a real signature to a false one; and the alteration of

a date of a bill of exchange after acceptance, by which its payment may be accelerated, are

forgeries. 1 Hale, 683-685; 4 T. R. 3^0. Altering a bill from a lower to a higher sum U

forging it; and a person may bo indicted on the 7 Geo. o. 22, tor forging such nn inqt—•-
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may with us be defined, at common law. to be, " the fraudulent making or alter-

ation of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right; " for which the of-

fender may suffer fine, imprisonment, and pillory. And also by a variety of

statutes, a more severe punishment is inflicted on the offender in many particu-

inent, though the statute has the word alter as well as forge; and in the same case it was held

no ground of defence, that before the alteration it had been paid bv the drawer and re-issued.

R. aud It. C. C. 33; 2 East, P. C. 979, S. 0. So altering a banker's one pound note, by substi-

tuting the word ten for the word one, is a forgery. Rnss. aud Ry. C C. 101; 2 Burn, J., 24th ed.,

491; a East, P. C. 986. If a note be made payable at a country banker's, or at their banker's in

London, who fails, it is forgery to introduce a piece of paper over the names of the London

bankers, who have so failed, containing the names of another banking-house in London. Russ.

and Ry. C. C.^l(i4; 2 Taunt, 323; 2 Leach, 1040, 8. C.; and see 2 East. P. C. f&G; 2 Burn, J.

24th*ed. 492, S. C. Expunging an indorsement on a bank note with a liquor unknown, has been

holdeu to be an erasure within 3 and 9 Win. Ill, c. 20, and 3 P. Wins. 419. The instrument

must, in itself, be false; for if a man merely pass for another, who is the maker or iudorser of a

true instrument it is no forgery, though it may be within the statute of false pretences.

1 Leach, 229. The instrument counterfeited must also bear a resemblance to that for which it,

is put forth, but need not be perfect or complete: it is sufficient if it is calculated to impose on

mankind in general, though an individual skilled in that kind of writings would detect its

fallacy. Thus, if it appears that several persons have taken forged bank notes as good ones, the

offender will be deemed guilty of counterfeiting them, though a person from the bauk should

swear that they would never impose on him, being, in several respects, defective. 2 East, P. 0.
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950. Aud it has been holdeu that a bank note may be counterfeited, though the paper contains

no water mark, and though the vroril pounds is ouiitted, that word being supplied by the figures

in the margin. 1 Leach, 174. For it was said that in forgery there need not be an exact re-

semblance, but it is .sufficient if the instrument counterfeited "be prima facie fitted to pass for

the writing which it represents. 1 Leach, 179. As to how far the iustrameut should appear

genuine, and the forging of fictitious names, see infra, div. III.

II. WITH WHAT INTENT TUB FORGERY MUST BE COMMITTED. The very essence of forgery

is an indent to defraud; and, therefore, the mere imitation of another's writing, the assumption

of a name, or the alteration of a written instrument, where no person can be injured, does not

come within the definition of the offence. Must of the statutes expressly make an intent to

defraud a necessary ingredient in the crime; whether it existed or not is a question for the jury

to determine. But it is in no case necessary that any actual injury should result from the

offence. 2 Stra. 747 ; 2 Lord Raym. 1461. The question as to the party's intent, is for a jury,

and such jury ought to infer an intent to defraud the person who would have to pay the instru-

ment, if it were genuine, although, from the manner of executing the forgery, or from that

person's ordinary caution, it would not be likely to impose on him, and although the object was

general, to defraud whoever might take the instrument, and the intention of defrauding, in par-

ticular, the person who would have to pay the instrument, if genuine, did not enter into the-

prisoner's contemplation. R. and Ry. 0. C. 291; and see id. 709.

III. HOW FAR THE INSTRUMENT FORGED MUST APPEAR GENUINE. It IS of no COUSC-

queuce whether the counterfeited instrument be such as if real would be effectual to the pur-

pose it intends, so long as there is a sufficient resemblance to impose on those to whom it is

uttered. Whether the fraud be effected on the party to whom au iustruuieut is addressed, or

whose writing is counterfeited, or on a third person who takes it upon the credit it assumes,

is immaterial. Thus, to counterfeit a conveyance with a wrong name, has been deemed

within 5 Eliz. c. 14, though it would have been ineffectual if genuine. 1 Kcb. 803; 3 id. 51.

The fabrication of au order for payment of a sailor's prize-money is forgery, as we have

already seen, though it be invalid as wanting the requisites required by statute. 2 Leach, 863.

The offence of uttering a forged stamp will be complete, though, at the time of uttering, that

part which in a genuine stamp would in terms specify the amount of duty is concealed, and

in tact cut out, aud though that part where the papers were entire did not contain any thing

specifying the amount of duty, provided the parts left visible are like a genuine stamp. Kuss.

aud Ky. C. C. 229, 212. We have also seen that the forgery of an instrument, as a last will,

comes within the statutes, although the supposed testator" is living. 1 Leach, 449. Aud it

may be collected from a number of cases, that forgery in the name of a person who has no

real existence is as much criminal as if there was an inteut to defraud an individual whoso

writing is counterfeited. 1 Leach, 83. Thus, the making of a bill of exchange is within the

acts, though all the names to it arc fictitious. 2 Bast, P. C. 957. To counterfeit a power of

attorney, as by the administratrix and daughter of a t,eaniar. who died childless, is capital.

Fost. 116. \or is it necessary that any additional credit should be obtained by using the fic-

titious name. 1 Leach, 172, "and see K. and Ry. C. C. 75, 90, 209, 278. So, to put a fictitious

name on a bill indorsed in blank, in order to circulate it with secrecy, is a similar offence. 1

Leach, 215. And indeed it seems that it is not necessary, to constitute forgery, that there

should be an intent to defraud any particular person, aud a general intent to defraud will suf-

fice. 3 T. R. 176; 1 Leach, !!16, 217, in notes. Bnt to support a charge of forgery, by sub-

scribing a fictitious name, there must be satisfactory evidence on the part of the prosecutor

247. OFFENCES AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY. [Book IV.

lar cases, which are so multiplied of late as almost to become general. I shall

mention the principal instances. (17)

By statute 5 Eliz. c. 14, to forge or make, or knowingly to publish or give in

evidence, any forged deed, court-roll or will, with intent to affect the right of

real property, either freehold or copyhold, is punished by a forfeiture to the

party grieved of double costs and damages; by standing in the pillory, and

having both his ears cut off, and his nostrils slit and seared ; by forfeiture to

the crown of the profits of his lands, and by perpetual imprisonment. For any

r*°481 f°rSel7 'relating to a term of years, or annuity, bond, obligation,

1 ' '"J acquittance, release or discharge of any debt or demand of any personal

chattels, the same forfeiture is given to the party grieved ; and on the offender

is inflicted the pillory, loss of one of his ears, and a year's imprisonment; the

second offence in both cases being felony without benefit of clergy.

Besides this general act, a multitude of others, since the revolution (when

paper credit was first established), have inflicted capital punishment on the

forging, altering or uttering as true, when forged, of any bank bills or notes, or

other securities; (^)(18)of bills of creditissued from the exchequer ; (q) ol'South-

fpj Stat. 8. 9 Win. HI. <•-. 20. f :i6. 11 Geo. I, c 9. 12 Geo. I, c. 32. 15 Geo. II, c. IS. 13 Geo HI, c. 79.

( q) Sec the several acts for issuing them.

that it is not the party's real name, aud that it was assumed for the purpose of frand in that

instance. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 2f>0. Assuming and using a fictitious name, though for pur-

poses of concealment and fraud, will not amount to forgery, if it were not for that very fraud
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or system of fraud, of which the forgery forms a part. Russ. and Ry. C. C. 2(50. If there ia

proof of what is the prisoner's real namu, it is for him to prove that he used the assumed

name before the time lie had the fraud in view, even in the absence of all proof as to what

mime he had used for several years, before the frand in question. Russ. and Ry. C. C. V7H ;

id. 405; 3 Brod. and Bing. 228, S. C. ; 2 Burn, J., 24th ed. 510; Russ. and Ry. C. C. 463,

8. 0.

A defect in the stamp will not avail the prisoner : 1 Leach, 257, 258, in notes ; 2 East, P. C.

955 ; and it has even been decided that, if there be no stamp at all on a counterfeit promissory

note, it may still be forgery : 2 Leach, 703 : though this case seems to go too far ; for how can

a promissory mite, without the appearance of a stamp, have such a similitude to a genuine in-

strument as is requisite to constitute forgery ? But though the validity of the instrument if

real is thus immaterial, it must not appear on its face, so that no one of common understand-

ing would give it credit. Thus, it will not be forgery to fabricate a will for land, as attested

by only two witnesses. 2 East, P. C. 953. Jfor is it felony to counterfeit a bill of exchange

for a sum more than twenty shillings and loss than five pounds, without mentioning the abode

of the payee and being attested by a subscribing witness ; as such an instrument is, by 17 Geo.

III. e. 30', absolutely void. 1 Leach, 431. These cases will sufficiently explain the law on this

(17) The 24 and 25 Tic. c. 98, consolidates the various statutes on this subject, and goes with

great particularity into an enumeration of the cases which shull be punishable under it. The

punishment in gome cases may be penal servitude for life.

Besides the punishment to which the forger is subject, he becomes, at common law, infamous,

and incapable of giving evidence. Co. Lilt. 6, b.; 1 Greeul. Ev. § 373. But to have this effect,

there must be both a conviction and a judgment. Rex r. Caatell 8 East, 77 ; Rex v. Teal, 11

id. 3(19; People v. Whiffle, 9 Cow. 707.' The disability will be removed by a reversal of

judgment, or by pardon : People v. Pease. 3 Johns. Cas. 333 ; and it is not competent to attach

to the pardon a condition that the disability shall still remain. Id.

Statutes, in some cases, have changed tins common law rule, either by making the convicted

party a competent witness after he has endured the punishment, or by making the infamy of a

person an objection to his credibility only.

(Irt) [What circumstances are sufficient to constitute the offence of uttering, which must be

attended with a guilty knowledge, and what proofs required to substantiate it, may be

deduced trom the following abstract of decided cases, which have been selected from among

ninny others. Where a prisoner, charged with uttering a forged note to A B, knowing it to

be forged, gave forged notes to a uoy, who was not aware of their being forgeries, and

directed the boy to pay away the note described in the indictment at B's for the purchase ot

foods, and the boy did" so, and brought back the goods and the change to the prisoner ; it was

eld by the twelve judges an uttering by the prisoner to A. B. Rex v. Giles. Car. C. L. 191. So

the delivering a box containing, among other things, forged stamps, to the party's own ser-

vant, that he might carry them to an inn to bo forwarded by a carrier to a customer in the

country, is an uttering. And if the delivery be in one county, and the inn to which thev are

carried by the servant in another, the prisoner may be indicted in the former. The on'enco

of uttering a forged stamp will be complete, although at the time of uttering, certain part* ol
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sea bonds, &c.; (r) of lottery tickets or orders; («) of army or navy debentures; (()

of East India bonds; (u) of writings under the seal of the London, or royal

exchange assurance; (w) of the hand of the receiver of the pre-fines; (x) or of

the accountant-general and certain other officers of the court of chancery ; (y)

of a letter of attorney or other power to receive or transfer stock or annuities ;

and on the personating a proprietor thereof, to receive or transfer such annui-

ties, stock or dividends; (z) also on the personating, or procuring to be person-

ated, any seaman or other person, entitled to wages or other naval emoluments,

or any of his personal representatives; and the taking or procuring to be

taken, any false oath in order to obtain a probate, or letters of administration

in order to receive such payments ; and the forging or procuring to be forged

and likewise the uttering, or publishing, as true, of any counterfeited seaman's

*will or power: (a) to which may be added, though not strictly reducible

to this head, the counterfeiting of Mediterranean passes, under the

hands of the lords of the admiralty, to protect one from the piratical states of

Barbary; (5) the forging or imitating of any stamps to defraud the public revenue

(c) and the forging of any marriage register or license; (d) all which are by dis-

tinct acts of parliament made felonies without benefit of clergy. By statute 13

Geo. Ill, cc. 52 and 59, forging or counterfeiting any stamp or mark to denote

the standard of gold and silver plate, and certain other offences of the like

tendency, are punished with transportation for fourteen years. By statute 12

Geo. Ill, c. 48, certain frauds on the stamp duties, therein "described, principally
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by using the same stamps more than once, are made single felony, and liable

to transportation for seven years. And the same punishment is inflicted by

statute 13 Geo. Ill, C. 38, on such as counterfeit the common seal of the corpo-

ration for manufacturing plate glass (thereby erected) or knowingly demand

money of the company by virtue of any writing under such counterfeit seal.

There are also certain other general laws with regard to forgery of which the

first is 2 Geo. II, c. 25, whereby the first offence in forging or procuring to be

forged, acting or assisting therein, or uttering or publishing as true any forged

(r) Stnt 9 Ann. c. 21. 6 Geo. 1 cc. 4 and 11. 12 Geo. I. c. 32.

(s) See the several acts for the lotteries. (t) Stat. 5 Geo. I, e. 14. 9 Geo. Ift. 5.

fiij Stat. 13 Gen. I, c. 32. (tcj Stat. 6 Geo. I, c. IS. (x) Stat 32 Geo II. c.14.

(IU Stat. 12 Geo. I. c. 32. fzj Stat. 8Geo. c. 2i 9 Geo. I, c. 12. SI Geo. II, c. 22, } 77.

(a) Stat. 31. Geo. II, c. 10. 9 Geo. Ill, c. 30. (blStnt. 4 Geo. II, c. 18. (cj See the several stamp acts.

(d) Suit. 2!) Geo. II, c. 33.

the stamp are concealed; all the parts that are visible being like those of a genuine stamp, Rex

v. Callicott, R. aiid R. C. C. 212. An indictment on 45 Geo. ill, c. 89, for uttering forged notes,

need not state to whom they were disposed, it is sufficient to state that the prisoner disposed

of the notes with intent to defraud the hank, he knowing them at the time to be forged; ami

although the person to whom they were disposed purchased them as and for forged notes, and

purchased them on his own solicitation, and as agent for the hank, for the purpose of bringing

the prisoner to punishment. Rex v. Holden, id. 154. Uttering a forged order for the payment

of money under a false representation, is evidence of knowing it to be forged. Id. 169. To

prove the guilty knowledge of an utterer of a forged bank note, evidence may he given of the

prisoner's having previously uttered other forged notes, knowing them to be forged. Rex v.

Whiley, 2 Leach C. C. 983. So, upon an indictment for uttering a forged note, evidence is ad-

missible of the prisoner's having at a former period, uttered others of a similar manufacture ;

and that others of similar fabrication had been discovered on the files of the bank with the pris-

oner's handwriting on the back of them, in order to show the prisoner's knowledge of the note

mentioned in the indictment being a forgery. Rex v. Ball. R. and R. C. C. 132. Bat in order

to show a guilty knowledge on an indictment for uttering forged bank notes, evidence of an-

other uttering, subsequent to the one charged, is inadmissible, except the latter uttering was in

some way connected with the principal case, or it can be shown that the notes were of the same

manufacture; for only previous or contemporaneous acts, can show, quo ammo, a thing is done.

Rex r. Taveruer, Carl C. L. 195.

So, if a second uttering be made the subject of a distinct indictment, it cannot be given in

evidence to show a guilty knowledge in a former uttering. Rex v. Smith, 2 C. and P. 633.

The person whose name is forged was formerly held to he not a competent witness to prove tho

forgery. Rex r. Russell, 1 Leach, C. C. 8. But he has recently been made competent by tho

9 Geo. IT, c. 32, s. 2-1

See further as to uttering, Rex v. Anscott, 6 C. and P. 408; R. v. Harris, 7 id. 428; R. t>.

Page, 8 id. 122; R. v. Cook, 8 id. 582; R. t>. Callicott, 4 Taunt. 300 ; R. v. Radford, 1 C. and K.

707; R. c. Hey wood, 2 id. 352: Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Mass. 136.
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deed, will, bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange, promissory note, indorse-

ment, or assignment thereof, or any acquittance or receipt for money or goods,

with intention to defraud any person (or corporation), (e) is made felony without

benefit of clergy. And by statute 7 Goo. II, c. 22, and 18 Geo. Ill, c. 18, it is

equally penal to forge or cause to be forged, or utter as true, a counterfeit ac-

ceptance of a bill of exchange, or the number or principal sum of any account-

T2501 a^e rec^P^'for anJ note, bill, or any *other security for money; or any

"• J warrant or order for the payment of money, or delivery of goods. So

that I believe, through the number of these general and special provisions, there

is now hardly a case possible to be conceived wherein forgery, that tends to

defraud, whether in the name of a real or fictitious person, (/) is not made a

capital crime. (19)

These are the principal infringements of the rights of property: which were

the last species of offences against individuals or private subjects which the

method of distribution has led us to consider. We have before examined the

nature of all offences against the public, or common wealth; against the king

or supreme magistrate, the father and protector of that community ; against

the universal law of all civilized nations, together witli some of the more atro-

cious offences, of public pernicious consequences, against God and his holy

religion. And the several heads comprehend the whole circle of crimes an3.

misdemeanors, with the punishment annexed to each, that are cognizable by the

laws of England.
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CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING OFFENCES.

WE are now arrived at the fifth general branch, or head, under which I pro-

posed to consider the subject of this book of our Commentaries; viz., the means

of preventing the commission of crimes and misdemeanors. And really it is an

honour, and almost a singular one, to our English laws, that they furnish a title

of this sort; since preventive justice is, upon every principle of reason, of hu-

manity, and of sound policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice ; (a)

the execution of which, though necessary, and in its consequences a species of

mercy to the commonwealth, is always attended with many harsh and disagree-

able circumstances.

This preventive justice consists in obliging those persons whom there is a

probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to give

full assurance to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not

(ej Slat. 31 Geo. H, c. 22, f 78. (f) Post. 118, Ao. (a) Beccar. ch. 41.

(19) [It has frequently been determined, that drawing, indorsing or accepting a bill of ex-

change in a fictitious name is a forgery. Holland's Case, <fec., Leach, 78, 159,192; 1 Hen. Black,

688; .Post. IK). It is alao forgery to fabricate a will by counterfeiting the name of a pretended

testator, who is still living. Cogan's Case, Id. 355.

If a person puts his own name to an instrument, representing himself to be a different person

of that name,with intent to defraud, he is guilty of forgery. 4 T. R. 28.

But where a bill of exchange is indorsed bv" a person in his own name, and another repre-

sents himself to be that person, he is not guilty ot forgery, but it is a misdemeanor. Hevey's

Case. Leach, 268.

A bill or note may he produced in evidence against a prisoner prosecuted for the forgery of

it, and ho may bo convicted upon the usual evidence of the forgery, though it has never been

(stamped pursuant to the stamp acts. Hawkeswood's and Reculist's Cases, Leach, 292 and 811.

For the forgery in such a case is committed with an intent to defraud ; and the legislature meant

only to prevent their being given in evidence, when they were proceeded upon to recover the

value of the inonov thereby secured.]

That a party may be convicted of forging an instrument not stamped, see further, Rex v.

Teague, Russ. and Ry. 33, Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moody, 70; People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507.
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happen; by finding pledges or securities for keeping the peace, or for their good

behaviour. This requisition of sureties has been several times mentioned before,

as part of the penalty inflicted upon such as have been guilty of certain gross

misdemeanors; but there, also, it must be understood rather as a caution against

the repetition of the offence, than any immediate pain or punishment. And

indeed, if we consider all human *punishmeutsin a large and extended r *o-o -i

Yiew, we shall find them all rather calculated to prevent future crimes, L ' " J

than to expiate the past; since, as was observed in a former chapter, (b) all pun-

ishments inflicted by temporal laws may be classed under three heads ; such as

tend to the amendment of the offender himself, or to deprive him of any power

to do future mischief, or to deter others by his example; all of which conduce

to one and the same end, of preventing future crimes, whether that can be

effected by amendment, disability or example. But the caution which we speak

of at present is such as is intended merely for prevention, without any crime

actually committed by the party, but arising only from a probable suspicion

that some crime is intended or likely to happen; and consequently it is not

meant as any degree of punishment, unless perhaps for a man's imprudence in

giving just ground of apprehension.

By the Saxon constitution these sureties were always at hand, by means of

King Alfred's wise institution of decennaries or frankpledges; wherein as has

more than once been observed, (c) the whole neighbourhood or tithing of free-

men were mutually pledges for each other's good behaviour. But this great
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and general security being now fallen into disuse and neglected, there hath

succeeded to it the method of making suspected persons find particular and

special securities for their future conduct: of which we find mention in the

laws of King Edward the Confessor; (d) tradat fidejussores de pace el legalitate

tucnda." Let us, therefore, consider, first, what this security is; next who may

take or demand it; and, lastly, how it may be discharged.

I. This security consists in being bound, with one or more securities, in a

recognizance or obligation to the king, entered on record, and taken in some

court or by some judicial officer; whereby the parties acknowledge themselves

to be indebted to the crown in the sum required (for instance 100/.), with con-

dition to be void and of none effect if the *party shall appear in court r ^,531

on such a day, and in the mean time shall keep the peace; (1) either 1- ' •"

generally towards the king and all his liege people; or particularly, also, with

regard to the person who craves the security. Or, if it be for the good behaviour,

then on condition that he shall demean and behave himself well (or be of good

behaviour), either generally or specially, for the time therein limited, as for one

or more years, or for life. This recognizance, if taken by a justice of the peace,

must be certified to the next sessions, in pursuance of the statute 3 Hen. VII,

c. 1, and if the condition of such recognizance be broken, by any breach of the

peace in the one case, or any misbehaviour in the other, the recognizance be-

comes forfeited or absolute; and being estreated or extracted (taken out from

among the other records) and sent up to. the exchequer, the party and his sure-

ties, having now become the king's absolute debtors, are sued for the several

sums in which they are respectively bound.

3. Any justices of the peace, by virtue of their commission, or those who are

ex officio conservators of the peace, as was mentioned in a former volume, (e) (2)

fb} Sec page 11. (e) See book I, page 114.. (d) Cap. 18. ft} See book I, page 350.

(1) [It is now settled that a justice of the peace is authorized to require surety to keep the

peace for a limited time, as two years, according,to his discretion, and that he need not bind the

party over to the next sessions only : 2 B. and A. 278 ; but if a recognizance to appear at the

sessions be taken, and an order of court for finding sureties applied for, articles of the peace must

be exhibited. 5 Bum, J., 24th od. 304 ; 1 T. R. 696.]

See also Prichett r. Greatrex, 8 Q. B. 1020.

(•2) [A secretary of state or priw counsellor cannot bind to keep the peace or good behaviour.

11 St. Tr. 317.] '
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may demand such security according to their own discretion; or it may be

granted at the request of any subject, upon due cause shown, provided such

demandant be under the king's protection; for which reason it has been for-

merly doubted, whether Jews, pagans, or persons convicted of uprcemunire were

entitled thei-eto.(/) Or, if the justice is averse to act, it may be granted by a

mandatory writ, called a supplicavit, issuing out of the court of king's bench or

chancery; which will compel the justice to act, as a ministerial and not as a

judicial officer: and he must make a return to such writ, specifying his com-

pliance, under his hand and seal, (g) But this writ is seldom used : for, when

application is made to the superior courts, they usually take the recognizances

there, under the directions of '.he statute 21 Jac. I, c. 8. And, indeed, a peer

or peeress cannot be bound over in any other place than the courts of

r*9r4l *k'uo's bench or chancery: (3) though a justice of the peace has a

' " J . power to require sureties of any other person, being compos mentis and

under the degree of nobility, whether he be a fellow-justice or other magistrate,

or whether he be merely a private man. (A) Wives may demand it against their

husbands; or husbands, if necessary, against their wives, (i) But feme coverts,

and infants under age, ought to find security by their friends only, and not to

be bound themselves : for they are incapable of engaging themselves to answer

any debt; which, as we observed, is the nature of these recognizances or ac-

knowledgments. (4)

3. A recognizance may be discharged, either by the demise of the king, to
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•whom the recognizance is made; or by the death of the principal party bound

thereby, if not before forfeited; or by order of the court to which such recog-

nizance is certilied by the justices (as the quarter sessions, assizes, or king's

bench), if they see sufficient cause ; or in case he at whose request it was granted,

if granted upon a private account, will release it, or does not make his appear-

ance to pray that it may be continued, (k)

Thus far what has been said is applicable to botli species of recognizances, for

the peace, and for the good behaviour: dc pace, et legalUnte, tuenda, as expressed

in the laws of King Edward. But as these two species of securities are in some

respects different, especially as to the cause of granting, or the means of forfeit-

ing them. I shall now consider them separately : and, lirst, shall show for what

cause such a recognizance, with sureties for the peace, is grautable; and then,

how it may be forfeited.

1. Any justices of the peace may, ex offi'-io, bind sill those to keep the peace,

who in his presence make any affray: or threaten to kill or beat another; or

contend together with hot and angry words; or go about with unusual weapons

r*o-- -i *or attendance, to the terror of the people; and all such as he knows

L Ol> J to be common barretors; and such as are brought before him by the

constable for a breach of peace in his presence ; and all such persons, as, having

been before bound to the peaca, have broken it and forfeited their recogniz-

ances. (I) Also, wherever any private man hath just cause to fear that another

will burn his house, or do him a corporal injury, by killing, imprisoning, or

beating him; or that he will procure others so to do; he may demand surety

of the peace against such person : and every justice of the peace is bound to

grant it, if he who demands it will make oath that he is actually under fear of

death or bodily harm ; and will show that he has just cause to be so, by reason

of the other's menaces, attempts, or having lain in wait for him ; and will also

further swear, that he does not require such surety out of malice, or for mere

(f) 1 Hawk. P. C. 12fi. (g) F. X. B. 80. 2 P. Wins. 202. (h) 1 Hawk. P. C. 127.

(i) 2 Slru. 1207. (t) \ Hawk. P. C. !•». (I) Ibid. 126.

(3) [A peeress mav demand surety of the peace against her husband. Fost. 349; 2 Stra.

1202; 13 East. 171, tf. Cas.; T. Hard. 74 ; 1 Burr. 631. 703 ; 1 T. R. 696.]

(4) In default of giving security the party is committed to prison, but is not to be detained

on the warrant of a single magistrate for more than twelve calendar months. Statute 16 and 17

Vic. c. 30, s. 3.
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vexation, (m) This is called swearing the peace against another: and, if the

party does not find such sureties, as the justice in his discretion shall require,

he may immediately be committed till he does, (n)

2. Such recognizance for keeping the peace when given, may be forfeited by

any actual violence, or even an assault, or menace, to the person of him who

demanded it, if it be a special recognizance; or if the recognizance be general,

by any unlawful action whatsoever, that either is or tends to a breacli of the

peace; or more particularly, by any one of the many species of offences which

were mentioned as crimes against the public peace in the eleventh chapter of

this book; or by any private violence committed against any of his majesty's

subjects. But a bare trespass upon the lands or goods of another, which is a

ground for a civil action, unless accompanied with a wilful breach of the peace,

is no forfeiture of the recognizance, (o) Neither are mere reproachful words, as

calling a man a knave or liar, any breach of the peace, so as to forfeit one's

recognizance (being *looked upon to be merely the effect of unmean- r*o-g "1

ing heat and passion), unless they amount to a challenge to fight, (p) *- *"'" '

The other species of recognizance, with sureties, is for the good abearance or

good behaviour. This includes security for the peace, and somewhat more; we

will therefore examine it in the same manner as the other.

1. First, then, the justices are empowered by the statute 34 Edw. Ill, c. 1, to

bind over to the good behaviour towards the king and his people, all them that

be not of good fame, wherever they be found: (6) to the intent that the people

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:05 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

be not troubled or endamaged, nor the peace diminished, nor merchants and

others, passing by the highways of the realm, be disturbed nor put in the peril

which may happen by such offenders. Under the general words of this expres-

sion that be not of good fame, it is holden that a man may be bound to his

good behaviour for causes of scandal, contra bonos mores, as well as contra

pacem: as, for haunting bawdy-houses with women of bad fame; or for keep-

ing such women in his own house; or for words tending to scandalize the gov-

ernment, or in abuse of the officers of justice, especially in the execution of

their office. Thus, also, a justice may bind over all night-walkers ; eaves-drop-

pers ; such as keep suspicious company, or are reported to be pilferers or robbers ;

such as sleep in the day, and wake in the night; common drunkards; whore-

masters; the putative fathers of bastards; cheats; idle vagabonds; and other

persons whose misbehaviour may reasonably bring them within the general

words of the statutes, as persons not of good fame : an expression, it must be

owned, of so great a latitude, as leaves much to be determined by the discretion

of the magistrate himself. But if he commits a man for want of sureties, he

must express the cause thereof with convenient certainty; and take care that

such cause be a good one. (q) (7)

(ml 1 Hawk. P. C. 127. (n) Ibid. 183. (o) IMd. 131. (p) Ibid. 130. (7) Ibid. 132.

(5) [The surety of the peace will not be granted but whore there is a fear of some present

or future danger, and not merely for a battery or trespass, or for any breach of the peace that is

past. Dalt. c. 11.

The articles to entitle a party to have sureties of the peace must be verified by the oath of

the exhibitant. 1 Stra. 527; 12 Mod. 243. The truth of the allegations therein cannot be

controverted by the defendant, and if no objections arise to the articles exhibited, the court or

justice will order securities to be taken immediately. 2 Stra. 12(hJ; 13 East, 171, n. If the

articles manifestly appear to contain perjury, the court will refuse the application, and eveii

commit the cxhfbitaut. 2 Burr. 806; 3 id. 1922. The articles will not generally be received

if the parties live a distance in the county, unless they have previously made application to

a justice in the neighbourhood. 2 Burr. 780.]

(fi) [See Haylock v. Sparke, 1 E. and B. 471, in which this subject was examined by Lord

Campbell, and it was decided that a magistrate might require sureties for good behaviour of a

person charged with having published a libel calculated to cause a bre<vch of the peace. See

also Butt ». Conant, 1 B. and B. 548.

(7) The subject of this chapter will be found covered bv statutes in the several states of the

American Union, and treated of in the treatises published for the guide of magistrates in

criminal cases, and also in some of the works on criminal law.
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F *2571 *^° ^ reco£nizance f°r the good behaviour may he forfeited by all the

! ' J same means as one for the security of the peace may be: and also by

some others. As, by going armed, with unusual attendance, to the terror of the

people ; by speaking words tending to sedition; or by committing any of those

acts of misbehaviour which the recognizance was intended to prevent. But not

by barely giving fresh cause of suspicion of that which perhaps may never

actually happen : (r) for, though it is just to compel suspected persons to give

security to the public against misbehaviour that is apprehended; yet it would

be hard, upon such suspicion, without proof of any actual crime, to puuis'j.

them by a forfeiture of their recognizance.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF COURTS OF A CRIMINAL JURISDICTION;

THE sixth, and last, object of our inquiries will be the method of inflicting

those punishments which the law has annexed to particular offences; and which

I have constantly subjoined to the description of the ci'ime itself. In the

discussion of which, I shall pursue much the same general method that I fol-

lowed in the preceding book, with regard to the redress of civil injuries; by,

first, pointing out the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, wherein offenders

may be prosecuted to punishment; and by, secondly, deducing down in their

natural order, and explaining, the several proceedings therein.

First, then, In reckoning up the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, I

shall, as in the former case, begin with an account of such as are of a public
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and general jurisdiction throughout the whole realm; and afterwards, proceed

to such as are only of a private and special jurisdiction, and confined to some

particular parts of the kingdom.

I. In our inquiries into the criminal courts of public and general jurisdiction,

I must in one respect, pursue a different order from that in which I considered

the civil tribunals. For there, as the several courts had a gradual subordination

to each other, the superior correcting and reforming the errors of the inferior,

I thought it best to begin with the lowest, and so ascend gradually to the courts

F *2fc) 1 °^ aPPeal or those of *the most extensive powers. But as it is contrary

L -* to the genius and spirit of the law of England to suffer any man to be

tried twice for the offence in a criminal way, especially if acquitted upon

the first trial; therefore these criminal courts may be said to be all independent

of each other; at least, so far as that the sentence of the lowest of them can

never be controlled or reversed by the highest jurisdiction in the kingdom

unless for error in matter of law, apparent upon the face of the record ; though

sometimes causes may be removed from one to the other before trial. And

therefore as in these courts of criminal cognizance, there is not the same chain

and dependence as in the others, I shall rank them according to their dignity,

and begin with the highest of all, viz.:

1. The high court of parliament; which is the supreme court in the king-

dom, not only for the making, but also for the execution, of laws ; by the trial

of great and enormous offenders, whether lords or commoners, in the method of

parliamentary impeachment. (1) As for acts of parliament to attaint particular

(r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 183.

(1) In the United States, as well as in the several states of the Union, the sennte tries im-

peachments, while the lower house prefers the charges. The whole law of impeachment was

very fullv considered on the trial of President Johnson, to the report of which the reader is

referred." See also 6 Am. Law Keg. N. S. 257 and 641.

Special acts imposing punishments on particular persons, cannot be passed in the United

States. Const, of the U. S. art. 1, {$ 9 and 10; Cumniings v. Missouri, 4 Wai. 27? ; Ex parto

Garland, id. 333.
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persons of treason or felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or con-

trary to the common law, to serve a special purpose, I speak not of them ; being

to all intents and purposes new laws, made pro re nata, and by no means an

execution of such as are already in being. But an impeachment before the

lords by the commons of Great Britain, in parliament, is a prosecution of the

already known and established law, and has been frequently put in practice;

being a presentment to the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdic-

tion by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom. («) A commoner

cannot, however, be impeached before the lords for any capital offence, but only

for high misdemeanors: (b) a peer may be impeached for any *crime. (2) r*orn 1

And they usually (in case of an impeachment of a peer for treason) L '

address the crown to appoint a lord high steward for the greater dignity and

regularity of their proceedings; which high steward was formerly elected by

the peers themselves, though he was generally commissioned by the king; (c)

but it hath of late years been strenuously maintained (d) that the appointment

of an high steward in such cases is not indispensably necessary, but that the

house may proceed without one. The articles of impeachment are a kind of

bills of indictment, found by the house of commons, and afterwards tried by

the lords; who are, in cases of misdemeanors, considered not only as their own

peers, but as the peers of the whole nation. This is a custom derived to us from

the constitution of the ancient Germans: who, in their great councils, some-

times tried capital accusations relating to the public: " licet apud consilium
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accusare quoque, et discriinen, capitis inlendere." (e) And it has a peculiar

propriety in the English constitution; which has much improved upon the

ancient model imported hither from the continent. For, though in general the

union of the legislative and judicial powers ought to be more carefully avoid-

ed, (/) yet it may happen that a subject, intrusted with the administration of

public affairs, may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of such crimes

as the ordinary magistrate either *dares not or cannot punish. Of these r*opi 1

the representatives of the people, or house of commons, cannot prop- <- *

erly judge; because their constituents are the parties injured, and can therefore

only impeach. But before what court shall this impeachment be tried? Not

before the ordinary tribunals, which would naturally be swayed by the authority

of so powerful an accuser. Reason, therefore, will suggest that this branch of

the legislature, which represents the people, must bring its charge before the

other branch, which consists of the nobility, who have neither the same inter-

ests nor the same passions as popular assemblies, (g) This is a vast superiority,

which the constitution of this island enjoys, over those of the Grecian or Ro-

man republics; where the people were, at the same time, both judges and

accusers. It is proper that the nobility should judge, to insure justice to the

(o) 1 Hal. P. C. 150.

(61 When In 4 Edw. III. the king ilemnmleil the carls, barons, ami peers to rive judgment against Simon

de Bereford, who had been a notorious accomplice in the treasons of Itoger, Earl of Mortimer, thev c.nme

before the king in parliament, and said all with one voice that the said Simon was not their peer t and, there-

fore they were not hound tojudsrehim as a peer of the land. And when afterwards, in the same parlia-

ment, they were prevailed upon, in respect to the notoriety and heinousness of his crimes, to receive the

charge, ami to give Judgment against him. the following protest and proviso was entered in the parliament-

roll : " And it is assented and accorded by our lord the king, ami all the great men, in full parliament, that

albeit the peers, as judges of the parliament, have taken upon them in the presence of our lord the king,

to make and render the said judgment, yet the peers who now are, or shall be in time to come, be not

bound or charged to render Judgment upon others than pevrs ; nor that the peers of the land have power

to do this, but thereof ought ever to be discharged and acquitted ; and that the aforesaid judgment nn\v

rendered be not drawn to example or consequence In lime to come, whereby the saiil peers may be charged

hereafter, to judge others than their peers, contrary- to the laws of the land, if the like case happen, which

God lorbid. (Hot. Parl. 4 Ed. III. n. 2 and H. 2 Brad. Hist. 190. Sclden, Judlc. in Parl. c. l.i

(c) 1 Hal. P. 0. 330. (rf| Lords- Jouni. 12 Slay, KI7U. Com. Journ. 15 May. 1070. Fost. 142, &e.

(e) Tacit, de mor. Germ. 12. (/) Sec book I, page 2B9. (g) Montesq. Sp. L. xi, 6.

(2) [For misdemeanors, as libels, riots, <fcc., peers are to be tried, like commoners, by a jury,

for at the common law, in these four cases only, a peer shall be tried by his peers, viz., in treason,

felony, misprision of treason, and misprision of felony : and the statute law which gives such

trial hath reference unto these, or to other offences made treason or felony ; his trial by his peers

i-li.-ill be as before ; and to this effect are all these statutes. Per Fleming, C. J., assented to by

the whole court, in Kex v. Lord Taux. 1 Bulstr. 197. ]

s
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accused; as it is proper that the people should accuse, to insure justice to

the commonwealth. And. therefore, among other extraordinary circumstances

attending the authority of this court, there is one of a very singular nature,

which \VMS insisted on by the house of commons in the case of the earl of

Uanby, in the reign of Charles II ; (/*) and it is now enacted by statute 12 and

13 Wm. Ill, c. 2, that no pardon under the great seal shall be pleadable to an

impeachment by the commons of Great Britain in parliament, (i)

2. The court of the lord high steward of Great Britain (k) is a court insti-

tuted for the trial of peers, indicted for treason or felony, or for misprisiou of

either. (I) The office of this great magistrate is very ancient ; and was formerly

hereditary, or at least held for life, or dum bene se gesserit : but now it is usually

and hath been for many centuries past, (»«) granted pro hac vice only ; and it

hath been the constant practice (and therefore seems now to have become nec-

f*2G2 1 essarv t° grant *it to a lord of parliament, else he ia incapable to try

' J such delinquent peer. (».) When such an indictment is therefore found

by a grand jury of freeholders in the king's bench, or at the assizes before the

justices of oi/er and terminer, it is to be removed by a writ of certiorari into

the court of the lord high steward, which only has power to determine it. A

peer may plead a pardon before the court of king's bench, and the judges have

power to allow it; in order to prevent the trouble of appointing an high stew-

ard, merely for the purpose of receiving such plea. But he may not plead, in

that inferior court, any other plea; sa guilty or not guilty, of the indictment ;
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but only in this court: because, in consequence of such plea, it is possible that

judgment of death might be awarded against him. The king, therefore, in

case a peer be indicted for treason, felony or misprision, creates a lord high stew-

ard pro hac vice by commission under the great seal ; which recites the indict-

ment so found, and gives his grace power to receive and try it secundum legem

et consueiudinem Anglice. Then, when the indictment is regularly removed by

writ of certiorari, commanding the inferior court to certify it up to him, the

lord high steward directs a precept to the Serjeant at arms, to summon the lords

to attend and try the indicted peer. This precept was formerly issued to sum-

mon only eighteen or twenty, selected from the body of peers; then the num-

ber came to be indefinite; and the custom was for the lord high steward to

summon as many as he thought proper (but of late years not less han twenty-

three, (o) and that those lords only should sit upon the trial: (3) which threw a

monstrous weight of power into the hands of the crown, and this its great officer,

of selecting only such peers as the then predominate party should most approve

of. And accordingly, when the Earl of Clarendon fell in disgrace with Charles

[*2G3 1 ^' *tnere was a design formed to prorogue the parliament, in order to try

' '"' J him by a select number of peers; it being doubted whether the whole

house could be induced to fall in with the views of the court, (p) But now by

statute 7 Wm. Ill, c. 3, upon all trials of peers for treason or misprision, all the

peers who have a right to sit and vote in parliament shall be summoned, at least

twenty days before such trial, to appear and vote therein ; and every lord ap-

pearing shall vote in the trial of such peer, first taking the oaths of allegiance

and supremacy, and subscribing the declaration against popery.

1 (7i) Com. Jonrn.SMay, 1679. (i) Sec c. 81. (k) 4 Inst. 58. 2 Hawk. P. C. 5, 421. 2 Jon. 64.

(1) 1 Bnlstr. l'J8. [m\ Pi-yn. on 4 Inst. 46.

......

(o) Kclynge, .W. (p) Carte's Life of Ormonde, Vol. II

(3) [The decision is \>y a majority, but a majority cannot convict, unless it consists of twelve

or more.

A peer cannot have the benefit of a challenge like a commoner. 1 Horg. St. Tr. 198, 388.]

The right of challenge was somewhat discussed in the case of the impeachment of President

Johnson.
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During the session of parliament the trial of an indicted peer is not properly

in the court of the lord high steward, but before the court last mentioned, of

our lord the king in parliament, (q) It is true, a lord high steward is always

appointed in that case, to regulate and add weight to the proceedings: but he

is rather in the nature of a speaker pro tempore, or chairman of the court, than

the judge of it; for the collective body of the peers are therein the judges both

of law and fact, and the high steward has a vote with the rest, in right of

his peerage. But in the court of the lord high steward, which is held in the

recess of parliament, he is the sole judge of matters of law, as the lords triors

are in the matters of fact; and as they may not interfere with him in regulating

the proceedings of the court, so he has no right to intermix wibh them in giv-

ing any vote upon the trial, (r) Therefore, upon the conviction and attainder

of a peer for murder in full parliament, it hath been holden by the judges, (•«)

that in case the day appointed in the judgment for execution should lapse

before execution done, a new time of execution may be appointed by either

the high court of parliament during its sitting, though no high steward be

existing; or, in the recess of parliament, by the court of king's bench, the record

being removed into that court.

*It has been a point of some controversy, whether the bishops have r ^/M -i

now a right to sit in the court of the lord high steward, to try indict- "- J

ments of treason and misprision. Some incline to imagine them included

under the general words of the statute of King William, " all peers who have a
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right to sit and vote in parliament;" but the expression had been much clearer

if it had been, "all lords," and not " all peers j" for though bishops, on account

of the baronies annexed to their bishopricks, are clearly lords of parliament, yet,

their blood not being ennobled, they are not universally allowed to be peers

with the temporal nobility: and perhaps this word might be inserted purposely

with a view to exclude them. However, there is no instance of their sitting on

trials for capital offences, even upon impeachments and indictments in full

parliament, much less in the court we are now treating of; for indeed they

usually withdraw voluntarily, but enter a protest declaring their right to stay.

It is observable that, in the eleventh chapter of the constitutions of Clarendon,

made in parliament 11 Hen. II, they are expressly excused, rather than

excluded, from sitting and voting in trials, when they come to concern life or

limb: " episcopi, sicut cateri barones, dcbent interesse judiciis cum baronibus,

qudsque perveniatur ad diminutionem membrorum, vel ad mortem ;" and Becket's

quarrel with the king hereupon was not on account of the exception (which

was agreeable to the canon law), but of the general rule that compelled the

bishops to attend at all. And the determination of the house of lords in the earl

of Danby's case, (t) which hath ever since been adhered to, is consonant to these

constitutions; "that the lords spiritual have a right to stay and sit in court in

capital cases, till the court proceeds to the vote of guilty, or not guilty." It

must be noted that this resolution extends only to trials in full parliament: for

to the court of the lord high steward (in which no vote can be given, but merely

that of guilty, or not guilty), no bishop, as such, ever was or could be sum-

moned; and though the statute of King William *regulates the pro- r*opK-i

cecdings in that court, as well as in the court of parliament, yet it never <- *

intended to new-model or alter its constitution: and consequently does not

give the lords spiritual any right in cases of blood which they had not before.(«)

And what makes their exclusion more reasonable is, that they have no right to

be tried themselves in the court of the lord high steward, (w) and therefore

surely ought not to be judges there. For the privilege of being thus tried

depends upon nobility of blood, rather than a seat in the house: as appears

from the trials of popish lords, of lords under age, and (since the union) of the

Scots' nobility, though not in the number of the sixteen; and from the trials

of females, such as the queen consort or dowager, and of all peeresses by birth;

(9) Fost. HI. (r) State Trials, vol. iv, 214. 232, 233. (») Fost. 139.

(0 Lords' Journ. IS May, 1U79. (u) Fost. 248. (to) Bro. Abr. t. Trial. It*.
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and peeresses by marriage, also, unless they have, when dowagers, disparaged

themselves by taking a commoner to their second husband. (4)

3. The court of king's bench, (x) concerning the nature of which we partly

inquired in the preceding book, (y) was (we may remember) divided into & crown

side and a plea side. And on the crown side, or crown office, it takes cogni-

zance of all criminal causes, from high treason down to the most trivial misde-

meanor or breach of the peace. Into this court also indictments from all

inferior courts may be removed by writ of ccrtiorari, and tried either at bar, or

at nisi prius, by a jury of the county out of which the indictment is brought,

p The judges of this court are the supreme coroners of the kingdom. And the

court itself is the principal court of criminal jurisdiction (though the two

former are of greater dignity) known to the laws of England. For which reason

by the coming of the court of king's bench into any county (as it was removed

to Oxford on account of the sickness in 1065), all former commissioners of oyer

and fcnniner, and general gaol delivery, are at once absorbed and determined

f *9f p 1 ^P80 fac^'° (•*) *'n the S!lme manner as by the old Gothic and Saxon consti-

"• -" tutions, "jure vetusto obti-nuit, quievisse omnia in^'criora judicia,

dicente jus rege." (z)

Into this court of king's bench hath reverted all that was good and salutary

of the jurisdiction of the court of atar-ctiamber, camera stellata ; (a) which was

a court of very ancient original, (b) but new-modeled by statutes 3 Hen. VII,

c. 1, and 21 Hen. VIII, c. 20, consisting of divers lords, spiritual and temporal,
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being privy counsellors, together with two judges of the courts of common law,

without the intervention of any jury. Their jurisdiction extended legally

[*%C* 1 over riots, perjury, misbehaviour of sheriff's, and other notorious *misde-

' •• meanors, contrary to the laws of the, land. Yet, this was afterwards (as

Lord Clarendon informs us) (c) stretched "to the asserting of all proclamations

and orders of state: to the vindicating of illegal commissions, and grants of

monopolies; holding for honorable that which pleased, and for just that which

profited, and becoming both a court of law to determine civil rights, and a court

of revenue to enrich the treasury; the council table by proclamations enjoining

to the people that which was not enjoined by the laws, and prohibiting that

which was not prohibited; and the star-chamber, which consisted of the same

persons in different rooms, censuring the breach and disobedience to those proc-

lamations by very great fines, imprisonments, and corporal severities: so that

any disrespect to any acts of state, or to the persons of statesmen, was in no time

(x) 4 Inst. 70. 1 Hal. P. C. 2. 2 Hawk. P. C. 6. (y) See book:!, page 41. (z) Sticrnhook, I. 1. c. 2.

(aj This is said ;Lamb. Arch. 154) to have boon so called, cither from the Saxon wordPQOJun to steer or

govern ;—or from its punishing the crimen steltir/nitlttfi. or cosenage;—or because the room wherein it satp

theold council-chamber of the palace of Westminster (Lamb. 148), which is now converted into thclottery

office, and forms the eastern side of Xew Palacc-vard, was full of windows; or (to which Sir Edward Coke,

4 Inst. 6fi, accedes) because haply the roof thereof was at the llrst garnished with gilded stars. As all these

arc merely conjectures (for no stars are now in the roof, nor are any said to have remained there so late as the

reign of Queen Klizabeth), it may be allowable to propose another conjectural etymology, as plausible per-

haps as any of them. It is well known that before the banishment of the Jews under Kdwiu-d I. their contracts

and obligations were denominated in our ancient reconls storm or Starrs, from a corruption of the Hebrew

word elietar. uconvenant. Tovcy's Angl. Judaic, !W. Selden, tit. of lion. ii. 34. Uxor. ebraic. i. 14. These

Starrs, by an ordinance of Hiclmrd the First, preserved by Hoveden. were commanded to be enrolled and

deposited in chests under three keys incerUiin places; one. and the most considerable, of which was in the

king's exchequer at Westminster; and no starr wo« allowed to be valid unless it were fimndinsomeofthesaid

repositories. (Memorandiii Scacc./'. 6 Elite. /. prefixed to MaTnard's year-book of Edw. II fol. S. Sladox, hist,

cxch. c. vii, }j 4. 5, (i.) The room at the exchequer, where the chests containing these Starrs were kept, was

probably called the tthirr-clutmber; and when the Jews were expelled the kingdom, was applied to the nsc of

the king's council, sitt'mgin their judicial capacity. To confirm this, the first time the Starr-chamber is men-

"- lioned in anyrceord, it issaid to have been situated near the receiptof the exchequer at Westminster: the

king's council, bis chancellor, treasurer, justices, and other sages, were assembled en la fhimmbrf fits esteillei

prea la roteelptla Westminster. Cltiuit.41. Edw. III. m. 13. For in process of time, when the meaning of the

Jewish Ktnrrs was forgotten, the word starr-cluimber was naturally rendered in law-French, lachaumbrettet

ertei/fe^and in law-la tin camera stellata; which continued to be the style in latin till the dissolution of that court.

ftij Lamb. Arch. 166. (c) Hist, of Kcb., books 1 and ».

(4) [See, for instance, the Dutchess of Kingston's Case, 20 St. Tr. 355.

Upon conviction fur felony a peer is now liable to the same punishment as any other subject

of the crown (statute 4 and 5 Vic. c. 2ii), and for a misdeameanor, as libel, he is liable in like

manner as a commoner. Case of Lord Vaux, 1 Bulstr. 197.]

(5) This is now otherwise by statute.
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now the only method of trying marine felonies in the court of admiralty; the

judge of the admiralty still presiding therein, as the lord mayor is the president

of the session of oyer and terminer m London. (7)

These five conrts may be held in any part of the kingdom, and their jurisdic-

tion extends over crimes that arise throughout the whole of it, from one end to

tha other. What follow are also of a general nature, and universally diffused

oyer the nation, but yet are of a local jurisdiction, and confined to particular

districts. Of which species are,

6, 7. The courts of oyer and terminer and the general gaol delivery,(i) which are

held before the king's commissioners, among whom are usually two judges of the

courts at Westminster, twice in every year in every county of the kingdom ; except

the four northern ones, where they are held only once, and London and Middle-

sex, wherein they are held eight times. These were slightly mentioned in the

preceding book, (k) We then observed that, at what is usually called the assizes,

the judges sit by virtue of five several authorities: two of which, the commis-

sion of assize and its attendant jurisdiction of nisi, prius, being principally of

a civil nature, were then explained at large; to which I shall only add, that

these justices have, by virtue of several statutes, a criminal jurisdiction, also, in

r*2«()i certain special cases. (I) The third, which is the *commission of the

1 ' J peace, was also treated of in a former volume, (m) when we inquired into

the nature and office of a justice of the peace. I shall only add, that all the

justices of the peace of any county, wherein the assizes are held, are bound by
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law to attend them, or else are liable to a fine; in order to return recognizances,

&c., and to assist the judges in such matters as lie within their knowledge ano-

jurisdiction, and in which some of them have probably been concerned, by wa>

of previous examination. But the fourth authority is the commission of oi/et

and terminer (n) to hear and determine all treasons, felonies and misdemeanors

(i) 4 Insts 162. 168. 2 H«l. P. C. 22, 32. 2 Hawk. P. C. 14, 23. (k) Sec hook III, p. <!0.

(1) 2 Hal. P. C. 39. 2 Hawk, P. C. 28. (m) See book 1, p. 351. (n) Sec Appendix, i 1.

(7) [If a pistol be fired on shore, which kills a man at sea, the offence is properly triable at the

admiralty sessions, because the murder is, in law, committed where the death occurs. 1 East

P. C. 367; 1 Leach, 388; 12 East, 246; 2 Hale, 17, 20; but if, on the other hand, a man be

stricken upon the high sea, and died upon shore after the reflux of the water, the admiral, by

virtue of this commission, has no cognizance of that felony. 2 Hale, 17, 20; 1 East, P. C. 305,

366. And, it being doubtful whether it could be tried at common law, the statute 2 Geo. IT,

c. 21, provides that the offender may be indicted in the county where the party died. So the

courts of common law have concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty, in murders committed

in Milford Haven, and all other havens, creeks, and rivers in this realm. 2 Leach, 10413; 1 East,

P C. 368; K. and R. C. C. 243, S. C.]

By 4 and 5 Win. IV, c. 36 and 7 "Wm. IT and 1 Tic. c. 77, the central criminal conrt was cre-

ated, with a district composed of London, and Middlesex, and parts of Kent and Surrey. It is

composed of the lord mayor of London, the lord chancellor, the common law judges, the judges

of the courts of bankruptcy and admiralty, the dean of the arches, the aldermen of London,

the recorder and common sergeant of London, the judge of the sheriff's court of London, and

the ex-chancellors and ex-judges of the superior courts. Any two or more may hold the court,

and, in practice, it is generally presided over by two judges of the superior eo'nrts and the law-

officers of the city of London. It has jurisdiction of offences committed within the district,

and also of all offences committed on the high seas and other places within the jurisdiction of

the admiralty.

By 7 and 8 Vic, c. 2, after reciting that the issuing of a special commission in the manner

prescribed by 28 Hen. Till, c. 15, was found inconvenient, it is enacted that her majesty's

justices of assize, or others, her majesty's commissioners, by whom any conrt shall be holden

under any of her majesty's commissions of oyer and terminer, or general gaol delivery, shall

have the powers which by any aet are given to any commissioners named in any commission

of oyer and terminer, for the trying of offences committed within the jurisdiction of the ad-

miralty, and to deliver the gaol, &c., of any person therein for any offence alleged to have been

committed on the high seas and other places within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. See,

also, 18 and 19 Tic. c. 91, s. 21. And several subsequent statutes declare that offences com-

mitted within the jurisdiction of the admiralty shall bo deemed offences of the same natnre

and liable to the same punishments, as if committed upon land within England or Ireland,

and may be tried in any county or place in which the offender may be apprehended or in

custody.
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.This is directed to the judges and several others, or any two of them; but the

judges or Serjeants at law only are of the quorum, so that the rest cannot act

without the presence of one of them. The words of the commission are, "to

inquire, hear and determine;" so that, by virtue of this commission, they can

only proceed upon an indictment found at the same assizes; for they must first

inquire by means of the grand jury or inquest, before they are empowered to

hear and determine by the help of the petit jury. Therefore, they have, besides,

fifthly, a commission of general good delivery; (o) which empowers them to try

and deliver every prisoner, who shall be in the gaol when the judges arrive at

the circuit town, whenever or before whomsoever indicted, or for whatever crime

committed. It was anciently the course to issue special writs of gaol delivery

for each particular prisoner, which are called the writs de lono et rnulo: (p)

but these beiug found inconvenient and oppressive, a general commission for all

the prisoners has long been established in their stead. So that, one way or

other, the gaols are in general cleared, and all offenders tried, punished, or

delivered, twice in every year; a constitution of singular use and excellence. (8)

Sometimes, also, upon urgent occasions, the king issues a special or extraordi-

nary commission of oyer and terminer, and gaol delivery confined to .those

offences which stand in need of immediate inquiry and punishment: upon

which the course of proceeding is much the same, as upon general and ordinary

commissions. Formerly it was held, in 'pursuance of the statutes r*o71i

8 Ric. II, c. 2, and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 4, that no judge or other lawyer L 4li J
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could act in the commission of oyer and terminer, or in that of gaol delivery,

within his own county where he was born or inhabited; in like manner as

they are prohibited from being judges of assize and determining civil causes.

But that local partiality, which the jealousy of our ancestors was careful to pre-

vent, being judged less likely to operate in the trial of crimes and misdemeanors,

than in matters of property and disputes between party and party, it was thought

proper by the statute 12 Geo. II, c, 27, to allow any man to be a justice of oyer

and terminer, and general gaol delivery, within any county of England.

8. The court of general quarter sessions of the peace (q) is a court that must

be held in every county once in every quarter of a year; which, by statute

2 Hen. V, c. 4, is appointed to be in the first week after Michaelmas-day; the

first week after the epiphany; the first week after the close of easter; and in the

(o) See Appendix, i 1. (j>) 2 Inst. 43. (?) 4 Inst. 170. 2 Hal. P. C 4i. S Hawk. P. C. 32.

(8) [Every description of offence, even high treason, is cognizable under this commission;

and the justices may proceed upon auy indictment of felony or trespass found before other

justices; 2 Hale, 32; Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, 8. 2; or may take an indictment originally before them-

selves: Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, 8. 3; 2 Hale, 34 ; and they have power to discharge, not only prisoners

acquitted, but also such against whom, upon proclamation made, no parties shall appear to

indict them, which cannot be done either by justice of oyer and terminer, or of the peace.

Hawk. b. ~i, c. 6, s. 6; 2 Hale, 34. It is not imperative on a commissioner of gaol delivery to

continue on their commitments such prisoners as appear to him committed for trial, but the

witnesses against whom did not appear, having been bound over to the sessions. Rusx. and

K. C. C. 173. But it seems clear, from the words of the commission, that these justices can-

not try any persons, except in some special cases, who are not in actual or constructive cus-

tody of the prison specifically named in the commission. Hawk. b. 2, c. 6, s. 5; Bac. Ab.

Court of Justices of Oyer, <tc. B. But it is not necessary that the party should be always in

actual custody, for if a person be admitted to boil, yet he is, in law, in prison, and his buil are

his keepers, and justices of gaol delivery may take an indictment against him, as well as if he

were actually in prison. 2 Hale, 34, 35. The commissions of gaol delivery are the same on all the

circuits. Unlike the commission of oyer and terminer, in which the same authority suffices for

every county, there is a distinct commission to deliver each particular gaol of the prisoners under

the care of its keeper.

The court of general gaol delivery has jurisdiction to order, that the proceedings on a trial,

from day to day, shall not be published till all the trials against different prisoners shall be

concluded, and the violation of such orders is a contempt of court, punishable by fine or imprison

ineut. and if the party refuse to attend, he may be imed in his absence. 5 B. and A. 218: 11

Price, 68.]
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week after the translation of St. Thomas the Martyr, or the eeyenth of July.

It is held before two or more justices of the peace, one of whom must be of

the quorum. (9) The jurisdiction of this court, by statute 34 Edw. Ill, c. 1,

extends to the trying and determining all felonies and trespasses whatsoever:

though they seldom, if ever, try any greater offence than small felonies within

the benefit of clergy; that commission providing, that if any case of difficulty

arises, thev shall not proceed to judgment, but in the presence of one of the

justices of the court of king's bench or common pleas, or one of the judges of

assize. And, therefore, murders, and other capital felonies, are usually remitted

for a more solemn trial to the assizes. (10) They cannot also try any new

created offence, without express power given them by the statute which creates

it. (?•) But there are many offences and particular matters, which by particular

statutes belong properly to the jurisdiction, and ought to be prosecuted in this

f *272 1 cour'; • ***'tne *8nlaMer misdemeanors against the public or common-

' " J wealth, not amounting to felony; and, especially, offences relating to

the game, highways, ale-houses, bastard children, the settlement and provision

for the poor, vagrants, servants' wages, apprentices, and popish recusants, (s)

Some of these are proceeded upon by indictment; and others in a summary

way by motion and order thereupon; which order may, for the most part,

unless guarded against by particular statutes, be removed into the court of

king's bench, by a writ of certiorari facias, and be there either quashed or con-

firmed. The records or rolls of the sessions are committed to the custody of a
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special officer, denominated the custos rotulorum, who is always a justice of

the quorum; and among them of the quorum (saith Lambard) (t) a man for

the most part especially picked out, either for wisdom, countenance, or credit.

The nomination of the custos rotulorum (who is the principal civil officer in the

county, as the lord lieutenant is the chief in military command) is by the king's

sign manual: and to him the nomination of the clerk of the peace belongs;

which office he is expressly forbidden to sell for money, (u)

In most corporation towns there are quarter sessions kept before justices of

their own, within their respective limits: which have exactly the same authority

as the general quarter sessions of the county, except in a very few instances:

one of the most considerable of which is the matter of appeals from orders of

removal of the poor, which, though they be from the orders of corporation

justices, must be to the sessions of the county, by statutes 8 and 9 Wm. Ill,

c. 30. In both corporations and counties at large, there is sometimes kept a

special or petty session, by a few justices, for dispatching smaller business in the

neighbourhood, between the times of the general sessions; as, for licensing ale-

houses, passing the accounts of the parish officers, and the like.

F *2r"? 1 *9' sheriff's tourn, (v) or rotation, is a court of record, held twice

L J every year, within a month after easter and michaelmas, before the

sheriff, in different parts of the county; being, indeed, only the turn of the

sheriff to keep a court-leet in each respective hundred: (w) this, therefore, is the

great court-leet of the county, as the county court is the court-baron: for out

of this, for the ease of the sheriff, was it taken.

10. The court-leet, or view of frunkpledye, (x) which is a court of record, held

once in the year, and not oftener, (y) within a particular hundred, lordship, or

manor, before the steward of the leet: being the king's court, granted by charter

r, 4 Mini. S79. Salk. 40B. Lonl Rarra. 11W. (»l See tamluufl n'renarrto im<l Burn's Justice.

(C)B. 4. c. *. (u)SUit. 37ilen. VUl. c. \. 1 W. ami M. lit. 1, c. SI.

(t'l 4 lust. 259. 2 Hal. I1. C. K). i liawk. I1. C. S3. (wi Mirr. c. 1, H 13,16.

(xi I Inst. XI. S Hawk. P. C. 72. (y) Mirror, c. I, » 10.

(9) The commission so runs, but it is made immaterial by statute. The terms of the court are

also now altered by statute.

(10) Since tho statute 5 and 6 Vic. c. 38, thic court cannot try any person for treason or mur-

der, or for any felony which, when committed by a pernon not previously convicted of felony, is

punishable by transportation for life; uud its jurisdiction is still further restricted by subsequent

statutes.
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to the lords of those hundreds or manors. Its original intent was to view the

frankpledged, that is, the freeman within the liberty ; who (we may reniember),(z)

according to the institution of the great Alfred, were all mutually pledges for

the good behaviour of each other. Besides this, the preservation of the peace,

and the chastisement of divers minute offences against the public good, are the

objects both of the court-leet and the sheriff's tourn ; which have exactly the

eame jurisdiction, one being only a larger species of the other; extending over

more territory, but not over more causes. All freeholders within the precinct

are obliged to attend them, and all persons commorant therein; which com-

morancy consists in usually lying there: a regulation, which owes its origin to

the laws of king Canute, (a) But persons under twelve and above sixty years

old, peers, clergymen, women, and the king's tenants in ancient demesne, are

excused from attendance there: all others being bound to appear upon the

jury, if required, and make their due presentments. It was also, anciently, the

custom to summon all the king's subjects, as they respectively grew to years of

discretion and strength, to *come to the court-leet, and there take the r $074 1

oath of allegiance to the king. The other general business of the leet L J

and tourn, was to present by jury all crimes whatsoever that happened within

their jurisdiction : and not only to present, but also to punish, all trivial mis-

demeanors, as all trivial debts were recoverable in the court baron, and county

court: justice, in these minuter matters of both kinds, being brought home

to the doors of every man by our ancient constitution. Thus in the Gothic con-
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stitution, the heereda, which answered to our court-leet, " de omnibus quidem

cognoscit, non tamen de omnibus judicat." (b) The objects of their jurisdiction

are therefore unavoidably very numerous: being such as, in some degree, either

less or more, affect the public weal, or good governance of the district in which

they arise; from common nuisances and other material offences against the

king's peace and public trade, down to eaves-dropping, waifs, and irregularities

in public commons. But both the tourn and the leet have been for a long time

in a declining way ; a circumstance, owing in part to the discharge granted by

the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 10, to all prelates, peers, and clergy-

men, from their attendance upon these courts; which occasioned them to grow

into disrepute. And, hence, it is that their business hath, for the most part,

gradually devolved upon the quarter sessions; which it is particularly directed

to do in some cases by 1 Edw. IV, c. 2.

11. The court of the coroners (c) is also a court of record, to inquire when

any one dies in prison, or comes to a violent or sudden death, by what manner

he came to his end. And this he is only entitled to do super visum corporis.

Of the coroner and his office we treated at large in a former volume, (d) among

the public officers and ministers of the kingdom: and, therefore, shall not here

repeat our inquiries; only mentioning his court by way of regularity, among

the criminal courts of the nation.

*12. The court of the clerk of the market (e) is incident to every fair r +„„,. i

and market in the kingdom, to punish misdemeanors therein ; as a court L '

pie poudre is, to determine all disputes relating to private or civil property. The

object of this jurisdiction (f) is principally the cognizance of weights and

measures, to try whether they be according to the true standard thereof, or no:

which standard was anciently committed to the custody of the bishop, who

appointed some clerk under him to inspect the abuse of them more narrowly;

and hence this officer, though now usually a layman, is called the clerk of the

market (g) If they be not according to the standard, then, besides the punish-

ment of the party by fine, the weights and measures themselves ought to be burnt

This is the most inferior court of criminal jurisdiction in the kingdom: though

the objects of its coercion were esteemed among the Romans of such importance

to the public that they were committed to the care of some of their most digni-

fied magistrates, the curule sediles.

it] See bonk 1(1, p. 11 j. (a) Part 1. c. 19. (ft) Stlernhook, de jure Oath. I. 1, e. J.

(«) 4 IiiHt. 471. -2 Hal. P. C. 53. 3 Hawk. P. C. «. (di See book I,jiaRe 349. (e)4 Inst 273.

I/) See st. 17 Car. II, c. 19. a Car. II, e. 8. 23 Oar. n. c. 12. (g) Bacon of English Gov. p. x. 0.8.

.-
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II. There are a few other criminal courts of greater dignity than many of

these,but of a more confined and partial jurisdiction; extending only to some

particular places, which the royal favour, confirmed by act of parliament has

distinguished by the privilege of having peculiar courts of their own for the

punishment of crimes and misdemeanors arising within the bonnds of their

cognizance. These, not being universally dispersed, or of general use as the

former but confined to one spot, as well as to a determinate s]>ecies of causes,

may be denominated private or special courts of criminal jurisdiction.

I speak not here of ecclesiastical courts; which punish spiritual sins, rather

than temporal crimes, by penance, contrition and excommunication, pro salute

aiiimw ; or, which is looked upon as equivalent to all the rest, by a sum of

f *276 1 *money t° the officers of the court by way of commntation of penance.

'• " J Of these we discoursed sufficiently in the preceding book.(/t) I am now

speaking of such courts as proceed according to the course of the common

law; which is a stranger to such unaccountable barterings of public justice.

1. And, first, the court of the lord sfewnnl, treasurer, or comptroller of the

king's household, (i) was instituted by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 14. to inquire of

felony by any of the king's sworn servants, in the cheque roll of the household,

under a degree of a lord, in confederating, compassing, conspiring, and imagin-

ing the death or destruction of the king, or any lord or other of his majesty's

privy council, or the lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the king's house.

The inquiry, and trial thereupon, must be by a jury according to the course of
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the common law, consisting of twelve sad men (that is, sober and discreet per-

sons) of the king's household. (11)

2. The court of the lord steward of the king's household, or (in his absence)

of the treasurer, comptroller, and steward of the marsJuiJsea, (k) was erected by

statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, with jurisdiction to inquire of, hear, and determine,

all treasons, misprisions of treason, murders, manslaughters, bloodshed, and

other malicious strikings; whereby blood shall be shed in, or within the limits

(that is, within two hundred feet from the gate) of, any of the palaces and houses

of the king, or any other house where the royal person still abide. The proceed-

ings are also by jury, both a grand and a petit one, as at common law, taken out

of the officers and sworn servants of the king's household. The form and solem-

nity of the process, particularly with regard to the execution of the sentence for

cutting off the hand, which is part of the punishment for shedding blood iu

the king's court, are very minutely set forth in the said statute 33 Hen. VIII,

and the several officers of the servants of the household in and about such execu-

F *277l ^on are Described; from the sergeant of the wood-yard, who furnishes

L J the chopping-block, to the sergeant-farrier, who brings hot irons to sear

the stump. (12)

3. As in the preceeding book (I) we mentioned the courts of the two universi-

ties, or their chancellors' courts, for the redress of civil injuries; it will not be

improper now to add a short word concerning the jurisdiction of their criminal

courts, which is equally large and extensive. The chancellor's court of Oxford

(with whicli university the author hath been chiefly conversant, though probably

that of Cambridge hath also a similar jurisdiction) hath authority to determine

all causes of property, wherein a privileged person is one of the parties, except

only causes of freehold; and also all criminal offences or misdemeanors under

the degree of treason, felony, or mayhem. The prohibition of meddling with

freehold still continues: but the trial of treason, felony,and mayhem, by a par-

ticular charter, is committed to the university-jurisdiction in another court,

namely, the court of the lord high steward of the university.

(Al See book HI, p. 61. (0 4 Inst. 133. (i) 4 lust. 133. 2. Hal. P. C. 7. (7) See book HI, page 83.

(11) The statute 3 Hen. TIT. c. 14. was repealed by the 6 Geo. IT, c. 31, and the jurisdiction

of this court has accordingly become-obsolete.]

(12) That part of statute 33 Hen. Till, c. 12, relating to this subject, was repealed by 9 Gea

IT, c. 31, and this court is therefore become obsolete.
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For by the charter of 7th June, 2 Hen. IV, (confirmed, among the rest, by the

statute 13 Eliz. c, 29), cognizance is granted to the university of Oxford of all

indictments of treasons, insurrections, felony and mayhem, which shall be found

in any of the king's courts against a scholar or privileged person; and they are

to be tried before the high steward of the university, or his deputy, who is to be

nominated by the chancellor of the university for the time being. But when his

office is called forth into action, such high steward must be approved by the lord

high chancellor of England; and a special commission under the great seal is

given to him, and others, to try the indictment then depending, according to

the law of the land and the privileges of the said university. When, therefore,

an indictment is found *at the assizes or elsewhere, against any scholar .- *O«Q -i

of the university, or other privileged person, the vice-chancellor may >- J

claim the cognizance of it; and (when'claimed in due time and manner) it

ought to be allowed him by the judges of assize: and then it comes to be tried

in the high steward's court. But the indictment must first be found by a grand

jury, and then the cognizance claimed: for I take it that the high steward can-

not proceed originally ad inquirendum ; but only, after inquest in the common-law

courts ad audiendum et deter minandum. Much in the same manner, as when

a peer is to be tried in the court of the lord high steward of Great Britain, the

indictment must first be found at the assizes, or in the court of king's bench, and

then (in consequence of a writ of certiorari) transmitted to be finally heard and

determined before his grace the lord high steward and the peers.
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When the cognizance is so allowed, if the offence be inter minora crimina, or

a misdemeanor only, it is tried in the chancellor's court by the ordinary judge.

But if it be for treason, felony, or mayhem, it is then, and then only, to be deter-

mined before the high steward, under the king's special commission to try the

same The process of the trial is this. The high steward issues one precept to

the sheriff of the county, who thereupon returns a panel of eighteen freeholders;

and another precept to the bedels of the university, who thereupon return a panel

of eighteen matriculated laymen, " laicos privilegio universitatis gaudentes:" and

hy a jury formed de medietate, half of freeholders and half of matriculated per-

sons, is the indictment to be tried; and that in the guildhall of the city of Ox-

ford. And if execution be necessary to be awarded, in consequence of finding

the party guilty, the sheriff of the county must execute the university-process;

to which he is annually bound by an oath.

*I have been the more minute in describing these proceedings, as there ,- *omq 1

has happily been no occasion to reduce them into practice for more •- ' •»

than a century past; nor will it perhaps be thought advisable to revive them :

though it is not a right that merely rests in scriptis or theory, but has formerly

often been carried into execution. There are many instances, one in the reign

of Queen Elizabeth, two in that of James the First, and two in that of Charles

the First, where indictments for murder have been challenged by the vice-

chancellor at the assizes, and afterwards tried before the high steward by jury.

The commissions under the great seal, the sheriff's and bedel's panels, and all

the other proceedings on the trial of the several indictments, are still extant in

the archives of that university:
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CHAPTER XX.

OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.

"WE are next, according to the plan I have laid down, to take into considera-

tion the proceedings in the courts of criminal jurisdiction, in order to the

punishment of offences. These are plain, easy, and regular; the law not admit-

ting any fictions, as in civil causes, to take place where the life, liberty, and

the safety of the subject are more immediately brought into jeopardy. And

these proceedings are divisible into two kinds; summary and regulur: of the

former of which I shall briefly speak, before we enter upon the latter, which will

require a more thorough and particular examination.

By a summary proceeding (1)1 mean principally such as is directed by several

acts of parliament (for the common law is a stranger to it, unless in the case of

contempts) for the conviction of offenders, and the inflicting of certain penal-

ties created by those acts of parliament In these there is no intervention of a

jury, but the' party accused is acquitted or condemned by the suffrage of such

person, only, as the statute has appointed for his judge. An institution designed

professedly for the greater ease of the subject, by doing him speedy justice, and

by not harassing the freeholders with frequent and troublesome attendances to

rVjoi -, try every minute *offence. But it has of late been so far extended, as,

L -I if a check be not timely given, to threaten the disuse of onr admirable

and truly English trial by jury, unless only in capital cases. (2) For,

I. Of this summary nature are all trials of offences and frauds contrary to
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the laws of the excise, and other branches of the revenue: which are to be

inquired into and determined by the commissioners of the respective depart-

ments, or by justices of the peace in the country; officers, who are all of them

appointed and removable at the discretion of the crown. And though such

convictions are absolutely necessary for the due collection of the public money,

and are a species of mercy to the delinquents, who would be mined by the

expense and delay of frequent prosecutions by action or indictment; and though

such has usually been the conduct of the commissioners, as seldom (if ever) to

afford just grounds to complain of oppression; yet when we again (a) consider

the various and almost innumerable branches of this revenue; which may be

in their turns the subjects of fraud, or, at least, complaints of fraud, and, of

course, the objects of this summary and arbitrary jurisdiction; we shall find

that the power of these officers of the crown over the property of the people is

increased to a very formidable height.

II. Another branch of summary proceedings is that before jittiices of the

peace, in order to inflict divers petty pecuniary mulcts, and corporal penalties

denounced by act of parliament for many disorderly offences; such as common

swearing, drunkenness, vagrancy, idleness, and a vast variety of others, for

which I must refer the student to the justice-books formerly cited, (b) and which

used to be formerly punished by the verdict of a jury in the court-leet This

(a) See book I. page 319, Ac. (b) Lambard and Burn.

(1) [As to summary proceedings in general, and the dispositions of the courts, especially

•where no appeal is given, to require a stricter accuracy than is essential in other cases where

there is a tnul by jury, see 1 Stra. 67; Burn, J., tit. Convictions: 1 East, 649, 655; 5 M. and

S. '206; 1 Chitty on game laws, 189 to 2-23; Bracy's Case. 1 Salk. 348.]

(2) [See observations, Burn, J., tit. Convictions; 1 East, 649. Hence, it has been a doctrine

that a different rule of evidence, as to the strictness of proof, should be required in the ca.se

of proceedings on a nummary information than in an action: see 1 East, 649; but that doc-

trine now seems to have been properly overruled: 1 East, 655; 1 M. and S. 206; for if the

legislature has thought fit to intrust magistrates or other inferior jurisdictions with the deci-

sion in certain matters, their proceedings ought to be governed by the same ruleb of evidence

as affect superior courts.]
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change in the administration of justice hath, however, had some mischievous

effects; as, 1. The almost entire disuse and contempt of the court-leet, and

sheriff's tourn, the king's ancient courts of common law, formerly much revered

and respected. *2. The burthensome increase of the business of a jus- r ^^ ]

tie* of die peace, which discourages so many gentlemen of rank and *- ' J

character from acting in the commission; from an apprehension that the duty

of their office would take up too much of tljat time, which they are unwilling

to spare from the necessary concerns of their families, the improvement of their

understandings, and their engagements in other services of the public. Though

if all gentlemen of fortune had it both in their power and inclinations to act

in this capacity, the business of a justice of the peace would be more divided,

and fall the less heavy upon individuals: which would remove what, in the pres-

ent scarcity of magistrates, is really an objection so formidable that the country

is greatly obliged to any gentleman of figure who will undertake to perform

that duty, which, in consequence of his rank in life, he owes more peculiarly to

his country. However, this backwardness to act as magistrates, arising greatly

from this increase of summary jurisdiction, is productive of, 3. A third mis-

chief: which is, that this trust, when slighted by gentlemen, falls, of course,

into the hands of those who are not so; but the mere tools of office. And then

the extensive power of a justice of the peace, which, even in the hands of men

of honour, is highly formidable, will be prostituted to mean and scandalous

purposes,to the Tow ends of selfish ambition, avarice or personal resentment.
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And from these ill consequents we may collect the prudent foresight of our

ancient lawgivers, who suffered neither the property nor the punishment of the

subject to be determined by the opinion of any one or two men; and we may

also observe the necessity of not deviating any farther from our ancient consti-

tution, by ordaining new penalties to be inflicted upon summary convictions.(3)

The process of these summary convictions, it must be owned, is extremely

speedy. Though the courts of common law have thrown in one check upon

them," by making it necessary to summon the party accused before he is

*condemned. This is now held to be an indispensable requisite; (e) r*ogq i

though the justices long struggled the point; forgetting that rule of *• '

natural reason expressed by Seneca,

(c) Sulk. 131. •_• I ..ml Raym. 1405.

(3) [Unless a power of appeal be expressly given by the legislature, there is no appeal: 6

East, 514; Wightw. 22; 4 M. and S. 421; 8 T. R. 218, note C; but the party has, in general, a

right to a certiorari, to remove the conviction into the court of king's bench, unless that right

be expressly taken away. S Term Rep. 542. But though it seems to be a principle that au

appeal ought to be preserved in cases where the certiorari is taken away yet in many cases,

although there be no appeal, yet the eertiorari is expressly taken away. Per Lord Mansfield,

Dougl. 552. If a statute, authorizing a summary conviction before a magistrate, give an ap-

peal to the sessions, who are directed to hear and finally determine the matter, this does not

take away the certiorari, even after such an appeal made and determined; and Lord Kcuyon

said, " The certiorari, being a beneficial writ for the subject, could not be taken away without

express words, aud he thought it was much to be lamented, in a variety of cases, that it waa

taken away at alL" 8 T. R. 542. Where an appeal is given, the magistrates should make known

to the convicted party his right to appeal; but if he decline appealing, they need not go on to

infonn him of the necessary steps to be taken in order to appeal. 3 M. and S. 493. Upon

an appeal, the magistrates are bound to receive any fresh evidence, although not tendered on the

former hearing. 3 M. and S. 133.

Upon a certiorari, the conviction of the magistrate is removed into the superior conrt, but there

is not (as upon an appeal) any rehearing of the evidence or merits; and the court can only look

to the form of the conviction, and see from that whether or not the party has been legally con-

victed, and the certiorari therefore operates in the nature of a writ of error, and no extrinsic ob-

jection to the proceedings can be taken. 6 T. R. 376 ; 8 id. 590. If, therefore, the magistrate,

in order to sustain his conviction, should misstate the evidence or other proceeding before him,

the remedy is by motion founded on affidavits to the court of K. B. for a rule to show cause why

« mandamus should not issue, requiring the magistrate to state the whole of the evidence

adduced before him correctly in his conviction, pursuant to 3 Goo. IV, c. 23. 4 Dowl. and R.

352. If a magistrate wilfully misstate material evidence, he will be subject to a criminal

information or indictment. 1 East, 186. ]

-'
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" Qui statuit aliquid, parte inaudita altera,

Aeqnum licet statuerit, hand aequus fuit:" (4)

A rule, to which all municipal laws, that are founded on the priciples of

justice, have strictly conformed: tlie Roman law requiring a citation at the

least; and our common law never Buffering any fact (either civil or criminal)

to be tried, till it has previously compelled an appearance by the party con-

cerned. After this summons, the magistrate, in summary proceedings, may go

on to examine one or more witnesses, as the statute may require, upon oatli; (5)

and then make his conviction of the offender,-in writing: upon which he

usually issues his warrant, either to apprehend the offender, in case corporal

punishment is to he inflicted on him: or else to levy the penalty incurred, by

distress and sale of his goods. This is, in general, the method of "summary pro"-

(4) [" He who decides a case without hearing both parties, though his decision may be just,

is himself unjust;" which is adopted as a principle of law by Lord Coke, in 11 Co. Rep. 99.

A summons is indispensably required in all penal proceedings of a Nummary nature by justices

of pence. Hex v. Dyer, 1 Salk. 181; 6 Mod. 41; anil see the cases collected in 8 Mod. 154,

note (a). It is declared by Lord Kenyon to be an invariable rule of law : Rex ». Beun, 6 T. K.

198; and it is stated by Mr. Serj. Hawkins to be implied in the construction of all penal stat-

utes. 1 Hal. P. 0. 420. So jealous is the law to enforce this equitable rule, that the neglect

of it by a justice in proceeding summarily without a previous summons to the party, has been

treated as a misdemeanor, proper for the interference of the court of king's beech bv infor-

mation (Rex v, Venables, 'i Lord Raj1. 1407; Rex v. Simpson, 1 Stra. 46; Rex t'. Alliugtoii,
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id. 678), which has been granted upon affidavits of the fact. Rex v. Harwood, 'i Stra. 1088; 3

Burr. 171*5, 1768; Rex v. Constable, 7 I), and It. 663; 3 M. C. 4.-W. As this is a privilege of

common right, which requires no special provision to enttitle the defendant to the aJvantage

of it, so it cannot be taken away by any custom. Rex t'. Cambridge (University), 8 Mod. lu':{.

Upon a sufficient information properly laid, the magistrates are bound to issue a summons,

and proceed to a hearing, and if they refuse to do so, will be compelled by mandamus. Rei

t>. Beun, 0 T. R. l'J8. Where a particular form of notice is prescribed by the act, that must be

strictly pursued. Rex v. Croke, Cowp. :!0. The intention of the summons being to afford the

person accused the means of making his defence, it should contain the substance of the charge,

and fix a day and place for his appearance; allowing a sufficient time for the attendance of

himself and his witnesses. Rex t>. Johnson, 1 Stra. 260. A summons to appear immediately

upon the receipt thereof, has been thought insufficient in one case. 2 Burr. 681. In another,

an objection made to the summons that it was to appear on the same day, was only removed

by the fact of the defendant having actually appeared, and so waived any irregularity in the

notice. Rex «. Johnson, 1 Stra. 261. It is equally necessary that it should be to appear at a

place certain: otherwise the party commits no default by not appearing; and the magistrate

cannot proceed in the defendant's absence upon a summons defective in these particulars, without

making himself liable to an information. Rex v. Simpson, 1 Stra. 46. The service of the

summons must be personal, unless where personal service is expressly dispensed with by statute.

Parker, C. J. 10 Mod. 345.]

(5) [The examination of witnesses must be upon oath, and no legal conviction can be

founded upon any testimony not so taken. Bait. e. 6, J 6; and see id. cc. 115. 164; Plowd.

12, a ; Lamb. 617 ; Ex parte Aldri 4 D. and R. 83 ; 2 M. C. 120 ; Rex r. Glossopp, 4 B. and

A.. 616; Paley, 33, 34. Although no mode of examination be pointed out by the statutes

giving jurisdiction over the offence; yet, as justice requires that the accused should be con-

troutcd with the witnesses against him, and have an opportunity of cross-examination, it is

required by law, in the summary mode of trial now under consideration, that the evidence

and depositions should be taken in the presence of the defendant, where he appears. For

though the legislature, by a summary mode of inquiry, intended to substitute a more expedi-

tious process for the common-law method of trial, it could not design to dispense with the

rules of justice, as far as they are compatible with the method adopted. Indeed it may be

useful upon this occasion to "notice the general maxim which has been laid down as a guide

to the conduct of magistrates in regulating all their summary proceedings, namely, that " acts

of parliament, in what they are silent, are best expounded according to the use and reason of

the common law." Rex <>. Simpson, 1 Stra. 45. Unless, therefore, the defendant forfeits this

advantage by his wilful absence, he ought to be called upou to plead before any evidence ig

given. 1 T. R. 320. And the witnesses must be sworn and examined in his presence. Res

c. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163. Or, if the evidence has beeu taken down in his absence, and, and is read

over to him afterwards, the witness must at the same time, unless the defendant upon hearing

the evidence should confess the fact, (Rex t'. Hall, 1 T. R. 320), be resworu in his presence, and

not merely called upon to assert the truth of his former testimony. Rex v. Crowther, 1 T. R.

125. For the intenf. of the rule is, that the witness should be subjected to the examination of

the defendant upon his oath. 2 Burr. 1163; and see Kex v. Kiddy, 4 I), and It. 734;

2 M. C. 364.]
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ceedings before a justice or justices of the peace; but for particulars we must

have recourse to the several statutes, which create the offence, or inflict the

punishment: and which usually chalk out the method by which offenders are

to be convicted. (6) Otherwise they fall of course under the general rule, and

can only be convicted by indictment or information at the common law.

III. To this head, of summary proceedings, may also be properly referred the

method, immemorially used by the superior courts of justice, of punishing

contempts by attachment, and the subsequent proceedings thereon.

The contempts, that are thus punished, are either direct, which openly insult

or resist the powers of the courts, or the persons of the judges who preside there;

or else are consequential which (without such gross indolence or direct opposi-

tion) *plainly tend to create an universal disregard of their authority, r*284. i

The principal instances, of either sort that have been usually, (d) pun- \- * '

ishable by attachment, are chiefly of the following kinds. 1. Those committed

by inferior judges and magistrates ; by acting unjustly, oppressively or irregu-

larly, in administering those portions of justice which are intrusted to their

distribution: or by disobeying the king's writs issuing out of the superior

courts, by proceeding in a cause after it is put a stop to or removed by writ of

prohibition, certiorari, error, superscdeas, and the like. For, as the king's

superior courts (and especially the court of king's bench) have a general super-

intendence over all inferior jurisdictions, any corrupt or iniquitous practices of

subordinate judges are contempts of that superintending authority, whose duty
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it is to keep them within the bounds of justice. 2. Those committed by sher-

iffs, baliffs, gaolers, and other officers of the court, by abusing the process of the

law, or deceiving the parties, by any acts of oppression, extortion, collusive

behaviour, or culpable neglect of duty. 3. Those committed by attorneys and

solicitors, who are also officers of the respective courts: by gross instances of

fraud and corruption, injustice to their clients, or other dishonest practice. (7)

For the malpractice of the officers reflects some dishonor on their employers:

and, if frequent or unpunished, creates among the people a disgust against the

courts themselves. 4. Those committed by jurymen, in collateral matters

relating to the discharge of their office; such as making default, when sum-

moned ; refusing to be sworn, or to give any verdict; eating or drinking with-

out the leave of the court, and especially at the cost of either party; and other

misbehaviours or irregularities of a similar kind: but not in mere exercise of

their judicial capacities, as by giving a false or erroneous verdict. 5. Those

committed by witnesses: by making default when summoned, refusing to be

sworn or examined, or prevaricating in their evidence when sworn. 6. Those

committed by parties to any suit, or proceeding before the court: as by disobe-

(<!) 2 Hawk. P. C. 142, Ac.

(6) [These acts have been consolidated, and the duties of justices clearly denned by the

statute 11 and 12 Vic. c. 43, which provides a procedure applicable to the great majority of

cases in which in a summary conviction or order may be made by justices of the peace out of

sessions.]

And in the United States, where statutes authorize nummary convictions, they point out

specifically the course of proceeding, and it is a rule of universal application that" the magis-

trate must follow this course strictly, and the conviction must show upon its face a case

coming within the statute, and of which the justice had jurisdiction. No intendinents will

be made in favor of these summary proceedings. See the general rule in Britain «. Kinnard,

1 Brod. and Bing. 432; Piper v. Pierson, 2 Gray 120, and notes thereto, in Leading Criminal

Cases, by Bennett and Heard.

(7) [It is not. however, usual for the court to interfere in a snmmary way against an attor-

ney for a mere breach of promise, where there is nothing criminal: 2 Wils. 371; and see 2

Moore, 665; 1 Bing. 102, 105; or on account of negligence or unskilfulness: 4 Burr. 2060; 2

Bla. Rep. 780; 1 Chit. Rep. 651; except it bo very gross; Say, 50, 169; nor for the misconduct

of an attorney independently of his profession. But see 4 B. and A. 47; 5 id. 898; 8 Chit.

Rep. 58: 1 Bingh. 91; 7 Moore, 424, 437 ; Tidd. 5th ed. 81.]

The power ol courts to commit for contempt, and the limitations upon that power were very

fully considered in the case of Yates, 4 Johns. 317; 6 id. 337, aud 9 id. 395. And as to justices'

courts, see Onderdonk v. Ranlett, 3 Hill, 323.
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F *285 1 ^ence *° any *rule or order, made in the progress of a cause; by non-

"• J payment of costs awarded by the court upon a motion; or, by non-

observance of awards duly made by arbitrators or umpires, lifter having entered

into a rule for submitting to such determination, (e) Indeed the attachment for

most of this species of contempts, and especially for non-payment of costs and

non-performance of awards, is to be looked upon rather as a civil execution for

the benefit of the injured part}7, though carried on in the shape of a criminal

process for a contempt of the authority of the court. And, therefore, it hath

been held that such contempts, and the process thereon, being properly the

civil remedy of individuals for a private injury, are not released or affected by

the general act of pardon. And upon a similar principle, obedience to any rule

of court may also, by statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 50, be enforced against any person

having privilege of parliament by the process of distress infinite. 7. Those

committed by any other persons under the degree of a peer: and even by peers

themselves, when enormous and accompanied with violence, such as forcible

rescousand the like; (/) or when they import a disobedience to the king's great

prerogative writs of prohibition, habeas corpus, (g) and the rest Some of these

contempts may arise in the face of the court; as by rude and contumelious

behaviour; by obstinacy, perverseness, or prevarication : by breach of the peace,

or any wilful disturbance whatever: others in the absence of the party; as by

disobeying or treating with disrepect the king's writ, or the rules of process of

the court; by perverting such writ or process to the purposes of private malice,
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extortion, or injustice; by speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or

judges, acting in their judicial capacity; by printing false accounts (or even

true ones without proper permission) of causes then depending in judgment;

and by any thing, in short, that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and

respect which, when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so

necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the people.

T *2R61 *The process of attachment, for these and the like contempts, must

L J necessarily be as ancient as the laws themselves. For laws without a

competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and con-

tempt, would be vain and nugatory. A power, therefore, in the supreme courts

of justice to suppress such contempts, by an immediate attachment of the

offender, results from the first principles of judicial establishments, and must

be an inseperable attendant upon every superior tribunal Accordingly, we find it

actually exercised as early as the annals of our law extend. And though a very

learned" author (A) seems inclinable to derive the process from the statute of

Wegtin. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 39 (which ordains, that in case the process of the king's

court be resisted by the power of any great man, the sheriff shall chastise the

resisters by imprisonment, " a qua tion deliberenter sine speciali prmcepto

domini regis:" and if the sheriff himself be resisted, he shall certify to the

courts the names of the principal offenders, their aiders, consenters, command-

ers, and favourers, and by a special writ judicial they shall be attached by their

bodies to appear before the court, and if they be convicted thereof they shall be

punished at the king's pleasure, without any interfering bv any oth'er person

whatsoever), yet he afterwards more justly concludes, that it is part of the law

of the land, and, as such, is confirmed by the statute of manqna carlo.

It the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the offender may be

instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges, (t) with-

out any farther proof or examination. But in matters that arise at a distance,

and of which the court cannot have so perfect a knowledge, unless by the con-

fession of the party or the testimony of others, if the judges upon affidavit see

sufficient ground to suspect that a contempt has been committed, they either

make a rule on the snspacted party to show cause why an attachment should not

issue against him; (.;') or, in very flagrant instances of contempt, the attach-

T *2871 men'; issues in *ne firs* instance; (k) as it also *does, if no sufficient

*- -I cause be shown to discharge, and thereupon the court confirms, and

(e) See book, III. page 17. (/! Styl. 277. 2 Hawk. P. C. 152. Cro. Jac. 419. Salt 586.

(17) 4 Burr. 6S2. Lord's Journ. 7 Feb. 8 Jun. 1757. (A) (iilb. Hist. C. P. ch. S.

(ill Stnund. P. C. 73. b. (j) Styl. 277. (K, Salk. 84. Stra. 185, 564.
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makes absolute, the original rule. This process of attachment is merely in-

tended to bring the party into court: and, when there, he must either stand

committed, or put in bail, in order to answer upon oath to such interrogatories

as shall be administered to him, for the better information of the court with

respect to tho circumstances of the contempt. These interrogatories are in the

nature of a charge or accusation, and must by the course of the court be ex-

hibited within the first four days: (I) and, if any of the interrogatories is

improper, the defendant may refuse to answer it. and move the court to have it

.struck out. (m) If the party can clear himself upon oath, he is discharged;

but, if perjured, may be prosecuted for the perjury. («) If he confesses the con-

tempt, the court will proceed to correct him by fine, or imprisonment, or both,

and sometimes by a corporal or infamous punishment, (o) If the contempt be

of such nature that, when the fact is once acknowledged, the court can receive

no farther information by interrogatories than it is already possessed of (as in

the case of a rescous), (p) the defendant may be admitted to make such simple

acknowledgment, and receive his judgment without answering to any interrog-

atories: but if he wilfully and obstinately refuses to answer, or answers in an

evasive manner, he is then clearly guilty of a high and repeated contempt, to be

punished at the discretion of the court

It cannot have escaped the attention of the reader, that this method of mak-

ing the defendant answer upon oath to a criminal charge, is not agreeable to the

feiiius of the common law in any other instance; (q) and seems indeed to have
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een derived to the courts of king's bench and common pleas through the me-

dium of the courts of equity. For the whole process of the courts of equity,

in the several stages of a cause, and finally to enforce their decrees, was, till the

introduction of sequestrations, in the nature of a process of contempt; i *2»s 1

acting only in personam and not in rent. And there, after the party *• -I

in contempt has answered the interrogatories, such his answer may be contra-

dicted and disproved by affidavits of the adverse party: whereas, in the courts

of law, the admission of the party to purge himself by oath is more favourable

to his liberty, though perhaps not less dangerous to his conscience; for, if he

deal's himself by his answers, the complaint is totally dismissed. And, with

regard to this singular mode of trial, thus admitted in this one particular instance,

I shall only for the present observe, that as the proce.ss by attachment in general

appears to be extremely ancient, (r) and has in more modern times been recog-

nized, approved, and confirmed by several express acts of parliament, (s) so the

method of examining the delinquent himself upon oath with regard to the

contempt alleged, is at least of as high antiquity, (t) and by long and immemo-

rial usage is now become the law of the land.

CHAPTER XXI.

OF ARRESTS.

WE are now to consider the regular and ordinary method of proceeding in the

courts of criminal jurisdiction; which may be distributed under twelve general

heads, following each other in a progressive order, viz.: 1. Arrest; 2. Com-

mitment, and bail; 3. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5. Arraignment, audits inci-

dents; 6. Plea, and issues; 7. Trial, and conviction; 8. Clergy; 9. Judgment,

and its consequences; 10. Reversal of judgment; 11. Reprieve, or pardon;

(I) 6 Mod. 73. (m) Stra. 444. («) 6 Mod. TS. (o) Cm. Car. 1M.

(») The Km:.- / Elkins, M. 8 Oeo. in, It K. (q, See book 111 pp. 100, 101.

(r) Ye.irl). 20 Hen. VI. c. 37. iBEilw. IV, c. 29.

(»> Stnt. 4:! Eliz. c. 6, > 3. 13 Car. II, 8t. 2, c. 2, H. 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, o. 19. 12 Ana. at. 2, c. 15, ', 8.

It) M 6 I.<Iv.. IV, rot. 75, cited ID Host. Knt. 208, pi, 5.

475

289 ARRESTS. [Book IV.

12. Execution; all of which will be discussed in the subsequent part of this

book.

First, then, of an arrest; which is the apprehending or restraining of one's

person, in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime. To

this arrest all persons whatsoever are, without distinction, equally liable in all

criminal cases: but no man is to be arrested, unless charged with such a crime

as will at least justify holding him to bail when taken. And, in general, an ar-

rest may be made four ways: 1. By warrant; 2. By an officer without warrant;

3. By a private person also without warrant; 4. By an hue and cry.

F *290 1 *•*•' warrant may be granted in extraordinary cases by the privy

' " J council, or secretaries of shite:(«) (1) but ordinarily by justices of the

peace. This they may do in any cases where they have a jurisdiction over the

offence, in order to compel the person accused to appear before them: (b) for it

would be absurd to give them power to examine an offender, unless they had also

a power to compel him to attend, and submit to such examination. And this

extends undoubtedly to all treasons, felonies, and breaches of the peace ; and also

to all such offences as they have power to punish by statute. (2) Sir Edward

Coke indeed (c) hath laid it down that a justice of the peace cannot issue

a warrant to apprehend a felon upon bare suspicion; no, not even till an.

indictment be actually found: and the contrary practice is by others (d) held

to be grounded rather upon connivance than the express rule of law; though

now by long custom established. A doctrine which would in most cases give a
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loose to felons to escape without punishment; and therefore Sir Matthew Hale

hath combatted it with invincible authority and strength of reason: maintain-

ing, 1. That a justice of the peace hath power to issue a warrant to apprehend

a person accused of felony, though not yet indicted; (e) and. 2. That he may

also issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of felony, though the

original suspicion be not in himself, but in the party that prays his warrant;

because he is u competent judge of the probability offered to him of such suspicion.

But in both cases it is fitting to examine upon oath the party requiring a war-

rant, as well to ascertain that there is a felony or other crime actually committed,

without which no warrant should be granted ; as also to prove the cause and

probability of suspecting the party against whom the warrant is prayed. (/) (3)

This warrant ought to be under the hand and seal of the justice, should set forth

the time and place of making, and the cause for which it is made, and should be

f *2911 t^rec';ea' t° the *constable or other peace officer (or, it may be, to

*- -" any private person by name), (g) requiring him to bring the party

either generally (4) before any justice of the peace for the county, or only

before the justice who granted it; the warrant in the latter case being called a

(a) 1 Lord Rivym. SS. (6) 2 Hawk. P. C. St. (c) 4 Inst. 176. (d) 2 Hawk. P. C. 84.

(ej 2Hnl. P.'C. HW. (/) Ibitl. 110. (g) Sulk. 176.

(1) [Or by the speaker of the house of commons (14 East, 1, 163), or house of lords (8 T. R.

314), or by a judge of the court of king's bench. 1 Hale, 57ri; and see 48 Geo. Ill, c. 58.

When the offender is not likely to abscond before a warrant can be obtained, it is in general

better to apprehend him by a warrant, than for a private person, or officer, to arrest him of his

own accord, because if the justice should grant his warrant erroneously, no action lies ngainst

the party obtaining it. 3 Esp. 166, 167. And if a magistrate exceed his jurisdiction, the offi-

cer who executes a warrant is protected from liability; and no action can be supported agaiust

the party procuring the warrant, though the arrest was without cause, unless it can be proved

that tho warrant was obtained maliciously. 1 T. K. 535; 3 Esp. R. 135.]

Power is now, by several recent statutes, expressly conferred upon private individuals to make

arrest of persons found committing offences. The caution to abstain from so doing where no

apparent necessity exists is nevertheless worthy of being observed.

(2) [Where a statute gives a justice jurisdiction over an offence, it impliedly gives him power

to apprehend any person charged with such offence; and especially after a party has neglected

a summons. 2 Biug. 63 ; Hawk. b. 2, c. 13, s. 15 ; 12 Rep. 131 b ; 10 Mod. 248J

(3) The power to grant such warrants is now regulated by statute 11 and 12 Vic. c. 42, which

amends and consolidates the previous statutes.

(4) [The wan-ant need not state the time when the party is to bo brought before the magistrate

for examination. 8 T. R. 110; Fost. 143.]
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special warrant. (7t) A general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected,

•without naming or particularly describing any person in special, is illegal and

void for its uncertainty; (i) for it is the duty of the magistrate, and ought not

to be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of suspicion. And a warrant to

apprehend all persons, guilty of a crime therein specified, is no legal warrant:

for the point upon which its authority rests, is a fact to be decided on a subse-

quent trial; namely, whether the person apprehended thereupon be really guilty

or not. (5) It is therefore in fact no warrant at all; for it will not justify the

officer who acts under it: (k) whereas, a warrant properly penned (even though

the magistrate who issues it should exceed his jurisdiction); will, by statute 24

Geo. II, c. 44, at all events indemnify the officer who executes the same minis-

terially. And when a warrant is received by the officer he is bound to execute

it, so far as the jurisdiction of the magistrate and himself extends. A warrant

from the chief or other justice of the court of king's bench extends all over the

kingdom: and is teste'd, or dated, England; not Oxfordshire, Berks, o\- other

particular county. But a warrant of the justice of the peace in one county, as

Yorkshire, must be backed, that is, signed by a justice of the *peace in p *ooo i

another, as Middlesex, before it can be executed there. Formerly, regu- L -I

larly speaking, there ought to have been a fresli warrant in every fresh county:

but the practice of backing warrants had long prevailed without law, and was

at last authorized by statutes 23 Geo. II, c. 26, and 24 Geo. II, c. 55. And now,

by statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 31, any warrant for apprehending an English offender,
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who may have escaped to Scotland, and vice versa, may be indorsed and executed,

by the local magistrates, and the offender conveyed back to that part of the

united kingdom, in which such offence was committed. (6)

(ft) 2 Hawk. P. C. $.'>. «> 1 Hal. P. C. 580. 2 Hawk. P. C. 82.

(i) A practice hail obtained In the secretaries' office ever since the restoration, grounded on some clauses

in the acts for regulating the press, of issuing genernl warrants to take up (without naming any person in

particular) the authors, printers, or publishers of such obscene

ciflcil in the warrant. When those nets expired in 1B!U, the sitin

every reign, ami under everv administration, except the four las

17IB; when such a warrant being issued to apprehend the null

• seditions libels as were particularly

practice was Inadvertently continued in

years of Queen Anne, down to the your

, printers, and publishers, of a certain

seditious libel, its validity was disputed; and the warrant was i llutlged by the wlmle court of the king's

bench to be void, In the case of Money v. Leach, Trin. 5 Geo. III. R. R. After which the issuing of such

general warrants was declared illegal by a vote of the house of commons. (Com. Journ. 22 Apr. 176U.)

(5) Warrants to arrest idle, loose, or disorderly persons are an exception to this rule, and

by several statutes, peace officers are expressly authorized to apprehend them without any

warrant at all.

(G) [By statute, all warrants issued in England, Scotland, or Ireland may be executed in

any part of the united kingdom. Independently of this, the secretary of state for Ireland

may, by his warrant, remove a prisoner there to lie tried in England, for an offence committed

in the latter: 3 Esp. Kep. 178; and an English justice may commit a person here who has

committed an ofl'euce in Ireland, preparatory to sending him thither for trial. 2 Stra, 848;

4 Taunt. 34.

With respect to the time of arresting a person: A person may be apprehended in the night

as well as the day; 9 Co. 66; and though the statute 29 Car. II, c. 7, B. 6, prohibits arrests on

Sundays, it excepts the cases of treasons, felonies and breaches of the peace; in these cases,

therefore, an arrest may be made on that day. Cakl. 291; 1 T. R. 265; 'W illes, 459.

As to the place in which a party may bo arrested. Since the privileges of sanctuary and

abjuration were abolished, by 21 Jac. I, c. 28, no place affords protection againt the criminal

law. .And even the clergy may, on a criminal charge, be arrested whilst in their churches (Cro.

Jnc. 321), though it is illegal "to arrest them iu any civil case, whilst in the church to perform

divine service, or going to or returning from the same on any day. Bac. Ab. Trespass, D. 3.

And if a person having committed a felony in a foreign country comes into England, he may

be arrested here, and convoyed and given up to the magistrates of the country against the

laws of which the offence was committed. 4 Taunt, 34.

It may be here observed as a genera} rule, that if the warrant be materially defective, or the

officer exceed his authority in executing it, and if he be killed in the attempt, this is only-

manslaughter in the party whom he endeavored to arrest: 1 East, P. C. 310; 1 Leach, 20H;

6 T. K. 122; 5 East, 308; 1 B. and C. 291; and any third person may lawfully interfere to

prevent an arrest under it, doing no more than is necessary for that purpose. 5 East, 304, 308;

1 Leach, 206.]

The statute 6 and 7 Vic. c. 24, makes provision for the return of supposed offenders escaping

from the colonies to the united kingdom, and the statutes 6 and 7 Vic. cc. 75, 76, provide for

the extradition of supposed offenders who have escaped from France and the Umtod States
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2. Arrests by officers without warrant may be executed. 1. By a justice of the

peace; who may himself apprehend or cause to be apprehended, by word only,

any person committing a felony or breach of the peace in his presence. (I) 2.

The sheriff; (7) and 3. The coroner, may apprehend any felon within the county

•without warrant. 4. The constable, of whose office we formerly spoke, (m) hath

great original and inherent authority with regard to arrests. He may, without

warrant, arrest any one for a breach of the peace, committed in his view, and

carry him before a justice of the peace. And, in case of felony actually commit-

ted, or a dangerous wounding, whereby felony is like to ensue, he may upon

probable suspicion arrest the felon; (8) and for that purpose is authorized fas

upon a justice's warrant) to break open doors, and even to kill the felon if ne

cannot otherwise be taken; and, if he or his assistants be killed in attempting

such arrests, it is murder in all concerned. (n) 5. Watchmen, either those ap-

pointed by the statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, c. 4, to keep watch and ward

in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are mere assistants to the

constable, may virtute offirii arrest all offenders, and particularly night-walkers,

and commit them to custody till the morning, (o)

3. Any private person (and a fortiori a peace officer) that is present when any

r *OQQ i felony is committed, is bound by the law to *arrest the felon, on pain of

*• *" * fine and imprisonment, if he escapes through the negligence of the

standers-by. (p) And they may justify breaking open the doors upon following

such felon; and if they kill him, provided he cannot be otherwise taken, it is
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justifiable; though if th&y are killed in endeavouring to make such arrest, it is

murder, (q) Upon probable suspicion also a private person may arrest the felon,

or other person so suspected, (r) (9) But he cannot justify breaking open doors

to do it; and if either party kill the other in the attempt, it is manslaughter,

and no more. (*) It is no more, because there is no malicious design to kill:

(I) 1 Hal. P. C. 86. (m) See book I. pageSSS. (n) 3 Hal. P. C. 88, $9. <ol IMd. 98.

(pi 2 Hawk. P. C. 74. (9) 2 Hal. P. C. 77. (r) Stat. 30 Ueo. II, c. 24. («) 2 Hal. P. C. 84, 81

into the united kingdom. The offences covered by these acts are murder, or assault with intent

to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, and forgery. Similar laws have been passed in France

and the United States for the return of the like offenders escaping to those countries from

the n nil rd kingdom. See the act of congress, 9 Stat. at Large, 302.

(7) [And the sheriff may arrest, though the party be merely suspected of a capital offence,

2 llale, 87; and if the sheriff be assaulted in the execution of his office, he may arrest the

offender. 1 Sannd. 77; 1 Taunt. 146.]

(3) [A constable may justify an imprisonment, without warrant, on a reasonable charge of

felony made to him, although he afterwards discharges the prisoner without taking him

before a magistrate, and although it turn ont that no felony was committed by any one:

Holt N. P. 418; Cald. 291; and the charge need not specify "all the particulars necessary to

constitute the offence. R. and R. C. C. 3^9. In general, however, a constable cannot, without

an express charge or warrant, justify the arrest of a supposed offender, upon suspicion of his

guilt, unless some actual felony has been committed, and there is reasonable cause for the sus-

picion that the purty imprisoned is guilty: 4 Eap. Rep. 80; Holt, C. N. P. 478; Hawk. b. 2,

c. 12, s. 16; 2 Hale, 92, 89, n. f.; Cald. 291; and a constable is not justified in apprehending

and imprisoning a person on suspicion of having received stolen goods, on the mere assertion

of one of the principal felons. 2 Stark. 167. There are, however, authorities in favor of an

exception to this rule in the case of night-walkers, and persons reasonably suspected of felony

in the night. 3 Taunt. 14; 1 East, P. C. 303; Hawk. b. 2, c. 12, s. 20; 2 Halo, 89; 5 Edw. Ill,

c. 14; 2 Inst. 52: Bac. Ab. tiL Constable, G.]

(9) [Where a felony ha* been actually committed, a private person acting with good inten-

tion, and upon snch information as amounts to a reasonable and probable ground of funfricion,

is justified m apprehending without a warrant the suspected person in order to carry him be-

fore a magistrate. Cald. 291; 4 Taunt. 34, 35; Price, 525. But where a private person had

delivered another into the custody of a constable, upon a suspicion which appeared afterward

to be unfounded, it was held that the person so arrested might maintain an action of trespass

for an assault and false imprisonment against such private person, although a felony had been

actually committed. 6 T. R. 315.

With respect to interference, and arrests in order to prevent the oommi »don of a crime, any

person may lawfully lay hold of a lunatic about to commit any mischief, which, if committed

by a sane persou, would constitute a criminal offence; or any other person whom he shall see

on the point of committing a treason or felony, or doing any act which will manifestly en-
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but it amounts to so much, because it would be of most pernicious consequence,

if, uuder pretence of suspecting felony, any private person might break open a

house, or kill another; and also because such arrest upon suspicion is barely

permitted by the law, and not enjoined, as in the case of those who are pres-

ent when a felony is committed.

4. There is yet another species of arrest, wherein both officers and private

men are concerned, and that is upon an hue and cry raised upon a felony com-

mitted. An hue (from huer, to shout, and cry), htit-esiun et clamor, is the old

common-law process of pursuing, with horn and with Voice, all felons, and such

as have dangerously wounded another.(^) It is also mentioned by statute

Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 9, and 4 Edw. I, d« officio coronatoris. But the principal

statute, relative to this matter, is that of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, cc. 1 and 4,

which directs that from thenceforth every county shall be so well kept, that imme-

diately upon robberies and felonies committed, fresh suit shall be made from

town to town, and from county to county; and that hue and cry shall be raised

upon the felons, and they that keep the town shall follow with hue and cry with

all the town, and the towns near; and so hue and cry shall be made from town to

town, until they be taken and delivered to the sheriff. And that such hue and

cry may more effectually be made, the *hundred is bound by the same r*og41

statute, chapter 3, to answer for all robberies therein committed, unless <- " "

they take the felon; which is the foundation of an action against the hundred, (u)

in case of any loss by robbery. By statute 27 Eliz. c. 13, no hue and cry is suf-
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ficient, unless made with both horsemen and footmen. And by statute 8 Geo.

II, c. 16, the constable or like officer, refusing or neglecting to make hue and

cry, forfeits 5/.: and the vill or district is still in strictness liable to be

amerced, according to the law of Alfred, if any felony be committed therein,

and the felon escapes. (10.) An institution which hath long prevailed in many

of the eastern countries, and hath in part been introduced even into the Mogul

empire, about the beginning of the last century; which is said to have effect-

ually delivered that vast territory from the plague of robbers, by making in

gome places the villages, in others the officers of justice, responsible for all the

robberies committed within their respective districts, (w) Hue and cry (:c)

maybe raised either by precept of a justice of the peace, or by a peace officer,

or by any private man that knows of a felony. The party raising it must ac-

quaint the constable of the vill with all the circumstances which he knows of

the felony, and the person of the felon; and thereupon the constable is to search

his own town, and raise all the neighbouring vills, and make pursuit with

horse and foot; and in the prosecution of such hue and 017 the constable and

his attendants have the same powers, protection and indemnification, as if act-

ing under a warrant of a justice of the peace. But if a man wantonly or ma-

liciously raises an hue and cry, without cause, he shall be severely punished as a

disturber of the public peace, (y)

In order to encourage farther the apprehending of certain felons, rewards and

immunities are bestowed on such as bring them to justice, by divers acts of par-

(t) Bracton, I. 3, tr. 2 c. 1, Jl. Mirr. c. 2 f 6. fa} See book in, pago 181.

(w) Mod. Un. Hist, vi, S33 vii. 156. (xj 2 Hal. F. C. 100-104. (y) 1 Hawk. P. C. 75.

danger the life or person of another, and may detain him until it may be reasonably presumed

that he has changed his purpose; but where he interferes to prevent others from fighting, he

shonld first notify his intention to prevent the breach of the peace. Hawk. b. 2 c. 12, B. 19 ; 1

Hale, 589; 2 Roll. A. B. 559, E. pi. 3. n. ci; Selw. 3d ed. 830 ; Coin. Dig. Pleader, 3 M. 22 ; Bac.

Abr. Trespass, D. 3; 1 East, P. C. 304. Thus, any one may justify breaking and entering a

partv'* house and impriBoning him, to prevent him from murdering bin wife, who cries ont for

assistance. 2 B. and P. 260; Selw. 3d ed. 830 ; Bac. Abr. Trespass, D. 3. And tho riding in a

body tu quell a riot is lawful, and no information will be granted for small irregularities in the

pursuit of anch a design. 1 Bla. Rep. 47 ; IB. and P. 284 n. a.; 1 East, P. C. 304. If a man

in- found attempting to commit a felony, in the night, any one may apprehend and detain him

till h« be carried before a magistrate. 1 E. and M. C. C. 93.

(10) All these acts are now repealed.

•
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liament. The statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 8, enacts, that such as apprehend a

highwayman, and prosecute him to conviction, shall receive a reward of 40J.

r*29"l frorn *'ie public; to be paid to them (or if *killed in the endeavour to

1 " take him, their executors) bv the sheriff of the county; besides the

horse, furniture, arms, money, and other goods taken upon the person of such

robber; with a reservation of the right of any person from whom the same

may have been stolen: to which the statute 8 Geo. II, c. 16, superadds 101. to be

mid by the hundred indemnified by such taking. By statutes 6 and 7 Win.

Ill, c. 17, and 15 Geo. II, c. 28, persons apprehending and convicting anv of-

fender against those statutes, respecting the coinage, shall (in case the offence

be treason or felony) receive a reward of forty pounds; or ten pounds, if it only

amount to counterfeiting the copper coin. By statute 10 and 11 Win. III. c. 23,

any person apprehending and prosecuting to conviction a felon guilty of burg-

lary, house-breaking, horse-stealing, or private larceny to the value of 5*. from

any shop, warehouse, coach-house, or stable, shall be excused from all parish

offices. And by statute 5 Ann. c. 31, any person so apprehending and prosecut-

ing a burglar, or felonious house-breaker (or, if killed in the attempt, his exe-

cutors), shall be entitled to a reward of 40£. (z) By statute 6 Geo. I, c. 23, per-

sons discovering, apprehending, and prosecuting to conviction, any person taking

reward for helping others to their stolen goods, shall be entitled to forty pounds.

By statute 14, Geo. II, c. C, explained by 15 Geo. II, c. 34, anv person apprehend-

ing and prosecuting to conviction sucfi as steal, or kill witli an intent to steal,
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any sheep, or other cattle specified in the latter of the said acts, shall for every

such conviction receive a reward of ten pounds. Lastly, by statute 1C, Geo. II,

c. 15, and 8 Geo. Ill, c. 15, persons discovering, apprehending, and convicting

felons and others being found at large during the term for which they are

ordered to be transported, shall receive a reward of twenty pounds. (11)

CHAPTER XXII.

OF COMMITMENT AND BAIL.

WHEN a delinquent is arrested by any of the means mentioned in the preced-

ing chapter, he ought regularly to be carried before a justice of the peace: (1)

and how he is there to be treated, I shall next show, under the second head, of

commitment and bail.

The Justice before whom such prisoner is brought is bound immediately to

examine the circumstances of the crime alleged : (2) and to this end by statute

(z) The statutes 4 and 6 W. and M. c. 8.6 and 7 Win. Ill, c. 17, and 5 Ann c. 31 ("together with 3 Geo. I.

c. 15. » 4. which directs the method or reimbursing the sheriflbj, are extended to the comity palaliuc of

Durham, by glut. 14 (jco. Ill, o. 46.

(11) These statutes are repealed and new provisions substituted.

(1) [In a case •where it was stated the party behaved improperly in a church, it was held that

though a constable might be justified in removing him from the church, and detaining him till

the service was over, yet he could not legally detain him afterwards to tako him before a magis-

trate. 2 B. and 0. 699.

A ii-iiiclni/iiit should deliver the supposed offender over to a constable, or take him before a

magistrate. Dalt. J. c. 104.

A private person may do the same as a watchman. It has been held that a private person,

•when he took a party endeavouring to commit a felony, might detain him, in order to take hini

before a magistrate. 1 K. and M. C. C. 93.]

(-) [A constable, arresting a man on suspicion of felony, is bound to take him before a mag-

istrate as soon as he reasonably can; and he has no right to detain a prisoner three dav»

without taking him before a magistrate, in order that evidence may be collected in support
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2 and 3 P. and M. c. 10, he is to take in writing the examination of such prisoner,

and the information of those who bring him: (3) which, Mr. Lambard observes, (a)

was the first warrant given for the examination of a felon in the English law.

For, at the common law, nemo tenebatur prodere seipsum: and his fault was

not to be wrung out of himself, but rather to be discovered by other means and

other men. (4) If upon this inquiry it manifestly appears that either no such

crime was committed, or that the suspicion entertained of the prisoner was

wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawlul totally to discharge him. Other-

wise he must either be committed to prison, or give hail: that is put in securi-

ties for his appearance, to answer the charge against him. (5) This commit-

ment, therefore, being only for safe custody, wherever bail will answer the same

intention, it ought to be taken; as in most of the inferior crimes: but in felo-

nies, and other offences of a *capital nature, no bail can be a security r #0071

equivalent to the actual custody of the person. For what is there that - -"

a man may not be induced to forfeit, to save his own life? and what satisfaction

or indemnity is it to the public, to seize the effects of them who have bailed a mur-

(a) Elrmarck, b. 2, c. 7. See page 357.

of a felony with which he is charged. "Wright v. Court, 6 D. and R. 623. And see 2 Haw.

P. C. 117.

It is the duty of the magistrate to take and complete the examination of all concerned, and

to discharge or commit the individual suspected as soon us the nature of the case will admit.

Fost 142, 143.]
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(3) [The prisoner's examination must not be upon oath; that of the witnesses must be.

2 Hale, P. C. 52; 1 id. 585; 1 Phil. Ev. 106. Where magistrates first took the examination of

witnesses, not on oath, in support of a conviction, and afterwards swore them to the truth of

their evidence, the courts of king's bench expressed their disapprobation of the practice. Rex,

v. Kiddy, 4 D. and R. 734.]

(4) The statute 2 and 3 P. and M. c. 10, is repealed. By statute 11 and 12 Tic. c. 42, 8. 17,

when a person appears or is brought before a justice or justices charged with an indictable

offence, the justice or one of the justices shall '• read or cause to be read to the accused the

depositions taken against him, and shall say to him these words or words of the like effect:

" Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say any thing in answer to the charge f Ton

are not obliged to pay anv thing unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be

taken down in writing, and may be given in crntence against you on your trial;" and whatever

the prisoner shall then say in answer thereto shall be taken down "in writing and read over

to hiin, and shall be signed by the said justice or justices, and kept with the depositions of

the witnesses, and shall be transmitted with them as hereinafter mentioned; and afterwards,

upon the trial of said accused person, the same may, if necessary, be given in evidence against

him without further proof thereof, unless it shall" be proved that the justice or justices pur-

porting to sign the same did not in fact sign the same; provided always that the said justice

or justices, before such accused person shall make any statement, shall" state to him and give

him clearly to understand that he has nothing to hope from any promise of favor and nothing

to fear from any threat which may have been holdeu out to him to induce him to make any

admission or confession of his guilt, but that whatever he shall then say may be given in

evidence against him on the; tnat, notwithstanding such promise or threat; provided, never-

theless, that nothing herein enacted or contained shall prevent the prosecutor in any case from

giving in evidence any admission or confession or other statement of the person accused or

charged, made at any time, which by law would be admissible as evidence against such person."

Some further provisions are made by statute 30 and 31 Vic. c. 35.

The statement of one defendant is not evidence against another arrested ou the same charge.

Reg. r. Swiunerton, 1 C. and M. 593. It must not be taken on oath, or it will be inadmissible.

Rex c. Smith, 1 Stark. N. P. 242; R. r. Rivers, 7 C. and P. 177 ; R. v. Pikesley, 9 id. 124.

(f>) [Besides this commitment and bail, the magistrate should take the recognizance of the

prosecutor to appear and jjrefer an indictment and give evidence at the next sessions of the peace,

or general gaol delivery, as the case rnav require, and in case of refusal may commit him to

gaol. 1 Hale, 586; 2 id. 52, 121; 3 11. and S. 1.

When it appears that a person brought before the magistrate as a witness, may probably be

able to give material evidence against the prU'uier, he has, in the cases of manslaughter and

felony, by statute, authority to bind such witness by recognizance or obligation to appear at the

next general gaol delivery, to give evidence against the party indicted ; and infants and married

women, who cannot legally bind themselves, must procure others to be bound for them. And

if the witness refuse tog^ive such recognizance, the magistrate has power to commit him, this

being virtually included m his commission, and by necessary consequence upon the above men-

tioned statutes. 3. M. and S. 1 ; 1 Hale, 586.]
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derer, if the murderer himself be suffered to escape with impunity ? Upon a

principle similar to which the Athenian magistrates, when they took a solemn

oath never to keep a citizen in bonds that could give three sureties of the same

quality with himself, did it with an exception to such as had embezzled the public

money, or been guilty of treasonable practices, (b) What the nature of bail is

hath been shown in the preceding book, (c) viz., a delivery of bailment, of a

person to his sureties, upon their giving (together with himself) sufficient secu-

rity for his appearance: he being supposed to continue in their friendly custody,

instead of going to gaol. In civil cases we have seen that every defendant is

bailable; but in criminal matters it is otherwise. Let us therefore enquire in

what cases the party accused ought, or ought not, to be admitted to bail.

And, first, to refuse or delay to bail any person bailable is an offence against

the liberty of the subject, in any magistrate by the common law (d) as well as

by the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15, and the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II,

c. 'Z. And, lest the intention of the law should be frustrated by the justices

requiring bail to a greater amount than the nature of the case demands, it is

expressly declared by statute I W. and M., st. 2, c. 1, that excessive bail ought

not to be required; though what bail should be called excessive must be left to

the courts, on considering the circumstances of the case, to determine. And, on

the other hand, if the. magistrate takes insufficient bail he is liable to be fined,

if the criminal doth not appear, (e) (6) Bail may be taken either in court, or

in some particular cases by the sheriff, coroner, or other magistrate, (7) but
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most usually by the justices of the peace. Kegularly. in all offences either

f *2981 a£amsk the common *law or act of parliament, that are below felony,.

*- -" the offender ought to be admitted to bail, unless it be prohibited by

some special act of parliament (/) In order, therefore, more precisely to ascer-

tain what offences are bailable,

Let us next see, who may not be admitted to bail, or what offences are not

bailable. And here I shall not consider any one of those cases in which bail is

ousted by statute, from prisoners convicted of particular offences: for then such

imprisonment without bail is part of their sentence and punishment. But.

where the imprisonment is only for safe custody before the conviction, and not

for punishment afterwards, in such cases bail is ousted or taken away, wherever

the offence is of a very enormous nature; for then the public is entitled to

demand nothing less than the highest security that can be given, viz., the body

of the accused; in order to insure that justice shall be done upon him if guilty.

Such persons, therefore, as the author of the Mirror observes, (g) have no other

sureties but the four walls of the prison. By the ancient common law, before (h)

and since (t) the conquest, all felonies were bailable, till murder was excepted

by statute: so that persons might be admitted to bail before conviction almost

in every case. But the statute Westm. I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15, takes away the power

of bailing in treason, and in divers instances of felony. The statutes 23 Hen.

VI, c. 9, and 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 13, give further regulations in this matter;

(8) and upon the whole we may collect, (k) that no justice of the peace

(6) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 18. (c) Sec book III, pngc 200.

(e} Ibid.»'.!. (/) 2 Hnl. P. C. 127. (JJTI C. 2, » 24.

if! In omnSaa placitis tit felonia aolet afctttatui per ptegioa di

(d) 2 Hawk. P. C 90.

(*> 2 Inst. 18H.

,.,_.,. , . . . „ > dimitti, prteter quam in placito de Iwmicidio,

ubi ad terrorem aliter statutum ent. (tilanv. /. 11. c. 1.)

U-l 2 lust ISO. 2Hal. 1'. C. 129.

(6) [And even if the criminal does appear, yet, if the bail were taken corruptly, the magis-

trate would continue liable to an informatiou or indictment. 2 T. R. 190.]

(7) The court of king's bench, or any judge thereof, in vacation, may at their discretion

admit persons t« bail in all cases whatsoever: see H East, 163; 5 T. R. 169; but none can

claim this benefit de jure. 2 Hale, 189. As to when this court will bail, see 1 Chit. C. L.

2 ed. 98.]

(8) These statutes are since repealed, aud much more liberal authority is conferred upon

justices to admit to bail.

In the United States it is provided by the national and state constitutions that unreasonable

bail shall not be required. But what is reasonable is necessarily left to the discretion of the
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can bail, 1. Upon an accusation of treason: (9) nor, 2. Of murder: nor, 3. In

case of manslaughter, if the prisoner be clearly the slayer, and not barely sus-

pected to be so; or if any indictment be found against him: nor, 4. Such as,

being committed for felony, have broken prison; because it not only carries a

presumption of guilt, but is also snperadding one felony to another: 5. Persons

outlawed: 6. Such as have abjured the realm: 7. *Approvers of whom r*oan i

we shall speak in a subsequent chapter, and persons by them accused: "- '

8. Persons taken with the mainour, or in the fact of felony: 9. Persons

charged with arson. 10. Excommunicated persons taken by writ de cxcomuni-

cfito capiendo: all which are clearly not admissible to bail by the justices.

Others are of a dubious nature; as, 11. Thieves openly defamed and known:

12. Persons charged with other felonies, or manifest and enormous offences, not

being of good fame: and, 13. Accessories to felony, that labour under the same

want of reputation. These seem to be in the discretion of the justices, whether

bailable or not The last class are such as mutt be bailed upon oifering suffi-

cient surety; as, 14. Persons of good fame, charged with a bare suspicion of man-

slaughter, or other inferior homicide: 15. Such persons, being charged with

petit larceny, or any felony not before specified: or, 16. With being accessory

to any felony. Lastly, it is agreed that the court (I) of king's bench (or any

judge (in) thereof in time of vacation) may bail for any crime whatsoever, be it

treason, (») murder (o) or any other offence, according to the circumstances of

the case. And herein the wisdom of the law is very manifest. To allow bailv
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to be taken commonly for such enormous crimes would greatly tend to elude

the public justice: and yet there are cases, though they rarely happen, in which

it would be hard and unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of

the greatest offence. The law has therefore provided one court, and only one,

which has a discretionary power of bailing in any case: except only, even to

this high jurisdiction, and of course to all inferior ones, such persons as are

committed by either house of parliament, so long as the*session lasts: or

such as are committed for contempts by any of the king's superior courts

of justice, (p)

Upon the whole, if the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail,

he is to be committed to the county gaol by the mittimus of the justice, or

warrant under his hand and seal, containing the cause of his commitment:

there to abide till delivered by due course of law. (q) But this imprisonment, as

has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this

dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner ought to be used

with the utmost humanity; and neither be loaded with needless fetters, nor sub-

jected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose

of confinement only; though what are so requisite must too often be left to the

discretion of the gaolers; who arc frequently a merciless race of men, and, by

being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any tender sensation. Yet

(I) 2 Inst. 189. I-ntch 12. Vaugh. 157. Comli. Ill, 2!)8. 1 Oomyn's Dig. 495.

(m) Skin. «S3. Sulk. 105. Sim. nil. 1 Comyn's Dig. 497.

(n) In Die reign of tjuecn Elizabeth it was the unanimous opinion of the judges, thtit no court could

bail upon n commitment for a clwrgt' of hi^li treason, by any of the queen's privy council. 1 Anders. 298.

(o) In omnibus phicUiit df. felonin solet acctisutuR per pleyiog dimitti, prtrteryttnm in plncito dehomicitlio.

f Gilan. (. 14, c. i.) Sriairlum tamen quod, in hoc plitcito nun tokt accutulut per plegiot dimitti, nisi ex regice

potmtatis beiuflcto. (Ilul. c. i.J

fp.J SUiuudf. 1'. C. 78, b. (q) 2 Hal. P. C. 122,

officer who is empowered to fix it. Bail is usually denied in offences punishable capitally, hut

it may be taken m any case. State r. Summons, 19 Ohio, 139; Ex parte Tayloe, 5 Cow. 39;

U. S. v. Hamilton, 3 Ball. 18; Commonwealth C. Seuimcs, 11 Leigh, 665; D. S. v. Jones, 3

"Wash. C. C. 224; Barronet's Case, 1 El. and HI. 1.

As to the duty of the justices in taking bail to look into the nature of the charge and the

evidence to sustain it, see the case last cited. The duty is essentially judicial. Liniord v. Fitz-

roy, 13 Q. B. 240; Reg. v. Badger, 4 id. 468.

(9) On a charge of treason, bail cannot be taken, except by order of a secretary of state, or

by the court of queen's bench, or in vacation, by one of the judges thereof. 11 and 12 Vic.
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the law (as formerly held) would not justify them in fettering a prisoner, unless

where he was unruly, or had attempted to escape; (r) this being the humane

language of our ancient lawgivers; (s) " mstodes ptenam sibi commissorvrn non

auyeant, nee eos torqueant; sed omni scBvitia remota, pietatique adhibita,judiria

debite ezequantur,"

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE SEVERAL MODES OF PROSECUTIONS.

THE next step towards the punishment of offenders is their prosecution, or

the manner of their formal accusation. (1) And this is either upon a previous

finding of the fact by an inquest or grand jury; or without such previous find-

ing. The former way is either by presentment or indictment.

I. A presentment, generally taken, is a very comprehensive term; including

not only presentments, properly so called, but also inquisitions of office and

indictments by a grand jury. A presentment properly speaking, is the notice

taken by a grand jury of any offence from their own knowledge or observation, (a)

without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit of the king: as the

presentment of a nuisance, a libel, and the like; upon which the officer of the

court must afterwards frame an indictment, (b) before the party presented can

be put to answer it. An inquisition of office is the act of a jury summoned by

the proper officer to inquire of matters relating to the crown, upon evidence

laid before them. Some of these are in themselves convictions, and cannot

afterwards be traversed or denied; and therefore the inquest or jury, ought to
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hear all that can be alleged on both sides. Of this nature are all inquisitions

of felo de se ; of flight m persons accused of felony; of deodands, and the like;

and presentments of petty offences in the sheriffs tourn or court-leet, where-

upon the presiding officer may set a fine. (2) Other inquisitions may be after-

f*302l wa1'^8 traversed and examined; as particularly the coroners *inquisi-

' J tion of the death of a man, when it finds any one guilty of homicide;(3)

(r) 2 1 u -l. 381. 3 Inst. 34. («) Flet J.1 c. 36. (a) Lamb. Kirtnarck. I 4, e. 5. (6) 2 I ml. 739.

(1) [It may here be useful briefly to consider the time when the prosecution shall be com-

menced. The habeas corpus act provides, that a person committed for treason or felony must

be indicted in the ensuing term or sessions, or the party must be bailed, unless it be shown, upon

oath, that the witnesses for the prosecution could not be produced at the preceding; session.

31 Car. II, c. 2, $ 7. This regulation applies, however, only to persons actually eonnned upon

suspicion, and is solely intended to prevent the protracting of arbitrary imprisonment; so that

it does not preclude the crown from preferring an iudictmeut at any distance of time from the

actual perpetration of the offence, unless some particular statute limits the time of prosecuting.]

(2) Mr. Justice Coleridge points out an inaccuracy here. He shows that inquisitions of felo

(le se may be traversed by the executors or administrators of the deceased : Toomes p. Ether-

ington, 1 Saund. E. 303, n. 1, ed. 1824; that inquisition is not takeu of the flight of persons

accused of felony distinct from the felony; that the finding as to deodands is not so conclusive

but that the court may interfere to diminish the value: Fost. 266; and that, as to presentments

of petty offences in the tonni or leet, Lord Mansfield has said that it cannot be true that they

arc not traversable anywhere : Cowp. 459 : and the law scorns to be that, before the fine is es-

treated and paid, though not afterwards, the presentment may be removed hy certiorari into the

court of king's bench, and traversed there. Rex 1;. Heaton, 2 T. R. 184.

(.() [Upon this inquisition the party accused mav be tried without the intervention of the

grand jury : 2 Hale, 61; 3 Camp. 371; 2 Leach, 1095; Russ. and R. C. C. 240, S. C.; and if

an indictment be found for the same offence, and the defendant be acquitted on the one. he must

be arraigned on the other, to which he may, however, effectually plead his former acquittal.

2 Hale, 01.

Verdict in an action. There is also a mode in which a party may be put on his trial without

any written accusation, viz., the verdict of a jury ill a civil cause. 2 Hale. 150; 4 T. R. 293;

3 Esp. 134. Thus, in an action for taking away goods, if the jury found that they were
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for ia such cases the offender so presented mnst be arraigned upon this inqui-

sition, and n&y dispute the truth of it; which brings it to a kind of indictment,

the most usual and effectual means of prosecution, and into which we will

therefore inquire a little more minutely.

II. An indictment (c) is a written accusation of one or more persons of a crime

or misdemeanor, preferred to, and presented upon oath by, a grand jury. To

this end the sheriff of every county is bound to return to every session of the

peace, and every commission of oyer and terminer, and of general gaol-delivery,

twenty-four good and lawful men of the county, some out of every hundred, to

inquire, present, do, and execute all those things which, on the part of our lord

the king, shall then and there be commanded them, (d) They ought to be

freeholders, (4) but to what amount is uncertain: (e) which seems to be casus

omissus, and as proper to be supplied by the legislature as the qualifications of

the petit jury, which were formerly equally vague and uncertain, but are now

settled by several acts of parliament. However, they are usually gentlemen of

the best figure in the county. As many as appear upon this panel are sworn

upon the grand jury, to the amount of twelve at the least, and not more than

twenty-three; that twelve may be a majority. Which number, as well as the

constitution itself, we find exactly described, so early as the laws of King Ethel-

red. (/) " Exeant seniores duodecim thani, et proefectus cum eis, et jurent super

sanctuarium quod eis in manus datur, quod nolint ullum innocentem accusare,

nee aliquem noxium celare." In the time of King Richard the First (according
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to Hoveden) the process of electing the grand jury ordained by that prince was

as follows : four knights were to be taken from the county at large, who chose

two more out of every hundred; which two associated to themselves ten other

principal freemen, and those twelve were to answer concerning all particulars

relating to their own district. This number was probably *ibund too I-*QQQ -j

large and inconvenient; but the traces of this institution still remain !• ' J

in that some of the jury must be summoned out of every hundred. This grand

jury are previously instructed in the articles of their inquiry, by a charge from

the judge who presides upon the bench. They then withdraw, to sit and receive

indictments, which are preferred to them in the name of the king, but at the

suit of any private prosecutor; and they are only to hear evidence on behalf of

the prosecution: for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an

inquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined; and the

grand jury are only to inquire, upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient

cause to call upon the party to answer it A grand jury, however, ought to be

thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence

goes; and not to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine that

might be applied to very oppressive purposes. (g)

The grand jury are sworn to inquire, only for the body of the county, pro

corpore comitatus ; and therefore they cannot regularly inquire of a fact done

out of that county for which they are sworn, unless particularly enabled by an

act of parliament. And to so high a nicety was this matter anciently carried,

fc) See Appendix, f 1. (d) 2 Hal. P. C. 164. (e) Ibid. 165. (f) Wilk. LL. Angl. Sax. 117.

(a) State Trials, iv, !.-:>.

taken feloniously, the verdict served also as an indictment. 2 Hale, 151; Hawk, b. 2, c. 15,

$ 6; Com. Pie. Indictment, C; Bac. Ab. Indictment, B. 5. And, at the present day, in an

action for slander, in which the plaintiff is charged with a criminal offence, and the defendant

justifies; if the jury find that the justification is true, the plaintiff may be immediately put

upon his trial for the crime alleged against him, without the intervention of a grand jury. 5

T. R. 293. But the verdict mnst be found in some court which has competent jurisdiction

over criminal matters, or otherwise it seems to have but little force. 2 Hale, 151; Hawk. b. 2,

c, 25, $ <>•]

Generally in the United States, by express constitutional provisions, a party oaa only be put

on trial for'a crime after presentment by a grand jury, except in the case ra inferior offences.

And where this presentment is allowed to be dispensed with, an information iiictl by the pub-

lic prosecutor is substituted.

(4) It Is not essential that they be freeholders. Kass. mid U. 177.
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that where a man was wounded in one county, and died in another, the offender

was at common law indictable in either, because no complete act'of felony was

done in any one of them; but by statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 24, he is now

indictable in the county where the party died. And, by statute 2 Geo. II, c.

21, if the stroke or poisoning be in England, and the death upon the sea, or out

of England: or, vice versa ; the offenders and their accessories may be indicted

in the county where either the death, poisoning, or stroke shall happen. And

so in some other cases; as particularly, where treason is committed out of the

realm, it may be inquired of in any county within the realm, as the king shall

direct, in pursuance of statutes 26 Hen. VIII, c. 13, 33 Hen. c. VIII, 23, 35

Hen. VIII, c. 2, and 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11. And counterfeiters, washers or

F *304 1 m'n'sners *°f the current coin, together with all manner of felons and

"• " -I their accessories, may bv statute 26 Hen. VIII, c. 6 (confirmed and

explained by 34 and 35 Hen.Vlfl,o. 26, §§ 75,76), be indicted and tried for

those offences, if committed in any part (h) of Wales, before the justices of gaol-

delivery and of the peace in the next adjoining county of England, where the

king's writ runneth: that is, at present in the county of Hereford or Salop;

and not, as it should seem, in the county of Chester or Monmouth: the one

being a county-palatine where the king's writ did not run, and the other a part

of Wales, in 26 Hen. VIII. (t) Murders, also, whether committed in England

or foreign parts, (k) may by virtue of the statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 23, be inquired

of and tried by the king's special commission in any shire or place in the king-

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:05 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

dom. By statute 10 and 11 Wm. Ill, c. 25, all robberies and other capital

crimes, committed in Newfoundland, may be inquired of and tried in any

county in England. Offences against the black-act, 9 Geo, I, c. 22, may be

inquired of and tried in any county in England, at the option of the prose-

cutor. (/) So felonies- in destroying turnpikes, or works upon navigable rivers,

erected by authority of parliament, may by statutes 8 Geo. II, c. 20, and 13

Geo. Ill, c. 84, be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county. By statute

20 Geo. II, c. 19, plundering or stealing from any vessel in distress or wrecked,

or breaking any ship contrary to 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18, (m) may be prosecuted

either in the county where the fact is committed, or in any county next adjoin-

ing; and, if committed in Wales, then in the next adjoining English county:

by which is understood to be meant such English county as by the statute 26

Hen. VIII, above mentioned, had before a concurrent jurisdiction with the

great sessions of felonies committed in Wales, (n) Felonies committed out of

T *305 1 ^e rea^m» iQ burning or destroying the king's ships, *magaziues or

' " -" stores, may by statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 24, be inquired of and tried in any

county of England, or in the place where the offence is committed. By stat-

ute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 63, misdemeanors committed in India may be tried upon

information or indictment in the court of king's bench in England; and a

mode is marked out for examining witnesses by commission, and transmitting

their depositions to the court. But in general, all offences must be inquired

into, as well as tried, in the county where the fact is committed. Yet, if lar-

ceny be committed in one county, and the goods carried into another, the

offender may be indicted in either; for the offence is complete in both, (o) Or

he may be indicted in England, for larceny in Scotland, and carrying the goods

with him into England, or vice versa; or for receiving in one part of the united

kingdom goods that have been stolen in another, (p) But for robbery, bur-

glary, and the like, he can only be indicted where the fact was actually com-

mitted ; for though the carrying away and keeping of the goods isa continuation

(h) Stra. .133. 3 Mod. 1.14. (ij See Hardr. Gfi.

ftj Ely's Case, at the Old Bailey, Dec. 1720. Roadie's Case, Dec. 177ft.

n> So hold by all the judges, II. 11 George III, in tbe cose of liichard Mortis, on a case referred from the

Old Bailey.

(m) Sec page 245.

(nj At Shrewsbury summer assizes. 1774.1'arry and Roberts were convicted of plundering a vessel which

was wrecked on the coast of Anglesey. It was moved in arrest ofjndgment, that Chester, and not Salop, was

the noxtadjoininp English couniy. Butallthejndecsfin Mich.15 Goo. Ill) huld the prosecution to lie regular.

foj 1 Hal. P. c. 507. (p) Slat 13 Geo. Ill, c. 31.
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of the original taking, and is therefore larceny in the second county, yet it is

not a robbery or burglary in that jurisdiction. And if a person be indicted in

one county for larceny of goods originally taken in another, and be thereof

convicted, or stands mute, he shall not be admitted to his clergy; provided the

original taking be attended with such circumstances as would have ousted him

of his clergy by virtue of any statute made previous to the year 1691. (<?) (5)

When the grand jury have heard the evidence, if they think it a groundless

accusation, they used formerly to indorse on the back of the bill, " ignoramus ;"

or, we know nothing of it: intimating, that though the facts might possibly be

true, that truth did not appear to them: but now, they assert in English more

absolutely, "not a true bill;" or (which is the better way) "not found;" and

then the party is discharged without further answer. But a fresh bill may

afterwards be preferred to a subsequent grand jury. If they are satisfied

of the truth of the accusation, they then ""indorse upon it, " a true bill;"

anciently " billa vera." The indictment is then said to be found, and the party

stands indicted. But to find a bill there must at least twelve of the jury agree:

for so tender is the law of England of the lives of the subjects, that no man can

be convicted at the suit of the king of any capital offence, unless by an unani-

mous voice of twenty-four of his equals and neighbours: that is, by twelve at

least of the grand jury, in the first place, assenting to the accusation: and after-

wards, by the whole petit jury, of twelve more, finding him guilty, upon his trial.

But if twelve of the grand jury assent, it is a good presentment, though some
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of the rest disagree, (r) And the indictment, when so found, is publicly

delivered into court.

Indictments must have a precise and sufficient certainty. (6) By statute

(8) Slat. 23 Hen. vni, c. 3. 3 W. and M. c. 9. (r) 2 Hal. P. C. 161.

(5) Formerly it was necessary to state the venue in the body of the indictment, but it is not

so now. See statute 14 and 15 Tic. c. 100, $ 23. And as the court by the same statute has

powur to allow an amendment in the statement of the venue, an objection on this score does

not often become available, unless the indictment on its face, or the evidence given on the

trial, shows that the court had no jurisdiction. And if the record on its face shows the court

to have no jurisdiction, a conviction cannot be sustained without amendment, notwithstand-

ing the court had jurisdiction in fact. Reg. v. Mitchell, 2 Q. B. 636.

(G) [The indictment must state the facts of the crime with as much certainty as the nature

of the case will admit. Cowp. 682; 5 T. R. 611-623. Therefore, an indictment charging

the defendant with obtaining money by false pretences, without stating, what were the

particular pretences, is insufficient. 3 T. R. 581. The cases of indictment for being a

common scold or barrator, or for keeping a disorderly house, or for conspiracy, may bo

considered as exceptions to the general rule. 2 T. R. 586; 1 id. 754; 2 B. and A. 205. And au

indictment for endeavoring to incite a soldier to commit an act of mutiny,,.or. a servant to rob

his master, without stating the particular means adopted, may also be- considered as an

exception. 1 B. and P. 180.

The indictment ought to be certain to every intent, and without any ihtendtnent to the

contrary. Cm. Eliz. 490; Cro. Jac. 20. But this strictness does not so far prevail, as to

render an indictment invalid in consequence of the omission of a letter, which does not

c'hange the word into another of different signification, as underload for understood, and

rceered for received: 1 Leach, 134, 145: and if the sense bo clear, nice objections ought not to

be regarded: 5 East, 259; and in stating mere matter of inducement, not so much certainty

is required as in stating the offence itself. 1 Ventr. 170; Com. Dig. Indictment, G. Th»

charge must be sufficiently explicit to support itself; for no latitude of intention can be

allowed to include anything more than is expressed. 2 Burr. 1127; 2 M..and S'. 381. And

every crime must appear on the face of the record with a scrupulous certainty: Cald. 187; so

that'it may be understood by every one; alleging all the requisites that constitute- the offence;

and that every averment must be so stated, that the party accused may know the general

nature of the crime of which he is accused, and who the accusers are, whom he will be

called upon to answer: 1 T. R. 69; and as a branch of this rule it is to be observed, that in

describing some crimes, technical phrases and expressions are required to be used, to express

the precise idea which the law entertains of the offence; see the instances in the text. The

offence must be positively charged, and not stated by way of recital, so that the words "that

whereas" prefixed, will render it invalid. 2 Stra. 900, n. 1; 2 Lord, Ray..1363. Stating an

offence in the disjunctive is bad. 2 Stra. 901, 200; and see further,.L Chit. C. L. 2d ed. 236.

Repugnancy, in a material matter, may be fatal to the indictment. 5 East. 254. But though

the indictment must in all respects be certain, yet the introduction of averments altogether

superfluous and immaterial will seldom prejudice. For if the indictment can bo supported
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1 Hen. V, c. 5, all indictments must set forth the Christian name, surname, and

addition of the state, and degree, mystery, town or place, and the county of the

offender: and all this to identify his person. The time, and place, are also

to be ascertained by naming the day and township, in which the fact was com-

mitted; though a mistake in these points is in general not held to be material,

provided the time be laid previous to the finding of the indictment, aud the

place to be within the jurisdiction of the court; unless where the place is laid,

not merely as a venue, but as a part of the description of the fact. («) -But

sometimes the time may be very material, where there is any limitation in point

of time assigned for the prosecution of offenders: as by the statute 7 Wm.

Ill, c. 3, which enacts, that no prosecution shall be had for any of the treasons

or misprisons therein mentioned (except an assassination designed or attempted

on the person of the king), unless the bill of indictment be found within three

years after the offence committed: (t) and in case of murder, the time of the

death must be laid within a year and a day after the mortal stroke was given.

The offence itself must also be set forth with clearness and certainty; aud in

some crimes particular words of art must be used, which are so appropriated by

F *30" 1 *')e 'ttW ^° exPress tne precise idea which it entertains of the *otfeiice,

L ' J that no other words, however, synonymous they may seem, are capable

of doing it. Thus, in treason, the facts must be laid to be done, " treasonably

and against his allegiance;" anciently, "proditorie ei contra ligeantiae sute

debitum:" else the indictment is void. In indictments for murder, it is neces-
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sary to say that the party indicted "murdered," not killed, or "slew," the

other; which till the late statute was expressed in Latin by the word "mur-

drarit." (u) In all indictments for felonies, the adverb ''feloniously," "felonice,"

must be used; and for burglaries also "burglariter," or in English, " burglari-

(») 2 Hawk. P. C. 433. (*) Fost. 849. («) Seo book III, page 331.

•without the words, which are bud, they may, on arrest of judgment, be rejected as surplusage:

1 T. R. 32-2; 1 Leach. 474; 3 Stark. 26; and see further'tis to repugnancy and surplusage, 1

Chit. C. L. 2d ed. 332, 238, <tc.

Presumptions of law need not bo stated: 4 It. and S. 105; 2 Wils. 147; neither need facts of

•which the court will ex ofh'oio take notice. See ante, book J, 293, note (1). It is uut nt'cessary

to state a conclusion of line resulting from the facts of a case, it suffices to-state the facts aud

leave the court to draw the inference. 2 Leach. 941. Neither is it necessary to state mere

matter of evidence, which the prosecutor proposes to adduce, unless it alters the offence; for if

go.it would make the indictment as long as the evidence. 1 Stra. 139, 140; Forst. 194; 2

B. and A. 205. lu general, all mutters of rkfcncc. must come from the defendant, and need not

be anticipated or stated by the prosecutor. 5 T. K. 84; 2 Leach, 580; 2 East, 19. And it is

never necessary to negative all the exceptions which, by some other statute than that which

creates the oii'enee. might render it legal, for these must l>e shown by the defendant for his own

jnstideation. 2 Burr. 1036: 1 Bla. Kep. 230. Facts which lie more particularly within the

defendant's thin the prosecutor's knowledge need not be shown with more than a certainty

to a common intent, 5 T. R. (V)7; Hawk. b. 2, c. 25, s. 112. If notice be necessary to raise

the duty which the defendant is alleged to have broken, it should be averred; but where

knowledge must bo presumed, and the event lies alike in the knowledge of all men, it is never

necessary either to state or prove it. 5 T. K. 021. If a request or demand is necessary, to

complete the offence, it must be stated in the indictment. ti East, 52, 53; 1 T. 11. 316; C'ald.

554. Where an evil intent accompanying an act is necessary to constitute such act a crime

the intent must be alleged in the indictment, and proved. 2 Stark. 245; K. and R. C. C. 317 : 1

Hnle, 5H1; 2 East, P. C. 514. 515; 2K.andK.C.C.817. Indictments must be in English. 4 Geo.

II, c. 6; 0 Geo. II, c. 6. Bat if any document in a foreign language, as a libel, be necessarily

introduced, it should be set out in the original tongue, and then translated, showing its

applications: 0 T. R. 162; 7 Moore, 1; but it has beeu said to be both needless and dangerous

to translate it. 1 Saund. 242. n. 1. By the same act, statutes 4 Geo. II, c. 26, aud 6 Geo. II,

c. 14, all indictments must be in words at length, and therefore no abbreviations can be

admitted. 2 Hale. 170, n. g. Nor can any figures be allowed in indictments, but all numbers

must be expressed in words at length; "but to this rule there is an exception, in case of

forgery, and threatening letters, when a fac simile of the instrument urged rnmt be given in

the indictment. 2 llalei 170, 146.

If the name of a prisoner is unknown, ond he refuses to disclose it, an indictment against

him as a person whose name is to the jurors unknown, but who is personally brought before

Jie jurors by the keeper of the prison, will bo sufficient. Rex r. , R. and R. C. C. 489.

But an indictment against him as a person to the jurors unknown, without something to

ascertain whom the grand jury meant to designate, is insufficient. Id.]
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ously:" and all these to ascertain the intent In rapes, the word "rapuit"

or " ravished," is necessary, and must not be expressed by any periphrasis; in

order to render the crime certain. So in larcenies also, the words '•felonies

cepit et asportavit" "feloniously took and carried away," are necessary to every

indictment; for these only can express the very offence. Also in indictments

for murder, the length and depth of the wound should in general be expressed,

in order that it may appear to the court to have been of a mortal nature; but

if it goes through the body, then its dimensions are immaterial, for that is appa-

rently sufficient to have been the cause of the death. Also, where a limb, or the

like, is absolutely cut off, there such description is impossible, (v) Lastly, in

indictments the" value of the thing, which is the subject or instrument of the

offence must sometimes be expressed. In indictments for larcenies this is neces-

sarv, that it may appear whether it be grand or petit larceny; and whether entitled

or not to the benefit of clergy; in homicides of all sorts it is necessary; as the

weapon with which it is committed is forfeited to the king as a deodand. (7)

The remaining methods <»f prosecution are without any previous finding by a

jury, to fix the authoritative stamp of verisimilitude upon the accusation. One

of these by the common law, was when a thief was taken with the mainour,

that is, with the thing stolen upon him in manu. For he might, when so de-

tec ted flagrante delicto, be brought into court, arraigned, and tried, without in-

dictment: as by the *Danish law he might be takeu and hanged upon r*gQg -i

the spot, without accusation or trial, (w) But this proceeding was taken *- -•
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away by several statutes in the reign of Edward the Third: (a;) though in Scot-

land a similar process remains to this day. (y) So that the only species of pro-

ceeding at the suit of the king, without a previous indictment or presentment

by a grand jury, now seems to be that of information.

III. Informations are of two sorts: first, those which are partly at the suit of

the king, and partly at that of a subject; and, secondly, such as are only in the

name of the king. The former are usually brought upon penal statutes, which

inflict a penalty upon conviction of the offender, one part to the use of the king,

and another to the use of the informer; and a sort of qui tarn actions (the

nature of which was explained in a former book, (z) only carried on by a crimi-

nal instead of a civil process: upon which I shall therefore' only observe, that

by the statute 31 Eliz. c. 5, no prosecution upon any penal statute, the suit and

benefit whereof are limited in part to the king and in part to the prosecutor,

can be brought by any common informer after one year is expired since the

commission of the offence; nor on behalf of the crown after the lapse of two

years longer; nor, where the forfeiture is originally given only to the king, can

(v) 5 Ecp. 1M. ftp; Stlernh. dejure Sveon. I. 8. c. «. (x) 2 Hal. P. C. H9.

(yj Lord Kuims, I, 831. (z) see book III, page 162.

Some important changes have boon made in the law relative to indictments by recent

statutes. By statute 14 and 15 Vic. c. 100, s. 24, no indictment is to be held insufficient for

omitting to state the time at which the offence was committed when time is not of the essence

of the offence, uor by stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offence to have been

committed on a day subsequent to the pending of the indictment, or on an impossible day, or

on a day that never happened. By section 9, a person on trial for an offence, if it shall ap-

pear that he did not complete it, may be convicted of an attempt to commit the same. By 24

and 25 Vic. c. 96. s. 85, a person on trial for robbery may be acquitted on the main charge

and convicted of an assault with intent to rob. By section 72 there may be a conviction lor

larceny on an indictment fur embezzlement. By section SS a person indicted for false pre-

tences may be convicted of larceny. By 9 Qeo. IV, c. 31, s. 14, a woman indicted for

the murder of her infant child may be convicted of endeavoring to conceal its birth.

And by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94. an accessory before the fact to any felony may be indicted in all

respects as if he were the principal felon. And by statutes 24 aud 25 Vic. c. 100, in an

indictment for felonious homicide it is not necessary' to set forth the manner in which, or the

means by which, the death was caused. Indictments in other cases have been very much

simplified.

(7) Very broad powers to amend indictments are conferred upon the courts by 14 and 15

Vie. c. 100. As to amendment of the record after judgment, see Gregory v. Reg., 15 Q. B.

957; Bowers v. Nixon, 12 id. 546.
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such prosecution be had after the expiration of two years from the commission

of the offence. (8)

The informations that are exhibited in the name of the king alone, are also

of two kinds: first, those which are truly and properly his own suits, and filed ex

officio by his own immediate officer, the attorney general; secondly, those in

which, though the king is the nominal prosecutor, yet it is at the relation of

some private person or common informer; and they are filed by the king's cor-

oner and attorney in the court of king's bench, usually called the master of the

crown-office, who is for this purpose the standing officer of the public. The

objects of the king's own prosecutions, filed ex vfficio by his own attorney-

F*309 1 §c'nera'> are properly such *enormous misdemeanors as peculiarly tend

' J to disturb or endanger his government, or to molest or affront him iu

the regular discharge of his royal functions. For offences so high and danger-

ous in the punishment or prevention of which a moment's delay would be fatal,

the law lias given to the crown the power of an immediate prosecution, without

•waiting for any previous application to any other tribunal: which power, thus

necessary, not only to the ease and safety, but even to the very existence of the

executive magistrate, was originally reserved in the great plan of the English

constitution, wherein provision is wisely made for the due preservation of all

its parts. The objects of the other species of informations, filed by the master of

the crown-office upon the complaint or relation of a private subject are any

gross and notorious misdemeanors, riots, batteries, libels, and other immoralities
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of an atrocious kind, (a) not peculiarly tending to disturb the government (for

those are left with the care of the attorney general), but which, on account of

their magnitude or pernicious example, deserve the most public animadver-

sion. (9) And when an information is filed, either thus, or by the attorney-

general e.r, officio, it must be tried by a petit jury of the county where the

offence arises: after which, if the defendant be found guilty, the court must be

resorted to for his punishment.

There can be no doubt but that this mode of prosecution by information (or

suggestion), filed on record by the king's attorney-general, or by his coroner or

master of the crown-office in the court of king's bench, is as ancient as the com-

mon law itself. (6) For as the king was bound to prosecute, or at least to lend

the sanction of his name to a prosecutor, whenever the grand jury informed

him upon their oaths that there was a sufficient ground for instituting a crimi-

nal-suit: so when these his immediate officers were otherwise sufficiently as-

sured that a man had committed a gross misdemeanor, either personally against

the king or his government, or against the public peace and good order, they

were at liberty, without waiting for any farther intelligence, to convey that in-

F*310 1 f°rma^on to the court of king s bench by a *suggestion on record, and

' ' -I to carry on the prosecution in his majesty's name. But these informa-

tions (of every kind) are confined by the constitutional law to mere misde-

meanors only: for, wherever any capital offence is charged, the same law

(aj 2 Hawk. P. C. 260. (b) I Show. US.

(8) The time, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute relating to the particular cose,

is limited in the ease of offences punishable on summary conviction, to six calendar months.

11 and !••> Vie. c. 43. s. 36.

(9) [The eonrt will always take into consideration the whole of the circumstances of the

charge before they lend their sanction to this extraordinary mode of prosecution They will

observe the time (if making the application, and whether a long interval has elapsed since the,

injurr, and to what cause it may be fairly ascribed; also the cridcttce on which the charge is

founded, and weigh the probabilites which it seems to offer: they will also examine the

character and motives of the applicant, at least his share in the matter before them : and they

•will look forward to the consequences of the measure they are requested to grant, iu the pe-

culiar situation of the defendant. 1 Bla. Rep. 54-.J. In applications of this nature for libels,

the applicant must, unless the charge be general, show his innocence of the matter imputed to

him. See Dongl. S->4, 3^7,55H : 1 Hnrr. 41W ; 6 T. R. 294; 4 id. aa&; 5 B. and A. 59r>; II). and

R. 197; a ('hit. Rep. 1(53. In applications against magistrates, the applicant must Jirectly

impute corrupt motives for the misconduct complained of. 3 B. and A. 432.]
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requires that the accusation be warranted by the oath of twelve men; before the

party shall be put to answer it. And, as to those offences in which informa-

tions were allowed as well as indictments, so long as they were confined to this

high and respectable jurisdiction, and were carried on m a legal and regular

course in his majesty's court of king's bench, the subject had no reason to com-

plain. The same notice was given, the same process was issued, the same pleas

were allowed, the same trial by jury was had, the same judgment was given by

the same judges, as if the prosecution had originally been by indictment. But

when the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. I, had extended the jurisdiction of the court of

star-chamber, the members of which were the sole judges of the law, the fact,

and the penalty; and when the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 3, had permitted infor-

mations to be brought by any informer upon any penal statute, not extending

to life or member, at the assizes or before the justices of the peace, who were to

hear and determine the same according to their own discretion ; then it was

that the legal and orderly jurisdiction of the court of king's bench fell into dis-

use and oblivion, and Empson and Dudley (the wicked instruments of King

Henry VII), by hunting out obsolete penalties, and this tyrannical mode of

prosecution, with other oppressive devices (c) continually harassed the subject,

and shamefully enriched the crown. The latter of these acts was soon indeed

repealed by statute 1 Hen. VIII, c. 6, but the court of star-chamber continued in

high vigour, and daily increasing its authority, for more than a century longer;

till finally abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 10.
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Upon this dissolution the old common-law (d) authority of the court of

king's bench, as the custos morum of the nation being found necessary to reside

somewhere for the peace and good government of the Kingdom, was again revived

in *practice. (e) And it is observable, that in the same act of parliament r ^^ i

which abolished the court of star-chamber, a conviction by information *- '

is expressly reckoned up, as one of the legal modes of conviction of such persons

as should offend a third time against the provisions of that statute. (/) It is

true Sir Matthew Hale, who presided in this court soon after the time of such

revival, is said (y) to have been no friend to this method of prosecution : and,

if so. the reason of such his dislike was probably the ill use which the master of the

crown-office then made of his authority, by permitting the subject to be harassed

with vexatious informations, whenever applied to by any malicious or revengeful

prosecutor: rather than his doubt of their legality, or propriety upon urgent

occasions. (h) For the power of filing informations, without any control, then

resided in the breast of the master: and, being filed in the name of the king,

they subjected the prosecutor to no costs, though on trial they proved to be

groundless. This oppressive use of them, in the times preceding the revolution,

occasioned a struggle, soon after the accession of King William, (i) to procure a

declaration of their illegality by the judgment of the court of king's bench. But

Sir John Holt who then presided there, and all the judges, were clearly of opinion,

that this proceeding was grounded on the common law, and could not be then

impeached. And, in a few years afterwards, a more temperate remedy was ap-

plied in parliament, by statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 18, which enacts, that the

clerk of the crown shall not file any information without express directions from

the court of king's bench : and that every prosecutor, permitted to promote such

information, shall give security by a recognizance of twenty pounds (which now

seems to be too small a sum) to prosecute the same with effect: and to pay

costs to the defendant, in case he be acquitted thereon, unless the judge, who

tries the information, shall certify there was reasonable cause for filing it; and,

at all events, to pay costs, unless *the information shall be tried within r ag^g i

a year after issue joined. But there is a proviso in this act, that it *-

shall not extend to any other information than those which are exhibited by

(e) 1 And. 157. <d1 5Mod. 404.

(«i Styl. Hop,. 217. 245. Styl. Frnct. Reg. tit. Information, T>. 1ST, (edit. 1B57)._ _J SiOJl. 1 Sid. 158.

Stat. IB Car. I. c. 10. f 6. (0) 5 Mod. 4BO. (Ail S.-mnd. 301. 1 Sid. 174.

(i) M. 1 W. and M. 5 Mod. 439. Comb. 141. Far. 381. 1 Show. 106.

s
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the master of the cro wn-office: and consequently, informations at the king's own

suit, filed by his attorney-general, are no way restrained thereby.

There is one sp.-oies of informations, still farther regulated by statute 9 Ann.

c. 20, viz., those in the nature of a writ of quo warranto; which was shown, in

the preceding book, (k) to be a remedy given to the crown against such as hod

usurped or intruded into any office or franchise. The modern information tends

to the same purpose as the ancient writ, being generally made use of to try the

civil rights of such franchises ; though it is commenced in the same manner as

other informations are, by leave of the court, or at the will of the attorney-general:

being properly a criminal prosecution, in order to fine the defendant for his

usurpation, as well as to oust him from his office; yet usally considered at pres-

ent as merely a civil proceeding. (10)

These are all the methods of prosecution at suit of the king. There yet

remains another, which is merely at the suit of the subject, and is called an

appeal.

IV. An appeal, in the sense wherein it is here used, does not signify any com-

plaint to a superior court of an injustice done by an inferior one, which is the

general use of the word ; but it here means an original suit, at the time of its

first commencement (/) An appeal, therefore, when spoken of as a criminal

prosecution, denotes an accusation by a private subject against another, for some

heinous crime; demanding punishment on account of the particular injury

suffered, rather than for the offence against the public. As this method of prosecu-
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tion is still in force, 1 cannot omit to mention it: but as it is very little iu use,

F *^13 1 on accoun^ °f the *great nicety required in conducting it, I shall treat of

"- J it very briefly; referring the student for more particulars to other more

voluminous compilations, (m)

This private process, for the punishment of public crimes, had probably its

original in those times when a private pecuniary satisfaction, called a weregild,

was constantly paid to the party injured, or his relations, to expiate enormous

offences. This was a custom derived to us, in common with other northern na-

tions, («) from our ancestors, the ancient Germans; among whom, according to

Tacitus, (o)" lullur liomicidium certo armentorum ac pecoram numero; reciptique

satis factinnem universa damns." (p) In the same manner by the Irish brehon

law, in case of murder, the brehon or judge was used to compound between the

murderer and the friends of the deceased who prosecuted him, by causing the

malefactor to give unto them, or to the child or wife of him that was slain, a re-

compense which they called an eriach. (q) And thus we find in our Saxon laws

(particularly those of King Athelstan)(r) the several weregilds for homicide estab-

lished in progressive order from the death of the ceorl or peasant, up to that of

the king himself. (,s) And in the laws of King Henry I, (t) we have an account

of what other offences were then redeemable by weregild, and what were

not so. (M) As therefore during the continuance of this custom, a process was

certainly given, for recovering the weregild by the party to whom it was due; it

(t) Pee bonk III. page 282.

(1) It Is from the French, -'appeller," the verb active, which signifies to call upon, munition, or challenge

one : and not the verb neuter, which signifies the same as the ordinary scnae of" appeal" in English.

C™; - Hawk. 1'. C. clt. 23. (u) Stlcrnh. <le jure Sueon. I. 8, c. 4. (o) de If. O. c. 21.

(p) And in another place, (c. 12). ' Deiictii, pro morlo pmuirum. emtonan pecorumqnc numero convicti

mnlrtantur. Pan miiMte reyi rd ciritati: par» ipri qui injidfcnAur, vet provinqvii ejut exaolritur."

(q) .'Spencer's State of Ireland, p. IMS, edit. Hushes, (r) Jniiic. Cictt. Lnnd. Wilk. 71.

(t) The werogiM of » ccorl was 26fi thrysmas, that of the king 30,000 ; each thryama being equal to about a

shilling of our present money. Tne weregild of a subject was paid entirely to the relations of the party

slain ; but that of the king was divided ; one-half being paid to the public, the other half to the royal family.

ft) c 12

(ul In Turkey this principle Is carried so far, that even murder is never prosecuted by the officers of the

government, as with u». It is the business of the next relations, and them only, to revenge tile slaughter

of their kinsmen ; and if tliev rather choose (as they generally do/ to compound the matter tor moiiey, noth-

ing more is said about it. (LadyM. V». Montague, Ictt. 42.)

(10) Rexc. Francis, 2 T. E. 484, in which it was held that a new trial might be granted in

these cases.
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seems that, when *these offences by degrees grew no longer redeemable, r*oi JT

the private process was still continued, in order to insure the infliction *- ' " '•

of punishment upon the offender, though the party injured was allowed no

pecuniary compensation for the offence.

But, though appeals were thus in the nature of prosecutions for some atrocious

injury committed more immediately against an individal, yet it also was an-

ciently permitted, that any subject might appeal another subject of high treason,

either in the courts of common law, (to) or in parliament, or (for treasons com-

mitted beyond the seas^ in the court of the high constable and marshal. The

cognizance of appeals in the latter still continues in force; and so late as 1631

there was a trial by battle awarded in the court of chivalry, on such an appeal

of treason: (x) but that in the first was virtually abolished (y) by the statutes

5 Edw. Ill, c. 9, and 25 Edw. Ill, c. 24, and in the second expressly by statute 1

Hen. IV. c. 14, so that the only appeals now in force for things done within the

realm, are appeals of felony and mayhem.

An appeal of felony may be brought for crimes committed either against

the parties themselves or their relations. The crimes against the parties them-

selves are larceny, rape and arson. And for these, as well as for 'mayhem, the

persons robbed, ravished, maimed, or whose houses are burnt, may institute this

private process. The only crime against one's relation, for which an appeal can

be brought, is that of killing him, by either murder or manslaughter. But this

cannot be brought by every relation : but only by the wife for the death of her
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husband, or by the heir male for the death of his ancestor; which heirship was

also confirmed, by an ordinance of King Henry the First, to the four nearest

degrees of blood, (z.) It is given to the wife on account of the loss of her hus-

band ; therefore, if she marries again, before or pending her appeal, it is lost and

gone ; or, if she marries after judgment, she shall not demand execution. The

heir, as was said, must also be heir male, and such a one as was the *next r*qiEi

heir by the course of the common law, at the time of the killing of the "- -I

ancestor. But this rule hath three exceptions: 1. If the person killed leaves an

innocent wife, she only, and not the heir, shall have the appeal: 2. If there be

no wife, and the heir be accused of the murder, the person who, next to him,

would have been heir male, shall bring the appeal: 3. If the wife kills her hus-

bund, the heir may appeal her of the death. And, by the statute of Gloucester,

6 Edw. I, c. 9, all appeals of death must be sued within a year and a day after

the completion of the felony by the death of the party: which seems to be only

declaratory of the old common law; for in the Gothic constitutions we find the

same " prcescriptio annalix, qua currit adversus actorem, si de homicidn ei non

conxtet intra annum a cceda facta, nee qiienquam interea arguat et accuset." (a)

These appeals may be brought previous to an indictment: and if the appellee

be acquitted thereon, he cannot be afterwards indicted for the same offence. In

like manner as by the old Gothic constitution, if any offender gained a verdict

in his favour, when prosecuted by the party injured, he was also understood to

be acquitted of any crown prosecution for the same offence: (b) but, on the con-

trary, if he made his peace with the king, still he might be prosecuted at the suit

of tiie party. And so, with us, if a man be acquitted on an indictment of mur-

der, or found guilty, and pardoned by the king, still he ought not (in strictness)

to go at large, but be imprisoned or let to bail till the year and day be past, by

virtue of the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, in order to be'forthcoming to answer any

appeal for the same felony, not having as yet been punished for it, though, if he

hath been found guilty of manslaughter on an indictment, and hath had the

benefit of clergy, and suffered the judgment of the law, he cannot afterwards

be appealed; for it is a maxim in Jaw that, " nemo bis punitur pro eodein de-

lido." Before this statute was made, it was not usual to indict a man for

homicide within the time limited for appeals; which produced very great incon-

venience, of which more hereafter, (c)

(w) Britt. c. 22.

(x) By Doniild lord Eea against David Ramsey. Rushw. vol. 2. part2, p. 112. j (y) 1 Hal. P. C. 849.

(z) Mirr. c. 2. J 7. (a) SUcrnh. dejure Ootlt. 1. 3, o. 4. (tj SOernh. dejvre Goth. I. 1, c. B.

(c) See page o35.
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F*316l *^ *^e aPPe^ee oe acquitted, the appellor (by virtue of the statute of

L J Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 12) sliall suffer one years imprisonment, and

pay a fine to the king, besides restitution of damages to the party for the im-

prisonment and infamy which he has sustained: and if the appellor be incapa-

ble to make restitution, his abettors shall do it for him, and also be liable to

imprisonment. This provision, as was foreseen by the author of Fleta, (d)

proved a great discouragement to appeals; so that thenceforward they ceased to

be in common use.

If the appellee be found guilty he shall suffer the same judgment as if he had

been convicted by indictment: but with this remarkable difference; that on an

indictment, which is at the suit of the king, the king may pardon and remit

the execution; on an appeal, which is at the suit of a private subject, to make

an atonement for the private wrong, the king can no more pardon it than he can

remit the damages recovered in an action of battery, (c) In like manner, as

while the weregild continued to be paid as a line for homicide, it could not be

remitted by the king's authority. (/) And the ancient usage was, so late as

Henry the Fourth's time, that all the relations of the slain should drag the ap-

pellee to the place of execution: (g) a custom fouirded upon that savage spirit of

family resentment, which prevailed universally through Europe, after the irrup-

tion of the northern nations, and is peculiarly attended to in their several codes

of law; and which prevails even now among the wild and untutored inhabitants

of America; as if the finger of nature had pointed it out to mankind, in their
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rude and uncultivated state, (h) However, the punishment of the offender may

be remitted and discharged by the concurrence of all parties interested ; and, as

the king, by his pardon, may frustrate an indictment, so the appellant by his

r*31r'l re^case mflv *discharge an appeal; (t) " nam quilibet potest renunciare

"- -I juri pro se introducto. (11)

These are the several modes of prosecution, instituted by the laws of Eng-

land for the puishment of offences; of which that by indictment is the most

general. I shall therefore confine my subsequent observations principally to

this method of prosecution; remarking by the way the most material variations

that may arise, from the method of proceeding, by either information or appeal.

(d) L. 1, c. J4, > «. (ej 2 Hawk. P. C. 302. (f) LL. Edm. •; 3.

(g) Jf. 11 Ben. IV, 12. 3 Inst. 181. (h) Robertson, Clias. V, i. 45. (I) 1 Hal. P. C. 9.

(11) These appeals had become nearly obsolete, but the right Rtill existing was claimed, and

in part exercised, in the year 1818, by William Ashl'ord, eldest brother aud heir at law of Mary

Ashl'ord, who brought a writ of appeal against Abraham Thornton, for the murder of his sister.

Thorton had been tried at the Warwick summer assizes, 1817, for the murder, and acquitted,

though under circumstances of strong suspicion. The appellee, when called upon tn plead,

pleaded " not guilty, and that he was ready to defend himself by his body;" aud, taking his

glove off, he threw it upon the floor of the court. A counterplea was afterwards delivered m by

the appellant, to which there was a replication. A general demurrer followed, and joinder

thereon. See a full detail of the proceedings in that singular case, in the report of it, under the

mune of Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. aud A. 405. It was held, iu that case, that where, in an ap-

peal of death, the appellee wages his battle, the counterplca, to oust him of this mode of trial,

must disclose such violent and strong presumptions of guilt, as to leave no possible doubt iu the

minds of the court; aud, therefore, that a countcrplea, which only stated strong circumstances

(if suspicion, was insufficient. It was also held, that the appellee may reply fresh matter, tend-

ing to show his innocence, as an alibi, and his former acquittal of the same offence on an indict-

ment. But it was doubted whether, when the countcrplea is per se insufficient, or where the

replication is a good answer to it, the court should give judgment that the appellee be allowed

his wager of battle, or that he go without day. Therefore, the appellant praying no further

judgment, the court, by consent of both parties, ordered that judgment should be staved in the

appeal, and that the appellee should be discharged. This case, the first of the kintl that had

occurred for more than half a century : see Bigby v. Kennedy, 5 Burr, 2643 ; 2 W. Bl. 713;

Hex v. Taylor, 5 Burr, 2793; Smith v. Taylor, id.; the last cases upon the subject, where the

mode of proceeding is detailed at large, led to the total abolition of appeals of murder, as well

as of treason, felony, or other offences, together with wagers of battle, by the passing of the

statute 59 Geo. Ill, c. 46.]
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CHAPTER XXIV.

OF PROCESS UPON AN INDICTMENT.

WE are next, in the fourth place, to inquire into the manner of issuing pro-

cess, after indictment found, to bring in the accused to answer it. We have

hitherto supposed the offender to be in custody before the finding of the indict-

ment ; in which case he is immediately (or as soon as convenience permits) to be

arraigned thereon. But if lie had fled, or secretes himself, in capital cases: or

hath not, in smaller misdemeanors, been bound over to appear at the assizes or

sessions, still an indictment maybe preferred against him in his absence; since,

were he present, he could not be heard before the grand jury against it And,

if it be found, then process must issue to bring him into court; for the indict-

ment cannot be tried, unless he personally appears: according to the rules of

equity in all cases, and the express provision of statute 28 Edw. Ill, c. 3, in

capital ones, that no man shall be put to death, without being brought to answer

by due process of law.

The proper process on an indictment for any petit misdemeanor, or on a

penal statute, is a writ of venire facias, which is in the nature of a summons to

cause the party to appear. And if, by the return to such venire, it appears that

the party hath lands in the county, whereby he may be distrained, then a dis-

tress infinite shall be issued, from time to time, till he appears. But if the

sheriff returns that he hath no lands in his bailiwick, (then upon his non-

appearance) a writ of capias *shall issue, which commands the sheriff r *QJQ -i
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to take his body, and have him at the next assizes; and if he cannot be L "•" " '

taken upon the first capias, a second and third shall issue, called an alias, and a

pluries capias. But, on indictments for treason or felony, a capias is the first

process : and, for treason or homicide, only one shall be allowed to issue, (») or

two in the case of other felonies, by statute 25 Edw. Ill, c. 14, though the

usage is to issue only one in any felony; the provisions of this statute being

in most cases found impracticable, (b) And so, in the case of misdemeanors, it

is now the usual practice for any judge of the court of king's bench, upon cer-

tificate of an indictment found, to award a writ of capias immediately, in order

to bring in the defendant. (1) But if he absconds, and it is thought proper to

pursue him to an outlawry, then a greater exactness is necessary. For, in

such case, after the several writs have issued in a regular number, according to

the nature of the respective crimes, without any effect, the offender shall be put

in the exigent in order to his outlawry: that is. he shall be exacted, proclaimed,

or required to surrender, at five county courts; and if he be returned quinto

exttc/us, and does not appear at the fifth exaction or requisition, then he is

adjudged to be outlawed, or put out of the protection of the law: so that he is

incapable of taking the benefit of it in any respect, either by bringing actions

or otherwise.

The punishment for outlawries upon an indictments for misdemeanors is the

same as for outlawries upon civil actions (of which, and the previous process

by writs of capias exit/i facias, and proclamation, we spoke in the preceding

book); (c) viz., forfeiture of goods and chattels. But an outlawry in treason or

felony amounts to a conviction and attainder of the offence charged in the

(«) See Appendix, ! 1. (i>) 2 Hal. P. C. 19i. (c) See book III, pp. 283, 284.

(1) [By the statute 11 and 12 Tic. c. 43, ?. 3, when any indictment is found in any court of

over and terminer, or gaol delivery, or in any court of general or quarter sessions, ajrainst any

person at larjrc, whether he has been previously bound to appear or not, the clerk of indictment'?,

or clerk of the peace, as the cose muy be, may at any time issue a certificate of such indictment

hnviufr been found ; and, upon its production, a justice for the county or place where the offence

was committed, or where the defendant resides, may issue his warrant, and thereupon commit

him for trial or admit him to bail.]

.-•
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indictment, as much as if the offender had been found guilty by his country. (r7)

His life is, however, still under the protection of the law, as hatli formerly been

F *320 1 *ODServe(l: (e) s° that though anciently an outlawed felon was said to

*• -" have caput lupinum, and might be knocked on the head like a wolf, by

any one that should meet him; (/) because, having renounced all law. he was

to be dealt with as in a state of nature, when every one that should find him

might slay him; yet, now, to avoid such inhumanity, it is holdeu that no

man is entitled to kill him wantonly or wilfully: but in so doing is guilty of

murder, (g) unless it happens in the'endeavour to apprehend him. (/*) For"any

person may arrest an outlaw on a criminal prosecution, either of his own head,

or by writ or warrant of capias uttagatum, in order to bring him to execution.

But such outlawry may be frequently reversed by writ of error; the proceedings

therein being (as it is fit they should be) exceedingly nice and circumstantial;

and, if any single minute point be omitted or misconducted, the whole outlawry

is illegal, and may be reversed: upon which reversal the party accused is admit-

ted to plead to, and defend himself against, the indictment.

Thus much for the process to bring in the offender after indictment found;

during which stage of the prosecution it is that writs of eertiorari facias are

usually had, though they maybe had at any time before trial, to certify and

remove the indictment, with all the proceedings thereon, from anv inferior

court of criminal jurisdiction into the court of king's bench; (2) which is the
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sovereign ordinarv court of justice in causes criminal. And this is frequently

done for one of these four purposes; either, 1. To consider and determine the

validity of appeals or indictments and the proceedings thereon ; and to quash

or confirm them as there is cause: or, 2. Where it is surmised that a partial or

insufficient trial will probably be had in the court below the indictment is

removed in order to have the prisoner or defendant tried at the bar of the

court of king's bench, or before the justices of nisi prim: or, 3. It is so

removed in order to plead the king's pardon there: or, 4. To issue process of

r ,001 I outlawry against the offender, in those ""counties or places where the

L <>J J process of the inferior judges will not reach him (i). Such a writ of

eertiorari, when issued and delivered to the inferior court for removing any record

or other proceeding, as well upon indictment as otherwise, supercedes the juris-

diction of such inferior court, and makes all subsequent proceedings therein,

entirely erroneous and illegal; unless the court of king's bench remands the

record to the court below, to be there tried and determined. A eertiorari jnay

be granted at the instance of either the prosecutor or the defendant: the for-

mer as a matter of right, the latter as a matter of discretion; and therefore it

(d) 2 Hal. P. C. 20S. (e) See page 178. (f) Mlrr. c, 4. Co. I.ilt. 128.

(g) 1 Hal. P. C. 497. (A; Brocton,/oi. 125. (i) 2 Hal. P. C. S10.

(2) [For the definition and history of the writ of eertiorari, see Pitz X. B. 554. As the

conrt of king's bench has n general superintendence over all other courts of criminal juris-

diction, so it may award a eertiorari to remove proceedings from them, unless they are ei-

pressly exempted from such superintendence by the statutes creating them. 2 Hawk. P. C.

286; Rex r. Young, 2 T. R. 473; Rex v. Jukes, 8 id. 542. But cettior.iri cannot be taken away

by any general, but only by express negative words: Rex ». Rneve, 1 W. Bl. 231; and a statute,

taking away eertiorari, does not take it from the crown, unless expressly mentioned. Rex ». ,

2 Chit. R. 13G; and see Rex v. Tindal, 15 East, 339, u. Cortiomri lies from the court of king's

bench to justices, even in cases which thev are empowered finally to hear aad determine. 2

Haw. P, 0. 886 j Rexe. Morely. 2 Burr. 1040: Hartley r. Hooker, Gowp. 524.]

Xow, by statute 5 and 6 Wm. IV, c. 33, s. 1, no eertiorari issues from the queen's bench,

except at the instance of the attorney-general, unless on leave obtained from the court, or a

judge at chambers. And by statute 1(3 and 17 Vie. c. 30, s. 4, no indictment, except indict-

ments against bodies corporate not authorized to appear by attorney in the courts in which the

Bame aro found, can be removed into the queen's bench or the central criminal court, by eer-

tiorari, at the instance of the prosecutor or defendant (other than the attorney-general acting

on behalf of the crown), unless it be made to appear to the court that ft fair and impartial

trial cannot be had in the court below, or that some question of law of more than usual diffi-

culty and importance is likely to arise upon the trial, or that a view of the premises in respect

whereof any indictment is preferred, or a special jury, may be required for the satisfactory trial

of the same.
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is seldom granted to remove indictments from the justices of gaol-delivery, or

after issue joined or confession of the fact in any •»!' the courts below, (k)

At this stage of prosecution, also, it is that indictments found by the grand

jury against a peer must, in consequence of a writ of cvrtiorari, be certified

and transmitted into the court of parliament, or into that of the lord high

steward of Great Britain; and that, in places of exclusive jurisdiction, as the

two universities, indictments must be delivered (upon challenge and claim of

cognizance) to the courts therein established by charter, and confirmed by act

of parliament, to be there respectively tried and" determined.

CHAPTEE XXV.

OF ARRAIGNMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS.

the offender either appears voluntarily to an indictment, or was before

in custody, or is brought in upon criminal process to answer it in the proper

court, he is immediately to be arraigned thereon; which is the fifth stage of

criminal prosecution.

To arraign is nothing else but to call the prisoner to the bar of the court, to

answer the matter charged upon him in the indictment. («) The prisoner is

to be called to the bar by his name; and it is laid down in our ancient books (I)

that, though under an indictment of the highest nature, he must be brought to

the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds: unless there be

evident danger of an escape, and then he may be secured with irons. But yet
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in Layer's case, A. D. 1722, a difference was taken between the time of arraign-

ment and the time of trial; and accordingly the prisoner stood at the bar in

chains during the time of his arraignment, (c)

*When he is brought to the bar, he is called upon by name to hold r*qo-31

up his hand: which, though it may seem a trifling circumstance, yet is "• -"

of this importance, that, by the holding up of his hand, cnnstat de persona, and

he owns himself to be of that name by which he is called, (d) However, it is

not an indispensable ceremony; for, being calculated merely for the purpose

of identifying the person, any other acknowledgment will answer the purpose

as well; therefore, if the prisoner obstinately and contemptuously refuses to

hold up his hand, but confesses he is the person named, it is fully sufficient, (e)

Then the indictment is to be read to him distinctly in the English tongue

(which was law, even while all other proceedings were in Latin), that he may

fully understand his charge. After which it is to be demanded of him whether

he be guilty of the crime whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty. By the

old common law the accessory could not be arraigned till the principal was

attainted, unless he chose it; for he might waive the benefit of the law: and

therefore, principal and accessory might, and may still, be arraigned, and plead,

and also be tried together. Bat otherwise, if the principal had never been

indicted at all, had stood mute, had challenged above thirty-five jurors peremp-

torily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had obtained a pardon, or had died

before attainder, the accessory in any of these cases could not be arraigned: for

lion constitit whether any felony was committed or no, till the principal was

attainted;' and it might so happen that the accessory should be convicted one

day, and the principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. However

this absurdity could only happen where it was possible that a trial of the prin-

cipal might be had subsequent to that of the accessory; and therefore the law

(k) -1 Hawk. P. C. 287. 2 Burr. 749. (a) 2 Hal. P. C 210.

rtjllrnct. (. 3, ife core*, o. 18. f 3. Mirr. c. 5, »ec«. 1, j 51. Flet. 1.1, e. 31, }1. Brit. C. 5. Staundf. P. C.

73. S lust. :U. Kel. 10. 2 Hal. P. C. 21H. 2 Hawk. P. C. 308.

(c) State Trials, VI, 230. (d) 2 Hal. P. C. 219. fe) Raym. 408.
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still continues that the accessory shall not be tried so long as the principal

[*3241 remains liable to be tried hereafter. (1) But by statute, *1 Ann. c. 9, if

' '" J the principal be once convicted, and before attainder (that is, before lie

receives judgment of death or outlawry), he is delivered by pardon, the benefit

of clergy, or otherwise; or if the principal stands mute, or challenges peremp-

torily above the legal number of jurors, so as never to be convicted at all; in

any of these cases, in which no subsequent trial can be had of the principal,

the accessory may be proceeded against as if the principal felon had been at-

tainted; for there is no danger of future contradiction. And upon the trial

of the accessory, as well after as before the conviction of the principal, it seems

to be the better opinion, and founded on the true spirit of jnstice,( f) that the

accessory is at liberty (if he can) to controvert the guilt of his supposed prin-

cipal, and to prove him innocent of the charge, as well in point of fact as in

point of law.

When a criminal is arraigned, he either stands mule or confesses the fact;

which circumstances we may call incidents to the arraignment: or else he

pleads to the indictment, which is to be considered as the next stage of pro-

ceedings. But, first, let ns observe these incidents to the arraignment, of stand-

ing mute, or confession.

I. Regularly, a prisoner is said to stand mute, when, being arraigned for trea-

son or felony, he either, 1. Makes no answer at all: or, 2. Answers foreign to the
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purpose, or with such matter as is not allowable; and will not answer other-

wise: or, 3. Upon having pleaded not guilty, refuses to put himself upon the

country, (c/) If he says nothing, the court ought ex offiuio to empanel a jury to

inquire whether he stands obstinately mute, or whether he be dumb exvisitn-

tioiie Dei. If the latter appears to be the case, the judges of the court (who

are to be of counsel for the prisoner, and to see that he hath law and justice)

shall proceed to the trial, and examine all points as if he had pleaded not

guilty. (//,) (2) But whether judgment of death can be given against such a

[*12~ 1 *Pr'soner wno huth never pleaded, and can say nothing in arrest of

L J judgment, is a point yet undetermined, (i)

(f) Foster. 365, Ac. (g) 2 Hal. P. C. 316. (k) 2 Hawk. P. C. 307. (i) 2 Hal. P. C. SIT.

(1) Now, by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94, s. 1, an accessory before the fact to any felony may be

indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as if he were the principal felon. By

section 2, whosoever shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit any felony

shall be guilty of felony, and may be indicted and convicted, either as an accessory before

the fuct to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or may be indictod and

convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been pre-

viously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to justice, and may thereupon be punished

in the same manner as an accessory before the fact to the same felony, if convicted as an acces-

sory, muy bi> punished. And by 24 and 25 Vic. e. 99, s. 3, the like provision is made for the case

of accessories after the fact.

(2) [By ? am! 8 Geo. IV, c. 23, s. 1, where a prisoner pleads " not guilty," without more, he

shall be put on his trial by jury; and, by section 2, if he refuses to plead, the court may order

a plea uf •' not guilty" to be entered, and proceed as in other cases. Bat the latter is dis-

cretionary ; and where there is any real doubt whether the refusal to plead arises from obsti-

nacy or inability, the court may, and will, impanel a jury to try that question. In case of

insanity this is specially provided for by the unrepealed statute of 159 and 40 Geo. III. c. 94,

section 1 of which enacts that the jury, in case of any person charged with treason, Ac., prov-

ing «/»')» the trial to be insane, shall declare whether he was acquitted by them on account

of insanity, and the court shall order him to be kept in custody till his majesty's pleasure be

known, and his majesty may give an order for the safe custody of snoh insane person ; and

section 2 enacts that insane persons indicted for any offence, and found to be iusane by »jury,

to be impaneled on their arraignment, shall bo ordered by the court to be kept in cus'tody till

his majesty's pleasure be known. The latter section has been hold to extend to cases of mis-

demeanor. Ki'i c. Little, R. and R. C. C. 4:W. In Rex v. Roberts, Car. Cr. L. 57, a prisoner

would not plead, and a jury being impaneled to try whether he stood mute by the visitation of

God, his counsel claimed a right to address the jury, as this was an issue with the affirma-

tive on the prisoner. This was allowed by Park and Abbot, JJ. The prisoner's counsel ad-

dressed the jury, and called witnesses to prove he was insane. The jury found that he was

so, and Park, J., directed that he should be detained until his majesty's pleasure should

be known.]

See Keg. r. Pritchard, 7 C. and P. 303, 305, n.
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If he be found to be obstinately mute (which a prisoner hath been held to be

that hath cut out his own tongue), (£) then, if it be on an indictment of high

treason, it hath long been clearly settled, that standing mute is an equivalent to

a conviction, and he shall receive the same judgment and execution. (/) And as

in this the highest crime, so also in the lowest species of felony, viz.: in petit

larceny, and in all misdemeanors, standing mute hath always been equivalent

to conviction. But upon appeals or indictments for other felonies, or petit

treason, the prisoner was not, by the ancient law, looked upon as convicted, so

as to receive judgment for the felony; but should, for his obstinacy, have

received the terrible sentence of penance, or peine (which, as will appear pres-

enth', was probably nothing more than a corrupted abbreviation of jjrisone)

forte et dure.

Before this was pronounced the prisoner had not only trina admonitio, but

also a respite of a few hours, and the sentence wras distinctly read to him, that

he might know his danger; («i) and. after all, if he continued obstinate, and bis

offence was clergyable, he had the benefit of his clergy allowed him, even though

he was too stubborn to pray it(«) Thus tender was the law of inflicting this

dreadful punishment; but if no other means could prevail, and the prisoner

(when charged with a capital felony) continued stubbornly mute, the judgment

was then given against him without any distinction of sex or degree. A judg

ment, which was purposly ordained to be exquisitely severe, that by that very
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means it might rarely be put in execution. (3)

The rack, or question, to extort a confession from criminals, is a practice of a

different nature; this having been only "used to compel a mail to put

himself upon his trial; that being a species of trial in itself. And the

trial by rack is utterly unknown to the law of England; though once when

thednkes of Exeter and Suffolk, and other ministers of Henry VI, had laid a

design to introduce the civil law into this kingdom as the rule of government,

fora beginning thereof they erected a rack for torture; which was called in

derision the duke of Exeter's daughter, and still remains in the tower of Lon-

don; (o) where it was occasionally used as an engine of state, not of law, more

than once in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, (p) But, when upon the assassina-

tion of Villiers, duke of Buckingham, by 1'elton, it was proposed in the privy

council to put the assassin to the rack, in order to discover his accomplices; the

judges being consulted, declared unanimously, to their owu honour and the

honour of the English law, that no such proceeding was allowable by the laws

of England, (q) it seems astonishing that this usage of administering the tor-

ture should be said to arise from a tenderness to the lives of men : and yet this

is the reason given for its introduction in the civil law, and its subsequent

adoption by the Ereuch and other foreign nations, ()•) viz.: because the laws can-

lil 3 Inst. 17$. (I] 1 Hnn-k. P. C. 3M. 2 Hal. P. C. 317. Im) 2 Hal. P. C. 320.

(Hi/tW. .T21. 2 Hnvvk. P. C. ».'. (o) S lust. S3. (?) Burr, ft!, 1!N|.

((/> ltii«hw. Coll. i, (US. (r) Cod. I. 9, t, 41, I. d, <f t. 47, I. lii. Foi tesq. de LL. Ang. c. 22.

(3) [Aulus Gellius, with, more truth, has made the same observation upon the cruel law of

the Twelve Tables, D<i iitojw ilebitorexeeamlo, " Et> aiiutilo tiintn iiumanitan pcuna dcnnnciuta e»t,

nc ad cam iiiiqitain pavciiirftur;" for he adds, •' flis.icetum ease antiquitus iiemiHem cqitiilcut

nequc leg! ncqiw aailiei." lib. <JO, c. 1. But with respect to the horrid judgment of the J>CIH«

forte ct dure, the prosecutor and the court could exercise no discretion, or show no favor to a

prisoner who stood obstinately mute. And in the legal history of this country there are

numerous instances of persons, who have had resolution and patience to undergo so terrible d

death in order to benefit their heirs by preventing a forfeiture of their estates, which would have

been the consequence of a conviction by a verdict.]

Many cases are on record in which this punishment was inflicted. See Case of Juliana

Qnicke, Cro. Car. 118; Case of Johu Kusscll, whose tortures are said to have been shortened

liv compassionate by-standers casting stones upon him, Barrington's Statutes, 85, note. In

Kelynge's Kep., p. <J7, it is said to have been the constant practice at Newgate, in the time of

Charles II. U> tie the two thumbs together with whipcord in order that the pain might compel

the party to plead.

Th« only American case 011 record in which this punishment was inflicted was that of Giles

Corey. 8 Baacruft'a U. S. 93; 2 Hildroth's U. S. 160.
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not endure that any man should die upon the evidence of a false or even a

single witness; und, therefore, contrived this method that innocence should

manifest itself by a stout denial, or guilt by a plain confession. Thus rating a

man's virtue by the hardiness of his constitution, and his guilt by the sensibil-

ity of his nerves!—But there needs only to state accurately, (*) in order most

effectually to expose this inhuman species of mercy, the uncertainty of which,

as a test and criterion of truth, was long ago very elegantly pointed out by

T *'J27 1 Tully ' though he lived in a state wherein it was *usua1 to torture slaves

' ' J in order to furnish evidence; "lumen," says he," ilia tormenfa gubernat

dolor moderatur natnra cujmrjite turn animi turn corporis, rcyit qucesilor, flectit,

libido, corrwmpit tpet, inftrmat metus, nt in tot re-rum angusiiis nihil veritati

loci rettnquatnr." (t)

The English judgment of penance for standing (u) mute was as follows: that

the prisoner be remanded to the prison from whence he came; and put into a

low, dark chamber; and there be laid on his back, on the bare floor, naked,

unless where decency forbids: that there be placed upon his body as great a

weight of iron as he could bear, and more; that he have no sustenance, save

only, on the first day, three morsels of the worst bread; and, on the second day,

three draughts of standing water, that should be nearest to the prison door; and in

this situation this should be alternately his daily diet till he died, or (as anciently

the judgment ran) till he answered, (v)
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It hath been doubted whether this punishment subsisted at the common

law, (to) or was introduced in consequence of the statute Westm. 1. 3 Edw. I, c.

12, (x) which seems to be the better opinion. For not a word of it is mentioned

in Glauvil or Bractou, or in any ancient author, case, or record (that hath yet

been produced), previous to the reign of Edward I; but there are instances on

record in the reign of Henry III, (//) where persons accused of felony, and stand-

• ing mute were tried in a particular manner by two successive juries, and convicted;

and it is asserted by the judges in 8 Hen. IV, that, by the common law before the

statute, standing mnteon an appeal amounted to a conviction of the felony.(z) This

r *'•<:> 8 1 statute of Edward I directs such persons *"as will not put themselves upon

L -• inquests of felonies before the judges at the suit of the king, to be put

into hard and strong prison (xoient my.i en In prisons fort et dure) as those which

refuse to be at the common law of the land." And immediately after this stat-

ute, the form of the judgment appears in Fleta and Britton to have been only

a very strait confinement in prison, with hardly any degree of sustenance; bu't

no weight is directed to be laid upon the body, so as to hasten the death of the

miserable sufferer: and indeed any surcharge of punishment on persons ad-

judged to penance, so as to shorten their lives, is reckoned by Home in the

Mirror (a) as a species of criminal homicide. It also clearly appears, by a record

of 31 Edw. Ill, (b) that the prisoner might then possibly subsist for forty days

under this lingering punishment. I should, therefore, imagine that the practice

of loading him with weights, or. as it was usually called, pressing him to death,

was gradually introduced between 31 Edw. Ill, and 8 Hen. IY, at which last

period it first appears upon our books ; (c) being intended as a species of mercy

to the delinquent, by delivering him the sooner from his torment: and hence 1

presume it also was, that the duration of the penance was then first (d) altered;

and instead of continuing till he answered, it was directed to continue /»7/ he died,

which must very soon happen under an enormous pressure.

The uncertainty of its original, the doubts that were conceived of its legality,

(») The marquis B«ocarla (oh. W), in an exquisite piece of raillery, has proposed this problem, with a

gravity und precision that nre truly mathematical: '-The force of ilie mnaolos and the sensibility of the

nerves of nn iiiniM'uni person being given, it is required to Qnil the degree of pain necessary to make him

confess himself guilty of a given erlnra."

10 I'ro Sulla, 28. (u) 2 Hal. P. C. 3I». 2 Hawk. P. C. 338.

(ri Krltton, c. 4. ft 22. Kiel. I. 1, t. 31. (:«. iw) 2 lust. 17». 2 Hal. P. C. n.29. 8 Hawk. P. C. S30.

Ul Stiiuiulf P. C 111). Unrr. Hi. lyl Emlyn on 2 Mai P. C. 32J.

I:) At aimmnn ley itmnit le utiitute de Wat. 1, c. 12, si. ascum ust mire appeal, et tut ettre mutt,ili i

Cfiirict tie felony. (.\f. » Hen. II'. 3.)

IfliCll. I, }9. Ox Kltym. 13. (c) Yearl). 8Hcn.IV, 1.

(<l: Et fuit tlit. que le coutraire utait eitre j'uit ilevant ces hcun. (Ibid. 2.)
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and the repugnance of its theory (for it was rarely carried into practice) to the

humanity of the laws of England, all concurred to require a legislative abolition

of this cruel process, and a restitution of the ancient common law-: whereby

the standing mute in felony, as well as in treason and in trespass, amounted to

a confession of the charge. Or, if the corruption of the blood and the con-

sequent escheat in felony had been removed, the judgment of peine forte et dure

might perhaps have still innocently remained, *as a monument of the ^ ^.^ -,

savage rapacity with which the lordly tyrants of feudal antiquity hunted I- ''"' '

after escheats "and forfeitures; since no one would ever have been tempted to

undergo such a horrid alternative. For the law was, that by standing mute,

and suffering this heavy penance, the judgment, and of course the corruption

of the blood and escheat of the lands, were saved in felony and petit treason,

though not the forfeiture of the goods: and, therefore, this lingering punish-

ment was probably introduced, in order to extort a plea: without which it was

held that no judgment of death could be given, and so the lord lost his escheat.

But in high treason, as standing mute is equivalent to a conviction, the same

judgment, the same corruption of blood, and the same forfeitures always

attended it, as in other cases of conviction. (<?) And very lately, to the honour

of our laws, it hath been enacted by statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 20, that every person

•who, being arraigned for felony or piracy, shall stand mute or not answer

directly to the offence, shall be convicted of the same, and the same judgment
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and execution (with all their consequences in every respect) shall be thereupon

awarded, as if the person had been convicted by verdict or confession of the

crime. (4) And thus much for the demeanor of a prisoner upon his arraignment,

by standing mute; which now, in all cases, amounts to a constructive con-

fession.

II. The other incident to arraignments, exclusive of the plea, is the prisoner's

actual confession of the indictment. Upon a simple and plain confession, the

court hath nothing to do but to award judgment: but it is usually very back-

ward in receiving and recording such confession, ont of tenderness to the life

of the subject; and will generally advise the prisoner to retract it, and plead to

the indictment, (/)

But there is another species of confession, which we read much of in our

ancient books, of a far more complicated kind, which is called approvement.

And that is when a *person indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned r *OQQ -i

for the same,doth confess the fact before plea pleaded; and appeals or *- '

accuses others, his accomplices, of the same crime, in order to obtain his pardon.

In this case he is called an approver or prover, probator, and the party appealed

or accused is called the appellee. Such approvement can only be in capital

offences; and it is, as it were, equivalent to an indictment, since the appellee is

equally called upon to answer it: and if he hath no reasonable and legal ex-

ceptions to make to the person of the approver, which indeed are very numer-

ous, he must put himself upon his trial, either bybattel, or by the country: and

if vanquished or found guilty, must suffer the judgment of the law, and the

approver shall have his pardon ex deUto justitia. On the other hand, if the

appellee be conqueror, or acquitted by the jury, the approver shall receive

judgment to be hanged, upon his own confession of the indictment; for the

condition of his pardon has failed, viz., the convicting of some other person, and

therefore his conviction remains absolute.

But it is purely in the discretion of the court to permit the approved thus to

(e) 2 Hawk. P. C. 831. (/) 2 Hal. P. C. 225.

(4) [Two instances have occurred since the passing of this statute, of persons who refused

to plead, and who in consequence were condemned and executed. One was at the Old Bailey,

for murder, in 1777 ; the other was for burglary, at the Hammer assizes at AVells, in 179-2.]

The practice now, since the statute 7 ami 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, is for the court to enter a plea ol

not guilty for the accused party. See notes, pp. 324 and 325, supra.
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appeal or not: and, in fact, this course of admitting approvements hath been

long disused: for the truth was, as Sir Mathew Hale observes, that more mis-

chief hath arisen to good men by these kind of approvements, upon false and

malicious accusations of desperate villains, than benefit to the public by the

discovery and conviction of real offenders. And therefore, in the times when

such appeals were more frequently admitted, great strictness and nicety were

held therein: (g) though, since th'eir discontinuance, the doctrine of approve-

ments is become a matter of more curiosity than use, I shall only observe,

that all the good, whatever it be, that can be expected from this method of ap-

provement, is fully provided for in the cases of coining, robbery, burglary, house-

breaking, horse stealing, and larceny to the value of live shillings from shops,

warehouses, stables, and coach-houses, by statutes 4 and 5 \V. and M. c. 8,

F *3311 *6 and 7 Wm" m? c- 17' 10 and U Wm" -111' Cl 23e and 5 Ann- a ?*'

' ' -" which enact, that if any such offender, being out of prison, shall dis-

cover two or more persons, who have committed the like offences, so as they

may be convicted thereof; he shall in case of burglary or house-breaking receive

a reward of 40/., and in general be entitled to a pardon of all capital offences,

excepting only murder and treason ; and of them also in the case of coining. (//)

And if any such person, having feloniously stolen any lead, iron, or other metal,

shall discover and convict two offenders of having illegally bought or received

the same, he shall by virtue of statute 29 Geo II, c. 30, be pardoned for all such
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felonies committed before such discovery. (5) It hath also been usual for the

justices of the peace, by whom any persons charged with felony are committed

to gaol, to admit some one of their accomplices to become a witness (or, as it is

generally termed, king's evidence) against his fellows; upon an implied confi-

dence, which the judges of gaol-delivery have usually countenanced and adopted,

that if such accomplice makes a full and complete discovery of that and of all

other felonies to which he is examined by the magistrate, and afterwards gives

his evidence without prevarication or fraud, he shall not himself be prosecuted

for that or any other previous offence of the same degree, (i) (6)

(Hi 2 Hal. P. C. eh. 29. 2 Hawk. P. C. ch. 24.

[») The pardon for discovering offences againat the coinage act of 15 Gco. n, c. 28, extends only to all

f< It offences,

(i) The King v. Rndd; Mich. 16 Geo. in, on a case reserved from the Old Bailey,Oct. 1775.

(5) The statutes here mentioned arc since repealed.

(6) [It has now been solemnly decided that an accomplice admitted as king's evidence, and

performing the condition on which ho is admitted as a witness, ie not entiueti, as matter of

riflht, to he exempt from prosecution for other offences with which he is charged, hut that it will

be matter in the discretion of the judge whether he will recommend him for a pardon or not.

Bex v. Lee, R. and R. C. C. 36i. Rex v. Bruntou, id. 454. Even the equitable claim of an

accomplice to a pardon, on condition of his making a full and fair confession, does not extend

to prosecutions for other offences in which he was not concerned with the prisoner: with

respect to such offences, therefore, he is not bound to answer on cross-examination. Lee's,

Ihice's, and West's Cases, 1 Phil. Ev. 37 But the judges will not, in general, admit an accom-

plice ax king's evidence, although applied to for that purpose by the counsel for the prosecu-

tion, if it appear that he is charged with any other felony than "that on the trial of which he

is a witness. 2 C. and P. 411; Car. Cr. L. 62. Where an accomplice is confirmed in his evi-

dence against one prisoner, but not with respect to another, both may be convicted, if the jury

think the accomplice deserving of credit. Rex r. Dawber and others; 2 Stark. N". P. C. 34;

Car. Cr. L. 67. 2d ed. And see Rex «. Dawber, 3 Stark. 34, 35, n., where it is said, that if the

testimony of an accomplice be confirmed so far as it relates to one prisoner, but not as to

another, "the one may be convicted on the testimony of the accomplice, if the jury deem him

worthy of credit. An accomplice docs not require confirmation as to the person charged,

provided he is confirmed in the particulars of his story. Rex v. Birkett and Brady, R. and R.

C. C. 251. And the corroboration of his evidence need not be on every material point, but

he must be so confirmed as to convince the jury that his statement is correct and true. Rer

i'. Barnard, 1 C. and P. 88. A person indicted for a misdemeanor may be legally convicted

upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. Rex v. Jones, 2 Camp, lifcj." So may a

person indicted for a capital offence. Jordaine p. Lashbrook, 7 T. R. 609. But the testimony

of accomplices alone is seldom of sufficient weight with a jury to convict the offenders; the

temptation to commit perjury being so great, where the witness by accusing' another may

escape himself. The practice, therefore, is to advise the jury to regard the evidence of on
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CHAPTER XXVI.

OF PLEA AND ISSUE.

WE are now to consider the plea of a prisoner, or defensive matter alleged by

him on his araignment, if he does not confess or stand mute. This is either,

1. A plea to the jurisdiction; 2. A demurrer; 3. A plea in abatement; 4. A

special plea in bar; or, 5. The general issue.

Formerly, there was another plea, now abrogated, that of sanctuary ; which

is however necessary to be lightly touched upon, as it may give some light to

many parts of our ancient law: it being introduced and continued during the

superstitious veneration that was paid to consecrated ground in the times of

popery. First, then, it is to be observed, that if a person accused of any crime

(except treason, wherein the crown, and sacrilege, wherein the church, was too

nearly concerned,) had fled to any church, or church yard, and within forty days

after went in sackcloth and confessed himself guilty before the coroner, and

declared all the particular circumstances of the offence ; and thereupon took the

oath in that case provided, viz., that he abjured the realm, and would depart from

thence forthwith at the port that should be assigned him, and would never

return without leave from the king; he by this means saved his life, if he ob-

served the conditions of the oath, by going with a cross in *his hand, I-*QQQ-I

and, with all convenient speed, to the port assigned, and embarking. L -I

For if, during this forty days' privilege of sanctuary, or in his road to the sea-
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side, he was apprehended and arraigned in any court, for this felony, he might

plead the privilege of sanctuary, and had a right to be remanded, if taken out,

against his will, (a) But by this abjuration his blood was attainted, and he

forfeited all his goods and chattels, (b) The immunity of these privileged places

was very much abridged by the statutes 27 Hen. VIII, c. 19, and 32 Hen. VIII,

c. 12. And now, by the statute, 21 Jac. I, c. 28, all privilege of sanctuary, and.

abjuration consequent thereupon, is utterly taken away and abolished.

Formerly also the benefit of clergy used to be pleaded before trial or con-

viction, and was called a declinatory plea; which was the name also given to

that of sanctuary, (c) But, as the prisoner upon a trial has a chance to be

acquitted, and totally discharged; and, if convicted of a clergyable felony, is

entitled equally to his clergy after as before conviction: this course is extremely

disadvantageous; and therefore the benefit of clergy is now very rarely pleaded ;

but, if found requisite, is prayed by the convict before judgment is passed upon

him. (1)

I proceed, therefore, to the five species of pleas before mentioned.

L A plea to the jurisdiction, is where an indictment is taken before a court

that hath no cognizance of the offence; as if a man be indicted for a rape at

the sheriffs tourn, or for treason at the quarter sessions: in these, or similar

(a) Mirr. o. 1,} 13. t Hawk. P. C. 336. (b) 2 Hawk. P. C. 62. (c) 2 Hal. P. C. 230.

accomplice, only so far as he may be confirmed, in some part of his testimony, by unimpeach-

able testimony. Phil. ev. 34, 3d ed. And see id. c. 4, J ii, and the several authorities there cited

and considered.]

Where an accomplice admits his own guilt, and testifies \rithont reserve, immunity in respect

to that offence is substantially promised him. And after having given his testimony for the

prosecution, he cannot claim the privilege of uot criminating himself on cross-examination, but

will be compelled to answer fully. State v. Coudry, 5 Jones (Law), 418; Commonwealth v.

Price, 10 Gray, 472; Foster v. People, 16 Mich. 266.

The prisoner is not entitled of right to a charge from the court that the jury cannot convict

him on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice. People v. Jeuiiess, 5 Mich. 305.

(1) It is now abolished.
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cases, he may except to the jurisdiction of the court, without answering at all

to the crime alleged.(rf)

II. A demurrer to the indictment. This is incident to criminal cases, as well

r*<n.n "^ c'v''» *'hen the liict as alleged is *allowed to be true, but the prisoner

1 ""' 'J joins issue upon some point of law in the indictment, by which he in-

sists that the fact, as stated, is no felony, treason, or whatever the crime is alleged

to be. Thus, for instance, if a man be indicted for feloniously stealing a

greyhound ; which is an animal in which no valuable property can be had, and

therefore it is not felony, but only a civil trespass, to steal it: in this case the

party indicted may demur to the indictment; denying it to be felony, though

he confesses the act of taking it. Some have held, (e) that if, on demurrer, the

point of law be adjudged against the prisoner, he shall have judgment and exe-

cution, as if convicted by verdict. But this is denied by others, (/) who hold,

that in such case he shall be directed and received to plead the general issue, not

guilty, after a demurrer determined against him. (3) Which appears the more

reasonable, because it is clear that if the prisoner freely discovers the fact in

court, and refers it to the opinion of the court, whether it be felony or no ; and

upon the fact thus shown it appears to be felony; the court will not record the

confession ; but admit him afterwards to plead not guilty. (</) And this seems to

be a case of the sam.; nature, being for the most part a mistake in point of law,

and in the conduct of his pleading; and though a man by mispleading may in
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some cases lose his property, yet the law will not suffer him by such niceties to

lose his life. However, upon this doubt, demurrers to indictments are seldom

used: since the same advantages may be taken upon a plea of not guilty; 01

afterwards in arrest of judgment, when the verdict has established the fact,

III. A plea in abatement is principally for a misnomer, a wrong name, or a

false addition to the prisoner. As, if James Allen, gentlenwn,\s indicted by the

name of John Allen, esquire, he may plead that he has the name of James, and

not of John; and that he is a gentleman, and not an esquire. And if either fact

ig found by a jury, then the ^indictment shall be abated, aa writs or

declarations may be in civil actions ; of which we spoke at large in the

preceding book, (h) (4) But in the end, there is little advantage accruing to

the prisoner by means of these dilatory pleas; because, if the exception be

allowed, a new bill of indictment may be framed, according to what the pris-

oner in his plea avers to be his true name and addition. For it is a rule, upon

all pleas in abatement, that he who takes advantage of a flaw must at the same

time show how it may be amended. Let us therefore next consider a more sub-

stantial kind of plea, viz.:

IV. Special pleas in bar; which go to the merits of the indictment, and give

a reason why the prisoner ought not to answer it at all, nor put himself upon

his trial for the crime alleged. These are of four kinds: a former acquittal, a for-

mer conviction, a former attainder, or a pardon. There are many other pleas,

which may be pleaded in bar of an appeal; (i) but these are applicable to both

appeals and indictments.

1. First, the plea of aufrefoits acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on

this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be

brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence. And

hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a man is ouce fairly found not

(A) I bM. 25fi. (e) 2 Hal. P. C. 257. (f) 2 Hawk. P. C. 331. (g) 2 Hnl. P. C. 235.

(h) See book III, page S02. (i) 2 Hawk. P. C. cli. 23.

(2) A plea to the jurisdiction is never important whore the want of jurisdiction appears on the

face of the proceedings, as the defect may then be taken advantage of either bv demurrer or by

motion in arrest of judgment. And if the objection is one which must appear i'roin the evidence

of the prosecution, it may be taken without special plea whenever it appears.

(:?) [This rule holds good in indictments for felonies, but not lor misdemeanors. 8 East, 112.1

(4) Defects of this description are now amendable. Statute 14 and 15 Vic, c. 100, f. 1. II

objection was takeu in any form, they would therefore be amended, and if not taken, they would

be cured by verdict.
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guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having

competent jurisdiction of the offence, (;') he may plead such acquittal in bar of

any subsequent accusation for the same crime. (5) Therefore an acquittal on an

appeal is a good bar to an indictment on the same offence. And so also was an

acquittal on an indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the common law: (k) and

therefore, in favour of appeals, a general practice was introduced, not to try any

person on an indictment of homicide, till after the year and day, within which

appeals may be brought, were past; by which time it often happened that the wit-

nesses died, or the whole was forgotten. To remedy which inconvenience, the

statute 3 Hen. VII, c, 1, enacts, that *iiulictments shall be proceeded on, r „„.,,. -,

immediately, at the king's suit, for the death of a man, without waiting "- ""' '

for bringing an appeal; and that the plea of aiifrefoits acquit on an indictment,

shall be no bar to the prosecuting of any appeal.

2. Secondly, the plea of aittrefoits convict, or a former conviction f6r the

saiiie identical crime, though no judgment was ever given, or perhaps will be

(being suspended by the benefit of clergy or other causes), is a good pica in bar

to an indictment. And this depends upon the same principle as the former,

that no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the

same crime. (I) Hereupon it lias been held, that a conviction of manslaughter,

on an appeal or an indictment, is a bar even in another appeal, and much more

in an indictment of murder; for the fact prosecuted is the same in both,
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though the offences differ in colouring and in degree. It is to be observed, that

the pleas of autrefoits acquit and autrefoits convict, or a former acquittal, and

former conviction, must be upon a prosecution for the same identical act and

crime. But the case is otherwise in,

3. Thirdly, the plea of autrefoits attaint, or a former attainder; which is a

good plea in bar, whether it be for the same or any other felony. For wherever

a man is attainted of felony, by judgment of death either upon a verdict or

confession, by outlawry, or heretofore by abjuration; and whether upon an

appeal or an indictment; he may plead such attainder in bar to any subsequent

indictment or appeal, for the same or for any other felony, (in) And this

O'l 3 Mod. 194. (t) 2 Hawk. P. C. 873. (J) 2 Hawk. P. C. 377. (m) Ibid. 375.

(5) [But such a pica must be strictly regular both in form and substance; for, in cases

of misdemeanor, if it is held bod on demurrer, final judgment may be entered up against the

defendant. Rex v. Taylor, 5 D. and R. 422; 3 B. and C. 502. And if it is irregularly

pleaded, and the acquittal which it sets forth appears to have been obtained by collusion, the

court will strike the plea off the file. Hex e. Taylor, 5 D. and R. 521; 3 B. and C. BW. A

plea of antrefoits acquit cannot be pleaded unless the facts charged in the second indictment

would, if true, have sustained the first. Rex v. Vandereomb, 2 East, P. C. 519. If, in a plea

of autrefoits acquit, the prisoner were to insist on two distinct records of acquittal, his plea

would be bad for duplicity. But semble, that if he insisted upon the wrong, the court would,

in a capital case, take care that he did not suffer by it. Rex t1. Sheen, 2 C. and P. 635. And

if the prisoner could have been legally convicted on the first indictment upon any evidence

that might have been adduced, his acquittal on that indictment may be successfully pleaded

to a second indictment; and it is immaterial whether the proper evidence was adduced at the

trial of the first indictment or not. Id. A prisoner indicted for felony may plead not

guilty after his special plea of autrefoits acquit has been found against him. Rex v. Welch,

Oar. Or. L. 56.] And in the United States he is allowed to do so in case of misdemeanor

also. Commonwealth v. Goddiird, 13 Mass. 457.

That an acquittal on an indictment which was sufficient to warrant a conviction will be a

bar to future prosecution of the same offence, see Rex v. Emden, 9 East, 437; Heikcs v. Com-

monwealth, 26 Penn. St. 513; People r. Cook, 10 Mich. 164. A person is not to be twice put

in jeopardy on the same charge; and he is in jeopardy when he is put upon trial before a

court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information which is so far valid as

U> be sufficient to sustain a conviction, and a jury has been charged with his deliverance.

Commonwealth ». Cook. 6 S. and R. 586; Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 292; State e. Non-ell, 2

Yerg. 24; State v. Ned, 7 Port. 217; State v. Ephraiin, 2 Dev. and Bat. 162; Price r. State, 19

Ohio, 423. After the jury are impaneled and sworn, any discharge of them without verdict

.. , .--,.. - '. jurisdit

tion; "State v. Odell, 4 Blackf. 156; State c. Payne, 4 Mo. 376; State «. Uodgkiu, 42 N. H. 474.
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because, generally, such proceeding on a second prosecution cannot be to any

purpose: for the prisoner is dead in law by the first attainder, his blood is

already corrupted, and he hath forfeited all that he had: so that it is absurd

and superfluous to endeavour to attaint him a second time. But to this gen-

eral rule, however, as to all others, there are some exceptions; wherein,

cessante ratione, cessat et ipsa lex. As, 1. Where the former attainder is

r *ooi« -I reversed for error, for then it *is the same as if it had never been. And

*• ' J the same reason holds, where the attainder is reversed by parliament, or

the judgment vacated by the king's pardon, with regard to felonies committed

afterwards. 2. Where the attainder was upon indictment, such attainder is no

bar to an appeal: for the prior sentence is pardonable by the king; and if that

might be pleaded in bar of the appeal, the king might in the end defeat the

suit of the subject, by suffering the prior sentence to stop the prosecution of a

second, and then, when the time of appealing is elapsed, granting the delin-

quent a pardon. 3. An attainder in felony is no bar to an indictment of

treason: because not only the judgment and manner of death are different,

but the forfeiture is more extensive, and the land goes to different persons.

4. Where a person attainted of one felony is afterwards indicted as principal in

another, to which there are also accessories, prosecuted at the same time; in

this case it is held, that the plea of aulrefoifs attaint is no bar, but be shall be

compelled to take his trial, for the sake of public justice; because the accesso-
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ries to such second felony cannot be convicted till after the conviction of the

principal, (n) And from these instances we may collect that a plea of

autrefoits attaint is never good, but when a second trial would be quite super-

fluous, (o) (6)

4. Lastly, a pardon may be pleaded in bar; as at once destroying the end and

purpose of the indictment, by remitting that punishment which the prosecu-

tion is calculated to inflict. There is one advantage that attends pleading a

pardon in bar, or in arrest of judgment, before sentence is past; which gives it

by much the preference to pleading it after sentence or attainder. This is, that

by stopping the judgment it stops the attainder, and prevents the corruption of

the blood; which, when once corrupted by attainder, cannot afterwards be

restored, otherwise than by act of parliament. But as the title of pardons is

applicable to other stages of prosecution; and they have their respective force

r #030 T and efficacy, as well after as before conviction, outlawry, or ^attainder;

•• J I shall therefore reserve the more minute consideration of them till I

have gone through every other title except only that of execution.

Before I conclude this head of special pleas in bar, it will be necessary once

more to observe, that though in civil actions when a man has his election what

plea in bar to make, he is concluded by that plea, and cannot resort to another

if that be determined against him (as if, on an action of debt, the defendant pleads

a general release, and no such release can be proved, he cannot afterwards plead

the general issue, nil debit, as he might at first: for he has made his election

what plea to abide by, and it was his own folly to choose a rotten defence;)

though, I say, this strictness is observed in civil actions, quid interest reipublica

ut sit finis litinm : yet in criminal prosecutions in favormi vitce, as well upon

appeal as indictment, when a prisoner's plea in bar is found against him upon

issue tried by a jury, or adjudged against him in point of law by the court;

still he shall" not be concluded or convicted thereon, but shall have judgment

of respondeat ouxter, and may plead over to the felony the general issue, not

guilty, (p) For the law allows many pleas, by which a prisoner may escape

death; but only one plea, in consequence whereof it can be inflicted: viz., on

!n) Poph. 107. (o) Staund. P. C. 107. (p) t Hnl. P. C. 238.

(f>) [By the 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, B. 4, it is enacted that no pica setting forth any attainder

shall be pleaded in bar of anv indictment, uuiess the attainder be for the same offence as that

charged in the indictment; by which enactment the plea of autrefois attaint seems to be at

an end.]
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the general issue, after an impartial examination and decision of the fact, by

the unanimous verdict of a jury. (7) It remains, therefore, that I consider,

V. The general issue, or plea of not guilt;/, (q) upon which plea alone the

prisoner can receive his final judgment of death. In case of an indictment

of felony or treason, there can be no special justification put in by way of pica.

As, on an indictment for murder, a man cannot plead that it was in his own

defence against a robber on the highway, or a burglar; but he must plead the

general issue, not guilty, and give this special matter in evidence. For (besides

that these pleas do in effect amount to the general issue; since, if true the

prisoner is most clearly not guilty) as the facts in treason are *laid to r *o.v> -i

be done proditorie et contra liycantice mice debit-urn, and, in felony, that >• ' -"

the killing was done felonice; th« charges of a traitorous or felonious intent,

are the points and very gist of the indictment, and must be added directly, by

the general negative, not guilty; and the jury upon the evidence will take notice

of any defensive matter, and give their verdict accordingly, as effectually as if

it were, or could be, specially pleaded. So that this is, upon all accounts, the

most advantageous plea for the prisoner, (r)

When tho prisoner hath thus pleaded not guilty, non culpnbilis, or nient

culpable; which was formerly used to be abbreviated upon the minutes, thus,

" it-on (or nient) cul.," the clerk of the assizes, or clerk of the arraigns, on behalf

of the crown replies, that the prisoner is guilty and that he is ready to prove

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

him so. This is done bv two monosyllables in the same spirit of abbreviation,

"cul. prit.," which signifies, first, that the prisoner is guilty (cul., culpable or cul-

pabilis), and then that the king is ready to prove him so; pritprce-ito sum, or

partitu* vi-riftcure. This is therefore a replication on behalf of the king viva

voce at the bar; which was formerly the course in all pleadings, as well in civil

as in criminal causes. And that was done in the concisest manner: for when

the pleader intended to demur, he expressed his demurrer in a single word,

"judgment;"'signifying that he demanded judgment, whether the writ, declara-

tion, plea, &c., either in form or matter, were sufficiently good in law: and if

he meant to rest on the truth of the facts pleaded, he expressed that also in a

single syllable "prit;" signifying that he was ready to prove his assertions: as

may be observed from the year-books and other ancient repositories of law. (.y)

By this replication the king and the prisoner are therefore at issue; for we may

remember in our strictures upon pleadings, in the preceding book, (t) it was

observed, that when the parties came to a fact, which is affirmed on one side

and denied on the other, then they are said to be at issue in point *of r *o .^ -i

fact: which is evidently the case here, in the plea of lion cul. by the *- J

prisoner; and the replication of cul. by the clerk. And we may also remember,

that the usual conclusion of all affirmative 'pleadings, as this of cul. or guilty

is, was by an averment in these words, "and this he is ready to verify \et hoc

para fun e*t verificare;" which same thing is here expressed by the single word

"prit."

How onr courts came to express a matter of this importance in so odd and

obscure a manner, "rein tantnm tain nei/lif/enter," can hardly be pronounced

with certainty. It may perhaps, however, be accounted for by supposing, that

these were at first short notes, to help the memory of the clerk, and remind him

that he was to reply; or else it was the short method of taking down in court,

upon the minutes, the replication and averment, "culprit;" which afterwards

(7) Sec Appendix. 11. (r) 2 Hal. P. C. 253. (») North's Life of Lord Guilford, 98.

(«• See book HI, page312.

(7) [Ttnt this is confined to cases of felony ; a defendant having pleaded in liar in all case?

of misdemeanor, is precluded from the benefit of the plea of not guilty, if the plea of bar should

be found insufficient: 8 East, 107; 1 M. and S. 184; 3 B. and C. 603j 2 id. bit; unless on

"demurrer. 6 East, 583, 602.]

See note 5. p. yAjtupra.
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the ignorance of succeeding clerks adopted for tlie very words to be by them

spoken, (u)

But however it may have arisen, the joining of issue (which though now

usually entered on the record, («,*) is no otherwise joined (x) in any part of tha

proceedings) seems to be clearly the meaning of this obscure expression: (y)

which has puzzled our most ingenious etymologists, and is commonly understood

as if the clerk of the arraigns, immediately on plea pleaded, had fixed an oppro-

brious name ou the prisoner, by asking him, '• Culprit, how wilt thou be tried ?''

For, immediately upon issue joined, it is inquired of the prisoner, by what trial he

will make his innocence appear. This form has at present reference to appeals

and approvements only wherein the appellee has his choice, either to try the

r *.,.. -, *accusation by bat tel or by jury. But upon indictments, since the aboli-

' ' * tion of ordeal, there can be no other trial but by jury, per pai#, or by

the country ; and therefore, if the prisoner refuses to pat himself upon the inquest

in the usual form, that is. to answer that he will be tried by God and his country,

(z) if a commoner; and, if a peer, by God and his peers; (i) the indictment, if in

treason, is taken pro COH/BMO; and the prisoner, in cases of felony, is adjudged to

stand mute, and if he perseveres in his obstinancy, shall now (b) be convicted of

the felony. (8)

When the prisoner has thus put himself on his trial, the clerk answers in the

humane language of the law, which always hopes that the party's innocence
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rather than his guilt may appear, '• God send tiie a good deliverance.'' And

then they proceed, as soon as conveniently may be, to the trial; the manner of

which will be considered at large in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF TRIAL AND CONVICTION.

THE several methods of trial and conviction of offenders established by the

laws of England, were formerly more numerous than at present, through the-

superstition of our Saxon ancestors: who like other northern nations, were

extremely addicted to divination: a character which Tacitus observes of the

ancient Germans, (a) They therefore invented a considerable number of methods

of purgation or trial, to preserve innocence from the danger of false witnesses,

and in consequence of a notion that God would always interpose miraculously

to vindicate the guiltless.

I. The most ancient (/>) species of trial was that by ordeal: which was pecu-

liarly distinguished by the appellation ofjudicium Dei; and sometimes vulya

ria purgatio, to distinguish it from the canonical purgation, which was by the

oath of the party. This was of two sorts, (c) either /ire-ordeal, or water-orasaA ;

(u) Of this ignorance we may see daily instances in the abuse of two le;ral term* of ancient French ;

one, the prologue t«i all proclamation*, '-oy*?.'' or hear ye, whu'.h i* cre-icrally pronounced most uninc-un-

In^lv, •• O yes :" the other a nrtre pardonable mistake, viz. when the jurv are at) sworu. the oilicei- bids

the crier ninnlier them, for which the won.1 in law-French U •' counter" but we now hear it pronounced

in very good English, "count these ''

rw/See Appendix. ) 1. (x) 2 Hawk. P. C. 3!I9. (y) 2 Hal. P. C. 2.W.

(z) A learned author, who is very seldom mistaken in his oonjoutnres, lias observed that the proper

answer is, " by Gwl or llm country," that is, either by ordril or by jury ; became the question supposes an

option in the pri*>nur. And certainly It Rived some countenance to this observation, that the trial l>y

ordail used formerly to be called jtttlict'im Dei. But it should le.'ni, that when the question give* the nris-

oueran option, his'answer mint be positive ; and not in the disjunctive, which returns the option back

to the prosecutor.

(n) K«yliiiRe, 57. State Trinls, prusim. fbj St»t. 12 Goo. Ill, c. 20. (aJDe Mar. Germ 10

(b) LL. liuc, 3, e. 77. (cj Mirr. c. 3, ! 53.

(8) When a prisoner pleads " not .Kiiilty" he puts himself upon the country, and the eereraonv-

of asking him how he will lie tried is discontinued. And if he stands mute the eourt will euw'r

thu plcn of not guilty for him. 7 and ri Creo. IV, c. 23, $ 2.
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the former being confined to persons of higher rank, the latter to the common

people, (d) Both these might be performed by deputy: but the prineipal was

to answer for the success of Hie trial; the deputy only venturing some corporal

pain for hire, or perhaps for friendship, (e) Fire-ordeal was performed r *•> 10 -i

either by taking up in the hand, unhurt, apiece of red-hot iron of one, <- '' ' '

two or three pounds weight; or else by walking barefoot and blindfold over nine

red-hot ploughshares, laid lengthwise.- at equal distances: and if the party

escaped being hurt, he was adjudged innocent; but if it happened otherwise, as

without collusion it usually did. he was then condemned as guilty. However,

by this latter method Queen Emma, the mother of Edward the Confessor, is

mentioned as having cleared her character, wheii suspected of familiarity with

Alwyn, bishop of Winchester.(/)

Water-ordeal was performed, either by plunging the bare arm up to the elbow

in boiling water, and escaping unhurt thereby: or by casting the person sus-

pected into a river or pond of cold water; and. if he floated therein without

any action of swimming, it was deemed an evidence of his guilt; but, if he

sunk, he was acquitted. It is easy to trace out the traditional relics of this

water-ordeal, in the ignorant barbarity still practiced in many countries to dis-

cover witches by casting them into a pool of water, and drowning them, to

prove their innocence. And in the eastern empire the tire-ordeal was used to

the same purpose by the emperor Theodore Lascarus : who, attributing his sick-
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ness to magic, caused all those whom he suspected to handle the hot iron : thus

joining (as has been well remarked) ((/) to the most dubious crime in the world

the most dubious proof of innocence.

And, indeed, this purgation by ordeal seems to have been very ancient and

very universal in the times of superstitious barbarity. It was known to the

ancient Greeks: for, in the * Antigone of Sophocles, (Ii) a person, sus-

pected by Creoii of a misdemeanor, declares himself ready "to handle

hot iron, and to walk over fire," in order to manifest his innocence ; which, the

scholiast tells us, was then a very usual purgation. And Grotius (i) gives us

many instances of water-ordeal in Bythynia, Sardinia, and other places. There

is also a very peculiar species of water-ordeal, said to prevail among the Indians

on the coast of Malabar; where a person accused of any enormous crime is

obliged to swim over a large river abounding with crocodiles, and, if he escapes

unhurt, he is reputed innocent. As, in Siam, besides the usual methods of lire

and water ordeal, both parties are sometimes exposed to the fury of a tiger let

loose for that purpose : and, if the beast spare either, that person is accounted

innocent; if neither, both are held to be guilty; but if he spares both, the trial

is incomplete, and they proceed to a more certain criterion, (fc)

One cannot but be astonished at the folly and impiety of pronouncing a man

guilty, unless he was cleared by a miracle; and of expecting that all the powers

of nature should be suspended" by an immediate interposition of Providence to

save the innocent, whenever it was presumptuously required. And yet, in Eng-

land, so late as King John's time, we find grants to the bishops and clergy to

use the jiidicmm fern, aquce, et ignis. (I) And, both in England and Sweden,

the clergy presided at this trial, and it was only performed in the churches or

in other consecrated ground: for which Stiernhook (?«) gives the reason: " non

(li'fuit ill is operat d luboris pretiiini. ; (temper enim ab ejusmodi jvdicio (/liquid

lucri xacerdottints obveniebnt" But, to give it its due praise, we find the canou

law very early declaring against trial by ordeal, or vulyaris purgalio, as being

the fabric of the devil, " cum sit contra prcecvptum Domini, non tentabis Domi-

num Deum funm." (») Upon this authority, though the canons *them- r *,, ^- -i

selves were of no validity in England, it was thought proper (as had L

(rf) Tenrtur le ptirgrirf is tjiti ncmsntur. per Dei indicium : scilicet per calidvm ferrum. vet per aqvam.

p~o divernitute cotulitioni* hominum * per j'crmm calidiau, si fuerit nomo liber .• per aquam xt fliertl rwtiatt

(Uliinr. 1. 14. c. 1.)

If) This Is still oxirressed in that common form of speech, •' of going through flre and water to serve

Another,"

(/i Tho. Rndboriie ITM. mnj. JTtntmi, I. 4. c. 1. {g} S|>. I., b. 12, <•.. 5. (k) v. S70. «) On Hnffib. v, 17.

It) Mini. Univ. Hist, vii, MB. «l spclin. CJlnss. 435. (mi Tie jure Sntmmm, I. 1, c. S.

(») Decret.part 2, cans. 2, qv. 5, disi. 7. Decretal, lib. 3, tit. 50, c. 9, taut Glosi. ibid.

OU J

345 TRIAL AND CONVICTION. [Ben k IV.

been done in Denmark above a century before) (<?) to disuse and abolish this trial

entirely in our courts of justice, by an u-et of parliament in 3 Hen. 111. accord-

ing to Sir Edward Coke, (p) or, rather, by an order of the king in council, (q)

II. Another species of purgation, somewhat similar to the former, but proba-

bly sprung from a presumptuous abuse of revelation in the ages of dark super-

stition, was the corsned, or morsel of execration: being a piece of cheese or

bread, of about an ounce in weight, which was consecrated with a form of exor-

cism ; desiring of the Almighty that it might cause convulsions and paleness,

and find no passage if the man was really guilty; but might turn to health and

nourishment, if he was innocent: (r) as the water of jealousy among the Jews (s)

was, by God's special appointment, to cause the belly to swell, and the thigh to

rot, if the woman was guilty of adultery. This corsned was then given to the

suspected person, who at the same time also received the holy sacrament: (t) if,

indeed, the corsned was not, as some have suspected, the sacramental bread

itself; till the subsequent invention of transubstantiation preserved it from

profane uses with a more profound respect than formerly. Our historians assure

us, that Goodwin, earl of Kent, in the reign of King Edward the Confessor,

abjuring the death of the king's brother, at last appealed to his corsued, "per

bticcellam deglutiendatn abjurant," (u) which stuck in his throat, and killed

him. This custom has long since been gradually abolished, though the remem-

brance of it still subsists in certain phrases of abjuration retained among the
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common people, (w)

F *S461 *However, we cannot but remark, that though in European countries

' "* J this custom most probably arose from an abuse of revealed religion, yet

credulity and superstition will, in all ages and in all climates, produce the same

or similar effects. And, therefore, we shall not be surprised to find that, in the

kingdom of Pegu, there still exists a trial by the corsned, very similar to that

of our ancestors, only substituting raw rice instead of bread, (x) And, in the

kingdom of Monomotapa, they have a method ot deciding lawsuits equally

•whimsical and uncertain. The witness for the plaintiff chews the bark of a

tree endued with an emetic quality; which, being sufficiently masticated, is thou

infused in Avater, which is given the defendant to drink. If his stomach rejects

it, he is condemned: if it stays with him, he is absolved, unless the plaintiff

will drink some of the same water; and, if it stays with him also, the suit is left

undetermined, (y)

These two antiquated methods of trial were principally in use among our

Saxon ancestors. The next, which still remains in force, though very rarely in

use, owes its introduction among us to the princes of the Norman line. And

that is,

III. The trial by battol, (1) duel, or single combat; which was another species

of presumptuous appeal to Providence, under an expectation that Heaven would

unquestionably give the victory to the innocent or injured party. The nature

of this trial, in cases of civil injury, upon issue joined in a writ of right, was

fully discussed in the preceding book: (2) to which I have only to add, that the

trial by battel may be demanded at the election of the appellee, in either an

appeal or an approvement; find that it is carried on with equal solemnity as

that on a writ of right: but with this difference, that there each party might

hire a champion, but here they must fight in their proper persons. And, there-

F *347 1 ^Ole' ^ ^le *aPPe^!U1': or approver be a woman, a priest, an infant, or of

L -I the age of sixty, or lame, or blind, he or she may counterplead and

(o) Mod. tin. Hint, xxxll. 105. (p) 9 Rep. ta.

(?) 1 llym. Fncil, 'tin. Spclm. Glom. ;»!. 2 Pryu Rec. Append. 20. Sold. Eadm. fol. 48.

(T) Spuliu. Gl. -Uffl. i«) Nnuib. ch. v. (0 LL. Cnjiulc.K. («> Ingulph.

(ioi As, "I will take the mcrnmenc upon It ;" nmy this murral be my last;'" ana the like.

(x) Mod Univ. Hist, vii, 129. (y} Ibul. xv. 401. (j) Sue book III, p. 337.
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refuse the wager of battel; and compel the appellee to put himself upon the

country. Also peers of the realm, bringing an appeal, shall not be challenged

to wage battel, 011 account of the dignity of their persons; nor the citizens of

London, by special charter, because fighting seems foreign to their education

and employment. So, likewise, if the crime be notorious; as, if the thief be

taken with a mainour, or the murderer in the room with a bloody knife, the

appellant may refuse the tender of battel, from the appellee; («) for it is unrea-

sonable that an innocent man should stake his life against one who is already

half-convicted.

The form and manner of waging battel upon appeals are much the same as

upon a writ of right; only the oaths of the two combatants are vastly more

striking and solemn. (J) The appellee, when appealed of felony, pleads not

guilty, and throws down his glove, and declares he will defend the same by hia

body: the appellant takes up the glove, and replies that he is ready to make

good the appeal, body for body. And thereupon the appellee, taking the book

in his right hand, and in his left the right hand of his antagonist, swears to this

effect: " Hoc nucli, homo queni per manum teneo," &c. "Hear this, 0 man,

whom I hold by the hand, who callest thyself John by the name of baptism,

that I who call myself Thomas by the name of baptism, did not feloniously

murder thy father, William by name, nor am any way guilty of the said felony.

So help me God, and the saints; and this I will defend against thee by my body,
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as this court shall award." To which the appellant replies, holding the bible

and his antagonist's hand in the same manner as in the other: "Hear this, 0 man,

whom I hold by the hand, who callest thyself Thomas by the name of baptism,

that thou art perjured; and therefore perjured, because that thou feloniously

didst murder my *father, William by name. So help me God, and the r*o-g i

saints: and this I will prove against thee by my body, as this court shall L ' '

award, (c) The battel is then to be fought with the same weapons, viz., baton:],

the same solemnity, and the same oatli against amulets and sorcery, that are

used in the civil combat: and if the appellee be so far vanquished that he can-

not or will not fight any longer, he shall be adjudged to be hanged immediately,

and then, as well as if be be killed in battel, providence is deemed to have deter-

mined in favor of the truth, and his blood shall be attainted. But if he kills

the appellant, or can maintain the fight from sunrising till the stars appear in

the evening, he shall be acquitted. So also if the appellant becomes recreant,

and pronounces the horrible word of craven, lie shall lose his Hberam legein, and

become infamous; and the appellee shall recover his damages, and also be for-

ever quit, not only of the appeal,' but of all indictments likewise for the same

offence.

IV. The fourth method of trial used in criminal cases is that by the peers

of Great Britain, in the court of parliament, or the court of the lord high

steward, when a peer is capitally indicted : for in case of an appeal, a peer shall

be tried by jury, (d) (2) Of this enough has been said in a former chapter; (e)

to which I shall now only add, that, in the method and regulation of its pro-

ceedings, it differs little from the trial per patriam, or by jury ; except that no

special verdict'can be given in the trial of a peer: (/) because the lords of

parliament, or the lord high steward (if the trial be *had in his court), r*o4u -\

are judges sufficiently competent of the law that may arise from the L ' '

fact: and except, also, that the peers need not all agree in their verdict; but

(a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 427. (b) Flct. 1. 1, c. 84. 2 Hawk. P. C. 426.

(e) There is a striking resemblance lictween this process and thnt of the court of Areopagus nt Athens

for mm-l'T ; wherein the prosecutor and prisoner were both sworn in the most solemn munner ; the pro-

secutor, thai he \vas related to ilie deceased (for none but near relalions were permitted to prosecute' iu

that court; ami that the prisoner wns the cause of his death; the prisoner, that he was innocent of the

eharjre ngninst him. ('Pott. Autiq. b. i. c. IB.

(d) 9 Kep. W. 2 Inst. 49. (e) See page 259. (f) Halt. 116.

(2) [The nobility are tried by their peers for treason and felony, and misprision of these ; but

in all other criminal prosecutiom they are tried like commoners; by a jury. 3 Inst. 30. See

took I, 401, note.] '
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the greater number, consisting of twelve at the least, will conclude, and bind

the minority, (a)

V. The trial by jury, or the country, per patriam, is also that trial by the

peers of every Englishman, which, as the grand bulwark of his liberties, is

secured to him by the great charter: (h) " nulfus liber homo capiatur, vcl impris-

oiieltir, aid es.nlet, ant aliqun (tlio tnotlo destraiitur, nisi per leyale judiciiim

parinin suorum, vcl per luf/am terra."

The antiquity and excellence of this trial, for the settling of civil property,

has before been explained at large. ((') And it will hold much stronger in crim-

inal cases; since in times of difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended

from the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the crown, in suits

between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one individual

and another, to settle the. metes and boundaries of private property. Our law

has therefore wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a presentment

and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of

the crown. It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance of our con-

stitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince: and yet this

power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution, if exerted

without check or control, by justices of oyer and ter miner occasionally named

by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch or

exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration
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that such is their will and pleasure. But the founders of the English law

have, with excellent forecast, contrived that no man should be called to an-

swer the king for any capital crime, unless upon the preparatory accusation

of twelve or more of his fellow-subjects, the grand jurv; and that the truth

of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information

r*3"0l or !1PPe'1'' *should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage

' ° •" of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior

to all suspicion. So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as

this palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks

(which none will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret machinations,

'which may sap and undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary methods

of trial, by justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, and courts of

conscience. And however convenient these may appear at first (as doubtless all

arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient), yet let it be again

remembered, that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are

the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial

matters; that these inroads upon the sacred bulwark of the nation are funda-

mentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that, though begun in

trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of

juries in questions of the most momentous concern.

What was said of juries in general, and the trial thereby, in civiJ cases, will

greatly shorten our present remarks, with regard to the trial of criminal suits:

indictments, informations and appeals: which trial I shall consider in the same

method that I did the former; by following the order and course of the pro-

ceedings themselves, as the most clear and perspicuous way of treating it.

When, therefore, a prisoner on his arraignment has pleaded not guilty, and

for his trial hath put himself upon the country, which country the jury are,

the sheriff of the county must return a panel of jurors, liberos et legates homing,-*,

de vicini'to: that is, freeholders, without just exception, and of the vimte or

neighbourhood; which is interpreted to be of the comity where the fact is com-

mitted. (/) If the proceedings are before the court of king's bench, there is

r*.>-i -I time allowed, between the assignment and the trial, for a jury to be *im-

' "'' J paneled by a writ of venire facia* to the sheriff, as in civil causes: and

the trial in case of misdemeanor is had at nisi prius, unless it be of such

consequence as to merit a trial at bar; which is always invariably had when

(a) Kclyngc, )W. Stat. 7 Wm. in, n. .1. fll. Foster, 247. fhj 9 Hen. Ill, c. 29.

(i) Soe book III, page 379. (jj 2 Hul. P. C. 284. 2 Hawk. P. C. 103.
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the prisoner is tried for any capital offence. But, before commissioners of oyer

and terminer and gaol-delivery, the sheriff, by virtue of a general precept directed

to him beforehand, returns to the court a panel of forty-eight jurors, to try all

felons that may be called upon their trial at that session; and therefore it is

there usual to try all felons immediately, or soon, after their arraignment. But

it is not customary, nor agreeable to the general course of proceedings (unless

by consent of parties or where the defendant is actually in gaol), to try per-

sons indicted of smaller misdemeanors at the same court in which they have

pleaded not guilty, or traversed the indictment. But they usually give security

to the court, to appear at the next assizes or session, and then and there to try

the traverse, giving notice to the prosecutor of the same.

In cases of high treason, whereby corruption of blood may ensue (except

treason in counterfeiting the king's coin or seals), or misprision of such treason,

it is enacted by statute 7 Win. Ill, c. 3, first, that no person shall be tried for any

such treason, except an attempt to assassinate the king, unless the indictment

be found within three years after the offence committed: next, that the pris-

oner shall have a copy of the indictment (which includes the caption), (k) but

not the names of the witnesses, five days at least before the trial; that is, upon

the true construction of the act, before his arraignment; (I) for then is his

time to take any exceptions thereto, by way of plea or demurrer; thirdly, that

he shall also have a copy of the panel of jurors two days before his trial; and,
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lastly that he shall have the same compulsive process to bring in his witnesses

for him as was usual to compel their appearance against him. And by statute

7 Ann. c. 21 (which did not take place till after the decease of the late preten-

der), all persons indicted for high treason or misprision *thereof, shall r *o~o i

have not only a copy of the indictment, but a list of all the witnesses "- -"

to be produced, and of the jurors impaneled, with their professions and places

of abode, delivered to him ten days before the trial, and in the presence of two

witnesses; the better to prepare him to make his challenges and defence. But

this last act, so far as it affected indictments for the inferior species of high

treason, respecting the coin and the royal seals, is repealed by the statute 6

Geo. Ill, c. 53, else it had been impossible to have tried those offences in the

same circuit in which they are indicted: for ten clear days, between the find-

ing and the trial of the indictment, will exceed the time usually allotted for

any session of oyer and terminer. (in) And no person indicted for felony, is, or

(as the law stands) ever can be, entitled to such copies before the time of his

trial. («) (3)

When the trial is called on, the jurors are to be sworn, as they appear to the

number of twelve, unless they are challenged by the party.

Challenges may here be made, either on the part of the king, or on that of

the prisoner; and either to the whole array, or to the separate polls, for the very

same reasons that they may be made 121 civil causes, (o) For it is here at least

us necessary, as there, that the sheriff or returning officer be totally indifferent;

that where an alien is indicted, the jury should be de medietate, or half foreigners,

if so many are found in the place; (which indeed does not hold in treasons, (p)

aliens being very improper judges of the breach of allegiance; nor yet in the

case of Egyptians (4) under the statute 22 lien. VIII, c. 10), that on every panel

(t) Fost. 229. Append, i. (I) Ibid. 230. I/KI Fost. 250. (») 2 Hawk. P. C. 410.

( o) See book III, page 359. (p) 2 Hawk. P. C. 420. 2 Hal. P. C. 271.

(3) Although in England the prisoner ia not entitled aa of right to a copy of the indictment

in case of felony, yet the prosecution may give it, and their doing so on request would be

expected. If not given, the court would direct the indictment to be read over slowly, in order

that it might be taken down. Hex v. Parry, 7 C. and P. 83H. In misdemeanors, the defendant

is entitled to a copy. Morrison v. Kelly, 1 "W. Black. 385. In the United States, the right ia

generally secured by statute or constitution in all cases.

(4) This class of persons are now dealt with summarily, as rogues and vagabonds.
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there should be a competent number of hundredors; (5) and that the particular

jurors should be omni exceptione nut/ores; not liable to objection either pnipler

honor in respect um, propter defectuin. proffer effect-urn, or propter delictiuii.

F *'3r3 1 Challenges upon auv of the foregoing accounts are sty led challenges

1 ' for cunse ; which may be without stint in both criminal and civil trials.

But in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there is in favorem vitas, allowed

to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain

number of jurors, without sho wing any cause at all; which is called a peremptory

challenge: a provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners for

which our English laws are justly famous. (G) This is grounded on two reasons.

1. As every one must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unaccountable

prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another;

and how necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should

have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him ;

the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom he

has conceived a prejudice, even without being able to assign a reason for such his

dislike. 2. Because upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned

prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indif-

ference may sometimes provoke a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences

from which the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him

aside.
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The privilege of peremptory challenges, though granted to the prisoner, is

denied to the king by the statute 33 Edw. I, st. 4, which enacts, that the king

shall challenge no jurors without assigning a cause certain, to be tried and ap-

proved by the court. However, it is held that the king need not asssigu his

cause of challenge, till all the panel is gone through, and unless there cannot

be a full jury without the person so challenged. And then, and not sooner, the

king's counsel must show the cause: otherwise the juror shall be sworn, (q) (7)

The peremptory challenges of the prisoner must, however, have some reason-

f*3"41 a'J^e Doun^al7 > otherwise ho might never *be tried. This reasonable

' "' J boundary is settled by the common law to be the number of thirty-five ;

that is. one under the number of three full juries, for the law judges that five-

aud-thirty arc fully sufficient to allow the most timorous man to challenge

through mere caprice; and that he who peremptorily challenges a greater num-

ber, or three full juries, has no intention to be tried at all. And, therefore, it

dealt with one who peremptorily challenges above thirty-five, and will not

retract his challenge, as with one who stands mute or refuses his trial; by sen-

tencing him to the peine forte et dure in felony, and by attainting him in

(q) 2 Hawk. P. C. 413. 2 Hal. P. C. 271.

(5) [The right to challenge for want of hundredors is now taken away by the 6 Goo. IV, c.

50, s. 13.]

((>) [A peremptory challenge is not allowed in the trial of collateral issues. Fost. 42. Xor

in any triul tor a misdemeanor. '2 Hiirg. St. Tr. 808, and 4 H. St. Tr. 1.]

(7) [And the practice is the same both in trials for misdemeanors and for capital offences

3 Harg. St. Tr. 519. Where there is a challenge for cause, two persons in court not of the jury,

are sworn to try whether the jurymau challenged will try the prisoner indifferently. Evidence

is then produced to support the challenge, and according to the verdict of the two triers, the

juryman is admitted or rejected.]

lii the United States challenges to the favor are generally tried by two jurors already im-

paneled, if there are such, and if not, thun by two indifferent by-slanders appointed and sworn

by the court for that purpose, or by the court itself. The American decisions regarding

challenges are collected in 1 Waterman's Arch. Or. L. 545, et scq. The subject of challenges to

the polls was quite fully considered in People v. Bodine, 1 Denio, 281. There is a good deal

of diversity of opinion as to what previously received impressions of the party called as a

juror, an to the guilt of the accused, should exclude him Irom sitting. Compare Freeman r.

People, 4 Denio. 9 ; People r. Mather, 4 Wend. i«9 ; Baxter r. People, 3 Gil. 368, with Moran'a

Case, 9 Leigh. 651 ; State v. Ellington, 7 Ired. 61; Moses v. State, 10 Humph. 456; Holt v. Peo-

ple, 13 Mich. 2-24.
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treason, (r) And so the law stands at this day with regard to treason of any

kind.

But by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14 (which, with regard to felonies, stand?

un repealed by statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10), by this statute, I say, no person

arraigned for felony can be admitted to make any more than twenty peremptory

challenges. But how if a prisoner will peremptorily challenge twenty-one ? what

shall be done? The old opinion was, that judgment of peiiie forte et dure

should be given, as where he challenged thirty-six at the common law: (s) but

the better opinion seems to be, (t) that such challenge shall only be disregarded

and overruled. Because, first, the common law doss not inflict the judgment

of penance for challenging twenty-one, neither doth the statute inflict it; and

so heavy a judgment (or that of conviction, which succeeds it) shall not be im-

posed by implication. Secondly, the words of the statute are, " that he be not

admitted to challenge more than twenty;" the evident construction of which is,

that any further challenge be disallowed or prevented: and therefore, being

null from the beginning, and never in Tact a challenge, it can subject the

prisoner to no punishment; but the juror shall be regularly sworn. (8)

If, by reason of challenges or the default of the jurors, a sufficient number

cannot be had of the original panel, a tales *may be awarded as in civil r*q = r-i

causes, (u) till the number of twelve is sworn, " well and truly to try. and •- '"''

true deliverance make, between our sovereign lord the king, and the prisoner
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whom they have in charge; and a true verdict to give according to the

evidence."

AVhen the jury is sworn, if it be a cause of any consequence, the indictment

is usually opened, and the evidence marshaled, examined, and enforced by the

counsel for the crown or prosecution. But it is a settled rule at common law,

that no counsel shall be allowed a prisoner upon his trial, upon the general

issue, in any capital crime, unless some point of law shall arise proper to be

debated. («') (9) A rule, which (however it may be palliated under cover of that

noble declaration of the law, when rightly understood, that the judge shall be

counsel for the prisoner; that is, shall see that the proceedings against him are

legal and strictly regular) (x) seems to be not all of a piece with the rest of the

humane treatment of prisoners by the English law. For upon what face of

reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is

allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass? Nor, indeed, is it, strictly

speaking, a part of our ancient law: for the Mirror (;/) having obserred the

necessity of counsel in civil suits, " who know how to forward and defend the

cause, by the rules of law and customs of the realm," and immediately afterwards

subjoins: "and more necessary are they for defence upon indictments and

appeals of felony, than upon other venial causes." (z) And the judges themselves

(r) 2 Hal. P. C. 268. (»; 2 Hawk. P. C. 414. (*) 3 Inst. 227. 2 Hal. P. C. 270.

(u) See book III. page 3B4. Itut in mere commissions of gaol delivery, no tales can be awarded ; though

the court may ore <«n«sordera new panel to be returned itistanter. (4 Inst. 6d. 5 St. Tr. 728. Cooke's Cuse.)

(ic) 2 Hawk. P. C. 400.

(z) Sir Edward Coke (3 Inst. 137) gives another additional reason for this refusal, " because the evidence

t<i com ict a prisoner should lie so manliest, as it could not be contradicted." Which Lord Nottingham

(when high steward) declared (3 St. Tr. 73('») was the only good reason that could be given for it.

(trl <> :l S I

(8) By statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, s. 3, peremptory challenges beyond the number allowed

by law are entirely void.

(9) A full defence by counsel is now allowed in all cases. See statute 6 and 7 TVm. IT,

c. 114. In the United States the right to counsel is a constitutional right, and if the accused
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are so sensible of this defect, that they never scruple to allow a prisoner counsel

r*o-c-i to instruct him what questions to ask, or even to *asK questions for

' '"' 'J him, with respect to matters of fact: for as to matters of law, arising on

the trial, they are entitled to the assistance of counsel. But, lest this indulgence

should be intercepted by superior influence, in the case of the state criminals, the

legislature has directed by statute 7 Wm. Ill, c. 3, that persons indicted for such

high treason, as works a corruption of the blood, or misprision thereof (except

treason in counterfeiting the king's coin or seals), may make their full defence

by counsel, not exceeding two, to be named by the prisoner and assigned by the

court or judge: and the same indulgence, by statute 20 Geo. II, c. 30, is extended

to parliamentary impeachments for nigh treason, which were excepted in the

former act.

The doctrine of evidence upon pleas of the crown is, in most respects, the

same as that upon civil actions. There are, however, a f«w leading points,

wherein, by several statutes, and resolutions, a difference is made between civil

and criminal evidence.

First, in all cases of high treason, petit treason, and misprision of treason, by

statutes 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, and 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11, two lawful witnesses are

rt'qnired to convict a prisoner; unless he shall willingly and without violence

confess the same. By statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10, a farther exception is

made as to treasons in counterfeiting the king's seals or signatures, and treasons
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concerning coin current within this realm: and more particularly by chapter

11, the offences of importing counterfeit foreign money current in this king-

dom, and impairing, counterfeiting, or forging any current coin. The statutes

r*Q-71 8 and 9 "Win. Ill, c 25, and 15 and *16 Geo. II, c. 28, in their subsequent

L •" extensions of this species of treason, do also provide, that the offenders

may be indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted, and attainted, by the like evidence,

and in such manner and form as may be had and used against offenders for

counterfeiting the king's money. But by statute 7 Wm. Ill, c. 3, in prosecu-

tions for those treasons to which that extends, the same rule (of requiring two

witnesses) is again enforced; with this addition, that the confession of the

prisoner, which shall countervail the necessity of such proof, must be in open

court. In the construction of which act it hath been holden, (a) that a confes-

sion of the prisoner, taken out of court, before a magistrate or person having

competent authority to take it, and proved by two witnesses, is sufficient to con-

vict him of treason. But hasty, unguarded confessions, made to persons having

no such authority, ought not to be admitted as evidence under this statute.

And, indeed, even in cases of felony at the common law, they are the weakest

and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by artifice,

false hopes, promises of favour, or menaces; seldom remembered accurately, or

repeated with due precision ; and incapable in their nature of being disproved

by other negative evidence. (10) By the same statute, 7 Wm. Ill, it is declared,

that both witnesses must be to the same overt act of treason, or one to one overt

act, and the other to another overt act, of the same species of treason, (b) and

not of distinct heads or kinds: and no evidence shall be admitted to prove any

(a) Fost. 240-341. (6) See St. Tr. II, 144. Foster, 235.

party is unable to employ counsel, the court \vill designate some member of the bar for that

purpose, and he is uot at liberty to decline the appointment. See Vise ». Hamilton County,

19 111. 18. See nlso, Cooley's Const. Lim. 334.

(10) The confession is not sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti, but is only allowed for the

purpose of connecting the defendant with the offence when that has been established by other

evidence. People*. Hennessey, 15 Wend. 147; Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157; State r.

Guild, 5 Hulst. 163; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349.

The confession, to be admissible in any case, ought to appear to have been made voluntarily,

and without motives of hope or fear being employed for the puqjose of inducing it. Rex V.

Euoch, 5 C. and P. 539 ; Earle v. Picken, id. 542, note ; Morehead p. State, 9 Humph. 635; State

v. Bostick, 4 Harr. 563; 1 Greenl. Ev. $ 214, and note; 1 Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill and Edwards,

514, and cases cited.
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overt act not expressly laid in the indietment.(ll) And, therefore, in Sir John

Fenwick's case in King William's time, where there was but one witness, an act

of parliament (c) was made on purpose to attaint him of treason, and he was

executed, (d) But in almost every other accusation one positive witness is stif-

ficienL Baron Montesquieu lays it down for a rule, (e) that those laws which

condemn a man to death in any case on the deposition of a single witness, are

fatal to liberty; and he adds this reason, that the witness who affirms, and the

accused who denies, make an equal balance; (/) there is a necessity, therefore,

to call *in a third man to incline the scale But this seems to be carry- r*o-o-i

ing matters too far: for there are some crimes, in which the very pri- "- -"

vacy of their nature excludes the possibility of having more than one witness;

must these, therefore, escape unpunished ? Neither, indeed, is the bare denial

of the person accused equivalent to the positive oath of a disinterested witness.

In cases of indictment for perjury, this doctrine is better founded; and there our

law adopts it: for one witness is not allowed to convict a man indicted for per-

jury; because then there is only one oath against another, (g) In cases of trea-

son, also, there is the accused's oath of allegiance, to counterpoise the informa-

tion of a single witness; and that may perhaps be one reason why the law re-

quires a double testimony to convict him: though the principal reason, un-

doubtedly, is to secure the subject from being sacrificed to fictitious conspiracies,

which have been the engines of profligate and craftv politicians in all ages.
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Secondly, though from the reversal of Colonel Sidney's attainder by act of

parliament, in 1689, (h) it may be collected, (i) that the mere similitude of

hand-writing in two papers shown to a jury, without other concurrent testi-

mony, is no evidence that both were written by the same person ; yet undoubt-

edly the testimony of witnesses, well acquainted with the party's hand, that

they believe the paper to have been written by him is evidence to be left to a

jurv.(.;)(12)

Thirdly, by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 27, a mother of a bastard child, conceal-

ing its death, must prove by one witness that the child was born dead ; other-

wise such concealment shall be evidence of her having murdered it.(&) (13)

Fourthly, all presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously;

for the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one

innocent suffer. *And Sir Matthew Hale in particular (1) lays down two *ro-q i

rules most prudent and necessary to be observed: 1. Never to convict a >• *

man for stealing the goods of a person unknown, merely because he will give

no account how he came by them, unless an actual felony be proved of such

goods; and 2. Never to convict any person of murder or manslaughter, till at

least the body be found dead; on account of two instances he mentions, where

persons were executed for the murder of others, who were then alive, but mis-

sing. (14)

Lastly, it was an ancient and commonly received practice (m) (derived from

the civil law, and which, also, to this day obtains in the kingdom of France), (»)

that, as counsel was not allowed to any prisoner accused of a capital crime, so

(c)Stat. 8 Wm.m, c. 4. (d) St. Tr. V. 40. (e) Sp. L. b. 12, c. 3. (/) Beccar. c. 13.

(CTI 10 Mod. 191. (ft! St. Tr. VIII, 472. til 2 Hawk. P. C 431.

(i) Lord Preston's Case, A. D. 1690. St. Tr. IV, 453. Francis's Case, A. D. 1716. St. Tr. VI, 69. Layer's

Case, A. Tl. 1722. Ibid. 27fl. Henzuy's Case, A. D. 1758. Bnrr. B44.

(h) See page 1U8. (i) 8 Hal. P. C. 290. (tn) St. Tr. I. paisim.

;n) Domnt. publ. law, b. 3, 1.1. Jlontesq. Sp. L. b. 29, c. 11.

(11) [By 5 and 6 Vic. c. 51, where the overt act is aa attempt to injure the person of the

sovereign, a conviction may be had on the same evidence as if the prisoner were charged with

murder ; so that, in this case, two witnesses are not required.]

(12) [But the proof of handwriting is not evidence m high treason, unless the papers are found

in the custody of the prisoner. 1 Burr. 644.]

(13) This statute is since repealed.

(14) A noted instance of conviction in America for the murder of a person who afterwards re-

turned alive, had principally upon the confessions of the accused parties, has had a tendency

towards still greater caution. See the case referred to in 1 Greenl. Ev. 214, n., and given more

at large by Mr. GaUison, in 10 K. A. Review, 418.

517

359 TRIAL AND CONVICTION. [Book IV.

neither should he be suffered to exculpate himself by the testimony of any wit-

nesses. And, therefore, it deserves to be- remembered to the honour of Mary I,

(whose early sentiments, till her marriage with Philip of Spain, seem to have

been humane and generous), (o) that when she appointed Sir Richard Morgan

chief justice of the common pleas, she enjoined him, " that notwithstanding

the old error, which did not admit any witness to speak, or any other matter to

be heard, in favour of the adversary, her majesty being party; her highness's

pleasure was, that whatsoever should be brought in favour of the subject should

be admitted to be heard: and moreover, that the justices should not persuade

themselves to sit in judgment otherwise for her highness than for her sub-

ject." (p) Afterwards, in one particular instance (when embezzling the queen's

military stores was made felony by statute 34 Eliz. c. 4), it was provided, that

any person impeached for such felony, " should be received and admitted to

make any lawful proof that he could, by lawful witness or otherwise, for his

discharge and defence:" and in general the courts grew so heartily ashamed

r*3CO 1 °f a doctrine so unreasonable and oppressive, that a practice was *gradu-

' '' J ally introduced of examining witnesses for the prisoner, but not upon

oath; (q) the consequence of which still was, that the jury gave less credit to

the prisoner's evidence than to that produced by the crown. Sir Edward Coke

(r) protests very strongly against this tyrannical practice; declaring that he

never read in any act of parliament, book-case, or record, that in criminal cases
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the party accused should not have witnesses sworn for him; and, therefore,

there was not so much as scintilla juris against it. (s) And the house of com-

mons were so sensible of this absurdity, that, in the bill for abolishing hostili-

ties between England and Scotland, (t) when felonies committed by Englishmen

in Scotland were ordered to be tried in one of the three northern counties, they

insisted on a clause, and carried it (?<) against the efforts of both the crown and

the house of lords, against the practice of the courts in England, and the ex-

press law of Scotland, (w) " that in all such trials for the better discovery of the

truth, and the better information of the consciences of the jury an^d justices,

there shall be allowed to the party arraigned the benefit of such credible wit-

nesses, to be examined upon oath, as can be produced for his clearing and justi-

fication." At length by the statute 7 Wm. Ill, c. 3, the same measure of justice

was established throughout all the realm, in cases of treason within the act: and.

it was afterwards declared by statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 9, that in all cases of treason

and felony all witnesses /or "the prisoner should be examined upon oath, in like

manner as the witnesses against him.

When the evidence on both sides is closed, and indeed when any evidence hath

been given, the jury cannot be discharged (unless in cases of evident necessity)

(r) till they have given in their verdict; (15) but are to consider of it, and

deliver it in, with the same forms as upon civil causes- only they cannot,

in a criminal case which touches life or member, give & privy verdict, (y) But

the judges may adjourn while the jury are withdrawn to confer, and return to

receive the verdict in open court, (z) And such public or open verdict may be

F*3fl 1 e^ner general, guilty, or not guilty; *or special, setting forth all the

' '' -" circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the court,

whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it" be murder, manslaughter, or no

crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore choose to

(o) See page 17. (p) Holllnjrsh. 1112. St Tr. I. 72. (q) 2 Bnlst. 147. Cro. Car. 293.

(r) :i Inst. ,'•>. (») See also 2 Hal. P. C. 2*!, anil his snmninrv. 2«4. ft) Stat. 4 Jac. I, c. 1.

(u) Com. Jimrn. 4, ft, 12, 13, 15. 2!), afl Jun. 1H07. (\o) Com. Jouru. 4 Jnn. 1907.

(x) Co. f.itt. -121. 3 Inst. 110. Fost. 27. Gould's Case. Hill, 1764.

(y) 2 Hal. P. C. 300. 2 Hawk. P. C. 430. (z) 3 St. Tr. 781. 4 St. Tr. 231, 455, 4S5.

(15) The dinchfirge of the jury from any overruling necessity does not entitle the defendant to

his discharge : U. S. t>. Perez, 9 Wheat, 579; Stole r. Ephraim, 2 Dev. and Bat. 166; Common-

wealth r. Fells, 9 Leigh, 620 ; People v. Goodwin, 18 Johns. 205. The sickness or death of the

judge, or of a juror, or inability of the jury to aprce upon a verdict, or the term of the court

coming to an end before the conclusion of the trial would be such a necessity. See Miller «.

State. Bind. :«5: Mahala v. State. 10 Yerg. 532; State v. Battle. 7 Ala. 259.
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leave it to the determination of the court; though they have an unquestionable

right of determing upon all the circumstances, and finding a general verdict,

if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oaths: and if their verdict

be notoriously wrong, they may be punished, and the verdict set aside by attaint

at the suit of the king; but not at the suit of the prisoner, (a) 16) But the

practice heretofore in use of lining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing jurors,

merely at the discretion of 4;he court, for finding their verdict contrary to the

direction of the judge, was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and illegal: and is

treated as such by Sir Thomas Smith, two hundred years ago; who accounted

"such doings to be very violent, tyrannical, and contrary to the liberty and cus-

tom of the realm of England." (b) For, as Sir Matthew Hale well observes,(e)

it would be a most unhappy case for the judge himself, if the prisoner's fate de-

pended upon his directions ; unhappy, also, for the prisoner; for, if the judge's

opinion must rule the verdict, the trial by jury would be useless. Yet, in many

instances, (d) where contrary to evidence the jury have found the prisoner

guilty, their verdict hath been mercifully set aside, and a new trial granted by

the court of king's bench : for in such case, as hath been said, it cannot be set

right by attaint But there hath yet been no instance of granting a new trial

where the prisoner was acquitted upon the first, (e) (17)

If the jury, therefore, lind the prisoner not guilty, he is then forever quit

and discharged of the accusation, (/) except he be appealed of felony within the
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time limited by law. And upon such his acquittal, or discharge for want of

*prosecution, he shall be immediately set at large without payment of r *qon -i

any fee to the gaoler, (g) But if the jury find guilty,(A) he is then said *• '' '" '

to be convicted of the crime whereof he stands indicted. Which conviction

may accrue two ways: either by his confessing the offence and pleading guilty;

or by his being found so by the verdict of his country.

When the offender is thus convicted, there are two collateral circumstances

that immediately arise. 1. On a conviction (or even upon an acquittal where

there was a reasonable ground to prosecute, and in fact a bonaf.de prosecution)

for any grand or petit larceny, or other felony, the reasonable expenses of prose-

cution, and also, if the prosecutor be poor, a compensation for his trouble and

loss of time, are by statutes 25 Geo. II, c. 36, and 18 Geo. Ill, c. 19, to be al-

lowed him out of the county stock, if he petitions the judge for that purpose :

and by statute 27 Geo. II, c. 3, explained by the same statute, 18 Geo. Ill, c. 19,

all persons appearing upon recognizance or subpwna to give evidence, whether

any indictment be preferred or no, and as well without conviction as with it, are

entitled to be paid their charges, with a farther allowance (if poor) for their

trouble and loss of time. 2. On a conviction of larceny, in particular, the

prosecutor shall have restitution of his goods, by virtue of the statute 21 Hen.

VIII, c. 11. (18) For, by the common law, there was no restitution of goods

upon an indictment, because it is at the suit of the king only; and therefore the

party was enforced to bring an appeal of robbery, in order to have his goods

(a) 2 Hal. P. C. 310. fb) Smith's Commonw. I. 3, c. 1. (e) 2 Hal. P. C. SIS.

(d) 1 Lev. S. T. Junes, 163. St. Tr. X. tin. (e) 2 Hitwk. P. U. 4+2.

ffl 'I'll'' civil law in such case only discharges him from the same accuser, but not from the same accnsa-

tlu'n. Ff, 4*. 'i, 7, (2.

ff/J Stilt. 14 Geo. Ill, e. 20.

(h) In tlie Roman republic, when the prisoner was convicted of nny capital offence by his judges, the

form ot pronouncing that conviction was something peculiarly delicate ; not that he was guilty, but that

he had not been enough upon his guard: "parum oavisse videtur." (Feitta, S25.>

(16) This is no longer the law. Attaints are abolished, arid the jury must bo left perfectly-

free to {rive such judgment as their conscience dictates, and be protected in no doing. See

Perm's Case, B Howell's St. Tr. 951; Vaughau, 135.

(17) It' the prisoner is convicted on one count of an indictment and acquitted on another,

and then obtains a new trial, he is onlv tried afterwards on the count on which he was before

convicted. State r. Cooper, 1 Green, if. J. 360; Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 504 ; Price p.

State, 19 Ohio. 423 ; State ». Benham, 7 Conn 414; People ». McGowen, 17 Wend. 386.

(18) Those statutes are since repealed, and new provisions made. The present law on the

restoration of property stolen, embezzled, <te., or received with guilty knowledge, is 24 and

25 Vic. c. 96, s. 100.

-•
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again, (i) But, it being considered that the party prosecuting the offender by

indictment, deserves to the full as much encouragement as he who prosecutes

by appeal, this statute was made, which enacts, that if any person be convicted

of larceny, by the evidence of the party robbed, he shall have full restitution

of his money, goods and chattels; or the value of them out of the offender's

goods, if he has any, by a writ to be granted by the justices. And the con-

struction of this act having been in a great measure conformable to the law of

appeals, it has therefore in practice superceded the use of appeals of larceny.

For instance: as formerly upon appeals, (/) so now upon indictments of lar-

F *363 1 cenJr' *n's wr^ °f restitution *shall reach the goods so stolen, notwith-

" -I standing the property (k) of them is endeavoured to be altered by sale in

market overt. (?) And though this may seem somewhat hard upon the buyer,

yet the rule of law is that " spoliutus debet, ante omnia, reshtui;" especially

when he has used all the diligence in his power to convict the felon. And, since

the case is reduced to this hard necessity, that either the owner or the buyer

must suffer; the law prefers the right of the owner, who has done a meritorious

act by pursuing a felon to condign punishment, to the right of the buyer,

whose merit is only negative, that he has been guilty of no unfair transaction.

And it is now usual for the court, upon the conviction of a felon, to order,

without any writ, immediate restitution of such goods as are brought into

court, to be made to the several prosecutors. Or else, secondly, without such
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writ of restitution, the party may peaceably retake his goods, wherever he hap-

pens to find them, (m) unless a new property be fairly acquired therein. Or,

lastly, if the felon be convicted and pardoned, or be allowed his clergy, the

party robbed may bring his action of trover against him for his goods; and re-

cover a satisfaction in damages. But such action lies not before prosecution;

for so felonies would be made up and healed: (n) and also recaption is unlaw-

ful, if it be done with intention to smother or compound the larceny; it then

becoming the heinous offence of theft-bote, as was mentioned in a former

chapter, (o)

It is not uncommon, when a person is convicted of a misdemeanor, which

principally and more immediately affects some individual, as a battery, imprison-

ment or the like, for the court to permit the defendant to speak with the prose-

cutor, before any judgment is pronounced ; and, if the prosecutor declares him-

self satisfied, to inflict but a trivial punishment. This is done tore-imburse the

prosecutor his expenses, and make him some private amends, without the trouble

F *3P4 1 anc' c'rcu'ty °fa °iv'l Action. But it surely is a dangerous practice; *aud

' '"' J though it may be intrusted to the prudence and discretion of the judges

in the superior courts of record it ought never to be allowed in local or inferior

jurisdictions such .as the quarter sessions; where prosecutions for assaults are

by these means too frequently commenced rather for private lucre than for the

great eiads of public justice. Above all, it should never be suffered where the

testimony of (he prosecutor himself is necessary to convict the defendant: for,

by these means, the rules of evidence are entirely subverted; the prosecutor Ije-

comes in effect a plaintiff, and yet is suffered to bear witness for himself. Nay,

even a voluntary forgiveness by the party injured ought not, in true policy, to

intercept the stroke of justice. " This," says an elegant writer, (o) who pleads

with equal strength for the certainty as for the lenity of punishment, " may be

an act of good nature and humanity, but it is contrary to the good of the pub-

lic. For, although a private citizen may dispense with satisfaction for his pri-

vate injury, he cannot remove the necessity of public example. The right of

punishing belongs not to any one individual in particular, but to the society in

general, or the sovereign who represents that society: and a man may renounce

Fiis own portion of this right, but he cannot give up that of others.

(i) 3 Inst. 242. <i) Bracton, <fe Coron. c. 32. ft) See hook II, MO.

(1) 1 Hal. r. C. 5tt. fmjl See Book III, page *. (n) 1 Hal. 1'. U. M6. (o) See page 133

<!>) Becc. cb. 1'".,
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CHAPTER XXVIII.

OF THE BENEFIT OF CLERGY.

AFTER trial and conviction, the judgment of the court regularly follows,

unless suspended or arrested by some intervening circumstance; of which the

principal is the benefit of clergy; (1) a title of no small curiosity as well as use ;

and concerning which I shall therefore inquire: 1. Into its original, and the

various mutations which this privilege of clergy has sustained. 2. To what per-

sons it is to be allowed at this day. 3. In what cases. 4 The consequences of

allowing it.

I. Clergy, the privilegium clericals, or in common speech, the benefit of clergy,

had its original from the pious regard paid by Christian princes to the church

in its infant state ; and the ill use which the popish ecclesiastics soon made of

that pious regard. The exemptions which they granted to the church, were

principally of two kinds: 1. Exemption of places consecrated to religious

duties, from criminal arrests, which was the foundation of sanctuaries ; 2. Ex-

emption of the pernoHx of clergymen from criminal process before the secu-

lar judge in a few particular cases, which was the true original and meaning of

the privilegium clericals.

But the clergy, increasing in wealth, power, honour, number, and interest,

began soon to set up for themselves: and that which they obtained by the

favour of the civil government, they now claimed as their inherent right: and
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as a *right of the highest nature, indefeasible, and jure divino. (a) By r MCC -i

their canons, therefore, and constitutions, they endeavoured at, and where I

they met with easy princes obtained, a vast extension of these exemptions: as

well in regard to the crimes themselves, of which the list became quite univer-

sal ; (b) as in regard to the persons exempted, among whom were at length com-

prehended not only every little subordinate officer belonging to the church or

clergy, but even many that were totally laymen.

In England, however, although the usurpations of the pope were very many

and grievous, till Henry the Eighth entirely exterminated his supremacy, yet a

total exemption of the clergy from secular jurisdiction could never be thoroughly

effected, though often endeavoured by the clergy: (c) and therefore, though the

ancient privilegium clericale was in some capital cases, yet it was not universally

allowed. And in those particular cases, the use was for the bishop or ordinary

to demand his clerks to be remitted out of the king's courts, as soon as thev

were indicted: concerning the allowance of which demand there was for many

years a great uncertainty; (d) till at length it was finally settled in the neigii

of Henry the Sixth, that the prisoner should first be arraigned; and might

either then claim his benefit of clergy, by way of declinatory plea; or, after

conviction, by way of arresting judgment. This latter way is most usually prac-

ticed, as it is more to the satisfaction of the court to have the crime previously

ascertained by confession or the verdict of a jury: and also it is more advanta-

geous to the prisoner himself, who may possibly be acquitted, and so need not

the benefit of his clergy at all.

Originally the law was held, that no man should be admitted to the privilege

of clergy, but such as had the *habitum et tonsuram clericalem. (e) But r *ofi,-, -i

in process of time a much wider and more comprehensive criterion I

was established : everyone that could read (a mark of great learning in those days

of ignorance and her sister superstition) being accounted a clerk or clericus

(a) The principal argument upon which they fonmlcil tills exemption was that text of Scripture :

Touch not mine annotated, and do mv prophets no harm." (Kcilw. l»l.)

rb) See book HI. page l«. (c) SrilW. 180. (d) 2 llul. P. C. 377.

[ej 2 Hal. P. U. .172. M Paris, A. D. Iio9. Sec book I, p. 24.

(1) Benefit of clerjrv is now abolished, and the law of this chapter is obsolete.
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and allowed the benefit of clerkship, though neither initiated in holy orders, nor

trimmed with the clerical tonsure. But when learning, by means of the inven-

tion of printing, and other concurrent causes, began to be more generally

disseminated than formerly; and reading was no longer a competent proof of

clerkship, or being in holy orders ; it was found that as many laymen as divines

were admitted to the privileyium clerical*.: and, therefore, by statute 4 Hen. VII,

c. 13, a distinction was once more drawn between mere lay scholars, and clerks

that were really in orders. And. though it was thought reasonable still to

mitigate the severity of the law with regard to the former, yet they were not

put upon the same footing with actual clergy; bein<* subjected to a slight

degree of punishment, and not allowed to claim the clerical privilege more than

once. Accordingly, the statute directs that no person once admitted to the

benefit of clergy shall be admitted thereto a second time, unless he produces

his orders: and in order to distinguish their persons, all laymen who are

allowed this privilege shall be burnt with a hot iron in the brawn of the left

thumb. This distinction between learned laymen, and real clerks in orders,

was abolished for a time by the statutes 28 Hen. VIII. c. 1, and 32 Hen. VIII,

c. 3, but it is held (e) to have been virtually restored by statute 1 Edw. VI, c.

12, which statute also enacts that lords of parliament and peers of the realm,

having place and voice in parliament, may have the benefit of their peerage,

equivalent to that of clergy, for the first offence (although they cannot read,
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and without being burnt in the hand), for all offences then clergyable to com-

moners, and also for the crimes of house-breaking, highway robbery, horse-steal-

ing, and robbing of churches. (2)

f *368 1 * After this burning, the laity, and before it the real clergy, were dis-

"- J charged from the sentence of the law in the king's court, and delivered

over to the ordinary, to be dealt with according to the ecclesiastical canons.

Whereupon the ordinary, not satisfied with the proofs adduced in the profane

secular court, set himself formally to work to make a purgation of the offender

by a new canonical trial; although he had been previously convicted by his

country, or perhaps by his own confession. (/) This trial was held before the

bishop in person, or his deputy; and by a jury of twelve clerks: and there,

first, the party himself was required to make oath of his own innocence; next,

there was to be the oath of twelve compurgators, who swore they believed he

spoke the truth ; then, witnesses were to be examined upon oath, but on behalf

of the prisoner only: and, lastly, the jury were to bring in their verdict upon

oath, which usually acquitted' the prisoner; otherwise if a clerk, he was

degraded, or put to penance, (g) A learned judge, in the beginning of the last

century, (h) remarks with much indignation the vast complication of perjury

and subornation of perjury, in this solemn farce of a mock trial; the witnesses,

the compurgators, and the jury, being all of them partakers in the guilt: the

delinquent party also, though convicted before on the clearest evidence, and

conscious of his own offence, yet was permitted and almost compelled to swear

(e) Hob. 291. 2 Hal. P. 0. 375. (f) Staundford, P. C. 138, 6.

(g) 3 I'. Wins. 447. Hub. 289. fhj Hob. 281.

(2) [Upon the conviction of the duchess of Kingston for bigamy, it was argued by tin

attorney-general, Thurlow that peeresses were not entitled by 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, like peers tc

the privilege of peerage ; but it was the unamimous opinion of the judges, that a peeress con-

victed of a clergyable felony ought to be immediately discharged without being burnt in the

hand, or without being liable to any imprisonment. 11 II. St. Tr. 264. If the duchess hail

been admitted like a commoner, only"to the benefit ot the clergy, burning in the hand at that

time could not have been dispensed with. The argument was, that the privilege of peerage

was only an extension of the benefit of clergy, and therefore granted only to thi^e who

were or might be entitled to that benefit; but as no female, peeress or commoner, at that time

was entitled to the benefit of clergy, so it was not the iuteuion of the legislature to grant tr.

any female the privilege of peerage. And in my opinion the argument of the attorney-general

is much more convincing and satisfactory, as a legal demonstration, than the arguments t»i" the

counsel on the other side, or the reasons stated for the opinions of the judges.]
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himself not guilty: nor was the good bishop himself, under whose countenance

this scene of wickedness was daily transacted, by any means exempt from a

share of it. And yet by this purgation the party was restored to his credit, his

liberty, his lands, and his capacity for purchasing afresh, and was entirely made

a new and an innocent man.

This scandalous prostitution of oaths, and the forms of justice, in the almost

constant acquittal of felonious clerks by purgation, was the occasion, that upon

very heinous and ""notorious circumstances of guilt, the temporal r *«,,,, ->

courts would not trust the ordinary with the trial of the offender, but L " ' '

delivered over to him the convicted clerk, absque purgations facienda: in which

situation the clerk convict could not make purgation; but was to continue iu

prison during life, and was incapable of acquiring any personal property, or

receiving the profits of his lands, unless the king should please to pardon him.

Both these courses were in some degree exceptionable; the latter being perhaps

too rigid, as the former was productive of the most abandoned perjury. As,

therefore, these mock trials took their rise from factious and popish tenets,

tending to exempt one part of the nation from the general municipal law; it

became high time, when the reformation was thoroughly established, to abolish

so vain and impious a ceremony.

Accordingly, the statute of 18 Eliz. c. 7, enacts that, for the avoiding of such

perjuries and abuses, after the offender has been allowed his clergy, he shall not
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be delivered to the ordinary, as formerly; but, upon such allowance and burn-

ing in the hand, he shall forthwith be enlarged and delivered out of prison;

with proviso, that the judge may, if he thinks fit, continue the offender in gaol

for any time not exceeding a year. And thus the law continued, for above a

century, unaltered, except only that the statute of '21 Jac. I, c. 6, allowed, that

women convicted of simple larcenies under the value of ten shillings should

(not properly have the benefit of clergy, for they were not called upon to read;

but) be burned in the hand, and whipped, (3) stocked, or imprisoned for any

time not exceeding a year. And a similar indulgence, by the statutes 3 and 4

W. and M. c. 9, and 4 and o W. and M. c. 24, was extended to women, guilty of

any clergyable felony whatsoever; who were allowed once to claim the benefit

of the statute, in like manner as men might claim the benefit of clergy, and to

be discharged upon being burnt in the hand, and imprisoned for any time not

exceeding a year. The punishment of burning in the hand, being found in-

effectual, was also changed by statute 10 and 11 Win. III. c. 23, into burning in

the most visible part of the left cheek, nearest the nose; but such an indelible

stigma being found by experience to render offenders desperate, this provision

wsvs repealed, about seven years afterwards, by statute 5 Ann. c. 6, and till that

period, all women, all peers of parliament and peeresses, and all male com-

moners who could read, were discharged *in all clergyable felonies; the r *owr. r

males absolutely, if clerks in orders: and other commoners, both male ' L

and female, upon branding; and peers and peeresses without branding, for the

first offence: yet, all liable (excepting peers and peeresses), if the judge saw

occasion, to imprisonment not exceeding a year. And those men who could

not read, if under the degree of peerage, were hanged.

Afterwards, indeed, it was considered, that education and learning were no

extenuations of guilt, but quite the reverse: and that, if the punishment of

death for simple felony was too severe for those who had been liberally instructed,

it was, 8 fortiori, too severe for the ignorant also. And, thereupon, by the

same statute. 5 Ann. c. 6, it was enacted, that the benefit of clergy should be

granted to all those who were entitled to ask it, without requiring them to read,

by way of conditional merit And, experience having shown that so very

universal a lenity was frequently inconvenient, and an encouragement to com-

mit the lower degrees of felony; and that, though capital punishments were

too rigorous for these inferior offences, yet no punishment at all (or next to

1 ["Whipping of women is abolished by 1 Geo. IV, c. 67.]

••
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none), wag as much too gentle; it was further enacted by the same statute, that

when any person is convicted of any theft, or larceny, and burnt in the hand

for the same, according to the ancient law, he shall also, at the discretion of

the judge, be committed to the house of correction or public workhouse, to be

there kept to hard labour, for any time not less than six months, and not ex-

ceeding two years; with a power of inflicting a double confinement in case of

the party's escape from the first. And it was also enacted, by the statutes

4 Geo. I, c. 11, and 6 Geo. 1, c. 23, that when any persons shall be convicted of

any larceny, either grand or petit, or any felonious stealing or taking of money,

or goods and chattels, either from the person or the house of any other, or in

any other manner, and who by the law shall be entitled to the benefit of clergy,

and liable only to the penalties of burning in the hand, or whipping, the court

in their discretion, instead of such burning in the hand, or whipping, may

direct such offenders to be transported to America (or, by statute 19 Geo.

Ill, c, 74, to any other parts beyond the seas) for seven years: and, if they

F *3711 *re''urn or are 8een a^ lal'ge in this kingdom, within that time, it shall

L -I be felony, without benefit of clergy. And by the subsequent statutes

16 Geo. II, c. 15, and 8 Geo. Ill, c. 15, many wise provisions are made for the

more speedy and effectual execution of the laws relating to transportation, and

the conviction of such as transgress them. But now, by the statute 19 Geo. Ill,

c. 74, all offenders liable to transportation may, in lieu thereof, at the discretion
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of the judges, be emploved, if males, except in the case of petty larceny, in hard

labour for the benefit of some public navigation ; or, whether males or females,

may, in all cases, be confined to hard labour in certain penitentiary houses, to

be erected by virtue of the said act, for the several terms therein specified, but

in no case exceeding seven years; with a power of subsequent mitigation, and

even of reward, in case of their good behaviour. But if they escape, and are

retaken, for the first time an addition of three years is made to the term of their

confinement; and a second escape is felony, without benefit of clergy.

In forming the plan of these penitentiary houses, the principal objects have

been, by sobriety, cleanliness, and medical assistance, by a regular series of

labour,'by solitary confinement during the intervals of work, and by due re-

ligious instruction, to preserve and amend the health of the unhappy offenders,

to inure them to habits of industry, to guard them from pernicious company,

to accustom them to serious reflection, and to teach them both the principles

and practice of every Christian and moral duty. And if the whole of this plan

be properly executed, and its defects be timely supplied, there is reason to hope

that such a reformation may be effected in the lower classes of mankind, and

such a gradual scale of punishment be affixed to all gradations of guilt, as may

in time supersede the necessity of capital punishment, except for very atrocious

crimes.

It is also enacted by the same statute, 19 Geo. Ill, c. 74, that instead of burn-

ing in the hand (which was sometimes too slight and sometimes too disgraceful

a punishment) the court,in all clergyable felonies, may impose a pecuniary fine;

or (except in the case of manslaughter) may order the offender to be once, or

oftener, but not more than thrice, either publicly or privately whipped; such

private whipping (to prevent collusion or abuse) to be inflicted in the presence

of two witnesses, and in case of female offenders in the presence of females

only. Which fine or whipping shall have the same consequences as burning in

the hand: and the offender, so fined or whipped, shall be equally liable to a

subsequent detainer or imprisonment.

In this state does the benefit of clergy at present stand; very considerably

different from its original institution: the wisdom of the English legislature

having, in the course of a long and laborious process, extracted by a noble

alchemy rich medicines out of poisonous ingredients; and converted, by grad-

ual mutations, what was at first an unreasonable exemption of particular popish

ecclesiastics, into a merciful mitigation of the general law, with respect to capi-

tal punishment. »
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From the whole of this detail we may collect, that however in times of

ignorance and superstition that monster in true policy may for a while subsist,

of a body of men, residing in the bowels of a state, and yet independent of

its law; yet, when learning and rational religion have a little enlightened

men's minds, society can no longer endure an absurdity so gross, as must destroy

its very fundamentals. For, by the original contract of government, the price

of protection by the united force of individuals is that of obedience to the

united will of the community. This iinited will is declared in the laws of

the land: and that united force is exerted in their due and universal execution.

II. I am next to inquire, to what persons the benefit of clergy is to be allowed

at this day: and this must be chiefly collected from what has been observed in

the preceding *article. For, upon the whole, we may pronounce, that r t^n.) -\

all clerks in orders are, without any branding, and of course without *• ' '

any transportation, fine, or whipping, (for those are only substituted in lieu of

the other) to be admitted to this privilege, and immediately discharged; and

this as often as they offend, (i) Again, all lords of parliament and peers of the

realm, having place and voice in parliament, by the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12,

(which is likewise held to extend to peeresses) (k) shall be discharged in all

clergyable and other felonies provided for by the act, without any burning in

the hand, or imprisonment, or other punishment substituted in its stead, in the

same manner as real clerks convict: but this is only for the first offence.
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Lastly, all the commons of the realm, not in orders, whether male or female,

shall, for the first offence, be discharged of the capital punishment of felonies,

within the benefit of clergy, upon being burnt in the hand, whipped, or fined,

or suffering a discretionary imprisonment in the common gaol, the house of

correction, one of the penitentiary houses, or in the places of labour, for the

benefit of some navigation; or, in case of larceny, upon being transported for

seven years, if the court shall think proper. It hath been said, that Jews, and

other infidels and heretics, were not capable of the benefit of clergy, till after

the statute 5 Ann. c. 6, as being under a legal incapacity for orders. (I) But I

much question whether this was ever ruled for law, since the re-introduction

of the Jews into England, in the time of Oliver Cromwell. For, if that were

the case, the Jews are still in the same predicament, which every day's experience

will contradict: the statute of Queen Aune having certainly made no alteration

in this respect; it only dispensing with the necessity of reading in those per-

sons, who, in case they could read, were before the act entitled to the benefit of

their clergy.

III. The third point to be considered is, for what crimes the privilegium

clericale, or benefit of clergy, is to be allowed. And, it is to be observed, that

neither in high treason, nor in petit larceny, nor in any mere misdemeanors, it

was indulged at the common law; and therefore we may lay it down for a rule

that it was allowable only in petit treason and capital felonies: which, for the

most part, became legally entitled to this *indulgence by the statute de r *o~n -i

clero, 25 Edw. Ill, st. 3, c. 4, which provides that clerks convict for trea- L ' -"

sons or felonies, touching other persons than the king himself or his roval

majesty, shall have the privilege of holy church. But yet it was not allowable

in all felonies whatsoever: for m some it was denied even by the common law,

viz., insidiatio viarum, or lying in wait for one on the highway; depopulatio

agrorum, or destroying and ravaging a country; (in) and combustio doinorum,

or arson, that is, the burning of houses: (M) all which are a kind of hostile acts,

and in some degree border on treason. And, farther, all these identical crimes,

together with petit treason, and very many other acts of felony, are ousted of

clergy by particular acts of parliament; which have in general been mentioned

under the particular offences to which they belong, and therefore need not here

be recapitulated. Upon all which statutes for excluding clergy I shall only

observe, that they are nothing else but the restoring of the law to the same

(*| 2 Hal. P. C. 375. . (i) Duchess of Kingston's Case In Parliament, 22 Apr. 1776.

(i) 2 Hal. P. C. 373. 2 Hawk. P. C. 338. J'ost. 30«. (m) 2 Hal. P. C. 333. (n) 2 Hnl. P. C. 316.
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rigour of capital punishment in the first offence that it exerted before the prii'i-

ler/ium dericah was at all indulged; and which it still exerts upon a second

offence in almost all kinds of felonies, unless committed by clerks actually in

orders. But so tender is the law of inflicting capital punishment in the first

instance for any inferior felony, that, notwithstanding by the marine law, as

declared in statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 15, the benefit of clergy is not allowed in

any case whatsoever; yet, when offences are committed within the admiralty-

jurisdiction, which would be clergyable if committed by land, the constant

course is to acquit and discharge the prisoner. (<i) (4) Ami, to conclude this head

Tof inquiry, we may observe the following rules: 1. That in all fVlonies, whether

new created or by common law, clergy is now allowable, unless taken away by

express words of an act of parliament, (p) 2. That, where clergy is taken away

from the principal, it is not of course taken away from the accessory, unless he

be also particularly included in the words of the statute. (7) 3. That when the

benefit of clergy is taken away from the offence (as in case of murder, buggery,

robbery, rape, and burglary), a principal in the second degree being present,

r *o«4 i aiding and abetting the crime, is as well *excluded from his clergy as

' •* he that is principal in the first degree: but, 4. That, where it is only

taken away from the person committing the offence (as in the case of stabbing,

or committing larceny in a dwelling-house, or privately from the person), his

aiders and abettors are not excluded; through the tenderness of the law which
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hath determined that such statutes shall be taken literally, (r)

IV. Lastly, we are to inquire what the consequences are to the party, of allow-

ing him this benefit of clergy. I speak not of the branding, line, whipping,

imprisonment, or transportation; which are rather concomitant conditions, thaii

consequences of receiving this indulgence. The consequences are such as affect

his present interest, and future credit and capacity: as having been once a felon,

but now purged from that guilt by the privilege of clergy; which operates as a

kind of statute pardon.

And we may observe, 1. That by this conviction he forfeits all his goods to the

king: which, being once vested in the crown, shall not afterwards be restored to

the offender. («) 2. That, after conviction, and till he receives the judgment of

the law, by branding, or some of its substitutes, or else is pardoned by the king,

he is to all intents and purposes a felon, and subject to all the disabilities and

other incidents of a felon. (I) 3. That after burning, or its substitute, or pardon,

he is discharged forever of that, and all other felonies before committed, within the

benefit of clergy; but not of felonies from which such benefit is excluded: and

this by statute 8 Eliz. c. 4, and ISEliz. c.7. 4. That, by the burning, or its sub-

stitute, or the pardon of it, he is restored to all capacities and credits, and the

possession of his lauds, as if he had never been convicted. («) 5. That what is

said with regard to the advantages of commoners and laymen, subsequent to

the burning in the hand, is equally applicable to all peers and clergymen,

although never branded at all, or subjected to other punishment in its stead.

For they have the same privileges, without any burning, or any substitute for it,

which others are entitled to after it. («')

(o) Moor, 756. Fost. 588. (p) 2 Hal. P. C. 330. (qt 2 Hawk. P. C. S«2.

(p) 1 Hal. P. C. S3). Fost. 35fi, 357. <«l 2 Hal. P. C. 8<W. (t) 3 P. Wins. *37.

(K) 2 Hal. P. C. 3sa. 6 Kcp. 110. (w) 2 Hal. P. C. 339, 390.

(4) By subsequent statutes, offences committed on the high seas tire to be considered and

treated in the same manner as if committed on shore.
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CHAPTER XXIX.

OF JUDGMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

WK are now to consider the next stage of criminal prosecution, after trial and

conviction are past, in such crimes and misdemeanors as are either too high or

too low to be included within the benefit of clergy: which is that of judgment.

For when, npon a capital charge, the jury have brought in their verdict guilty,

in the presence of the prisoner, he is either immediatelv, or at a convenient time

soon after, asked by the court if he has anything to offer why judgment should

not be awarded against him. And in case the defendant be found guilty of a

misdemeanor (the trial of which may, and does usually, happen in his absence,

after he has once appeared), a cnpiiis is awarded and issued, to bring him in to

receive his judgment; and, if he absconds, he may be prosecuted even to out-

lawry. But whenever he appears in person, upon either a capital or inferior

conviction, he may, at this period, as well as at his arraignment, offer any excep-

tions to the indictment, in arrest or stay of judgment: as, for want of sufficient

certainty in setting forth either the person, the time, the place, or the offence.

And, if the objections be valid, the whole proceedings shall be set aside; but the

party may be indicted again, (a) (1) And we may take notice, 1. That none of

the statutes ofjeofails, (b) for amendment of errors, extend to indictments or

proceedings in criminal cases ; *and therefore a defective indictment is r „„„,, -•

not aided by a verdict, as defective pleadings in civil cases are. 2. That, L °'"J
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in favour of life, great strictness has at all times been observed, in every point

of an indictment. Sir Matthew Hale indeed complains, " that this strictness

is grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administration

thereof: for that more offenders escape by the over-easy ear given to exceptions

in indictments, than by their own innocence." (c) And yet no man was more

tender of life than this truly excellent judge. (2)

A pardon, also, as has been before said, may be pleaded in arrest of judgment,

and it has the same advantage when pleaded here as when pleaded upon arraign-

ment, viz., the saving the attainder, and, of course, the corruption of blood;

which nothing can restore but parliament, when a pardon is not pleaded till

after sentence. And certainly, upon all accounts, when a man hath obtained a

pardon, he is in the right to plead it as soon as possible.

Praying the benefit of clergy may also be ranked among the motions in arrest

of judgment: of which we spoke largely in the preceding chapter.

If all these resources fail, the court must pronounce that judgment which

the law hath annexed to the crime, and which hath been constantly men-

tioned, together with the crime itself, in some or other of the former chapters.

Of these some are capital, which extend to the life of the offender, and consist

generally in being hanged by the neck till dead; though in very atrocious

crimes other circumstances of terror, pain or disgrace, are superadded ; as, in

treasons *of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execu- r *o~^-i

tion ; in high treason affecting the king's person or government, embow- L ' ' J

eling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in murder, a public dissection.

And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment is to be

burned alive. But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a

tacit consent, an almost general mitigation of such parts of these judgments

as savour of torture or cruelty: a sledge or hurdle being usually allowed to

such traitors as are condemned to be drawn ; and there being very few instances

(«) 4 Rep. 45. (6) See book III, p. 407. (c) 2 Hal. P. (J. 193.

(1) Sec Casborus t'.Peoplc, 13 Johns. 351; Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass. 455.

(2) But now, formal defects appnrent on the face of the indictment can only be taken advan-

tage of by demurrer or motion to quash, and not afterwards. Statute 14 and 15 Vio. o.

inn ft 25.
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(and those accidental or by negligence) of any person's being emboweled or

burned, till previously deprived of sensation by strangling. Some punishments

consist in exile or banishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation:

others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some ex-

tend to confiscation, by forfeiture of lands, or movables, or both, or of the

profits of lands for life: others induce a disability of holding offices or employ-

ments, being heirs, executors, and the like. Some, though rarely, occasion a

mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears; others fix a last-

ing stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or

cheek. Some are merely pecuniary, by stated or discretionary fines : and lastly,

there are others that consist principally in their ignominy, though most of thein

are mixed with some degree of corporal pain ; and these are inflicted chiefly for

such crimes as either arise from indigence, or render even opulence disgraceful.

Such as whipping, hard labour in the house of correction, or otherwise, the pil-

lory, the stocks, and the ducking-stool.

Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English

reader, and do honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking

apparatus of death and torment, to be met with in the criminal codes of almost

every other nation in Europe. And it is moreover one of the glories of our

English law, that the species, though not always the quantity or degree, of pun-

ishment is ascertained for every offence ; and that it is not left in the breast of
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f *'3781 any ""J11^6' nor even °f a Jurv» t° alter that judgment, which the law

"- J has beforehand ordained, for every subject alike, wihout respect of per-

sons. For, if judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men

would then be slaves to their magistrates; and would live in society without

knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under. And.

besides, as this prevents oppression on the one hand, so on the other it stifles

all hopes of impunity or mitigation ; with which an offender might flatter him-

self, if his punishment depended on the humour or discretion of the court.

Whereas, where an established penalty is annexed to crimes, the criminal may

rend their certain consequence in that law; which ought to be the unvaried

rule, as it is the inflexible judge, of his actions.

The discretionary fines and discretionary length of imprisonment, which our

courts are enabled to impose, may seem an exception to this rule. But the

general nature of the punishment, viz., by fine or imprisonment, is, in these

cases, fixed and determinate: though the duration and quantity of each must

frequently vary, from the aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the quality

and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other circumstances. The

quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines, neither can, nor ought to be ascer-

tained by an invariable law. The value of money itself changes from a thou-

sand causes: and, at all events, what is ruin to one man's fortune, may be

matter of indifference to another's. Thus the law of the twelve tables at Home

fined every person that struck another five-and-twenty denarii: this in the

more opulent days of the empire, grew to be a punishment of so little consid-

eration, that Aulus Gellius tells a story of one Lucius Neratius, who made it

his diversion to give a blow to whomsoever he pleased, and then tender them the

legal forfeiture. Our statute law has not, therefore, often ascertained the quan-

tity of fines, nor the common law ever; it directing such an offence to be pun-

ished by fine in general, without specifying the certain sum; which is fully

r *n^n 1 sufficient, when we consider that *however unlimited the power of the

L ' J court may seem, it is far from being wholly arbitrary; but its discretion

is regulated by law. For the bill of rights (d) has particularly declared, that

excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments

inflicted (which had a retrospect to some unprecedented proceedings in the

court of king's bench, in the reign of King James the Second): and the same

statute farther declares, that all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures of

(it; Stat. 1 W. and Jl, nt. 2, c. 8.
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particular persons before conviction, are illegal and void. Now the bill of rights

was only declaratory of the old constitutional law: and accordingly we find it

expressly holden, long before, (e) that all such previous grants are void; since

thereby many times undue means, and more violent prosecution, would be used

for private lucre, than the quiet and just proceeding of law would permit.

The reasonableness of tines in criminal cases has also been usually regulated

by the determination of magna carta, c. 14, concerning amercements for misbe-

haviour by the suitors in matters of civil right. " Liber homo non amercietur

proparvo delicto, nisi secundum modum ipnius delicti; et pro rnagno delicto,

secuiidum magnitudinem delicti; salvo contenemento suo ; et mercator eodeiii

modo, salva mercandisa suaj et villanus eodem modo amercietur, salvo waintiyio

suo." A rule that obtained even in Henry the Second's time, (/) and means

only, that no man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon him, than his

circumstances or personal estate will bear; saving to the landholder his conten-

ement, (3) or land; to the trader his merchandize; and to the countryman his

wainage, or team and instruments of husbandry. In order to ascertain which,

the great charter also directs that the amercement, which is ahvavs iullicted in

general terms (" sit in miser icordia "), shall be set, ponatur, or reduced to a cer-

tainty, by the oath of good and lawful men of the neighbourhood. Which

method of liquidivting the amercement to a precise sum, was usually performed

in the superior courts by the assessment or affeerment of the coroner, a sworn
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officer chosen by the neighbourhood, under the equity of the statute Westm. 1, c.

18; and then the judges estreated them into the exchequer, (g) But in the

court-leet and court-baron it is still performed by *affeerors, or suitors r*ooQ -i

sworn to affeere, that is, tax and moderate the general amercement ac- >- ' -I

cording to the particular circumstances of the oifence and the offender, (h)

Amercements imposed by the superior courts on their own officers and ministers

were affeered by the judges themselves; but when a peculiar mulct was inflicted

by them on a stranger (not being party to any suit), it was then denominated

&fine; (i) and the ancient practice was, when any such fine was imposed, to in-

quire by a jury "quantum inde regi dare valeatper annum, salva sustentntione

sua, et uxoris, et liberorum suorum." (j) And since the disuse of such inquest,

it is never usual to assess a larger fine than a man is able to pay, without touch-

ing the implements of his livelihood; but to inflict corporal punishment, or a

limited imprisonment, instead of such fine as might amount to imprisonment

for life. And this is the reason why fines in the king's court are frequently

denominated ransoms, because the penalty must otherwise fall upon a man's

person, unless it be redeemed or ransomed by a pecuniary fine; (k) according to

an ancient maxim, qui non habet in crumena luat in corpore. Yet, where any

statute speaks both of fine and ransom, it is holden that the ransom shall be

treble to the fine at least (I) (4)

When sentence of death, the most terrible and highest judgment in the laws

of England, is pronounced, the immediate inseparable consequence from the

common law is attainder. For when it is now clear beyond all dispute, that

(el 2 Inst. 48. (/) Glanv. I. 9 co. 8 and 11. (g) F. N. B. 76.

(Ai Thetafl'eerer's oath is conceived in the very terras of magna carta. Fltzh. Survey, ch. 11.

(i, .-i Rep. 40. (ji Uilb. Exch. c. 6. (/;)' Hirr. c. 5, j S. Lamb, Eirenarch, 575. (i) Dyer, 232.

(3) [Lord Coke says, that " contenement signiueth his countenance, as the armour of a soldier

is his countenance, the books of a scholar his countenance, and the like." 2 Inst. 28. He also

adds that, •• the wainagium is the countenance of the villein, and it was great reason to save his

vrainage, for otherwise the miserable creature was to carry the burden on his back."

Id.]

(4) In any case, the judgment must be the same which the law allows, and not other or

different; for if it is it will be erroneous, and the prisoner may have it reversed, even though

it be not so severe as should have been inflicted. Bourne i>. Rex, 7 A. and E. 58; Hartung v.

People, 16 N. Y. 167; Elliott e. People. 13 Mich. 3H5. But if the punishment consist of two

sevcrable things, as fine and imprisonment, the prisoner cannot be heard to complain that only

one imposed. See Kane o.People 8 Wend. 203.
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the criminal is no longer fit to live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as

a monster and a bane to human society, the law sets a note of infamy upon him,

puts him out of its protection, and takes no further care of him than barely to

see him executed. (5) He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained or blackened.

He is no longer of any credit or reputation; he cannot be a witness in any

court: neither is he capable of performing the functions of another man: for,

by an anticipation of his punishment, he is already dead in law. (m) This is

after judgment; for there is great difference between a man convicted and at-

tainted: though they are frequently through inaccuracy confounded together.

F*3811 After conviction *only a man is liable to none of these disabilities; for

*• -1 there is still in contemplation of law a possibility of his innocence.

Something may be offered in arrest of judgment; the indictment may be erro-

neous, which will render his guilt uncertain, and thereupon the present convic-

tion may be quashed: he may obtain a pardon, or be allowed the benefit of

clergy: both which suppose some latent sparks of merit, which plead in exten-

uation of his fault. But when judgment is once pronounced, both law and fact

conspire to prove him completely guilty; and there is not the remotest possi-

bility left of anything to be said in his favour. Upon judgment therefore of

death, and not before, the attainder of a criminal commences: or upon such

circumstances as are equivalent to judgment of death ; as judgment of outlawry

on a capital crime, pronounced for absconding or fleeing from justice, whicn
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tacitly confesses the guilt. And therefore either upon judgment of outlawry,

or of death, for treason or felony, a man shall be said to be attainted.

The consequences of attainder are forfeiture and corruption of blood.

I. Forfeiture is two-fold; of real and personal estates. First, as to real

estates: by attainder in high treason (ti) a man forfeits to the king all his lands

and tenements of inheritance, whether fee-simple or fee-tail, and all his rights

of entry on lands or tenements which he had at the time of the offence com-

mitted, or at any time afterwards, to be forever vested in the crown; and also

the profits of all lands and tenements, which he had in his own right for life or

years, so long as such interest shall subsist. This forfeiture relates backwards

to the time of the treason committed: so as to avoid all intermediate sales and

incumbrances, (o) but not those before the fact: and therefore a wife's jointure

is not forfeitable for the treason of her husband; because settled upon her

F*3821 Previ°us t° the treason committed. But her dower *is forfeited by the

' '"' ' express provisions of statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11. And yet the hus-

band shall be tenant by the curtesy of the wife's lands, if the wife be attainted

of treason: (p) for that is not prohibited by the statute. But, though after

attainder the forfeiture relates back to the time of the treason committed, yet it

does not take effect unless an attainder be had, of which it is one of the fruits ;

and therefore if a traitor dies before judgment pronounced, or is killed in open

rebellion, or is hanged by martial law. it works no forfeiture of his lands: for

he never was attainted of treason, (a) But if the chief justice of the king's

bench (the supreme coroner of all England) in person, upon the view of tho

body of one killed in open rebellion, records it and returns the record into his

own court, both lands and goods shall be forfeited, (r)

The natural justice of forfeiture or confiscation of property, for treason, (s) is

founded on this consideration : that he who hath thus violated the fundamental

rinciples of government, and broken his part of the original contract between

ing and people, hath abandoned his connections with society; and hath no

longer any right to those advantages, which before belonged to him purely as a

member of the community ; among which social advantages, the right of trans-

ferring or transmitting property to others is one of the chief. Such forfeitures

(mJS Tnst. 213. (n) Co. LHt. KI3 ; S Inst. 19; 1 Hal. P. C. 240 ; 2 Hawk. P. C. 448. (o) SInst. ill.

(/') 1 Hal. I•. i,'.. xa. (q) Co. LIU. 13. (r)4 Kep. 57. (t) See book I, page :.*.<

(5) [This must be taken with some qualification ; for tho person of an attainted felon is still

under the protection of the law, and to kill him without warrant would be murder. Post. 73.]
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moreover, whereby his posterity must suffer as well as himself, will help to

restrain a man, not only by the sense of his duty, and dread of personal pun-

ishment, but also by his passions and natural affections; and will interest

every dependent and relation he has to keep him from offending: according to

that beautiful sentiment of Cicero, (t) " nee vero me fugit quam sit acerbum,

parentum scelera filiorum pcenis lui : ssd hoc pradare legibus comparatum cst

ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicce redderet." And therefore

Aulus Cascellins, a Roman lawyer in the time of the triumvirate, used to boast

that he had two reasons for *despising the power of the tyrants; his old r *ogo -i

age and his want of children : for children are pledges to the prince L '''"''

of the father's obedience. («) Yet many nations have thought, that this post-

humous punishment savours of hardship to the innocent; especially for crimes

that do not strike at the very root and foundation of society, as treason against

the government expressly does. And therefore, though confiscations were very

frequent in the times of the earlier emperors, yet Arcadius and Honorius in

every other instance but that of treason thought it more just, " ibi esse pcenam,

ubi ef nf'ya eat;" and ordered that "peccata tuos teneant auctores, nee ulterius,

•irogrcdiatur metus, quam reperiatur delictuin :" (v) and Justinian also made a

aw to restrain the punishment of relations, (w) which directs the forfeiture to

•o, except in the case of crimen majestatis, to the next of kin to the delinquent.

)n the other hand, the Macedonian laws extended even the capital punishment
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of treason, not only to the children, but to all the relations of the delinquent: (x)

and of course their estates must be also forfeited, as no man was left to inherit

them. And in German y, by the famous golden bulle (y) (copied almost verbatim

from Justinian's code), (z) the lives of the sons of such as conspire to kill an

elector are spared, as it is expressed, by the emperor's particular bounty. But

they are deprived of all their effects and rights of succession, and are rendered

incapable of any honour, ecclesiastical or civil: " to the end that, being always

poor and necessitous, they may forever be accompanied by the infamy of their

father; may languish in continual indigence ; and may find (says this merciless

edict) their punishment in living, and their relief in dying."

With us, in England, forfeiture of lands and tenements to the crown for

treason is by no means derived from the feudal policy (as has been already

observed), (a) but was antecedent to the establishment of that system in this

island; *being transmitted from our Saxon ancestors, (b) and forming p tva* i

a part of the ancient Scandinavian constitution, (c) But in certain L l" J

treasons relating to the coin (which, as we formerly observed, seem rather a

species of the crimen falsi, than the crimen laesae majestatis), it is provided by

some of the modern statutes (d) which constitute the offence, that it shall work

no forfeiture of lands save only for the life of the offender; and by all, that it

shall not deprive the wife of her dower, (e) And, in order to abolish such

hereditary punishment entirely, it was enacted by statute 7 Ann. c. 21, that,

after the decease of the late pretender, no attainder for treason should extend

to the disinheritiug of any heir, nor to the prejudice of any person other than

the traitor himself. By which, the law of forfeitures for high treason would by

this time have been at an end, had not a subsequent statute intervened to give

them a longer duration. The history of this matter is somewhat singular, and

worthy observation. At the time of the union, the crime of treason in Scot-

land was, by the, Scots' law, in many respects different from that of treason in

England; and particularly in its consequence of forfeitures of entailed estates,

which was more peculiarly English ; yet it seemed necessary, that a crime so

nearly affecting government should, both in its essence and consequences, be put

on the same footing in both parts of the united kingdoms. In new-modeling

these laws, the Scotch nation and the English house of commons struggled

hard, partly to maintain, and partly to acquire, a total immunity from forfeiture

(fl ad llrutum fp. 12. («) Gravin. 1. » 88. (») Cod. 9, 47. 22. (to) Nov. JSt, c 13.

(*) QII Curt. 1. 6. (»1 cap. «. (zi 1. 9. *. S, 1. S. ;<i) See book II, page 251.

(b\ LL. Aelfr. c. 4 ; Canvt. c. M. (c) Stiemli. tie jure Oath. 1. 2. c. fi, line! I. :i, c. 3.

id) Stat. a kliz c. 11 ; IS Eliz. o. 1. (e) JMd. S ami U Win. Ill, c. 26. 15 aud IB Geo. II, c. 23
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and corruption of blood, •which the house of lords as firmly resisted. At

length a compromise was agreed to, which is established by this statute, viz.:

that the same crimes, and no other, should be treason in Scotland that are so in

England: and that the English forfeitures and corruption of blood should take

place in Scotland till the death of the then pretender; and then cease through-

out the whole of Great Britain : (/) the lords artfully proposing this temporary

I *38" 1 c^ause> in *hopes (it is said) (g) that the prudence of succeeding

' J parliaments would make it perpetual. (A) This has partly been done by

the statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39 (made in the year preceding the late rebellion),

the operation of these indemnifying clauses being thereby still farther sus-

pended till the death of the sons of the pretender. (?) (6)

In petit treason and felony, the offender also forfeits all his chattel interests

absolti tely, and the profits of all estates of freehold during life; and after his death,

all his lands and tenements in fee simple (but not those in tail) to the crown, for a

very short period of time: for the king shall have them for a year and a day,

and may commit therein what waste he pleases; which is called the king's year,

day and waste, (j) Formerly the king had only a liberty of committing waste

on the lands of felons, by pulling down their houses, extirpating their gardens,

ploughing their meadows, and cutting down their woods. And a punishment

of a similar spirit appears to have obtained in the oriental countries, from the

decrees of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus in the books of Daniel (k) and Ezra;(Z)
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which, besides the pain of death inflicted on the delinquents there specified,

ordain, " that their houses shall be made a dunghill." But this tending greatly

to the prejudice of the public, it was agreed, in the reign of Henry the First, in

this kingdom, that the king should have the profits of the land for one year and

a day, in lieu of the destruction he was otherwise at liberty to commit: (?») and

therefore magna curia (n) provides, that the king shall only hold such lands for

a year and a day, and then restore them to the lord of the fee; without any

mention made of waste. But the statute 17 Edw. II, de prcerogativa reqis

seems to suppose, that the king shall have his year, day ami waste; and not the

F *SSfi 1 *J'ear an<^ day instead of waste. Which Sir Edward Coke (and the

' ' J author of the Mirror, before him) very justly look upon as an encroach-

ment, though a very ancient one. of the royal prerogative. (0) This year, day

and waste, are now usually compounded for; but otherwise they regularly

belong to the crown; and after their expiration, the land would naturally have

descended to the heir (as in gavelkind tenure it still does), did not its feudal

quality intercept such descent, and give it by way of escheat to the lord. These

forfeitures for felony do also arise only upon attainder; and therefore a felo de se

forfeits no lands of inheritance or freehold, for he never is attainted as a

felon, (p) They likewise relate back to the time of the offence committed, as

well as forfeitures for treason ; so as to avoid all intermediate charges and con-

veyances. This may be hard upon such as have unwarily engaged with the

offender: but the crueltv and reproach must lie on the part, not of the law,

but of the criminal; who has thus knowingly and dishonestly involved others

in his own calamities.

These are all the forfeitures of real estates created by the common law, as

consequential upon attainders by judgment of death or outlawry. I here omit

the particular forfeitures created by the statutes of prmntinire and others:

because I look upon them rather as apart of the judgment and penalty,

inflicted by the respective statutes, than as consequences of such judgment; as

in treason and felony they are. But I shall just mention, as a part of the for-

( f) Bnrnet's Hist. A. D. 1709. (g] Considerations on the law of forfeiture, 6. (») Sec Fost 2SO.

ft) The justice and ex)x>ilienr.ynf till* provision wore rlefumlod at Hie time with roach learning »n<1 strength

ofnnriimuut in the coiaitteratioiw on the law of forfeiture, flrot published A. D. 1744. f See book I, p:> ;<•-.:11. J

OM 2 I "St. 37. (k) ch. Hi, 29. (I) ch. vi, 11. (m) Mlrr. c. 4. 5 16. fM. 1.1, c. 2S.

(n) 9 Hen. Ill, c. 22. foj Mirr. 0. 5, } 2. 2 lust. 37. (p) » Inst. 55.

(6) The modifipntion of the law of forfeiture by later statutes is referred to elsewhere.

See book 2, pp. 267, 409, 420.
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feiture of real estates, the forfeiture of the profits of lands during life: which

extends to two other instances, besides those already spoken of; misprision of

treason, (q) and striking in Westminster-hall, or drawing a weapon upon a judge

there sitting in the king's courts of justice, (r)

The forfeiture of goods arid chattels accrues in every one of the higher kind

of offence: in high treason or misprision *thereof,petit treason, felonies r *<JQ-~ n

of all sorts, whether clergyable or not, self-murder or felony de se, petit L ' J

larceny, standing mute, and the above mentioned offences of striking, &c., in

Westminster-hall. For flight also, on an accusation of treason, felony, or even

petit larceny, whether the party be found guilty or acquitted, if the jury find

the flight, tne party shall forfeit his goods and chattels: for the very flight is an

offence, carrying with it a strong presumption of guilt, and is at least an

endeavor to allude and stifle the course of justice prescribed by the law. But

the jury very seldom find the flight: (s) forfeiture being looked upon since the

vast increase of personal property of late years, as too large a penalty for an

offence, to which a man is prompted by the natural love of liberty. (7)

There is a remarkable difference or two between the forfeiture, of lands and

of goods and chattels. ' 1. Lands are forfeited upon attainder, and not before:

goods and chattels are forfeited by conviction. Because, in manv of the cases

where goods are forfeited, there never is any attainder; which happens only

where judgment of death or outlawry is given: therefore in those cases the
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forfeiture must be upon conviction or not at all; and, being necessarily upon

conviction in those, it is so ordered in all other cases, for the law loves uniform-

ity. 2. In outlawries for treason or felony, lands are forfeited only by the judg-

ment: but the goods and chattels are forfeited by a man's being first put in the

exigent without staying till he is quinto erachts, or finally outlawed; for the

secreting himself so long from justice is construed a flight in law. (t) The

forfeiture of lands has relation to the time of the fact committed, so as to avoid

all subsequent sales and incumbrances; but the forfeiture of goods and chat-

tels has no relation backwards; so that those only which a man has at the time

of conviction shall be forfeited. Therefore a traitor or felon may bona fide sell

any of his chattels real or personal, for the sustenance of himself and family

between the fact and conviction; (u) for personal property is of *so r *»aa -\

fluctuating a nature, that it passes through many hands in a short time; >- "' ' '

and no buyer could be safe, if he were liable to return the goods which he had

fairly bought, provided any of the prior vendors had committed a treason or

felony. \ et if they be collusively and not bona fide parted with merely to

defraud the crown, the law (and particularly the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5) will reach

them; for they are all the while truly and substantially the goods of the

offender: and as he, if acquitted, might recover them himself, as not parted

with for a good consideration ; so in case he happens to be convicted, the law

will recovei them for the king.

II. Another immediate consequence of attainder is the corruption of blood,

both upwards and downwards, (8) so that an attainted person can neither inherit

lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those lie is already

in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the same shall

escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king's superior right of forfeiture:

and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his posterity, wherever

they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter ancestor, (v)

This is one of those notions which our laws have adopted from the feudal

(q) Ibitl. 218. (r) Ibid. 141. («) Stenndf P. C. 163, b. (*) 3 Inst. 232.

(u) 2 Hawk. P. C. 4M. (e) See book n, page 251.

(7) [By 7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, B. 5, it is enacted, " that whore any person shall be indicted for

treason or felony, the jury impaneled to try such person shHll not be charged to inquire con-

cerning his lands, tenements, or poods, nor whether he fled for such treason or felony."

[The practice has been wholly discontinued for some years.]

(8) [But now descents are not thus obstructed. See statute 3 and 4 TVm. IV, c. 106. s. 10.]
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constitutions, at the time of the Norman conquest; as appears from its being

unknown in those tenures which are indisputably Saxon, or gavelkind: wherein,

though by treason, according to the ancient Saxon laws, the land is forfeited to

the king, yet no corruption of blood, no impediment of descents, ensues; and,

on judgment of mere felony, no escheat accrues to the lord. And therefore as

every other oppressive mark of feudal tenure is now happily worn away in these

kingdoms, it is to be hoped, that this corruption of blood, with all its connected

consequences, not only of present escheat, but of future incapacities of inheri-

tance even to the twentieth generation, may in process of time be abolished by

uct of parliament: as it stands upon a very different footing from the forfeiture

F *S80 1 °^ 'an(^s f°r high *treason, aifecting the king's person or government.

J And indeed the legislature has, from time to time, appeared very inclin-

able to give way to so emiitable a provision; by enacting, that, in certain

treasons respecting the papal supremacy (w) and the public coin, (x) and in many

of the new-made felonies, created since the reign of Henry the Eighth by act

of parliament, corruption of blood shall be saved. But as in some of the acts

for creating felonies (and those not of the most atrocious kind) this saving was

neglected, or forgotten, to l>e made, it seems to be highly reasonable and expe-

dient to antiquate the whole of this doctrine by one undistinguisbing law :

especially as by the afore-mentioned statute of 7 Ann. c. 21 (the operation of

which is postponed by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 39), after the death of the sons of
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the late pretender, no attainder for treason will extend to the disinheriting any

heir, nor the prejudice of any person, other than the offender himself; which

virtuallv abolishes all corruption of blood for treason, though (unless the legis-

lature should interpose) it will still continue for many sorts of felony.

CHAPTER XXX.

OF REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT.

WE are next to consider how judgments, with their several connected con

sequences of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood, may be set aside.

There are two ways of doing this; either by falsifying or reversing the judg-

ment, or else by reprieve or pardon.

A judgment may be falsified, reversed, or avoided, in the first place, without

a writ of error, formatters foreign to or dehors the record, that is, not apparent

upon the face of it; so that they cannot be assigned for error in the superior

court, which can only judge from what appears in the record itself: and there-

fore if the whole record be not certified, or not truly certified, by the inferior

court, the party injured thereby (in both civil and criminal cases) may allege a

diminution of the record, the cause is to be rectified. Thus, if any judgment

whatever be given by persons who had no good commission to proceed against

the person condemned, it is void; and may be falsified by showing the special

matter without writ of error. As, where a commission issues to A and B, and

twelve others, or any of them, of which A or B shall be one, to take and try indict-

ments ; and any of the other twelve proceed without the interposition or presence

T *3Q11 *°^ e^her A or B: in this case all proceedings, trials, convictions, and judg-

' J ments, are void for want of a proper authority in the commissioners, and

may be falsified upon bare inspection without the trouble of writ of error; (a) (1)

(w) Stat. 5 Ellx. c. 1.

(z) Stat.5EHz. c. 11. SEliz. c. 1. 18 and 9 W. HI, 0.26. 16andl6Gco. U. c. 28. (a) 2 Hawk. P. C. 459.

(1) That is, if the court had no jurisdiction of the case, its proceedings may be treated as

void whenever they come in question. Even the prosecution may treat them an void, and
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it being a high misdemeanor in the judges so proceeding, and little (if any

tiling) short of murder in them all, in case the person so attainted be executed

and suffer death. So, likewise, if a man purchases land of another; and after-

wards the vendor is, either by outlawry or his own confession, convicted and

attainted of treason or felony previous to the sale or alienation ; whereby such

land becomes liable to forfeiture or escheat; now upon any trial the purchaser

is at liberty, without bringing any writ of error, to falsify not only the time of

the felony or treason supposed, but the very point of the felony or treason

itself; and is not concluded by the confession or the outlawry of the vendor;

though the vendor himself is concluded, and not suffered now to deny the fact,

which lie has by confession or flight acknowledged. But if such attainder of

the vendor was by verdict, on the oath of his peers, the alienee cannot be

received to falsify or contradict the fact of the crime committed ; though he is

at liberty to prove a mistake in time, or that the offence was committed after

the alienation, and not before, (b)

Secondly, a judgment may be reversed by writ of error: which lies from all

inferior criminal jurisdictions to the court of king's bench, and from the king's

bench to the house of peers; and mav be brought for notorious mistakes in the

judgment or other parts of the record : as, where a man is found guilty of per-

jury and receives the judgment of felony, or for other less palpable errors; such

as any irregularity, omission, or want of form in the process of outlawry, or
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proclamation ; the want of a proper addition to the defendant's name, accord-

ing to the statute of additions; for not properly naming the sheriff or other

officer of the court, or not duly describing where his county court was held;

for laying an offence committed in the time of the late king, to be done

*against the peace of the present; and for many other similar causes, which r*ogoi

(though allowed out of tenderness to life and liberty) are not much to L

the credit or advancement of the national justice. These writs of error, to

reverse judgments in case of misdemeanors, are not to be allowed of course,

but on sufficient probable cause shown to the attorney-general; and then they

are understood to be grantable of common right, and ex debito fustitice. (2) But

writs of error to reverse attainders in capital cases are only allowed ex gratia;

and not without express warrant under the king's sign manual, or at least by

the. consent of the attorney-general, (c) These, therefore, can rarely be brought

by the party himself, especially where he is attainted for an offence against the

state: but they may be brought by his heir, or executor, after his death, in more

favourable times; which may be some consolation to his family. But the easier

and more effectual way is,

Lastly, to reverse the attainder by act of parliament. This may be and hath

been frequently done, upon motives of compassion, or perhaps from the zeal of

the times, after a sudden revolution in the government, without examining too

closely into the truth or validity of the errors assigned. And sometimes,

though the crime be universally acknowledged and confessed, yet the merits of

the criminal's family shall after his death obtain a restitution in blood, honours,

and estate, or some, or one of them, by act of parliament; which, (so far as it

extends) has all the effect of reversing the attainder without casting any reflec-

tions upon the justice of the preceding sentence.

The effect of falsifying, or reversing, an outlawry, is that the party shall be

in the same plight as if he had appeared upon the 'capias ; and, if it be before

plea pleaded, he shall be put to plead to the indictment; if after conviction, he

shall receive the sentence of the law; for all the other proceedings, except only

(b) 3 Inst. 231. 1 Hal. P. C. 381. (c) 1 Vern. 170, 175.

pnt the accused party on trial again for the same offence. Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13

Kb*.4ffi: People ». Tyler, 7 Mich. 101.

i[)le v. Tyle.,

P) Sec Mausell ». Reg. 8 E. aud B. 54; Ex parte Newton, 4 id. 869.
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f*3031 ^"e Process °f outlawry for his non-appearance, *remain good and

1 •>••>} effectual as before. But when judgment pronounced upon conviction,

is falsified or reversed, all forme* proceedings are absolutely set aside, and the

party stands as if he had never been at all accused; restored in his credit, his

capacity, his blood, and his estates: with regard to which last, though they be

granted away by the crown, yet the owner may enter upon the grantee with as

little ceremony as he might enter upon a disseisor. (d) But he still remains

liable to another prosecution for the same offence; for the first being erroneous,

he never was in jeopardy thereby. (3)

CHAPTEE XXXI.

OF REPRIEVE AND PARDON.

THE only other remaining ways of avoiding the execution of the judgment

are by a reprieve or a pardon ; whereof the former is temporary only, the latter

permanent.

I. A reprieve, (1) from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawing of a sen-

tence for an interval of time ; whereby the execution is suspended. This may

be, first, ex arbitrio judicis ; either before or after judgment; as, where the

judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or the

indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the offence be within

clergy ; or sometimes if it be a small felony, or any favourable circumstances

appear in the criminal's character, in order to give room to apply to the crown
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for either an absolute or conditional pardon. These arbitrary reprieves may be

granted or taken off by the justices of gaol delivery, although their session be

finished, and their commission expired: but this rather by common usage, than

of strict right, (a)

Reprieves may also be ex necessitate leg is : as, where a woman is capitally con-

victed, and pleads her pregnancy ; though this is no cause to stay the judgment,

*" 'e^ ^ '8 to res'te *ne execution till she be delivered. This is a mercy *dic-

F*39" 1 -'e '8 o resP'e ne execuon se e evere. s s a mercy c-

-* tated by the law of nature, in favorem prolis ; and therefore no part of

the bloody proceedings, in the reign of Queen Mary, hath been more justly

detested than the cruelty that was exercised in the island of Guernsey, of burn-

ing a woman big with child: and when, through the violence of the flames,

the infant sprang forth at the stake, and was preserved by the bystanders, after

some deliberation of the priests who assisted at the sacrifice, they cast it again

into the fire as a young heretic, (b) A barbarity which they never learned from

the laws of ancient Rome ; which direct, (c) with the same humanity as our

own, " quod prcBgnantis mulieris damnatce pceno differatur, quod pariat ; " which

doctrine has also prevailed in England as early as the first memorials of our

law will reach, (d) In case this plea be made in stay of execution, the judge

(di 1 Hawk. P. C. 463. (a) 2 Hal. P. C. 412. (6) Fox, Acts and Mon. (c) Ff. 48, 18, 3.

(ill Flct. I. 1. c. 38.

(3) [Where the indictment has been preferred in the court of queen's bench, or where it has

beeii removed thither by certiorari, a new trial will be granted by that court in a case of misde-

meanor, or even of felony — as for misdirection or surprise (Reg. ». Whitehouse, Dearsl. 1), or the

improper admission of evidence (Reg. v. Scaife, 17 Q. B. 23d), to further the ends of justice.

But alter acquittal on a charge of felony, or with certain peculiar exceptions, of misdemeanor,

a new trial will not be granted. Reg. v'. Russell, 3 E. aud B. 942.]

(1) [In addition to the reprieves mentioned by the learned commentator is that ex mantlatio

regix, or from the mere pleasure of the crown, expressed in any way to the court by whom the

execution i» to be awarded. 2 Hale, 412; 1 id. 368 ; Hawk. b. 2, c. 51. s. 8.]
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must direct a jury of twelve matrons or discreet women to inquire the fact:

and if they bring in their verdict quick with child (for, barely with child,

unless it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient), execution shall be staid gener-

ally till the next session ; and so from session to session, till either she is deliv-

ered, or proves by the course of nature not to have been with child at all. But

if she once hath had the benefit of this reprieve, and been delivered, and after-

wards becomes pregnant again, she shall not be entitled to the benefit of a far-

ther respite for that cause, (c) For she may now be executed before the child is

quick in the womb; and shall not, by her own incontinence, evade the sentence

of justice. (2)

Another cause of regular reprieve is, if the offender becomes non compos be-

tween the judgment and the award of execution :(/) for regularly, as was for-

merly (g) observed, though a man be compos when he commits a capital crime,

yet if he becomes non compos after, he shall not be indicted; if after indictment,

he shall not be convicted; if after conviction, he shall not receive judgment;

if after judgment, he *shall not be ordered for execution: for "furiosus r *qng -i

solo furore punitur," and the law knows not but he might have offered "- °" ' '

some reason, if in his senses, to have stayed these respective proceedings. It is

therefore an invariable rule, when any time intervenes between the attainder

and the award of execution, to demand of the prisoner what he hath to allege

why execution should not be awarded against him: and if he appears to be
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insane, the judge in his discretion may and ought to reprieve him. (3) Or, the

party may plead in bar of execution ; which plea may be either pregnancy, the •

king's pardon, and act of grace, or diversity of person, viz., that he is not the

same as was attainted, and the like. In this last case a jury shall be impaneled

to try this collateral issue, namely, the identity of his person; and not whether

guilty or innocent; for that has been decided before. And in these collateral

issues the trial shall be instanter, (h) and no time allowed the prisoner to make his

defence or produce his witnesses, unless he will make oath that he is not the

person attainted: (i) neither shall any peremptory challenges of the jury be

allowed the prisoner; (/) though formerly such challenges were held to be allow-

able, whenever a man's life was in question. (Jc)

II. If neither pregnancy, insanity, non-identity, nor other plea, will avail to

avoid the judgment, and stay the execution consequent thereupon, the last and

surest resort is in the king's most gracious pardon; the granting of which is

the most amiable prerogative of the crown. Law (says an able writer) cannot

be framed on principles of compassion to guilt; yet justice, by the constitution

of England, is bound to be administered in mercy; this is promised by the king

in his coronation oath, and it is that act of his government which is the most

personal, and most entirely his own. (I) The king himself condemns no man ;

that rugged task he leaves to his courts of justice: the great operation of his

sceptre is *mercy. His power of pardoning was said by our Saxon r *oq7 i

ancestors (m) to be derived a lege sues dignitatis: and it is declared in L J

parliament, by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 24, that no other person hath power to

pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatsoever: but that the king hath the

(e) 1 Hul. P. C. 360. (f) Ibid. 370. (g) See pnge 24. (h) 1 8i<l. 72. See Appendix. » 3-

ft) Foat. 42. (j) 1 Lev. 61. Fost. 42, 4fi. (k) Staundf. P. C. 163. Co. UK. 157. Hal. Sum. 25'J.

(I) Law of Forfeit. 99. (m) LL. Edw. Coi\f. c. 18.

(2) [It is usual for the clerk of assize to ask women, who receive sentence of death, if they

have any thing to say why execution shall not be awarded according to the judgment. As

the execution of the law in the first instance is respited not from regard for the mother,

but from tenderness towards the innocent infant; if then it should happen that she became

quick of a second child, this surely is as much an object of compassion and humanity as the

first.]

(3) [See ante, 25, n., as to the trial of an insane person.

Br the 56 Geo. Ill, c. 117, provision is made for convicted criminals who become insane. See

also"the 55 Geo. III. c. 46, and 5 Geo. IV, o. 71 ]

Also statute 3 and 4 Vic. c. 54, and 30 and 31 Vic. o. 12.
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whole and sole power thereof, united and knit to the imperial crown of this

reulm. («)

Tliis is indeed one of the great advantages of monarchy in general, above any

other form of government; that there is a magistrate who has it in his power

to extend mercy, wherever he thinks it is deserved: holding a court of inquiry

in his own breast, to soften the rigour of the general law, in such criminal cases

as merit an exemption from punishment. Pardons (according to some theo-

rists) (o) should be excluded iu a perfect legislation, where punishments are mild

but certain: for that the clemency of the prince seems a tacit disapprobation

of the laws. But the exclusion of pardons must necessarily introduce a very

dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the criminal law by

the spirit instead of the letter; (p) or else it must be holden, what no man wifl

seriously avow, that the situation and circumstances of the offender (though

they alter not the essence of the crime) ought to make no distinction in the punish-

ment. In democracies, (4) however, this power of pardon can never subsist; for

there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who administers the

laws : and it would be impolitic for the power of judging and pardoning to centre

in one and the same person. This (as the president Montesquieu observes) (q)

would oblige him very often to contradict himself, to make and to unmake his

decisions: it would tend to confound all ideas of right among the mass of the

people ; as they would find it difficult to tell whether a prisoner was discharged
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F *S98 1 kj' n's innocence, or obtained a pardon through favour. In "Holland,

J- *'' •" therefore, if there be no studtholder, there is no power of pardoning lod-

ged in any other member of the state. But iu monarchies the king acts in a

superior sphere; and though he regulates the whole government as the first

mover, yet he does not appear in any of the disagreeable or invidious parts of it.

Whenever the nation see him personally engaged, it is only in works of legisla-

ture, magnifieuce, or compassion. To him, therefore, the people look up as the

fountain of nothing but bounty and grace; and these repeated acts of goodness,

coming immediately from his own hand, endear the sovereign to his subjects,

and contribute more than any thing to root in their hearts that filial affection

and personal loyalty which are the sure establishment of a prince.

Under this head of pardons, let us briefly consider, 1. The object of pardon:

2. The munner of pardoning: 3. The method of allowing a pardon: 4. The

effect of such pardon when allowed.

1. And, first, the king may pardon all offences merely against the crown, or.

the public; excepting, 1. That, to preserve the liberty of the subject, the com-

mitting any man to prison out of the realm is, bv the habeas corpus act, 31 Car.

II, c. 2, made & prcemunire, unpardonable even \>j the king. Nor, 2. Can the

king pardon, where private justice is principally concerned in the prosecution

of offenders; " non potest rex ijrntiam facere cum injuria et damno aiiorum." (r)

Therefore in appeals of all kinds (which are the suit, not of the king, but of the

party injured) the prosecutor may release, but the king cannot pardon, (s)

Neither can he pardon a common nuisance, while it remains unredressed, or so

as to prevent an abatement of it, though afterwards he may remit the fine:

because though the prosecution is vested in the king to avoid multiplicity of

ijuits, yet (during its continuance) this offence savours more of the nature of a

F *3<}<) 1 Pr'va*;e *injury to each individual in the neighborhood, than of ^public

J wrong, (t) Neither, lastly can the king pardon an offence against a

popular or penal statute, after information brought; for thereby the informer

hath acquired a private property in his part of the penalty, (u)

(n) And this power belongs only to a Ungdefacto, and not to a king de jure during the time of usur-

pation. (Bro. Abr. t. charter rfe pardon, 22.)

(o) Becrar. fih. 46. (p) I bid. ch. 4. fq) Sp. L. b. 6, c. B. (r) 3 Ins*. 236.

(t) Ibid. 2J7. (t) -I Hiiwk. P. <J. 391. (uj last. 238.

(4) In the United States the power to reprieve and pardon is vested in the president, and in

the several states it is (fiven to the executive of the state, with some restrictions ui sonic of them.
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There is also a restriction of a peculiar nature, that affects the prerogative of

pardoning in cases of parliamentary impeachments; viz., that the king's pardon

cannot bo pleaded to any such impeachment so as to impede the inquiry, and

stop the prosecution of great and notorious offenders. Therefore when, in the

reign of Charles the Second, the earl of Danby was impeached by the house of

commons of high treason, and other misdemeanors, and pleaded the king's par-

don in bar of the same, the commons alleged, (v) " that there was no precedent

that ever any pardon was granted to any person impeached by the commons of

.high treason, or other high crimes, "depending the impeachment;" and thereupon

resolved, (w) " that the pardon so pleaded was illegal and void, and ought not to

be allowed in bar of the impeachment of the commons of England;" for which

resolution they assigned (x) this reason to the house of lords, "that the setting

up a pardon to be a bar of an impeachment defeats the whole use and effect of

impeachment: for should this point be admitted, or stand doubted, it would

totally discourage the exhibiting any for the future; whereby the chief institu-

tion for the preservation of the government would be destroyed." Soon after

the revolution the commons renewed the same claim, and voted, (y) " that a

pardon is not pleadable in bar of an impeachment." And at length, it was

enacted by the act of settlement, 12 and 13 Wm. Ill, c. 2, " that no pardon under

the great seal of England shall be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons

in parliament." But, after the impeachment has been solemnly heard and
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determined, it is not understood that the *king's royal grace is farther T+JQA -i

restrained or abridged: for, after the impeachment and attainder of the I- "

six rebel lords in 1715, three of them were from time to time reprieved by the

crown, and at length received the benefit of the king's most gracious pardon. (5)

2. As to the manner of pardoning. 1. First, it must be under the great seal.

A warrant under the privy seal, or sign manual, though it may be a sufficient

authority to admit the party to bail, in order to plead the king's pardon, when

obtained in proper form, yet is not of itself a complete, irrevocable pardon, (z)

2. Next, it is a general rule that, wherever it may be reasonably presumed the

king is deceived, the pardon is void, (a) 'rherefore any suppression of

truth, or suggestion of falsehood, in a charter of pardon, will vitiate the whole;

for the king was misinformed. (V) 3. General words have also a very imperfect

effect in pardons. A pardon of all felonies will not pardon a conviction or

attainder of felony (for it is presumed the king knew not of those proceedings),

but the conviction or attainder must be particularly mentioned; (c) and a pardon

of felony will not include piracy; (d) for that is no felonies punishable at the

common law. 4. It is also enacted by statute 13 Kic. II, st. 2, c. 1, that no par-

don for treason, murder, or rape shall be allowed unless the offence be particularly

specified therein; and particularly in murder it shall be expressed, whether it

was committed by lying in wait, assault, or malice prepense. Upon which Sir

Edward Coke observes (e) that it was not the intention of the parliament, that

the king should ever pardon murder under these aggravations ; and therefore

they prudently laid the pardon under these restrictions, because they did not

conceive it possible that the king would ever excuse an offence by name, which

was attended with such high aggravations. And it is remarkable enough, that

fvjr,am. Jonrn.28 Apr. 1679. (w>) lUd. 6May, 1679. (x) Ibid. 20 Mny, 1S79. (yj Ibid. 6 Juno, 1689

(z) 5 St. Tr. 1BO, 173. (a) 2 Huwk. P. C. 3«3. (b) 3 lust. 238. (c) 3 Hawk. P C. 383.

(d} I Hawk. P. C. 99. (e) 3 Inst. 23«.

(5) [After the lords have delivered their sentence of guilty, the commons have the power of

pardoning the impeached convict, by refusing to demand judgment against him ; for no judg-

ment can be pronounced by the lords till it is demanded by the commons. Lord Mocclestield

•was found guilty without a dissenting voice in the honse of lords; but when the question was

afterwards proposed in the house of commons, that this house will demand judgment of the lords

againxt Thomas, earl of Macclcsfield, it occasioned a warm debate, but (the previous question

being first moved) it was carried in the affirmative by a majority of 136 voices against 65.]

In the United States the president can grant no pardon in case of impeachment. Const, of

TJ. S., art. 2, $ 2.
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there is no precedent of a pardon in the register for any other homicide than

r*401 1 ^^ *wnicn happens se defendendo or per infortunium: to which two

' -" species the king's pardon was expressly confined by the statutes 2 Edw.

Ill, c. 2, and 14 Edw. Ill, c. 15, which declare "that no pardon of homicide shall

be granted, but only where the king may do it by the oath of his crown ; that is

to say, where a man slayeth another in his own defence, or by misfortune. But

the statute of Richard the Second, before mentioned, enlarges by implication the

royal power; provided the king is not deceived in the intended object of his

mercy. And, therefore, pardons of murder were always granted witli u non obs/atite

of the statute of King Richard, till the time of the revolution ; when the doc-

trine of non obstantes ceasing, it was doubted whether murder could be pardoned

generally ; but it was determined by the court of king's bench, (/) that the king

may pardon on an indictment of murder, as well as a subject may discharge an

appeal. Under these and a few other restrictions, it is a general rule, that a

pardon shall be taken most beneficially for the subject, and most strongly against

the king.

A pardon may also he conditional; that is, the king may extend his mercy

upon what terms he pleases ; and may annex to his bounty a condition either

precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof the validity of the pardon

will depend; and this by the common law. (g) Which prerogative is daily

exerted in the pardon of felons, on condition of being confined to hard labour
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for a stated time, or of transportation to some foreign country for life, or for

a term of years; such transportation or banishment(h) being allowable and

warranted by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II, c. 2, § 14, and both the impris-

onment and transportation rendered more easy and effectual by statutes 8 Geo.

Ill, c. 15, and 19 Geo. Ill, c. 74. (6)

3. With regard to the manner of allowing pardons: we may observe that a

F*402 1 Pal'd°n by act °f parliament is more *beneficial than by the king's char-

*- -1 ter, for a man is not bound to plead it, but the court must ex officio take

notice of it;(t) neither can he lose the benefit of it by his own laches or neg-

ligence, as he may of the king's charter of pardon, (k) The king's charter of

pardon must be specially pleaded, and that at a proper time: for if a man is

indicted, and lias a pardon in his pocket, and afterwards puts himself upon his

trial by pleading the general issue, he has waived the benefit of such pardon. (I)

But, if a man avails himself thereof, as soon as by course of law he may, a par-

don may either be pleaded upon arraignment, or in arrest of judgment, or in the

present stage of proceedings, in bar of execution. Anciently, by statute 10 Edw.

Ill, c. 2, no pardon of felony could be allowed, unless the party found sureties

for the good behaviour before the sheriff and coroners of the county, (m) But

that statute is repealed by the statute 5 and 6 W. and M. c. 13, which, instead

thereof, gives the judges of the court a discretionary power to bind the criminal,

pleading such pardon, to his good behaviour, with two sureties, for any term

not exceeding seven years.

4. Lastly, the effect of such pardon by the king, is to make the offender a new

man; to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to that

offence for which he obtains his pardon ; and not so much to restore his former,

as to give him a new credit and capacity, But nothing can restore or purify

the blood when once corrupted, if the pardon be not allowed till after attainder,

but the high and transcendent power of parliament. Yet, if a person attainted

receives the king's pardon, and afterwards hath a son, that son may be heir to

his father, because the father being made a new man, might transmit new in-

heritable blood; though, had he been born before the pardon, he could never

have inherited at all. (n)

(f) Salk. 499. (g) 2 Hawk. P. C. 391.

(h) Transportation is said (Bar. :VA) to have been first inflicted ns a punishment by statute 30 Eliz. c. 4.

fij Fust. 43. (k) 2 Hawk. P. C. 397. (I) * Hawk. P. C. 3%. (m) Salk. 490.

(n) See book II, pajfe 264.

(6) These statutes ore since repealed and now provisions made.
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CHAPTER XXXII.

OF EXECUTION.

THERE now remains nothing to speak of but execution; the completion of

human punishment. And this in all cases, as well capital as otherwise, must

be performed by the legal officer, the sheriff or his deputy ; whose warrant for

so doing was anciently by precept under the hund and seal of the judge, as it is

still practiced in the court of the lord high steward, upon the execution of a

peer: (a) though in the court of the peers in parliament, it is done by writ from

the king, (b) Afterwards it was established, (c) that in case of life, the judge

may command execution to be done without any writ. And now the usage is,

for the judge to sign the calendar, or list of all the prisoners' names, with their

separate judgments in the margin, which is left with the sheriff. As for a cap-

ital felony, it is written opposite to the prisoner's name, 'Met him be hanged by

the neck;" formerly in the days of Latin an abbreviation, (d) " sus.per cot.," for

" sus-pendatur per collum." And this is the only warrant that the sheriff has

for so material an act as taking away the life of another, (e) It may certainly

afford matter of speculation, that in civil causes there should be such a variety

of writs of execution to recover a trifling debt, issued in the king's name, and

under the seal of the court, without which the sheriff *cannot legally r*jA.i n

stir one step ; and yet that the execution of a man, the most important >- -I

and terrible task of any, should depend upon a marginal note.
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The sheriff, upon receipt of his warrant, is to do execution within a con-

venient time; which in the country is also left at large. In London, indeed, a

more solemn and becoming exactness is used, both as to the warrant of execu-

tion and the time of executing thereof: for the recorder, after reporting to the

king in person the case of the several prisoners, and receiving his royal pleasure,

that the law must take its course, issues his warrant to the sheriffs ; directing

them to do execution on the day and at the place assigned. ( /) (1) And, in the

court of king's bench, if the prisoner be tried at the bar, or brought there by

habeas corpus, a rule is made for his execution; either specifying the time and

place, (g) or leaving it to the discretion of the sheriff. (A) And, throughout the

kingdom, by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 37, it is enacted that, in case of murder, the

judge shall in his sentence direct execution to be performed on the next day

but one after sentence passed, (i) (2) But otherwise the time and place of exe-

cution are by law no part of the judgment, (k) It has been well observed, (/)

that it is of great importance, that the punishment should follow the crime as

early as possible ; that the prospect of gratification or advantage, which tempts

a man to commit the crime, should instantly awake the attendant idea of pun-

ishment. Delay of execution serves only to separate these ideas ; and then the

execution itself affects the minds of the spectators rather as a terrible sight,

than as the necessary consequence of transgression.

The sheriff cannot alter the mariner of the execution by substituting one

death for another, without being guilty of felony himself, as has been formerly

said, (m) It is is held also *by Sir Edward Coke (n) and Sir Matthew

Hale, (0) that even the king cannot change the punishment of the law,

- ,,,,„- •,

°J

by altering the hanging or burning into beheading; though, when beheading

(n) 2 Hal. P. C. 409. (ft) Soo Appendix, (S. (el Finnh, L. 478. 'd| Stmindf. P. C. 183.

iel 5 Moil. 22. (/) See Appendix, » 4. (g<i St. Trials, VI. S32. Tost. 43.

(fti Sec Appendix, } 3. (11 See \mtte 202. (!•) So held by the twelve judges, Mich. 10 Geo. III.

1/1 Beccar. ch. IB. (m) See page 17:i. (n) 3 I MM. 52. (o) 2 Hal. P. C. 412.

(1) [But now by statute 1 Tic. o. 77, $ 1, no report is to be made to her majesty of the case

of any capital convict at the central criminal court ; but by section 5 the court shall of its own

authority direct execution to be done on offenders.]

(8) This is no longer the law. Stat. 6 and 7 Win. IT, o. 30.

r
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is part of the sentence, the king may remit the rest. And notwithstanding

some examples to the contrary, Sir Edward Coke stoutly maintains that "jitdi-

candum est leyibus, non exemplis." But others have thought, (p) and more

justly, that this prerogative, being founded in mercy, and iinmemorially exer-

cised by the crown, is part of the common law. For, hitherto, in every in-

stance, all these exchanges have been for more merciful kinds of death; and

how far this may also fall within the king's power of granting conditional par-

dons (viz., by remitting a severe kind of death, on condition that the criminal

submits to a milder), is a matter that may bear consideration. It is observable

that when Lord Stafford was executed for the popish plot in the reign of King

Charles the Second, the then sheriffs of London, having received the king's

writ for beheading him, petitioned the house of lords for a command or order

from their lordships how the said judgment should be executed; for, he being

prosecuted by impeachment, they entertained a notion (which is said to have

been countenanced by Lord Russell) that the king could not pardon any part

of the sentence, (a) The lords resolved (r) that the scruples of the sheriffs were

unnecessary, ana declared that the king's writ ought to be obeyed. Disap-

pointed of raising a flame in that assembly, they immediately signified (s) to the

house of commons by one of the members that they were not satisfied as to

the power of the said writ. The house took two days to consider of it; and

then (t) sullenly resolved that the house was content that the sheriff do execute
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Lord Stafford, by severing his head from his body. It is further related, that

when, afterwards, the same Lord Russell was condemned for high treason

upon indictment, the king, while he remitted the ignominious part of the

r *4061 'sentence, observed, "that his lordship would now find he was possessed

•- J of that prerogative which in the case of Lord Stafford, he had denied

him." (u) One can hardly determine (at this distance from those turbulent

times) which most to disapprove of, the indecent and sanguinary zeal of the

subject, or the cool and cruel sarcasm of the sovereign.

To conclude: it is clear that if, upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till

he is dead, the criminal be not thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must

hang him again, (w) For the former hanging was no execution of the sentence;

and if a false tenderness were to be indulged in such cases a multitude of col-

lusions might ensue. Nay even while abjurations were in force, (x) such a

criminal, so reviving, was not allowed to take sanctuary and abjure the realm;

but his fleeing to sanctuary was held an escape in the officer, (y) (3)

And, having thus arrived at the last stage of criminal proceedings, or execu-

tion, the end and completion of human punishment, which was the sixth and

last head to be considered under the division of public wrongs, the fourth and

last object of the laws of England; it may now seem high time to put a period

to these Commentaries, which the author is very sensible, have already swelled

to too great a length. But he cannot dismiss the student, for whose use alone

these rudiments were originally compiled, without endeavouring to recall to his

memory some principal outlines of the legal constitution of this country; by a

short historical review of the most considerable revolutions that have happened

in the laws of England from the earliest to the present times. And this task

he will attempt to discharge, however imperfectly, in the next or concluding

chapter.

fpj Yost. 270. F. N. B. 244, h. 19 Kym.Foed. 284. (q) 2 Hnm. Hist, of G. B. 323.

(r) Lord's Journ. 21 Deo. 1KSU. (») Cora. Journ. 21 Dec. lt«0. (t) Ibid. 23 Dec. 1680.

(it) 2 Hume. 3SO. (w) '1 Hal. P. C 412. 2 Hawk. P. C. 463. (x) See page S32.

fyj Fitz. Abr. t. corone. 33. Finch. L. 487. .

(3) Executions in England are now private and within the walls of the prison. Statute 31

aud 32 Vic. c. 24. And burning, as before stated, is abolished. See supra, 376, note.
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CHAPTER XXXIII.

OF THE RISE, PROGRESS AND GRADUAL IMPROVEMENTS OF

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

BEFORE we«nter cm the subject of this chapter, in which I propose, by way

of supplement to the whole, to attempt an historical review of the most remark-

able changes and alterations that have happened in the laws of England, I

must, first of all, remind the student that the rise and progress of many prin-

cipal points and doctrines have been already pointed out in the course of these

Commentaries, under their respective divisions; these having therefore been

particularly discussed already, it cannot be expected that I should re-examine

them with any degree of minuteness; which would be a most tedious under-

taking. What I therefore at present propose is, only to mark out some outlines

of our English juridical history, by taking a chronological view of the state of

our laws, and their successive mutations at different periods of time.

The several periods, under which I shall consider the state of our legal polity,

are the following six: 1. From the earliest times to the Norman conquest:

2. From the Norman conquest to the reign of King Edward the First: 3. From

thence to the reformation: 4. From the reformation to the *restoration r #AQO i

of King Charles the Second: 5. From thence to the revolution of 1688: "- •"

6. From the revolution to the present time.

I. And, first, with regard to the ancient Britons, the aborigines of our island,
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we have so little handed down to us coucerning them with any tolerable cer-

tainty that our inquiries here must needs be very fruitless and defective. How-

ever, from Cfflsar's account of the tenets and discipline of the ancient Druids

in Gaul, in whom centered all the learning of these western parts, and who

were, as he tells us, sent over to Britain (that is, to the island of Mona or An-

glesey) to be instructed; we may collect a few points which bear a great affinity

and resemblance to some of the modern doctrines of our English law. Par-

ticularly the very notion itself of an oral, unwritten law, delivered down from

age to age, by custom and tradition merely, seems derived from the practice of

the Druids, who never committed any of their instructions to writing: possibly

for want of letters; since it is remarkable that in all the antiquities, unques-

tionably British, which the industry of the moderns has discovered, there is

not in any of them the least trace of any character or letter to be found. The

partible quality, also, of lands by the custom of gavel-kind, which still obtains in

many parts of England, and did universally over Wales till the reign of Henry

VIII, is undoubtedly of British original. So likewise is the ancient division

of the goods of an intestate between his widow and children, or next of kin;

which has since been revived by the statute of distributions. And we may also

remember an instance of a slighter nature, mentioned in the present volume,

where the same custom has continued from Csesar's time to the present; that

of burning a woman guilty of the crime of petit treason by killing her hus-

oand. (1)

The great variety of nations that successively broke in upon and destroyed

both the British inhabitants and *constitution, the Romans, the Picts, r *j0n i

and after them the various clans of Saxons and Danes, must necessarily L J

have caused great confusion and uncertainty in the laws and antiquities of the

kingdom ; as they were very soon incorporated and blended together, and there-

fore, we may suppose, mutually communicated to each other their respective

usages, (a) in regard to the rights of property and the punishment of crimes.

So that it is morally impossible to trace out with any degree of accuracy, when

the several mutations of the common law were made, or what was the respective

(a) Hal. Hist. C. L. 62.

(1) Both petit treason, and burning as a mode of execution, ore now abolished.
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original of those several customs we at present use, by any chemical resolution

of them to their first and component principles. We can seldom pronounce

that this custom was derived from the Britons; that was left behind by the

Romans; this was a necessary precaution against the Picts; that was. intro-

duced by the Saxons; discontinued by the Danes, but afterwards restored by

the Normans.

Wherever this can be done, it is a matter of great curiosity, and some use:

but this can very rarely be the case; not only from the reason above mentioned,

but also from many others. First, from the nature of traditional laws in gen-

eral; which, being accommodated to the exigencies of the times, suffer by

degrees insensible variations in practice :(b) so that, though upon comparison

we plainly discern the alteration of the law from what it was five hundred years

ago, yet it is impossible to define the precise period in which that alteration

accrued, any more than we can discern the changes of a bed of a river, which

varies its shores by continual decreases and alluvions. Secondly, this becomes

impracticable from the antiquity of the kingdom and its government: which

alone, though it had been disturbed by no foreign invasions, would make it

impossible to search out the original of its laws; unless we had as authentic

monuments thereof as the Jews had by the hand of Moses, (c) Thirdly,

F *4101 **-n's uncertainty of the true origin of particular customs must also in

L J part have arisen from the means whereby Christianity was propagated
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among our Saxon ancestors in this island; by learned foreigners brought over

from Rome and other countries, who undoubtedly carried with them many of

their own national customs; and probably prevailed upon the state to abrogate

such usages as were inconsistent with our holy religion, and to introduce many

others that were more conformable thereto. And this perhaps may have partly

been the cause that we find not only some rules of the Mosaical, but also of the

imperial and pontifical laws, blended and adopted into our own system.

A farther reason may also be given for the great variety, and of course the

uncertain original, of our ancient established customs; even after the Saxon

fovernment was firmly established in this island, viz.: the subdivision of the

ingdom into an heptarchy, consisting of seven independent kingdoms, peopled

and governed by different clans and colonies. This must necessarily create an

infinite diversity of laws: even though all those colonies, of Jutes, Angles,

Anglo-Saxons, and the like, originally sprung from the same mother-country,

the great northern hive; which poured forth its warlike progeny, and swarmed

all over Europe, in the sixth and seventh centuries. This multiplicity of laws

will necessarily be the case in some degree, where any kingdom is cantoned out

into provincial establishments; and not under one common dispensation of

laws, though under the same sovereign power. Much more will it happen,

where seven unconnected states are to form their own constitution and super-

structure of government, though they all begin to build upon the same or sim-

ilar foundations.

When, therefore, the West Saxons had swallowed up all the rest, and King

Alfred succeeded to the monarchy of England, whereof his grandfather Egbert

was the founder, his mighty genius prompted him to undertake a most great

T *4111 an(^ necessarv work, which he is said to have executed in as *masterly a

L J manner: no less than to new-model the constitution; to rebuild it on a

plan that should endure for ages: and, out of its old, discordant materials,

which were heaped upon each other in a vast and rude irregularity, to form one

uniform and well connected whole. This he effected, by reducing the whole

kingdom under one regular and gradual subordination of government, wherein

each man was answerable to his immediate superior for his own conduct and

that of his nearest neighbours: for to him we owe that master-piece of judicial

polity, the subdivision of England into tithings and hundreds, if not into 001111-

ties; all under the influence and administration of one supreme magistrate,

the king; in whom, as in a general reservoir, all the executive authority of the law

(b) Ibid. :.7. (o Hal. Hist. C. L. 89.
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•was lodged, and from whom justice was dispersed to every part of the nation by

distinct, yet communicating, ducts and channels; which wise institution has

been preserved for near a thousand years unchanged, from Alfred's to the present

time. He also, like another Theodosius, collected the various customs that he

found dispersed in the kingdom, and reduced and digested them into one uni-

form system or code of laws, in his Dom-bec, or liber judicialis. This he com-

piled for the use of the court-baron, hundred, and county court, the court-leet

and sheriff's tourn; tribunals, which he established, for the trial of all causes

civil and criminal, in the very districts wherein the complaint arose: all of

them subject, however, to be inspected, controlled, and kept within the bounds

of the universal or common law, by the king's own courts; which were then

itinerant, being kept in the king's palace, and removing with his household in

those royal progresses which he continually made from one end of the kingdom

to the other.

The Danish invasion and conquest, which introduced new foreign customs,

was a severe blow to this noble fabric: but a plan so excellently concerted could

never be long thrown aside. So that, upon the expulsion of these intruders,

the English returned to their ancient law ; retaining, however, some few of the

customs of their late visitants; which went *under the name of Dane- r#,-, g-i

Ldf/e: as the code compiled by Alfred was called the \Vest-Saxon Lage ; *- v'

and the local constitutions of the ancient kingdom of Mercia, which obtained
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in the counties nearest to Wales, and probably abounded with many British

customs, were called the Mercen-Lage. And these three laws were, about the

beginning of the eleventh century, in use in different counties of the realm:

the provincial polity of counties, and their subdivisions, having never been

altered or discontinued through all the shocks and mutations of government,

from the time of its first institution; though the laws and customs therein used

have (as we shall see) often suffered considerable changes.

For King Edgar (who, besides his military merit, as founder of the English

navy, was also a most excellent civil governor), observing the ill effects of three

distinct bodies of laws prevailing at once in separate parts of his dominions,

projected and begun what his grandson, King Edward the Confessor, afterwards

completed, viz., one uniform digest or body of laws, to be observed throughout

the whole kingdom; being probably no more than a revival of King Alfred's

code, witli some improvements suggested by necessity and experience; particu-

larly the incorporating some of the British, or rather Mercian, customs, and also

such of the Danish as were reasonable and approved, into the West-Saxon-Laye,

which was still the groundwork of the whole. And this appears to be the best

supported and most plausible conjecture (for certainty is not to be expected) of

the rise and original of that admirable system of maxims and unwritten customs

which is now known by the name of the common law, as extending its authority

universally over all the realm; and which is doubtless of Saxon parentage.

Among the most remarkable of the Saxon laws we may reckon, 1. The con-

stitution of parliaments, or, rather, general assemblies of the principal and wisest

men.in the nation: the wittena gemole, or commune contiHum, of the ancient

Germans, which was not yet reduced to the forms and *distinctions of r*iio-i

our modern parliament; without whose concurrence, however, no new L "'

law could be made, or old one altered. 2. The election of their magistrates by

the people; originally even that of their kings, till, dear-bought experience

evinced the convenience and necessity of establishing an hereditary succession

to the crown. But that of all subordinate magistrates, their military officers or

heretochs, their sheriffs, their conservators of the peace, their coroners, their

port-reeves, (since changed into mayors and bailiffs), and even their tything-men

and borsholders at the leet, continued, some till the Norman conquest, others for

two centuries after, and some remain to this day. 3. The descent of the crown,

when once a royal family was established, upon nearly the same hereditary prin-

ciples upon which it has ever since continued; only that, perhaps, in case of

minority, the next of kin of full age would asceud the throne, as king, and not

VOL. II.—69. *-t-"
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as protector: though after his death, the crown immediately reverted back to

the heir. 4. The great paucity of capital punishments for the first offence; even

the most, notorious offenders being allowed to commute it for a fine or iceregehl,

or, in default of payment, perpetual bondage; to which our benefit of clergy has

now in some measure succeeded. 5. The prevalence of certain customs, as heriots

and military services in proportion to every man's land, which much resembled

the feudal constitution : but yet were exempt from all its rigorous hardships:

and which may be well enough accounted for, by supposing them to be brought

from the continent by the first Saxon invaders, in the primitive moderation and

simplicity of the feudal law, before it got into the hands of the Norman jurists,

who extracted the most slavish doctrines and oppressive consequences oat of

what was originally intended as a law of liberty. 6. That their estates were

liable to forfeiture for treason, but that the doctrine of escheats and corruption

of blood for felony, or any other cause, was utterly unknown amongst them.

7. The descent of their lands to all the males equally, without any right of

primogeniture; a custom which obtained among the Britons, was agreeable to

the Roman law, and continued among the Saxons till the Norman conquest:

f*414l Chough really inconvenient, and more especially destructive to ancient

' * families; which are, in monarchies, necessary to be supported, in order

to form and keep up a nobility, or intermediate state between the prince and the

common people. 8. The courts of justice consisted principally of the county
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courts, and, in cases of weight or nicety, the king's court, held before himself in

person, at the time of his parliaments; which were usually holdeu in different

places, according as he kept the three great festivals of Christmas, easter, and

Whitsuntide. An institution which was adopted by King Alonzo VII, of Cas-

tile, about a century after the conquest: who, at the same great feasts, was wont

to assemble his nobility and prelates in his court; who there heard and decided

all controversies, and then, having received his instructions, departed home. ((/)

These county courts, however, differed from the modern ones, in that the eccle-

siastical and civil jurisdiction were blended together, the bishop and the eal-

dorman or sheriff sitting in the same county court; and also that the decisions

and proceedings therein were much more simple and unembarrassed; an advan-

tage which will always attend the infancy of any laws, but wear off as they

gradually advance to antiquity 9. Trials among a people who had a very strong

tincture of superstition, were permitted to be by ordeal, by the corsned, or

morsel of execration, or by wager of law with compurgators, if the party chose

it; but frequently they were also by jury; for, whether or no their juries con-

sisted precisely of twelve men, or were bound to a strict unanimity; yet the

general constitution of this admirable criterion of truth, and most important

guardian both of public and private liberty, we owe to our Saxon ancestors.

Thus stood the general frame of our polity at the time of the Norman invasion;

when the second period of our legal history commences.

II. This remarkable event wrought as great an alteration in our laws as it did

in our ancient line of kings: and though the alteration of the former was

F*415l effec^ rather by the *consent of the people than any right of conquest,

L J yet that consent seems to have been partly extorted by fear, and partly

given without any apprehension of the consequences which afterwards ensued.

1. Among the first of these alterations we may reckon the separation of the

ecclesiastical courts from the civil: effected in order to ingratiate the new king

with the popish clergy, who for some time before had been endeavouring all over

Europe to exempt themselves from the secular power; and whose demands the

conqueror, like a politic prince, thought it prudent to comply with, by reason

that their reputed sanctity had a great influence over the minds of the people;

and because all the little learning of the times was engrossed into their hands,

which made them necessary men, and by all means to be gained over to his

interests. And this was the more easily effected, because the disposal of all the

episcopal sees being then in the breast of the king, he had taken care to till

them, with Italian and Norman prelates.

(dj Mod. Un. Hist. «, 1H.
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2. Another violent alteration of the English constitution consists in the

depopulation of whole counties, for the purposes of the king's royal diver-

sion ; and subjecting both them and all the ancient forests of the kingdom

to the unreasonable severities of forest-laws imported from the continent,

whereby the slaughter of a beast was made almost as penal as the death of a

man. In the Saxon times, though no man was allowed to kill or chase the

king's deer, yet he might start any game, pursue, and kill it, upon his own

estate. But the rigour of these new constitutions vested the sole property of

all the game in England in the king alone; (2) and no man was entitled to

disturb any fowl of the air, or any beast of the field, of such kinds as were

specially reserved for the royal amusement of the sovereign, without express

license from the king by a grant of a chase or free warren: and these fran-

chises were granted as much with a view to preserve the breed of animals as

to indulge the subject. From a similar principle to which, though the forest-

laws are now mitigated, and by degrees *grown entirely obsolete, jet r*jig-i

from this root has sprung a bastard slip, known by the name of the <- ^

game-law, now arrived to and wantoning in its highest vigour: both founded

upon the same unreasonable notions of permanent property in wild creatures;

and both productive of the same tyranny to the commons; but with this dif-

ference, that the forest-laws established only one mighty hunter throughout

the land, the game-laws have raised a little Nimrod in every manor. And in
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one respect the ancient law was much less unreasonable than the modern:

for the king's grantee of a chase or free-warren might kill game in every part

of his franchise; but now, though a freeholder of less than 100/. a year is for-

bidden to kill a partridge upon his own estate, yet nobody else (not even the

lord of the manor, unless he hath a grant of free-warren) can do it without

committing a trespass, and subjecting himself to an action.

3. A third alteration in the English laws was by nan-owing the remedial in-

fluence of the county courts, the great seats of Saxon justice, and extending

the original jurisdiction of the king's justiciars to all kinds of causes, arising

in all parts of the kingdom. To this end the aula regis, with all its multi-

farious authority, was erected; and a capital justiciary appointed, with powers

so large and boundless, that he became at length a tyrant to the people, and

formidable to the crown itself. The constitution of this court, and the judges

themselves who presided there, were fetched from the duchy of Normandy:

and the consequence naturally was, the ordaining that all proceedings in the

king's courts should be carried on in the Norman, instead of the English lan-

guage. A provision the more necessary, because none of his Norman justiciars

understood English; but as evident a badge of slavery as ever was imposed upon

a conquered people. This lasted till King Edward the Third obtained a double

victory, over the armies of France in their own country, and their language in

our courts here at home. But there was one mischief too deeply rooted thereby,

and which this caution of *King Edward came too late to eradicate. r*4.i7i

Instead of the plain and easy method of determining suits in the county L -"

courts, the chicanes and subtleties of Norman jurisprudence had taken posses-

sion of the king's courts, to which every cause of consequence was drawn. In-

deed that age, and those immediately succeeding it, were the a?ra of refinement

and subtility. There is an active principle in the human soul, that will ever be

exerting its faculties to its utmost stretch, in whatever employment, by the

accidents of time and place, the general plan of education or the customs and

manners of the age and country, it may happen to find itself engaged. The

northern conquerors of Europe were then emerging from the grossest ignorance

in point of literature; and those who had leisure to cultivate its progress, were

such only as were cloistered in monasteries, the rest being all soldiers or peas-

ants. And, unfortunately, the first rudiments of science which they imbibed

(2) This is controverted by Mr. Christian, book 2, page 419, note.
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were those of Aristotle's philosophy, conveyed through the medium of his Ara-

bian commentators; which were brought from the east by the Saracens into

Palestine and Spain, and translated into barbarous Latin. So that, though the

materials upon which they were naturally employed, in the infancy of a rising

shite, were those of the noblest kind; the establishment of religion, and the

regulations of civil polity ; yet having only such tools to work with, their exe-

cution was trifling and flimsy. Both the divinity and the law of those times

were therefore frittered into logical distinctions, and drawn out into metaphysi-

cal subtleties, with a skill most amazingly artificial: but which serves no other

purpose than to show the vast powers of the human intellect, however vainly

or preposterously employed. Hence law in particular, which (being intended,

for universal reception) ought to be a plain rule of action, became a science of

the greatest intricacy; especially when blended with the new refinements

engrafted upon feudal property: which refinements were from time to time

gradually introduced by the Norman practitoners, with a view to supercede

(as they did in great measure) the more homely, but more intelligible, maxims

of distributive justice among the Saxons. And, to say the truth, these

f *41S 1 *sc'10^as*'c reformers nave transmitted their dialect and finesses to pos-

' -I terity, so interwoven in the body of our legal polity that they cannot

now be taken out without a manifest injury to the substance. Statute after

statute has in later times been made, to pare off these troublesome excrescences,
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and restore the common law to its pristine simplicity and vigour; and the en-

deavour has greatly succeeded: but still the scars are deep and visible; and the

liberality of our modern courts of justice is frequently obliged to have recourse

to unaccountable fictions and circuities, in order to recover that equitable and

substantial justice, which for a long time was totally buried under the narrow

rules and fanciful niceties of metaphysical and Norman jurisprudence.

4. A fourth innovation was the introduction of the trial by combat, for the

decision of all civil and criminal questions of fact in the last resort. This was

the immemorial practice of all the northern nations; but first reduced to regu-

lar and stated forms among the Burguiidi, about the close of the fifth century,

and from them it passed to other nations, particularly the Franks and the Nor-

mans: which last had the honour to establish it here, though clearly an

unchristian, as well as most uncertain, method of trial. But it was a sufficient

recommendation of it to the conqueror and his warlike countrymen, that it was

the usage of their native duchy of Normandy.

5. But the last and most important alteration, both in our civil and military

polity, was the engrafting on all landed estates, a few only excepted, the fiction

of feudal tenure: which drew after it a numerous and oppressive train of servile

fruits and appendages; aids, reliefs, primer seisins, wardships, marriages, escheats,

and fines for alienation ; the genuine consequences of the maxim then adopted,

that all the lands in England were derived from, and holdeu, mediately or im-

mediately, of the crown.

The nation at this period seems to have groaned under as absolute a slavery

F *410 1 as was *n k'le Power °*'a warlike, an *ambitious, and a politic prince to

L -I create. The consciences of men were enslaved by sour ecclesiastics,

devoted to a foreign power, and unconnected with the civil state under which

they lived: who now imported from Rome for the first time the whole farrago

of superstitious novelties, which had been engendered by the blindness and cor-

ruption of the times, between the first mission of Augustiu, the monk, and the

Norman conquest; such as transubstautiation, purgatory, communion in one

kind, and the worship of saints and images; not forgetting the universal

supremacy and dogmatical infallibility of the holy see. The laws, too. as well

as the prayers, were administered in an unknown tongue. The ancient trial by

jury gave way to the impious decision by battel. The forest-laws totally re-

strained all rural pleasures and manly recreations. And in cities and towns the

case was no better; all company being obliged to disperse, the fire and candlo

to be extinguished, by eight at night, at the sound of the melancholy curfeu.
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The ultimate property of all lands, and a considerable share of the present

profits, were vested in the king, or by him granted out to his Norman favour-

ites; who, by a gradual progression of slavery, were absolute vassals to the

crown, and as absolute tyrants to the commons. Unheard of forfeitures, tal-

liages, aids, and fines were arbitrarily extracted from the pillaged landlords in

pursuance of the new system of tenure. And, to crown all, as a consequence

of the tenure by knight-service, the king had always ready at his command an

army of sixty thousand knights or milites ; who were bound, upon pain of con-

fiscating their estates, to attend him in time of invasion, or to quell any domestic

insurrection. Trade, or foreign merchandise, such as it then was, was carried

on by the Jews and Lombards, and the very name of an English fleet, which

King Edward had rendered so formidable,was utterly unknown to Europe: the

nation consisting wholly of the clergy, who were also the lawyers; the barons,

or great lords of the land; the knights, or soldiery, who were the subordinate

landholders; and the burghers, or inferior tradesmen, who, from their insignifi-

cancy, happily retained, in their socage and burgage tenure, some *poiuts r *, ^Q i

of their ancient freedom. All the rest were villeins or bondmen.

From so complete and well-concerted a scheme of servility, it has been the

work of generations for our ancestors to redeem themselves and their posterity

into that state of liberty which we now enjoy; and which, therefore, is not to

be looked upon as consisting of mere encroachments on the crown, and infringe-
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ments on the prerogative, as some slavish and narrow-minded writers in the

last century endeavoured to maintain ; but as, in general, a gradual restoration

of that ancient constitution, whereof our Saxon forefathers had been unjustly

deprived, partly by the policy, and partly by the force, of the Norman. How

that restoration has, in a long series of years, been step by step effected, I now

proceed to inquire.

William Eufus proceeded on his father's plan, and in some points extended

it; particularly with regard to the forest-laws. But his brother and successor,

Henry the First, found it expedient, when first he came to the crown, to in-

gratiate himself with the people; by restoring (as our monkish historians tell

us) the laws of King Edward the Confessor. The ground whereof is this : that

by charter he gave up the great grievances of marriage, ward, and relief, the

beneficial pecuniary fruits of his feudal tenures; but reserved the tenures them-

selves for the same military purposes that his father introduced them. He,

also, abolished the citrfeu: (c) for, though it is mentioned in our laws a full

century afterwards, (/) yet it is rather spoken of as a known time of night (so

denominated from that abrogated usage), than as a still subsisting custom.

There is extant a code of laws in his name, consisting partly of those of the

Confessor, but with great additions and alterations of his own; and chiefly

calculated for the regulation of the county courts. It contains some directions

as to crimes and their punishments (that of theft being made capital in. his

reign), and a few things relating to estates, *particularly as to the de- ,- *.,.. -,

scent of lands: which being by the Saxon laws equally to all the sons, L

by the feudal or Norman to the eldest only, King Henry here moderated the

difference; directing the eldest son to have only the principal estate, "primiun

pa-trig feurlum," the rest of his estates, if he had any others, being equally

divided among them all. On the other hand, he gave up to the clergy the free

election of bishops and mitred abbots: reserving, however, these ensigns of

patronage, conge d'eslire, custody of the temporaries when vacant, and homage

upon their restitution. He lastly united again for a time the civil and ecclesi-

astical courts, which union was soon dissolved by his Norman clergy: and,

upon that final dissolution, the cognizance of testamentary causes seems to

have been first given to the ecclesiastical court. The rest remained as in his

father's time ; from whence we may easily perceive how far short this was of a

thorough restitution of King Edward's or the Saxon laws.

The usurper Stephen, as the manner of usurpers is, promised much at his

(e) Spelm. Cod. LL. Wm. I, 288. Hon. I, 299. (f) Stftt. Civ. Loud. 13 Edw. I.
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accession, especially with regard to redressing the grievances of the forest-law«,

but performed no great matter either in that or in any other point. It is from

his reign, however, that we are to date the introduction of the Roman civil

and canon laws into this realm: and at the same time was imported the doc-

trine of appeals to the court of Rome, as a branch of the canon law.

By the time of King Henry the Second, if not earlier, the charter of Henry

the First seems to have been forgotten : for we find the claim of marriage, ward,

and relief, then flourishing in full vigour. The right of primogeniture seems

also to have tacitly revived, being found more convenient for the public than

the parcelling of estates into a multitude of minute subdivisions. However, in

this prince's reign much was done to methodize the laws, and reduce them into a

regular order; as appears from that excellent treatise of Glanvil; which, though

some of it be now antiquated and altered, yet, when compared with the code of

F *4221 ^eliry ^ne first, *carries a manifest superiority. (g) Throughout his

' J reign, also, was continued the important struggle, which we have had

occasion so often to mention, between the laws of England and Rome: the

former supported by the strength of the temporal nobility, when endeavoured

to be supplanted in favour of the latter by the popish clergy. Which dispute

was kept on foot till the reig^i of Edward the First: when the laws of England,

under the new discipline introduced by that skilful commander, obtained a

complete and permanent victory. In the present reign of Henry the Second,
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there are four things which peculiarly merit the attention of a legal antiquarian :

1. The constitutions of the parliament at Clarendon, A. D. 1164, whereby the

king checked the power of the pope and his clergy, and greatly narrowed the

total exemption they claimed from the secular jurisdiction : though his farther

progress was unhappily stopped by the fatal event of the disputes between him

and Archbishop Becket. 2. The institution of the office of justices in eyre,

in Minere ; the king having divided the kingdom into six circuits (a little dif-

ferent from the present), and commissioned these new created judges to ad-

minister justice, and try writs of assize in the several counties. These remedies

are said to have been then first invented; before which all causes were usually

terminated in the county courts, according to the Saxon custom ; or before the

king's justiciaries in the aula regis, in pursuance of the Norman regulations.

The latter of which tribunals, traveling about with the king's person, occasioned

intolerable expense and delay to the suitors; and the former, however proper

for little debts or minute actions, where even injustice is better than procrasti-

nation, were now become liable to too much ignorance of the law, and too much

partiality as to facts, to determine matters of considerable moment 3. The

introduction and establishment of the grand assize, or trial by special kind of

jury in a writ of right, at the option of the tenant or defendant, instead of the

barbarous and Norman trial by battel. 4, To this time must also be referred the

r *4.o-} i introduction of escuage, or pecuniary *commutation for personal mili-

L 4/w J tary service ; which in process of time was the parent of the ancient

subsidies granted to the crown by parliament, and the land tax of later times.

Richard the First, a brave and magnanimous prince, was a sportsman as well

as a soldier ; and, therefore, enforced the forest laws with some rigour; which

occasioned many discontents among his people: though (according to Matthew-

Paris) he repealed the penalties of castration, loss of eyes, and cutting off the

hands and feet, before inflicted on such as transgressed in hunting; probably

finding that their severity prevented prosecutions. He also, when abroad, com-

posed a body of naval laws at the Isle of Oleron, which are still extant, and of

high authority ; for in his time we began again to discover, that (as an island)

we were naturally a maritime power. But with regard to civil proceedings, we

find nothing very remarkable in this reign, except a few regulations regarding

the Jews, and the justices in eyre: the king's thoughts being chiefly taken up

by the knight errantry of a croisade against the Saracens in the holy land.

In King John's time, and that of his son, Henry the Third, the rigours of the

(a) Hal. Hist. C. L. 138.
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feudal tenures and the forest laws were so warmly kept up, that they occasioned

many insurrections of the barons or principal feudatories: which at last had this

effect, that first King John, and afterwards his son, consented to the two famous

charters of English liberties, mayna cart a and carta de foresta. Of these the latter

was well calculated to redress many grievances and encroachments of the crown, in

the exertion of forest law: and the former confirmed many liberties of the church,

and redressed many grievances incident to feudal tenures, of no small moment

at the time; though now, unless considered attentively and with this retrospect,

they seem but of trifling concern. But, besides these feudal provisions, care was

also taken therein to protect the subject against other oppressions, then frequently

arising from unreasonable amercements, from illegal distresses, or other process

for debts or services due to the crown, and *froni the tyrannical abuse r*jo4l

of the prerogative of purveyance and pre-emption. It fixed the forfeiture L J

of lands for felony in the same manner as it still remains: prohibited for the

future the grants of exclusive fisheries; and the erection of new bridges so as to

oppress the neighbourhood. With respect to private rights: it established the

testamentary power of the subject over part of his personal estate, the rest being

distributed among his wife and children; it laid down the law of dower, as it

hath continued ever since; and prohibited the appeals of women, unless for the

death of their husbands. In matters of public police and national concern : it

enjoined an uniformity of weights and measures; gave new encouragements to
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commerce, by the protection of merchant strangers; and forbad the alienation

of lands in mortmain. With regard to the administration of justice: besides

prohibiting all denials or delays of it, it fixed the court of common pleas at

Westminster, that the suitors might no longer be harassed with following the

king's person in all its progresses; and at the same time brought the trial of

issues home to the very doors of the freeholders, by directing assizes to be taken

in the proper counties, and establishing annual circuits; it also corrected some

abuses then incident to the trials by wager of law and of battel; directed the

regular awarding of inquest for life or member; prohibited the king's inferior

ministers from holding pleas of the crown, or trying any criminal charge,

whereby many forfeitures might otherwise have unjustly accrued to the ex-

chequer : and regulated the time and place of holding the inferior tribunals

of justice, the county court, sheriffs tourn, and court-leet. It confirmed and

established the liberties of the city of London, and all other cities, boroughs,

towns, and ports of the kingdom. And, lastly (which alone would have merited

the title that it bears, of the great charter), it protected every individual of

the nation in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty, and his property, unless

declared to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. (3)

*However, by means of these struggles, the pope, in the reign of King r*425 ]

John, gained a still greater ascendant here, than he ever had before L " •"

enjoyed; which continued through the long reign of his son, Henry the Third:

in the beginning of whose time the old Saxon trial by ordeal was also totally abol-

ished. And we may by this time perceive, in Bracton's treatise, a still farther

improvement in the method and regularity of the common law, especially in the

point of pleadings, (h) Nor must it be forgotten that the first traces which remain

of the separation of the greater barons from the less, in the constitution of

parliaments, are found in the great charter of King John ; though omitted in

that of Henry III, and that, towards the end of the latter of these reigns, we

(h) Hal. Hist. C. L. 158.

(3) [The following is the celebrated 29th chapter of magna carta, the foundation of the lib-

erty of Englishmen.

" Nullus liber homo capintur, vol imprisonctur, aut disseisiatur de liberp tenemento BUO vel

libertatibus vel liberis consuetudinibus suia, aut utlagetur aut exnlet, aut aliqno modo destraator,

nee super cum ibimus, nee super eummittemus, nisi per Icgale judicium parium suornrn vel per

legem terrcc. Nnlli vendemns, nulii negabiinus, aut differemus rectum veljusticiain."]

This is the chapter as it stood in the charter as confirmed by Henry III. In the original

charter it was somewhat different. See Blackstone's Charters; Cooley's Coiist. Lira. 351, note,

'
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find the first record of any writ for summoning knights, citizens and burgesses

to parliament. And here we conclude the second period of our English legal

history.

III. The third commences with the reign of Edward the First, who hath

justly been styled our English Justinian. For in his, time the law did receive

so sudden a perfection, that Sir Matthew Hale does not scruple to affirm, (i) that

more was done in the first thirteen years of his reign to settle and establish the

distributive justice of the kingdom, than in all the ages since that time put

together.

It would be endless to enumerate all the particulars of these regulations; but

the principal may be reduced under the following general heads. 1. He estab-

lished, confirmed, and settled the great charter and charter of forests. 2. He

gave a mortal wound to the encroachments of the pope and his clergy, by limit-

ing and establishing the bounds of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: and by obliging

the ordinary, to whom all the goods of intestates at that time belonged, to dis-

charge the debts of the deceased. 3. He detined the limits of the several tem-

poral courts of the highest jurisdiction, those of the king's bench, common

'

r*4"?fi 1 P'oas- and exchequer ; so as *they might not interfere with each other's

L J proper business: to do which they must now have recourse to a fiction,

very necessary and beneficial in the present enlarged state of property. 4. He
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settled the boundaries of the inferior courts in counties, hundreds and manors:

confining them to causes of no great amount, according to their primitive insti-

tution : though of considerably greater, than by the alteration of the value of

money they are now permitted to determine. 5. He secured the property of the

subject, by abolishing all arbitrary taxes and talliages, levied without the con-

sent of the national council. 6. He guarded the common justice of the king-

dom from abuses, by giving up the royal prerogative of sending mandates to

interfere in private causes. 7. He settled the form, solemnities and effect of

fines levied in the court of common pleas: though the thing itself was of

Saxon original. 8. He first established a repository for the public records of the

kingdom; few of which are ancienter than the reign of his father, and those

were by him collected. 9. He improved upon the laws of King Alfred, by that

great and orderly method of watch and wai'd, for preserving the public peace

.and preventing robberies, established by the statute of Winchester. 10. He

settled and reformed many abuses incident to tenures, and removed some

•restraints on the alienation of lauded property, by the statute of quia emptores.

11. He instituted a speedier way for the recovery of debts, by granting execu-

tion, not only upon goods and chattels, but also upon lands, by writ of elegit ;

which was of signal benefit to a trading people: and upon the same commer-

cial ideas, he also allowed the charging of lands in a statute merchant, to pay

debts contracted in trade, contrary to all feudal principles. 12. He effectually

provided for the recovery of advowsons. as temporal rights ; in which, before,

the law was extremely deficient. 13. He also effectually closed the great gulf,

in which all the landed property of the kingdom was in danger of being swal-

lowed, by his reiterated statutes of mortmain ; most admirably adapted to meet

the frauds that had then been devised, though afterwards contrived to be evaded

I*.!-}-' 1 '3y ^ie inveution of uses. *14. He established a new limitation of prop-

1 -I erty by the creation of estates-tail ; concerning the good policy of which,

modern times have, however, entertained a very different opinion. 15. He

reduced all Wales to the subjection, not only of the crown, but in great measure

of the laws of England (which was thoroughly completed in the reign of Henry

the Eighth) ; and seems to have entertained a design of doing the like by Scot-

land, so as to have formed an entire and complete union of the island of Great

Britain.

I might continue this catalogue much farther — but upon the whole we may

observe, that the very scheme and model of the administration of common

(I) Hal. Hist. 0. L. 169.
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justice between party and party, was entirely settled by this king; (&) and has

continued nearly the same, in all succeeding ages, to this day, abating some few

alterations, which the humour or necessity of subsequent times hath occasioned.

The forms of writs, by which actions are commenced, were perfected in his

reign, and established as models for posterity. The pleadings consequent upon

the writs, were then short, nervous and perspicuous; not intricate, verbose and

formal. The legal treatises, written in his time, as Britton, Fleta, Hengham,

and the rest, are, for the most part, law at this day; or at least, were so, till the

alteration of tenures took place. And, to conclude, it is from this period, from

the exact observation of magna cnrta, rather than from its making or renewal,

in the days of his grandfather and father, that the liberty of Englishmen began

again to rear its head: though the weight of the military tenures hung heavy

upon it for many ages after.

I cannot give a better proof of the excellence of his constitutions than that

from his time to that of Henry the Eighth, there happened very few, and those

not very considerable, alterations in the legal forms of proceedings. As to matter

of substance : the old Gothic powers of electing the principal subordinate magis-

trates, the sheriffs, and "conservators of the peace, were taken from the *rjoai

people in the reigns of Edward II and Edward III; and justices of the

peace were established instead of the latter. In the reign, also, of Edward the

Third, the parliament is supposed most probably to have assumed its present
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form; by a separation of the commons from the lords. The statute for defining

and ascertains treasons was one of the first productions of this new-modelled

assembly; and the translation of the law proceedings from French into Latin

another. Much also was done, under the auspices of this magnanimous prince,

for establishing our domestic manufactures; by prohibiting the exportation of

English wool and the importation or wear of foreign cloth or furs; and by

encouraging cloth-workers from other countries to settle here. Nor was the

legislature inattentive to many other branches of commerce, or, indeed, to com-

merce in general: for, in particular, it enlarged the credit of the merchant, by

introducing the statute staple; whereby he might the more readily pledge his

lands for the security of his mercantile debts. And, as personal property now

grew by the extension of trade to be much more considerable than formerly,

care was taken, in case of intestacies, to appoint administrators, particularly

nominated by the law, to distribute that personal property among the creditors

and kindred of the deceased, which before had been usually applied, by the

officers of the ordinary, to uses then denominated pious. The statutes also of

prcentunire, for effectually depressing the civil power of the pope, were the work

of this and the subsequent reign. And the establishment of a laborious paro-

chial clergy, by the endowment of vicarages out of the overgrown possessions

of the monasteries, added lustre to the close of the fourteenth century; though

the seeds of the general reformation, which were thereby first sown in the-king-

dom, were almost overwhelmed by the spirit of persecution, introduced into the

laws of the land by the influence of the regular clergy.

From this time to that of Henry the Seventh, the civil wars and disputed

titles to the crown gave no leisure for farther "juridical improvement; r* 190-1

" narn silent leges inter anna." And yet it is to these very disputes that <- " -I

we owe the happy loss of all the dominions of the crown on the continent of

France; which turned the minds of our subsequent princes entirely to domestic

concerns. To these, likewise, we owe the method of barring entails by the fiction

of common recoveries; invented originally by the clergy to evade the statutes

of mortmain, but introduced under Edward the Fourth for the purpose of un-

fettering estates, and making them more liable to forfeiture: while, on the

other hand, the owners endeavoured to protect them by the universal establish-

ment of z«.sw, another of the clerical inventions.

In the reign of Henry the Seventh, his ministers (not to say the king himself)

were more industrious in hunting out prosecutions upon old and forgotten penal

(kj Hal. Hist. C. L. 162.
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laws, in order to extort money from the subject, than in framing any new and

beneficial regulations. For the distinguishing character of this reign was that

of amassing treasure in the king's coffers, by every means that could be devised:

and almost every alteration in the laws, however salutary or otherwise in their

future consequences, had this and this only for their great and immediate object.

To this end the court of star-chamber was new-modeled, and armed with powers

the most dangerous and unconstitutional, over the persons and properties of

the subject. Informations were allowed to be received, in lieu of indictments, at

the assizes and sessions of the peace, in order to multiply fines and pecuniary

penalties. The statute of fines for landed property was craftily and covertly

contrived, to facilitate the destruction of entails, and make the owners of real

estates more capable to forfeit as well as to alien. 'The benefit of clergy (which

so often intervened to stop attainders and save the inheritance) was now allowed

only once to lay offenders who 'only could have inheritances to lose. A writ of

capias was permitted in all actions on the case, and the defendant might in con-

sequence be outlawed: because upon such outlawry his goods became the prop-

F*4SOl er^ °^ *^e crown- In short; there is hardly a statute in this reign *in-

' " -1 trodnctive of a new law, or modifying the old, but what either directly or

obliquely tended to the emolument of the exchequer.

IV. This brings us to the fourth period of our legal history, viz.: the refor-

mation of religion under Henry the Eighth, and his children; which opens an

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

entire new scene in ecclesiastical matters; the usurped power of the pope being

now forever routed and destroyed, all his connections with this island cut off,

the crown restored to its supremacy over spiritual men and causes, and the

patronage of bishoprics being once more indisputably vested in the king. And,

had the spiritual courts been at this time reunited to the civil, we should have

seen the old Saxon constitution with regard to the ecclesiastical polity com-

pletely restored.

With regard also to our civil polity, the statute of wills, and the statute of uses

(both passed in the reign of this prince), made a great alteration as to property:

the former by allowing the devise of real estates by will, which before was in gen-

eral forbidden ; the latter, by endeavouring to destroy the intricate nicety of uses,

though the narrowness and pedantry of the courts of common law prevented

this statute from having its full beneficial effect. And thence the courts of

equity assumed a jurisdiction, dictated by common justice and common sense;

which, however arbitrarily exercised or productive of jealousies in its infancy,

has at length been matured into a most elegant system of rational jurisprudence;

the principles of which (notwithstanding they may differ in forms) are now

equally adopted by the courts of both law and equity. From the statute of uses,

and another statute of the same antiquity (which protected estates for years

from being destroyed by the reversioner), a remarkable alteration took place in

the mode of conveyancing: the ancient assurance of feoffment and livery upon

the laud being now very seldom practiced, since the more easy and more private

invention of transferring property, by secret conveyances to uses, and long terms

of years, being now continually created in mortgages and *family settlements,

r.+ .o-r-i which may be moulded to a thousand useful purposes by the ingenuity

1 d -1 of an able artist.

The farther attacks in this reign upon the immunity of estates-tail, which

reduced them to a little more than the conditional fees at the common law,

before the passing of the statute rle donis ; the establishment of recognizances in

the nature of a statute-staple, for facilitating the raising of money upon landed

security; and the introduction of the bankrupt laws, as well for the punish-

ment of the fraudulent, as the relief of the unfortunate, trader; all these were

capital alterations of our legal polity, and highly convenient to that character,

which the English began now to re-assume, of a great commercial people. The

incorporation of Wales with England, and the more uniform administration of

justice, by destroying some counties palatine, and abridging the unreasonable

privileges of such as remained, added dignity and strength to the monarchy j
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and, together with the numerous improvements before observed upon, and the

redress of muny grievances and oppressions which had been introduced by his

father, will ever make the administration of Henry VIII a very distinguished

fflra in the annals of judicial history.

It must be however remarked, that (particularly in his latter years) the royal

prerogative was then strained to a very tyrannical and oppressive height; and,

what was the worst circumstance, its encroachments were established by law,

iinder the sanction of those pusillanimous parliaments, one of which, "to its

eternal disgrace, passed a statute, whereby it was enacted that the king's proc-

lamations should have the force of acts of parliament; and others concurred in

the creation of that amazing heap of wild and new-fangled treasons, which

were slightly touched upon in a former chapter. (I) Happily for the nation,

this arbitrary reign was succeeded by the minority of an amiable prince; during

the short sunshine of which, great part of these extravagant laws were repealed.

And to do justice to the shorter reign of Queen Mary, *many salutary ^JO^T

and popular laws in civil matters were made under her administration ; L "' - I

perhaps the better to reconcile the people to the bloody measures which she was

induced to pursue, for the re-establishment of religious slavery: the well-con-

certed schemes for effecting which, were (through the providence of God)

defeated by the seasonable accession of Queen Elizabeth.

The religious liberties of the nation being, by that happy event, established
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(we trust) on an eternal basis, (though obliged in their infancy to be guarded,

against papists and other non-conformists, by laws of too sanguinary a nature);

the forest-laws having fallen into disuse; and the administration of civil rights

in the courts of justice being carried on in a regular course, according to the

wise institutions of King Edward the First, without any material innovations :

all the principal grievances introduced by the Norman conquest seem to have

been gradually shaken off, and our Saxon constitution restored, with consider-

able improvements: except only in the continuation of the military tenures,

and a few other points, which still armed the crown with a very oppressive and

dangerous prerogative. It is also to be remarked that the spirit of enriching

the clergy and endowing religions houses had (through the former abuse of it)

gone over to such a contrary extreme, and the princes of the house of Tudor

and their favourites had fallen with such avidity upon the spoils of the church,

that a decent and honourable maintenance was wanting to many of the bishops

and clergy. This produced the restraining statutes, to prevent the alienation

of lands and tithes belonging to the church and universities. The number of

indigent persons being also greatly increased, by withdrawing the alms of the

monasteries, a plan was formed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, more humane

and beneficial than even feeding and clothing of millions; by affording them

the means (with proper industry) to feed and to clothe themselves. And, the

farther any subsequent plans for maintaining the poor have departed from this

institution, the more impracticable and even pernicious their visionary attempts

have proved.

*However, considering the reign of Queen Elizabeth in a great and r*joo-i

political view, we have no reason to regret many subsequent alterations in >• ' ''

the English constitution. For, though in general she was a wise and excellent

princess, and loved her people: though in her time trade flourished, riches

increased, the laws were duly administered, the nation was respected abroad, and

the people happy at home: vet the increase of the power of the star-chamber,

and the erection of the high commission court in matters ecclesiastical, were

the work of her reign. She also kept her parliament at a very awful distance :

and in many particulars she, at times, would carry the prerogative as high as

her most arbitrary predecessors. It is true, she very seldom exerted this pre-

rogative, so as to oppress individuals; but still she had it to exert; and there-

fore the felicity of her reign depended more on her want of opportunity and

inclination, than want of power, to play the tyrant. This is a high enconium

(I) See page 86.
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on her merit; but at the same time it is sufficient to show, that these were not

those golden days of genuine liberty that we formerly were taught to believe:

for surely the true liberty of the subject consists not so much in the gracious

behaviour, as in the limited power, of the sovereign.

The great revolutions that had happened, in manners and in property, had

paved the way, by imperceptible yet sure degrees, for as great a revolution in

government: yet, while that revolution was effecting, the crown became more

arbitrary than ever, by the progress of those very means which afterwards

reduced its power. It is obvious to every observer that, till the close of the

Lancastrian civil wars, the property and the power of the nation were chiefly

divided between the king, the nobility, and the clergy. The commons were

generally in a state of great ignorance; their personal wealth, before the exten-

sion of trade, was comparatively small; and the nature of their lauded property

was such as kept them in continual dependence upon their feudal lord, being

r*4'U 1 u8uaH>" some powerful baron, some opulent abbey, *or sometimes the kino;

' -" himself. Though a notion of general liberty had strongly pervaded

and animated the whole constitution, yet the particular liberty, the natural

equality, and personal independence of individuals, were little regarded or

thought of; nay, even to assert them was treated as the height of sedition and

rebellion. Our ancestors heard, with detestation and horror, those sentiments

rudely delivered, and pushed to most absurd extremes, by the violence of a Cade
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and a Tyler; which have since been applauded, with a zeal almost rising to

idolatry, when softened and recommended by the eloquence, the moderation,

and the arguments of a Sidney, a Locke, and a Milton.

But when learning, by the invention of printing and the progress of religious

reformation, began to be universally disseminated; when trade and navigation

were suddenly carried to an amazing extent, by the use of the compass and

the consequent discovery of the Indies; the minds of men, thus enlightened by

science and enlarged by observation and travel, began to entertain a more just

opinion of the dignity and rights of mankind. An inundation of wealth flowed

in upon the merchants, and middling rank; while the two great estates of the

kingdom, which formerly had balanced the prerogative, the nobility and clergy,

were greatly impoverished and weakened. The popish clergy, detected in their

frauds and abuses, exposed to the resentment of the populace, and stripped of

their laud and revenues, stood trembling for their very existence. The nobles,

enervated by the refinements of luxury (which knowledge, foreign travel and

the progress of the politer arts, are too apt to introduce with themselves), and

fired with disdain at being rivaled in magnificence by the opulent citizens, fell

into enormous expenses; to gratify which they were permitted, by the policy of

the times, to dissipate their overgrown estates, and alienate their ancient patri-

monies. This gradually reduced their power and their influence within a very

moderate bound; while the king, by the spoil of the monasteries and the great

increase of the customs, grew rich, independent and haughty; and the

r*43" 1 *commons were not yet sensible of the strength they had acquired, nor

' •* urged to examine its extent by new burthens or oppressive taxations,

during the sudden opulence of the exchequer. Intent upon acquiring new

riches, and happy in being freed from the insolence and tyranny of the orders

more immediately above them, they never dreamed of opposing the prerogative

to which they had been so little accustomed; much less of taking the lead in

opposition, to which by their weight and their property they were now entitled.

The latter years of Henry the Eighth were therefore the times of the greatest

despotism that have been known in this island since the death of William the

Norman: the prerogative as it then stood by common law (and much more

when extended by act of parliament), being too large to be endured in a land

of liberty.

Queen Elizabeth, and the intermediate princes of the Tudor line, had almost

the same legal powers, and sometimes exerted them as roughly, as their father,

King Henry the Eighth. But the critical situation of that princess with

556

Chap. 33.] RISE, PORGRESS, &c., OF THE LAWS. 435

regard to her legitimacy, her religion, her enmity with Spain, and her jealousy

of the Q.ueen ot Scots, occasioned greater caution in her conduct. She, proba-

bly, or her able advisers, had penetration enough to discern how the power of

the kingdom had gradually shifted its channel, and wisdom enough not to pro-

voke the commons to discover and feel their strength. She therefore threw a

veil over the odious part of the prerogative; which was never wantonly thrown

aside, hut only to answer some important purpose: and, though the royal

treasury no longer overflowed with the wealth of the clergy, which had been all

granted out. and had contributed to enrich the people, she asked for supplies

with such moderation, and managed them with so much economy, that the

commons were happy in obliging her. Such, in short, were her circumstances,

her necessities, her wisdom and her good disposition, that never did a prince so

long and so entirely, for the space of half a century together, reign in the afiee-

tioifs of the people.

*0n the accession of King James I, no new degree of royal power r *,,?>(• -i

was added to or exercised by him; but such a sceptre was too weighty *• "' ' '

to be wielded by such a hand. The unreasonable and imprudent exertion of

what was then deemed to be prerogative, upon trivial and unworthy occasions, and

the claim of a more absolute power inherent in the kingly office than had ever

been carried into practice, soon awakened the sleeping lion. The people heard

with astonishment doctrines preached from the throne and the pulpit subver-
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sive of liberty and property, and all the natural rights of humanity. They

examined into the divinity of this claim, and found it weakly and fallaciously

supported: and common reason assured them, that if it were of human origin,

no constitution could establish it without power of revocation, no precedent

could sanctify, no length of time could confirm it. The leaders felt the pulse

of the nation, and found they had ability as well as inclination to resist it: and

accordingly resisted and opposed it, whenever the pusillanimous temper of the

reigning monarch had courage to put it to the trial; and they gained some little

victories in the cases of concealments, monopolies and the dispensing power.

In the mean time, very little was done for the improvement of private justice,

except the abolition of sanctuaries, and the extension of the bankrupt^ laws, the

limitation of suits and actions, and the regulating of informations upon penal

statutes. For I cannot class the laws against witchcraft and conjuration under

the head of improvements; nor did the dispute between Lord Ellesraere and

Sir Edward Coke, concerning the powers of the court of chancery, tend much

to the advancement of justice.

Indeed, when Charles First succeeded to the crown of his father, and at-

tempted to revive some enormities, which had been dormant in the reign of

King James, the loans and benevolences extorted'from the subject, the arbi-

trary imprisonments for refusal, the exertion of martial law in time of peace,

and other doinestic grievances, clouded the morning of that misguided r *^g« -i

prince's reign ; which, though the noon of it began a little to brighten, L J

at last went down in blood, and left the whole kingdom in darkness. It must

be acknowledged that, by the petition of right, enacted to abolish these en-

croachments, the English constitution received great alteration and improve-

ment. But there still remained the latent power of the forest-laws, which the

crown most unseasonably revived. The legal jurisdiction of the star-chamber

and high commission courts, was extremely great; though their usurped

authority was still greater. And if we add to these the disuse of parliaments, the

ill-timed zeal and despotic proceedings of the ecclesiastical governors in matters

of mere indifference, together with the arbitrary levies of tonnage and pound-

age, ship-money and other projects, we may see grounds most amply sufficient

for seeking redress in a legal,'constitutional way. This redress, when sought,

was also constitutionally given: for all these oppressions were actually abol-

ished by the king in parliament, before the rebellion broke out, by the several

statutes for triennial parliaments, for abolishing the star-chamber and high

commission courts, for ascertaining the extent of forests and forest-laws, for

JOB*,.".'
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renouncing ship-money and other exactions, and for giving up the iv-'-ogative

of knighting the king's tenants in capite in consequence of their feudal tenures;

though it must be acknowledged that these concessions were not made with so

good a grace as to conciliate the confidence of the people. Unfortunately,

cither by his own mismanagement, or by the arts of his enemies, the king had

lost the reputation of sincerity; which is the greatest unhappiuess that can

befall a prince. Though he formerly had strained his prerogative, not only

beyond what the genius of the present times would bear, but also beyond the

examples of former ages, he had now consented to reduce it to a lower ebb than

[•was consistent with monarchical government. A conduct so opposite to his

temper and principles, joined with some rash actions and unguarded expressions,

made the people suspect that his condescension was merely temporary. Flushed,

f *4SS 1 therefore, with the success they had gained, fired with resentment for

' J past oppressions, *and dreading the consequences if the king should

regain his power, the popular leaders (who in all ages have called themselves the

people) began to grow insolent and ungovernable; their insolence soon ren-

dered them desperate: and despair at length forced them to join with a set of

military hypocrites and enthusiasts, who overturned the church and monarchy,

and proceeded with deliberate solemnity to the trial and murder of their sovereign.

I pass by the crude aud abortive schemes for amending the laws in the times

of confusion which followed; the most promising and sensible whereof (such
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as the establishment of new trials, the abolition of feudal tenures, the act of

navigation, and some others) were adopted in the

V."Fifth period, which I am next to mention, viz., after the restoration of

King Charles II. Immediately upon which the principal remaining grievance,

the doctrine and consequences of military tenures, were taken away and abol-

ished except in the instance of corruption of inheritable blood, upon attainder

of treason and felony. And though the monarch, in whose person the regal

government was restored, and with it our ancient constitution, deserves no com-

mendation from posterity, yet in his reign (wicked, sanguinary and turbulent

as it was), the concurrence of happy circumstances was such that from thence

we may date not only the re-establishment of our church and monarchy, but

also the complete restitution of English liberty, for the first time since its total

abolition at the conquest. For therein not only these slavish tenures, the badge

of foreign dominion, with all their oppressive appendages, were removed from

incumbering the estates of the subject: but also an additional security of hia

person from imprisonment was obtained by that great bulwark of our constitu-

tion, the habeas corpus act. These two statutes, with regard to our property

and persons form a second magna carta, as beneficial and effectual as that of

Running-Mead. That only pruned the luxuriances of the feudal system ; but

r*<nol the statute of Charles the Second extirpated all its *slaveries; except

J- •" perhaps in copyhold tenure ; and there also they are now in great meas-

ure enervated by gradual custom, and the interposition of our courts of justice.

Magna carta only, in general terms, declared, that no man should be imprisoned

contrary to law: the habeas corpus act points him out effectual means, as well

to release himself, though committed even by the king in council, as to punish

all those who shall thus constitutionally misuse him.

To these. I may add the abolition of the prerogatives of purveyance and pre-

emption ; the statute for holding triennial parliaments ; the test and corporation

acts, which secure both our civil and religions liberties; the abolition of the

writ de hceretico comlrnrendo ; the statute of frauds and perjuries, a great and

necessary security to private property; the statute for distribution of intestates'

estates, and that of amendments and jeofails, which cut off those superfluous

niceties which so long had disgraced our courts: together with many other

wholesome acts that were passed in this reign, for the benefit of navigation and

the improvement of foreign commerce: and the whole, when we likewise con-

sider the freedom from taxes and armies which the subject then enjoyed, will

be sufficient to demonstrate this truth, "that the constitution of Engfaud had
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arrived to its fall vigour, and the true balance between liberty and prerogative

was happily established by law, in the reign of King Charles the Second."

It is far from my intention to palliate or defend many very iniquitous proceed-

ings, contrary to all law, in that reign, through the artifice of wicked politi-

cians, both in and out of employment. What seems incontestible is this; that

ly the laic, (m) as it then stood (notwithstanding some invidious, nay, danger-

ous, brunches of the prerogative have since been lopped *off, and the r *AAQ i

rest more clearly defined), the people had as large a portion of real lib- L " ' i

erty as is consistent with a state of society; and sufficient power, residing in

their own hands, to assert and preserve that liberty, if invaded by the royal

prerogative. For which I need but appeal to the memorable catastrophe of the

next reign. For when King Charles's deluded brother attempted to enslave the

nation, he found it was beyond his power: the people both could, and did, resist

him ; and, in consequence of such resistance, obliged him to quit his enterprise

and his throne together. Which introduces us to the last period of our legal

history, viz.:

VI. From the revolution in 1688 to the present time. In this period many

laws have passed; as the bill of rights, the toleration-act, the act of settlement,

with its conditions, the act for uniting England with Scotland, and some others:

which have asserted our liberties in more clear andcmphatical terms; have reg-

ulated the succession of the crown by parliament, as the exigencies of religious
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and civil freedom required; have confirmed and exemplified the doctrine of

resistance, when the executive magistrate endeavours to subvert the constitu-

tion ; have maintained the superiority of the laws above the king, by pronounc-

ing his dispensing power to be illegal; have indulged tender consciences with

every religious liberty, consistent with the safety of the state; have established

triennial, since turned into septennial, elections of members to serve in parlia-

ment; have excluded certain officers from the house of commons; have re-

strained the king's pardon from obstructing parliamentary impeachments; have

imparted to all the lords an equal right of trying their fellow-peers ; have reg-

ulated trials for high treason ; have afforded our posterity a hope that corrup-

tion of blood may one day be abolished and forgotten ; have (by the desire of

his pi'esent majesty) set bounds to the civil list, and placed the administration

of that revenue in hands that are accountable to parliament; and have (by the

like desire) made the judges completely independent of the king, his ministers,

and his successors. Yet, though these provisions have, in appearance and

•"nominally, reduced the strength of the executive power to a much r *AA\ i

lower ebb than in the preceding period; if on theotherhancl wethrowinto L '"*' ' •'

the opposite scale (what perhaps the immoderate reduction of the ancient pre-

rogative may have rendered in some degree necessary) the vast acquisition of

force, arising from the riot-act, and the annual expedience of a standing army;

and the vast acquisitiozi of personal attachment, arising from the magnitude of

the national debt, and the manner of levying those yearly millions that are

appropriated to pay the interest; we shall find that tfie crown has, gradually

and imperceptibly, gained almost as much in influence as it has apparently lost

in prerogative.

The chief alterations of moment (for the time would fail me to descend to

minutias,) in the administration of private justice during this period, are the

solemn recognition of the law of nations with respect to the rights of ambassa-

dors : the cutting off, by the statute for the amendment of the law, a vast num-

ber of exercrescences, that in process of time had sprung out of the practical

part of it; the protection of corporate rights by the improvements in writs

of mandamus, and informations in nature of quo warranto : the regulations of

trials by jury, and the admitting witnesses for prisoners upon oath : the farther

restraints upon alienation of lands in mortmain: the annihilation of the ter-

rible judgment of peinefort et dure: the extension of the benefit of clergy, by

(m) The point of time at which I would choose to flx this theoretical perfection of our public law, is in

the year 1B7», after the habeas corpus act was passed, and that for licencing the press had expired ; though

the years which immediate!}: followed it were tinio ol gre&t practical oppression.
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abolishing the pedantic criterion of reading: the counterbalance to this mercy,

by the vast increase of capital punishment: the new and effectual methods for

the speedy recovery of rents: the improvements which have been made in

ejectments for the trying of titles: the introduction and establishment of paper-

credit, by indorsements upon bills and notes, which have shown the legal possi-

bility and convenience (which our ancestors so long doubted) of assigning u

chow in action; the translation of all legal proceedings into the English lan-

guage ; the erection of courts of conscience for recovering small debts, and

(which is much the better plan) the reformation of county courts: the

great system of marine jurisprudence, of which the foundations have been laid,

r *44-» 1 ^~ clearly *developing the principles on which policies of insurance are

*• v-" founded,and by happily applying those principles to particular cases:

and, lastly, the liberality of sentiment, which (though late) has now taken pos-

session of our courts of common law, and induced them to adopt (where facts

can be clearlv ascertained) the same principles of redress as have prevailed in

our courts of equity, from the time that Lord Nottingham presided there; and

this, not only where specially empowered by particular statutes (as in the ease

of bonds, mortgages and set-offs), but by extending the remedial influence of

the equitable writ of trespass on the case according to its primitive institution

by King Edward the First, to almost every instance of injustice not remedied

bj tiny other process. And these, I think, are all the material alterations that
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hare happened with respect to private justice in the course of the present centurv.

Thus, therefore, for the amusement and instruction of the student, I have

endeavoured to delineate some rude outlines of a plan for the history of our laws

and liberties; from their first rise and gradual progress, among our British and

Saxon ancestors, till their total eclipse at the Norman conquest from which

they have gradually emerged, and risen to the perfection they now enjoy, at dif-

ferent periods of time. We have seen in the course of our inquiries, in this

and the former books, that the fundamental maxims and rales of the law, which

regard the rights of persons, and the rights of things, the private injuries that

may be offered to both, and the crimes which affect the public, have been and

are every day improving, and are now fraught with the accumulated wisdom of

ages : that the forms of administering justice came to perfection under Edward

the First; and have not been much varied, nor always for the better, since:

that our religious liberties were fully established at the reformation; but that

the recovery of our civil and political liberties was a work of longer time ; they

not being thoroughly and completely regained till after the restoration of King

Charles, nor fully and explicitly acknowledged and defined till the era of the

r*44T 1 naPPy revolution. Of a constitution so wisely contrived, *so strongly

I -I raised, and so highly finished, it is hard to speak with that praise which

is justly andsererely its due:—the thorough and attentive contemplation of it will

furnish its best panegyric. It hath been the endeavour of these Commentaries,

however the execution may have succeeded, to examine its solid foundation-!, to

mark out its extensive plan, to explain the use and distribution of its parts, and,

from the harmonious concurrence of those several parts, to demonstrate the ele-

gant proportion of the whole. We have taken occasion to admire at every turn

the noble monuments of ancient simplicity, and the more curious refinements

of modern art. Nor have its faults been concealed from view, for faults it has,

lest we should be tempted to think it of more than human structure; defects,

chiefly arising from the decays of time, or the rage of unskilful improvements

in later ages. To sustain, to repair, to beautify this noble pile, is a charge in-

trusted principally to the nobility, and such gentlemen of the kingdom as are

delegated by their country to parliament. The protection of THE LIBERTY OP

BRITAIN' is a duty which they owe to themselves, who enjoy it; to their ances-

tors, who transmitted it down; and to their posterity, who will claim at their

hands this, the best birthright, and noblest inheritance of mankind. (4)

(4) The just exultation with which our commentator reviewed the gradual improvement in the

lawa of England, which had continued to his own time, mav well be felt by the English
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statesmen of the present day, when the legislation of the succeeding period is presented to his

view. During no equal period in English nistory were the changes m the English constitution

so great and manifest, nor the modifications in English law so radical or BO beneficent. Indeed,

the England of to-day is, in many particulars, so different from the England of Blockstone's

time, and its system of law is pervaded by a spirit so much milder and more just, that, upon

many points, our author seems to be writing ot some far off and barbarous realm, rather than

of the England which we know, and the justice, humanity, and equity of whose laws we admire,

and are, for the most part, content to copy.

In notes to the preceding pages we have sought to point out the changes in the law which

have been introduced by statute, and the student will be enabled, as he progresses, to compare

the past with the present, and to form some estimate of how the English system of laws which

now prevails differs from that which was in force when our English ancestors colonized this

country, bringing with them the common law to plant and acclimate upon our shores. But it

may be desirable that, at the conclusion of our task, wo refer briefly to some of the most striking

and important of the changes which have been made, as we may thus, by bringing them together

into one general summary, the better appreciate the general effect of all, than wo could possibly

by the contemplation of each as a separate and distinct event.

The union of Ireland with England, and the abolition of the Irish parliament, was an act

which promised at once strength to the empire and beneficence to Ireland, by incorporating it

more intimately as a constituent part of the realm, and advancing its people from the condition

of those of a conquered province, controlled and governed mainly in the interest of the con-
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querors, to that of freemen, entitled to a like voice with their fellows in the making of the laws,

and to the like redress for all injuries. If the result of the union has not thus far answered tho

expectation of its advocates, it is, in part, because the difficulties were too deeply seated to be

reached, except by long and patient probing and experiment, and we may reasonably hope that

the more recent efforts in that direction — the abolition of the Irish church establishment, and

the pending reform in the land-laws — will do much to relieve the distress of that unhappy

country, and to place it, in point of prosperity and contentment, on a level with other parts of

the empire.

The roost important statutes in the interests of our common humanity were those which made

the foreign slave trade piracy, and which finally uprooted utterly the condition of servitude

in all tho territories subject to the crown of Great Britain. In immediate prosperity to the

countries directly concerned, this act, also, has failed to answer expectation, but the general

benefit to the world at large has been incalculable, and the effects are constantly spreading

wider and farther, until the present generation may well hope to witness the utter extinc-

tion of human slavery among the nations professing the Christian religion, or entitled, by their

civilization and intelligence, to claim the benefits and come under the obligations of the law of

nations.

The representation of the people in tho house of commons was greatly changed by the reform

act of 1832, and many boroughs which had ceased to be populous and invited corruption, were

entirely disfranchised. Further changes were made by the reform acts of 18C7, which increased

very largely tho number of electors, and established such liberality of qualification as to bring

the elective franchise within the reach of all but the hopelessly poor and dependent. Concur-

rent with the changes in public sentiment which have made these reforms possible, has gone on

another change, perceptible only at considerable intervals of time, by which the house of lords

has been shorn of a considerable portion of its former power and importance, and the authority

of the government has been steadily concentrating in the house of commons. Hitherto this

change has been beneficial, but how fur it can continue without necessitating other and more

radical changes, the future alone can tell. In alluding to the reforms in parliament we must

not forget to mention the improvement in the laws for the punishment of bribery in elections,

and the reference of contested elections to a judicial tribunal, by means of which party favoritism

in their determination is rendered impossible, and the actual will of the electors is reasonably

certain to prevail.

The advance in religious liberty baa been so remarkable that we do not know, in the brief

space we can allot to the subject here, how fitly to characterize or indicate it. A century ago

the law not only supported and encouraged the state church, but, from motives of state policy,

it threatened severe penalties against the teachers of another prominent body of Christians, and

it imposed burdens and disabilities upon all who were not connected with the establishment.

Jews and catholics, in particular, were mode to feel the weight of governmental displeasure,

but all classes of dissenters were, in various ways, discriminated against, and, so far as the

laws could effectually do so, conformity with the established church was sought to bo enforced.

It cannot yet be said that religious equality is the law of England, nor can it be so Inn;: as

burdens are imposed upon the people for the support of a favored church; but religious

toleration is now universal, and all classes may take part in the making of the laws which

are to govern them. The corporation and test acts, which excluded catholics and dissenters

from petty offices, and even from some other employments, were at length swept away by an

act passed in 1*38, though with a proviso which excluded Jews from some of its benefits, and

precluded their taking seats in parliament as representatives of the people for thirty years

longer. The last obstacle was then removed by a statute, which allowed the obnoxious words
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this moat important rite celebrated according to such form as will satisfy their own consciences ;

the scruples of qnakers and others, however singular or absurd they may seem to others, are

respected by law, and there is a steady and very rapid advance to that entire equality of seels,

and perfect freedom of religious opinion and expression, which now prevails in America. Cath-

olic emancipation, after long resistance on the part of the crown and of a majority of the

national church, was finally effected, under the leadership of Sir ROBERT PEEL, in 1629,'and the

penal legislation aimed at that denomination since, in order to defeat the supposed encroach-

ments of the court of Rome, has been allowed to remain a dead letter, and will probably be

repealed at any time when any considerable portion of the people shall express a desire to that

end. And a crowning act of justice to the catholics has been done in the abrogation of the

state church in Ireland, where it was the church of a small fraction of the people only, so that

its support was a grievous oppression.

The last half of the reign of George III was characterized by exceedingly stringent measures

to repress freedom of opinion and of expression, which, indeed, at one time threatened the

most alarming disorders, and were well calculated to excite intense anxiety. The excesses

of the French revolution and the spirit of independent inquiry which that great event made

eo active in England, alarmed the conservative government of the day, and led to coercive

measures which tended to produce the very dangers which the government sought to pre-

clude. The prosecutions for treason for engaging it organized, and sometimes, it must be

confessed, in imprudent and threatening opposition to the existing authorities, were treated by

British juries with an independence, a prudence and a wisdom which was something new
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in state prosecutions, and the liberties of the people found protection in the courts of law

at a time when the parliament was lending itself to despotic measures. The parliament,

however, is entitled to the credit of passing the libel act, under which juries were at liberty

to pase upon the intent of publications prosecuted as libelons, and which, perhaps, has done

more than any thing else to make the press as free in fact as it was before in theory. Indeed,

we may safely say, now, that the restraint upon the licentiousness of the press in its discus-

sion of" public affairs and of the conduct of public men, consists rather in a regard to a just and

enlightened public opinion than in any penalties which the law threatens or would be likely to

impose. And while the press of Great Britain is now much more free and much less subject

to restraining laws than that of many other countries, it is gratifying to know that its free-

dom has not been productive of license, but that a gradual improvement in its tone and

character is perceptible, and self-imposed restraints are generally found sufficient to prevent

serious abuse.

The ameliorations in the criminal law have been so numerous and so great, that it would

be impossible to enumerate them all in the compass of a note. Among the principal are,

allowing a full defence by counsel in all cases ; the entire abolition of trials by battel, appeals

of murder and felony, and the absurd privilege of benefit of clergy, and the reduction of the

list of capital offences to the two — treason und murder — regarded as the most heinous; the

discontinuance of the pillory, the burning and whipping ot females, the hanging in chains,

the horrible accompaniments" of capital executions for treason, and the punishment of families

of offenders by corruption of blood. And at length, by the statutes of 24 and 25 "Victoria,

the body of the criminal law has been revised and methodized, and its punishments mod-

erated and better proportioned. And, by extradition treaties with other nations, provision

is made by which one country no longer becomes an asylum for the desperate criminals of

others.

Imprisonment for debt has at last been abolished in Great Britain. A clear idea of the bar-

barity of treating an unfortunate debtor as a criminal seems to have dawned slowly upon the

niiuds of legislators in any country, but when once the public attention was fixed upon it, the

inhuman laws which permitted it were not long suffered to disgrace the statute books. Only in

cases of fraud or other wrong in contracting the debt, or in obstructing the creditor in obtaining

satisfaction, can the body of the debtor be now seized, and even then he is relieved from impris-

onment on making surrender of his property to be applied to the just demands against him.

And while thus the good of the unfortunate has been had in view, the interest of the creditor,

also, has been consulted in various statutory changes which have improved his remedies. Ono

of the principal of these — the subjecting of real estate to the payment of debts — is alluded to

further on ; but the creation of courts for small demands, in which justice could be had speedily

and inexpensively, has also had an effect highly beneficial upon all the branches of small trade

and commerce in which the middle and poorer classes of the people are most particularly inter-

ested, while it has aided the poor in giving confidence to credit, and protecting them against

ruinous costs in cases of misfortune. The law of bankruptcy has also been wholly remodeled,

and its barbarous penalties mitigated; many restraints upon trade and upon the freedom of

artificers to employ their services in their discretion have been abolished, and the penalties for

usnry have been entirely done away with, without being followed by the evils which so many

were ready to predict.

The same spirit of philanthropy which has secured the improvement of the criminal code,

has also effected great reforms in prison management, and the law now endeavors to prcvejit

parties who are accused of crime being puniuhed as criminals before condemnation, or sub-

jected to needless and inhuman barbarities afterwards. The care of insane persons is also
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shall rh.wv. to obtain the management, the most careful, patient and humane efforts are made

for their cure, so long as cure is believed possible, and for their comfort afterwards.

No invention of either ancient or modern times has so sensibly affected the laws as the

application of Bteam as a motive power, and especially for the conveyance of freight and

passengers. Railroads have introduced many new questions in the law of eminent domain,

of principal and agent, of bailments, and of negotiable securities, which have been solved by

the application of old principles of th« common law, but under such new circumstances as

to make them really innovations, and sometimes of a very remarkable character. To par-

ticularize all these cases would fill many pages of this work, and even a complete enumera-

tion would give but a faint impression of the manner in which business and society have

been affected by them, unless we go beyond the law books, and. at the centres of traffic and

exchange, consider how large a proportion of all business transactions is connected with

steam transportation, and governed by the principles of law which have been laid down and

established with special reference to these improved modes of conveyance. Railroad securi-

ties now constitute a very large share of the commercial papor of the world, and the law of

negotiable paper has been modified and changed so as to embrace them: and they have become

for many purposes a substitute for money in the markets of the world, not surpassed in value or

convenience by any other securities, except, possibly, the public debt of a few of the leading

nations.

Perhaps in no particular has the change in the law of property been so palpable and so benefi-

cial as in its relations to real estate. This species of property has at last been mode liable
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generally to the payment of the debts of its owner, and the absurd exemption which formerly

prevailed has been done away. Estates tail are also brought under more reasonable rules;

restraints upon alienation have been limited within narrow bounds; the forms of conveyance

have been simplified; fines and recoveries have given way to a simple deed, acknowledged by

the party and expressing the real purpose of the conveyance; real actions have been abolished,

and the proceedings to try claims to real property have" been reduced to the action of ejectment,

which, at the same time has been divested of all its cumbrous forms and needless fictions. Lim-

itation laws have also been passed, under which claims to real property must be pursued within

a reasonable period ; and the law of descent has been considerably improved.

The establishment of penny postage has increased the correspondence of the kingdom to

enormous proportions, and has doubtless tended, in a considerable degree, to the spread of

intelligence among the people, and to a more general desire that the means of education may

be brought within the reach of all, which bids fail', at a period not now remote, to result in a

general system of free schools supported by public taxation. Postage to the colonies and to

foreign countries is also established at very low rates, and the facilities which are afforded for

etill more rapid communication by means of the electric telegraph, though now expensive,

are made available, by means of a cheap public press, for diffusing among all classes of the

people the speedy intelligence of important affairs as they transpire in every quarter of the

globe.

When our commentator wrote, the general disposition aruonp the statesmen in England was,

to assert and maintain the unlimited power of the British parliament to control and govern the

British colonies at its discretion, and to bind them by its enactments as well in respect to local

concerns as to those of a more general nature. The attempt to enforce this view by military

power lost to the empire the finest portion of her colonies, and the dUsevered country has since,

by the establishment of free institutions, by the enactment of just laws, and by the cultivation

of the arts of peace, attracted to itself a large immigration of industrious, enterprising, and

liberty-loving people, and attained a population, a wealth of resources and a financial stand-

ing that gives it rank among the first nations of the globe in point of influence, power and

importance. The lesson of this loss has not been thrown away upon the British nation,

and a more liberal and just spirit now controls the relations between the mother country

and its colonies. The right of the colonies to regulate their internal affairs is conceded anil

protected. At the same time it is perceived that those colonies are but embryo states, whose

maturity and independence must at some time be recognized, and the government, instead of

seeking to perpetuate their condition of pupilage and dependence, favors and encourages their

increase in strength, population and resources, and prepares the way for making the separation,

should it take place, result in the mutual benefit of both, and in permanent amity between

them. The cruel and exacting government of India by the East India company has been abol-

ished, and though the subject people of that country are not likely soon to be in condition to

share the blessings of self-government, the rule of the crown will be found much more mild

and just than that which it has superseded, and the change is a long stride in the direction of

substantial progress.

Much has been done in the interest of humanity by the laws which regulate the working of

children in mines, factories, <fce., and which give for the benefit of the surviving family an

action against the party whose negligence or default has caused the death of another. Much

also has been done for public morals, and for the equal and just administration of the law in

the interest of the people, by the abolition of profitable sinecures, and by modification of official

emoluments, to make them correspond in some decree with the services performed and the

responsibilities assumed. And. while to those who live under a simpler form of government,
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economv has been as great, perhaps, a? could reasonably have been expected, and the phrase

that " all abuses are freeholds," ouce justly applied to the English official system, may now be

dismissed as obsolete.

Of the petty annoyances to which British subjects were liable, and which, in the aggregate,

amounted to serious evils, two of the chief were abolished by the statute* so modifying the

game laws as to do away with the previous qualifications, and those for abolishing tithes and

substituting a rent charge instead. These will be found particularly alluded to. and the extent

of the changes indicated in the preceding pages. The abolition of tithes has undoubtedly done

something to strengthen and support the national church, or, at least, to render it less odious to

those not in communion with it, and the statutory provisions against pluralities have also

removed another source of seriou^ complaint, and all together have resulted to the substantial

benefit of the cause of religion and public morals.

The poor laws of Great Britain have been wholly revised since the time of our author; and

we wish we could say, with entire confidence, that they have been greatly improved. JSfo doubt

the.- changes are for the better; but. with so large a pauper population a< that country unfor-

tunately possesses, the inherent difficulties are great, and we must still look to the future for

reforms which can benefit their condition to any considerable degree. Upon these, and similar

subjects, changes must generally he iu the nature of experiment, and it is difficult to determine,

many times, until after considerable experience, whether the}- constitute substantial improve-

ments or not.

Upon one particular subject we are glad to have it in our power to say that the English sys-
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tem and English opinions nave undergone no change. We refer to the deep settled conviction,

that standing armies are inconsistent with liberty, which has prevented the people from being

burdened with the support of large military forces, whieh could only constitute a means of

oppression to the people at home, and of menace to other nations. While some of the neigh-

boring nations have been steadily and rapidly enlarging their standing armies, until they

constitute a very large proportion of their able-bodied men, and the life and energy of their peo-

ple are exhausted by their withdrawal from the avocations of industry, and being made a charge

upon the public, instead of contributing to the public wealth, Great Britain, secure in her

insular position, and trusting to the patriotism of her people to protect her against unex-

pected assaults, has contented herself with garrisons for her forts and other fortified places,

and relied upon the voluntary training of the people to arms to fit them for the wars which

may be inevitable, but which the policy, not less than the best sentiment of her Christian

peo'ple, now inclines her to avoid. In this policy she is followed by the great republic of the

western hemisphere, which, in the most important and threatening crisis of its national exist-

ence, has demonstrated that, with a free people, standing armies are worse than useless, and

that the best dependence of any government is in civil and political liberty, in just laws, justly

administered.

Among the minor changes deserving of note are the abolition of the counties palatine, and

the bringing of Wales more directly within the jurisdiction of the English courts. Among

those of greater importance are the simplification and expediting of proceedings in chancery ;

the abolition of the office of master in chancery, and the introduction of jury trial in the courts

of equity; the taking away, from the ecclesiastical courts, the jurisdiction over probate and

matrimonial causes, and conferring it upon courts specially created for its exercise; the simplifi-

cation of pleadings and proceedings in courts of law; the remodelling of the judicial committee

of the privy council, so as greatly to enlarge its powers and give to its constitution and proceed-

ings more of the judicial character and importance; the establishment of a court of criminal

appeal, and the almost total abolition of the legal objections to the competency of witnesses.

All the new improvements in these and similar matters are noted in the preceding pages,

and so given as to enable the reader to compare the existing system with that whicn it has

displaced.

Many of the most useful and beneficial changes in English law could not, with any propriety,

lie given in notes to the foregoing Commentaries, because they relate to subjects not treated in

them, and but distantly, if at all, referred to. Among these are the establishment of a board

for the administration of charitable trusts; the statutes establishing or providing for local regu-

lations of police for ensuring cleanliness and good order, and thereby promoting the health and

happiness of the people, and those, also, which encourage local libraries and schools, and other

means of voluntary instruction of the people. And, while those sheets are passing through the

press, the people of Great Britain are discussing earnestly a general system of public secular

instruction, to be supported from the public treasury, and brought within the reach of rich and

poor alike; and with every prospect of its early establishment. The condition of women haa

also been improved — indeed, we might justly say, the condition of society — by the more dis-

tinct recognition of their right to property, and by lessening the power of control which the

common law allowed to the husband over the wife and over her possessions. And we must not

omit to mention, in this place, that the system of local self-government, whieh has always

characterized England, has been greatly improved and amplified by thu modem municipal cor-

poration acts; and the tendency of late in Great Britain — unlike that in some other countries —

has been towards a strengthening of the local authorities, and an increase of their powers and

jurisdiction.
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of passion or excitement, but that they have been introduced with caution, discussed freely,

fully and calmly, and only adopted after reasonable deliberation, and after all objection* bad

been couriered and weig'hed. Indeed, the eminent conservatism of the English character has

often tended to continue for long periods what have been known and admitted to be abuses in

their system. But if this has been a just ground for reproach, we must at the same time admit

that the general result has been that, when amendments have finally been made in the law, they

have been beneficial, safe, prudent and permanent, and that English legislation has been charac-

terised with more stability than that of some other countries.

The changes in American law have not been so great or so striding as those in the law <if

England, because, in many particulars, America began at a point which Great Britain has only

now reached. In the adoption of the constitution of the United States, the great idea of religious

freedom and equality was assumed as fundamental j no state had a church estatishmeut; there

•were no tithes to abolish, or religious oppression to be relieved from; and the few traces of

discriminations against particular classes of persons, based on religious beliefs or profession, have

been allowed to disappear by common consent. The oppressive features of the feudal system,

•which clung so long to the faw of real estate in England, were never transplanted in America;

the right of primogeniture in descents was generally discarded; the forms of conveyance were

always simple, and real estate was, from the first, made assets for the payment of debts. And

many of the most repulsive features in the common law of England were never engrafted in

the law of America, which, from the very beginning, gave more full effect to the presumption

of innocence on behalf of persons accused of crime, and avoided the severe punishments in
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the case of small offences, which were deemed necessary in England at the middle of the last

conturv.

The United States exerted its authority to forbid the importation of slaves into the country at

the very earliest period permitted by its constitution, and followed this prohibition, in a few ye'ars,

by making the slave trade piracy. "Within the states, however, the government of the nation

had no control of the domestic institutions, and the relation of slavery was allowed to exist in

Borne of them, until overthrown in the course of a great civil war. It is now entirely at an end

throughout the whole country ; but some of the evils, necessarily resulting from so great and

sudden a change in society, are still upon the country, and it will require time, patience and

wise statesmanship to wholly eradicate them.

The right of married women to the real and personal estate of every name and description

possessed by them at the time of their marriage, or in any manner acquired afterwards, and to

make contracts in relation thereto, and to sell or otherwise dispose of the same, has gradually

come to be recognized in most of the states; and the evils anticipated from this great departure

from the common-law principle, that the civil existence of the wife is swallowed up in that of

the husband, have been looked for in vain. At the same time, the law has come to pay more

regard to the rights of the family in the property acquired by its head, generally through the

joint exertions of all; and while facilitating and simplifying the processes for the collection of

debt*, it has in most states made liberal exemptions for the benefit of the family, and, in case

of the homestead, and sometimes of other property also, has forbidden the husband to incumber

or dispose of it, except with the wife's assent.

Marriage is generally recognized as a relation by contract, into which parties can enter by such

ceremonv as thev please, or without any ceremony whatever; and the regulations by statute

are only such as'are deemed essential to prevent irregular and discreditable relations, and to

insure a proper record of so important a transaction.

Imprisonment for debt is abolished throughout the country, and ample provision is made

everywhere for the support of the helpless poor. Asylums for the insane and for other unfortu-

nate" classes are established by state laws, and supported by state taxation ; and, it is believed,

thov are made generally to subserve faithfully the purposes of their creation. The large number

of immiirrants landing every year upon our shores, renders regulations for their comfort, and to

protect them against fraud and dishonesty, important; and provision of the most liberal charac-

ter has been made for these purposes. The vast public domain is thrown open to actual

settlers for the choice of homesteads, which, to a reasonable amount, are donated to

to

lity

and ecouomv. . .. .

Suffrage in the United States has always been nearly universal; generally only the dependent

classes being excluded from participation ; and in the states in which a small property qualifica-

tion was at first established, it has afterward been abolished; and provision has been made by

law for the naturalization of the aliens who come to cast their lot in the new world, through a

proceeding both simple and inexpensive. Indeed, in some ot the new states, even this formality

has once been dispensed with, for, in framing their constitutions, they have allowed every boiia

fide resident to participate, and given to all an equal voice in the government.

One of the most noticeable changes in the law of America has been in the direction of impos-

ing restraints upon the legislative power in the enactment of laws. The American people, trom

the first have shown great solicitude, lest fundamental individual rights should be trampled

upon and they have made each of their constitutions a magnet carta, by means of which bar-

riers are erected against the encroachments of government. The promise extorted from King
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any war destroyed, except by the judgment of hi* peers, or the law of the land, is repeated ID snb-

fitance in them all, and, lest this comprehensive declaration should prove insufficient, there is a

careful enumeration of ri.ulii s. which are guarded from the encroachments of power, and of secu-

rities for the protection oi liberty, where government is exercising its acknowledged authority.

Religions liberty shall not be invaded; freedom of speech shall be inviolate; soldiers shall not

be quartered npon citizens in time of peace ; unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be al-

lowed ; the press shall be free; and a jury shall pass upon the criminality of any of its alleged

excesses. Taxes shall onlj'ue levied in accordance with law, and when voted by the people's

representatives; the military shall be subordinate to the civil authority; the pnvilege oi the

v. lit of habeas corpus shall lie inviolate; no accused party shall be compelled to give evidence

;n:.-iin-t himself, and none shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offence.

But the disposition of late is to go far beyond this specification of individual right*, to inhibit

class legislation, as well as the omnibus system of making laws, and to restrain within reason-

able bounds the private legislation of which all our law-making bodies are apt to be so prolific.

Forms of proceeding are also prescribed in some cases, the purpose of which is to ensure care

and deliberation in the enactment of laws, and to prevent the legislature being taken by surprise

by designing and unscrupulous men. Anil a strong inclination has been developed to forbid

private and special acts in all cases where public and general laws can reasonably accomplish

the end designed.

The proceedings in courts of justice have been greatly simplified within a few years. In this

direction, however, there was not the same room for improvement as iu England, it,my of the
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states had no distinct equity system, and those which had established one had. at the same time,

established regulations to render its remedies sp«edy and reasonably inexpensive. At this time

equitable and legal remedies are generally administered by tfie same courts, and under forms

which are very simple, and with such ample power in the court to amend the pleadings aud pro-

ceedings for the advancement of justice, that it is not easy for the forms of law to be employed

for the furtherance of unjust and oppressive schemes. In some states statutes have beeu passed,

the purpose of which was to sweep away at a single blow all legal subtleties and technicalities

in the forms of pleadings and proceedings; and where changes so radical have been avoided,

the old forms have been greatly simplified, and the lawyer may now safely give more attention

to the merits of his cause, aud less to the forms provided by law, by means of which his client's

rights ore to be protected or his wrongs redressed.

Many of the modern changes in the English law enumerated in this note have been simultane-

ously made in America, and with the like good result. Among thorn may be mentioned the

remedy given to the family of any deceased person whose death Las been caused by the wrong-

ful act, neglect or default of another, and the doing away with objections to the competency of

witnesses based npon their interest or connection with the cause. The latter innovation has

been followed in some states by statutes permitting accused parties in criminal cases to give

their own account of the transaction to the jury ; and the result has been generally satisfactory.

America preceded England in abolishing imprisonment for debt, aud she has also exhibited a

greater readiness to modify the law of nations for the protection of the rights and interests of

neutrals in time of war. But as, in this respect, the interest of each is identical, and the voice

of religion and humanity pleads earnestly for such changes as will so limit and circumscribe the

calamities of war as to make them affect the least possible number of persons, we may confi-

dently expect the efforts in this direction to be hereafter made by these two nations conjointly,

and with a reasonable degree of success.

Great as have been the changes in the law here chronicled, we may still look forward, with

reasonable confidence, to others, of the like gratifying character, to be introduced by the Anglo-

Saxon nations, upon the basis of the common law of England, by the like gradual but sure and

safe steps, and ae speedily as the public sentiment may be prepared to receive and perpetuate

them.
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. 1. RBCOBD OK AN INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION op UURUKK,

AT THE ASSIZBB.

"Warwickshire,) BE rr REMBMBKRED, that at the general session of the lord the 8eM!onofoy<r

to vrit, j king of oycr and terminer holden at Warwick, in and for the and in-mum-

eaid county of Warwick, on Friday, the twelfth day of March, in the second year

of the reign of the lord George the Third, now king of Great Britain, before Sir

Michael Foster, knight, one of the justices of the said lord the king assigned to

hold pleas before the king himself, Sir Edward Clive, knight, one of the justices of

the said lord the king, of his court of common bench, and others their fellows,

justices of the said lord the king, assigned by letters patent of the said lord the commiwion of

king, under his great seal of Great Britain, made to them the aforesaid justices

and others, and any two or more of them, (whereof one of them the said Sir

Michael Foster and Sir Edward Clive, the said lord the king would have to be

one) to inquire (by the oath of good and lawful men of the county aforesaid, by

whom the truth of the matter might be the better known, and by other ways,

methods, and means, whereby they could or might the better know,"as well within

liberties as without) more fully the truth of the treasons, misprisions of treasons,

insurrections, rebellions, counterfeitings, clippings, washings, false coinings, and

other falsities of the moneys of Great Britain, and of other kingdoms or do-

minions whatsoever; and of all murders, felonies, manslaughters, killings,

burglaries, rapes of women, unlawful meetings and conventicles, unlawful utter-
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ing 'of word*, unlawful assemblies, misprisions, confederacies, false allegations,

trespasses, riots, routs, retentions, escapes, contempts, falsities, negligencies, con-

cealments, maintenances, oppressions, champerties, deceits, and all other mis-

deeds, offences, and injuries whatsoever, and also the accessories of the same,

within the county aforesaid, as well within liberties as without, by whomsoever

and howsoever done, had, perpetrated, and committed, and by whom, to whom,

when, how and in what manner; and of all other articles and circumstances in

the said letters patent of the said lord the king specified; the premises, and

every or any of them howsoever concerning; and for this, time to hear and avw and (^

determine the said treasons and other the premises, according to the law and miner,

custom of the realm of England ; and also keepers of the peace, and justices of

the said lord the king assigned to hear and determine diverse felonies, trespasses, JJace* "*

and other misdemeanors committed within the county aforesaid, by the oath *"'"

of Sir James Thomson, baronet, Charles Roper, Henry Dawes, Peter Wilson, Grand Jury.

Samuel Rogers, John Dawson, James Phillips, John Mayo, Richard Savage.-

William Bell, James Morris, Lawrence Hall, and Charles Carter, esquires, good

and lawful men of the county aforesaid, then and there impaneled, sworn, and

charged to inquire for the said lord the king and for the body of the said county,

it is presented; That Peter Hunt, late of the parish of Lighthom in the said indictment,

county, gentleman, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but being moved

and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the 5th day of March, in the

said second year of the reign of the said lord the king, at the parish of Light-

home aforesaid, with force and arms, in and upon one Samuel Collins, in the

peace of God and of the said lord the king, then and there being, feloniously, wil-

fully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault; and that the said Peter

Hunt, with a certain drawn sword, made of iron and steel, of the value of five

shillings, which he the said Peter Hunt in his right hand then and there had and

held, him the said Samuel Collins, in and upon the left side of the belly of him

the said Samuel Collins, then and there feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice

•forethought, did strike, thrust, stab, and penetrate; giving unto the said Samuel

Collins, then and there, with the sword drawn as aforesaid, in and upon the left

Bide of the belly of him, the said Samuel Collins, one mortal wound of the breadth

of one inch, and the depth of nine inches; of which said mortal wound he the

sniil Samuel Collins, at the parish of Lighthorne aforesaid, in the said county of

Warwick, from the said fifth day of March, in the year aforesaid, until the seventh

day of the same month in the same year, did languish, and languishing did

live; on which said seventh day of March, in the year aforesaid, the said Samuel

Collins, at the parish of Lighthorne aforesaid, in the county aforesaid of the

-•
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said mortal wound did die; and so the juror-: aforesaid, upon their oatb afore-

Baid, do say, that the said Peter Hunt, him the said Samuel Oiling, in mannei

and form aforesaid, feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill

and murder, against the pence of the said lord the now king, his "crown, and

dignity. Whereupon the sheriff of the county aforesaid is commanded, that ho

omit not for any liberty in his bailiwick, but that he take the said Peter Hunt, if

he may be found in his bailiwick, and him safely keep, to answer to the felony
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and murder whereof he stands indicted. Which wild indictment the said justices

of the lord the king above named, afterwards, to wit, at the delivery of the gaol

of the; said lord the king, holden at Warwick, in and for the county aforesaid, on

Friday, the sixth day ol August, in the said second year of the reign of the said lord

the king, before the right honourable William lord Mansfield, chief justice of the

said lord the king, assigned to hold pleas before the king himself, Sir Sidney Staf-

ford Suiythe, knight, one of the barons of the exchequer of the said lord the king,

and others their fellows, justices of the said lord the king, assigned to deliver his

said gaol of the county aforesaid of the prisoners therein being, by their proper

hands to deliver here iu court of record iu form of the law to be determined.

Attd afterwards, to wit, at the same delivery of the gaol of the said lord the king

of his county aforesaid, on the said Friday, the sixth day of August, in the said

second year of the reign of the said lord the king, before the said justices of tha

lord the king last above named, and others their fellows aforesaid, here cometh

the said Peter Hunt, under the custody of William Browne, esquire, sheriff of

the county aforesaid, (in whose custody in the gaol of the county aforesaid, for

the cause aforesaid, he had been before committed,) being brought to the bar hero

in his proper person by the said sheriff, to whom he is here also committed :

And forthwith being demanded concerning the premises in the said indictment

above specified and charged upon him, how he will acquit himself thereof, he

saith that he is not guilty thereof; and thereof for good and evil, puts himself

upon the country: And John Blencowe, esquire, clerk of the assizes for the

county aforesaid, who prosecutes for the said lord the king in this behalf doth

the like : Tlierefore, lot a jury thereupon here immediately come before the said

justices of the lord the king last above mentioned, and others their fellows afore-

said, of free and lawful men of the neighbourhood of the said parish of Light-

home, in the county of Warwick aforesaid, by whom the truth of the matter

may be the better known, and who are not of kin to the said Peter Hunt, to

recognize upon their oath, whether said Peter Hunt be guilty of the felony

and murder in the indictment aforesaid above specified, or aot guilty: because

as well the said John Blencowe, who prosecutes for the said lord the king in this

behalf, as the said Peter Hunt, have put themselves upon the said jury. And

the jurors of the said jury, by the said sheriff for this purpose impanelled and

returned, to wit, David Williams, John Smith, Thomas Horne, Charles Nokes,

Richard May, Walter Duke, Matthew Lion, James White, William Bates, Oliver

Green, Bartholomew Nash, and Henry Long, being called, come; who, being

elected, tried and sworn, to speak the truth of and concerning the premises, upon

their oath say, that the said Peter Hunt is guilty of the felony ana murder afore-

said,' on him above charged in the form aforesaid, as by the indictment aforesaid

is above supposed against him; and that the said Peter Hunt, at the time of

committing the said felony and murder, or at any time since to this time, had

not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands, or tenements, in the said county of

Warwick, or elsewhere, to the knowledge of the said jurors. (I) And upon this

it is forthwith demanded of the said Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any

thing to say, wherefore the said justices here ought not upon the premises and

verdict aforesaid to proceed to justice and execution against him : who nothing

further saith, unless as he before hath said. Whereupon all and singular the

premises being seen, and by the said justices here fully understood, it is conxidercd
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knowledge of the said jurors. (2) And immediately it is demanded of the said

Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any thing to say, wherefore the said justices

here onght not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to judgment

and execution against him : who saith that he is a clerk, and prayeth the Dent-fit of Clergy prayed.

clergy to be allowed him in this behalf. Whereupon, all and singular the premises judgment to

being seen, and by the said justices here fully understood, it is considered by the be burned in

court here, that the said Peter Hunt be burned in his left hand, and delivered. dciij'enr'^.*nl1

And immediately he is burned in bin left hand, and is delivered, according to the

form of the statute. (3)

SEC. 3. ENTRY OP A TRIAL INSTANTER is THE COURT OF KINO'S BENCH,

UPON A COLLATERAL iSSUK AND RCLK OF CoURT FOR EXECDTION

THEREON.

Michaelmas Term, in the Sixth Year of the Reign of King George the Third.

Kent; The King > THE PRISONER at the bar being brought into this court

against > in custody of the sheriff of the connty of Sussex, by

Thomas Rogers. ) virtue of his majesty's writ of habeas corpus, it is ordered Habau arjxu.

that the said writ and the return thereto be filed. And it appearing by a Recm.(1 of nt.

certain record of attainder, which hath been removed into this court by his tainder read,

majesty's writ of certiorari, that the prisoner at the bar stands attainted, by

the name of Thomas Rogers, of felony for a robbery on the highway, and the for fpiony and

said prisoner at the bar having heard the record of the said attainder now robbery,
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read to him, is now asked by the court here what he hath to say for himself, Prisoner naked

why the court hero should not proceed to award execution against him what he can »ay

upon the said attainder. Ho for plea saith, that he ia not the same Thomas t"o.i?r ° ecu"

Rogers in the said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment Plea; not the

was pronounced: and this he is ready to verify and prove, Ac. To which said KmK P"80"-

plea the honorable Charles Yorke, esquire, attorney-general of our present sov- Replication,

ereign lord and king, who for our said lord the kine in this behalf prosecuteth,

being now present here in court, aud having heard what the said prisoner at

the bar hath now alleged, for our said lord the king by way of reply saith, that

the said prisoner now here at the bar is the same Thomas Rogers in the said averrlll th t

record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was pronounced as heln. "'

aforesaid; and this be prayeth may be inquired into by the country ; and the said iMuej0ined.

prisoner at the bar doth the like: 'Therefore let a jury in this behalf immediately

come here into court, by whom the truth of the matter will be the better known,

and who have no affinity to the said prisoner, to try upon their oath, whether

the said prisoner at the bar be the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of

attainder named, and against whom judgment was so pronounced as aforesaid

or not: because, as well the said Charles Torke, esquire, attornev-general of

onr said lord the king, who for our said lord the king in this behalf prosecutes,

as the said prisoner at the bar, have put themselves in this behalf upon the said

jury. And immediately thereupon the said jury come here into court; ind Jury"rorn-

Doing elected, tried and sworn to speak the truth touching and concerning che

premises aforesaid, and having heard the said record read to them, do say, upon

their oath, that the said prisoner at the bar is the same Thomas Rogers in thn.

said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was so pronounced verdict: that

as aforesaid, in manner and form as the said attorney-general hath by his said he u the same,

replication to the said plea of the said prisoner now here at the bar alleged.

And hereupon the said attorney-general, on behalf of our said lord the king,

now prayeth that the court he'ro would proceed to award execution against

him, the said Thomas Rogers, upon the said attainder. Whereupon, all and

singular the premises being now seen and fully understood by the court here, execution.

it is ordered by the court here, that execution be done upon the said prisoner at

the bar for the said felony, in pursuance of the said judgment, according to due

form of law. And it is lastly ordered, that he, the said Thomas Rogers, the

prisoner at the bar, be now committed to the custody of the sheriff of the county of

Kent (now also present here in courO for the purpose afosesaid ; and that the said

sheriff'of Kent do execution upon the said defendant, the prisoner at the bar, for

the said felony, in pursuance of the said judgment, according to due form of law.

On the motion of Mr. Attorney-General.

By the Court.

(2) See preceding note.

(3) liunetU of clergy and burning In the hand being now abolished : see 6 Geo. I v, .-. 28;

7 and 8 Geo. IV, c. 28, ante, p. 374, n (8) this form will require alteration accordingly.
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SBCT. 4. WARREN OP EXECUTION ON JUDGMENT OF DEATH, AT THE GENERAL

GAOL DELIVERY IN LONDON AND MIDOLKSEX.

London )To the sln-ril}'.- of the city of London; and to the sheriff of

and > the count; of Middlesex: and to the keeper of his majesty's

Middlesex. > gaol of Newgate.

Whereas, at the session of gaol delivery of Newgate, for the city of London

county of Middlesex, holden at Justice Hall, in the Old Bailey,on the nineteeth

day of October last, Patrick Mahony, Koger Jones, Charles King and Mary

Smith received sentence of death for the respective offences in their several indict-

ments mentioned: Now it is hereby ordered, that execution of the said sentence

he made and done npon them, the said Patrick Mahony and Roger Jones, on Wed-

nesday, the ninth day of this instant mouth of November, at the usual place of

execution. And it is his majesty's command, that execution of the said sentence

upon them, the said Charles King and Mary Smith, be respited until his majesty's

pleasure touching them be further known.

GIVEN under my hand and seal, this fourth day of November, one thonsand

seven hundred and sixty-eight.

JAMES EYRE, [L. g.J

SECT. 5. WRIT OF EXECUTION TTPON A. JUDGMENT OP MURDER, BEFORE THE

KING op PARLIAMENT.

GEORGR the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland
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king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriffs of London, and sheriff of

Middlesex, greeting. Whereas, Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth,

hath been indicted of felony and murder, by him done and committed, which said

indictment hath been certified before us in our present parliament; and the said

Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, hath been thereupon arraigned, and

upon such arraignment hath pleaded not guilty; and the said Lawrence Earl

Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, hath before us in our said parliament been tried,

and in due form of law convicted thereof and whereas, judgment hath been given

in our said parliament that the said Lawrence Earls Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth,

shall be hanged by the neck till he is dead, and that his body be dissected and

anatomized, the execution of which judgment remiiueth to be done: We require,

and by these presents strictly command you, that, upon Monday, the fifth day of

May instant, between the hours of nine in the morning and one m the afternoon of

the same day, him, the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, without

the gate of our tower of London (to yon then and there to be delivered, as by

another writ to the lieutenant of our tower of London or his deputy directed, we

have commanded) into your custody you then and there receive : and him, in your

custody so being, yon forthwith convey to the accustomed place of execution at

Tyburn: and that you do cause execution to be done upon the said Lawrence Earl

Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, in your custody so being, in all things according to

the said judgment. And this you are by no means to omit, at your peril.

Witness ourself at Westminster, the second day of May, in the thirty-third year

of oar reign. YORKB and VOKKE.
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GENERAL INDEX.

Abandonment of right gained by prescription,

ii, 9, 36, n., 264, n.

of bastard children, i, 458.

Abatement, iii, 167.

plea in, iii, 301.

not admitted in partition suit, iii, 302.

verification of, id.

to indictment, iv, 334.

of suit in equity, iii, 448.

. of nuisance, iii, 5, 220 and n.

Abbey lands, molesting possessors of, iv, 116.

exemption of, from tithes, ii, 32.

Abbots, i, 155.

Abbreviations in legal proceedings, iii, 323.

Abdication of the king, i, 211; iv, 78.

of James II, i, 212.

Abduction of wife, iii, 139.

of child, i, 140.

and marriage of women, i, 443.

of heiress, iv, 208.

of girl under fourteen, iv, 16.
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or kidnapping, iv, 219.

Abearance, security for, iv, 251-257.

Abettors, iv, 34, 323.

Abeyance of the freehold, ii, 107.

Abiegi, or cattle stealers, iv, 239.

Abjuration, oath of, i, 162, n., 368.

of the realm, i, 132; iv, 55, 124, 332, 377.

Abolition of slavery, i, 423, n., 425, n.

Abortion, iv, 198.

Abroad, homicide committed, iv, 269, n.

action for matter arising, iii, 293, n.

Absolute power of the crown, i, 250.

of the parliament, i, 160.

limitation upon, in America, i, 125, n.

Absolute property, ii, 389.

Absolute rights and duties, i, 123.

Accedas ad curiain, iii, 24.

Acceptance of bills, ii, 468.

Access, presumption of, i, 457.

Accessories, iv, 35.

before the fact, iv, 36, 39.

after the fact, iv, 37, 39.

when to be tried, iv, 323.

Accession, title by, ii, 404.

Accident, remedy in case of, iii, 431.

(See " Negligence.")

Accomplices, discovery of, iv, 330, 331.

(See "Accessories.")

Accord and satisfaction, iii, 15.

requisites of, iii, 16 and n.

tender of satisfaction, iii, 16 and u,

Account, action of, iii, 162.

stated, iii, 162.

books of, when evidence, iii, 368.

in equity, iii, 163.

Accroaching royal power, iv, 76.

Accumulation of income, ii, 174, n.

Ac etiam, clause of, iii, 287, 288.

Acknowledgment of feme covert's deed, ii,

293, n.

of fine, ii, 350.

Act of bankruptcy, ii, 477.

in the United States, ii, 477, n.

Act of grace or pardon, i, 184; iv, 396.

when pleaded, iv, 396, 402.

Act of indemnity, i, 136.

Act of parliament, i, 85.

how enrolled, i, 182.

INDEX.

Admiralty, proceedings in, iii, 108.

suit for beaconage may be brought in it,iii,107.

bos jurisdiction as to prizes, iii, 68, n., I1'-, n.

law in, i, 83.

trial of offences in, iv, 268, 269, n.

Admission of a clerk, i, 390.

Admittance to copyhoM, ii, 366, 370.

J cl in in cud mi i clericuui, writ ad, iii, 350.

Ad quod darnnuin, writ of, ii, 271.

Adultery, i, 441; iv, 64, 65, 191.

divorce for, i, 441.

alimony not allowed in cases of divorce for,

iii, 94.

action of trespass, or on the case, may be

brought for, iii, 139.

Adverse possession, ii, 196, n., 266, n.

conveyances in case of, ii, 290, n.

Advocates, iii, 126.

liability of, for negligence or want of skill,

iii, 164, and n.

Advocatus fisci, iii, 27.
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Advowson, ii, 21; iv, 426.

appeudant or in gross, ii, 22.

how conveyed, id.

right of presentation before and after vacancy,

ii, 22, 24, n.

presentative, collative, or donative, ii, 22.

donative, how destroyed, ii, 23.

lapse, ii, 24, n., 276.

prerogative presentation, ii, 24, n.

simouy, ii, 278, et scq.

cnrtesy of, ii, 127.

who may be disturbers of right of, iii, 244.

limitations to actions for, iii, 25, n.

writ of right of, abolished, iii, 250, n.

.<Equitas sequitnr legem, ii, 330; iii, 441.

Affectum. challenge propter, iii, 303; iv, 352.

Affeerors of amercements, iv, 380.

Affidavit, iii, 304.

veritication of plea in abatement to indict-

ment by, iv, 334, n.

Affinity, i, 434, 435, n.

Affirmance of judgments, iii, 411.

Afl'ray, iv, 145.

breach of the peace chargeable upon him

who begins, iii, 3.

Age, action formerly suspended by non-age,

iii, 300.

of consent to marry, i, 436.

fall, what, i, 463; IT, 22.

of criminal responsibility, iv, 22 ct seq.

Agents, embezzlement by, iv, 231.

public, not answerable on contracts for pub-

lic, i, 243, n.

Aggregate corporation, i, 469.

Aggregate fund, i, 330.

Agistment, ii, 452.

Agnati, ii, 235.

Agnus Dei, <tc., iv, 115.

Agreement, specific performance of, iii, 435,438.

(See " Contract.")

Agriculture, its origin, ii, 7.

Aid-prayer, iii, 300.

Aiders and abettors, iv, 34.

Aids, feudal, ii, 63, 86, 87; iv, 411.

parliamentary, i, 307.

Ail', right to, ii, 14, 266, n.

(See " Easement.")

prescriptive right to, not recognized in

INDEX.

American states, statutes of, when to take

effect, i, 46, n.

exercise of legislative power in, i, 52, n., 58,

n., 89, n., 125, n.

sovereignty in, i, 49, n., 52, n.

rights of married women to property in, i,

55, n. ; ii, 433, n.; iv, 443, n.

common law of, i, 68, n.

civil divisions of, i, 119, n.

habeas corpus in, i, 135, n.

protection of private property In, i, 139, n.

right of petition in, i, 143, n.

right to bear arms in, i, 143, n.

property qualification of electors, i, 179, n.

executive power in, i, 214, n, 232, n.

treaties, how made in, i, 257, n

war, how declared by, i, 257, n.

judicial tenure in, i, 268, n.

titles of nobility forbidden, i, 272, n.

how corporations created, i, 273, n.

legal tender in, i, 277, n.
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corruption of blood, i, 300, n.; ii, 851, n.

escheats in, i, 302, n.

national taxes of, i, 321, n.

independence of, as affecting status of inhab-

itants, i, 36fi, n., 309, n.

escheats for alienage, i, 372, n.

naturalization in, i, 375, n.

religious societies in, i, 376, n.

abolition of slavery in, i, 423, n.

tenures of land, ii, 102, n.

estate tail in, ii, 119, n.

foreclosure of mortgages in, ii, 159, n.

registry system in, ii, 343, u.

conveyances in, by private statutes, ii, 346. n.

married women's property in, ii, 433, n.

bankrupt law ol, ii, 476, n., 481, n., 484, n.,

488, n.

courts of, iii, 60, n., 70, n.

habeas corpus in, iii, 138, n.

suits against, iii, 257, n.

treason in, i?, 76, n.

American war, i, 119, n.

Anatomy, offence of stealing bodies for, ii,

429.

Ancestors, ii, 203, 209.

not heirs, ii. 210 ; see 240, n.

Ancestral actions, iii, 186.

Ancient, demesne, i, 286; ii, 90, 99.

writings prove themselves, iii, 367.

Animals, property in, ii, 5, 389, 390, 403.

laming of, iv, 235.

killing or maiming, iv, 244.

fene nature, ii, 389, 403.

trespasses by, iii, 211.

trespass in hunting wild, iii, 213.

(See " Cattle," " Game.")

Animosity between clergy and lawyers, i, 20, n.

Animus furandi, iv, 230, 232.

Animus revertendi, ii, 392.

Annual parliaments, i, 153.

Annuties, ii, 20, n., 40.

may be granted in fee or in tail, ii, 40, n.,

113.

for lives, il, 461.

memorial of, ii, 461.

Annnlum et baculum, investiture per, i, 378.

Annus luctus, i, 457.

Answer in equity, iii, 437, 438, 446.

INDEX.

j\ nny, regular, i, 413.

history of, i, 408.

how mixed, i, 262, 366.

standing, i, 413, 414 ; iv, 419,439, 441.

Arraignment, iv, 322, 449.

incidents to, iv, 324.

Array, commissions of, i, 411.

challenge to the, iii, 358; iv, 352.

Arrest of judgment, iii, 393 : iv, 375.

of persons, when allowed, iii, 287, n.

of seamen and soldiers, i, 421.

how made, iii, 288, and n.

what persons are privileged from, iii, 238.

liability of soldiers, etc., to, iy, 421.

of persons in criminal cases, iv, 289.

by warrant, and by whom, ami for what

granted, ir, 290

form of warrant, id.

backing warrant, iv, 291.

time and place of, iv, 292.

by officers without warrant, iv, 292.
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by private persons, iv, 293.

by hue and cry, iv, 293.

of clergymen guing to perform divine ser-

vice, ic., iv, 218.

in trespass, iii, 281.

Arrha, ii, 447.

Arson, in general, iv, 220,372.

what a nouse to constitute this offence, iv,

221.

where house must be burnt, id.

what a burning, iv, 222.

malice, id.

punishment, id.

appeal of, iv, 314.

(See"Burning," "Fire."

Articles of the navy, i, 420.

of war, i, 415, 417.

of the peace, iv, 255.

Artificers, i, 407.

laws against combination by, iv, 159.

seducing from the realm, iv, 160.

As, Roman, divisions of, ii, 462.

Asportation, what is, iv, 231.

Assault, what is, and how redressed, iii, 120;

iv, 216,217.

costs in action for, iii, 100.

on king's chancellor, Ac., iv, 84.

in king's palace, iv, 125.

in courts of justice, id.

on constables, iv, 129.

on clergymen, iv, 217.

in rescues, iv, 131.

to raise price of wages, iv, 159, 217, n.

to stop progress of grain, <tc., iv, 217, u.

with intent to commit felony, id.

on doorkeepers and gamekeepers, id.

on persons saving wreck, id.

on revenue officers, iv, 155.

on commiKsiouers of taxes, iv, 158.

Assembly, riotous or unlawful, iv, 146.

of estates, i, 147.

Assessed taxes, i, 325.

Assessment of damages for waste, iii, 228.

Assets, ii, 510.

estates pour antre vie, ii, 260.

by descent, ii, 244, 302, 340 ; iii, 430.

when not liable for personal wrongs, ii, 302.

real, in equity, iii, 430.

INDEX.

Attornment, wrongful, :.i forfeiture, ii, 275.

Aubaine, droit d", i, 372.

Audita querela, when it lies, Hi, 405.

Augmentation of vicarages and curacies, i, 388.

Ama regio, iii, 37; iv, 416, 422.

Aulnager, i, 275.

Aurain regiuse, i, 221.

Authorities in law, i, 72.

Auterfois acquit, iv, 335.

attaint, iy, 336.

convict, id.

Autre droit, ii, 177.

Autre vie, ii, 120.

(See" Estate.")

Averinm, ii, 424.

Averuient, in pleading, iii, 313.

in indictments, iv, 340.

Avowry, iii, 149.

Avulsion of laud, ii, 261.

Award, what is, iii, 16.

real property cannot pass by, id.
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under rule of court, id.

Ayle, writ of, iii, 186.

Bachelor, knight, i, 404.

Backing warrants, iv, 291

Bail, above, iii, 290.

below, iii, 291.

common, iii, 287.

sheriff obliged to take, Hi, 289.

to the action, if not put in. plaintiff may sue

the sheriff's bail, iii, 290.

when and how put in, id.

special, when required, iii, 291.

plaintiff in error must find, iii, 411.

when may be proceeded against, iii, 416.

scire facias against, id.

in criminal cases, iv, 297.

taking excessive, i, 135; iv, 297.

taking insufficient, iv, 297.

what offences bailable, iv, 298.

what to be done, if offence not bailable, iv,

300.

personating of, iv, 128, n.

bond, iii, 290.

piece, iii, 291.

Bailable or not, who, iv, 297, 298, 299.

Bailee, larceny by, iv, 2:W.

larceny from, iv, 231.

Bailiffs, i, 345.

of hundreds, i, 116, 345.

special, i, 346.

Bailiwick, i, 344; iv, 38.

Bailments, ii, 295, et seq.

classification of, ii, 451 and n.

Bakers, regulation as to baking, &o., bread, iv,

157.

selling bad bread, iv, 162.

Ballot for jurors, iii, 358.

Balnearii, iv, 239.

Bane, what are days in, iii, 277.

Banishment, i, 133, 137; iv, 377, 401.

Bank notes, ii. 470, n.

checks, id.

Bank of England, misbehavior of its officers;

iv, 234.

Bankers, embezzlement by, iv, 231, n.

forging their plates, iv, 250 and n.

Bankrupt, the word, ii, 472.

promise to pay by, after certificate must be

INDEX.

Beanmount, Viscount, i. 398.

Bees, property in, ii, 393 and n.

Behavior, good, security for, iv, 251, 256, 402.

Beheading, iv, 92, 377.

Benefices, iv, 107.

Benefit of clergy, i, 377, 402, n.; iv, 333. 365,

413, 429. 441.

Benevolence, compulsive, i, 140; iv, 436.

Bequest.

(See " Will.")

Berwick-upon-Tweed, i, 99.

Besayle, writ of. iii, 186.

Bible, right to print, ii, 410 and n.

Bigamy, iv, Hvi.

Bill in parliament, i, 181.

how passed, id.

of rights, i, 128. 211-217; iv, 440.

for patent, ii, 346.

of indictment, iv, 302.

of exceptions, iii, 372.

of Middlesex, iii, 285.
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in equity, iii, 442.

of privilege, iii, 289.

Bills of exchange and promissory notes, ii, 466

et seq.

consideration for, ii. 446.

negotiability of, ii. 442, n.

may be taken in execution, ili, 417, n.

foreign and inland, ii, 47.

for what amount legal, ii, 468.

assignment of, id.

acceptance, protest, presentment for pay-

ment, days of grave, ii, 469.

notice of dishonor, ii, 470.

stamp, ii, 469.

action on, ii, 470.

interest on, ii, 463, n.

forging, iy, 248, 249, and 250, n.

stealing, iv, 234, and n.

Bills of banks, ii, 470, n.

Bills of lading, ii, 449.

Billa vcra, iv. 305.

Billeting military, i, 413.

Bishops, i, 155, 377, 382.

are not peers, i, 401.

mode of appointment, i, 377.

powers and duties, i, 381, 382.

crown entitled to hounds of, on death of, ii,

413.

mortuary to crown on death oi, ii, 426.

used to sit in the county court, iii. 61.

what matters tried by certificate of, iii, 335.

not electing or consecrating, iv, 115.

not entitled to trial as peers, i, 401; iv, 264.

Bishoprics, nominating to, iv, 108, 115,415, 430.

Bissextile year, ii, 141.

Black act, threatening letters, iv, 144.

shooting at another, iy, 208.

going disguised, &K., iv, 244.

burning houses, <fcc., iv, 246.

Black mail, ii, 43; iv, 244.

Blanch rent, ii, 43.

Blasphemy, iv, 59.

Blench holding, ii, 43.

Blind persons, wills by, ii, 497 and n.

Blood, corruption of, ii, 251; iv, 388.

restitution in, iv, 402.

half, i, 70, 194 ; ii, 227.

royal, i, 225, 226.

INDEX.

(See "Boroughs.")

Burglary, what, iv, 222, 223.

as to the time, iv, 224 aad a.

as to the plaee and residence, id. and n.

as to the mode of committing, iv, 220.

there must be a breaking, iv, 226 and n.

also an entry, iv, 227 and n.

as to the intent, iv, 228 and n.

Burial, of felo de, se, iv, 190.

expenses allowed to executor, ii, 508.

Burning in the cheek, iv, 99, 370, 377.

in the hand, iv, 367, 369, 370, 372, 377, 451.

malicious, iv, 244, 245, 246.

to death, iv, 93, 204, 216, 222, 377, 408.

Butlerage, i, 315.

Bye-law of corporation, i, 475, 476, n.

action of debt on, iii, 160.

Cabinet, i, 230, n.

in United States, i, 232, n.

Calais, captain of, his certificate, iii, 334.

Calendar, new style, ii, 140, n.
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Calendar of prisoners, iv, 403.

Calling the plaintiff, iii, 376.

Canal, destroying works of, iv, 244.

banks, &o., breaking down, id.

Cancellation of deed, ii, 309.

of will, ii, 503.

of letters patent, iii, 47, 260, 261.

Canon law, i, 14, 19, 82, 83; iv. 421, 423.

authority of, i, 79, 83, n.

degrees of consanguity under, ii, 205.

Canonical obedience, iv, 10(5, 112, 204.

purgation, iv, 368.

Canonists should study the common law, i, 15.

Canons of a church, i, 383.

of Edw. VI, i, 83.

of A. D. 1603, id.

Canterbury, archbishop of, i, 381.

precedence of, i, 380, n.

Canterbury and York, struggle between arch-

bishops of, i, 115, n., 404, n.

Capacity to purchase or convey, ii, 290.

of guilt, iv, 20.

Capias ad audiendnm judicium, iv, 375.

Capias ad respoudeudum in criminal cases iv

318. 429, 459.

allowed in actions of account by the stat-

utes of Marlbridge, iii, 281.

in actions of debt and detinue by 25 Edw.

Ill, c. 17, id.

in all actions on the case by 19 Hen. VII, o

9, id. . •

was usually sued out in the first instance,

Hi, 282.

return of non eat inventus to, id.

testatum, id.

arrest of defendant upon iii, 287.

Capias ad satisfaciendnin, iii, 413.

when it may issue after writ of elegit. iii, 419.

if lion est inventns returned, plaintiff may

proceed against the bail, iii, 416.

Capias in Withernam, iii, 148.

Capias pro fine, iii, 398.

Capias utlngatum, iii, 284; iv, 320.

Capiatur, jndment quod, iii, 398, and App.

Capita, distribution per, ii, 517.

succession per, ii, 218.

Capital punishment, iv, 9,18,237, 376,413, 441.

Capite, tenure in, ii, 60.

INDEX.

Chance medley, iv, 184.

Chancery, court of, iii, 47; iv, 436.

(See " Equity.")

original writs issue out of, iii, 48.

origin of the name, iii, 46.

jurisdiction of legal court of, iii, 47.

equity, court of, history of its jurisdiction,

iii, 49.

appeal from equity court to house of peers,

iii, 56, 4'.>7.

guardianship of infants, iii, 426.

custody of idiots and lunatics, iii, 427.

appeal from, in matters of lunacy, iii, 427.

jurisdiction over charities, iii, 427.

(See " Charities.")

Chapters, i, 382.

Character of witnesses in rape, questioning,

iv, 213.

infamous witness, iii, 370.

defaming.

(See "Libel.")
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Charge to grand jury, iv, 303.

to traverse jury, iii, 375.

Chariots and cabriolets, i, 325.

Charitable uses, i, 479.

void gifts to, ii, 268, 273, 376.

estate tail may be appointed to, ii, 119.

Charities, jurisdiction of chancery, iii, 427.

remedy for breaches of trust, iii, 427.

Chapel, breaking and stealing from, iv, 241.

Charles I, his judges, i, 209, 316.

Charter, ii, 395.

of the king, ii, 346.

government in America, i, 108.

Charter land, ii, 90.

Charter of incorporation, i, 472.

of our liberties, i, 127, 129.

Chase, ii, 36, 416; iv, 415.

boasts of, id.

Chattels, real and personal, ii, 143, 384.

(See " Personalty.")

estates. (See " Estate.")

Chastity, homicide in defence of, iv, 181.

of queen consort, <tc., violation of, iv, 81.

violating by force, iv, 210.

Chaud medley, iv, 184.

Cheat, action against, iii, 164.

Cheating, ofl'ence of, iv, 157.

at plav, iv, 173.

Cheek, burning in, iv, 99, 370, 377.

Cheque, banker's, ii, 470, n.

stealing, iv, 234.

forging of, iv, 249.

Chester county palatine of, i, 117, 118.

courts of county palatine of, abolished, Iii,

/y.

Chevisance, the word, ii, 474.

Chief justices, iii, 40, 41.

Chief justiciar, iii, 37 ; iv, 416.

decline of his authority, iii, 39.

Chief rent, ii, 42.

Child stealing, iv, 219.

Child in ventre sa mere, i, 130.

Children, duties of, i, 453.

custody of, id.

parent's remedy for abduction of, iii, 140.

evidence of, iv, 214.

(See "Infants.")

Chirograph, ii, 296.

INDEX.

Clipping the coin, iv, 90.

Close, breach of, iii, 209.

Close writs and rolls, ii, 346.

Clothes, malicious injuries to, iv, 246.

Coal mines, setting fire to, Ac., iv, 246.

Coat of arms, ii, 300; iii, 105.

Code of Justinian, i, 81.

of Theodosius, id.

Codicil, ii, 500.

Cognate, ii, 2155.

Cognizance, iv, 278.

must be claimed before defence made, iii,

297.

when it may be claimed, id.

in replevin, iii. 149.

L'ngnizor and cognizcc, ii. 341, 350; iii, 157.

Cognovit actionem, iii, 297, 304.

Com, falsifying, (tc., iv, 84, 88, 90, 98, 100,

120.

felonies and misdemeanors relating to, iv,

84, 88, 90 et seq.
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Coinage, instruments of, offences relating to,

iv, 90 et seq.

duties, i, 295.

right of, i, 277.

Coke, Sir Edward, i, 72, 73.

causes of his removal from the office of

chief justice of the king's bench, iii, 55.

Collateral consanguinity, ii,~204, 220.

Collateral issue, iv, 338, 396.

Collatio bonorum, ii, 517.

Collation to a benefice, iv, 391.

Colleges, i, 471.

their visitors, i, 482.

leases by, ii, 322.

Collegia in the civil law, i, 469.

Collieries, malicious injuries to, iv, 246.

Colonial assemblies, i, 109.

Colonies, i, 107-110.

transportation to, iv, 401.

Colonization, right of, ii, 7.

Color, in pleading, iii, 309.

Combinations, auioug workmen, <fec., iv, 133,

160.

Combustio domorum, iv, 374.

Comburcndo herctico, writ de, iv, 46, 439.

Commonda, iv, 107.

Commendams, i, 393.

Commentaries, plan of the, i, 34.

Commerce, king the arbiter of, i, 273.

Commission of array, i, 411.

of lunacy, i, 305, 306, n.

of the peace, i, 351; iv, 270.

in bankruptcy, ii, 480.

of rebellion, iii, 444.

high court of, iii, 68.

of review, iii, 67.

to examine witnesses, <fcc., iii, 75, n., 383,

438, 449.

under the statute of charitable uses, iii, 427.

Commitment of persona accused, iv, 296.

reason for which it is made must be ex-

pressed, iii, 133.

Committee, judicial, of the privy council, i,

231, n., 280, n.

how organized, iii, 69, n.

of lunatic, i, 306.

of peers, iii, 56.

Common assurances, ii, 294.

INDEX.

Condition, distinguished from a remainder and

a conditional limitation, ii, 156.

estates upon, ii, 152.

implied or express condition, ii, 152,154, 299.

precedent or subsequent, ii, 154.

ju deed and in law, ii, 155.

effect of breach of, ii, 156, 281.

impossible or illegal, ii, 156, 340.

estate in mortgage, ii, 157.

(See " Mortgage.")

Conditional fee, ii, 109, n.

(See " Estate.")

Conditional limitation, ii, 156.

Conditional pardon, iv, 401.

Confession by prisoners, iv, 357.

of indictment, iv, 329.

iu divorce cases, i, 441, n.

of cause of action, iii, 303, 397.

iu ejectment, iii, 203.

of debt barred by statute, iii, 306, n.

Confinement to the realm, i, 265.
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Confirmation, ii, 325,

of bishops, i, 378, 380; iv, 115.

Confiscation, iv, 377.

Confiscations, part of royal revenue, i, 299.

Confusion and intermixture of goods, ii, 405.

Conge d'eslire, i, 379, 382; iv, 421.

Congregations, religious, disturbance of, iv, 54

and n.

Congress of United States, meetings of, i, 153,

n,, 189, u.

how composed, i, 160, n.

revenue bills in, i, 170, n.

approval of bills, i, 185, n.

Couies, taking, killing or stealing, iv, 235.

Conjugal rights, suit for restitution of, iii, 94.

Conjuration, iv, 60, 436.

Conquest, the words, ii. 48, 242.

Conquest. Norman, i, 199 ; iv, 414, 415.

introduction of feudal tenures on, ii, 48.

Consanguinity, i, 434, 435, n.

degrees of,"ii, 202, 206.

collateral, ii, 204.

Conscience laws binding on the, i, 54, 57, n.

courts of, iii, 441.

Consecration of bishops, i, 380; iv, 115.

Consequential damages, iii, 153.

Conservators of the peace, i, 350; iv, 413, 431.

(See "Justice.")

Conservators, truce and safe-conducts, iv, 69.

Conservatory, robbery of, iv, 233, and n.

Consideration for a contract, ii, 443, 444, n.,

4G8.

moral obligation, ii, 445, n.

in a deed, ii, 296.

different kinds of, ii, 444.

inadequacy of, ii, 444, n.

Consideratuin est per curiam, iii, 396.

Consilium, or imparlance, iv, 356.

Cousimili casu, writ of entry in, iii, 183.'

Consistory court, iii, 64.

Consolidated fund, i, 331.

Consort, queen's, i, 219.

Conspiracy, law of, in general, iv, 136.

to raise wages, iii, 160.

action of, iii, 126.

Constable, i, 355, 411; iv, 292.

high, i, 115.

lord high, i, 355 ; iii, 37 ; iv, 268.

INDEX.

Conveyances, of freehold, ii, 311, et seq.

of contingent remainder, ii, 290, n., 354.

of incorporeal hereditaments, ii, 317.

fraudulent, ii, 296.

Convict, transportation of, iv, 401.

rescue of, iv, 131.

execution of, iv, 403.

Conviction in general, iv, 280.

in frauds against revenue laws, iv, 281.

before justices for disorderly offences in gen-

eral, id.

by judgment, iv, 362.

Convocation, i, 279.

court of bishops in, iii, 67.

Coparceners, ii, 187.

(See " Estate.")

Copper coin, counterfeiting, iv, 100.

Copy of indictment, right of prisoner to, iv,

351.

of record of indictment, iii, 126.

Copyhold, ii, 90, 95, 147.
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varieties of tenures by custom, ii, 148.

tenant's right of renewal, ii, 148.

customary freeholds, ii, 107, 149.

lands, parcel of the manor, ii, 97.

demisable iminemorially by custom, id.

inheritable, or for life, ii, 97, 98.

heriots, ii, 97, 422, 424.

wardship, ii, 98.

admittance of heir, ii, 97, n., 371.

customary court and court-baron, ii, 90, n.

court of ancient demesne, ii, 100.

tines, ii, 98.

modes of alienation, ii, 365.

surrender, re-grant and admittance, ii, 366.

368 et seq.

trusts of, ii, 367, n.

devisee of, by unadmitted heir, devisee or

surrenderee, ii, 367, n.

estate of surrenderor, ii, 368.

entails of, how barred, ii, 113.

free bench, ii, 132.

forfeiture for breach of custom, ii, 284.

when aifected by an act of parliament, ii,

113.

could not formerly be taken in execution, iii,

418.

but may now, iii, 419, n.

Copyright, ii, 405 et seq., 410.

prerogative copyright of crown in acts of

parliament, bibles, Ac., ii, 410.

Corn, may be distrained, iii, 9.

destroying, iv, 246.

sporting, &c., in, iv, 174.

stopping it going to market, iv, 158.

Corn rents, ii, 322.

Coinage, ii, 74.

Cornwall, duchy of, i, 225, n.

Corody, i, 284; ii, 40.

Coronation oath, ancient, i, 236.

modern, i, 235.

made use of to prevent Catholic emancipa-

tion, i, 235, n.

Coronatore eligendo, writ de, i, 347.

ex oneraudo, writ de, i. 348.

Coroner, i, 346; iv, 292, 413.

duration of office of, i, 348.

mode of appointing, i, 347.

power and duty of, i, 348.

INDEX.

Counsel, king's iii, 27.

cannot maintain an action for big fees, iii, 28.

action against, iii, 164.

not answerable (or any matter spoken by him,

iii, 29.

for prisoners, iv, 355.

Count, i, 116, 398.

in declaration, iii, 293, 295.

in indictment, iv, 98, 306, n.

Connterfeiting the king's coin, iv, 84, 88, 100, n.

the king's seals, iv, 83, 89.

Counterpart of deed, ii, 296.

Counties, i, 116 ; iv, 411.

corporate, i, 120.

palatine, i, 117-119; iv, 431.

courts of, iii, 79.

members for, i, 159.

electors for, i, 172, 173.

Country, trial by the, iv, 349.

County court, i, 267; iii, 35: iv, 411, 441.

of Middlesex, iii, 82.
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holdou by the sheriff, i, 343.

its jurisdiction, iii, 36.

when holden, id.

formerly a court of great dignity, id.

formerly as much a spiritual at) a temporal

tribunal, iii, 61.

Court-baron, ii, 90 ; iii, 33 ; iv, 411.

may hold plea of personal actions under40«.;

iii, 34.

writ of false judgment lies to courts at "West-

minster, id.

Court, payment into, when it may be, iii, 304, n.

Court hand, iii, 323.

Courts, their nature and incidents, iii, 23; iv,

258, 414.

derived from the power of the crown, iii, 23.

some are of record, others not, iii, 24

their constituent parts, iii, 25.

assaults in, iv, 125.

are of four sorts, common law and equity,

ecclesiastical, military, and maritime, iii. 30

origin of, id.

inferior, have fallen into decay, id.

aula rcgia, iii, 37.

establishment of distinct, has been advan-

tageous, iii, 31, 40.

power to erect, i. 267; iii, 24.

practice of tried by certificate of officers, iii,

335.

of equity, i, 62, 92.

jurisdiction of, iii, 46, 443.

proceedings in, iii, 425 ct seq.

(See " Chancery," " Equity," " Pleading,"

" Practice. )

Christian, and others, which receive peculiar

laws, i, 83 ; iii, 61.

martial, i, 416 ; iii, 68.

profits of, i, 289.

of piepoudro, iii, 32

baron, iii, 33.

customary, ii, 90.

of bankruptcy, iii, 56, 428, n.

hundred court, iii, 34.

county, iii, 35.

of wards and liveries, ii, 69.

of common pleas, iii, 37.

of exchequer, equitable jurisdiction of, iii,

426.

INDEX.

Crown, leases, i, 287.

power of, i, 335-337.

all lands are held of, ii, 51.

royal mines, ii, 18, 43.

royal fish, ii, 403.

title to chattels by prerogative, ii, 408. 505.

ancient jewels of, are heir-loorus, ii, 428.

may take a chattel by succession, ii, •!:!•„'.

cannot be joint owner of a chattel with a

subject, ii, 409.

prerogative copyright, ii, 410.

property in game, id.

no lapse of right to present by, ii, 277.

mortuary on death of bishop, ii, 413, 426.

fori'eiture of lands to, ii, 267.

no general occupancy against, ii, 259.

•words of limitation in grants to, ii, 109.

descent of, to collateral relation of the half-

blood allowed, ii, 253.

reversion in, not barrable, ii, 118.

not bound by sale in market overt, ii, 449.
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grants by, ii, 308, 346.

mistake or deceit of, ii, 348.

cannot grant monopolies, except for inven-

tions, ii, 407.

injuries to, remedied by usual common-law

actions or inquests of office, iii, 257.

peculiar jurisdiction of exchequer in respect

of, iii, 4-28.

Clicking stool, iv, 169.

Cui ante divortium, writ of, iii, 183.

Cui in vita, writ of, iii, 183.

Culprit, ii, 339.

Cumberland, theft in, iv, 238.

Curate, i, 393.

his remedy for non-payment of his stipend,

iii, 90 and n.

Curator of infants, i, 460.

Cnratores viarum, i, 358.

Curfew, iv, 119, 4-20.

Curialitas, ii, 126.

Currency, i, 276-279.

Cursing, iv, 59.

Curtesy, ii, 126.

of trusts, ii, 127, n.

ol advowson, ii, 127.

Custody of idiots and lunatics, i, 303; iii, 427.

of temporalities, i, 282.

Custody of the law, goods in not to be dis-

trained, iii, 7, n.

Custom of London, i, 75, 76.

of merchants, i, 75.

distinguished from prescription, ii, 263.

title to personalty by, ii, 422.

of York and London, as to distribution of

intestate's effects, ii, 517.

of London, how tried, iii, 334.

alienation by, ii, 365.

dower by, ii, 132.

Customary court, ii, 91, n.

freeholds, ii, 100, 149.

dues to mills, <fec., iii, 235.

Customs general, i, 68-74; iii, 50.

how proved, i, 70-74, 76.

how settled, i, 69.

Customs, particular, i, 74-79.

how allowed, i, 78.

when legal, i, 76-78; ii, X>, n.

Customs on merchandize, i, 314, 316.

INDEX.

De consuetudinibus et servitiis, writ, ill, 232.

abolished, Hi, 232, n.

Decree in equity, iii, 451.

has the force of a judgment, iii, 453.

Decretals, i, 82.

Decretnm Gratiana, i, 82.

Dedication of ways, ii, 35, n.

dower barred by, ii, 138, n.

Dedimus potestatom, i, 352; ii, 351; iii, 447.

Deed, conveyance by, ii, 295.

what in, id.

several species of deeds, ii, 309.

indenture or deed-poll, ii, 295.

original and counterpart, ii, 296.

covenants by or with persons not parties, id.

may be printed, ii, 297.

consideration not essential to, ii, 296.

by feme coven, ii, 361, 362, 392.

construction of, ii, 19, 379.

recitals in, ii, 298.

deed-poll taken most strongly against the
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grantor, ii, 121, 380.

the first of two repugnant clauses preferred,

ii, 381.

intended to operate one way may operate

another, ii. 338, 379.

preference of operation at the common law,

ii, 379, n.

creation of estates by.

(See "Estate.")

form of conveyance of estate for life, ii, 120.

effect of conveyance without words of limita-

tion, ii, 107, 108, n., 120, n.

implication of cross-remainders, ii, 381.

formal parts of, ii, 298.

premises, id.

habeudum, ii, 298.

tenendtmi, id.

reddemlum, ii, 299.

condition, ii, 299.

warranty, ii, 300.

covenants for title, <fco., ii, 304.

conclusion, date, <fc«., id.

must bo read on request, id.

signing and sealing, ii, 305.

statute of frauds, 11, 306.

execution while incomplete, ii, 307.

.delivery, ii, 306.

escrow, id.

attestation, ii, 307.

stamps on, ii, 297.

defeasance to, ii, 327.

how avoided, ii, 308.

erasure or alteration of, id.

breaking the seal, cancellation, id.

disclaimer, ii, 309.

avoiding by judgment or decree, id.

right to custody of. ii, 428.

presumption of a lost deed, ii, 266, n.

stealing of, iv, 324.

forcing of, iv, 248.

Deer in a park are heir-looms, ii, 427.

Deer stealing, iv, 235, 239.

hunting, killing, <fee., in general, iv, 174.

in disguise, iv, 144.

Default, judgment by, iii, 296,395.

Defeasance, ii, 327, 342.

Defectum, challenge propter, iii, 362; iv, 352.

Defence, its legal signification, iii, 296.

INDEX.

Descent, collateral consanguinity, ii, 204.

heirs apparent and presumptive, ii, 208.

canons of descent, ii, 208, et seq.

lineal descent to issue of person last seized,

ii, 208.

partible descent among daughters, ii, 214.

descent of title of honor to daughter, ii, 216.

ancient partible descent in socage, ii, 215.

representation, ii, 216, 219.

collateral heir, ii, 220, 224.

fiction of feudum novum, held ant ant in uum,

ii, 221.

effect of union of legal and equitable titles,

ii, 222, n.

different heirs to the same person in respect

of different estates, id.

immediate descent between brothers and sis-

ters, ii, 226, 250.

half blood, ii, 227, 233, 240.

possessio patris, ii, 228.

preference of male stocks, ii, 234, 240, n.
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rules of descent, subsequent to the year 1833,

ii, 240, n.

lineal ascent, id.

through an alien, ii, 226, n., 250, 251.

corruption of blood, ii, 251 253.

escheat, ii, 244.

(See " Escheat.")

modes of failure'of hereditary blood, ii, 246.

changing the stock of descent, ii, 240, n.

effect of partition on, ii, 191.

of equity changed by merger in legal estates

ii, XJ7, n.

change of by recovery, ii, 362.

when heir takes by purchase, ii, 240, n.

may toll right of entry, iii, 176.

of copvholds, admittance of heir, ii, 371.

rules fallowed in equity, iii, 430.

Desertion of children, i, 458.

by soldiers, i, 416; iv, 102.

Description of property, construction of par-

ticular word?, ii, 19.

Detainer, forcible, iii, 179; iv, 148.

unlawful, iii, 151.

Determinate fee, ii, 109.

(See "Estate.")

Determination of will, ii, 146.

Detinot, action of debt in the, iii, 156.

DetiuUe, action of, when it may be brought,

iii, 152.

execution, iii, 413.

Devastation, ii, 508.

Devises, ii, 373; iv, 430.

(See " Wills.")

executory, ii, 172.

title by, in general, ii, 373.

by married woman, ii, 375, n.

revocation of, ii, 376.

Die eat sine, iii, 316, 399.

Diet, excess in, iv, 171.

Diets, i, 147.

Digests, i, 81.

Dignity of the king, i, 241.

Dignities, ii, 37, 91.

descent of, ii, 216.

curtesy of, ii, 126, n.

Dilapidations, remedy for, iii, 91.

Dilatory pleas, iii, 30'l.

within what time to be pleaded, iii, 301, n.

INDEX.

Distress, party detraining not to be deemed

trespasser ab initio, iiu, 13.

remedy by, for subtraction, iii, 231.

illegal^ for crown debts, iv, 423.

irregularity in, does not make the landlord a

trespasser ab initio, iii, 213.

infinite, iii, 231, 280 ; iv, 285, 318.

Distribution of intestate's effects, ii, 315; iv,

408, 424, 439.

law of domicile, ii, 387, n.

District of Columbia, i, 112, n.

Distringus, iii, 280.

now abolished, iii, 280, n.

in detinue, iii, 413.

iu equity, iii, 445.

Disturbance, iii, 236.

of common, iii, 237.

of franchises, iii, 236.

of patronage, iii, 292.

of tenure, id.

of ways, iii. 241.
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Disturbance of religious assemblies, iv, 54, and n.

Disturber, ii, 278.

Diversity of person, plea of, iv, 396.

Dividend warrants, forgery of. iv, 248j 250.

Dividend on bankruptcy, ii, 487.

Divine law, i, 42.

offences against, iv, 250.

right of bishops, iv, 436.

of kings, i, 191.

Divine service, tenure by, ii, 102.

Divorce, i, 440 ; iii, 94.

dower lost by, ii, 130, n.

court of, iii, 67, n., 95, n.

Dock, stealing from, iv, 240.

Docket of judgment, ii, 511; iii, 397.

Doctrines, illegal, asserting or publishing. Iv,

91, 116, 123.

Dogs, property in, ii, 393.

right to keep, ii, 416.

damage bv. iii, 153.

stealing, iv, 236.

Dome-hook of Alfred, i, 64, 66, 114; iv, 411.

Domesday-book, ii, 49, n., 99; iii, 331.

Domicile, regulates succession to personalty,

ii, 387, n.

(See " Dwelling House."

Dominions, foreign, i, 110.

Donatio mortis causa, ii, 514.

Double plea, iii, 308.

Dowager, queen, i, 224; iv, 81.

princess, iv. 81.

Dower, title by, iu general, iv, 424.

estate in, its origin, nature and incidents, ii,

129 et scq.

how barred, ii, 136 et seq.

of wife of heir, who died without having been

seized, ii, 209, n.

of a trust, ii, 127, 132, n.

of wife of felon, ii, 253.

how prevented, ii, 136.

jointure in lieu of, ii, 137.

nnde nihil habet, writ of, iii, 182.

writ of right of, id.

•writ of admeasurement of, id.

Draft for money, ii, 467.

forgery of, iv, 248.

Dramatic piece, right to represent, ii, 407, n.

Drawbacks, i, 315.

INDEX.

Ejectment, when it lies, iii, 199.

introduction of judgment to recover the

term, and writ of possession, iii, 200.

how applied to the use of trying the title to

land, iii, 201,

notice to be given to the tenant in posses-

sion, id.

regular method of bringing an action of,

ui, 202.

invention of new method of trying titles

by, id.

notice to tenant in possession, iii, 203.

tenant may defend, id.

landlord may bo made defendant, iii, 204.

tenant must confess lease, entry and ouster,

iii, 203.

must specify in the rule of court the premises

for which he intends to defend, iii, 204, n.

if lease, entry and ouster not confessed at

the trial, plaintiff must bo non-suited,

iii, 204.
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consequence thereof, id.

question may be retried, id.

when a court of equity will interfere to pre-

vent it, id.

will not lie for incorporeal hereditaments,

except tithes, iii, 20ti.

remedy where rent is in arrear, id.

Election of bishops, i, 377; iv, 115, 421.

by corporations, i, 478, n.

of magistrates, i, 340; iv, 413, 427.

of members of parliament, i, 170, 177.

of Scotch peers, i, 169; iv, 416.

of Irish peers, i, 104, n.

of widow between devise and dower, ii,

138, n.

of remedy in cose of nuisance, iii, 220 and n.

Elective monarchy, iv, 413.

Electors in boroughs, i, 172, n.

in counties, i, 172, n.

privilege of, from arrest, iii, 289, n.

Eleemosynary corporations, i, 471.

Elegit, ii, 161.

(See "Judgment.")

ouster of estate held by, iii, 198.

writ of, iii, 417; iv, 426.

when capias ad Batisfaeiendum may issue

after, iii, 419.

Elisors, i, 349; iii, 355.

Elopement, i, 442.

Ely, Isle of, i, 120.

county of, now abolished, iii, 79, n.

destroying powdikes in, iv, 244.

Emancipation of slaves, i, 423, n., 425, n.

of children, i, 453, n.

Embargo, i, 270.

Embezzlement of the king's stores, <fee., iv, 101.

by clerks or servants, iv, 231.

by servants of persons deceased, iv, 231.

by bankrupts, iv, 156.

by persons in the public service, iv, 122.

by persons employed in the post-office, iv,

235 and n.

Emblements, right to, ii, 403.

go to the executor, id.

distress of, ii, 404.

of tenant for life, ii, 122.

of tenant for years, ii, 145.

of tenant at will, ii, 146.

INDEX.

Equity, courts of, i, 62, 92.

distinguished from law, iii, 436, 442.

jurisdiction of exchequer, iii, 44, 426.

origin of its jurisdiction, iii, 436, 442.

full development of, iii, 440.

former jealousy of, id.

character of. in its infancy, iii, 433.

sometimes makes merely technical distinc-

tions, iii, 432.

foundation of jurisdiction of, iii, 434, 442.

•when it follows rules of law, iii, 429, 430,

434, 441.

general nature of, iii, 429.

cannot alter the common law, id.

concurrent jurisdiction, when exercised, iii,

431.

sends some matters to law, iii, 431.

bouud by precedents, iii, 432.

cognizance of fraud, iii, 430.

relieves against accident and mistake, iii, 431.

remedies defective assurances in some cases,
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iii, 431.

interferes in whose favor, iii, 431, n.

proceedings in courts of, iii, 425, 442 ct seq.

Jurisdiction in bankruptcy, iii, 428.

urisdiction over charities, iii, 427.

urisdiction in case ot infants, lunatics, Ac.,

iii, 426, 427.

favors creditor's children, Ac., iii, 431, n.

remedy in case of bonds, mortgages, Ac., iii,

434,"439.

jurisdiction to enforce agreements, iii, 435,

4:!8.

relief against penalties in, iii, 435.

regards foreign law, when, iii, 436.

enforcing discovery by, iii, 437.

mode of proof in, iii, 437, 43S.

jurisdiction in cases of fraud, iii, 437, 439.

mode of trial in, iii, 438.

examination of witnesses, id.

jurisdiction to perpetuate testimony, iii, 438,

450.

mode of relief, specific performance, iii, 438.

administration of assets bv, iii, 439.

jurisdiction over loans and securities, id.

jurisdiction over trusts, iii, 431, 439.

proceedings in, iii, 442 et seq.

(See " Pleading;" " Practice.")

right of parol to demur, iii, 430.

time given to infants by, iii, 430, n.

of statute, i, 61, 62, n.; iii, 431.

reserved, iii, 453.

Equity of redemption, ii, 159.

Erasure in deed, effect of, ii, 308, n.

Eriaeh, iv, 313.

Error, writ of, iii, 406 ; iv, 391.

where prosecuted, iv, 391.

differences between appeals and writs of,

iii, 56.

bail by plaintiff in, iii, 411.

costs in, iii, 399, 410.

iu equity, iii, 454.

in lunacy, iii, 427.

Escape, iii, 290, 415.

upon mesne process, action on the case for,

iii, 165.

after judgment, action of debt for, id.

sheriff liable for, iii, 415.

voluntary, prisoner cannot be taken after, id.

INDEX.

Estate, joint life, ii, 121.

civil death, id.

estovers, einblementg, &o., ii, 122.

apportionment of rent, ii, 124.

by the cnrtesy, ii, 126.

(See '' Curtesy.")

in dower, ii, 129.

(See "Dower.")

pour autre vie, occupancy of, ii, 258.

in case of copyhold, ii, 2(iO.

in incorporeal hereditaments, id.

is assets, ii, 260.

entail of^ ii, 113, 260.

compelling appearance of tenant for life, ii,

less than freehold, ii, 140 et seq.

for years, ii, 140, 386.

goes to executor, ii, 431.

origin of, ii, 141.

requisites to lease, ii, 143.

(See " Lease.")

may commence in tuturo, ii, 143.
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inter esse termini, ii, 144.

entail of term, ii, 398.

from year to year, ii, 144, n., 147.

arising out of parol lease, ii, 147.

tenancy under mortgagee, ii, 150, n.

estovers and euiblenients, ii, 144, 145.

particular estate, remainder and reversion, ii,

176.

executory bequest of term, ii, 175, n.

notice to" quit, ii, 146, n

tenant holding over, ii, 160.

forcible ejectment, ii, 151.

nnder lease and assignment, ii, 327, n

merger, ii, 177.

by statute and elegit, ii, 160.

(See "Judgment.")

at will, ii, 145.

emblemenki, in case of, ii, 146.

determination of the will, id.

copyholders, ii, 147.

(See " Copyholds.")

cannot support a remainder, ii, 165.

at sufferance, ii, 150.

Estates of the kingdom, i, 156.

Estoppel, iii, 307.

by possession, from disputing title, ii, 144, n.

by record, ii, 465, u.

by fine, ii, 354, n.

by recovery, ii, 361.

by deed, ii, 295, 308.

Estovers, common of, ii, 35.

tenant's right to, ii, 35, n.

of tenant (or life, ii, 122.

of tenant for years, ii, 144.

of a wife, i, 441.

Estoveris habendis, writ de, i, 441.

Estrays, i, 297.

title of crown to, ii, 409.

Estreat of recognizance, <fcc., iv, 253.

Estrepeuieut, writs of, iii, 224.

Evidence, written, iii, 367.

must be the best, nature of case will admit

of, iii, 368.

meaning of this rule, iii, 368, n.

privileged communications, iii. 368, n.

hearsay, when admissible, iii, 368.

demurrer to, iii, 372.

in equity, iii, 437, 438, 447, 449.

INDEX.

Executors, duties of executor of, ii, 507 et seq.

acts before probate, ii, 507.

executor de son tort, id.

probate of will, ii, 508

burial of deceased, id.

inventory, ii, 510.

collecting and converting assets, id.

payment of debts, in what order, ii, 511.

appointing debtor or creditor to be executor,

li, 511, 512.

payment of legacies, ii, 512.

abatement and refunding of legacies, ii, 512.

right to residue, ii, 513.

distribution among next of kin, &c., ii, 515

et seq.

distribution by custom, ii, 517.

promise by, to pav debt of estate, iii, 158.

actions by, iii, 30{ and u.

may be sued on simple contract demands, iii,

346 n.

when liable to pay costs, iii, 400 and n.
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Executory devise, ii, 173, 334.

contract, ii, 443.

estate, ii, 163.

remainder, ii, 169.

Exigent, writ of, iii, 283; iv, 319.

Exigi facias, writ of, iii, 283; iv, 319.

Exile, i, 137.

of offenders, &c., iv, 362.

Ex officio informations, iii, 427 ; iv, 308.

Ex officio oath, iii, 100, 447.

Ex parte remedies, iii, 1 et seq., 15, n.

Expatriation, right of, i, 369, 370 and n.

Expectancy, estates in, ii, 163.

Expenses of prosecution, iv, 362 and n.

of witnesses, iii, 369; iv, 362 and u.

Exportation of wool, <fcc., iv, 154, 428.

Exposing person, offence of, iv, 65.

goods for sale on Sunday, iv, 64.

infected persons, iv, 161.

Ex post facto laws, i, 46.

cannot be passed in America, i, 46, n.

constitutional meaning of the term, id.

Express malice, iv, 198.

condition, ii, 154.

contract, ii, 443; iii, 154.

warranty, ii, 301.

Exteudi facias, iii, 420.

Extent, when issued, iii, 420.

Extinguishment of right, ii, 325.

Extortion by officers, iv, 141.

or blackmail, iv, 244.

Extra judicial remedy does not exclude ordi-

nary course of justice, iii, 22.

Extra parochial places, i, 114.

Extra parochial tithes, i, 284.

Extravagautes Joaunis, i, 82.

Eye, putting out, iv, 206, 207.

Eyre, justices in, iii, 58, 72; iv, 422, 423.

"killing of, iv, 84.

Facto, king de, i, 204, 371; iv, 77.

Factor, i, 427; iii, 437.

goods in hands of, not distrainable, 8, n.

Fair, ii, 38 ; iii, 218.

who appoints, i, 274.

nuisance to, iii, 218.

False imprisonment, what constitutes, iii, 127;

iv, 218.

action of, iii, 138.

INDEX.

Feudum novum held nt antiquum, ii, 52, n.,

221.

Fictions, legal, beneficial and useful, iii, 43,107.

in fictione juris, consistit, tequilas, iii, 283.

Fictitious plaintiff, iv, 134.

bail, iii, '291.

Fidd Comuiissum, ii, 327.

Fide jussors, iii, 108, 291.

Fief, 'ii, 45.

Fieri facias, iii, 416, 417.

Fifteenths, i. 309.

Fighting, offences of, iv, 183.

Filial portion, ii,519.

Final judgment, iii, 398.

decree, iii, 452.

Finding indictments, iv, 305.

Finding of goods, i, 295 ; ii, 9, 402.

Fine for alienation, ii, 71, 89.

for endowment, ii, 135.

for copvhold, ii, 98.

Fine ol lauds, ii, 118, 348, 352; iii, 156, 166;
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iv, 426, 429.

bar by non-claim, ii, 354, 356.

how it affects parties, privies and strangers,

ii, 358.

bar of feme covert, ii, 355.

deeds to declare uses of, ii, 363.

now abolished, ii, 364, n.

Fines and forfeitures, when grantable, iii, 259;

iv, 379.

for misdemeanors, iv, 377, 378.

are debts, iii, 159.

Finger, disabling, iv, 206.

Fire, negligeuce of, i, 431; iv, 222.

(See " Arson," " Burning.")

liability of tenant for accidental, ii, 281.

Firo-bote, ii, 35.

Fire ordeal, iv, 342.

First fruits, i, 284; ii, 66; iv, 107.

Fish, royal, i, 223, 290; ii, 403.

in a pond are heir looms, ii, 427.

stealing, iv, 236.

Fishery, ii, 39, 40, 417; iv, 424.

common of. ii, 34.

right of, iu public waters, ii, 34.

Fish pond, destroying, iv, 246.

Fitzherbert, i, 72; iii. 183.

Fixtures, when removable, ii, 281, n.

cannot be distrained, iii, 9.

stealing or ripping from building, &o., iv.

233.

Fleet prison, iii, 444.

Fleets, i, 262, iv, 419.

Fleta, i, 72; iv, 427.

Flight, confession by, iv, 387.

Floodgates, destroynig.iv, 144, 245.

Flotsam, i, 293 iii, 100.

Folklaud. ii. 90.

Food, offences of selling short weight, <fec., iv.

158.

forestalling, rcgrating, &c., iv, 159.

supplying unwholesome, iv, 162.

stinting apprentices iu, iv, 197.

implied warranty in sale of, ii, 451, n.

Force, when repellable by death, iv, 181.

injuries with and without, iii, 118.

Forcible abduction aud marriage, iv, 208

and n.

entries, remedies for, iii, 179.

INDEX.

Fraud, criminal, iv, 158.

vitiate* contracts, ii, 444, n.

Frauds aud perjuries, statute of, ii, 297, 306,

364, 448, 466, 500, 515; iii, 158; iv,

439.

parol leases, when valid, ii, 297.

as to contracts, ii, 442.

trusts, ii, 337.

declaration of uses of fines, A.C., ii, 363, 364.

execution of wills, ii, 376.

Fraudulent conveyances, <tc., ii, 296, 441.

devises, ii, 378; iii, 430.

Froe wan-en, ii, 38, 417.

Free-bench, ii. 122, 129, n.

Free fishery, ii, 39, 410, 417.

Free services, ii, 60.

Freehold, fixtures to. when removable, ii, 281, n.

(See " Estate.")

customary freeholds, ii, 149.

Freeholders, judges of county courts, iii, 36.

Fresh suit, i, 297.

and n.
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Fruit trees, destroying or damaging, iv, 246

Full age, i, 4G3.

Fnniagc, i, 324.

Funds; public, i, 831.

Funeral expenses, ii, 508.

Fnrandi animus, iv, 230. 232.

Furze, setting fire to, iv, 247.

Futuro, freehold in, ii, 144,166.

Gage, estates in, iii, 157.

and pledges, iii, 280.

Game, property in, ii, 14, 394, 410 et seq.

laws respecting, ii, 410 et seq.; iv, 175, n;

217, n.

of free warren, ii, 39.

beasts of park or chase, ii, 38.

shooting person in pursuit of, iv, 27, n., 174.

trespass in pursuing, iii, 213, 214.

Game-keeper, ii, 418; iv, 217, n.

Gaming, iv, 167, 170, 171.

(See " "Wagers.")

Gaming-houses, iv, 171.

Gaol delivery, iv, 270.

Gaol distemper, i, 346.

Gaols, i, 346; iv, 377.

Gaolers, i, 346 j iv, 300.

compelling prisoners to be approvers, iv, 128.

wheu guilty of murder in cruelty, iv, 197.

Gardeus, robbing of, iv, 233.

damaging trees in, iv, 247.

Garter, knight of the, i, 403.

Gavelkind, i, 74, 76, n., 79; ii, 84, 128, 220; iv,

409, 413.

General demurrer, iii, 315.

General fund, i, 331.

General issue, why so called, iii, 305.

wheu formerly pleaded, iii, 305; iv, 338.

what it is in the several actions, iii, 305.

special plea amounting to, iii, 309.

General occupancy, ii, 258.

General services, iv, 272.

General statute, i, 85.

General verdict, iii, 378; iv, 354.

General warrant, iv, 291.

.Generalissimo, i, 261.

Gentlemen, i, 405, 406.

should know the laws, i, 7, 13, 36.

Gibbon, commendation of Blackstone by, i,

INDEX.

Habeas corpus, ad faciendum et recioien-

(liiin. id.

when cause not to be removed by, id.

ad subjiciendum, iii, 131-134.

cum causa, iii, 77.

Habeas corpus act, i, 128, 135; iv, 438.

suspension of, i, 136

passage of, iii, 135, n

subsequent extension of, iii, 137, n.

substance and use of, id.

Habendum, ii, 298.

Hnbere facias possessionem, iii, 412.

Haberc facias seisiiiam, iii, 412.

Habitation, offenses against, iv, 220.

(See "Arson," "Burglary," "Dwelling-

house.")

Hackney coaches and chairs, i, 325.

Half-blood, i, 70, 194; ii, 233.

11 :iin i- secken, iv, 223.

Hamlets, i, 115.

Hannapcr office, iii, 49.
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Hand, burning in, iv, 367, 369, 371, 377.

disabling, iv, 206.

holding up, iv, 323.

loss of, iv, 125, 154, 276, 377.

Handsel, ii, 448.

Handwriting, similitude of, iv, 358.

Hanging, iv, 376.

Hanover, i, 110.

Harbors, injuries to, iv, 144.

Hard labor, punishment of, iv, 377.

Hares, stealing of, iv, 235.

Havens, i, 264.

Hay bote, ii, 35.

Hawks, stealing of, iv, 236.

Head of the church, i, 279; iv, 430.

Headborough, i, 114.

Health, protection of, i, 124.

offences against public, iv, 161.

nuisances to, iii, 122.

Hearing in equity, iii, 451.

Hearsay evidence, iii, 368.

Hearth inonev, i, 326.

Hedge-bote. ii, 35.

Heir, apparent and presumptive, ii, 208.

expectant, sale by, ii, 444.

•when he takes by purchase, ii, 240, n.

favor to, i, 450.

neuio est hfures viventis, ii, 224.

(See " Descent.")

Heiress, stealing of, iv, 208, 209, n.

Heir looms, ii, 17, 427 et aeq.

not devisable apart from freehold, ii, 429.

Heirs, when word necessary to create fee, ii,

107, I'-'O, n.

exceptions to this rule, ii, 108, n., 109, n.

Helping to stolen goods for reward, iv, 132.

Hengham, i, 72; hi, 409; iv, 427.

Heury I, his laws, iv, 420.

Heptarchy, iv, 410.

Heralds' visitation books, evidence of pedigree,

iii, 105.

Herbage, right to, ii, 34, 35, n.

Hereditament, what, ii, 17, 20, 106.

ejectment for, iii, 206.

Hereditary excise, i, 288, 319, 322.

Hereditary right to the crown, i, 191, 209.

Heresy, iv, 44.

Hcretico combnrendo, writ de, iv, 46, 439.

INDEX.

House, its members should understand law, i,

9, 10.

House oflords, i, 155, 158.

its peculiar laws, Ac., i, 167.

•writ of error to, from Ireland, iii, 410, n.

appeal to, from chancery, iii, 56.

its jurisdiction upon appeals and writs of

error, iii, 57, 427, 428.

quorum of, iii, 56, n.

Hue and cry, iv, 293.

Hundred, i, 116.

action against for robbery, <fec., ill, 160; iv,

246, 293, 411.

Hundred court, iii. 34, 95; iv, 411.

Hundredors, as jurors, iii, 359; iv, 353.

Hunger, does not excuse stealing, iv, 31;

Hunting.

(See "Game.")

Husband and wife, i, 433; iii, 98.

joint estate of, ii, 182, n.

power of wife to convey, ii, 292, 361, 362.
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lease of wife's lands, ii, 319.

will of feme, ii, 497.

husband's power over wife's property, ii,

433 < I sea.

wife's title by survivorship, ii, 433.

wife's equity to a settlement, ri, 434, n.

separate estate and restraint on anticipation,

ii, 293, n., 434, n., 436, n.

wife's paraphernalia, ii, 435.

husband's title by administration, ii, 436,504.

liability of husband on wife's contracts, ii,

445, n.

liability of wife to be made bankrupt, ii,

477, 488, n.

restitution of conjugal rights, iii 94.

action by husband for battery of wife, iii,

140.

how far wife's crime is excused, iv, 28.

surety of peace for, iv, 204.

(See " Curtesy," " Divorce," " Dower.")

Husband of the queen, i, 224.

Hustings, court of, Hi, 80.

Hydages, i, 310.

Hypotheca, ii, 159.

Hypothecation of ship, ii, 457.

bond, suit upon, iii, 117, n.

Identity of persons, iv, 396.

Idiots, custody of lands of, i, 303, 307.

their marriages, i, 438.

who are, i, 303.

cannot make wills, ii, 497.

jurisdiction of chancellor, iii, 427.

inspection of, iii, 332.

cannot appear by attorney, iii, 125.

conveyance by or to, iii, 127, 291.

Idiota inquirendo, writ de, i, 303.

Idleness, iv, 169.

Ignominious punishments, iv, 377.

Ignoramus, iv, 305.

Ignorance, when it excuses crime, iv, 27.

Illegality of deed, &c., ii, 156.

Imagining the king's death, iv, 76.

Imbezzling king's stores, <fcc., iv, 101.

(See '•' Embezzlement.")

Immorality, public offence of, iv, 65.

Immoral work, <fec., no copyright in, ri, 407, n.

Imparlances, iii. 299, 301.

Impeachment, in parliament, iv, 259.

INDEX.

Infants, conveyances by and to, ii, 291.

wills of, ii, 497.

executors, ii, 503.

jurisdiction of chancery over, in, 426.

inspection of, iii, 332.

carnal knowledge of, ir, 212.

evidence by, iv, 214.

when liable for crimes, iv, 22, 24, 168.

instigating to crimes, iv, 40.

stinting in food, <tc., iv, 217.

child stealing, iv, 219.

Inferior courts, writs of error from, iii, 411

and n.

Information in the exchequer, iii, 261.

in respect of charities, iii, 427.

in the ecclesiastic-til courts, iii, 101.

appeal from, iii, 428.

compounding of, iv, 136.

criminal, iv, 308, 429, 436.

ex officio, iii, 427 ; iv, 308.

in crown office, iv, 308.
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in nature of quo warranto, iv, 312, 441.

Informer, common, ii, 437; iii, 160; iv, 308.

Infortuninm, homicide per, iv, 182.

Injunction, iii, 442.

to stay waste, ii, 282, n.

dissolution of, id.

Injuries, civil, iii, 2, 118.

Inheritable blood, ii, 246.

Inheritance, words of, essential to create a fee,

ii, 107 and n.

(See " Descent," " Estate.")

Inn, entering an, not a trespass, iii, 212.

disorderly, iv, 167.

Innkeeper," liabilities and lien of, i, 414, n.,

430. n.; ii, 451, n.; iii, 164.

Inns of court and chancery, i, 23, 25.

Innuendo, iii, 126.

Inofficious wills, i, 448; ii, 502.

Inquests by coroners, i, 248, 302, n.

Inquests of office, remedy for injuries to crown,

iii, 257 ; iv. 301, 424.

in case of escheats, i, 372, n.; iii, 258.

prosecutions on, iv. 274, 301, 302.

Inquiry, writ of, ill, 398.

Inquisitio post mortem, ii, 68; iii, 257.

Inquisition, what it is, iii, 257.

gives the king his right by record, iii, 258.

may be traversed, iii, 260.

Inrolment of annuity deeds, ii, 461.

of bargain and sale, ii, 338.

Insidiatio viarum, iv, 374.

Insiinul computassent, iii, 162.

Insolvent debtors, relief of, iii, 415, n,, 484.

Inspection, trial by, iii, 331.

Installment, ii, 312.

Instanter, trial, iv, 396.

Institutes of Justinian, i, 81.

Institution to a benefice, i, 390; ii, 23 ; iv, 107.

Insurance, ii, 458 et seq. ; iii, 74 ; iv, 441.

on lives, ii, 459.

marine, ii, 460.

wagering policies, ii, 460.

interest or no interest, ii, 460.

of lender on bottomry and respondentia, ii,

461.

of lives by annuitants, ii, 461.

Intent, in larceny material, iv, 232.

in forgery, iv, 248, n.

INDEX.

Joinder of actions, iii, 295, n.

Joint owner of chattel, crown cannot be, ii. 409.

Joint tenancy, ii, 180 et seq.

dissolution of, ii, 185.

good faith required in, ii, 194, n.

Jointure, ii, 137, 180.

Judgment, title to chattels by, ii, 436.

debt by, ii, 465.

remedy by elegit, ii, 162.

void it' jurisdiction wftnting, iii, 24, n.

arrest of, iii, 393, 394.

-, operates as a charge upon lands, iii, 419, n.

: from what time it binds lands, iii, 420.

scire facias to revive, iii, 421 and n.

action of debt on, iii, 160.

jurisdiction of equity over, iii, 437.

decree in equity has the force of, iii, 453.

in criminal cases, iv, 375 et seq.

Judge in oue's own cause, iii, 289 and n.

Judges, iii, 25, 356; iv, 440.

commissions of, i, 267.
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are counsellors to the king, i, 229.

depositories of the common law, i, 69.

killing of, iv, 84.

assaults upon, iv, 125.

threats or reproaches to, iv, 126.

how counsel for prisoners, iv, 355.

are always made sergeants, iii, 26.

in equity, iii, 441, 442, 444.

punishment for misbehavior, iii, 408.

summing up of, iii, 375, n.

Judicial committee of the privy council, i, 232,

n., 2tiO, n.; iii, 67, n., 80, n.

its present organization, iii, 69, n.

Judicial decisions, i, 63, 64.

Judicial power, i, 267, 269.

Judicial writs, iii, 282.

Judice.s ordiuarii, iii, 315.

Judiciuni Dei, iv, 341,342.

ferri, aqua- et ignis, iv, 344.

Jure, king de, i, 204; iv, 77.

Jure divino right of kings, i, 191.

Juris utruni, writ of, iii, 252.

Jurisdiction, plea to, iii, 301; iv, 333.

of courts of equity, iii, 426.

encroachment of, iii, 111.

want of, renders judgments void, iii, 24, n.

Jurors, fining or imprisoning, iv, 361.

list of, in sheriff's office, iii, 354, n.; iv, 351.

challenge of, iii, 358, 362, 363; iv, 352.

qualification of, iii, 361 and n.

trial of challenge of, iii, 362.

verdict formerly on their own knowledge, iii,

374.

may be sworn as witnesses, id.

should understand law, i, 8.

Jury, trial by, iii, 349.

its establishment in England, iii, 360.

excellence of trial by, hi, 354.

the glory of the English law, iii, 378.

impartial administration of the law promoted

by, iii, 379.

defects of trial by, iii, 381.

must formerly be hundredors, iii, 358.

may retire to "consider verdict, iii, 375.

special, iii, 357.

common, iii, 358.

trial by, in criminal cases, iv, 348.

jury process, iv, 350.

INDEX.

King, power of, i, 250.

prerogative of, i, 237.

compassing or imagining death of, i v, 76.

adhering to enemies of, iv, 82.

contempts against government of, i v, 133.

against courts of, iv, 124.

counterfeiting money of, iv, 84, 98, 100, 11.

all lands held of, ii, 51.

right to mines, ii, 18.

royal fish, ii, 403.

titles to chattels by prerogative, ii, 408, 505.

cannot be joint owner with subject, ii, 409.

prerogative copyright, ii, 410.

• property in game. id.

may take a chattel by succession, ii, 432.

ancient jewels of, are heir-looms, ii, 428.

prerogative presentation to a living, ii, 24, n.

no lapse of time to present by, ii, 277.

mortuary on death of bishop, ii, 413, 426.

forfeitures of lands to, ii, 267.

no general occupancy against, ii, 259.
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words of limitation in grants to, ii, 109.

descent of crown to half-blood, ii, 253.

not bound by sale in market overt, ii, 449.

grants by, ii, 308, 346.

restrictions on alienations by, ii, 346, n.

mistake or deceit, ii, 348.

cannot grant monopolies except for inven-

tions, ii, 407.

revenue extraordinary of, i, 306

ordinary revenue, i, 281.

royal familv of. i, 219, 225.

seals of, ii,~346; iii, 47.

suits formerly discontinued by demise of, iii,

295.

when preferred to other creditors, iii, 420.

and n.

judgment of, effects all lands of his officers,

iii, 420.

neither pays nor receives costs, iii, 400.

exceptions, iii, 400. n.

jurisdiction of exchequer in matters con-

cerning, iii, 480

palaces of, contempts against, iv, 124.

person of, contempts against, iv, 123.

prerogative of, contempts against, iv, 122.

felonies against, iv, 98.

counterfeiting seals of? iv, 83, 89,92, n.

•levying war against, iv, 123.

refusing to advise or assist, iv, 122.

can do no wrong, i, 243-246; iii, 254.

personal irresponsibility of, iii, 254.

King's bench, court of, iii, 40; iv, 265.

not fixed to certain place, iii, 41.

jurisdiction of, iii, 41.

fiction of defendant being in custody, iii,

42, n.

from what courts a court of appeal, iii, 43,

and n.

writ of error from, to exchequer chamber,

iii, 43 and n.

process in, by original, iii, 284.

by bill of Middlesex, iii, 285.

by latitat, id.

justices of, killing, iv, 84.

King's connsel, iii, 27.

King's silver, ii, 350.

Knight, tenure of lands by, ii, 62.

bachelor, i, 404.

INDEX.

Lay, care and circumspection of the, iii, 422.

signification of, i, 38.

a science, i, 27. ,

French, iii, 317; iv, 416, 428.

Greek, iii, 321.

history of, iv, 407 et seq.

civil, i, 14, 19, 79, 80, 83.

canon, authority of, i, 14, 19, 79, 83; iv, 421,

422.

common, i, 63-67.

courts of, their profits, i, 289.

divine or revealed, i, 42.

written, i, 185.

interpretation of, i, 59-62, 87-91.

unwritten, i, 63-67 ; iv, 408.

martial, i, 413; iv, 4:36.

merchant, i, 75, 273.

moral obligation of, i, 43, n.. 57, 58.

municipal, i, 44.

of God, i, 41.

offences against, iv, 43.
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of nations, i, 43, 44, n.

offences against, iv, 66.

of nature, i, 39.

parts of a law, i, 54,58.

promulgation of, i, 6, n., 45.

statute, i, 85.

study of, i, 1-37.

amendment of, statute for, iv, 441.

feudal, iv, 418.

Latin, iii, 319; iv, 428.

causes of delays of, iii, 423.

of property, necessarily arbitrary, ii, 12.

consistency of, with natural justice, ii, 13.

wager of, iii, 341; iv, 414, 424.

Law of the land, i, 135, n.

Law schools, i, 23,25, n., 30, n.

Law side of the chancery court, iii, 47.

of the exchequer, iii, 45.

Laws of Alfred, i, 64.

of Edward the Confessor, i, 66.

Law suits, cause of multitude of, iii, 328.

chiefly arise from disputed facts, iii, 329.

Lawyers, iioble, i, 11, 25.

attempts to exclude from parliament, i, 177.

calling to the bar, i, 24, n.

Lay corporations, i, 470.

investiture of bishops, i, 378.

Lazarets, escaping from, iv, 162.

Lead, stealing of, iv, 233.

receiving stolen, iv, 132, 133.

Leading interrogatories, iii, 449.

Leap year, ii, 141.

Lease, ii, 317 et seq., 144, n., 150, n., iii, 41.

when by parol and when by deed, ii, 299.

who may make, ii, 318 etseq., 290 etseq., 319.

non-residence of incumbent, ii, 322.

college leases, id.

corn rents, id.

must be perfected by lessee's entry, ii, 314.

tenant cannot deny landlord's title, ii, 144, n.

to an alien, ii, 293.

defeasance of, ii, 327.

distinction between assignments and under-

leases, ii, 327, n.

relief from forfeiture, iii, 435,

and release, ii, 339.

entry and ouster, iii, 204.

Lectures, copyright in, ii, 407,n,

INDEX.

License, to administer oaths, iii, 59.

marriage, i, 431).

wine, i, 289.

from the pope, iv, lift,

implied, to enter on lands, iii, 212.

Licensing of books, iv, 152, 43!).

Licentia loqueddi, iii, 299.

Liege, i, 367.

Lien of vendor of goods, ii, 449, n.

of bailee, ii, 453, n.

Lieutenant, lord, of Ireland, i, 412; iv, 273.

Life, i, 129.

action for deprivation of, iii, 119.

distinction between natural aud civil, ii, 121.

presumption of death, ii, 177, n.

compelling production of ceatui que vie, ii,

177.

annuities, ii, 461.

peerage, i, 401, n.

crimes against, iv, 177.

estates for.
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(" See Estates.")

Ligen, i, 293 ; iii, 106.

Ligeance, i, 366.

Light, prescriptive right to, ii, 14, 266, n., 395,

n., 402; iii, 217, n.

obstruction of, a nuisance, iii, 216.

Light-houses, i, 264.

Limbs, i, 130; iii, 121, 333.

(See " Mayhem.")

Limitation of actions, .fee., ii, 194, n., 266, n.;

iii, 178, 188, 192, 196, 250, 306.

(See " Estate.")

adverse possession by tenant in common, ii,

194, n.

acknowledgment of debt, iii, 306, n.

not stopped by subsequent disability, iii,

306, n.

entry of writs to save statute of, iii, 307, n.

in equity, iii, 439.

of indictments, iv, 306, 308, 315, 351, 436.

Limited administration, ii, 506.

fee, ii, 109.

property, ii, 391.

Lineal descent of the orown, i, 194.

of lands.

(See " Descent.")

consanguinity, ii, 203.

warranty, ii, 301.

Linen, stealing, iv, 238.

Lip, cutting off, iv, 207.

Literary property, ii, 405.

Littleton, i, 7:2, 73.

Litigious church, iii, 243, 246.

Liturgy, reviling, iv, 50.

Livery of seisin, ii, 311.

abolished, ii, 314, n.

of ward, ii, 68.

in deed, ii, 315.

in law, ii. 316.

Loan, compulsive, i, 140; iv, 436.

interest upon, ii, 454 etseq.

(See " Interest.")

Local actions, i, 99; iii, 294.

Locality, of, trial, iii, 384; iv, 304.

(See " Venue.")

Locks on rivers, destroying, iv, 144.

Lodgers, larceny by, iv, 231.

distress of goods of, iii, 7.

INDEX.

Malice, under black act, iv, 246.

intent to injure inferred from wrongful act

iv, 222.

Malicious prosecution, action for, iii, 126.

Malicious destruction of powdike in fens in

Norfolk and Ely, iv, 245.

of sea and river, Ac., banks, bridges, turn-

pikes, etc., iv, 144. 145.

of corn, barns, stacks, <fcc., iv, 245-247.

of horses, cuttle, <fcc., iv, 246.

ships, Ac., iv, 245.

of other property, iv, 247.

Malt tax, i, 314.

Malum prohibitum and malumin BO, i, 54,57, n.

Man, Isle of, i, 406.

Mandamus, writ of, iii, 110; iv, 441.

return to, iii, 110.

demurrer to return, id.

•writ of error in case of, id.

remedy for refusal to admit corporate offi-

cer, iii, 264.
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to elect corporate officers, iii. 265.

is now in the nature of an action, iii, 264.

Mandates, royal, to the judges, i, 142; iv, 426.

Manhood, ceremony of, fi, 54.

Manors, ii, 20, 90.

demesne lands, ii, 90.

•within manors or houses, ii, 91.

court-baron or customary courts, ii, 90.

extinguishment of, id.

cannot now be created, ii, 91.

Mansion house, ii, 90; iv, 224.

Manslaughter, iv, 191.

punishment of. iv. 192.

conviction of, iv, 219.

Man stealing, iv, 219.

Manufacturers, seducing them abroad, iv, 160.

embezzlement by, iv, 231, 300.

encouragement of, iv, 428.

Manufactories,riotersdestroying engines in, iv,

injuries to, iv, 247.

stealing from, iv, 240.

Manumission of villeins, ii, 94, 347.

Marchers, lords, i, 398.

Marechal, lord, iii, 38, 68.

Marine felonies, how triable, iv, 269 and n.

Marines insurance, ii, 460.

Marines, i, 416.

impressment of, i, 420.

Mariners, wandering, iv, 165.

Maritagium, ii, 70. 80.

Maritime causes, iii, 106.

courts, iii, 69.

State, i, 419.

Mark, signature by, ii, 305.

Market, ii, 38.

how established, i, 274.

overt, sale in, ii, 449.

holding near another, a nuisance, iii, 218.

towns, i, 114.

clerk of, his court, iv, 275.

Marque and reprisal, letters of, i, 258, 259, n.

Marquesses, i, 397.

Marriage, i, 433.

injuries to rights of, iii, 92.

(See •' Husband and Wife.")

statute regulating, i, 435, 437, n., 438, n.

a civil contract, iv, 433, 439.

clandestine, i, 439; iv, 162.

INDEX.

Middlesex, county court of. iii, 82.

bill of, iii, 285.

Migration, ii, 7.

Military courts, i, 83 ; iii, 68.

law, i, 417 ; iii, 103.

offences, i, 415; iv, 101.

power of the crown, i, 262.

state, i, 408.

history of, i, 409.

testaments, i, 418.

service, i, 287; ii, 54, 57, 61.

(See " Tenure.")

Militia, i, 410, 412.

Milk, may be sold on Sunday, iv, 64.

Mill, customary dues to, iii, 235.

Minos, i, 295.

right to dig turf, gravel, Ac., ii, 34.

included in land, ii, 18.

royal mines, ii, 18.

firing, iv, 246.

destroying works of, 247.
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stealing ore out of, iv, 234.

Ministers, responsibility of, i, 250.

Ministry. (See " Cabinet.")

Minority, incidents of, i, 464.

(See •' Infant.")

none in the king, i, 248.

Misadventure, homicide by, iv, 182.

Mischief, malicious, iv, 244 et seq.

Misdemeanor, iv. 1-5.

forcible, self-defence against, iii, 3, n.

Mise, iii, 305.

Misfortune, unlawful act by, iv, 26.

Misnomer, consequence of, iii, 302'; iv, 334.

Mispleading, when cured by verdict, iii, 394.

Misprision against king and government, iv,

119-126.

Mistake, iv, 27.

remedies at law and in equity, iii, 431.

Misuser in office, ii, 153.

of franchise, i, 485, n.

Mitigation of damages in slander, iii, 125, n.

Mittcr le droit, ii, 325.

Mitter Testate, ii, 324.

Mittimus, iv, 300.

Mixed actions, iii, 118.

Modus, ii, 29. (See " Tithes.")

Mi.lliiIT inanus imposuit, iii, 5, n., 121.

Monarchy, i, 49.

(See " King.")

not elective, but hereditary, i, 192.

Monasteries, effect of dissolution of, upon

tithes, ii, 32.

Money, i, 276.

bills, i, 170, 184.

payment of, into court, iii, 304.

paid for another, iii, 162.

received to another's use, id.

counterfeiting, iv, 84, 88.

interest upon, ii, 454 et seq.

(See " Interest.)

legal tender, i, 277 and n.

Monks, i, 132.

Monopolies, statute against, ii, 407; iv, 159,436.

Monster cannot inherit, ii, 246.

Monstrans de droit, iii, 256.

Monuments arc heir-looms, ii, 428.

Month, lunar and calendar, ii, 141.

Moral consideration, ii, 445, n.

INDEX,

Necessaries, liability for, i, 449, 466, n.

Necessity, when it excuses crime, iv, 27, 31.

homicide by, iv, 178.

ways by, ii, 35, n.

Negative in corporations, i, 478.

of the king, i, 154, 184, n.

Negligence, lii, 163.

liability of advocate for, iii, 165 and n.

of bailee, ii, 451, n.

of officers, iv, 140.

Negligent escape, iii, 415; iv, 130.

Negotiable paper, ii, 442, n.

(See " Bills of Exchange aud Promissory

(Notes/')

Negro,!, 127, 425; ii, 408

slavery abolished, i, 425; iv.

Neife, ii, 94.

Neinbda, iii, 350.

New assignment, iii, 311.

New promise to revive debt, iii, 306, n.

New trial, when granted, iii, 387, 391.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:06 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

origin of practice of granting, iii, 388.

promotes the ends of justice, iii, 391.

granting upon terms, iii, 393.

niotion for, when to be made, id.

in criminal cases, iv, 361, 438.

New style, ii, 140.

News, spreading of false, iv, 149.

Newspaper, libel by, iii, 125, n.

Next of kin, ii, 224.

right of, to administer, ii, 504.

distribution iitnimir. ii, 515.

guardian for lunatic, Ac., i, 305.

Nient culpable, plea of, iv, 339.

Night, in uurglary what is, iv, 224.

Nigbtwalkers, iv, 292.

Nihil, return of, iii, 282.

Nihil debet, plea of, iii, 305.

Nihil dicet, judgment by, iii, 396.

Nisi prius, courts of, iii, 58.

commission of, iii, 60 ; iy, 269.

opening of commission, id.

clause of, in venire facias, iii, 352.

trial at, iv, 351.

writ of, not grantable when the king is a

party, iii. 352, n.

obUity, i, 157, 396.

Nol

how created, i, 399.

how lost, i, 402.

king the fountain of, i, 271.

incidents of, i, 401.

study of law by, i, 11, 12, 25.

Nocturnal crimes, preventing or resisting, iv,

180.

Non !is<uuipsil, plea of, iii, 305.

infra sex annos, iii, 308.

Non claim after a fine, iii, 354.

of infants, i, 465.

Non compos mentis, i, 304 ; ii, 497; iv, 24, 395.

(See " Lunacy.")

Non-conformity, iv, 51, 432.

Non culpabilis, iii, 305; iv, 339.

Non est factum, plea of, iii, 305.

Non est inventus, return of, iii, 383.

Non-juror, iv, 124.

Non prosequitur, iii, 296.

Non obstaute, i, 342; ii, 273; iv, 401.

Non obstante verdicto, judgment, iii, 394, n.,

INBJBX,

Officers, arrest by, iv, 292>

Officers, lulling of, in execution of office, iv, 200.

of revenue, assault ou, iv, 15i>.

constable, assault on, iv, I -'J.

public, embezzlement by, iv, 230.

refusal to admit, iii, 264.

Offices, ii, 36.

when grantable in reversion, ii, 3»i.

property in, ii, 37, n.

curtesy of, ii, 12(5, n.

pay of certain officers not assignable, ii, 36,

441, n.

and pensions, duty on; i, 327, 328, n.

usurpation of, now remedied, iii, 262.

Old age does not disqualify from making will,

ii, 497.

Oleron, laws of, i, 419; iv, 423.

Omnipotence of parliament, i, 160.

Oppression of crown, bow remedied, i, 243.

of magistrates, iv, 141.

Option of the archbishop, i, 381.
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Optional writs, iii, 274.

Orchards, robbery °C 'v, 233-

damaging plants, Ac., in, iv, 247.

Ordeal, trial by, iv, 342, 414, 425.

Order of sessions, iv, 272.

foi money, &o., forgery of, iv, 250.

Orders, holy, i, 388.

Ore, stealing, iv, 234.

Original contract of king and people, i, 211,233.

conveyances, ii, 310.

writ, lii, 272, 273.

teste and return of, iii, 274.

process in king's bench by, iii, 284.

Orphanage, ii, 519,

Ouster, different methods of, iii, 167,198.

Ouster le main, ii, 68.

Outlawry, proceedings to, iii, 283.

consequences of, iii, 284.

reversal of, id.

now abolished, iii, 280, n.

in criminal cases, i, 142; iv, 319.

Overseers of the poor, i, 359, 361.

antiquity of office of, i, 359,

Overt acts of treason, iv, 79, 86, 367.

market, ii, 449.

pound, iii, 12.

0-wling, ii, 421; iv, 154.

Oyer, iii, 299.

Oyer and terminer, commission of, iv, 269,

448.

justices of killing, iv, 34.

Oyez, iv, 340.

Oysters, stealing of, iv, 236 and n.

property in, ii, 393, n.

Pains and penalties, act to inflict, iv, 259.

act for, forbidden in America.

Pais, trial per. iii, 349; iv, 349.

Matter iu, ii, 294.

Palace, court of, iii, 76.

assault in, iv, 125.

Palatine counties, i, 116, 119; iii, 79; iv,4:U.

Pandects of Justinian, i, 17, 81.

Pauel ofjurors. iii, 354; iv, 302, 350.

Papal encroachment, iv, 1,04.

process, obedience to, iv, 115.

Paper credit, ii, 466; iv, 441.

Paper books, iii, 317, 407.

Papirian code, i, 81.

INDEX.

Partners, accounts of, in equity, iii, 437.

Passports, i, 260.

violation of, iv, 68.

Pasturage, right of, ii, 32, 34, n., 35, n.

common of, ii, 32.

Pasture, writ of admeasurement, iii, 237.

waste by plowing up, ii, 282.

Patent, letter*, ii, 346; iii, 3.

rolls and writs, ii, 346.

for inventions, law of, ii, 407; iv, 159.

scire facias to repeal, iii, 260.

of peerage, i, 400.

of precedence, iii, 28.

Patriam, trial per, iii, 349; iv, 349.

Patron, ii, 21.

Patronage, usurpation of, iii, 242.

how remedied, iii, 243.

Patterns, copyright in, ii, 407.

Pauper, when excused from paying costs, iii,

400. ' '

support of. (See " Poor."
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Pawn of goods, ii, 452.

Pawnbroker, nature of contract with, ii, 452.

Payment into court, iii, 304.

of debts of deceased person, ii, 511.

tender of, i, 277.

place of tender, iii, 303.

Peace and war, right of making, i, 257.

Peace, commissioii of, i, 351; iv, 270,

conservation of, i, 349.

justices of, i, 349; iv, 270, 282, 428.

(See "Justices of the Peace.")

the king's, i, 118. 268, 350.

breach of, iv, 142.

security for, iv, 251, 254.

clerk of, iv, 272.

offences against, iv, 142-150.

Peculatus, iv, 122.

Peculiars, court of, iii, 65.

Peerage, benefit of, in offences, iv, 367.

Peeresses, i, 401.

trial of, id.

Peers, privileges of, i, 401; iii, 359: iv, 253.

273, 267.

great council of, i, 227, 228 ; iii, 56.

hereditary councillors of the crown, i, 227.

how created, i, 399.

Irish and Scotch, i. 401.

pedigrees of, iii, 106.

foreign, i, 401.

protests by, i. 168.

proxies of, id.

process against, in eqnity, iii, 445.

trial by, i, 401; iv, 260, 368.

• of the lords' court, ii, 54.

answer of, in equity, i, 12, n.

spiritual, i, 157.

house of, i, 156.

jurisdiction of, npon appeals and writs of

error, iii, 57.

pedigrees to be delivered in, iii, 106.

quorum of, iii, 56, n.

Peme forte et dnre. iv, 325 and n.

Penal statutes, i, 88; iv, 429.

construction of, i, 82, n.

actions on, iii, 161.

Penalties, title to, by judgment, ii, 437.

relief against, iii, 435.

Penance, commutation of, iv, 105, 217, 276.

INDEX.

Petty constables, i, 355.

jury, iii, 351.

larceny, iv, 829.

sergeanty, ii, 81.

sessions, iv, 272.

treason, iv, 75, 203, n.

Pews, title to, ii, 429 and n.

Physician, iv, 197.

cannot maintain an action for fees, iii, 28, n.

may make special contract, id.

liable for negligence or unskUlfulness, iii, 122.

should be acquainted with law, i, 14.

Piepoudre, court of, iii, 32.

Pignus, ii, 159.

Pillory, iv, 136, n., 377.

Piracy, iv, 71.

Piscary, common of, ii, 34, 39.

Placemen, excluded from house of commons,

i, 175: iv, 440.

Plagiarii, iv, 219.

Plague, irregularity during, iv, 161.
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Plaint, iii, 273.

Plaintiff, iii, 25.

Plantation, burning or destroying, iv, 246.

Plantations, law in the, i, 107.

Plants, destruction of, iv, 246.

stealing of, iv, 233.

Play, right to represent, ii, 407, n.

Plays and players, license of, iv, 167.

Plea, dilatory, iii, 301.

within what time to be pleaded, iii, 301, n.

must be verified, iii, 302.

conclusion of, id.

effect of allowing or overruling, iii, 303.

to the action, iii, 303.

in bar, iii, 306.

conditions and qualities of, iii, 307.

special, conclusion of, id.

in equity, iii, 446.

in abatement, not admitted in suit for lands,

iii, 302.

to indictments, iv, 332.

sanctuary, id.

benefit of clergy, iv, 332, 364.

to the jurisdiction, iv, 333.

demurrer, id.

iu abatement, iv, 334 and n.

autrefois acquit, iv, 335.

autretois convict, iv, 336.

antrefois attaint, id.

pardon, iv, 337.

not guilty, iv, 338 el seq.

in bar of execution, iv, 396.

of lunacy, ii, 291.

Pleading, times for, iii, 299.

departure in, iii, 309.

formerly viva vocc, now in writing, iii, 293.

iu criminal cases, iii, 427.

required to be in English, iii, 317.

Pleading in equity, iii, 442 et seq.

commencement of suit, bill, iu, 422.

information, iii, 437.

parties to suit, iii, 442.

demurrer, iii, 446.

pleas, id.

answer, iii, 443, 446, 447.

cross-bill, iii, 448, 451.

amended and supplemental bill, iii, 448.

bills of revivor and interpleader, id.

INDEX.

Post-fine, ii, 350.

Post, writ of entry in, iii, 185.

Post-disseasin, writ of, iii, 188.

Post-man in exchequer, iii, 28.

Post-office duties, Ac., i, 322-324.

embezzlement by servants in, iv, 231.

misbehavior of officers of, iv. 234.

examining correspondence in, i, 322, n.

Posthumous children, i, 130; ii, 160.

Pound, iii, 12.

breach, what, and remedies for, iii, 146.

pi trov, of gold and silver, i, 276, n.

1 Poundage, i, 316; iv, 437.

Powdike, cutting, iv, 244.

Power of appointment, how executed by will,

ii, 379, n.

of the crown, i, 250.

sovereign, where lodged, i, 51.

in America, i, 4!), n., 52, n.

Poyning's, laws, i, 102, 103.

Practice in equity, iii, 442, et seq.
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injunction, iii, 442-443.

filing bill and subpoena, iii, 443

officers of court, in, 443.

affidavits, iii, 443.

answer, iii, 443, 447.

process of contempt, .iii. 443, 444.

appearance, iii, 443, 445.

commission of rebellion, iii, 444.

sequestration, id.

taking bill pro confesso, id.

process against corporation by distringas,

iii, 455.

process against peer or member of parlia-

ment, id.

defendant's pleading, id.

amendments, iii, 446, 488.

hearing of cause, iii, 488, 450, 451.

examination of witnesses, iii, 449.

publication of evidence, id.

dismissing bills for want of prosecution,

iii, 461.

subpoena to hear judgment, id.

decree, interlocutory or final, iii, 451, 453.

decree against infant, iii, 430, n.

costs, iii, 451.

feigned issue, iii, 452.

reference to master, iii, 453.

master's report, id.

final decree, id.

rehearing, id.

appeal, iii, 453, 454.

enforcement of decree, Hi, 458.

enrolment of decree, id.

bill of review, iii, 454.

new evidence on appeal, iii, 455.

Praecipe, ii, 350; iii, 195, 274.

tenant to, ii, 358; iii, 182.

> Pramunire, iv, 103, 428.

' Praetor's edicts, i, .80.

Prayer in aid, iii, 299.

Preamble of statute, i, 60, n.

Pre-audience, iii, 28.

Prebendary, i, 383.

Precedence, how settled, i, 272; iii, 105.

of royal family, i, 225.

table of, i, 405, n.j iii, 257.

letters patent of, w, 28.

among bishops, i, SSI), n.

INDEX.

Principal and accessory, after the fact, iv, 37.

punishment of, iv, 39.

Principal challenge, Hi, 363.

Prints, copyright in, ii, 407.

Priority cif debts, ii, 511.

Priors, i, 155.

Prisage, i, 314.

Prison of the Fleet, iii, 444.

breach of, iV, 130.

Prisoner, insolvent, relief of, ii, 488.

of war, ii, 40-2; iii, 132, n.

Prisons, regulation of, iv, 377.

Prjt, iv, 339.

Private act of parliament, i, 86 ; ii, 344.

nuisance, iii. 216.

property, rights to, i, 133.

persons, arrest by, iv, 293.

ways, ii, 35 and n.

(Sefe " Ways.")

Privateering, i, 259, n.

Privately stealing from the person, iv, 242.
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Privies to a fine, ii, 355.

bound by estoppel.

(See " Estoppel.")

Privilege, king, the fountain of, i, 272.

of parliament, i, 164-167.

bill of, iii, 289.

from arrest, id.

Privileged places, iv, 129.

Prlvilegja, i, 46.

Privilegiuui clerieale, iv, 365.

Privy council, i, 2-29-232, 280, n.

judibial committee of, i, 231, n.. 280. n.; iii,

69, n.

appeal to, in lunacy, iii, 427.

Privy councellor, killing or attempting to kill,

i, 232 ; iv, 100.

Privy purse, i, 334.

Privy seal and signet, ii, 347.

forging, iv, 89.

Privy verdict, iii, 377 ; iv, 360.

Prize, of enemy's goods, <fco., i, 259; 11, 401.

court, iii, 70, n.

commission of, iii, 69.

admiralty court no jurisdiction as to, iii,

70, n.

Probable cause, iii, 126, n.

Probate, ii, 494,507; iii, 98.

(See " Wills.")

court of. iii, 67, n., 95, n;

Procedendo, writ of, i, 353; iii, 109.

Process, iii, 279, 286.

in equity, iii, 426, 443.

former abolished and new writs substituted,

iii, 287, n.

Prochein ami, i, 464.

Proclamation by the king, i, 270, 271; iy, 431.

of estruys, i, 298.

writ of, iii, 284.

in outlawry, iv, 319.

under the riot act, iv, 143.

on attachment in chancery iii, 444.

Proctor, iii, 25.

Procuration money, iv, 157.

Prodigals, i, 305.

Profanity, iv, 59.

Prolert in curia, iii, A pp.

Profession of arms, i, 408.

religious, i, 133.

INDEX.

Public verdict, ui, 377; iv, 360.

rnI il iriii ii Hi of deposition, iii. 450.

Pueritia, iv, 22.

Paid darrein continuance, plea of, iii, 315, 317.

Puisne barons of exchequer, iii, 44.

judges, iii, 40, 41.

Pulliug down churches, houses, Ao., iv, 143.

Pulsation, iii, 120.

Punishment, nature of, i, 133; iv, 7.

capital, iv, 9, 18, 236.

certainty of, iv, 377.

end and purpose of, iv, 11, 352.

mode of inflicting, iv, 258.

measure of, iv, 12.

power of punishment, iv, 7.

severity of, iii, 404 ; iv, 16.

(See " Correction.")

Pur anter vie, estate in.

(See " Estate.")

Purchase, i, 215.

distinguished from escheat and descent, ii.

201, 241, 243, 245.
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rnle in Shelley's Case, ii, 242.

modes of takinjt by, ii, 244.

heir taking by, ii, 240, n.

of writs, iii, 273,274.

Purgatio vulgaris. iv, 342.

Purgation, canonical, iii, 342; iv, 368.

oath of, iii, 100, 447.

Pnrleiu, ii, 419, n.

Purprcsture, iv, 167.

Pursuit of remedies, iii, 270.

Purveyance, i, 2d7; iv, 116, 424, 439.

Putting iu fuar, iv, 242.

Quadruplicate, iii, 310.

Qualification for killing game, iv, 175,

of electors to parliament, i, 171, 175.

of justices of the peace, i, 352.

of members of parliament, i, 175.

of jurors, iii, 362; iv, 352.

Qualified fee, ii, 109.

(See " Estate.")

property, ii, 391.

Quantum uieruit, iii, 161.

valebat, id.

Quarantine, irregularity in, iv, 161.

of widow, ii, 135.

Quare ejecit infra termino, writ of, iii, 199.

when it lies, iii, 206.

abolished, iii, 207, n.

Qimre clausum fregit, iii, 281.

Quare impedit, writ of, Ui, 246-251.

costs in, iii, 249.

execution in, iii, 412.

Quare incumbravit, iii, 248.

Quaro uou admissit, iii, 250.

Quarreling in church or church yard, iv, 146.

Quartering of soldiers, i, 414 415.

Quartering traitors, iv, 93, 377.

Quarter sessions, court of, iv, 271.

appeal to, iii, 455.

Quarto die post, iii, 278.

Quashing, iii, 303; iv, 321.

Quays, i, 264.

Quo estate, ii, 264.

Queen, i, 219.

(See " Crown," " King.")

Anne's bounty, i, 286; ii, 273.

consort, i, 220.

INDEX.

Receipt of part of a debt in satisfaction of all.

16, 23.

Receiving stolen goods, offence of, iv, 133,133.

letters, iv, 234, n.

Recitals in a deed, ii, 897.

Recognizance, ii, 341, 465.

for the peace or good behavior, iv, 252.

to prosecute, iv, xJ96.

to give evidence, id.

Recompense in value, ii, 359.

Reconciliation to the pope, &c., iv, 87.

Record, i, 69; iii, 24, 317 ; iv, 426.

is tried by nothing but itself, iii, 24.

when may be disputed, iii, 24, n.

for the assizes, iii, 356.

transcript of, to be annexed to writ of error,

iii, 400, n.

alienation by, ii, 344.

debts of, ii, 465.

no prescription of right by, ii, 265.

embezzling, <tc., iv, 128.

courts of, iii, 24, 34, 406.
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nisi pi-ins, iii, 356.

trial by, iii, 330.

Recordari facias loquelam, iii, 34, 195.

Recoupment, iii, 306, n.

Recoveries, ii, 357 et seq.

common, invention of, ii, 116, 270.

vouchers in, ii, 358-360.

regarded as common assurances, ii, 360.

tenant to the prrecipe, ii, 362.

deeds to lead or declare the uses of, ii, 363.

abolished, ii, lit! I. n.

of copyholds, ii, 371; iii, 166.

Recreant, iii, 340; iv, 348.

Kector of a church, i, 384.

Rectorial tithes, i, 388.

Recusants, popish, iv, 56, 124.

Recusatio judicis, iii, 361.

Reddendum, ii, 299.

Re-disseisin, writ of, iii, 188.

Reditus, ii, 57.

(See " Rent")

Re-entry on land, iii, 4.

after exchange, on eviction, ii, 323.

Reeve laud, ii, 48, n., 90.

Reference to master, iii, 453.

Reform acts, i, 157, n., 159, n., 172, n., 175, n.

Reformation of religion, iv, 430.

Refusal of a clerk, i, 389.

Regalia rnajora et minora, i, 241.

Regard, court of, iii, 72.

Regent, i, 248 and n.

queen, i, 219.

Register of seamen, i, 419.

of mariners, iii, 105.

falsifying, iv, 163.

Registrum omnium brevium, iii, 183.

Registry of conveyances, ii, 342.

Regrating, iv, 160.

Rehearing in equity, iii, 453.

Rejoinder, iii, 310. i

Relation back, of title of bankrupt'8 assignees,

ii, 48.\ 486, n.

of judgment, iii, 420, 421.

in forfeiture, iv, 381, 386, 387.

Relations, domestic, i, 422-466.

public, i, 146.

Relative rights and duties, i, 123, 146.

IMDBX.

Replication in equity, iii, 448.

in criminal cases, iv, 339.

Reports of adjudged canes, i, 71.

by master, iii, 453.

Representation nut delegation, i, 159.

in descent of the crowu, i, 194, 201.

in descent of real property, ii, -Jit), 219.

of facts, distinguished Iroin warranty, ii,

460, n. '

in distribution, ii, 517.

Reprieves, iv, 394. '

Reprisals ou foreigners, i, 358.

of goods, ((•<•.. iii, 4.

Kepublication of wills, ii, 502.

Repugnant conditions, ii, 156.

Reputation, protection of, i, 134; iii, 123.

Requests, court of, i, 230, iii, 51, 81.

Rere fiefs, ii, 57.

i!r i-iiu., what and how remedied, iii, 146.

Rescripts of the emperor, i, 58.

Rescue, when it may be uiadu, iii, 12, 170; i v,

125, 131.
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Reservations, ii, 299.

Residence of spiritual persons, i, 390, 393.

Resignation, i, 362, 393.

legality of engagements to resign a living,

ii, 2rfO.

Resistance, right of, i, 251; iv, 436, 440.

must not exceed bounds of mere defence

and protection, iii, 4 and n.

Respite of jury, iii, 354.

Respondentia, ii, 458, 461.

Respoudeat ouster, judgment of, iii, 303, 396;

iv, 338.

Restitution of temporalities, i, 380; iv, 421.

in blood, Ac., iv, 402.

of conjugal rights, iii, 94.

of Btolen goods, iv, 362.

writ of. iv, 188, 363.

Restoration of 1660, i, 210; iv, 438.

Restraining statute, i, 87; ii, 320; iv, 432.

Resulting use, on a conveyance, ii, 296, u. 1,

335; iv, 430.

Retainder of debts, ii, 511; iii, 18.

executor of his own wrong cannot retain,

iii, 19.

of servant, iii, 142.

Retaliation, law of, iv, 12.

Retoruo habendo, plegii de, iii, 147.

writ de, iii, 150, 413.

Retrazit, iii, 296, 395.

Retrospective legislation, i, 91, n.

Return days, iii, 275.

false or double, i, 180; iii, 111, 37g,

irreplevisable, writ of, iii, 150.

of writs, iii, 273, 275.

Revealed law of God, i, 42.

Revenue, extraordinary, i, 307.

ordinary, i, 281.

jurisdiction of exchequer, iii, 438.

causes, trial of, iv, 281.

officers, assaults on, iv, 155 and n.

Reversal of judgment, iii, 411: iv, 390.

of outlawry, m, 284; iv, 320, 362.

Reversion, ii, 111, 175.

incidents to, fealty and rent, ii, 175.

merger, ii, 177.

Reverter, formedon in, iii, 192.

Review, commission of, iii, 07.

INDEX.

Home, appeals to, In ecclesiastical cases, iii, t!6.

Romney marsh, laws of, iii, 74.

Roots, destroying, IT, 246,

stealing, iv, 233.

Eope dancers, iv, 168.

Routs, iv, 146.

Royal assent to bills, i, 185.

authority, i, 250.

dignity, i, 241.

family, i, 218, 224.

marriages, i, 225; iv, 117.

fish, i.223, 290; ii, 403.

forests, i, 289.

income, i. 332, 334.

liability, L 243.

mines, i, 295.

perfection, i, 246.

perpetuity, i, 249.

prerogative, i, 237.

revenue, i, 281.

sovereignty, i, 241.

ubiqnity, i, 267.
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Rule in Shelley's Cane, ii, 172; n., 242.

of court, iti, 304.

Rural dean, i, 383.

deanery, i, 111.

Rider to* bill, i, 183.

Sabbath breaking, iv, 63'.

Sacrament, reviling of, iv, 50.

Sacramentum decisionis, iii, 342.

Safe conducts, i, 259, 260; iv, 68.

Saint Martin le grand, court of, ill, 80.

Saladine tenth, i, 309.

Sale of chattels, ii, 9, 446.

after execution, il, 447.

of distress, iii, 14.

what contracts of, to be in writing, ii, 448.

effect of part execution, id.

of earnest, ii, 447.

delivery, ii, 448, 449.

when property passes, ii, 448.

when right or possession passes, ii, 449.

stoppage in transitn, id.

of goods to be manufactured, id.

bill of lading, id.

vendor's lien, id.

of horses, ii, 450.

of stolen goods, ii, 449.

warranty of title, ii. 451.

of quality, id.

Salt duty, i, 322.

Salvage, i, 293; ii, 458, 460.

Sanction of laws, i, 56.

Sanctuary, iv, 332, 365, 436.

Sark, Isle of, i, 107.

Sali.sdutio, iii, 291.

Satisfaction, entry on record, iii, 421; iv, 428.

Suxon laws, i, 64 ; iv, 410, 412.

Sculo of crimes and punishments, iv, 18.

Scandal and impertenenee in pleading iii, 442.

Scandalum magnatum, i, 402; iii, 123.

Schire-men, i, 398.

Schoolmaster, i, 453 ; iv, 54.'

Sciences, auxiliary to study of the law, i, 33.

Scire facias to repeal paletots, iii, 47, 260,>361.

against bail; iii, 416.

in detinue iii, 413.

to remove usurper's clerk, ifi, 248.

to revive judgment, iti, 421.

INDEX.

Servants, menial, i, 42k.

retainer of, id.

duties of, i, 327.

embezzlement by, iv, 231.

larceny by, iv, 230.

of ambassador, i, 256,

Service, incidents of, i, 427.

Services, ii, 41, 60.

(See " Tenure.")

subtraction of, iii, 234.

remedy for, iii, 235.

Session of gaol delivery, iv, 270.

great, of Wales, iii, 77.

of parliament, i, 186, 187.

formarly one day, i, 46, n.

of oyer and torminer, iv, 270.

quarter, iv, 271, 274.

Set-off, iii, 304 ; iv, 442.

inn -t be pleaded, iii, 304, n.

in bankruptcy, ii, 487, n.

Settlement of the crown, i, 128, 216; iv, 440.

of the poor, i. 362, 364.

Generated for asbigham (University of Michigan) on 2013-04-29 19:07 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433008577110
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

marriage, trustees to preserve contingent

remainders, ii, 171.

protector of, ii; 364, n.

of personalty, ii, 398.

Severally, estate in, ii, 179.

Severance of joint estate, ii, 186.

Severity of punishments, impolicy of, IT, 16.

Sewers) commissioners of, iii, 73.

Sextons, i, 395.

Sheep, .'T. . stealing, and killing with intent to

steal, iv, 239.

Shelley's Case, rule in, ii, 172, n., 242.

Shepway, court of, iii, 79.

Sheriff, i, 117, 339; iv, 292, 413, 428.

duration of office, i, 342.

duties and powers, i, 343.

how chosen, i, 339.

officers, i, 345.

trial before, iii, 61, n.

official misfeasance or nonfeasanoe, iii, 163.

obliged to take bail, iii, 289.

responsible ii bail not pat in to action, iii,

return of jurors by, iii. 358, n.; ir, 850.

liability for escape of prisoner, iii. 415.

cannot retake prisoner after voluntary escape,

415.

when excused for negligence, id.

Sheriff's court in London, iii, 80.

Sheriff's tunru, iv, 273, 411, 424.

Ship, prize and ransom of, ii, 401, 402.

bottomry and njspondentia, ii, 457-161.

insurance, ii, 4-W.

in distress, plundering, i, 293.

mouey, iv, 437.

seized as a prize, remedy for, iv, 89.

plundering in distress, iv, 235.

burning, destroying, &c., iv, 246.

burning, etc., king's ships, iv, 102, 245,

Shipwrecks, i, 291.

Shire, i, 116.

Shooting at another, iv, 207.

Shop books, iii, 368.

Stroud, stealing of, iv, 235.

Shrubs, destroying, iv, 246.

stealing, iv, 233.

Si fecerit te securnm, iii, 274.

Sign Minimal, ii, 347.

INDEX.

Specific performance of agreement to arbitrate,

iii, 17, n.

Spiriting away persons, iv, 219.

Spiritual corporations, i, 470.

courts, i, 61; iii, 61.

lords, i, 155, 157.

persons, i, 376.

Spoliation, remedy for, iii, 90.

Sporting, restrictions upon, ii, 413.

Springing uses, ii, 334.

Squibs, nuisance by, iv, 168.

Stabbing, iv, 193.

Stage plays, when a nuisance, iv, 167.

Stamp duties, i, 323 ; iii, 3-23.

on deed, Ac., ii, 297.

on bill of exchange, ii, 469.

forgery of, iy, 249.

when material in forgery, <to., iv, 247, 248.

Standard of coin, i, 278.

of weights and measures, i, 274, 375; iv, 275.

Standing armies, i, 413, 414.

Stannary courts, iii, 80.
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Staple commodities, i, 315.

Star chamber, court of, i, 230; iii, 445; iv, 266.

310, 429. 433, 437.

State, sovereign, not suable except by consent,

i, 243; n.

statutes of limitations do not run against, i,

247, n.

Stated damages, iii, 435.

Statute, i, 85.

equity of, i, 62, n.

how passed, i, 181.

guardian by, i, 462.

labor, i, 58, 358.

law, i, 85.

private, ii, 344.

when to take effect, i, 46.

when applicable to copyhold, ii, 113.

of distributions, ii, 515.

de religiosis, ii, 270.

of frauds, (See " Frauds, Statute of.")

merchant, ii, 160; iv, 426, 431.

staple, id.

Statutes, rules for construction of, i, 87-91.

division of, i, 85, 86.

how enrolled, i, 182, n.

how stated, i, 85, n.

of mortmain, i, 108, n., 479.

promnlg.-i : m of, i, 45, 185, n.

in pan ni.i -ria, i, 60, n.

preambles of, i, 60, n.

penal, how construed, i, 86.

Staundforde, i, 72.

Stealing an heiress, iv, 209 and n.

(See " Larceny.")

Step-children i, 449, n.

Sterling, i, 278.

Steward, i, 427.

lord high, his court, iii, 37; iy, 260,261, 263.

of the household, his court, iii, 76; iv, 276.

of the university, his court, iv, 217.

Stipend, curate's remedy for non-payment of,

ii, 90 and n.

Stipulatio, iii, 291.

Stipulation in admiralty court, iii, 108.

Stirpes, claim per, ii, 217, 517.

Stocks, punishment of, iv, 377.

Stolen goods, receiving, Ac., iv, 132, 238.

ItfDEX.

Support of children by parents, i, 447, 458.

of parents by children, i, 453.

of the poor, i, 359.

Supremacy, oath of, i, 369 and n; iv, 115, 490.

Supremo magistrate, i, 14G.

pimvr. i, 40, 146.

Surcharge of common, iii, 1X1.

Siir disclaimer, iii, •,':!::. n.

Surgeon, liability of, fur negligence, ,l-i-., iii,

122.

Snr-rebntter, iii, 310.

Sur-rejoinder, iii, 310.

Surrenders, ii, 326.

iu law, ii, :'.->>>. n.

of copyholds, ii, 366.

Surveyors of highways, i, 357.

Survivorship, ii, I*}, 31)9; iii. 163,164.

Suspension of habeas corpus, i. 136.

of action for civil injury in easo of felony, iii,

1*1 if.

Sits, per ool., iv, 403.

Sussex, marriage of duke of, 1, 336, n.
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Swans, ii, 392; iv, 236.

Swearing, profane, iv, 69.

the peace, iv, 'J.Vi.

of witnesses, iii, 371.

Sweinmote, court of, iii, 72.

Syugrapha, ii, 296,

Synods, i, 279.

Table of precedence, i, 405, n.

of consanguinity, ii, 203-206.

Tacking mortgages, ii, 160, n.

Tail, estate in.

(See " Brtates.")

Taking, felonious, iv, 230, 232.

unlawful, iii, 145.

Tale or count, iii, 293.

Tales, iii, 365; iv, 344.

Tallionis, lex, iv, 12.

Talliage, i, 311; iv, 419, 426.

Tariff, i, 313.

Taxation, by house of commons, i, 169.

principle of imposition of, i. 318.

of costs, iii, 399.

Taxes, i, 139, 308.

their annual amount, i, 328; iv, 426, 439.

Teacher and scholar, i, 453 and n.

Technical words in indictments, ir, 306.

Temporal peers, i, 157-159.

Temporalities, of bishops, i, 282; iv, 421.

their restitution, i, 380; iv, 421.

Tenant, to the pracipe, ii, 359, 361,

(See " Estate.")

in capite, ii, 60.

paravail, id.

bound to give landlord notice of ejectment,

iii, 204.

not liable for accidental fire, ii, 381, iii,

228, n.

when bound to rebuild, id.

liable to pay rent after fire, id.

estopped to dispute landlord's title, ii, 144) n.

right of, to demand repairs, ii, 144, n.

assignment by, id.

Tenant-right of renewal, ii, 101,148.

Tender of amends, iii, 16.

of issue, iii, 313.

of money, i, 277 ; iii, 303.

plea ot, iii, 303.

Threats of accusation, to extort money, iv,

144.

remedy for, iii, 120.

ilurcrfs by, i, 131.

Timber, li, 34, n.( 281.

stealing, iv, 233.

destroying, iv, 247.

Time, division and computation of, i, 403; ii,

140, 141, n.

the maxim million tempus occurrit rogi, i,

247.

Tippling, iv, 64.

Tithes, i, 384,388; ii,

437.

24-32; iii, 46, 88, 102,

limitation of right to, ii, 266, n.

now practically at an end, i, 388, n.; ii, 32, n.

Tithing, i, 114; iv, 411.

Title of ad > of parliament, i, 183.

to the crown, i, 190.

pretended, solliug or buying, iv, 136.

warranty of, to goods sold, ii, 461.

to things real, ii, 195.
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by possession, id.

right of possession, ii, 196.

right of property, ii, 197.

complete, ii. 199.

by occupancy of lands left by sea or rivers,

ii, 261.

under statute of limitations, ii, 366, n.

by alienation, ii, 287.

by descent, ii, 208.

of chattels by occupancy, ii, 400.

by custom, ii, 422.

by succession, ii, 430.

by marriage, ii, 433.

by gift, grant and contract, ii, 440.

by bankruptcy, ii, 471.

by testament and administration, ii, 489.

regulated by law of domicil, ii, 387, n.

by Judgment, ii, 436.

of honor, descent to daughters, ii, 216.

cnrtesy of, ii, 126, n.

Toft, ii, 19.

Toleration, iv, 52, 53, 440.

Tolling entry, iii, 176.

Toll, writ of, iii, 34, 195.

Tongue, cutting out, or disabling, iv, 206, 207.

Tonnage, i, 316; iv, 437.

Tonsura clericalia, iv, 367.

Tort, action of, iii, 117.

Torture, iv, 325.

Tourn of the sheriff, iv, 272, 411,424.

Tout temps prist, iii, 303.

Town, i, 115.

Trade, its progress in England, iv, 419-438.

offensive, iv, 167.

unlawful exercise of, iv, 159.

offences against, iv, 151.

owling, iv, 154.

smuggling, id.

fraudulent bankruptcy, iv, 156.

usury, iv, 156.

cheating, iv, 157.

assize of bread, iv, 157.

false weights and measures, id.

false pretences, iv, 158.

regrating and engrossing, id.

monopolies, iv, 158, 159.

exercising trade without apprenticeship, iv,

INDEX.

Triors of jurors, iii, 263.

Triplicatio, iii, 310.

Trithing, i, 116.

Triverbial days, iii, 424.

Trover, action of, iii, 152; iv, 363.

Truce breakers, iv, 68.

conservators of, iv, 69.

Trustees of charities, Ac., jurisdiction of equity

in regard to, iii, 427, n.

Trusts, ii, 327 et seg., 336.

jurisdiction over, iii, 431, 439.

when cognizable, id.

of lands, must be manifested by writing, ii,

306, 337.

estates of trustees and cestni qne trust. ii, 337.

cnrtesy of, ii, 127, n., 132, n.

merger of, ii, 337, n.

Tub-man in the exchequer, iii, 28.

Tumultuous petitioning, i, 143; iv, 147.

Turbary, common of, ii, 34.

Turnips, stealing, iv, 233.

Turnpikes, destroying, iv, 145.
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Tutor, i, 306. 453, 460.

Twelve tables, laws of, i, 80.

Tyranny, i, 126, 133.

Ubiquity of the king, i, 270.

Udal right, ii, 45.

Umpire, iii, 16.

Unanimity of jurors, iii, 376; iv, 414.

Uncertainty of legal proceedings, iii, 326.

Uncore prist, iii, 303.

Underlease, iii, 176, 327.

Under-sheriff, i, 345.

Underwood, stealing, iv, 233.

injuring, Ac., iv, 247.

Union of England and Scotland, i, 96.

of Great Britain and Ireland, i, 99. n.: iv,

427, 440.

Unitarians, iv, 50, n.

United States of America.

(See " American States.")

Unities of joint estates, ii, 180.

University, study of law in, i, 16, 26-37.

burgesses of, i, 174.

courts of, i, 83; iii, 83; iv, 977.

nature of, i, 26, 37, 471.

certificate of chancellor of, iii, 335.

copyrights of, ii, 407.

rights of, to benefices, iii, 241.

Unknown persons, larceny from, iv, 236, 359.

Uses, invention of, ii, 271.

and trusts, ii, 137, 271, 327 et seq.; iii, 52.

statute of, ii, 33;^; iv, 430.

springing, shifting and resulting, ii, 334.

what not executed by statute of, ii, 335.

continued as trusts, ii, 336.

estates of trustee and cestui que trust, ii,

, 337.

forms of conveyances, ii, 337.

resulting, rebutted by parol, ii, 364, n.

deeds to lead, declare or revoke, ii, 339, 363.

in equity, ii, 43.

Usura niaratima, ii, 458.

Usurpation of patronage, iii, 242.

remedy for, iii, 243.

of franchise or office, iii, 262.

Usury, ii, 454 et seq.; iv, 116,156.

Usns fructus, ii, 327.

Uttering false money, iv, 89, 90.

INDEX.

Vinci's foundation, i, 27.

Violating the queen, &<•.. i, 222,223; iv, 81.

forcible. (See " Rape.")

Violent presumption, iii, 371.

Viscount, i, 398.

Visitor, i, 480.

of civil corporations, i, 481.

of eleemosynary corporations, i, 482.

of lay corporations, i, 480.

jpower of, i, 483.

Virgin Mary, a civilian and canonist, t, 21.

Visitation books of heralds, iii, 105.

Visne, iii, 294; iv, 350.

Viva voce examination in equity, iii, 373.

Vivum radium, ii, 157.

Void and voidable, ii, 291, 325, 433.

Voir dire, iii, 332.

Voluntary conveyances, when fraudulent and

void, ii, 896.

escape, iii, 415; iv, 130.

jurisdiction, iii, 66.

manslaughter, iv, 191.
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oaths, iv, 137.

Voucher, iii, 300.

in recoveries, ii, 357 et seq.

Vnlgaris purgatio, iv, 342.

"Wagering policies, ii, 459, 460.

Wager of battle, trial by, iii, 337; iv, 346, 418,

421, 424.

abolished, iii, 337, n.

history and mode of, iii, 337 et seq.

Wager of law, iii, 342; iv, 414, 484.

manner of, iii, 342.

when not allowed, iii, 345.

abolished, iii, 341, n., 347.

Wagers, when illegal, ii, 460; iv, 173.

Wages, of members of parliament, i, 174.

ot sen-nuts, i, 428.

Waifs, i, 297 ; ii, 409.

Waiuage, iv, 379.

Wales, i, 93, 94.

part of England, i, 99.

venue in criminal cases in, iv, 804.

prince of, i, 94, 225.

compassing and imagining his death, iv,

76.

princess of, i, 225.

violation of, iv, 61.

court of principality of, abolished, iii, 78, n.

Wandering soldiers and mariners, iv, 164.

_peiBong, vagrants, iv, 170, n.

Wapen takes, i, 116.

War, articles of, i, 415, 417.

levying against the king, iv, 81.

War and peace, right of making, i, 257.

Ward by constables, Ac., i, 356; iv, 292, 426.

Wards and liveries, court of, iii, 258.

Wardship, ii, 52, 67,87, 97.

in chivalry, iv, 418, 420, 421.

Warlike stores, embezzlement of, iv, 101.

Warrant, i, 137.

arrest by, iv, 290.

arrest without, iv, 292, 293.

Warrant of attorney, iii, 397.

Warrantia charte, iii, 300.

Warranty, express and implied, ii, 300; iii,

165.

lineal and collateral, ii, 301.

present effect of, ii, 302, 303, n.

INDEX.

Wills of chattels, regulated by domicil, ii, 387, n. |

payment, <te., of legacies, ii, 512, 513.

donatio mortis causa, ii, 514.

right of executor to residue, ii, 514.

alienation by devise, history of, ii, 373.

customary pow»r of devising, ii, 367, 371, n.,

373.

devise of use, ii, 375.

devises to charity, &c., id.

signature and attestation of, ii, 376, 501.

1 revocation of, ii, 376, 379, 502.

gifts to witnesses, ii, 377.

fraudulent devises, ii, 378.

laud purchased after will made, ii, 379, n.

lapse of gilts, ii, 379, n., 513.

whnt words pass a fee, ii, 108, 120, n.

heir looms not devisable apart from freehold,

ii, 429.

rules of construction, ii, 379.

(See " Deed.")

implication of cross remainders in, ii, 381.

fraudulently obtained, ii, 431.
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forgery of, iv, 249, 250.

Winchester measure, i, 274.

Window duties, i, 325, 326.

Windows, ancient, ii, 402.

Wine, adulteration of, iv, 162.

licenses, i, 288.

Witchcraft, iv, 60, 436.

Withdrawing from allegiance, i, 369, 370, n.;

iv, 87.

record, iii, 357.

Withernam, iii, 129, 146, 413.

Witness to deed, ii, 307.

to will, ii, 378. 501.

trial by, iii, 336.

may be compelled to attend before arbitra-

tor, iii, 16, n.

oath of, iii, 371.

privilege of, from arrest, iii, 289, n.

what persons admissible as, iii, 319.

how attendance of, compelled, iii, 369.

two always required by civil law, iii, 370;

iv, 350.

advantages of open examination, ii, 373.

examination when abroad or unable to at-

tend, iii, 383, n.

for prisoners, iv, 359, 441.

their expenses, iv, 362.

two, when necessary, iii, 370; iv, 350.

recognizance to give evidence by, iv, 296.

Wittena-genioto, i, 148; iii, 37; iv, 412.

Women, appeals by, iv, 424.

oud children, stealing or seduction of, iv, 209.

618

Women, when guilty of clergyable offences,

iv, 369.

jury of, iii, 362; iv, 395.

Wood, stealing, iv. 233.

buming, damaging, &c., iv, 246.

Woodmote, court of, iii, 71.

Wool, <te., transporting, iv, 154, 428.

Words, action for, iii, 123.

costs in action for, iii, 400.

treasonable, iv, 79.

of statutes must prevail, i, 81, 88.

Work-house, iv, 371.

Wounding, iii, 121; iv, 208, 816.

Wreck, i, 291, 293; ii, 14,409

